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close this bookThe Global Greenhouse Regime. Who Pays? (UNU, 1993, 382 p.)
View the documentList of contributors
View the documentPreface
View the documentAcknowledgements
close this folderPart I Measuring responsibility
close this folder1 Introduction
View the document(introduction...)
View the documentThe greenhouse effect
View the documentWhat was decided at Rio?
View the documentProtocol negotiating difficulties
View the documentKey issues for climate change negotiations
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close this folder2 The basics of greenhouse gas indices
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View the documentApples and oranges
View the documentImplications
View the documentConclusion: indices do matter
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close this folder3 Assessing emissions: five approaches compared
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View the documentIntroduction
View the documentComprehensiveness compared
View the documentAccuracy by category
View the documentRegional and national emissions by source
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View the documentAppendix A: Estimates of greenhouse gas emissions
View the documentAppendix B: Calculating cumulative and current emissions
close this folder4 Who pays (to solve the problem and how much)?
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View the documentIndices of allocation: a brief review
View the documentAccountability
View the documentEquity and efficiency
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close this folderPart II Resource transfers
close this folder5 North-South carbon abatement costs
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View the documentClimate change convention
View the documentMethod overview
View the documentImplications for the South
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close this folder6 North-South transfer
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View the documentObligation to pay indices
View the documentRedistribution of incremental cost
View the documentBenchmarks
View the documentUN scale of payments
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close this folder7 Insuring against sea level rise
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View the documentInsurability of losses
View the documentOil pollution
View the documentNuclear damage
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View the documentThe insurance scheme proposed by AOSIS
View the documentThe Climate Change Convention
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View the documentAppendix: Scheme proposed by AOSIS for inclusion in the Climate Change Convention
close this folderPart III National greenhouse gas reduction cost curves
close this folder8 Integrating ecology and economy in India
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View the documentIntroduction
View the documentEmissions inventory
View the documentEnergy efficiency and fuel substitution
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close this folder9 Carbon abatement potential in West Africa
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View the documentLong-term energy and carbon emissions scenarios
View the documentOptions for rational energy use and carbon conservation
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close this folder10 Abatement of carbon dioxide emissions in Brazil
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close this folder11 Thailand's demand side management initiative: a practical response to global warming
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View the documentEnd-use energy efficiency policies
View the documentCosts and benefits of the DSM master plan
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View the documentWhy should other developing countries adopt DSM?
View the documentThe role of the multilateral development banks
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close this folder12 Carbon abatement in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States
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close this folder13 Greenhouse gas emission abatement in Australia
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View the documentAbatement of energy sector emissions
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View the documentAustralia's international role
View the documentCarbon taxes, externalities and other policy instruments
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close this folderPart IV Conclusion
close this folder14 Constructing a global greenhouse regime
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View the documentConditionality and additionality
View the documentTechnology transfer
View the documentMulti-pronged approach
View the documentImplementation procedures
View the documentRegional building blocks
View the documentNorth-'South' conflicts
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close this folderAppendix: The Climate change convention
View the documentIntroduction
View the documentBackground
View the documentClimate change convention
View the documentArticle 1. Definitions
View the documentArticle 2. Objective
View the documentArticle 3. Principles
View the documentArticle 4 Commitments
View the documentArticle 5. Research and systematic observation
View the documentArticle 6. Education, training and public awareness
View the documentArticle 7. Conference of the Parties
View the documentArticle 8. Secretariat
View the documentArticle 9. Subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice
View the documentArticle 10. Subsidiary Body for implementation
View the documentArticle 11. Financial mechanism
View the documentArticle 12. Communication of information related to implementation
View the documentArticle 13. Resolution of questions regarding implementation
View the documentArticle 14. Settlement of disputes
View the documentArticle 15. Amendments to the Convention
View the documentArticle 16. Adoption and amendment of annexes to the Convention
View the documentArticle 17. Protocols
View the documentArticle 18. Right to vote
View the documentArticle 19. Depositary
View the documentArticle 20. Signature
View the documentArticle 21. Interim arrangements
View the documentArticle 22. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
View the documentArticle 23. Entry into force
View the documentArticle 24. Reservations
View the documentArticle 25. Withdrawal
View the documentArticle 26. Authentic texts

Indices of allocation: a brief review

Several investigators have attempted to allocate the global carbon budget based on exogenous considerations of the maximum acceptable warming or its rate of increase (for example, Krause et al. 1992), world averages (Mukherjee 1992), economic optimization models (Michaelis 1992), or other factors (Gurney 1991)

Dividing emissions rights equally among countries, coupled with the ability to sell or lease those rights, is the simplest scheme, yet fraught with inequities because it does not link emissions to human beings or activities. Thus it has few, if any, proponents. Another straightforward basis for allocating rights is land area (Welting 1989). Since 1950, national boundaries have not changed much (leaving aside the national break-ups of the early 1990s). Its stability as a measure, the ease of measurement, the avoidance of monitoring and verification difficulties are what recommend it. (Cheating is difficult.) There was a time, according to Grubb (1989), when the United States was arguing informally in international fore that its continental land mass necessitated enormous energy expenditures in having to move goods and people. Ultimately, with the possible exceptions of those countries with large wastelands (for example, Mongolia), land area is a measure of natural resources. Using it as an index to allocate emissions rights, however, favours large but sparsely populated nations (for example, Australia) and discriminates against small densely populated nations (for example, Japan).

If it is accepted that every person has an equal right to atmospheric resources - the ultimate global commons - then the most obvious and equitable basis is to distribute emissions permits in proportion to national populations (Feiveson et al. 1988; Agarwal and Narain 1991). If rights in subsequent years continue to be proportional to contemporaneous populations, however, a perverse incentive for population growth may be created. For this reason, and to make his scheme more palatable to industrialized countries, Grubb (1989) has suggested that allocations be based on adult populations. This would have the effect of reducing net transfers from countries with rectangular age distributions to developing countries with pyramidal age structures, but could be seen as discrimination against children. Depending on the definition of 'adult,' it would provide a 15-21 year delay between births and receiving the allotment, and thus reduce the pro-natalist incentive.

An alternate incentive for population stabilization could be built into the scheme by pegging the allotment to the entire population in a recent year and not increase future allotments. Compared to an index based on adult population, this would seem to represent less discrimination against children in the first years of an international protocol and no more discrimination in later years.

Arguing that any index based on per capita emissions alone would require unacceptably huge reductions in industrial countries (up to 75 per cent) or entail massive transfer payments to developing countries, Wirth and Lashof (1990) have proposed apportionment based half on per capita and half on per GDP, all the quantities being for the current or a recent year.

Similarly a multiplicative index could be structured that is directly proportional to emissions and inversely proportional to both GDP and population, the ratio being integrated over time. It is not clear, however, if GDP should find a place in an index for allocation, since countries would have already benefited from that economic activity.