|Community Leadership and Self-help Housing (HABITAT, 1988, 50 p.)|
|I. Why analyse community leadership|
|II. The nature of community leadership and decision making in low-income settlements|
|III. Why do leaders emerge and how do they relate to society at large?|
|IV. The impact of leadership upon low-income community development|
|V. Leaders and external agents: cooperation or conflict?|
|VI. Reaching the poor through community leaders; an agenda of points for consideration|
50. Although the motive for taking on the role of community leader varies considerably, this fact, by itself, fails to explain why leadership adopts particular forms both between societies and within societies. Why, for example, do different systems of caciquismo exist in Latin America and why do caciques become prominent at different periods? Similarly, in the Republic of Korea, why should parallel structures of leadership exist within the New Community Movement'? (11) Leadership motivation, by itself, fails to explain adequately the changing patterns of leadership that one observes both at a city-wide level as well as within individual communities.
51. Perhaps the most important feature of leadership is its role as intermediary between local residents and supra-local institutions, he they governmental, political or private. This chapter specifically identifies the nature of the link between these two levels as mediated by leaders, and analyses the relative importance of the community and external bodies in shaping leadership structures.
52. There are several reasons why this is regarded as a key issue. First, the review of the literature demonstrates that one cannot divorce analyses of leadership from the historical and cultural settings in which they emerge (76) nor, more specifically, from the particular political and economic context of a society at any given moment in time. As Bartra (7) argues, leadership forms part of the power structure of a whole region. One needs to understand, therefore, how leadership both affects and is affected by the local political economy. Leadership cannot be analysed in a social or political vacuum. It is necessary to discover why and how leadership structures operate and this can only be achieved by examining the nature of engagement between leaders and society. Secondly, and arising from the first point, all leaders act as mediators between external institutions and the grassroots, but this mediation operates in a variety of ways with varying degrees of autonomy. Sometimes neither leaders nor institutions are what they seem: both have covert as well as overt rationales which affect their behaviour.(34) If these different rationalities are not appreciated then it is likely that the real nature of leadership functions will be totally misconstrued. Thirdly, leadership is a dynamic phenomenon. Thus, local leadership structures change as perceived "needs" shift, as socio-political structures alter, and as competitors emerge. It is important to recognize the dynamics of leadership and to seek to identify the variables which are most likely to lead to change. Finally, leadership overlaps spatially and functionally so that both the causes of, and likely outcomes associated with, factions and their formation need to be understood.
A. The nature of leaders' links upwards to external institutions and down towards those whom they represent
1. The need for representational structures
53. All societies have some sort of formal or informal structure through which information, demands, resources and so on may be channelled both upwards and downwards. The extent to which these channels successfully represent the interests of the originating group and the degree to which the traffic is one-way varies considerably. Community representational structures may be highly formal such as the Saemaul Undong in the Republic of Korea or Acciomunal in Colombia. (11,34) Alternatively, they may comprise very loose arrangements with little formal direction or internal rules to govern activity. In such cases, leadership may operate simultaneously on a variety of fronts (religious, emotional, petitioning, arbitrating) but without having to constitute itself formally as a representational structure.
54. The formal establishment of a community association is usually a result of initiatives from outside rather than an expression of the local population's needs. For example, in addition to those cases already cited, the Alliance for Progress during the 1960s required the creation of community participation organizations throughout Latin America;(92) British colonial governments did likewise in Africa,(53) as did Community Action Program in the United States of America during the 1960s.(15) In all cases there were several reasons why it was considered desirable to encourage community participation and the formation of representational structures: to empower and raise people's consciousness; to promote democracy; to facilitate the implementation of community-development programmes; maintain social control, to reduce unrest and to harness political support.(83) The important point to recognize at this stage is that the initiative for formal arrangements usually came from outside the settlement.
2. Types of leader-State relationship
55. There are four inroad types of relationship between leaders (and their followers) and external institutions. In most cases this relationship is unequal with control over leaders being exercised by the State in a variety of ways (see table 2).(14,57)
56. The identifying characteristics of a patron-client link are that it: (a) is informal and not legally binding; (b) comprises personal. face-to-face relationships; (c) involves an exchange of valued resources; (d) is between actors of unequal status; and (e) persists through time.(35) Each actor in the equation seeks to fulfill certain aims or goals by offering resources that he controls or has access to in exchange for resources that he does not control. The classic example is where a politician or government bureaucrat promises public utilities in exchange for votes or political support.(19) Sometimes mobilization around a political boss leads to the formation of an "urban political machine" which develops a whole network of obligations and favours in order to extend a support base.(25,43) The patron- client relationship is extremely widespread and numerous examples can be found in the literature of Africa,(8,77) on the South Asian subcontinent and elsewhere in Asia,(37,62,96,98) and in Latin America.(20,44,51)
57. In actual fact, leaders are rarely either patrons or clients but intermediaries or brokers.
"A broker does not directly command the resources relevant to an exchange but instead maintains a personal relationship both with an actor who does control the needed goods and with one who desires to acquire them".(35)
The relationship of the broker to his superior is a crucial one, but it is also two-way. If the leader fails to conform to what the patron expects of him (e.g., fails to deliver enough support, demands too many services too fast, or does not keep his followers in line), then he may be punished by withdrawal of the patron's support. By the same token, the patron must deliver some of the rewards desired by the leader's followers or they may seek an altemative patron.(21)
Table 2. Methods of control exercised by different forms of community-State relationship
Nature of linkage
Way in which external control is exercised
- Ad hoc concessions
- Occasional minor concessions
- Compliance with external orthodoxy
- Queuing and concessions
- "Gatekeepers" allocating resources
- "Red tape" in order to delay and obstruct
- Concessions made in order to pacify
- Repression; assassination of leaders etc.
Cooption and incorporation
58. Cooption occurs where a leader affiliates with a supra-local organization thereby becoming subject to its orthodoxy, procedures and rules. A leader may do this because he or she believes that affiliation is likely to help win benefits for those whom he or she represents (or himself/herself). Thus affiliation to an influential political party may be perceived (usually mistakenly) as a prerequisite for successful demand-making.
59. Sometimes a leader seeks affiliation for private gain, but does so secretly, recognizing that his/her local support would be undermined if the link became common knowledge. "Incorporation" is the same as cooption except that it involves the whole group rather than just the leader.
60. Usually cooption and incorporation lead to a reduction in influence that the leader and local group are able to wield in their negotiations with external institutions.(28) This is because it is primarily a device used by institutions to extend their influence and control downwards. rather than by a mobilizing agency geared to meeting community needs.
61. Cooption is also widely practiced by party political and State institutions. In Guayaquil, local communities allow themselves to be coopted by political parties in the hope that they would receive services,(58) while in Mexico, many groups joined the governing party (the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)) with the same expectations. Cooption seems most likely when there is a dominant political or power group which, despite its influence, actively seeks to widen its control still further.
62. This is a form of integration achieved by government agencies when leaders are recognized and accommodated by the institution in order for this to allow it to fulfil its goals efficiently. "Technical" criteria are largely used by the agency to decide its priorities and procedures for the allocation of services to settlements.(34) Leaders are accommodated within these "routines" insofar as they will assist in the implementation of agency goals. Where leaders prove intransigent or uncooperative, agency staff may seek to undermine their power base either by negotiating with competing factions, or by using other mechanisms to drive a wedge between leaders and their followers. Tactics to achieve this include the direct signing of contracts between the agency and individual, thus bypassing the leadership, or by dropping the community from its works programme, thereby encouraging resident alienation from the leadership.(101,104) "Routinization" usually has the twin goals of overtly implementing actions with which the agency is charged, and (covertly) achieving social control through mediation and appeasement.(l05)
"Autonomy and independence"
63. Not all leaders succumb to any of the above forms of external mediation. Whether born of cynicism, or political radicalism, or because they genuinely believe that the best tactic in winning positive response from government is independence, some leaders have insisted upon maintaining distance from the State and have rejected overtures that might lead to any loss of autonomy. Radical leaders within the Citizen Movement of Madrid, and in urban social movements in Mexico (15,57) and in Rio de Janeiro (44,97) all resisted being formally associated (and potentially coopted) with any political party - including those on the political left. In the Philippines, too, various community groups forged themselves into an independent citywide association in 1977 and integrated the issue of land tenure into a broader struggle for a better life.(l) Although relatively rare, "autonomous" structures offer an interesting insight into the true nature of State-community relations. The position of independence and class mobilization that they adopt represent a considerable threat to the State which may respond in one (or several) ways: to coopt, to "divide and rule", to "starve" into submission or, ultimately. to repress.
64. It must be recognized that these relationships are not watertight categories that describe leader or more of the forms of linkage may overlap: as where a broker, "Big Man" or cacique is also coopted by a political party, or where several different types of link exist within the same settlement to different leaders. Also, as has already been observed, both leaders and agencies may not appear what they seem: there is often a spectrum of overt and covert rationales that governs the behaviour of institutions as well as leaders.(34) Nevertheless, the typology presented here does offer a broad insight into the ways in which leadership structures and external institutions engage with one other.
B. The determinants of leadership
65. Three broad sets of factors which act to shape the nature of leadership in different contexts can be identified: first, those which relate to the attributes of the individual leader; secondly, those that stem from characteristics of the community and, thirdly, those determinants that derive from the wider socio-political structure of the city or region. In the past, the little discussion that existed about leadership tended to focus upon community factors, or upon personal qualities of the individual leader. The argument here is that while these factors are important, their significance is secondary compared with the overriding influence of external pressures such as government and/or political parties.
1. Individual qualities of leadership
66. Chapter II has already dealt with leadership qualities in some depth and this will not be repeated here. Briefly, the argument is that leaders emerge because of their intrinsic qualities. They may have certain skills such as being able speakers, or possess charismatic personalities around which people mobilize.(27,98) Individual status may also provide an important basis for leadership. Such status may be earned. as when individuals have worked their way into positions of power, or economic influence.(6,8) Alternatively, it may be "ascribed" to certain individuals through inheritance and lineage - often the case for tribal leaders.(36,54,94) It was also observed, that in some societies leadership is reserved for the elders, and particularly for male elders. Age and sex are, therefore, key determinants of who exercises leadership in a community.
2. Settlement conditions and leadership type
67. It is argued here that leadership types are an outcome of settlement conditions. Thus, heterogeneity of social or economic groups is likely to lead to a greater variety of leadership opportunities and behaviour.(27) Generally, the larger the settlement the more difficult it is for one leader to maintain control, or to represent adequately the interests of all residents. Diversity in large settlements may derive from the different social and economic groups they accommodate as well as from the different tenure arrangements enjoyed by different sections of their populations (compare full owners, squatters, purchasers, "community land" holders and so on). Some settlements which expand their frontiers accretively may also contain groups whose arrival at different times sets them against each other: pioneers feel that their efforts may be threatened by later arrivals, particularly if the latter draw adverse publicity. In each case, competing groups can spawn different representational structures.
68. The opportunities for coercion and self-enrichment presented by different types of settlement, particularly during the earlier phases of their development, encourage the presence and activity of authoritarian leaders.(21) Once the basis of their control is removed, through the legalization of land tenure, and people have recourse to the law in settling disputes, the influence of such leaders is substantially reduced. Indeed, as settlement needs change through time so resident participation in community affairs and demands made of the representation structure also change.(61) Caciques are replaced by democratically-elected leaders who, in turn, give way to low-key "positional" leaders representing the interests of political parties, unions, religious organizations, and so on (see chapter II). In Kenyan self-help programmes, harambee leaders are selected according to their ability to perform different roles during the various stages of a grassroots project (initiation, organization and implementation); so settlement or project needs shape the emergence of leaders.(55)
3. External determinants of leadership
69. Individual and settlement attributes are obviously significant, but their importance is probably secondary to the following factors which shape the propensity for different types of leadership emergence. Primary determinants of leadership appear to be derived externally: from the regional culture; from the party-political structure; from national and local government; and from the actions of NGOs.
70. The regional culture has traditionally been identified as a key variable that determines leader-follower relations, particularly in the context of tribal society. Yet, although tribal elders were traditionally accorded leadership status in rural areas, the cultural basis of leadership has largely broken down in urban areas since different ethnic groups have been thrown together.(30) Even where ethnic group or lineage remains an important feature of leadership and local organization, there is some feeling that this is because of its value as a channel for mobilization rather than intrinsic traditional values that are attributed to it.(36) While traditional Confucian values of age and experience as determinants of leadership were respected by the New Community Movement in the Republic of Korea, this did not prevent the creation of a parallel structure of "new-style" leaders more geared to the needs of the Movement.(11)
71. Other "externally imposed" factors that determine leadership and which derive from the regional culture include traditional attitudes towards the selection of leaders from different castes, and upon the basis of gender. As has been seen, women do not generally figure as leaders in traditional society, especially among Muslim sects,(55) although there is some evidence that women held important leadership positions in Africa prior to the colonial period.(65) Caste in India is important: although leaders are not exclusively drawn from higher castes, the latter are much more likely to assume leadership functions.(32,37) Generally, though, traditional determinants of leadership appear to have less importance in contemporary rural and urban society than in the past.
72. Structural determinants emanating from party-political needs exercise enormous influence over the type of leadership to emerge in different situations. Party needs may be expressed in the desire to mobilize populations through settlement leaders. The latter are expected to act as mobilizers of national or party ideology such as the UNIP development of its "humanist" philosophy through its branch and constituency structures in Zambia.(79) Here party leaders and local leaders are often one and the same.(72) If ideological needs are not uppermost then the need to mobilize the vote may be. Political parties in many countries seek to establish leaders in local communities who will activate the vote on their behalf.(28,58,66,73,108) In Mexico, party militants continued to use local caciques to mobilize the vote on their behalf despite government and party headquarters directives to desist. The alternative was to invest resources and time in developing a grass-roots political organization in social contexts that were largely unfamiliar to the party militants.(21) "Political machines" may be established whereby local leaders form part of a wider network (usually built around an individual city hall politician) in which votes are traded for city services or local improvements.(21,25,79) Parties may also use the arena of settlement politics as a proving ground on which up-and-coming leaders can cut their political teeth.(87)
73. In addition to their attempts at mobilization, political parties may also seek to demobilize communities and local leadership structures which threaten the political system. Thus in Mexico, when various "independent" leaders broke with the normal practice of individual and vertical links with the political system and formed a horizontal urban social movement, the State acted to resolve the dispute through appeasement, and subsequently coopted or isolated breakaway leaders.(34)
74. Government needs for social stability and control are also important determinants of the type of leadership that emerges in low-income communities. Again the aim may be to mobilize the poor for ideological purposes or to assist in the implementation of a local development initiative. Examples of the former include the New Community Movement in the Republic of Korea and Ujamoa in the United Republic of Tanzania both of which sought to inculcate a nationalist ideology through carefully wrought leadership structures that were imposed upon local communities - a common feature also in societies such as China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.(48) Governments have also often encouraged the creation of community representational structures that mobilize local residents to participate in community development. (34, 72, 77)
75. Governments also use leadership structures to undermine mobilization in those circumstances in which it poses a threat. This may be achieved through the manipulation of different factions: supporting one group in order to weaken another; the setting of two powerful local constituencies against one another. A classic tactic in this respect is one of differential servicing whereby adjacent settlements are partially accommodated in different ways to ensure that they no longer have common aims. Another tactic is to be seen to spread benefits equally, but thinly, over a number of settlements in order to pacify the population and to prolong the period that the population is dependent upon politicians.(20,108) The processes of cooption and incorporation described earlier are key mechanisms whereby leaders are used to demobilize the poor.(8.44) Repression of local leaders who do not conform is not unknown. but it is usually adopted as a last resort.(1,13,15,57)
76. Government action sometimes has the opposite effect. Where residents perceive a strong threat from outside this may have a powerful integrating effect upon the community. "Out-group" hostility thereby creates "in-group" solidarity.(21)
77. As well as the government's need to mobilize and to demobilize low-income populations, the external control of local leadership presents an additional advantage. By creating a complex and internally divisive structure for channelling community-State interaction, the government promotes the appearance that it is busy and concerned on behalf of the poor. In fact, the outflow of central resources can be carefully controlled and slowed down.(20) There are several ways of achieving this: either through the classic patron-client relationship or through a more formalized system of competitive bargaining for limited resources at a local municipal or sub- municipal level. In both cases the issue is one of how to divide the cake rather than how much cake is put on the table in the first place.(102)
78. One may take the view, therefore, that community-development programmes, in many parts of Latin America at least, offer governments a prime medium for political mediation and the exercise of social control.(105) As Burges notes (14):
"in general the settlement organization is converted into an intermediary for the organization of construction processes in which ideological control, political manipulation and the subordination of spontaneous forms of organization is the rule".
79. Local leadership is one of the key elements in this process and the emergence of local structures is primarily an outcome of political and governmental needs rather than a result of the particular attributes of leaders or settlement. The latter are secondary to the structural factors which shape the propensity for community participation and leadership to emerge.
80. Non-governmental organizations may also influence the nature of leadership in different situations. In chapter V of this report different types of NGO are identified but generally their aims can he stated as developing the welfare of the poor in one or more ways: moral and spiritual if it is a church; developmental in the case of institutions like OXFAM, Save the Children and, often, church organizations as well; recreational in the case of some social organizations. However, in all cases it is important to recognize that NGOs are under pressure to achieve results. Community leaders may be "placed" in a community to represent and to extend the base of an NGO. Sometimes their role may be to develop a basis for organized struggle within a neighbourhood (see, for example, the pioneering work by Alinsky in the United States during the early 1940s and subsequently by his supporters).(15) Elsewhere NGOs may use cooption to involve local residents in work on their behalf.
81. The extent to which NGOs will play a major role in influencing leadership structures appears to relate to the vacuum left by the absence of governmental or political structures. In exceptionally repressive societies, internationally supported and staffed agencies may be the only vehicle for local organization. The Church, too, may be especially influential in these circumstances. One of the features of so-called "bureaucratic-authoritarian" governments is their denial of working class participation and organization.(71) In Brazil during the early 1970s the Roman Catholic Church was the only effective outlet through which local residents could negotiate for services. Priests were, therefore, at the forefront of local community leadership throughout this period.(10,25)
C. Multiple representation: the significance of factionalism
82. Many writers have commented upon the importance of "cohesiveness" in determining successful community participation and the effectiveness of leadership,(2, 27, 38) yet many pressures exist which reduce the likelihood of a cohesive community and enhance the emergence of different factions of interest within a community, many of which will be represented by different (and often competing) leaders.
1. The determinants of factions
83. An important basis of factionalism is the variety of intra-settlement interests and their relative strengths. Circumstances vary between societies but examples include different tribal factions and different ethnic groups or castes.(32, 60, 108) Socio-economic heterogeneity exists within most poor settlements, especially where they have been established for several years; only at the outset are age, family structure, incomes, migrant status, employment category and so on likely to be broadly similar. Once different economic and social groups emerge they are likely to have different priorities about such issues as settlement upgrading, attitudes towards newcomers, and willingness to participate in mutual aid versus self-help. People also have different needs for leaders, and this results in a multiplicity of leadership structures some of which fulfill task-oriented functions, while others meet the spiritual or emotional needs of the residents.(77) There are important differences, too, between those who rent land or dwellings and "owners" (whether or not they have full legal title to land). Clearly the two groups have different investment stakes and these may conflict. Owners are likely to favour formal land title, the provision of services and rising land values; renters, while also benefiting from improved servicing and security, will almost certainly have to pay more in the form of rent. Among owners there are also often important divisions associated with the various ways in which land has been acquired. Purchasers from real-estate companies are in conflict with those who have squatted, purchased from government, bought from holders of "common land rights", inherited from the latter, acquired from a third party who previously squatted, bought, inherited and so on. If forms of land acquisition are complicated, so are the processes of "regularization" or "legalization".(101) The route towards legalizing irregular settlements depends upon the way in which land was alienated and implies both differences of procedure and, ultimately, of cost. Therefore it is not surprising that different factions emerge, particularly where the financial pickings for leaders are high.
84. The size and spatial organization of the settlement may also facilitate factionalism. Larger settlements are more difficult to control, and disaffected or separate interest groups have a greater opportunity of establishing themselves. In these areas, residents even appear less able to identify leaders' names than they are in smaller neighbourhoods.(34) The same applies where settlements are divided by a physical barrier such as a road or railway tracks; or where one area suffers a problem not shared by the whole community (such as flooding, landslips, or fire hazards). In such cases a would-be leader can build a support base around that particular issue.
85. Past performance of leaders is also likely to shape the propensity for factionalism. Where they have proved to be highly effective, non-exploitative, and amenable to all groups, then incipient attempts from rival leaders are less likely to be successful. However, where disillusion and cynicism are rife, allegiance may be switched, provided supporting another leader is not likely to result in intimidation against oneself or one's family.
86. Factionalism will also emerge where it is required or given some formal status by external organizations. In circumstances which were described earlier in this chapter where governmental or political advantage may be derived from links forged with leaders, the propensity for factions to exist is heightened.(5,100) A similar conclusion was reached by a reviewer of urban politics in African towns; he suggested that factionalism is most likely to occur when "the external environment offers positive inducements for active intercourse".(6) Certainly, expansion of the number of departments with responsibilities for irregular settlements in Mexico City between 1970 and 1976 led to competing and conflicting functions within the bureaucracy. At the same time, each department forged links with local leaders in individual settlements for which it was responsible and often for settlements where a rival department had jurisdiction. Thus legitimacy for rival leaders in the same settlement was conferred by rival agencies. Significant, too, was the fact that conflict observed on the ground between factions mirrored conflicts operating between rival political groups within the Government. To a certain extent, therefore, conflict was transferred down to the settlement level.(103)
2. The significance of factionalism
87. Factionalism and settlement heterogeneity usually detract from successful community development.(46) As one writer comments "fragmentation of a low-income community into competing political factions can seriously inhibit the propensity to participate".(21) It diverts effort and attention away from the key pressure points of demand-making. It weakens leader and agency authority in carrying out negotiations. The accusations and counter-accusations between competing factions sow confusion and cynicism in residents' minds and act to discourage participation and collaboration. In one settlement in the United Republic of Tanzania, poor community-development performance was an outcome of tribal and inter-generational rivalries which resulted in a high turnover of leadership.(60) Similarly, inter-caste rivalries were found to lead to weak and ineffective leadership in a study of an Indian village.(32)
88. While arguing that factionalism is generally counter- productive to community development, it is necessary to recognize that factions are only a symptom of an underlying structure which encourages their existence. Thus, any attempt to head off factionalism at a settlement level without confronting the underlying rationale for the vitality of the factions will have only a limited effect. Nevertheless, where several parallel leadership structures exist in a single settlement or village it is imperative that these be identified, along with their external links to supra-local organizations. Only in so doing can appropriate decisions and judgements be made about those with whom one might collaborate, on what terms, how they should be approached, in what order, and so on - points which will be dealt with in chapter VI.
D. The dynamics of leadership
89. By now it should be apparent that leadership is a complex phenomenon. It has been shown how leadership structures are largely determined by external socio-political processes and that they may comprise multiple and overlapping structures. Nor is leadership a static phenomenon and in the final section of this chapter the main factors which determine changes in leadership are identified.
1. Political and/or ideological changes
90. Under conditions of competitive party politics, changing leadership positions will reflect the vitality and ideological persuasion of individual parties. A return to democratic government after military rule furnishes new opportunities for leaders - as is happening in Brazil since the "political opening" (abertura) in 1983. Elsewhere, too, one observes an increasing tendency to open the political franchise, albeit in carefully constrained ways and often largely motivated by a desire for greater legitimacy for the ruling party. Where leadership positions are linked directly to the governing party, political fortunes will shape which leaders are "in" and which are "out" at any one point in time: a feature described for countries as different as Pakistan and Venezuela.(73, 108) As one local leader in Valencia, Venezuela, commented wryly after his party had won the national elections "For five years we have sat with our arms crossed; now it is the turn of the Adecos (the opposition party) to do the same".(34)
91. It is not only when parties change that leaders rise and fall. important ideological shifts or the onset of more liberal attitudes can have the same effect. In Mexico it is argued that caciquismo has declined in rural areas although there is debate about why: as an outcome of government action to eradicate it, or as a result of the penetration of capitalism into traditional subsistence economies.(7,21,57) Changes in the predominant forms of political mediation (patron-client, cooption and repression) will also change quite dramatically what is expected of leaders and their behaviour.(104)
2. Changes in government policy
92. It is not possible here to analyse what processes or motives inform significant shifts in State intervention.(34) Nonetheless, there appears to be a tendency for an increasingly technocratic commitment to underpin bureaucracy behaviour. In Latin America, at least, some Governments are finding that they can achieve social control effectively by becoming more efficient and technocratic in matters of urban management.(5,105) If this is a broadening trend, then it will substantially change the format of State-community relations in the future. These are likely to become more "routinized" and less open to particularistic patterns of decision taking. "Gatekeepers" rather than caudillos will exercise control over the distribution of resources. There is considerable evidence to suggest that both the structure of leadership and leaders themselves are responsive to these changes, and that behaviour alters accordingly.(34)
3. Changing settlement form and changes of leadership
93. There is also a close link between the dynamics of settlement development and the type of leader who emerges at different points in time.(55) Although the broad political and governmental structural features described earlier condition the overall operation of State-community relations and leadership, local variables also determine which leaders emerge in the community. In squatter settlements, for example, when initial tenure insecurity is high, the financial pickings for leaders are potentially large, and the community is on the defensive, there is a greater likelihood leaders will be male, tough, intimidatory, and aggressive in the tactics they employ with government and would-be competitors. As the fledgeling community wins acceptance, and the possibilities for intimidation decline through formal registration of plots, so the possibilities for more representational forms of leadership emerge. There is concern to speed up the introduction of services and the tendency for leaders to "drag their feet" in order to sustain a leadership position is less prevalent. Finally, once most services are won then public participation and interest atrophies. Leadership committees become defunct or are replaced by positional leaders who represent external organizations.(103) While this cycle of participation and involvement has been widely described, its association with a leadership dynamic has not, although the importance of different types of legitimacy obtained from irregular settlements at different periods of their physical integration with the city have been recognized elsewhere.(20)
94. Caciques, who also serve a useful purpose by delivering the vote for the governing party, cease to be an asset to the party if they become increasingly despotic and arbitrary in their treatment of the local community, and will find themselves isolated: the government will shift its support to others.(7) Residents also change their allegiance to particular leaders thereby assisting in a turn-over. Sometimes they shift their support for good reason; but followers can also prove very fickle. Even in those cases where evidence has been found of hardworking, honest and efficient leaders, they have often been denounced publicly. Residents may come to envy the successful leader and, in gradually distancing themselves, leave the leader isolated.(S8)
95. Thus, having analysed what factors shape the emergence of leaders, their role, internal conflicts, and the processes leading to their removal and displacement, a position has been reached to turn to an analysis of their impact. The next chapter begins to evaluate the ways in which the patterns and changes so far described affect community development.