Cover Image
close this bookPromoting Organized Self-help through Co-operative Modes of Participation (HABITAT, 1984, 61 p.)
View the document(introduction...)
View the documentIntroduction
Open this folder and view contentsPart one eight major requirements for cooperative approaches to community improvement programmes
Open this folder and view contentsPart two four problem areas as subjects for training
Open this folder and view contentsPart three the organization of training programmes
View the documentNotes
View the documentReferences for further reading

(introduction...)

United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)

Nairobi, 1984

Introduction

Housing the poor is one of the current problems in the cities of developing countries. Many Governments of developing countries, faced with enormous housing demands in urban areas as a result of rapid population growth and massive migration from rural to urban areas, initially based their housing programmes on the large-scale housing projects undertaken in developed countries after the Second World War. Those projects were launched in order to provide shelter to the low-income urban population, in the hopes of stopping the rapid growth of squatter settlements in the cities and improving the living conditions of the urban population.

However, many of those housing schemes fell short of their objectives, for they proved to be too expensive for the people they were designed for. Sometimes high-income households displaced the intended beneficiaries from the start; in other cases, low-income families sold the houses after some time, because they could not afford or comply with the payment schedules. Furthermore, Governments found that subsidizing such schemes depleted public resources at an alarming rate.

Since a reduction in the capital cost of housing from the point of view of Governments and user groups alike appeared to be necessary, the idea of self-help construction was advanced. If beneficiaries assumed part of the labour component in the development of housing schemes, a considerable reduction in the cost of housing units could be achieved. Furthermore, self-help construction could generate beneficial side-effects. People would have an opportunity to learn useful skills and, thus, improve their position on the labour market. Households persuaded to pool labour and financial resources for construction of their houses could also contribute to community cohesiveness in newly developed residential areas.

However, initial self-help construction schemes proved to be less successful than anticipated. Many low-income families did not construct their houses within the time required. Only those families that had enough money to hire labour were in a position to complete their houses according to schedule, thereby undermining some of the ideas of self-help and community development. 1/

Self-help construction projects have not avoided criticism and opposition. Some critics identify self-help construction as a form of (self-) exploitation of the poor and a means of subsidizing the formal sector by reducing pressure on wages. Others point to the fact that, in self-financing housing schemes, the urban poor pay proportionally much more for infrastructure and services than the rich inhabitants of a city. 2/

Another fundamental criticism is not so much aimed at self-help construction schemes as such as at government policy on housing in general. In the view of John F.C. Turner, housing that is not adapted to the needs and resources of the occupants becomes oppressive. Unless the user is in control of the design, construction and maintenance of his shelter and is free to build according to his real and perceived needs and priorities, the dwelling environment becomes a barrier to personal fulfillment and a burden on the economy. 3/

In that view, the authorities responsible for the provision of housing should not set out specifications of what should be done and lay down procedures to be followed. Instead, they should set limits to what may be done, leaving the builder free to operate within those limits. The main role of the authorities is to ensure access to essential resources, such as land, credit, building materials and know-how.

That people are able and willing to participate in the development of human settlements can be witnessed in many squatter settlements which constitute a living environment adapted to the priorities, needs and resources of the urban poor. The settlements look miserable to the outsider, mainly because certain infrastructure cannot be provided by the squatters, and some environmental problems (e.g., sanitation) cannot be solved by them without external assistance. However, this can be expected, as long as they do not have security of tenure, since squatters are reluctant to invest very much in their houses and environment.

Studies of squatter settlements and public-sector housing show that the pride of squatter families in their houses and settlements compares favourably with that of occupants of standardized housing units. While the former do their utmost to improve their housing conditions, the latter often have an attitude ranging from neglect to mismanagement, vandalism and, even, abandonment of the dwelling.

The example of squatter settlements has led to two types of low-income housing projects, sites-and-services schemes and squatter-settlement upgrading projects.

In sites-and-services schemes, the allottee acquires a plot of land serviced with basic infrastructure: simple roads, communal water taps, pit latrines etc. Sometimes, a part of the house (kitchen, toilet or "wet wall") has already been provided. Often, planners prepare a number of house-design options for the allottee to build, but the allottee is free to follow another design, as long as certain basic standards are met. The allottee usually receives technical assistance for the construction work and financial assistance in the form of building-material loans. Co-operation between households for the construction of the dwellings is encouraged.

In squatter-settlement upgrading projects, the initiatives and the self-reliance of the squatters are rewarded by the legalizing of the settlement through the issuance of titles. Furthermore, the living conditions in the settlement are improved by the provision of basic infrastructure. Upgrading of the dwelling itself is left to the occupants, as the security of tenure resulting from the issuance of leases or other occupany instruments should be sufficient incentive for the residents to invest in the improvement of their houses.

The idea that people should participate in the planning and management of human settlements has gradually gained acceptance among Governments and development agencies. Unfortunately, the allegiance to participation remains verbal in most cases first, because participation implies sharing of power and, secondly, because participation is often difficult to promote. In project proposals, three arguments are usually employed to advocate the incorporation of participation in the execution of the projects:

(a) Participation is an end in itself. People have the right and duty to participate in the execution (i.e., planning, implementation and management) of projects which profoundly affect their lives;

(b) Participation is a way to produce good project results. If neonle Participate in the execution of a project by contributing their ingenuity, skills and other untapped resources, everyone benefits, implementation is facilitated, and the outcome responds to the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries;

(c) Participation is a self-reinforcing activity which stimulates people to seek participation in other spheres of life. Participation builds up a self-reliant and cooperative spirit in communities and is a learning process whereby people become capable of identifying and dealing actively with their problems.

However, when it comes to putting the theory of participation into effect, authorities and project staff raise numerous objections, and argue that participation is impossible or has to be restricted to some form of consultation. Many professionals believe that they know better what is good for the allottees of a sites-and-services scheme or the residents of a squatter settlement than the "ignorant" and "illiterate" people themselves. Other professionals feel that they know exactly what the beneficiaries want, so there is no need to involve them in planning and decision-making. The problems in many low-income housing projects prove that those assumptions are rarely justified. Very often, the real reason for limiting or discarding participation is the unwillingness of professionals to share their decision-making power with beneficiaries.

Moreover, those project staff members dedicated to participation face many problems as they attempt to mobilize the population. Years of neglect by the authorities and of contempt by professionals have rendered many of the urban poor reluctant to participate in governmental programmes or to cooperate with professionals. They distrust the intentions of public authorities and have become apathetic towards government initiatives. That attitude of the population is, subsequently, used by administrators and professionals as an argument to abandon the idea of participation.

Finally, many building codes, municipal bylaws and other rules and regulations, often formulated for the development of middle-income and high-income residential areas, hamper the involvement of beneficiaries in the execution of projects.

The most visible and striking evidence of the possibilities of popular participation in human-settlement development does not come from people's involvement in the execution of official housing projects but from the development of squatter settlements. Those settlements originate with people in need of shelter taking the law into their own hands by occupying a vacant piece of land and building their houses without permission of the authorities or titles to the plots. It is the basic form of self help: residents' participation in planning, implementation and management. It is that type of participation the authorities try to imitate in sites-and-services schemes.

Once established in possession of land, squatters start demanding legal recognition of their settlement and provision of adequate infrastructure and services, and those demands are usually expressed in an organized way, through representatives and politicians. Likewise, when threatened with eviction and the demolition of their houses, communities organize themselves, leaders emerge, and concerted efforts are made to influence decision-making with respect to the settlement's future. Although the first initiative for such activities may be taken by people from the settlement itself, effective movements rarely develop without some outside assistance. Sometimes, support comes from a political party which wants to turn the demands of the squatters into a political issue and cash in on it later. Often, community workers, employed by a non-governmental organization or even by a public body, assist the community in organizing itself, creating leadership and formulating demands.

The methods used to influence decision-making vary widely. They normally start with the submission of petitions to the authorities and the enlistment of politicians to plead the case. In most societies, those are accepted ways for citizens to influence decision-making. If, however, those ways are closed or prove ineffective, other methods may be employed, ranging from demonstrations and strikes to civil disobedience and riots. Such activities are often considered subversive or seen to be interfering with the decision-making process. In either case, they are perceived as being outside the legally and socially accepted channels. They are what authorities bear in mind when trying to restrict community participation in human-settlement projects, in the fear that, once a community is permitted to participate in the execution of a project, the people will resort to "undemocratic" methods and will start demanding participation in other spheres of life.

The circumstances in official housing projects differ from those in spontaneous settlements. People in squatter settlements are struggling for survival and are prepared to employ any means to defend their houses and settlement against demolition, while, in official housing projects, the goods will be delivered, provided the beneficiaries cooperate with the authorities. So, there is little incentive for the people to organize themselves and to participate in project execution,

Furthermore, in official housing projects, participation is initiated and controlled by the authorities. Its inclusion is internally defended with the argument that it guarantees a smooth implementation of plans and decisions and a quick attainment of project objectives.

To organize the community and promote cooperative forms of participation, community development workers are added to the project staff, but their role is quite different from that of community workers in slums and squatter settlements. Their task is to organize community participation when and where it is considered important by the project staff to facilitate the execution of the project. If they do more than that, and stimulate people to participate as much as possible in all phases of the project, they risk being criticized by the other project staff for slowing down the project instead of getting plans and proposals quickly endorsed by the beneficiaires.

Community-development workers, therefore, often occupy a rather marginal position in the project. They find themselves repeatedly in conflict with the technical staff which believes that its plans and proposals are the best. They encourage beneficiaries to participate in planning and decision-making, but they know that the final decision-making power remains with the project authorities. Many beneficiaries are aware of this ambivalence, and it makes them reluctant to spend much time and energy on community participation.

Background to and objectives of the present publication

It has been widely recognized that, in light of the sheer magnitude of the shelter problem, participatory forms of development activity constitute an important strategy, in the developing countries. Yet only in exceptional cases have the inhabitants of uncontrolled urban low-income settlements, 4/ such as slum and squatter-settlement dwellers, organized themselves effectively for co-operative undertakings. Most efforts to improve the living conditions of the urban poor have been limited to the provision of dwelling units, although experience indicates that such a sectoral approach is not appropriate. Rather, an integrated approach, embracing interrelated sectors such as housing, health, employment, education and transportation, may have a better chance of succeeding.

The realization that co-operative forms of development activity are important ways of effecting change in urban slums and squatter settlements, led to the holding of the Workshop on Integrated Cooperatives for satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, at Marburg (Federal Republic of Germany) in December 1980. 5/ Participating in the Workshop were specialists from different governmental and non-governmental housing and co-operative organizations from 13 African, Asian and Latin American countries. The main topics addressed were the operational requirements for establishing and managing housing co-operatives under different socio-economic conditions, with emphasis on self-help in groups and comprehensive or integrated approaches to development.

The discussions focused on simple forms of cooperative-like organizations*/ accessible to local people - e.g., organizations which encourage active participation of their members by giving each of them the chance to play a role in decision-making and control. Such simple forms of local organizations have to satisfy different needs and, therefore, imply the need for different types of activities. The workshop participants proposed specific recommendations for such organizations in terms of social, organizational and financial requirements, and institutional support. The participants concurred that, for the functioning of such multipurpose organizations, participation of the people concerned was essential.

In the light of that premise, participants evaluated experiences gained from a number of projects, in order to try to develop a meaningful effective and comprehensive concept for co-operative and other self-help organizations. They also discussed some of the political implications of cooperative forms of participation. It was agreed that, in order to raise levels of participation, community leaders and competent authorities have to play a role in training and educating slum and squatter-settlement dwellers in different aspects of organized participation in housing activities.

* Mutual self-help can be achieved through a variety of institutions which enable low-income groups to participate in the development of their communities, whether it be new construction, upgrading or other goals which they wish to achieve. Those kinds of institutions are often referred to as "cooperatives". A distinction should be made between cooperatives which are legally registered under relevant legislation in a specific country and other groups which have similar objectives but which are not legally incorporated. In many countries, the world "co-operative" can only be used by registered co-operative societies. In the present report, institutions registered as co-operatives are discussed in the case studies dealing with Palo Alto (Mexico), LEHCO-OP (Lesotho) and Barrio Escopa (Philippines).

The essence of a co-operative, in addition to the legal requirement, is that membership is voluntary, that it is owned and democratically controlled by the members and that members benefit equitably from the economic and social activities of the co-operative. Other institutions have similar characteristics but may not be co-operative in the strict legal sense - for example, they may be too informal at an early stage, be part of another hierarchy (e.g., government or political party), not wish to be associated with existing cooperatives in other sectors owing to their perception of political or bureaucratic control of co-operatives, or find that specific co-operative legislation does not accord with their goals. However, many such institutions enable low-income groups to participate effectively in self-help.

Owing to its interregional nature and its wide scope, the Marburg Workshop was not able to explore in depth the prevailing needs for teaching materials and training programmes. Therefore, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, the German Carl-Duisberg-Gesellschaft and non-governmental organization German Development Assistance Association for Social Housing, organized the subregional Workshop on Teaching Materials and Training Programmes for Co-operative Modes of Participation in Slum and Squatter Settlements, which was held in October 1981 at Nairobi. At the subregional level, it was possible to deal specifically with the discussion and evaluation of appropriate teaching materials and training programmes, in light of the practical needs of ongoing projects for the urban poor. The present publication was prepared on the basis of the two Workshops with the following objectives in mind:

1. To assess the requirements of the co-operative approach to improving human settlements in the light of project experiences.

Long-term experience with housing projects all over the world and the exchange of ideas based on studies of criteria for the success and failure of such projects usually conclude that there is a set of specific requirements that must be met by self-help organizations in integrated housing activities if they are to have a chance of being successful. The discussions held during the two Workshops mentioned above and the papers submitted by the participants demonstrated clearly that those requirements cannot be assembled as a fixed and rigid system but rather must be a collection of indicators. In reality, the implementation of projects differs so widely with regard to culture, legal situations, political aspects, size, finance, technology etc. that general conclusions have no meaning in single-project situations. That is why the recommendations included in the present publication are supported by case studies offering concrete examples of the practical implications. The case studies are based on papers that were submitted by the participants of the two Workshops.

2. To identify the training needs in integrated co-operative projects for human settlements in slums and squatter areas and to analyse teaching materials and training programmes which can strengthen participation in cooperative forms of development.

This second objective, covering four problem areas as subjects for training, is treated in part two of the present publication.

(introduction...)

The planning of projects along co-operative lines of organization by government agencies and their imposition on low-income communities usually meet enormous problems if they are not gradually developed in response to actual and pressing collective needs of residents. It can be argued that the needs and motivation of a community for co-operative action will over time develop adequate organizational structures if adequate administrative support from government agencies is granted. In the following example, a community was forced to organize itself, as its very survival was threatened by an unfavourable landownership situation.

Case study Palo Alto, Mexico

The Palo Alto community came into being with the exploitation of several sand quarries in the periphery of Mexico City by a group of immigrants from the countryside. The workers had to rent pieces of land from the quarry owner to construct provisional houses with their own means. In case they left their jobs, their houses became the property of the landlord. After 35 years of mining, in the beginning of the 1970s, the area was surrounded by high-income residential settlements. The exploitation of the quarries was completed and the owner tried to evict the former workers with the intention of reallocating the land. At that point, the Palo Alto community, facing the threat of being driven out of houses which some members had occupied for almost 30 years, organized itself.

A long legal battle started to allow the residents to acquire a part of the huge site of Palo Alto to construct their houses and develop their community. The sequence of events was as follows:

1972: An agreement was signed but the land owner did not comply with it, although all the necessary legal procedures were completed. During the same year the residents formalized the constitution of a housing co-operative.

1973: The residents occupied the land by means of a surprise construction of provisional houses. The expected result was the acceleration of bureaucratic measures, and the community's case was renegotiated.

1974: A new agreement was signed between the landlord, residents and city authorities, defining the way in which land boundaries of the co-operative should be determined and allowing five months to condition and to occupy its land. Immediately, levelling and land-filling works were begun, and the allocated area was occupied even before the stipulated time elapsed.

1975: The land boundaries and the development plans were approved by the city authorities. The plans and the housing projects - the results of a close consultation process with the residents - were prepared by a local non-governmental organization, COPEVI (Operation Centre for Housing and Human Settlement).

1976: An initial group of 80 families prepared to construct their houses was formed. A loan from FOMVICOOP (Fund for Housing in Popular Co-operation) was obtained to buy materials and pay for technical assistance. After raffling of plots, the construction of the first houses was organized. The first building put up by the co-operative served as a store for building materials and the community office. Apart from the actual construction work, the co-operative also organized production of building materials, construction of communal facilities and operation of a consumer shop. Later on, the society developed a number of social activities, including a kindergarten, educational programmes, skill training for shop management and production of building materials, health services, recreational facilities and religious education.

The Palo Alto example shows that a first task is to find a fundamental motivator for people to organize themselves. Informal self-help groups can develop the capability of forming a co-operative society. The success of Palo Alto was mainly due to the firm position of the residents in their fight for their rights and the support they received from COPEVI.

* Extract from Enrique Ortiz, "The Palo Alto experience in Mexico City", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Co-operatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

(introduction...)

Generally speaking, the inhabitants of urban squatter settlements have a common interest in securing their position and improving their housing and living conditions. Since that common interest requires sets of measures that have to be adjusted to each case, it is obvious that the identification of target areas is a sensible first step for promoting self-help housing activities, whereas the determination of target groups within those areas is a second one. There are different ways of selecting a target group, and a general rule cannot be given, as the selection depends on specific circumstances. Therefore, the best way to illustrate the definition of the target group may be through examples which may be taken as guidelines for action.

Case study the Ahmedabad project, India *

The Integrated Urban Development Project (IUDPO of Vasna in Ahmedabad was set up after floods of the river Sabarmati in 1973 swept away the colonies of more than 3,000 slum and squatter-settlement dwellers situated along its banks. After establishing informal contacts with the affected slum community, the Ahmedabad Study Action Group (ASAG), a voluntary interdisciplinary organization of professionals, submitted an exploratory proposal to the municipal authorities, which were already contemplating some action.

The ASAG proposal reflected its not-housing-but-development emphasis on participatory action. It emphasized the following points:

(a) The river bank dwellers had recognized the fact that their habitation was no longer safe and that relocation was necessary. If an alternative that was acceptable and cheep could be provided, they would voluntarily agree to shift. It was pointed out that earlier efforts had met with resistance, as people were simply driven out or offered acommodation they could not afford;

(b) For a successful relocation effort, involvement of the flood-affected people at every stage in the process was indispensable. It was argued that previous attempts at relocation had failed, as decisions were imposed from the top without consulting the residents;

(c) Convinced that the slum is more a reflection of attitudes towards life than of physical or environmental conditions, ASAG, suggested that not only a housing programme but also a comprehensive developmental effort was needed for integrated urban renewal.

The target group was determined by actual events which were not influenced by selection criteria. All people affected by the flood belonged to that group. There was only need to gather detailed information on the target group in order to agree on the best possible approach of the supporting agency and to involve the families concerned in the participatory process of the project. Therefore, a detailed profile of the target group was drawn up by surveying the household immediately after the flood.

The flood swept Ahmedabad in August-September 1973, and the first brick at the new site was laid on 15 May 1974. By the end of September 1975 - in the short period of 16 months - the first 2,248 houses, along with infrastructural services such as water supply, sewerage and street lighting, were completed. 6/

* Extract from Kirtee Shah, "Housing for the urban poor in Ahmedabad: an integrated urban development approach", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Co-operatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980

Case study la Trinidad, Colombia

In Cartago, a middle-sized Colombian town, a local organization, Corporaciiocesana Pro-Communidad Cristiana (CDPCC), with the support of the German Development Assistance Association for Social Housing (DESWOS), developed the housing project La Trinidad. In Cartago, about 10,000 people without adequate housing were scattered all over the town. As a result, the identification of a target group was a difficult process which involved selecting among applications of suitable families who met the criteria set by the organizing agency. The selected families were subsequently organized in project groups which were to construct their houses on allocated plots with the highest possible degree of self-administration and mutual self-help.

The following criteria for the selection of the target group were agreed upon by the organizing agency and representatives of the project groups:

(a) Low income: only families earning not more than the minimum wage were taken into consideration;

(b) Families with many children were preferred;

(c) Families had to have been residents of Cartago for five years;

(d) Families had to be capable of meeting and prepared to meet all requirements of self-administration and mutual self-help activities;

(e) Families had to have a good reputation in the neighbourhood.

Each family applying for membership in one of the project groups had to fill in a questionnaire with the help of a social worker. After examination of the questionnaire in the office of CDPCC, the family was visited by a social worker who interviewed the family members, looking into motivation, capabilities, problem areas etc. of the family. After the interview, a decision was made as to whether the family could be taken into consideration for membership in a project group.

In the case of La Trinidad, there was no specific target group but rather a set of concrete criteria based on the experience of the organizing agency and aimed at poor families willing to cooperate and capable of co-operating in such a difficult undertaking as a self-help housing project.

(introduction...)

After the target group has been defined, the next step is to inform the prospective participants of the relevant features of the proposed project and the conditions of their participation. The information provided should cover the following items:

(a) Aims and proceedings of the project;

(b) The self-help character of the project;

(c) The financial implications and property regulations;

(d) The building technology and the building process;

(e) Structure of organization and administration of the project;

(f) The role of possible external agents;

(g) The presentation and role description of personnel.

Each item should be discussed extensively so that those items on which there is no consensus can be realistically adjusted to the conceptions of the project participants. Everyone involved in the project must be informed about the proposals, in order to reduce future cases of misunderstanding the project's implications.

Case study low-income housing company (LEHCO-OP), Lesotho *

Facing a housing crisis, the Government of Lesotho invited the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) to provide a feasibility study for a low-cost housing programme in Lesotho. A pilot cooperative housing project, which was called the Mohalalitoe Co-operative Housing Society, began in early 1975. It was intended to fund the construction of 280 houses, of which only 185 were actually completed.

Since this was a pilot project in Lesotho, many problems could not be foreseen, and as a result, changes during the construction phase had to be made. Some of the problems were clearly owing to insufficient information of the beneficiaries on the terms of the project and a lack of consensus with the project staff - e.g., skilled labour provided by LEHCO-OP to assist families was misused, in that families participated only occasionally in the construction of their houses. The allocation of building materials became a problem, as participants began to make unauthorized changes to their houses. Loan arrears were another serious problem, partly caused by lack of information on the financial conditions of participation. The problems indicated the need for a series of information sessions and training courses which should, ideally, have been held before the project started and accompanied the implementation process.

Therefore, in the follow-up projects, training and information sessions were held for beneficiaries approved by the Beneficiary Selection Committee (BSC). The training sessions were organized during weekends under the supervision of the community section of LEHCO-OP, with contributions from the technical section. The sessions also provided LEHCOOP with a forum through which beneficiary preferences could be assessed. The mistakes made in the first project and the adjustments which were made by the organizing agency for the follow-ups demonstrate the importance of a comprehensive communications and information programme.

* Extract from C.A. Mphakalasi, "Lower-income Housing Company (LEHCO-OP), Lesotho: a self-help housing experience",' aper prepared for the Workshop on Tea Teaching Materials and Training Programmes for Cooperative Modes of Participation in Slum and Squatter Settlements, Nairobi, 1981.

(introduction...)

The application of a participatory approach requires recognition of the decisions taken by the target group, which may turn to an external agent for advice, support and help. This implies that mistakes can be made, and lessons learned from the mistakes. The task of the agent is to outline different ways and means to reach a goal and their advantages and disadvantages: he will provide information and leave the decisions to the people concerned. His role is mainly to facilitate, encourage, mediate and coordinate, and to give participants the opportunity to discuss by themselves the problems arising in the course of the project.

The agent has to mobilize a group-centred process of problem-solving on two different levels:

(a) Information: The agent's task is to outline possibilities of how people can improve their situation;

(b) Motivation: The agent has to encourage people to take action and change their situation.

The mobilization process is described in the case study of "La Trinidad" under requirement 2 above.

Case study la Trinidad, Colombia

Community participation is the main feature in La Trinidad, and the role of the Corporacion Diocesana Pro-Communidad Cristiana (CDPCC) is limited to the two principles of the mobilization process: information and motivation. The social worker from CDPCC organized meetings with the target group in which problems of daily life were discussed. Those problems were not discussed in a general way but with reference to concrete situations and shortcomings in the project. For example, some families complained that the nutrition available for their children was very poor and many suffered weakness and illness. That was discussed in a meeting, and information on food values as well as the preparation of nutritious meals was provided. Finally, courses were organized for the families on how to diversify and to increase nutrition with limited household budgets. Social workers also visited single families to encourage active participation and to work on specific problems, such as being unable to pay the necessary down payment for a house.

The activities of CDPCC concerning income generation were of particular importance, because many families lived on or beneath the subsistence level. For example, most of the women in the project were organized to form a handicraft group to produce embroidered shirts, shawls etc. which were sold not only in Cartago but also in other towns of Colombia. The activity worked out very successfully and encouraged families to face the financial burden of participating in a housing project.

Before the project started, each project family was briefed, during information sessions with all project members, about the rights and the obligations of every participant. Subsequently, agreements between CDPCC and the respective families were signed covering the following items:

(a) Credit conditions and repayment scheme;

(b) Plot allocation procedure and plot use;

(c) Regulations for self-help activities.

The regulations covered especially the organizational framework of the building process on the site as well as the system of self-administration and decision-making by the participants.

Between six and 10 families constituted a building group working on the site. Each building group elected a foreman who coordinated the group and who was responsible for the correct use of the building materials and the tools that were provided. Each head of a participating family worked with his group at least six hours a week as a minimum contribution of labour. Normally, the work was done on Saturday afternoon and Sunday morning. If at any time a participant was unable to join the working group he had to give reasons, and relatives or friends were expected to take his place. In certain extreme cases of repeated absence, sanctions defined by the project group for non-compliance included expulsion from the project.

La Trinidad was very successful and is recognized in Colombia as a project with a high degree of self-help and participation. The indicators for success can be seen in the following list of achievements:

(a) The project reached the target group of low-income families living at subsistence level. Such families are normally excluded from the low-cost housing market in Colombia;

(b) Through efforts to encourage saving activities and to organize income-generating measures, the families were generally able to pay for their houses under conditions which allowed more families to get access to low-interest credit via a revolving-fund system;

(c) The project led to a group identification of otherwise isolated families, and initiatives, such as a kindergarten, adult education and recreational activities, were organized by the group members.

Case study Barrio Escopa, Philippines*

Under the national Zonal Improvement Programme (ZIP), a number of upgrading and resettlement programmes have been launched and are being undertaken in cities throughout the Philippines. Barrio Escopa was selected as the pilot site for the implementation of the Zonal Improvement Programme in Quezon City, with a view to developing a system for the improvement of 22 other ZIP sites in the city.

Barrio Escopa began to evolve as a squatter community immediately after the Second World War, when the migration of rural populations into the cities reached an average rate of 22 per cent per year, up to 1950. The site particularly attracted the families of construction workers, since it was close to the construction site of government-sponsored housing projects for middle-income and high-income groups. The squatter community grew to over a total land area of 4.5 hectares, with some 1,246 families, or approximately 8,000 persons.

The conditions and the consequent problems in Barrio Escopa were typical of most squatter areas in Metropolitan Manila, although it particularly drew the concern of the city government because of the militance of its residents' organization, or Homeowners' Association. Their efforts to call the government's attention to their plight and to have the land they were squatting on given to them had been fully documented by the community leaders. Although the government recognized their situation, its early actions concentrated mostly on socioeconomic development programmes by different agencies, which were sporadic and un-coordinated in nature. The land issue was evaded, and most of the programmes were realized during campaign periods prior to elections.

In 1975, new developments favourable to the community began taking shape. The city government drew up and launched an urban redevelopment programme for Barrio Escopa which had the objectives of transferring the land to the people, providing the community with basic facilities and services, upgrading the old site, providing sites-and-services in adjacent areas and introducing socio-economic development programmes. In 1977, when the national Government - through the National Housing Authority-launched the Metro-wide ZIP, the city government's programme was incorporated into the national Government's ZIP, since both programmes had the same objectives and were utilizing the same methodologies. The project's-approach to the community's housing problems was to provide the residents with the resources required to upgrade/rehabilitate their own dwellings within the framework of a community improvement programme.

At first, the project implementation staff encountered apathy among the residents, which probably resulted from their unfortunate experiences with previous similar undertakings. In addition, the residents' own role in the programme was not at the outset clearly defined and explained. There was noticeable hesitance on the part of the residents to participate in the organized discussions as well as to accept the necessity of collaborating with the government. Discussions were limited to suggestions about plot size, location, amount and release of loans etc. During the initial survey, there was virtually no co-operation from the residents, or else they supplied false information.

Another factor that worked against the credibility of the programme arose during a particular period in the programme implementation when policies were periodically being changed. One change was the shift in programme approach to the construction of medium-rise tenements in 1978. That created a stir among the residents who expressed unwillingness to pay for the units and to relocate their dwellings from the space they already occupied. A:- a compromise with the national Government's Ministry of Human Settlements, the approach was revised to combine the original concept of upgrading existing housing units with the construction of at least seven tenement buildings, which were to rise at the newly acquired adjoining site.

After a series of preparatory activities which included improved contacts with the community, specific surveys and preliminary planning, the project was launched in April 1978 as an information drive that served as a springboard for introducing the different project components. As a result of extensive discussions between project staff and the community, which lasted during the entire duration of the project, effective means of participation gradually evolved.

* Extract from Teresa M. Mariano, "Experience in promoting people's participation in the integrated improvement of low-income settlements", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Cooperatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

(introduction...)

In the discussions of the two Workshops and in many workshop papers, it was pointed out that housing programmes must be a means for improving the living conditions of inhabitants, taking into consideration people's cultural backgrounds and requirements. One of the requirements for the development of housing co-operatives, therefore, is that housing be seen in the context of a continuous social process. The establishment of a development-oriented community structure is a basic condition. Such a structure ideally evolves through collective efforts of residents, with the aid of an accepted local leader and, sometimes, with the support of external agents.

Leader personalities often emerge from a reference group of residents who share the views of the initiating person or agency and who appear to support the idea of development. The reference group may consist of:

(a) A local leader with good reputation;

(b) A prominent inhabitant;

(c) Somebody working in a position that may be of advantage for the proposed action;

(d) Somebody with skills that may be needed in a housing group (e.g., carpenter).

Such a reference group is an important body not only when a project is being formulated but also later on when the self-help group is established and in operation. However, the essential advantage of a reference group is that it provides potential leadership manpower, which seems to be a must for effective self-help measures.

Case study Ruben Jaramillo, Mexico *

The squatter settlement Ruben Jaramillo in Morelos, Mexico, demonstrates the political implications of strong leadership in such a settlement and also the political responsibility of its leader. Cuernavaca (Morelos) was the administrative centre of the Tlahuica region, under the Aztec domination. After the War of Independence in 1810, the region saw the development of large sugar-cane plantations introduced by the Spaniards. Haciendas came to dominate the area, taking over the native rural communities and turning their inhabitants into slaves and day labourers. Those are among the main factors that made the locally based movement, led by Zapata, one of the most important events in the revolution of 1910. After the revolution, Cuernavaca began to grow rapidly and became a fashionable resort for upper-income groups from Mexico City. A trend towards industrialization has been reinforced in the past few years by the federal policy of decentralizing the industrial growth of Mexico City.

Named after a follower of Zapata, the colonia Ruben Jaramillo was established by a squatter invasion of 300 families in April 1973, on what was supposed to become a high-income weekend residential development called "Villa de las Flores". The squatters reclaimed the site with the assertion that it had been illegally procured with the help of a fraudulent governor. The Jaramillo population was young, composed largely of low-paid construction workers (29 per cent) and landless peasants (18 per cent). Most of them had come to the colonia from within or around the Cuernavaca metroplitan area, but 48.1 per cent were originally migrants from the neighbouring state of Guerrero. By early 1974, the original number of 300 families had risen to over 1,500.

From the beginning, the colonia developed a strong and politicized leadership which organized the community and built basic urban infrastructure through its own efforts. The leader came from a peasant family in the state of Guerrero. His immediate family members had been killed by either the army or the landlord's private police. As an adolescent he was sent to Mexico City to look for a job; being unable to read he got lost in the city and could not find his way back to the house of his relatives. He spent weeks sleeping outside and looking for a job, before eventually joining an itinerary group of artisans making and selling handicrafts. While working in that way around the country, he became introduced to Maoism through some Maoists who had joined the company. Later, he joined their discussion group, which eventually (1969) led to his being sent to China. He returned in 1973, convinced that he could lead the peasantry in revolt.

His first effort was the founding of a squatters' camp, of 1,500 people. Streets and communal areas were levelled by hand, and a school and a health centre were built of scrap materials and corrugated tar cardboard. Student volunteers from Cuernavaca and Mexico City staffed and operated the community facilities, helped redesign the urban layout, started food crops and self-managed workshops etc. The layout took into account the developer's scheme, which had already been partly implemented. The colonia also drew support from groups of teachers, artists and workers, and was fast becoming a revolutionary social experiment in self-managed urban development.

In view of the example that the colonia Jaramillo was setting, the state government decided to intervene. It offered to build facilities and install utilities in exchange for political control of the colonia. When several attempts of that sort as well as threats had failed, the army was ordered to encircle the settlement and capture the leaders. The army killed and wounded a number of people, but most of the leaders - students and others - escaped. All self-managed and mutual-aid activities ceased, and the community's participatory efforts were deactivated. The Government brought in a mobile subsidized food store and new teaching and health staff; schools and a child-care centre were built of permanent materials. INDECO (National Insitute for the Development of the Community), a governmental agency, was charged with developing the urban infrastructure, and work on utility networks began immediately.

The layout is a standard grid which evolved from the original settlement through modifications made by the community and then by INDECO. Basic problems were related to the excessive lengths of the networks and the limited flexibility of subdivision with the blocks. The semi-public areas were equally distributed, which did not allow a clear organization of the community around them.

* Extract from Maria Isabel Vargas, "Popular participation in a self-managed squatter settlement, Ruben Jaramillo, Morelos, Mexico", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Co-operatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

Case study the Lusaka urban project, Zambia*

Contrasted to the case of the squatter settlement Ruben Jaramillo in Mexico is the leadership system in the Lusaka Urban Project in Zambia. There, the role of leadership was taken over by the Government itself. Two important principles were embodied in the Lusaka Project after it was launched in 1975:

(a) An overall commitment to community participation in the programme;

(b) A new management approach using interdepartmental management teams, based at headquarters, and inter-departmental project teams, based in the geographical area office.

The apparent remoteness of the town centre was overcome by establishing six locally based project area teams. Those project team offices were accessible to residents and were sensitive to their needs.

The process took the form of locally based project teams providing information in a digestible form to individual groups. The commitment to participation involved considerable changes in the traditional local-authority approach to community involvement in decision-making. During the period of the project, there was considerable experimentation, as project teams endeavoured to translate the commitment to community participation into reality. Important development for residents were:

(a) New styles of communication with residents (attractive leaflets, exhibitions, film shows, tape, slide and video presentations etc.);

(b) Direct consultation with the residents' political groups (ward development committees, functional building groups and road planning groups);

(c) Some joint decision-making with residents' groups (road planning groups participated in deciding where the services should be placed and approved plans).

A significant feature of the programme was that project teams were obliged to consult with residents as part of the work programme for every area. That meant that, in all six project areas, the project teams had to promote community participation. The community development element in the project's work was crucial, if participation/consultation was to be achieved. In 1976, a communication unit was set up to supplement the work of the project teams. It provided necessary publicity in the form of leaflets, posters, booklets, exhibitions and slide and film shows, in order to demonstrate to residents the kind of improvements which were expected.

Resident involvement is important not only for the short term, while decisions are being made, but also for the long term, after the programmes have been completed. It is only by effective help from local authorities or agencies during formative stages that the residents' involvement may develop sufficiently to be self-perpetuating. To that end, in areas where such groups do not already exist, assistance should be given by the authority on such matters as the practical aspects of organization. Resident involvement, in turn, provides planners and project teams with valuable assistance in the distribution of information and with feedback.

The case study is an example of a Government trying to represent the interest of its people - in particular, of the poor. During the course of the project, governmental agencies took over the leadership role, using that role to motivate and teach the project participants to take responsibility upon their own shoulders step by step.

* Extract from Steve S. Mulenga, "The concept of participation and community involvement in the management of the Lusaka squatter upgrading, Lusaka, Zambia", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Co-operatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

(introduction...)

Once leader personalities emerge and the spontaneous mobilization process (attention, information and motivation) is set into motion, the promotion of managerial capabilities by educational means is highly desirable. Management is an important tool for reaching the desired aim of a self-help project, of keeping books and making responsible decisions in financial matters. It also includes the ability to motivate people and to work out compromises for conflicting parties.

Case study Barrio Escopa, Philippines*

In 1966, the institute for small-scale industries (issi) was established as a unit of the university of the Philippines, primarily to assist, stimulate and promote small-scale industries through training, research and consultancy. Over the years, the Institute developed its expertise and expanded its facilities, as it entered new areas of assistance or made innovations in existing programmes in response to needs of contemporary small industries. The Institute introduced the concept of low-cost mechanization and an entrepreneur-ship development programme in the Philippines. It pioneered in supervised credit programmes and extension services.

* Extract from Sonia Tiong-Aquino, "A case study on the Barrio Escopa Credit Union", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Co-operatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

In 1977, Barrio Escopa in Quezon City */ was chosen as a demonstration site. A survey was undertaken to establish terms of reference and to determine the points of entry for the Institute's development strategies. Based on the findings of the study, the following strategies were identified:

(a) Holding training courses that would satisfy the perceived needs of the residents, such as entrepreneurial training; basic supervisory training; and achievement motivation;

(b) Operational activities on how the residents could improve their living conditions, in terms of enterprise development; employment; and credit extension facilities.

In view of the fact that the existing skills of the residents were limited (dressmaking, carpentry typing etc.), the project team decided to introduce other, basic, skills to selected trainees, while at the same time upgrading levels of proficiency in the existing skills; and to prepare and develop a project feasibility study on the establishment of a credit union.

The credit union was decided upon as the most appropriate mechanism for serving the credit and financing needs of the intended beneficiaries. Not only did survey results corroborate that conclusion but experience suggested it. Many - if not most credit programmes for low-income groups had suffered from a high rate of arrears and non-repayment, and one reason for that problem was the tendency of borrowers to view the loans as grants which need not be paid back. A community-based credit union would discourage that tendency, since the money lent would be administered by the community - i.e., essentially by the residents themselves and not by the anonymous "government". At the same time, there would be community pressure on members and borrowers to abide by the union rules.

The project design for Barrio Escopa specified the establishment of the credit union as the conduit of funds for all activities in the area requiring financial assistance. Survey results confirming the interest in co-operative activity also showed that one of the basic sources of credit was relatives. Other sources were usurers, neighbours, profiteers, money shops and cash advances from offices. It is significant to note the presence of 50 banks within a five-kilometre radius of the area - 38 commercial banks, two thrift banks, nine savings and mortgage banks and one rural bank. A basic finding, however, was that banking institutions and other formal sources of loans generally would not grant consumption loans, and it would be cumbersome for both parties to negotiate for business loans that were relatively small in amounts.

A study of credit needs showed that loans should cater for productive and providential purposes. The ultimate ability of the co-operative in stimulating housing consturction then depended on the amount and quality of the loan portfolio which could be generated from the service area. Hence, the organization of the Barrio Escopa Credit Union Inc. (BECUI).

Vital to the establishment of any co-operative venture is an understanding of the concept of cooperatives and a campaign for membership. In organizing the credit union in Barrio Escopa, the first move was to form assemblies to explain the concept of the union. A primer prepared by the Department of Co-operatives Development in the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development was issued as the basic information document. The following topics were covered by the primer:

(a) The general assembly;

(b) The board of directors;

(c) Management staff;

(d) Steps in organizing a credit co-operative;

(e) Registration requirements;

(f) Capital requirements of a credit cooperative

(g) Assistance to co-operatives;

(h) How funds are protected.

There were at least four assembly meetings held for residents, but attendance was meagre, with an average audience of 20. Meetings were held on Sunday afternoons, preceded by a two-week announcement through the barangay bulletin boards, councilmen and contacts. An officer from the Bureau of Co-operatives Development was present at the meetings.

Owing to numerous meetings being called by different agencies responsible for other project components, the residents simply could not prioritize the meetings that were important. Attendance at assemblies was not adequate to support a co-operative movement, so a core group was selected from among those who showed concern and interest. As a strategy, the barangay captains' co-operation was sought, by involing them in the selection of the core groups, although the elderly project team gave preference to young residents, because of their enthusiasm, idealism, energy and availability. The core group of 18 persons represented proportionally the four barangays and members were given a three-day live-in course in co-operative leadership.

The course consisted of:

(a) Group dynamics exercises to mobilize cooperative thinking;

(b) Lectures - on co-operatives with regard to people and organizations, history and principles, nature and purpose, organizational and financial structure, leadership and involvement, overview of management;

(c) Workshops on the various forms of socioeconomic exploitation in the community and on the meaning of self-help and the dynamics of group action.

The core group was responsible for the membership campaign. Its first activity was to recruit interested residents for the first pre-membership education programme, scheduled on 16-22 October 1978. Thus, there were two groups actively campaigning for the organization of the credit union; the project team and the core group of residents. The key element in the realization of the credit union was the popular participation of the community through the core group, which served as the liaison between the community and the project team.

After the three batches of pre-membership education participants had graduated, a general assembly was organized to elect the officers of the credit union. Most of the core group members were elected. A total of 111 members were present, out of 159 residents who qualified to vote by attending the pre-membership education programme. During the assembly, the members were again informed of the goals and objectives which should be observed in the operations of the co-operative. The officers' roles were explained, and the concept of co-operativism and the operation of a credit union were discussed with the officers.

The Credit Union was organized with rigid internal controls. For the first two years, ISSI provided consultancy services to the committees and the board of directors. The board of directors provided management support and policy directions, and the credit committee attended to the processing of applications for loans and the keeping of records. The education committee was responsible for pre-membership training and the upgrading of members on co-operative rulings and policies. It was also responsible for planning and implementing promotional and other activities of the Credit Union. The supervisory committee controlled the financial management of the co-operative and was responsible for internal control and the installation of an adequate and effective accounting system.

To ensure that funds were disbursed as planned, control had to be instituted by the supervisory committee which came up with specific measures for the evaluation and monitoring of activities and operations of the credit scheme. The books of accounts of the Credit Union were open to regular checking by each member. Policies were contained in the lending manual prepared by the ISSI project team. In observing such policies, flexibility was encouraged, most especially in policy interpretation, depending upon decisions called forth in specific cases. The officers of the credit Union served as the focal point, as far as the implementation of policies was concerned.

A period of three months was needed to test the practicality of procedures and feasibility of policies. Officers and committee members were asked to note the flaws of the lending manual. Likewise, members were advised to comment on whether procedures were realistic and devoid of red tape. In the fourth months, the lending manual was revised to adopt changes which proved necessary during the trial period.

In March 1979, the fifth pre-membership seminar concluded with 143 graduates, with membership thus totalling 132. Since one of the basic requirements of a co-operative under Philippine laws was a minimum membership of 250, the registration requirements of the Barrio Escopa Credit Union had been fully met. In April 1979, another general assembly was called, to ratify policies and procedures of the Union.

* Based on Teresa M. Mariano, "Experiences in promoting people's participation in the integrated improvement of low-income settlements", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Cooperatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

(introduction...)

When a financing system is being set up, financial contributions, even small ones, are necessary, not only to start work but also to prove the members' interest in the joint undertaking and their readiness for active participation. The amount of the contributions will vary, according to the amount and type of income of the project members.

Usually, three socio-economic groups can be identified:

(a) Those without any income, living from donations and remittances;

(b) Those employed in the informal sector or self-employed;

(c) Those in wage employment.

In general, it can be observed that most of the lowest-income households are looking for gainful employment or depend on occasional jobs which, in sum, may provide subsistence. The latter have to find lodgings very near to their different working places.

There are crucial factors which tend to exclude such groups from conventional housing-finance schemes and have a restrictive effect on economically weak borrowers. The following components often are not adjusted to the special living and savings conditions of low-income families:

(a) Reliability requirements - proof of a formal and regular income of a level adequate to the amount of the loan, and the necessary personal resources for down payments;

(b) Loan terms - loan amount, maturity, interest, and method of payment.

If low-income families are to benefit from official finance systems, improvements are needed in the overall provision of funds, access to those resources, and adequate terms of finance, by means of:

(a) Acceptance of informal income criteria;

(b) Adequate requirements for personal resources;

(c) Low loan amounts;

(d) Short maturities;

(e) Low interest rates; and

(f) Flexible methods of payment.

Case study the Kirillapone housing improvement loan plan, Sri Lanka*

An integrated urban community development project in Kirillapone, Sri Lanka, was started by the United States Save the Children Federation (SCF) in July 1979. While using housing as its main base of development, the project incorporated several other social and economic development elements such as programmes for employment and income generation, health and nutrition, environmental sanitation, women's development, child care, social development and improvement of the physical infrastructure. A recent survey indicated that, in order to meet the minimum housing requirements of the Kirillapone shanty dwellers, a programme of housing improvement and reconstruction for at least 300 - 500 dwellings was necessary. Such a programme would involve an initial outlay of financial resources for technical and managerial inputs well beyond the current reach of the community. The community of Kirillapone, on the other hand, had an unskilled labour force numbering over 700, and a skilled labour force comprising carpenters, masons, roofers and brickmakers, numbering about 70.

A loan plan was devised to maximize resources available from interested parties. The proposed plan provided an experimental model on the financing of low-cost housing for low-income communities that have little access to the formal banking structure. An analysis of available resources indicated that each of the three main parties - the community of Kirillapone, the People's Bank of Sri Lanka and the Save the Children Federation - had a field of experience and resources to contribute to the loan plan.

The Community Committee, with its intimate knowledge of the community's social and economic structure and its capability for organizing the shanty dwellers into a homogeneous societal group, would be able to mobilize residents and provide a framework of collective responsibility. The People's Bank of Sri Lanka, a forerunner in state welfare assistance programmes for low-income groups that usually were not reached by the commercial bank sector, offered an administrative and legal structure within the formal banking system through which the loan plan could be operated. The Bank was particularly interested in experimenting with an innovative housing scheme for the urban poor and was willing to subsidize administrative costs. The Save the Children Federation brought expertise in community motivation and organization as well as the ability to mobilize financial resources. Finally, Sri Lankan professional staff played a role in effecting liaison betwen the other parties.

A detailed survey of all households was conducted by the Save the Children staff. The primary objective was to ascertain income levels, assess housing needs and obtain participants' preferences on construction models.

A Loan Subcommittee was created, each consisting of residents appointed by the Community Committee from among its members. Save the Children assigned a senior staff member to be present at all meetings of the Subcommittee, which was expected to perform a vital catalytic role in the administration and coordination of the loan plan. Members of the Subcommittee were to hold office for a period of one year and were eligible for re-appointment on the basis of the previous year's performance.

In order to familiarize members of the Subcommittee and prospective borrowers with aspects of the loan plan, Save the Children in close collaboration with the People's Bank of Sri Lanka, designed a comprehensive training curriculum in credit management. The Subcommittee participated in shortterm intensive training and, also acted as cotrainer for groups of four to five prospective borrowers. Participation in the training sessions was a prerequisite for all loan applicants.

On the basis of the survey and with the guidance of the Loan Subcommittee, the Kirillapone Housing Improvement Loan Fund was established. Save the Children opened a margin account (no interest) at the Marahenpita Branch of the People's Bank and periodically deposited cash in accordance with projected operational costs over the first three years of the loan plan. Designated officials of the Federation were authorized to operate the Loan fund account. Loans were repayable over a 10-year to

15-year period and carried a nominal interest of 3 per cent per annum. The Bank had claim on the first 80 per cent of the repaid interest, and the balance went back into the Loan Fund. The amount of each individual loan varied from Rs. 1,000-15,000 per unit (i.e., approximately $65-980), depending on the repayment capacity and needs of each borrower. Rapid loan instalments were credited to a special current account for the first three years of the plan, to be recirculated for use by additional borrowers. Thereafter, accumulated funds were transferred to a fixed deposit account which carried a high interest rate, from which they were available for further use.

An additional Administrative and Legal Funds Account was maintained, to cover administrative costs incurred by Save the Children in establishing and maintaining the Loan Fund and to finance necessary follow-up. A designated contribution of $4,000 was received for that purpose.

Prospective borrowers were invited to make preliminary applications to the Loan Subcommittee, stating their particular construction needs and the amount of the loan required. The Subcommittee investigated each application on the basis of information available from the household survey, a personal interview and other evidence. A recommendation regarding the quantum of terms of repayment was made. Screened applicants then made formal application to the People's Bank, furnishing the necessary documentation and credentials, and producing a guarantor, as required. An application fee of Rs. 7.50 was paid to the Bank by the applicant.

The People's Bank verified the credentials of the borrower and the guarantor, using criteria by Save the Children. The following criteria were established for the Bank's verification of borrowers' credentials:

(a) Positive recommendation from the Loan Subcommittee;

(b) Submission of a national identity card;

(c) Age less than 50 years;

(d) Acceptable previous credit record with the Bank, if applicable;

(e) Nomination of a guarantor with acceptable credentials who would be willing to assume financial and legal risk for the amount borrowed.

In addition, the following criteria were used as a set of flexible guidelines for the Loan Subcommittee in making recommendations:

(a) Participation in the household survey;

(b) Participation in credit management training;

(c) Acceptable credit clearance from Save the Children, if a borrower under another scheme;

(d) Participation in the skills training project, and future income potential of family;

(e) Substantiation of regular employment, or a regular income source of a stable nature;

(f) General reputation and reliability within the community;

(g) Calculated amount of disposable income per month and current costs of house maintenance per year exceeding loan obligations.

Several interrelated components were combined to ensure that adequate follow-up to the loan repayment process would occur. All three parties took responsibility in monitoring repayment progress and motivating defaulters. The People's Bank, as part of its normal services, supplied a loan officer at weekly intervals and at monthly intervals as the repayment process got under way. The officer discussed matters pertaining to the operation of the scheme, explained banking procedures and documents, and reviewed repayment performance with borrowers. The Community Committee received a list of defaulters on a monthly basis and paid household visits to ascertain the cause of the default. Those with inadequate income to meet repayment obligations were encouraged to enroll in skills training. Save the Children monitored the process of repayment and made suggestions on improving repayment performance. If necessary, a loan officer and a community counterpart could be assigned to collect loans on a daily basis within the community.

The advantage of repayment deposits through Savings Passbooks on a daily or biweekly basis was stressed in the credit-management training sessions. Persons employed in a Save the Children project were encouraged to have regular repayments withdrawn from their salaries. As part of its administrative responsibilities, the People's Bank took regular follow-up procedures for delinquent commercial borrowers.

* Extract from Hugh Karanunayake, "A Housing loan programme for low-income groups: a case study of a project planned by United States Save the Children Federation", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Co-operatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

(introduction...)

In low-cost housing projects there are three main interacting agents:

(a) The communities or target groups;

(b) Non-governmental agencies or main supporting agencies in the field of technical and managerial assistance, which are sometimes promoters as well as supporters;

(c) Financial supporters (national and international supporting agencies, donors).

In a project conceived with the broad objective of participation, the community or target group plays the double role of being object and subject of the project: it becomes an object but is also a main resource.

To take advantage of itself as a resource, it is necessary for the community to attain an adequate level of organizational structure and social awareness. This must be achieved step by step in a process of learning from experience and of building from simple to complex degrees of organization. The following stages can be identified in that process:

(a) In order to achieve very concrete, clear, relatively short-term objectives, the first step is to set up small groups. They must be small enough (15 - 30 persons) to be managed easily by their representatives;

(b) After the small groups are established or when the community by itself has acquired some organizational experience without the support of an external agent, the next step is to build a community-level organization based on the groups. The type of organization will vary, depending on the size of the community and the type of organizational experience it has had. The organization must try to achieve simple goals in the beginning and later diversify its work. The external supporting agency should gradually diminish its influence in decision-making and should play the role of a sponsor and consultant, always encouraging the community to project itself to the outside world and establish relations with other organizations and with bureaucratic and government institutions;

(c) Gradually, the community organization should acquire a certain skill in self-management, in order to deal with complex projects. It may wish to federate with similar communal organizations.

Case study Palo Alto, Mexico *

The Palo Alto co-operative, discussed under requirement 1 above, has always counted on the support of various non-governmental external agents, among which the following stand out:

(a) An auxiliary group of Christian volunteers organized from among the parents of children in a local private school were the first to establish contact with the community. Their role was important because of their knowledge, their social relations and the permanent commitment they showed towards the community in its different developmental phases in various fields of activity (legal, financial and administrative aid; support in negotiations; educational and sanitary activities; training of women; religious training etc.);

(b) The Social Centre for Popular Promotion was established by social workers. It carried out certain fundamental organizational tasks of community development, social training, integration of the Neighbours Union and the Co-operative, training techniques for community participation, support to the co-operative in its negotiations etc. It contributed to the consolidation of social awareness and to the successful fight to prevent the inhabitants from Palo Alto from being evicted.

(c) COPEVI (Operational Centre for Housing and Human Settlements) was in charge of providing technical aid to different phases of the project e.g., the selection of the negotiable land, provisional installation of houses, development of the land, urban and architectural projects, organization of tasks for self-construction, supervision of paid construction, quantification of the supply of materials, accounting of the financial procedures;

(d) FOMVICOOP (Fund for Housing in Popular Cooperation) was mobilized by the activities of COPEVI with the purpose of financing the construction of houses for the co-operative. It operated with the resources of foreign foundations.

In order to cover its different activities, the cooperative was in contact with a great number of authorities and, always took a strong position in defending its rights and supporting its objective of remaining on the land. That attitude, plus the internal organization of the community and the support it received from a volunteer group which had established good contacts with the city government in the 1970-1976 period, generated important support for the struggle of the inhabitants.

* Extract from Enrique Ortiz, "The Palo Alto Experience in Mexico City", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Co-operatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

Case study the Ahmedabad project'*

The Integrated Urban Development Project in Ahmedabad, India (see also the discussion under requirement 2), was primarily an intergovernmental-effort to rehabilitate flood victims. It started as a Municipal Corporation project with resources from the local and state governments. But for the positive intervention of three agencies outside the governmental system, it is conceivable that the Project would have been a conventional flood rehabilitation or slum clearance programme: the contractor would have built houses, and the flood victims would have occupied them after they were completed. The story would have begun and ended with the construction of houses for turnkey occupancy.

The first positive intervention was exercised by a voluntary agency, the Ahmedabad Study Action Group (ASAG), which not only brought in a development concept but, owing to its flexible structure, social orientation, institutional know-how and rapport with the community, provided the credibility, rationale and organizational base to convince the Municipal Corporation that it should attempt an unconventional approach.

Another important factor was the decision by the Municipal Corporation to create a semi-autonomous organization for decision-making and implementation. That arrangement not only insulated the project from political interference but also safeguarded its interests during the political crisis which brought about the downfall of the Government at the state as well as the municipal level. The arrangement for institutional co-ordination, through the mechanisms of a semi-autonomous Project Committee, distributed areas of responsibility to the participating agencies according to their respective strengths. Thus, representatives of the Government of Gujarat and the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, as members of the Project Committee, helped in obtaining resources, provided policy guidelines and advised in administrative, procedural and technical matters, while the entire sphere of project planning, implementation, community involvement and related matters was assigned to ASAG. Much of the project's success may be ascribed to the helping relationship and restrained but positive role played by the various contributing agencies. Undoubtedly, the relationship of trust between the Municipal Corporation and ASAG, while it lasted, proved the greatest asset of the project.

The third positive influence and support came from OXFAM which helped ASAG to sell the development package to government officials. OXFAM's willingness to support the social-action component, through which many community, organizational, educational, medical, motivational, training and income-supplementary activities were initiated and maintained, helped ASAG to build a nucleus of people who continued to provide essential managerial and organizational assistance to the community, which hopes to prepare itself to look after its own affairs.

* Based on Kirtee Shah, "Housing for the urban poor in Ahmedabad: an integrated urban development approach", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Co-operatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

(introduction...)

While it is clearly recognized that training can be a key element for development action along lines of cooperative forms of organization, the question of what kind of training is appropriate, is not easily answered. At the first glance, all projects dealing with the improvement of the housing situation of slum and squatter-settlement dwellers seem to be composed of similar elements, but certain basic conditions differ; for example:

(a) The upgrading of settlement A may be supported by external donors;

(b) People in settlement B may not have the same cultural background;

(c) The Government may deny the right of land use in settlement C;

(d) Among the residents of settlement D there may be a large number of skilled masons and bricklayers;

(e) Community E may have ample experience with self-help;

(f) The residents of settlement F may be reluctant to co-operate.

There are many experiences all over the world with self-organization, co-operatives, self-help housing, slum and squatter-settlement upgrading from which guidelines can be drawn. Therefore, everybody dealing with the improvement of the housing situation of slum and squatter-settlement dwellers can learn from the experience of others, take from those experiences those lessons that are suitable to his own needs and then design a training programme appropriate to a particular target group.

Experience has shown that there are four broad problem areas which are always troublesome to people in slum and squatter areas:

(a) Organization and management;

(b) Self-help building techniques;

(c) Finance;

(d) Legal matters.

Examples are given below of how different groups tackled the difficulties arising in those areas. They may be taken as guidelines for the development of further training programmes.

(introduction...)

Co-operatives and self-help organizations - be they housing, marketing, consumer or other - encounter common difficulties relating to organization, administration and management. Performing the specific tasks of overseeing, co-ordinating and implementing activities, budgeting, staffing and convening members' meetings, requires a sense of motivation and responsibility enhanced by particular skills. The failure of many co-operatives to function properly may be largely attributed to a lack of training in the necessary skills, for inadequate attention has been given to administrative and management training. If appropriate training and motivation are provided, cooperatives have a better chance to function for the benefit of their members.

Case study the Dandora project, Kenya*

The Dandora Sites-and-Services Project in; Nairobi, Kenya, developed a collective form of participation, with the purpose of organizing the financial labour and managerial resources of plot-holders (known as "building groups"). Building groups were formed as a strategy to enable the allottees to pool their meagre resources, so that they could construct their houses with organized self-help. Generally, three methods of house construction were adopted in the Dandora Project:

(a) Hiring a contractor - the fastest but most expensive method;

(b) The individual allottee working alone, buying all building materials himself, hiring labour on a casual basis and supervising the work personally - cheaper but very time-consuming;

(c) Building groups - also cheap but even slower.

Building-material loans were available to all allottees (in theory) on application. In practice, an allottee received a loan only after a certain amount of construction work had been completed and certified. Thus, an allottee with no savings or other means of raising the necessary cash could not utilize his building-material loan. The formation of building groups was, therefore, seen as a solution to the problem. Group members were given preferential treatment in releasing the initial instalment of the materials loan.

All building groups were entities registered under the Society Act and had a legal constitution. Only a fee of KShs.20 was payable as registration fee to the registrar of societies. In Phase 1, 15 groups were formed with 158 members, or 17 per cent of the total Phase 1 allottees of 1,000 families. Membership ranged from 10 to 16 persons per group as of the time of registration. All 15 groups in Phase 1 and lo of the 12 groups in Phase 2 were established subsequent to meetings between allottees and community development staff. All groups elected office bearers, chairmen, treasurers, and secretaries. Group meetings were held monthly, where possible, and decisions were made by consensus. Group officials also made decisions on behalf of their groups, usually after discussions with the community development staff in charge of the particular group.

The building groups handled such issues as:

(a) Members' failure to contribute regularly;

(b) Election of committee members (office bearers) and their duties;

(c) Composition and functions of the committee;

(d) General and committee meetings;

(e) Funds - monthly contributions, uses, and auditing;

(f) Plot development and authority for the group to rent whatever rooms had been constructed on members' plots, and utilization of such funds by the groups in developing other group members' plots;

(g) Determining whose plot was to be developed first or last (which was usually balloted).

Members of the community-development staff in the City Council worked very closely with the groups, giving them assistance as follows:

(a) Assistance to register with the Registrar of Societies;

(b) Assistance in the management of their resources, monthly contributions and materials loan, budgeting and planning;

(c) Training for group leaders in leadership skills, record maintenance and simple book-keeping;

(d) Help in the administration of day-to-day management of their affairs;

(e) Keeping records of their finances and other affairs;

(f) Attending their meetings regularly and helping them to solve their problems;

(g) Help in the purchasing of materials, when groups needed help, with advice on prices and funds;

(h) Advice on individual problems.

Teaching assistance was provided during house construction by building foremen and other technical staff, as was the case with all other allottees who were not organized in building groups.

Problems faced by the building groups included cases of some members taking undue advantage of other members and using the groups for political aims. A large proportion of the members were illiterate, which allowed knowledgeable members to promote their own causes at the group's expense. No proper accounts were available regarding contributions and payments, and, often, members who had joined a group in good spirit decided to leave after delays in financial contributions and decision-making.

* Extract from Monica M. Mutuku, "Mutual self-help help: house construction by allottees who have formed societies in the Dandora Project, Nairobi, Kenya", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Cooperatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

Case study the Ahmedabad flood relief resettlement, India

As mentioned above under requirement 8, the Ahmedabad Project had the welcome assistance of the Ahmedabad Study Action Group (ASAG), a voluntary interdisciplinary organization of professionals whose objective was to develop a community along with the construction of houses. Active participation of the people at the many stages of programming, planning and implementation was considered the strategy focus in the resettlement. After numerous meetings in the community and discussions with accepted leaders, an overwhelming number of the people opted for a collective housing effort with the support of a loan scheme which would be determined by their repayment capacity. Attempts were made to involve the community on house designs and site layouts through large-scale and frequent discussions which led to important changes in the final design.

Trained community workers were the agents of development under the social-action component. In the early project phase, the community workers were also the carriers of information and the channels of communication. After establishing a rapport with the community, they initiated an ongoing dialogue, explaining the project objectives, observing the reactions of the people and preparing the people to participate meaningfully. Even before the actual relocation from the makeshift shacks on the river took place, the community workers created a climate for intensive involvement through social programmes, such as enrolment of dropouts in nearby schools, regular health checks and income-supplementing activities.

During the planning stage, collective decision-making was facilitated by the community workers. They organized the people, to seek their views on the selection of site, design of houses, community layout and other matters. During the transfer phase, the community workers helped the people to solve problems of adjustment. In the post-occupation and maintenance phase, new leaders were identified and trained for self-governance: groups and subgroups were formed around issues to form popular opinion to take action for the resolution of problems identified by the group. Formal and informal indigenous organizations were activated, and people were helped in institution building and the development of management skills. The community workers were aware that they were outsiders and their role was only transitional. They knew that their function was not to replace the people's initiative by their own.

Case study the Chawama self-help housing project, Zambia *

In the Chawama Self-help Housing Project, the initiative came from outside. However, it was soon recognized that the interaction between the people, especially their leaders, and the external agency was important for the success of the project. Group leadership, decision-making in construction groups and group coordinating committees were the key elements of a training programme which enabled people to participate actively and efficiently in the project.

Group co-operation proved to be possible even among people who had no contact with one another at the beginning of the project. Co-operation within each group essentially depended on three agents: the chairman; the construction teacher; and the community-development worker. Their continuous daily encouragement of the construction groups proved central to the progress and successful completion of the project.

Each construction group selected its chairman during the orientation period. In all cases, the group's choice was a man, a woman being most frequently chosen for the post of group treasurer. Leadership ability of the chairman varied, but the most obvious indicator of the chairman's effectiveness was the group's ability to maintain a good pace in meeting construction schedules, such as making bricks or building the houses to roof level by a certain date. The group's ability to deal with its problems depended essentially on the chairman's interest in holding meetings frequently and on his strength in leading group discussions. Chairmen were frequently called on to ease group tensions, and some of them rose to the occasion. For example, one group was split by a participant's complaint that others had done an injustice to his wife and that the construction teacher had not adequately defended her. The group's chairman, showing great patience and sensitivity, helped the group solve the problem without breaking stride in the work effort. In another case, however, a fractionalized group continued to suffer tension and poor work performance, because the chairman condoned the disrespectful treatment which the majority faction meted out to the minority. In all cases, the community-development staff was on hand to furnish support to the whole group and to the chairman.

The construction teacher was as important to each group unit as the group chairman but in a quite different way. He was the project staff member closest to the house-builders in their work. His forethought, for example, in seeing that construction materials were always on hand and his adroitness in solving work problems were central to the success of the group. Many groups were initially surprised that their construction teacher was not a boss but rather a considerate teacher and helper who listened to them. During the construction period responsibilities of the community-development staff were closely linked to those of the construction teacher. He was encouraged to help the group solve its own problems on the job and to refer only the intractable problems to the community-development staff. A certain amount of rivalry existed at first between the construction teachers and the community-development staff. For example, the construction teachers felt that the community-development staff did not adequately explain to participants the difference between the government loan and total construction costs. On the other hand, the community-development staff members were tempted to blame the construction staff for their recruiting difficulties when prospective house-builders resisted becoming involved because they thought self-help construction too time-consuming. In the course of time, however, mutual respect for individual capabilities grew, and rivalries dwindled, which had the effect of the staff becoming mutually supportive.

Mobilizing and sustaining the families' interest and energy from the time of recruitment through to house completion were the community-development workers' tasks. Family and group self-confidence and active participation grew under their guidance. The community-development workers achieved that through the convening of meetings, mediation of conflict, liaison with other institutions and dissemination of information about the project.

Groups coalesced not only under leadership from the community-development staff, construction teachers and chairmen but also through joint decision-making. Questions most often before a construction group were:

Whose house should be build next? (an oblique way of asking, Whose behaviour and attitude does the group approve of?); Which families may move into their houses? Should we admit or expel this or that family?

The group's opinion of some member families was clearly shown by the visible lag in collective effort before work began on the last few houses of each group. Each time a group had to decide whose house should be built next, it would put off building the houses of laggard members. In that manner, groups would even single out a laggard husband in spite of the fact that the wife was hardworking. Nonconformity was sometimes punished in the same way. For example, a man who had dropped out of a group because it had refused his request to alter the brick-making procedure as suggested by the nonconforming member took up three days of group discussion. Under the terms of the work-exchange agreement, construction group members could invoke sanctions against laggard members. In practice, they quietly ignored that option, rarely using a formal conscious procedure to discipline a member.

Group solidarity was evident in the practice of allowing families to move into their houses only when the group gave its permission. Ten families had to complete their homes before such permission was granted. Participants gave a flexible intepretation to what might be considered a completed house. With the essential shell complete - i.e., the foundation laid - walls built and the roof on, a family already had something better than its original makeshift squatter dwelling and usually wanted to occupy it then and there. However, to permit families to move into their house as they became complete and before all of the group's tasks were finished would have jeopardized co-operative group work. Recognizing that, most groups did not allow occupancy until the work on all of the houses was more or less complete, except for doors and window glass, which were considered individual concerns.

After nine construction groups had been established, the project staff asked the groups if they wanted to form a central committee to represent all the groups. The staff saw a clear need for such a body as the scale of the project increased. By that time, about 140 families were involved, and matters requiring everybody's attention were arising. As the Field Director described it, the project participants' response was immediate. Not only did the staff want a committee but the groups also felt the need.

The Group Coordinating Committee which came into existence was composed of the chairman and two delegates from each building group. Usually, one delegate was a woman, and the other a man. Group treasurers, usually women, were frequently chosen as delegates. Half the members had to be present to transact business. However, if a quorum was not present, the delegates would often proceed to discuss issues on the agenda, even though they could not take official action. Decisions were usually made by reaching a consensus.

For the participants, the Committee's main function came to be that of a public-interest group, weighty enough to be listened to by the Township Council. The Committee petitioned the Township Council on behalf of the project residents for a number of needed facilities. Those included the upkeep of roads in the community, shopkeepers' licences for those who wanted to establish small stores, sufficient water taps and refuse bins, an adequately cleared, marked and scheduled bus stop on the main road, and a health clinic for children under five years of age.

Furthermore, the Group Co-ordinating Committee carried forward the initiative of several of the first building groups in constructing a primary school on the site. Finishing the school remained one of its chief functions well into 1973. It solicited and received a contribution from the Embassy the United States of America, mobilized and coordinated the construction of the building, petitioned the educational authorities for certification and the placement of teachers, and undertook to acquire and look after school supplies.

* Based on American Friends Service Committee, "Chawama Self-Help Housing Project, Kafue, Zambia (Philadelphia, 1975).

(introduction...)

Promotion of self-help building techniques is a prerequisite for people's participation in house construction, either individually or through mutual aid. It is emphatically stressed that some form of guidance through training (teaching) is necessary before actual physical construction can be initiated. Construction of houses or a four-walled room is a skilled task and should not be left to people's participation without their prior exposure to and education in construction techniques and knowledge of building materials. Self-help building techniques, therefore, should be explained and demonstrated to the people who are expected to build their houses, as part of the overall training package in slum and squatter-settlement improvement efforts.

Case study the Dandora sites-and-services project, Kenya*

The building groups in the Dandora Project in Kenya (see problem area 1 above) represented all those who were in genuine need of assistance during the construction process, mainly in technical, organizational and financial areas. The groups hired skilled persons to undertake the construction of each allottee's house, while the allottee's role was limited to the purchase of building materials and general supervision. Money contributed by the groups was paid to the skilled workers for labour costs.

Although self-help construction was encouraged, it was not imperative that every participant should actually build the house himself. The building group permitted an individual member to participate according to his own capacity, as long as he paid his contribution regularly. However, it was found that building houses was a skilled function, thus retarding the participation of many inexperienced members who were interested in building the houses themselves.

All allottees were given 18 months during which to construct at least one room on those plots where a kitchen was already provided by the project (type 'B' plots), and two rooms on those plots where only the wet core (toilet and shower) had been provided by the project. This was done with the aid of a buildingmaterial loan mentioned earlier. Allottees' failure to build their houses would have meant missing the ultimate objective of the sites-and-services project. House construction was, however, the most difficult part of the whole programme: it was costly, time-consuming and seemed too complicated to most allottees. At the end of the 18 months given to Phase 1 allottees, about 30 per cent had not been able to complete fully the one or two rooms as required.

The materials loan did not cover labour costs; in fact it did not even cover the costs of all materials. Group members had, therefore, to rely on their own savings to meet all labour charges plus the costs of some materials. Group members contributions ranged from K.Sh. 50 to K.Sh. 150 per month. Those rates were based on estimated costs and what group members felt they could afford. In a number of cases, the groups had to reduce the contributions from K.Sh. 150 to K.Sh. 100, as they found it difficult to raise monthly contributions which were in addition to monthly plot payments plus rental costs for the dwellings which group members occupied during the construction phase.

Group members were expected to supervise construction work on their own plots. Usually, such members were advised to take leave if they were wage earners. Self-employed group members usually did not have any problems in that respect. Skilled and unskilled labour was hired on daily rates ranging from K.Sh. 25 to K.Sh. 45 per day for Phase 1 and K.Sh. 50 to K.Sh. 60 per day in Phase 2 (skilled). In a few cases only, members provided unskilled labour themselves. Most of them simply could not spare the time in addition to employment and supervising the construction.

One of the concepts behind the development of the sites-and-services approach in house provision for low-income groups has been the role assigned to self-help. It was theorized that low-income communities contained much unemployed and underemployed labour that could be effectively utilized in shelter construction. It was expected that the surplus labour of households would be diverted into house construction.

The observations in Dandora have been as follows:

(a) The average allottee found that house construction was basically a skilled job and that unless he was an experienced artisan, his labour contributions were limited to unskilled labour. That also applied to building societies;

(b) Although some societies did contribute unskilled labour, it was generally found easier to give cash to each group member, leaving him the organization, management and other administrative matters, such as buying of building materials and hiring and supervising of both skilled and unskilled labour.

It was also observed that self-employed society members did much better than those in wage employment although wage-earners were advised to secure leave during the period their plot was under construction. Generally the self-employed could re-organize their time more effectively.

* Based on Monica M. Mutuku, "Mutual self-help: house construction by allottees who have formed societies in the Dandora Project, Nairobi, Kenya", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Co-operatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980

Case study the Chawama self-help housing project, Zambia *

In the Chawama Self-help Housing Project the organization of the construction work was laid down in a written Work Exchange Agreement, specifying each family's rights and obligations. The agreement, modelled on similar agreements used in other self-help housing projects, was an innovation in the sites-and-services scheme as originally conceived in the government plan. Each family pledged 1,000 work-hours to the group plus additional hours, if necessary, as the family's share in the total construction effort. The group itself was supposed to sanction and enforce the Agreement. Any family unable to contribute its full share agreed to pay a 40-ngwee penalty for every hour not worked, before being allowed to move into its house. No distinction was drawn between the work of an adult woman and the work of an adult man. The work of children under 16 years was counted as either two thirds or one half that of an adult. The key to the enforcement of the Work Agreement was the time record sheet kept by the timekeeper who was elected by each group.

All participants signed the Agreement. However, the building groups did not enforce its provisions fully, preferring to rely on norms and codes prevailing in their own culture rather than on a formal mode of contract. The adjustments needed for both staff and house builders required some attention, since the staff had to adapt its expectations to the cultural pattern and socioeconomic conditions. The modifications of procedure demonstrate some of the lessons learned in the Project.

Each family was obliged to work on the following tasks, presented below in the approximate order in which they were carried out:

(a) Clearing plots, which entailed cutting grass, removing stones etc.;

(b) Shovelling laterite soil into a truck and unloading the soil at the building site;

(c) Separating fine and coarse particles of laterite using a quarter-inch mesh sieve;

(d) Setting up galvanized iron roofs with a temporary supporting frame, which was done during the four-month rainy season;

(e) Filling in house foundations with large pieces of stone;

(f) Mixing fine particles with water and cement to make bricks, one house requiring approximately 2,500 bricks;

(g) Pressing bricks with a Cinva-Ram machine and setting bricks aside for two weeks of curing;

(h) Pouring concrete footings for the walls of the house;

(i) Laying bricks and keeping them plumb;

(j) Setting window and door frames as bricks were laid;

(k) Installing roof sheets and purling, then tying down roofs with wire;

(l) Digging privy, building privy walls etc.;

(m) Installing plumbing on the standard plots.

The Work Agreement required of the homebuilders more labour than was customarily invested in a house and a willingness to learn construction techniques. For most groups, it took 12-20 months from the beginning of construction before their houses could be occupied.

Beyond fulfillment of the requirements for work and other obligations spelled out in the Work Exchange Agreement, staff expected adherence to certain patterns of organization and procedure. Those expectations were oriented towards accomplishing the tasks of building the houses. They therefore entailed planning, co-ordination, punctuality, rational use of materials, purposeful employment of human resources and a system of fairness and mutual respect. The house builders had slightly different ideas. All wanted to finish the tasks before them, but the process of collectively undertaking the various tasks was just as important to them as the end product.

Reconciling the two orientations meant adjusting many of the provisions of the Work Agreement and required a revision of staff expectations. Keeping up morale had been a concern of staff from the outset, since the momentum and spirit of the first building group could shape the prospects for groups that followed, and before the project got under way, it had been decided to eliminate the element of competition, as a means of avoiding morale problems. (Construction contests have been used in other self-help housing projects, such as a government-sponsored project in rural Uganda in early 1960s.) It was felt that a competition would serve chiefly to introduce conflict into a situation where there was already a high potential for it. Thus, group morale took precedence over the staff's desire to complete houses as rapidly as possible.

The Zambian approach to keeping track of contributions to over-all group effort tended to make allowances for particular circumstances, nuances of behaviour and attitudes of each group member. The first building groups went through the motions of keeping track of hours on the time record sheet kept by the time-keepr but they generally passed responsibility for timekeeping to the construction teachers. The first group experienced tensions over work-hours within the two weeks after building began, but, instead of imposing sanctions against slow group members, the members decided to use the time record sheet merely as a public record of what each family was contributing. Still, after 10 weeks, the first group was so dissatisfied with that method of accounting for family contributions that it asked for the recording of work-hours to be stopped. Despite staff requests that they continue recording hours, the first group eliminated the procedure and, with it, the basic premise of the Work Agreement. Nevertheless, construction teachers did continue to record aggregate group hours.

After abandoning the work-hour concept, families continued to work together, despite differences in family contribution as great as 500 hours and despite the fact that groups never called on slackers to pay the penalty charged for hours not worked. Moreover, the earliest project participants advised later building groups not to expel lazy members and not to worry about the actual number of hours contributed. Why was that so? The reason probably stemmed from the house builders' own social values and norms. In their view, a participant's attitude and not the number of hours worked was the important consideration. A share in the work cannot be quantified, and, if one member was trying hard, the hours worked were of secondary importance to the other members.

A significant finding from the reports regarding self-help building techniques is that house construction requires specific skills and knowledge which many slum and squatter-settlement dwellers do not possess. The cognizance of that shortcoming should result in setting a pre-condition that all participants in house construction undergo buildingtechnique training. The use of illustrative training materials should be reinforced by large-scale models of building components, in order to help people perceive the finished house meaningfully and to understand the building assembly stages. However, as can be seen from the results of the Chawama Self-help Housing Project, it is not enough that people learn how to build a house. It is important that they learn how to build a house jointly.

* Based on American Friends Service Committee, Chawama Self-help Housing Project, Kafue, Zambia (Philadelphia, 1975).

(introduction...)

Mobilization of capital is an essential element in developing co-operatives and other non-profit associations. Government-supplied or induced financial assistance to co-operatives in improving shelter, infrastructure and services is usually in the form of subsidies, loans, guarantees, incentives or seed capital. The promise of future loans to an individual dweller as a means of encouraging personal savings is a technique which stems from co-operative and mutualist credit associations. The concept of "contractual" savings denotes that a voluntary agreement exists between a saver and lender whereby, if the saver accumulates a certain sum by a set date, he will recieve a loan of a specified amount. As such, along a continuum of possible housing finance sources, the contractual method of mobilizing private funds lies between those sources made available through the accumulation of voluntary individual deposits in savings and loans associations and those generated from compulsory government mandates to invest in lowincome housing programmes or bonds.

Savings-for-housing schemes attempt both to mobilize the indigenous resources of low-income families and to stimulate overall capital flows towards housing finance institutions. The latter general objective can be promoted by preferential taxation policies, high interest rates for house savings, the extension of grace periods for mortgage payments for holders of saving-for-housing accounts and/or by "soft loans" provided from government funds which enable savings institutions to grant loans at concessional interest rates. Aside from amassing funds through preferential treatment at the national level, individuals' savings can be attracted to housing ends by locally oriented savings-for-housing schemes. Many of those are modeled on the German contract system (Bausparkasse) in which the saver contracts to save a specified sum in return for a loan which is a multiple of the amount saved.

The co-operative housing movement has been particularly effective in promoting a mutually supportive group approach towards training, building materials production and promotion of self-help construction methods, housing management techniques, community services and savings credit activities. Cooperatives encourage people to save and thus generate capital for housing finance. They also reduce housing costs through economies of scale in group purchasing, their non-profit orientation and special tax status and their capacity as a safeguard against speculation.

Case study the Barrio Escopa credit union, Philippines

As part of the upgrading of Barrio Escopa in Quezon City (see also the case study under requirements 4 and 6), a study was carried out to assess the training needs and credit requirements of the residents. Based on the findings of the study, the Barrio Escopa Credit Union was established. The first move was to form assemblies to explain the concept of a credit union. A primer prepared by the Bureau of Cooperative Development was issued as the basic document, and several assembly meetings were convened. In order to prevent declines in meeting attendance, a core group was selected to work with community leaders to keep up interest among residents for cooperative membership training. The key element for the establishment of the credit union was the high level of participation of the community, mobilized by the core group which served as liaison between the community and the project team.

The core group's main task in the early phases of membership campaigns was to recruit interested residents to enroll in pre-membership education programmer, after which a general assembly was organized to elect officers of the credit union. Close monitoring of the credit union operations, particularly the lending activities, revealed the need for extensive on-the-job training of the officers. A live-in seminar was also designed to motivate the officers to work as a team.

The gradual strengthening and final success of the community-based credit co-operative depended largely on the quality of the training component. Emphasis on training was necessary in order to sustain the motivation, management capability and co-operative cohesiveness of the residents. A savings and credit union promotion programme should, therefore, be closely co-ordinated with a programme of teaching co-operative thinking, the rights and obligations of members in a co-operative society and the role of officers and supervisory boards.

Case study the Lusaka urban project, Zambia

The importance of training for co-operative finance was also demonstrated in the Lusaka Urban Project in Zambia. The experience gained made it evident that it is necessary to motivate residents to pay service charges and repay the building materials loans they receive. Often, the high default rates for loan-repayments is less an indicator for people's inability to pay than of their ignorance of their rights and duties in a co-operative society.

The Project had considerable difficulty in motivating participants to pay service charges and repay the building materials loans they received. Until the end of 1978, the service charge was only $1.55 per household, whereas it was to rise to $4.65 per household after all services had been provided in the improvement area. Default rates in payment for service charges were running about 50 per cent in 1978, and, on materials loan repayment, the default rate was much higher. This became a matter of great concern, both for the World Bank and the Government of Zambia, since the project was funded by loans which the Lusaka City Council had to repay to the Central Government which, in turn, had to repay the World Bank. This was one of the first projects in Zambia based on full-cost recovery from the population, and nonpayment in early sites-and-services schemes was endemic.

When the problem of non-payment was first encountered in the demonstration phase of the project, the Housing Project Unit (HPU) urged the community-development staff to put more emphasis on the participants' payment obligations during the community briefings. From that time, great care was taken by the community-development staff not only to underline the benefits of the upgrading but also to point out clearly and painstakingly to all participants the financial obligations they were expected to meet.

Written briefing materials, which the staff members used as their guide and which were distributed in local languages to all the leaders, contained the necessary information. Later statements by leaders and complaints by individual residents that they were not told about repayment obligations must be received with some scepticism because of the self-interest inherent in such response. Everyone who received a loan card signed a statement promising to repay the loan ,and an appraisal of service charge payment records in the overspill areas suggests that inadequate briefing was not a reason for default. Each family in the overspill areas was individually interviewed and attended three meetings prior to plot allocation. Their obligations were explained to them both individually and collectively, and yet the repayment record in the overspill of Chawama was only slightly better than in the existing area. In the case of the sites-and-services scheme, repayment obligations were clearly set forth in the briefing process, which also included three compulsory meetings. The difficulty the project experienced in recruiting low-income families to sites-and-services schemes indicates that families understood the obligations quite well and dropped out because they knew they would be unable to meet them.

Innovative ways of collecting charges were developed whereby each section of 25 households had corporate responsibility for payment, and credits were given for early and timely compliance. Ineffective input by community development staff has been mentioned as contributing to non-payment: not so much that they failed to describe payment obligations but rather that they did not create an atmosphere of community cohesion conducive to repayment. One possible reason for the limited success of the social workers could be staff shortage; at the time repayments were to start, most of the physical work had been completed and the community-based staff was greatly reduced.

There are a number of possible constraints on community participation in cost recovery that are not related to the performance of staff. Initially, leaders of the political party acted as collecting agents, but only the most secure leaders could afford to act as debt collectors. Most politicians preferred to be associated with visible improvements rather than recurrent burdens, and it was also important for them, even in a one-party State, to appear to be fighting for their constituents against the forces of bureaucracy and power. The idea of having party leaders themselves directly responsible for the collection of service charges flies in the face of such political realities.

Other issues probably further encouraged defaults in payment. For example, the poor maintenance of services by the City Council called into question the very reason for payment, and the lack of a clear relatonship between the total service charge and the improvements that were introduced further confused the participants. However, perhaps a more fundamental problem was that many households were already financially stressed to pay the monthly charges of $4.65 (in addition to the repayment of any loan). The project assumed that households could afford to pay up to 25 per cent of their income for housing and related costs, but, before, upgrading, the average household spent only 10 per cent of its income on housing. Most new house-owners were not used to any regular payments at all.

In a process of community participation, the structure of the community in all its aspects social and cultural, economic and political - must be understood. Only on that basis is it possible to develop appropriate methods to promote the involvement of the community. The Lusaka Project remains an impressive testimony of the potential of community involvement, and the contribution of the American Friends Service Committee in that achievement is unquestionable.

(introduction...)

A growing number of countries recognized the importance of providing a legal base for organized self-help and participation in decision-making, particularly in view of the apparent failures of public housing. Cooperative modes of participation require legal recognition - be it as a residents' association, building society or housing co-operative - if they are to fulfill the expectations of organized self-help. Evidently, the legal status of participation depends largely on the common objectives of the residents i.e., the purpose of their collective effort as well as the political and legal framework in which they are expected to operate.

Case study Palo Alto, Mexico *

Supported by a Presidential decree and fiscal incentives, the development of co-operatives in Mexico has taken positive steps in meeting the needs of members. Appropriate implementing and financing instructions, guided by Mexican Laws, have been set up to promote co-operative housing and other related activities which seek to integrate individual actions by means of co-operative efforts. The Palo Alto community has always taken a strong position in defending its perceived rights and achieving its objective of remaining on the land as part of a policy to eradicate slums and discourage support for urban segregation processes. In fact, Palo Alto was the first housing co-operative registered in the Federal District, and the first to hold its land as co-operative property.

Internal and external solidarity was the central principle of the Palo Alto co-operative, but it was difficult to find adequate legal instruments for making use of that solidarity. For example, it was not possible to establish a vigorous structure for social welfare which was to guarantee the necessary support to poor or troubled members.

* Based on Enrique Ortiz, "The Palo Alto experience in Mexico City", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Co-operatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

Case study co-operatives in the Philippines **

The legal system of the Philippines is favourable to co-operatives. However, since co-operatives laws have a rural bias, they are of only limited applicability to housing co-operatives in urban areas. The need to reorient that thrust in order to encourage the formation of non-agricultural cooperative development is quite evident. The Presidential Decree of 1973 entitled ''Strengthening the Cooperative Movement" sought to foster the creation and growth of co-operatives as a "means of increasing the income and purchasing power of the low-income sector of the population in order to attain a more equitable distribution of income and wealth". The Decree also did away with fragmentary and inefficient performances of past co-operative activities. As a consequence of the Decree, a threetiered structure of co-operatives was established: a barrio association in every barrio, co-operatives in every municipality, or city, and federations of several co-operatives. Following the general cooperative principles of open membership, democratic control, limited interest to capital and patronage refund, the Decree also provided exemption of income and sales taxes, and the application of the Minimum Wage Law in appropriate cases.

Barrio associations (samahang nayon) are social and economic in character, performing the simplest co-operative functions which do not require any complicated business procedures. They are pre-cooperative institutions, formed to carry out the educational process (including training, information and communication) at the barrio level, implement a compulsory savings programme and institute cooperative discipline among members. The rate of development of a barrio association is the basis for the extent of government assistance and the decision to elevate it into a full-fledged cooperative (kilusang bayan).

The Kilusang Bayan is a full-fledged cooperative organized by one or more barrio associations, provided they have satisfactorily achieved the basic purpose for which they were organized and are able to meet given requirements. Organized on a multi-barrio, or municipal, level, the full co-operative centralizes all economic activities of the barrio-associations, and the capital accumulated by their members service as its initial capital. It takes charge of area-wide production activities, the procurement and distribution of production supplies, and the accumulation of savings and extension of loans.

The Katipunanng Kilusang Bayan is composed of full-fledged co-operatives federated at the regional or provincial level. It serves as the operational support of full-fledged co-operatives, particularly in their marketing activities. It carries out tasks such as procuring production supplies, providing for storage, processing and transporting facilities, financing inventories, and providing credit for trade, bookkeeping, auditing, and continuing education services.

Given the supportive nature of national legislation on co-operatives in the Philippines, it can be expected that co-operatives and other organized forms of community participation will continue to contribute to the improvement of slum and squatter settlements.

** Based on Josephina M. Ramos, "Co-operatives in the Philippines", paper prepared for the Workshop on Integrated Co-operatives for Satisfying the Basic Need of Shelter in Slum and Squatter Areas, Marburg, 1980.

(introduction...)

Finding appropriate techniques for teaching people about co-operative modes of participation in human settlements is different because most existing teaching materials are not particularly relevant to the reality of low-income settlements in developing countries. Most current methods of instruction are based on the concept of trainer and trainee, with clear roles given to both, which means that the trainee is usually expected to play the role of a passive disciple. Co-operative modes of participation, however, require a type of training that, instead of enhancing individual knowledge, mobilizes collective action and the practical solidarity of the group. It is questionable whether existing formalized training programmes on cooperative housing possess the degree of sensitivity for community participation which is necessary when dealing with a lengthy and complex process of cooperative development.

The choice of a suitable organizational pattern for the promotion of co-operative modes of participation is determined by the objectives, scope and duration of the improvement programme. It is useful to distinguish between forms of organization that have the character of informal groups (self-help, economic and social purposes, or building groups for joint construction of houses) and formal organizations, such as housing co-operative societies, co-operative building construction societies, labour contracting co-operative societies, production co operative societies (e.g., craftsmen societies or societies for the production of building materials), savings and credit co-operative societies, and companies geared to promoting participation on a cooperative basis by means of adjusted bylaws etc.

The formal organizations have to operate in accordance with the existing legislation, which implies, for instance, that a minimum membership is mobilized. Because they are legally recognized entities, they normally enjoy certain advantages which may be denied to the informal groups - for example, limited liabilities and the authority to borrow money from the Government, banks, foreign agencies etc. Their immediate objectives are to secure land titles or acquire land; strengthen the legal status of squatter residents vis-a-vis the authorities, and promote access to technical assistance or government - aided schemes. In such formal groups as co-operatives, credit unions and building societies, a wide range of training on the part of participants is required before the group is legally recongized.

Informal groups have no general rules to follow in the organization and management of their daytoday activities. Rules are agreed upon by the members and vary from group to group.

Case study the Lusaka urban project, Zambia*

In the Lusaka Urban Project (see case studies under requirement 5 and problem area 3), the training of the assistant community development officers (ACDOs) who would be employed by the Housing Project Unit (HPU) of the Lusaka City Council was the joint responsibility of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). In theory, the AFSC was reponsible for classroom training, but, in practice, it took on substantial responsibility for field training as well. In co-operation with the Urban Community Development Staff Training College (UCDSTC) in Kitwe, the UNICEF consultant was to be a "trainer of trainers", instructing prospective ACDOs in the approaches required to motivate community participation. The AFSC consultant was to supervise the training in community organizing in Chawama.

The training programme was in response to a shortage of suitable community development personnel, a shortage identified in the project preparatory stage. The Department of Community Development, created by the Government in 1962, trained community development workers for urban and rural programmes, but the programmes were mainly carried out for rural health schemes, agricultural settlement projects, farming co-operatives and sites-and-services schemes, and the workers were trained for a specific role and method of approach. The role of community-development workers in squatter-settlement upgrading projects, however, required a different orientation - i.e., community organization, group work and stimulation of maximum self-help efforts.

The committee that selected the trainees for the job of assistant community development officer chose not to require rigid educational qualifications but considered previous experience and commitment to community participation as the trainees' important attributes. A few trainees were sent by the local authorities of other provinces, so that other areas could learn from the Lusaka upgrading experience.

The classroom training used "nondirective methods" which were introduced by the UNICEF consultant and two AFSC staff members. Such methods were thought to tee the most likely to produce the kind of community development worker needed for the upgrading project.

The trainer who uses the nondirective method does not attempt to decide for the trainees, or to lead, guide or persuade them to accept any of his own conclusions about what is good for them. He persuades the trainees to decide for themselves what their learning needs are; what, if anything, they are willing to do in order to meet them; and how they can best organize, plan and act to carry out what they have learned.

Under the nondirective method, the trainees were to be convinced that the trainers did not always possess the best ideas. It was hoped that residents of upgraded areas, after training, would have increased self-confidence when working with the community development trainees. Although there was an initial willingness to go along with such an approach learning, there was also some scepticism resistance, and expressed dependency on the familiar lecture method of learning. The trainers made themselves available during evenings for consultations, but trainees never used the eveing sessions except near examination time. Other scheduled non-classroom time included monthly interviews where trainees were encouraged to give honest feedback about the programme - and weekly tutorial discussions, where the trainees broke up into four groups under two trainers each. Weekly trips to the Mindolo Library were also scheduled, although many trainees avoided participating.

The success of the nondirective approach elsewhere did not guarantee its success in Zambia. One reality that had to be taken into account was the mix of social and ethnic backgrounds present in the training sessions. Although Zambians of different backgrounds had mixed before, the training programme required intimate acquaintance. Prejudice between ethnic groups came out in discussions and made trainees reluctant to comment on other trainees' ideas, and lack of mutual comment and criticism undermined the very basis of the nondirective approach. There were also problems between those who attended urban secondary schools and those who attended rural secondary schools. Some urban trainees called the trainees from rural areas "villagers", meaning backward, illiterate, unsophisticated persons.

However, the nondirective approach gradually dispelled tensions and stereotypes, as the trainees were forced to work together and learn from one another. The concept of working in groups also improved relationships and encouraged team spirit. Trainees debated Zambian politics and culture, often quite heatedly. The definition of Zambian culture was especially important when discussing development, because certain development ideas were said to be against Zambian culture - a term no two trainees agreed on. For example, it is against tradition for young people to argue or question their elders, but it was observed that, while that might be of advantage for the elders, there was a danger that it might produce obedient servants who were good implementers but bad planners.

For their field training, ACDO trainees were assigned to work with AFSC and HPU community development staff in the Chawama demonstration phase of the project. Most of the staff members had gained their community-development experience in the AFSC Kafue project (see the case studies under problem areas 1 and 2). Together with the staff, the ACDO trainees organized community meetings to explain the essential provisions of the project - the contributions and responsibilities of the HPU and the obligations of the participants. Personal discussion with squatters - either one-to-one conversations or small-group discusssion - was an important part of the project organization and ACDO training, since it permitted contributions from prospective participants to be incorporated into the design of the emerging project. The house-by-house, person-by-person approach was something new for the squatters, who were accustomed to community-development personnel who worked in downtown offices and tended to wait for the people to come to them.

The first group of trainees had more limited exposure to the field training than was planned. Chawama was already in the relocation phase, after the road planning group had earlier decided on the overall layout, and speedy relocation was essential if the contractors were to start work in time to meet the previously determined disbursement schedule. As a result, the trainees learned a great deal about relocating families affected by the installation of roads and pipelines, and proved themselves adept at organizing relocation in other areas later in the project. However, they gained little experience on how to undertake road planning as a co-operative activity. The tight schedule also meant that trainees had little time to consider other aspects of community development, notably the social services elements. The training staff did try to provide the trainees with other types of experiences, such as organizing women's clubs and sports activities, but the pressure of the relocation exercise limited those experiences to very few.

Despite the drawbacks, the ACDOs who graduated from the special training programme learned how to stimulate community participation, which was essential for the upgrading process. They were much better oriented to that approach than were the Lusaka City Council community development staff members whose training had focused on the traditional "from the top down" approach. Ultimately, the attitude and approach which the trainers and supervisors conveyed had a far greater impact on the learning experience than did the specific tasks the trainees were assigned to carry out.

* Based on Marja Hoek-Smit, "Community participation in squatter upgrading in Zambia", 1982.

Notes

1. Peter Warea., Self-Help Housing: A Critique (London, 1982).

2. Rod Burgess, "Petty commodity housing or dweller control? A critique of John Turner's views on housing policy", World Development, vol. VI, No. 9/10 (1978), pp. 1,105 - 1,133.

3. John F.C. Turner, Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environment, (London, 1976).

4. The use of the term "marginal settlements" should be discouraged. It is grossly misleading, because the majority of urban inhabitants often live in unplanned and largely uncontrolled settlements.

5. The Workshop was jointly organized by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements, the German Carl-Duisberg-Gesellschaft (COG) and the nongovernmental organization German Development Assistance Association for Social Housing (DESWOS).

6. The institutional support of ASAG to the flood-affected community is analysed under requirement 8.

References for further reading

Co-operative knowledge, Co-operative law

Trevor Bottomly. An introduction to co-operation. London, Intermediate Technology Publications, 1979.

H. Burr and J. Welty. Co-operative housing, First Manual. Detriot, Foundation of Co-operative Housing, 1970.

Co-operative Housing Agency. Establishing a housing co-opt (A series of leaflets for people who want to develop a housing co-op or organize a co-op education programme). London, 1978.

P.R. Dubhashi. Principles and philosophy of cooperation.

Poona, Vaikunth Mehta National Institute of Cooperative Management, 1970.

German Development Assistance Association for Social Housing: Pre-member education course for housing cooperatives.

Koln, DESWOS, 1979.

International Labour Organisation. The co-operative through pictures. Geneva, International Labour Office. N.B. The IL organization is the "author", the IL office is the publisher.

Instituto de Formaci Investigaciooperativista.

Sistema Progresivo. Recurrente de educaciooperativa (Anteproyecto). Tegucigalpa.

INVICOOP. Etapas de ahorro y adquisicie terreno. Manual de operaciones. Santiago (Chile), 1972.

Hans-H. Munkner. Co-operative principles and cooperative law.

Marburgh/Lahn, Institute for Co-operation in Developing Countries, 1981.

Problems of co-operative management in Africa.

Marburg/Lahn, Institute for Co-operation in Developing Countries, 1977.

D.D. Naik. You and your housing co-operative.

New Delhi, National Co-operative Housing Federation Limited, 1976.

Jose Polanco. Etapas operacionales de las cooperativas de vivienda.

Santiango (Chile), Instituto De Viviendas Populares, 1973.

Self-help Housing Agency. Family Moleffi's housing problems and how they were solved.

Washington, D.C., Foundation for Co-operative Housing, 1978.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. A manual and resource book for popular participation training. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.IV. 4, 5, 6 and 7.

Joel Welty. Co-operative housing activities manual.

Detroit, Foundation for Co-operative Housing, 1969.

Peter Yeo. The work of a co-operative committee.

London, International Technology publications, 1978.

Youngjohns. Co-operative Organization: an introduction. London, Intermediate Technology Publications Limited, 1977.

Management and administration

United States Agency for International Development. Leader training for aided self-help housing. Washington, D.C. 1970.

Trevor Bottomley. Business arithmetic for cooperatives and other small businesses. Intermediate Technology Publications, London, 1977.

International Labour Organisation. Co-operative management and administration. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1975.

D. Miles. A manual on building maintenance. Vol. 1: Management. London, Intermediate Technology Publications, 1976.

Accounting and bookkeeping for the small building contractor. London, Intermediate Technology Publications, 1978.

D.D. Naik. Management of housing co-operatives. Bombay, BKD Company, 1973.

Practices of housing co-operatives. Bombay, BKD Company, 1972.

A.E. Rasmussen. Financial management in co-operative enterprises. Toronto, Co-operative College of Canada.

Joel Welty. Co-operative housing board manual. Detroit, Foundation for Co-operative Housing, 1969.

Co-operative housing finance manual. Detroit, Foundation for Co-operative Housing, 1969.

J. Bose. Educational techniques in community development. New Delhi, Longmans, 1965.

Co-operative Education Materials Advisory Service. Participative teaching methods. A guide with specimen exercises for co-operative teachers. London, 1978.

Friedrich and others. Guide de l' agent de base aux cooperatives. Bonn, 1978.

International Labour Organisation. Co-operative information. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1972.

The why and how of producing a co-operative. Newsletter. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1975.

H.R. Mills. Teaching and training. A handbook for instructors. London, Macmillan, 1979.

S. Mshiu. Co-operative education radio programme. London, International Co-operative Alliance, 1976.

Daman Prakash. Using communication media as an integral component of co-operative extension activity.

Paper prepared for Third National Seminar for the Extension Officers of the Department of Co-operative Development, Polgolla, 1980.

J.K. Vella. Visual Aids for non-formal education. Boston, Centre for International Education, University of Massachusetts, 1979.