
| Disaster Economics (Department of Humanitarian Affairs/United Nations Disaster Relief Office - United Nations Development Programme , 1994, 56 p.) |
| PART 3 - Financing options |
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Insurance programs can be effective tools both for providing assistance in the aftermath of a disaster and for promoting mitigation activities.

While most developing countries do not have comprehensive disaster insurance schemes, insurance has been a strategy for disaster recovery and mitigation for over a century. There is increasing interest in insurance as a means of restricting government's liabilities in the case of a disaster and as a tool for ensuring compliance with building codes and other mitigation measures.
When insurance programs are in place, material damage can more quickly be replaced; disaster survivors have more prospect of rebuilding their homes and businesses because they have cash from their insurance policy and don't have to wait for other types of assistance.
Insurance allows risk to be spread over a larger community. The burden of the hardest hit is reduced by the less severely affected who bear part of the cost (through premium payment). It also allows the cost to be spread over a longer period of time. Insurance does not, of course, reduce the physical impact, but it may reduce the psychological impact of a disaster by removing the uncertainty involved in financing recovery.
There are several important points to remember about insurance. First, insurance can be taken out on almost anything, subject to the premium being commensurate with the risk involved. Second, although insurance might be taken out to cover the hill loss of a resource - whether it be an infrastructural asset, an annual crop, a livestock or fish population, or a plantation - claims are generally made for partial loss, rather than the full value of the loss. Third, insurance is a commercial proposition, i.e. intended to result in profit and, therefore, an insurance company is not obliged to offer insurance.
Disaster insurance policies have proven viable for a number of hazards including flood, tropical storm and earthquake. However, major disasters can be extremely costly to individual insurance companies. For this reason, re-insurance programs, which allow even wider spreading of risk, have recently proven essential.
The following discussion focuses on one specific type of insurance - crop insurance - as a means of understanding general issues involved in disaster insurance.
Crop insurance can be a source of finance with which to fund post-disaster rehabilitation. The potential for using this type of finance is significant, in that insurance is not yet widely used in developing countries. For example, in the 54 countries of Africa and the Near East, only 12 have introduced crop insurance schemes.
There are two levels of food security disasters in developing country agriculture, where insurance might be more widely used.
First, there might be a national production shortfall of food crops which requires government to use scarce foreign exchange to maintain national food security. While developing countries can overcome this source of food insecurity by increasing their foreign exchange expenditure on food imports, this can hamper overall economic development. Food security schemes must, therefore, deal with fluctuations in food import expenditures. The objectives of the food security/insurance scheme devised by Konandreas, Huddlestone and Ramangkura are to permit developing countries to stabilize their food consumption and food imports.
Second, insurance can be used to support smallholder incomes which are reduced as a result of poor yields caused by natural or human-made disasters. Further information on the possibilities for using insurance to offset the financial implications of disaster are given in FAO's 1991 Crop Insurance Compendium which provides:
- A world summary of crop insurance availability, with analysis by insured perils, sum insured, deductibles, reinsurance, loss assessment, insured crop and compulsory or voluntary participation. (An example for selected countries is given in Figure 3.)- Regional reports summarizing the nature of crop insurance available in each region with regional statistics of crop insurance results.
- Country reports which detail crop insurance structures and representative crop insurance schemes. (Summarized for Bangladesh in Figure 4.)
Figure 3: Multiperil insurance schemes
|
Country |
Crops Insured |
Multiperil cover |
Voluntary |
Loss ratios for five years % | ||||
|
ALBANIA |
wheat, maize, rice |
hail, storm, rainstorm, windstorm, flood, cyclone, snow, freeze |
voluntary but compulsory for state enterprises |
90 |
81 |
174 |
86 | |
|
AUSTRALIA |
bananas |
cyclone, storm, flood, pest, disease, other natural events |
automatic | |
| | | |
|
AUSTRALIA |
apples, pears |
frost, fire, hail, wind, flood, storm, sunburn, drought |
compulsory |
211 |
116 |
89 |
151 |
37 |
|
BANGLADESH |
wheat, rice, sugar cane, jute |
flood, drought, cyclone hail, pest, disease |
voluntary |
441 |
596 |
61 |
879 |
321 |
|
BARBADOS |
sugar cane |
fire, hurricane, earthquake, flood, riot, strike, vandalism |
voluntary |
197 |
54 |
4 |
13 |
4 |
|
BRAZIL |
cereals, pulses, vegetables, fruits, roots & tubers, sugar cane, wine grapes, fibre crops |
fire, flood, windstorm, hail, excessive rain, drought, frost, pest, disease, dramatic temp. change |
voluntary |
172 |
81 |
81 |
13 | |
|
CANADA |
collective programme for forages, cereals, honey |
frost, hail, excess wind, hurricane, excess moisture, heat, ground freeze, flood, drought, snow, pest, disease |
voluntary |
33 |
23 |
164 |
18 |
151 |
|
CANADA |
38 crops including: cereals, sunflower, rapeseed, mustard, sugar beet, legumes, alfalfa |
frost, hail, wind, flood, excess rain, drought, pest, disease, excess heat |
voluntary |
22 |
192 |
369 |
91 |
78 |
|
COSTA RICA |
cereals, pulses, vegetables & melons, fruits, roots & tubers, fibre crops |
drought, excess rain, flood, wind, volcanic ash, pest, disease, hail |
semi-compulsory |
79 |
37 |
80 |
692 |
247 |
|
CYPRUS |
deciduous, grapes, cereals, potatoes, citrus, forage crops |
drought, frost, flood, rust (cereals) |
compulsory |
135 |
90 |
10 |
61 | |
|
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC |
rice, beans, maize, groundnuts, yucca, sorghum |
cyclone, drought, earthquake, flood, excess rain, hail, tornado, fire, pests, disease |
voluntary, but compulsory for those with loans | | | | | |
|
HUNGARY |
all standing field crops, vineyards, orchards |
fire, hall, flood, frost damage |
voluntary |
92 |
125 |
82 |
191 |
|
|
INDIA |
wheat, maize, rice, millet, pulses |
all risks |
voluntary, but compulsory with credit |
216 |
261 |
1,034 |
896 |
826 |
|
ISRAEL |
vegetables, fruits, groundnuts, cotton, poultry, dairy, aquaculture |
hail, frost, storm, heat, flood, birds, rain, cold |
mainly compulsory |
52 |
148 |
72 |
60 | |
|
JAPAN |
paddy rice, wheat, potatoes, soya-beans, red kidney beans, sugar cane, sugar beet, hops, tea |
fire, hail, wind, flood, excess rain, drought, snow, pest, disease, earthquake, volcanic eruption, pests, |
compulsory for rice, wheat and barley, voluntary for others |
15 |
152 |
28 | | |
Figure 4: Representative Crop Insurance Scheme Report
|
Representative Crop Insurance Scheme Report | ||||||||
|
COUNTRY |
BANGLADESH |
Company Name |
Sadharan Bima Corporation |
Sheet N° |
1 | |||
|
Crop(s) group insured |
Wheat, rice, sugar cane, jute | |||||||
|
Perils covered for these crops |
Multi-peril: flood, drought, cyclone, hail, pest, disease, insects | |||||||
|
Policy holder |
Individual |
Voluntary or compulsory |
Voluntary |
N° of Insured |
N/A | |||
|
Basis of sum insured |
Estimated crop potential yield | |||||||
|
Deductible or excess details |
Deductible. 10% of sum insured | |||||||
|
Basis of premium calculation |
Specific rate charged on 80% of crop value | |||||||
|
Automatic rating |
None | |||||||
|
Types of linkages |
Banks & credit organisations, Ministry of Agriculture, B.R.D.B. and Nationalised Commercial Banks | |||||||
|
Means of reinsurance |
None | |||||||
|
Type of reinsurance |
N/A | |||||||
|
Loss assessors |
Loss assessment committee of local agricultural extension officer, loaning agency representative, plus person from Sadharan Bima Corporation | |||||||
|
Loss assessment procedures |
Eye estimation and crop cutting according to needs | |||||||
|
Year |
Premium |
Total sum |
Total |
Premium |
Loss |
Loss | ||
|
1990 |
330,275 |
9,735,308 |
1,455,456 |
3.39 |
15.0 |
440.7 | ||
|
1989 |
228,212 |
6,348,384 |
1,364,965 |
3.59 |
21.5 |
598.1 | ||
|
1988 |
1,021,132 |
2,948,536 |
620 373 |
34.63 |
21.0 |
60.8 | ||
|
1987 |
42,074 |
1,686,481 |
285.805 |
2.49 |
16.9 |
679.3 | ||
|
1986 |
41,109 |
1,108,400 |
131,874 |
3.71 |
11.9 |
320.8 | ||
|
1985 |
103,582 |
2,599,909 |
482,683 |
3.98 |
18.6 |
466.0 | ||
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Notes: Currency unit = Bangladesh Taka | ||||||||
In order that crop insurance companies can provide cover for growers against peril and still remain in business, there are a number of policy issues which must be considered. These include:
1. The choice and number of perils to be insured against as well as the number and type of crops2. Whether coverage is by individual, area, or group
3. The period of coverage i.e. the whole growing season or a specific growth stage
4. Whether insurance should be state operated, privately funded and self-supporting; or mixed public-private
Recently, it has been shown that multi-peril crop insurance operated by the public sector has been an expensive failure. This is because of very high administrative costs and politically-inspired inability on the part of government to charge fair premiums and enforce impartial loss adjustment. FAO's conclusions concerning crop insurance suggest the following:
· Most governments are not in a position to provide heavy subsidies to crop insurance. Most insurance schemes should, therefore, be private. The alternative parastatal body can only be successful if it has complete independence from political influence over fixing premiums and indemnities, and adjusting losses.· Despite the attraction of offering all risk cover, crop insurance is more viable on a limited peril basis, provided it addresses the main concerns of growers.
· A scheme involving small farmers should be compulsory. It is possible to design a voluntary program for larger farmers, but the economies of scale must be such that the insurer can afford the level of field supervision necessary to avoid adverse selection.
· Commercial crops lend themselves most readily to insurance. Food crops grown at subsistence or non-commercial levels are extremely difficult to insure. Payments for perennial crops should be based on the loss of one season's production only.
· Financial transactions between the insurer and insured farmers are by no means frequent. This means that insurers should try to forge linkages, where possible, with organizations or firms which already have ongoing financial dealings with farmers, so that transactions can be carried out at minimum cost.
· There are no short cuts to sound loss adjustment. There must be adequate field presence, preferably in the form of trained agronomists in a supervisory role, with less qualified persons carrying out field assessments.
· Close contact should be maintained with reinsurers in order to assist in shaping programs so that reinsurance (which is normally essential as a portfolio grows) can be readily arranged.
· Public education is important for an insurance program. Education programs and publicity material should be used by insurers in order to ensure that their clientele can take full advantage of the insurance service being provided. These should also help to avoid situations where unrealistic expectations are nurtured by farmers regarding the benefits that insurance programs can provide.
Q. Why are insurance programs a potentially important disaster management program?
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ANSWERDisaster insurance schemes provide a fast response private sector financing mechanism to promote recovery and can be used to inspire pre-disaster mitigation efforts.