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close this bookDisaster Economics (Department of Humanitarian Affairs/United Nations Disaster Relief Office - United Nations Development Programme , 1994, 56 p.)
close this folderPART 3 - Financing options
View the document(introduction...)
View the documentThe traditional route
View the documentDebt swaps
View the documentBlocked funds
View the documentTriangular food aid
View the documentTrust funds
View the documentDisaster insurance
View the documentRevolving funds
View the documentCentral Bank Assistance
View the documentCoordinating foreign disaster assistance

Disaster insurance

Insurance programs can be effective tools both for providing assistance in the aftermath of a disaster and for promoting mitigation activities.


While most developing countries do not have comprehensive disaster insurance schemes, insurance has been a strategy for disaster recovery and mitigation for over a century. There is increasing interest in insurance as a means of restricting government's liabilities in the case of a disaster and as a tool for ensuring compliance with building codes and other mitigation measures.

When insurance programs are in place, material damage can more quickly be replaced; disaster survivors have more prospect of rebuilding their homes and businesses because they have cash from their insurance policy and don't have to wait for other types of assistance.

Insurance allows risk to be spread over a larger community. The burden of the hardest hit is reduced by the less severely affected who bear part of the cost (through premium payment). It also allows the cost to be spread over a longer period of time. Insurance does not, of course, reduce the physical impact, but it may reduce the psychological impact of a disaster by removing the uncertainty involved in financing recovery.

There are several important points to remember about insurance. First, insurance can be taken out on almost anything, subject to the premium being commensurate with the risk involved. Second, although insurance might be taken out to cover the hill loss of a resource - whether it be an infrastructural asset, an annual crop, a livestock or fish population, or a plantation - claims are generally made for partial loss, rather than the full value of the loss. Third, insurance is a commercial proposition, i.e. intended to result in profit and, therefore, an insurance company is not obliged to offer insurance.

Disaster insurance policies have proven viable for a number of hazards including flood, tropical storm and earthquake. However, major disasters can be extremely costly to individual insurance companies. For this reason, re-insurance programs, which allow even wider spreading of risk, have recently proven essential.

The following discussion focuses on one specific type of insurance - crop insurance - as a means of understanding general issues involved in disaster insurance.

Crop insurance can be a source of finance with which to fund post-disaster rehabilitation. The potential for using this type of finance is significant, in that insurance is not yet widely used in developing countries. For example, in the 54 countries of Africa and the Near East, only 12 have introduced crop insurance schemes.

There are two levels of food security “disasters” in developing country agriculture, where insurance might be more widely used.

First, there might be a national production shortfall of food crops which requires government to use scarce foreign exchange to maintain national food security. While developing countries can overcome this source of food insecurity by increasing their foreign exchange expenditure on food imports, this can hamper overall economic development. Food security schemes must, therefore, deal with fluctuations in food import expenditures. The objectives of the food security/insurance scheme devised by Konandreas, Huddlestone and Ramangkura are to permit developing countries to stabilize their food consumption and food imports.

Second, insurance can be used to support smallholder incomes which are reduced as a result of poor yields caused by natural or human-made disasters. Further information on the possibilities for using insurance to offset the financial implications of disaster are given in FAO's 1991 Crop Insurance Compendium which provides:

- A world summary of crop insurance availability, with analysis by insured perils, sum insured, deductibles, reinsurance, loss assessment, insured crop and compulsory or voluntary participation. (An example for selected countries is given in Figure 3.)

- Regional reports summarizing the nature of crop insurance available in each region with regional statistics of crop insurance results.

- Country reports which detail crop insurance structures and representative crop insurance schemes. (Summarized for Bangladesh in Figure 4.)

Figure 3: Multiperil insurance schemes

Country

Crops Insured

Multiperil cover

Voluntary

Loss ratios for five years %

ALBANIA

wheat, maize, rice

hail, storm, rainstorm, windstorm, flood, cyclone, snow, freeze

voluntary but compulsory for state enterprises

90

81

174

86


AUSTRALIA

bananas

cyclone, storm, flood, pest, disease, other natural events

automatic






AUSTRALIA

apples, pears

frost, fire, hail, wind, flood, storm, sunburn, drought

compulsory

211

116

89

151

37

BANGLADESH

wheat, rice, sugar cane, jute

flood, drought, cyclone hail, pest, disease

voluntary

441

596

61

879

321

BARBADOS

sugar cane

fire, hurricane, earthquake, flood, riot, strike, vandalism

voluntary

197

54

4

13

4

BRAZIL

cereals, pulses, vegetables, fruits, roots & tubers, sugar cane, wine grapes, fibre crops

fire, flood, windstorm, hail, excessive rain, drought, frost, pest, disease, dramatic temp. change

voluntary

172

81

81

13


CANADA

collective programme for forages, cereals, honey

frost, hail, excess wind, hurricane, excess moisture, heat, ground freeze, flood, drought, snow, pest, disease

voluntary

33

23

164

18

151

CANADA

38 crops including: cereals, sunflower, rapeseed, mustard, sugar beet, legumes, alfalfa

frost, hail, wind, flood, excess rain, drought, pest, disease, excess heat

voluntary

22

192

369

91

78

COSTA RICA

cereals, pulses, vegetables & melons, fruits, roots & tubers, fibre crops

drought, excess rain, flood, wind, volcanic ash, pest, disease, hail

semi-compulsory

79

37

80

692

247

CYPRUS

deciduous, grapes, cereals, potatoes, citrus, forage crops

drought, frost, flood, rust (cereals)

compulsory

135

90

10

61


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

rice, beans, maize, groundnuts, yucca, sorghum

cyclone, drought, earthquake, flood, excess rain, hail, tornado, fire, pests, disease

voluntary, but compulsory for those with loans






HUNGARY

all standing field crops, vineyards, orchards

fire, hall, flood, frost damage

voluntary

92

125

82

191

INDIA

wheat, maize, rice, millet, pulses

all risks

voluntary, but compulsory with credit

216

261

1,034

896

826

ISRAEL

vegetables, fruits, groundnuts, cotton, poultry, dairy, aquaculture

hail, frost, storm, heat, flood, birds, rain, cold

mainly compulsory

52

148

72

60


JAPAN

paddy rice, wheat, potatoes, soya-beans, red kidney beans, sugar cane, sugar beet, hops, tea

fire, hail, wind, flood, excess rain, drought, snow, pest, disease, earthquake, volcanic eruption, pests,

compulsory for rice, wheat and barley, voluntary for others

15

152

28



Figure 4: Representative Crop Insurance Scheme Report

Representative Crop Insurance Scheme Report

COUNTRY

BANGLADESH

Company Name

Sadharan Bima Corporation

Sheet N°

1

Crop(s) group insured

Wheat, rice, sugar cane, jute

Perils covered for these crops

Multi-peril: flood, drought, cyclone, hail, pest, disease, insects

Policy holder

Individual

Voluntary or compulsory

Voluntary

N° of Insured

N/A

Basis of sum insured

Estimated crop potential yield

Deductible or excess details

Deductible. 10% of sum insured

Basis of premium calculation

Specific rate charged on 80% of crop value

Automatic rating

None

Types of linkages

Banks & credit organisations, Ministry of Agriculture, B.R.D.B. and Nationalised Commercial Banks

Means of reinsurance

None

Type of reinsurance

N/A

Loss assessors

Loss assessment committee of local agricultural extension officer, loaning agency representative, plus person from Sadharan Bima Corporation

Loss assessment procedures

Eye estimation and crop cutting according to needs

Year

Premium

Total sum

Total

Premium

Loss

Loss

1990

330,275

9,735,308

1,455,456

3.39

15.0

440.7

1989

228,212

6,348,384

1,364,965

3.59

21.5

598.1

1988

1,021,132

2,948,536

620 373

34.63

21.0

60.8

1987

42,074

1,686,481

285.805

2.49

16.9

679.3

1986

41,109

1,108,400

131,874

3.71

11.9

320.8

1985

103,582

2,599,909

482,683

3.98

18.6

466.0

Notes: Currency unit = Bangladesh Taka

In order that crop insurance companies can provide cover for growers against peril and still remain in business, there are a number of policy issues which must be considered. These include:

1. The choice and number of perils to be insured against as well as the number and type of crops

2. Whether coverage is by individual, area, or group

3. The period of coverage i.e. the whole growing season or a specific growth stage

4. Whether insurance should be state operated, privately funded and self-supporting; or mixed public-private

Recently, it has been shown that multi-peril crop insurance operated by the public sector has been an expensive failure. This is because of very high administrative costs and politically-inspired inability on the part of government to charge fair premiums and enforce impartial loss adjustment. FAO's conclusions concerning crop insurance suggest the following:

· Most governments are not in a position to provide heavy subsidies to crop insurance. Most insurance schemes should, therefore, be private. The alternative parastatal body can only be successful if it has complete independence from political influence over fixing premiums and indemnities, and adjusting losses.

· Despite the attraction of offering all risk cover, crop insurance is more viable on a limited peril basis, provided it addresses the main concerns of growers.

· A scheme involving small farmers should be compulsory. It is possible to design a voluntary program for larger farmers, but the economies of scale must be such that the insurer can afford the level of field supervision necessary to avoid adverse selection.

· Commercial crops lend themselves most readily to insurance. Food crops grown at subsistence or non-commercial levels are extremely difficult to insure. Payments for perennial crops should be based on the loss of one season's production only.

· Financial transactions between the insurer and insured farmers are by no means frequent. This means that insurers should try to forge linkages, where possible, with organizations or firms which already have ongoing financial dealings with farmers, so that transactions can be carried out at minimum cost.

· There are no short cuts to sound loss adjustment. There must be adequate field presence, preferably in the form of trained agronomists in a supervisory role, with less qualified persons carrying out field assessments.

· Close contact should be maintained with reinsurers in order to assist in shaping programs so that reinsurance (which is normally essential as a portfolio grows) can be readily arranged.

· Public education is important for an insurance program. Education programs and publicity material should be used by insurers in order to ensure that their clientele can take full advantage of the insurance service being provided. These should also help to avoid situations where unrealistic expectations are nurtured by farmers regarding the benefits that insurance programs can provide.

Q. Why are insurance programs a potentially important disaster management program?

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ANSWER

Disaster insurance schemes provide a fast response private sector financing mechanism to promote recovery and can be used to inspire pre-disaster mitigation efforts.