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close this bookEmergency Management (United Nations Children's Fund, 390 p.)
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(introduction...)

A UNICEF Training Package

Prepared by
Training Section
in co-operation with
Emergency Unit

March 1988

Use of the Package

1.1 This UNICEF Training Package on Emergency Management contains all the materials required for this course except supplementary readings and is designed to help the trainers/speakers to develop their own lesson plans. Its contents are intended to:

1.1.1 Advise the trainer/speaker on the objectives and learning points of each session and the workshop as a whole.

1.1.2 Minimize the preparation time needed by the trainer/speaker.

1.1.3 Facilitate learning and selection of appropriate teaching methods.

1.2 Session Layout and Content

To facilitate the use of the Package, the course materials are:

1.2.1 Listed by session which can be easily located by means of a numbered tab.

1.2.2 Each session has a similar plan.

1.2.3 For each session, the session plan presents the following information:

i) learning objectives;
ii) learning points to be covered during session;
iii) possible learning methods;
iv) required reading;
v) supplementary reading;
vi) speakers’ preparation aids.

1.3 In Preparing for Your Session

1.3.1 Review objectives and learning points of other sessions to build on and establish linkages with other presentations and avoid duplication.

1.3.2 Attend other sessions if possible or at least those most relevant to your presentation.

1.3.3 Discuss your session and coordinate with other presentors.

1.3.4 Establish the knowledge and skills of the participants upon which you will build on your presentation (this could be established through studying the information sheets on the participants and attending some of the sessions, particularly the ones on the first day).

Workshop Objectives

2.1 Be familiar with UNICEF's mandated policy and procedures for emergency operations and preparedness.

2.2 Understand characteristics of the global relief system for emergencies.

2.3 Describe basic management principles and how they apply to emergency operations.

2.4 Sufficiently understand technical emergency issues to manage professionals in the fields of health, nutrition, water, media, sanitation, logistics, etc.

2.5 Use and apply the "Assisting in Emergencies Handbook".

2.6 Identify early warning signs of an emergency and actions that can be taken when they are identified.

2.7 Identify and explain the steps and priorities in an emergency operation.

2.8 Access an emergency situation and prepare a plan of action and implementation.

2.9 Plan a UNICEF staffing of emergency operations.

2.10 Plan for a phase out of emergency operations.

2.11 Recognize opportunities provided by an emergency situation.

2.12 Share the basic information gained at this Workshop in an effective learning environment to other staff members.

Content Outline

3.1 Policies and Organization

3.1.1 UNICEF's perception of an emergency
3.1.2 Role of UNICEF and obligations
3.1.3 Priorities for UNICEF's response
3.1.4 Responsibilities for UNICEF's response (HQ, RO and COs)

3.2 Key Emergency Management Activities

3.2.1 Early Warning
3.2.2 Pre-disaster planning
3.2.3 Assessment
3.2.4 Operations planning
3.2.5 Decision-making
3.2.6 Information management
3.2.7 Negotiation
3.2.8 Monitoring
3.2.9 Evaluation

3.3 Possible Needs and Responses

3.3.1 Food/nutrition
3.3.2 Health
3.3.3 Water supplies
3.3.4 Hygiene and sanitation
3.3.5 Shelter
3.3.6 Child care and psyco-social needs

3.4 Field Office Operations

3.4.1 Mobilizing and managing personnel
3.4.2 Assuring capacity and support services
3.4.3 Managing funds
3.4.4 Ordering and receiving supplies
3.4.5 External relations

3.5 Training of Trainers

3.5.1 Sharing knowledge and skills with other staff members in country offices
3.5.2 Ways of sharing: training, briefing, distribution of materials

Workshop Methodology

4.1 In order to accomplish the workshop objectives, a number of working methods will be used:

- lectures and video material which present conceptual information as well as examples of what has already been done in a number of countries worldwide;

- open discussions to bring out and clarify related issues and to "brainstorm" on possible solutions;

- small group work drawing on the conceptual and practical information to discuss the implications of specific issues for emergency management;

4.2 In order for the above methodology to be successful, the following is essential:

- full participation of all participants by attending all sessions and by being active in the discussions, group work and simulation;

- having read the pro-workshop reading and referring back to it when necessary;

- completing the daily evaluation forms in order for the workshop steering committee to make needed and possible adjustments;

- a readiness to "go beyond" the normal working day, if need be: days may be longer than usual given the tremendous amount of material to be covered in a short time.

4.3 The small working groups should be formed in such a way as to strike a balance of the levels of experience and knowledge of group members. The role of small group discussion leaders and rapporteurs should be rotated from session to session.

For Effective Training

5.1 Keeping objectives clearly in view: Every good training must be clearly specified of objectives to be achieved in a limited time period. It is important to keep the objectives in mind (and in the participants' minds) as there is limited time for digression. Participants’ expectations must be added in the objectives. Any "unable to do" expectations must also be indicated from the beginning. Considerable tact and diplomacy may be required to keep participants on the right track.

5.2 Climate setting: Climate setting begins when the participants walk into the course. Initial impressions are of tremendous importance - you can switch people on or off very rapidly. Use selected tactics, both verbal and non-verbal, to establish a warm, supportive learning atmosphere. The facilities provided, the seating arrangements, the course leader's appearance and manner are all crucial to the sort of climate created. "Ice breakers" should be used in the initial stages of the course -time invested pays off well. Sensitivity to the course climate is required as the course progresses, and the facilitator should be prepared to warm things up if necessary.

5.3 Stage setting: Although the training activities are carefully designed as learning experiences, adults tend to be conservative and resent new experiences. Setting the stage for an activity in a manner which makes that activity appear relevant, worthwhile and even enjoyable requires careful preplanning.

5.4 Synthesizing background experience of participants with course activities: Ensure that some information is available about the professional background of course participants prior to the course. This can be supplemented where necessary during warm-up activities, e.g. participants can be asked to briefly describe who they are and why they have come. Invite sharing of experiences relevant to aspects of problems being discussed and encourage participants to regard each other as valuable learning resources. If this is done skill fully the learning experience will become much more closely related to the "real" world.

5.5 Consolidation: Following each phase of activity or at the end of each day during a training course it is essential that the course leader draws all of the threads of the learning experience together to form a firm basis from which learning can move forward. It is important to make clear to participants what has been gained from a particular activity, and to emphasize how these outcomes relate to the overall achievement of course objectives.

Many of the activities demand a concerted effort from participants, and this can only be sustained by generating a feeling that the outcomes of each experience represent a worthwhile gain in learning.

Without frequent and skillful consolidation the succession of different activities and changes of pace can leave participants feeling bewildered.

5.6 Sensitivity to individual needs: In a training course people from a wide variety of backgrounds come together for a relatively short period of time, therefore facilitators need to be extra sensitive to the needs of individuals.

5.7 Feedback: A good training design should be based on behavioural theory: input, process, output cycles. The effectiveness of this as a learning process depends on the feedback available to learners on the quality of each output in relation to the objectives of the course. Feedback is required from the earliest activities of the course so that the subsequent behaviour of the learners can be progressively modified in the light of feedback obtained. The course leader must be able to assess when feedback is required and what form it should take - sometimes the reinforcement provided by an encouraging smile is adequate. On other occasions participants may need a detailed list of criteria to use as a basis for evaluation of the "output". As well as providing feedback to course participants, the course leader must look for and accept criticism from course participants on all aspects of the course and the manner in which it is presented. In this way both teaching and learning can be improved.

For Effective Presentation

6.1 Giving clear directions: The ideal of good training is the training must emphasize learning by doing. The ability of the course presenter to give clear directions for each phase of the activity is crucial to the success of the course. If participants are unsure of what they are supposed to be doing and why, they quickly become frustrated or hostile or both. Although written directions are given for each activity these are intended to reinforce the clear verbal directions given by the course leader - statements about "what", "why", and "how long for" should be made in regard to each activity.

6.2 Group facilitating: The emphasis on group work in a training course involves a shift from the "management from the front" approach to teaching, to highly structured activities which are largely group directed. Helping groups move steadily towards the set objectives is a vital skill required of course leaders. Facilitation does not necessarily involve intervention in the group's activity - often the most helpful thing is to withdraw for a while. In order to be an effective facilitator the course leader must be able to establish the right sort of relationship with the group - his/her presence should be readily accepted without causing disruption to the group activity. The course leader must be regarded as an able listener as well as talker. Unless a group is getting off the track, or intervention is invited for a specific purpose, the course leader should play a low key role. However, if firm guidance is required be authoritative never authoritarian.

6.3 Keep it brief: The presenter should respond to signs of boredom or agitation, and be prepared for comment or questions.

6.4 Questioning: This skill has many uses, from providing reassurance that directions are understood, to probing for understanding of complex concepts. Questions should be used frequently to monitor the presenter's success as a teacher, and the success of participants as learners. Clear formulation and direction of questions is essential. Establish at the outset that facilitators are always ready to answer questions. Be honest, if you don't know the answer call upon the resources of the group to help you out.

6.5 Pacing: Prior to the commencement of the course the presenter should check how much time to allow for each activity, and what degree of flexibility is possible. Pacing should be as unobtrusive as possible - participants can be encouraged to help with pacing if expectations are made clear at each phase of the activity.

6.6 Intervention: Considerable tact and experience is required if intervention in learning is not to become interference. During small group work occasional intervention may be required to provide general orientation, clarification or information. The course presenter must be a good listener and watch for non-verbal signals from participants that all is not proceeding smoothly. Occasionally groups are dominated in a non-productive way by one or two members. Verbal intervention on the part of the course leaders may resolve the problem, if not, the group may have to be broken up and integrated with other groups.

6.7 Closure: Requires a clear understanding of what the intended outcomes of each phase of the activities are. When these outcomes have been attained, that phase of the experience should be brought to an end, perhaps by making the outcomes overt and relating these back to the course objectives. Be prepared to pick up loose ends and be patient if participants feel they have not finished exploring a particular issue.

6.8 Summarizing: A great deal may happen in a short time in small group situations. Often time does not allow extensive reporting back by each group, therefore, it is up to the course leader to note the essential happenings and ensure that these are included in the final summary of events. Where activities are proceeding at a fairly fast pace frequent summaries which are both coherent and concise can facilitate learning.

Audio-visual Aids

7.1 An audiovisual aid is any device which can be seen or heard by a group and helps the instructor/trainer in his/her presentation.

7.2 A good visual aid can do a lot of "talking". It can set the scene for you; it can summarize your main points or it can review your whole talk.

7.3 The effective use of audio-visual aids requires careful preparation, some rehearsing, certain skills and some extra time to set up the room in which you are to make your presentation.

7.4 A good visual aid must be simple, legible, appropriate, planned, accurate, colorful, manageable and realistic.

7.5 In using visual aids, don't talk to the aid, don't stand in front of it, hold it up for all to see and keep it up long enough for the group to see.

7.6 Types of audio-visual aids you might consider using are: films, slides, transparencies, chalkboards, flipcharts, graphs, flannel, etc.

Suggested Timetable*

* This timetable can be modified based on the needs of each particular office or region. Time allocated for certain sessions can be expanded. Some sessions can be combined, others can be dropped, e.g. Training of Trainers, if the package is not used in a regional workshop.

Day One

0900 - 0930

Session 0: Opening Session

Welcome Address Introduction of Participants Administrative Details

Session 1: Course Introduction

0930 - 1000

Review Objective of the Course and Workshop Methodology

1000 - 1030

View Video on Karamoja Emergency

1030 - 1045

Coffee Break

1045 - 1115

Brainstorming on Issues Raised by Video

1115 - 1130

Plenary Discussion

Session 2: Perceptions of Emergencies

1130 - 1200

Group Exercise

1200 - 1230

Plenary

1230 - 1400

Lunch

Session 3: Simulation*

* This Simulation Exercise is recommended only for Regional Workshops of ten-day duration. It requires an external resource person for its conduct. Materials or the simulation are still being developed and will be available by July 1988.

1400 - 1500

Orientation to the Simulation Exercise

1500 - 1600

Individual Preparations/Reading for the Simulation and Other Sessions

Day Two

0900 - 0915

Review of Day One Sessions (Listening Team)

0915 - 1700

All Day Simulation Exercise

Day Three

0900 - 1100

Session 4: Principles of Emergency Management

0915 - 1000

Lecture

1000 - 1030

Group Exercise

1030 - 1045

Coffee Break

1045 - 1100

Plenary


Session 5: Early Warning

1100 - 1130

Presentation

1130 - 1200

Group Exercise

1200 - 1230

Plenary

1230 - 1400

Lunch

Session 6: Assessment

1400 - 1500

Lecture

1500 - 1600

Group Exercise

1600 - 1615

Coffee Break

1615 - 1700

Plenary

Day Four


Session 7: Programme Planning

0900 - 0915

Review of Day Three Sessions (Listening Team)

0915 - 1000

Lecture

1000 - 1030

Group Exercise

1030 - 1045

Coffee Break

1045 - 1100

Plenary


Session 8: Water and Sanitation

1100 - 1200

Lecture

1200 - 1230

Analysis of Case Study

1230 - 1400

Lunch


Session 9: Health

1400 - 1500

Lecture

1500 - 1530

Group Exercise

1530 - 1600

Plenary

1600 - 1615

Coffee Break


Session 10: Food and Nutrition

1615 - 1630

Presentation

1630 - 1700

Group Exercise

1700 - 1730

Plenary

Day Five


Session 11: Media Relations

0900 - 0915

Review of Day Four Sessions (Listening Team)

0915 - 0930

Presentation

0930 - 0945

Video. "What About the U.N.?"

0945 - 1030

Group Exercise

1030 - 1045

Coffee Break

1045 - 1115

Plenary


Session 12: Supply and Logistics

1115 - 1200

Lecture

1200 - 1230

Discussion on Regional Specific Issues

1230 - 1400

Lunch


Session 13: Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances

1400 - 1430

Presentation

1430 - 1500

Video, "Children of the Terror"

1500 - 1515

Coffee Break

1515 - 1600

Group Exercise and Plenary

Day Six


Session 14: International Relief System

0900 - 0915

Review of Day Five Sessions (Listening Team)

0915 - 1000

Presentation/Case Study

1000 - 1030

Group Exercise

1030 - 1045

Coffee Break

1045 - 1100

Plenary


Session 15: Funding

1100 - 1130

Lecture

1130 - 1200

Preparation of Budget Exercise

1200 - 1230

Discussion

1230 - 1400

Lunch


Session 16: Key Operating Procedures

1400 - 1500

Lecture

1500 - 1530

Case Study

1530 - 1600

Discussion

1600 - 1615

Coffee Break

1615 - 1700

Exercise in BAL Amendments

Day Seven


Session 17: Application of Emergency Manual & Handbook

0900 - 0930

Review of Day Six Sessions (Listening Team)

0930 - 1030

Group Exercise

1030 - 1045

Coffee Break

1045 - 1130

Group Exercise (Cont'd)

1130 - 1230

Plenary

1230 - 1400

Lunch


Session 18: Training of Trainers

1400 - 1430

Presentation

1430 - 1500

Group Exercise

1500 - 1530

Video, "Meetings, Bloody Meetings"

1530 - 1600

Discussion

1600 - 1700

Presentation on Training Methods

Welcome Note

Congratulations on your selection to participate in the Emergency Management Workshop to be held in (name of place) from (date) to (date). We hope that this training programme will meet your needs and expectations and will enhance your knowledge and skills in the preparedness for and management of emergency situations.

What will certainly contribute to the success of this workshop is your active participation. As you will experience during the various sessions, participatory training methods have been adopted in which you (as a participant) play an active role and one in which each participant shares his/her experience with others.

Please pay special attention to the instructions given by the workshop co-ordinator and session moderators/speakers regarding the preparation for and participation in various sessions. These may require studying the required readings, undertaking individual assignments, preparation of case studies or playing a role in group work.

Good Luck!

Objectives of the Workshop

The overall objective of the training programme is to improve the quality and impact of UNICEF's responses to natural and man-made emergency situations. The specific objectives of this workshop are:

1. Be familiar with UNICEF's mandated policy and procedures for emergency operations and preparedness.

2. Understand the characteristics of the global relief system for emergencies.

3. Describe general management principles relevant to emergency operations.

4. Sufficiently understand technical emergency issues to manage professionals in the fields of health, nutrition, water, media, sanitation, logistics, etc.

5. Use and apply the Assisting in Emergencies Handbook in his/her region and country.

6. Identify early warning signs of an emergency and actions that can be taken when they are identified.

7. Identify and explain the steps and priorities in an emergency operation.

8. Access an emergency situation and prepare a plan of action and implementation.

9. Plan a UNICEF staffing of emergency operations.

10. Plan for a phase out of emergency operations.

11. Recognize opportunities provided by an emergency situation.

12. Share the basic information gained at this Workshop in an effective learning environment to other staff members in their offices.

Beside the general objectives of the workshop, there are specific and more detailed objectives for each session which you will find under each session's guidelines. If you need the workshop to meet some other learning needs, do not hesitate to bring this to the workshop organizer's or session moderator's attention, who will try as much as they can to address this need.

Required Reading

In preparation for the workshop and for various sessions, you will be required to read selected materials which will either be included in your binder or referred to, as in the case of chapters from the UNICEF handbook "Assisting in Emergencies".

Administrative and Evaluative Forms

The first few pages of this binder contain some forms to be filled in by you either at the beginning, during or at the end of the Workshop.

At the beginning of the Workshop

1. Information Sheet on Participants
2. Travel Arrangements form

During the Workshop

1. Individual Evaluation Forms
2. Listening Team Reports (if you were a member of the team)

At the end of the Workshop

1. Workshop Evaluation Form
2. Individual Action Plans

We hope this will be a useful learning experience for you and ask your contribution to make it an interesting and pleasant one.

Registration Form

NAME: ________________________________________________________________
DUTY STATION: _______________________________________________________
POSITION: _____________________________________________________________

WHAT DO YOU EXPECT TO OBTAIN FROM THIS WORKSHOP?
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

WHAT PARTICULAR EXPERTISE, EXPERIENCE IN THE FIELD OF EMERGENCIES MIGHT YOU BE ABLE TO SHARE WITH OTHER PARTICIPANTS?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Listening Team Form

(To report during review and feedback at the beginning of each day)

Day __________________________________________________________
Session _______________________________________________________

1. Lessons learned from session.

2. Other critical issues that should have been covered.

Daily Evaluation Form

(SAMPLE)

Day ___________________________________________________________
Session ________________________________________________________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.

Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Workshop Evaluation Form

DATE: _______________

Your evaluation of this programme and your comments are important. They guide us in improving and expanding our programmes to meet your needs and interests. Please take a few minutes to complete the form...don't forget to add any comments you feel will help us.

Please circle the number which reflects your feelings about the following statements:


Strongly Disagree

Agree

Neither Agree Nor Disagree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

1. The programme content met my expectations.

5

4

3

2

1

Comments:

2. The information from this will be useful in my job.

5

4

3

2

1

Comments:

3. The speakers were well qualified.

5

4

3

2

1

Comments:

4. Which topics were most adequately covered to meet your needs
____________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________

5. Which topics were not covered to the extent you would have wished? ________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________

6. Other comments: __________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________

7. How will you apply what you have learned? ______________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________

8. If you would like, please comment on other items such as lodging, meals, travel, etc. _____________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________

Signed:

________________


(Optional)

Thank you for participating in this programme and for your comments.

Session 0: Opening Session

- To welcome participants and introduce them to each other.

- To acquaint participants and resource persons with the course's administrative details and existing facilities.

Key Points to be Covered

- Welcome address

- Introduction of participants (one Introduces another): name, current position, experience in emergencies, expectations

- Administrative details: regulations, forms to be filled out, workshop secretariat, accomodation, travel, workshop materials, etc.

- Facilities: conference rooms, available services, recreation areas, etc. Daily schedule of sessions, meetings and other activities.

- Assignments, e.g. listening teams to report at the beginning of each day on critical points covered in sessions the day before.

Session 1: Course Introduction*

* This session should be conducted by the workshop co-ordinator or someone who is very familiar with all the workshop's content and methodology.

Learning Objectives

- be introduced to the overall objectives of the workshop
- be aware of the content areas to be covered
- understand the workshop methodologies
- be introduced to a specific emergency situation

Learning Points

1. Review of general objectives of the course
2. Overview of course content
3. Training methodologies to be used
4. Participants’ expectations and how can they be met
5. Emergency management issues raised by CBS film on Karamoja

Methodology

1. Open the session by discussing the objectives of the course. Use a flipchart or transparency.

2. Briefly review the course sessions, the main points they will address, the speaker/facilitator for each session, how each session will be conducted, and what is expected from participants, e.g. pre-course assignments. Use the course timetable and refer to workshop binders giving highlights of special methodologies to be used such as role playing, case studies, simulations.

3. Show the CBS film on Karamoja.

4. Follow by a brainstorming exercise on the issues that the film raises ... what went wrong? What issues are raised with wider lessons for UNICEF? Write these issues on a flipchart and explain how the workshop is going to address them.

(Note: This sets the tone for the workshop as a whole. It also identifies particular learning needs of participants which need to be addressed during the workshop which should be addressed either through the normal workshop sessions or through "clinic" sessions. The video on Karamoja shown thorugh this session raises issues of dealing with the media which is addressed in detail under the "Media" session.)

Speakers' Preparation Aids

- Workshop objectives
- Outline content and sessions' guidelines
- CBS video on Karamoja, "What about the U.N.?"
- Information sheets filled by participants before the workshop

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 2: Perceptions of Emergencies

Learning Objectives

- Distinguish the forms of emergencies and their characteristics

- Describe UNICEF's overall role and the range of interventions in each emergency type vis-is governments and other agencies

- Understand how UNICEF can translate emergencies into opportunity for development

- Interpret UNICEF's emergency role as assisting in and supporting governments rather than managing emergency programmes

- Recognize the importance of programme strategy decisions in allocating scarce resources

Learning Points

1. Forms of emergencies, including:

- types
- frequency
- characteristics
- scale of impact

(For details, refer to UNICEF Field Manual, Book E, Section 1.1 and Book E, Reference Note R1.)

2. Effects of disasters (for details refer to Book E, Section 1.1, and Assisting in Emergencies).

3. UNICEF's role in emergencies (for details, refer to Book E, Section 1.2 and Assisting in Emergencies).

4. Linking emergency operations with development (for details refer to "Disasters and Development" by F. Cuny, Oxford University Press, 1984).

Learning Methods

The session opens with the resource person asking participants to "name" types of emergency situations which UNICEF may be called upon to assist. These should be listed on a flip chart. After grouping the emergencies by type (see Book E, Section 1.1), smaller working groups can be asked to each analyze one type of emergency based on Discussion Points 1 and 2. (In addition to Book E and Assisting in Emergencies), groups can be given copies of the relevant "profiles" included with this session.

The groups should report back on their findings, taking no more than five minutes per group.

UNICEF's overall role in emergencies is then presented by the Resource Person, being sure to underline the importance of linking emergency operations with longer-term development. This can be done with a mix of "presentation", based on the written references noted in the "Learning Points" and participant contributions, based on experience and questions.

Discussion Points

1. Describe the form of emergency "assigned" to your group by noting:

- the type of emergency
- its relative frequency
- a physical description of the emergency
- its potential scale of impact

2. What are the potential effects of the "assigned" emergency?

- Who will be affected?
- How will they be affected?

Required Reading

- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies", Chapter 7.
- UNICEF, Field Manual Book E, Section 1.2.

Supplementary Reading

- Frederick Cuny, Disasters and Development.

Speaker's Preparation Aids

- Kunio Waki, "Perceptions of Emergencies in UNICEF", Notes from Presentation at Bangkok Workshop, June 1987

- The Disaster Spectrum

***

Speaker’s Aid (1)

TITLE: Perception of Emergency
AUTHOR: Kunio Waki

SESSION: PERCEPTIONS OF EMERGENCIES

UNICEF Emergency Management Workshop
Monday, 1 June 1987

Perception of Emergency
Presentation by Kunio Waki

***

UNICEF Involvement in Emergencies

Phases

I. Preparedness

surveillance
"early warning"

II. Emergency
III. Rehabilitation
Reconstruction
IV. Development

Types of Emergency and UNICEF Involvement in Asia

I. Localized Small Emergencies

- Earthquakes
- Volcanic eruption in Indonesia

Government and local NGOs
Only occasionally involved
Quick response required

II. Natural disasters which affect a significant size of the child population

The Government and local NGOs are capable of providing relief and rehabilitation services with some international assistance

Examples:

- Typhoons in Viet-Nam, the Philippines, the South Pacific

- Large-scale earthquake in China

- Medium-scale flood drought in Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, etc.

· Mobilization of UNICEF Executive Director's Emergency Fund/Reserve

· Limited response

· The Government plays a major role while UNICEF inputs are largely supplies and equipment for rehabilitation

III. Large-scale natural disasters which affect a large population

The government is not capable of providing rehabilitation services for the whole affected population.

Examples:

Cyclone/Flood in Bangladesh Flood/Drought in India

(Special Chile Relief Program...one minion children and mothers)

· UNICEF provides leadership in program formulation and implementation
· Special fund-raising (noted project)
· Operational involvement from center to the grass-roots
· Close working relation with the Government at all levels, WHO, WFP, others
· Large number of UNICEF staff involved

IV. Large-scale Man-made Emergencies

- Kampuchea

Boarder operations
Inside Kampuchea

- Bangladesh refugees/evacuees

8-9 million people

· UNICEF plays a lead agency role.
· Massive operational involvement with special funding

(Note: Biafra, Lebanon.....)

V. Limited Man-made Emergencies

- Muslim evacuees from Burma in Bangladesh
- Negroes Occidental
· Limited UNICEF involvement in cooperation with the Government agencies

VI. Small-scale Localized Man-made Emergencies

- Armed conflicts in the Philippines and Sri Lanka
· UNICEF rarely involved

UNICEF Mandate

· Special attention to the vulnerable groups

- Small children
- pregnant and lactating mothers
(Child Survival)

· Non-political/humanitarian image of the organization

- involvement in politically sensitive operations
- egalitarian approach without discrimination

· UNICEF as a development agency (not as an emergency relief agency... UNDRO, UNHCR, WFP, ICRC...)

· Accountability: capacity to monitor implementation to prevent loss/waste and corruption

· Security of UNICEF staff

UNICEF's Strength

I. Operational Capability

1. Field offices and staff

- quick response
- mobilization of local resources

2. Logistics

transportation
supply operations... UNIPAC

...Local Procurement

3. Communications Networks

II. Professional Competence

- Public health
- Nutrition/food technology
- Water supply and sanitation
- Transport maintenance

III. Capacity for Funding

- Media contacts throughout the world
- Information staff
- National Committees

Some Lesson from UNICEF experiences

1. Importance of team work

- Program staff
- Supply/Logistics staff
- Experts in health (WHO) nutrition

2. Importance of capacity to play quickly

- Lead time needed
- Establishment of assumptions/scenarios
- Knowledge/experiences in various areas

3. Political Analysis

- Negotiation with the authorities
- To protect UNICEF'S image

4. Difficulties in dealing with human factors

- Emotional reactions
- ego
- ambitions

5. Lack of institutional memory and staff capacity

- Report the same mistakes
- Need for training
- Career development staff's exposure to emergency operations

6. Importance of mobilizing existing UNICEF staff

7. Strategic thinking needed in programming

- Cost/benefit
- Return on investment
- Limited resources

8. Quick decision-making out

9. Difficulties in phasing out

10. Active participation of local community leaders, volunteers extension workers


***

Speaker’s Aid (2)

TITLE: Disaster Spectrum
AUTHOR: Disaster Management Center/Everett Ressler

SESSION: PERCEPTIONS OF EMERGENCIES

***

THE DISASTER SPECTRUM

General Considerations

- Disaster research
- Human behavior in emergencies
- Organizational behavior in emergencies
- National disaster systems
- Disaster legislation
- International disaster system
- Humanitarian law
- Economic impact of disasters
- General management principles
- Budgeting and accounting
- Role of the media in disasters

Prediction and Hazard/risk

- Disaster history
- Prediction techniques for natural disasters
- Vulnerability analysis techniques
- Risk mapping techniques
- Analysis of information sources for assessing vulnerability
- Environmental monitoring
- Scientist analysis (meteorological, hydrological, agriculture, epidemiologies)
- Community experience

Mitigation measures

- Land use planning/regulation
- Building codes/standards
- Crop cycle adjustment
- Mitigation-related building technologies
- Life-line engineering
- Securing essential structures
- Protective emergency structures (shelters, mounds, etc.)

Preparedness measures

- Develop of emergencies organizations
- Disaster plans
- Disaster planning at the local level
- Disaster planning at the national level
- Disaster planning at the international level
- Warning systems
- Public awareness/education
- Safety measures for life and personal property
- Procedures for emergency services
- Training of emergency services staff
- Evacuation planning
- Disaster training
- Insurance
- Logistics and supply
- Stockpiling/procurement
- Resources inventory
- Communication planning

Emergency response

- Damage assessment
- Logistics
- Need assessment
- Evacuating
- Search and rescue
- Communications

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 3: Simulation*

* This is Just an overview of the simulation exercise. The Trainers Guide and Participants Materials are attached in the Annex.

Learning Objectives

1. Provide an overview of an emergency operation, with an emphasis on a UNICEF perspective.

2. Raise issues that can drive subsequent activities in the training programme.

3. Provide a common experience for all the participants, to facilitate subsequent activities within the training programme.

4. Provide a neutral and controllable example that can be built upon elsewhere in the training programme. (The neutral example can be used to facilitate discussions that might be more difficult if actual countries or situations were used for reference. The controllability of the simulation permits presentations of situations that are directly tied into other agreed upon training objectives.)

Learning Points

1. What are the implications of a decision on emergency intervention for:

- Saving lives
- Utilization of funds, staff and other resources
- Effectiveness of service delivery

2. What opportunities are provided by an emergency situation

- Identify how existing programmes can be accelerated or expanded, and prepare plans for these actions.

- Identify fund-raising opportunities and put together a plan for taking advantage of them.

3. What kinds of the organizational and interpersonal relationships are associated with an emergency operation.

4. What are the key competing interests (needs of children vs. those of the whole population; short run vs. long run interests; potentials and problems caused by donations in kind; UNICEF playing a lead agency vs. UNICEF acting as a facilitator; speed vs. efficiency; funding vs. mandate).

Possible Learning Methods

The activities within the simulation fall into four related phases: orientation, routine operations, emergency operations and debriefing.

Phase I - Orientation

The orientation phase provides both instructions needed for participation in the simulation and key factors relating to the country of operation.

A key component in the orientation is the identification of the objectives that have been established for this activity. These objectives are the basis both for learning and for discussions taking part during the debriefing.

Phase II - Routine operations

UNICEF is already present when the simulation begins. It has a development programme through which it addresses its target population, providing: growth monitoring, oral rehydration, breast-feeding and any other services within its mandate and required by the existing conditions.

Participants begin by briefly managing an aspect of the on-going UNICEF operation. UNICEF has a regular operation within the country and it has been dealing with an existing, slo-onset emergency. This activity causes participants to become involved in logistics, understanding organizational relationships, donor relations, staff security, media relations and (broadly defined) planning activities.

This introduction forces the participants to establish a base within UNICEF and the country of operation. It sets targets that the participants will, all other things being equal, be expected to work within as the simulation progresses.

Early warning signs of a forthcoming emergency will be present.

Phase III - Emergency operations

A rapid on-set emergency will take place. The existing slow on-set emergency may also get worse (independently, or as a result of conditions caused by the rapid on-set emergency). Participants will have to take actions needed for its resolution. They will have to identify strengths and weaknesses, reallocate existing resources, assist in obtaining additional resources, differentiate between relief and development activities, etc.

It is unlikely that it will be possible to resolve the existing issues within the time permitted for the simulation. It is essential, however, that participants identify the issues, the relevant options and their implications so that they can be discussed in subsequent segments of the training programme.

Phase IV - Debriefing

The participants will be required to analyze the activities that have taken place, identifying options, their Implications and the results of the actions that were taken. They will be required to identify those issues in which judgement played a particularly strong role - where it was not possible to easily differentiate between right and wrong choices.

Duration:

One full day

Audience:

People who have dealt with at least some aspects of relief or development operations.

Number of Participants:

Approximately 25. The simulation should operate satisfactorily with between 20 and 30 participants.

Staffing:

BSI will provide professional staffing for the simulation. Administrative support will be provided by UNICEF.

Required Reading

Materials received by the participants

Prior to the Simulation1
Participants Guide
Country Guide

1 These materials will be distributed at the training programme, but prior to the start of the simulation per se.

During the Simulation
Detailed role kits
Material describing the changing situation

After the Simulation
Summary of the debriefing comments

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 4: Principles of Emergency Management

Learning Objectives

- Introduce the scope of emergency management.

- Understand the phases of emergency management, how each phase relates to the other and how actions in one phase set the stage for the subsequent action in another.

- Identify some of the sectors that are critical in different types of disaster.

- Describe skills needed to respond to disaster effectively.

- Identify the gaps in providing services in an emergency situation and role of the international disaster relief system in filling these gaps.

Learning Points

1. Emergency management in the full range of activities that focus on disaster and/or emergency situations that are designed to help the persons at risk avoid or recover from the impact of the disaster.

2. Emergency management deals with situations that occur before, during and after the emergency.

3. The role of the emergency manager is generally thought of mistakenly as a post disaster role. Increasingly, however, disaster management looks at pre-disaster activities as an important aspect of disaster management.

4. Patterns and indicators of emergencies allow us to make decisions before disasters occur.

5. Objectives of Emergency Management:

- To avoid or reduce human, physical and economic losses of individuals, families and society as a whole.

- To reduce the suffering or vulnerability to violence.

- To speed recovery (do you provide a tent for the victim or help the victim build his own house).

- To provide environmental protection.

- To prevent the recurrence of the disaster.


6. Essential Characteristics in an Emergency Manager:

- Knowledge: where to get information when needed, what is relevant, how to evaluation the information, what are the points of entry.

- Decision-making: in a disaster the manager is making decisions under conditions of uncertainty. Given that, what should the manager do to incorporate decision-making?

- a) Understand what the implications of the decision are. (Sea shipment vs. airshipment of food and the cost and time needed for either; the earlier decision is made, the better.

- b) Make the decisions routine. There are very few decisions that are made in emergencies that somebody hasn't made before. On the basis of those decisions, standard operating procedures can be set that would guide decision-making.

- Leadership: having the knowledge and asserting oneself in the emergency.

7. Key Elements in Emergency Management

- Support local community and initiatives.

- Understand and build on Society's coping mechanism in an emergency: families, extended family, religious organization, tribe, social and cultural organizations, etc.

- Involve the victims in meaningful participation.

- Accountability not only to donors but importantly to victims.

- Focus on the process not the product: how to give the disaster victim an opportunity to make decisions and participate in a development oriented programme rather than providing a short-term relief assistance.

- Focus on opportunities that the disaster provides for long-term development goals.

- Move the decision-making process as forward as possible (take emergency decisions out of the emergency).

8. Role of UNICEF in the management of an emergency situation as relates to governmental organization and the international disaster relief system.

Possible Learning Methods

This session lays the foundation and defines many terms. Some amount of lecture will be needed...using overhead projectors.

Group exercise - "What do you think are the characteristics of a good emergency manager" and "where do you need them".

Exercises:

- Checklists of preparedness actions
- Lists of decisions that could be made routine
- Examination of the UNICEF Handbook

Required Reading

- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies", Chapter 2.

Supplementary Reading

- UNICEF Field Manual, Book E, Chapter 5.

Speakers' Preparation Aids

- Management Institute, "Notes on Decision-Making".
- Frederick Cuny, "Principles of Emergency Management".
- Overview of Emergency Management Principles.
- Keys to Being a Competent Manager

***

Speaker’s Aid (1)

TITLE: Notes on Decision-Making
AUTHOR: Management Institute, University of Wisconsin

SESSION: PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

***

NOTES ON DECISION MAKING

I. Analysis of the Problem

A. Statement of What is Wrong

1. Stating specifically what is wrong, the situation where improvement is needed, or the area where results might be better.

a. Often times it is a situation which is quite obvious such as a machine producing defective parts.

b. These are basic deviations from well defined standards and come to the attention of the manager rather automatically

2. Real challenge comes in more nebulous situations where manager just feels that results could be better or that something might be wrong: example, a department always seems to be "under the gun" in meeting schedules or production standards are being met but there seem to be a degree of negativism present.

a. These are not fires but sparks. Symptoms of larger problems. Often overlooked and/or ignored.

b. To identify them as situations needing improvement, manager must have (1) know specific standards of performance and (2) keen insight into actual levels of performance and ability to pinpoint deviations, (3) maximum results oriented.

B. Getting the Facts

1. Too often decision is made and action taken before getting facts. The REAL PROBLEM is not correctly identified and decision falls short of accomplishing our objectives.

2. Must ask the questions, what, when, where.

a. Identify all key factors surrounding the situation and crystallize our statement of the situations.

b. With respect to the defective parts, we should now be able to say the holes are being drilled off center, they are appearing on the 2nd shift only, the number of defects is the same as the number of good ones.

C. Investigation of Possible Causes and Identification of the Real Problem.

1. Event or occurrence arousing our attention initially is more often than not, not the real problems.

a. If deals with only the apparent difficulty we get only temporary relief. Real problem not being solved will cause same symptom to re-occur.

b. Series of symptoms which are unrelated on the surface may have as a common route the same basic problem. As long as we treat each symptom independently or as a problem in itself the total situation will not improve.

2. Must avoid quick action by asking what are all the possible things that could have caused the situation to arise and in light of the fact do they actually apply.

a. Sometimes cause is suggested by the fact and investigation verifies this. However, facts may suggest a cause which does not get at the real problem.

D. Requirements of a Satisfactory Solution Stated as Objectives

1. Insures remainder of process has direction.
2. Focal point for getting additional facts.
3. Insures objectivity in phase two.

II. Developing and Analyzing Alternatives

A. Developing alternatives

1. Our own past experience
2. Experience of others
3. Creativity

B. Analyzing alternatives

1. Setting forth advantages and disadvantages

a. Will the alternative eliminate occurrence of the situation.
b. Does it meet requirements of a satisfactory solution.
c. Does it fall within any restrictions or limits.
d. Other specific benefits.

2. Areas where difficulties might be encountered.

(See worksheet handouts)

III. Implementing the Decision A.

A Plan of Action

1. Developing procedures - steps or actions to be performed, sequence, specific duties and responsibilities, follow-up and control.

2. What must be done, when or in what order, who should do them, how can they be cost effectively completed, why necessary, what difficulties likely to encounter.

B. Communicating the Decision

(What, when, to whom, and how)

C. Participation

***

Speaker’s Aid (2)

TITLE: Principles of Emergency Management
AUTHOR: Fredrick Cuny

SESSION: PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

***

Principals of Emergency Management

I. Introduction: What are we going to do in this hour and one-half?

A. Introduce the scope of emergency management
B. Divide emergency management into segment and phases
C. Explore how one phase affects others
D. See how sections in a phase sets the stage for subsequent
E. ID sectors involved
F. ID skills needed and who provides them
G. ID management skills needed
H. ID where the gaps often occur
Set first - we are going to define emergency management

II. What do we mean by emergency management?

A. Most people think of post-disaster. See also pre-disaster.

B. Definition: the full range of activities that focus on disaster and emergency situations that we designed to help the persons at risk avoid or recover from the input of the disaster. Emergency management deals with situations that occur prior to, during, and after disasters. Avoid control

C. Objectives of emergency management:

- to avoid or reduce human, physical and economic losses suffered by individuals, families and specific persons at risk, society, country

- to reduce suffering

- to speed recover - explain time concept

- (In conflicts) protection - we define protection much broader than HCR environmental sanctuary

- prevent recurrence

III. Who are emergency managers and where do you find them?

Everywhere!

They are specialists sent in by emergency - everyone must become emergency oriented.

IV. What are the key elements of emergency management?

Concept?

Decision Making

Knowledge

Leadership

A. Knowledge: The _______, without knowledge you're ________

- what kind of knowledge do you need:

expert generalist
pilot bag concept - where to go, when to ask, how to evaluate

B. Decision-making

- Always making decisions under conditions of uncertainty

1. Understand implications - EDM
2. Move decision-making forward
3. Make decision routine - how SOP'S, policies, standards

C. Leadership

There are different types of leaders - from dictators to facilitators

How do you get to be a leader?

- position - formal, traditional
- national popularity - opinion leader
- knowledge
- command presence - ex mr. work

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Overview of Emergency Management Principles
AUTHOR: Philip Sargisson

SESSION: PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

***

Overview of Emergency Management Principles

INTRODUCTION

A. What skills we want to develop

1. Our technical skills and knowledge
2. Our management skills
3. Our decision-making skills

B. Goal: To make us more effective emergency managers

C. What is emergency management?

1. 10% estimating or forecasting
2. 20% planning
3. 30% leadership
4. 40% decision-making

COMPONENTS

A. Estimating and Forecasting:

From the beginning we have to be able:

1. to predict events
2. to forecast the results

We do this by:

1. Monitoring events - not all, just the key ones
2. Identifying and recognizing patterns
3. Determining when thresholds have been reached/exceeded
4. Reacting to events based on known patterns/past performance

How do we know what to do?

In (1) Monitoring: certain events or actions trigger an alert.

These triggers we learn from:

- studying past operations
- experience

In (2) Pattern Recognition:

- study past events
- develop awareness of patterns
- identify the indicators of a developing pattern

In (3) Thresholds:

- We can indicate what some of the thresholds are.

In (4) Reaction:

- That we get with experience. Personal interpretation.

B. Planning: Planning consists of process, procedures, and technical know-how.

1. Process

2. Procedures: They simplify what we do by:

a. giving it structure and order
b. making it logical
c. putting it in sequence

Procedures put things in place so that everyone knows the rules and what to expect.

- Make things routine
- Reduce the necessary supervision/re-inventing the wheel

3. Technical Know-how: We have to know:

a. what to do
b. when to do it
c. how to do it

In theory, technical know-how is easiest:

- Books and manuals are there.
- We can't know everything. Be a knowledgeable generalist.

Instill a pattern of behavior (e.g. pilot checklists)

We must know:

- where to go to get information
- how to evaluate it in light of our immediate needs and situation
- what to do if the information is inadequate

Technical knowledge consists of information, or data.

- Some is hard, i.e. it is fact, quantifiable
- Some is soft, i.e., experience, unverifiable or qualitative

Distinguish between the two because:

- The first, we can believe and use
- The second, we react to and have to decide based on patterns and experience
- In emergencies, 90% are in the latter category

Technical knowledge forms the basis of our response. To prepare our response, we need:

a. Baselines
b. Standards

What are baselines? To know what is abnormal, we have to know what is normal. E.g., death rates, malnutrition, etc.

What are Standards? To judge and control performance, we need a point of reference (above = good; below = bad).

- need for monitoring
- need for evaluation

Both standards and baselines data are hard information, facts; e.g., water; calories per person per day, etc.

Technical Interrelationships

(e.g., water, sanitation, hygiene; supplemental feeding and immunizations)

C. Leadership;

1. We can't teach how to lead, only improve the peripheral skills

2. Everyone has their own strengths/weaknesses

3. Different styles:

- command
- knowledge
- reverent/friendship
- sheer physical presence

4. One thing for certain, just because we are appointed responsibility does not make us leaders.

5. You may even identify your style

- Improve it
- strengthen the weak areas
- home certain leadership skills
- give you knowledge
- help you be more creative

6. Only you can make yourself a leader, and that comes from practice and experience

D. Decision-making:

1. "I don't care what you decide, but decide something."

2. You finally made a decision and someone up the chain of command reversed it.

3. Decision-making under conditions of uncertainty:

How do we make the right decisions?

- information is incomplete, confusing, contradictory
- resources are scarce

We have to look for, and recognize, patterns

4. Very little in emergency operations is that new; the time and place change, but little else.

- We have to learn what has happened before. There is little collective memory. Find it.
- Past is prelude.
- Those who don't study the past are doomed to repeat it.

5. Decision-making is the very crux of emergency management

a. on all levels
b. we have to make

- the right decision
- at the right time

c. How do we make the decision?

- on the basis of knowledge
- on the basis of training
- on the basis of preparation

i.e., we are not making the decision with our eyes open.

KEY CONCEPTS

1. Accountability
2. Foresight and planning
3. Knowledge
4. Systems and the System
5. Patterns
6. Intelligent behavior
7. Management skills

- leadership
- decision-making
- ordering information

8. Creativity
9. Interrelationships and balance
10. Time
11. Experience and practice
12. Learning lessons

***

Speaker’s Aid (4)

TITLE: Keys to Being a Competent Manager
AUTHOR: Disaster Management Center

SESSION: Principles of Emergency Management

***

KEYS TO BEING A COMPETENT MANAGER

1. Write a plan of operations. It is a tool as well as a necessary step to organize your response, to set priorities, goals and objectives.

2. Implement a command and control system. Many emergency operations are set up with many ad hoc arrangements. A command and control system will eliminate ambiguities of authority and lines of communication.

3. Establish a strong logistics team. Getting relief supplies to the beneficiaries must be done quickly, efficiently, and with minimum loss of goods. This activity must be in the hands of experienced professionals who know the logistics chain and how to manage it.

4. Place a strong decision maker in the forward point. The critical issues of management are found in the relief camps and the zones of conflict. Instead of assigning inexperienced recruits to those posts (as is frequently the case) they should be run by the most experienced field staff who know what to do and can provide clear direction to the rest of the organization.

5. Be able to act quickly. The difference between life and death may be time. A good program is one that can be set up quickly and respond to changing condition quickly.

6. Create a unified team at all levels. For a program to be run coherently and effectively it must be managed by a team that "has their act together", that is, they must know how to work together and share a similar set of priorities.

7. Install an information management system. Implementing a program is dependent on communications at all levels. A communications system is necessary to expedite decisions, clarity priority actions, and to ensure that all parties are fully informed of key information.

8. Look for patterns. A good manager will always be looking for patterns that will give clues to critical issues. These are demographic patterns, physical observations, rate of change of the way beneficiaries are behaving, etc. Recognizing the patterns may be essential to be able to modify and respond the changing conditions.

9. Rely on basic experience. In general, place people with field experience in key positions.

10. Take preventive action. Anticipate problems, implement solutions before a crisis develops.

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 5: Early Warning & Pre-Disaster Planning

Learning Objectives

- To recognize and correctly interpret early signs of deteriorating conditions and potential problems

- To be aware of existing systems which monitor indications of emergencies

- To identify the complexities and multi-sectoral linkages of effective country-level pre-disaster planning

- To describe UNICEF's role in such planning and provide guidelines for this role

- To raise awareness of importance and linkages between pre-disaster plans and country programme activities.

Learning Points

1. - Early warning is the identification, recognition and interpretation of events that indicate an emergency is about to occur.

2. - Identification requires:

a) Awareness of what the normal situation is: baseline data.
b) Knowledge of the underlying or contributing factors to a brewing emergency.
c) Understanding how the society normally deals or copes with that type of emergency.
d) Setting up of a monitoring system to detect changes.

3. - Recognition means:

a) Looking for rapid changes in a situation.
b) Recognizing patterns and indicators of change.
c) Identifying the triggers that cause the situation to explode or sets off a chain of events that might lead to an emergency.

4. - Interpretation is made through:

a) Diagnosing the patterns and indicators in addition to thresholds (things that show that the ability of the society to cope has been exceeded).

b) Comparing present situation to past emergency situations to come up with conclusions (Ethiopia famine of 1983/1984 was to a large extent similar to the one of 1972-1975).

c) Use of internationally recognized standards for indicators, e.g. death rates, indexes of health, height for weight, etc.

5. - Early warning vs. early reaction: in many cases we know that something is happening but we don't react to it early. The Ethiopian famine in 1983-1984 is a good case example. (Why is the reaction delayed?)

6. - Some aspects of preparedness and pre-disaster planning are:

a) Awareness of "vulnerability" and possible interventions to mitigate it.
b) Early warning systems.
c) Agreement on policies and interventions for: -

a) beneficiaries; b) Government; c) Intervening agency.

d) Assuring operational capacity to respond appropriately.

7. - Roles of government's sectoral ministries, U.N. agencies (including UNICEF), other international organizations, NGO's and communities' pre-disaster planning and preparedness.

8. - Utilizing/structuring of (UNICEF-assisted) country programmes for pre-disaster planning.

Possible Learning Methods

- Lecture
- Chose as suitable any of the following exercises for group work.
- Group exercise:

1. Ask participants to name three types of disaster in which UNICEF is most likely to be involved (e.g. civil conflict, famine, epidemic) in which early warning could have an effect.

2. Ask participants to identify three sectors in which UNICEF is most likely to be involved (e.g. water, nutrition, MCH)

3. Divide participants into three groups and allocate one type of an emergency and one sector of intervention to each group.

4. Ask the groups to:

a) Identify the underlying causes and contributing factors to "their emergency" that could be identified in advance.

b) Identify indicators, triggers and thresholds that might exist that when crossed will be an indication of an emergency.

Example:

EMERGENCY

:

EPIDEMICS

SECTOR

:

WATER AND SANITATION

a) - Causes

Floods, earthquakes, etc.

b) - Indicators

Water contamination, availability of water, etc. Triggers Migration, etc.

- Thresholds

Supply of water less than 5 L./person/day, etc.

- Group Exercise II

What are the main reasons for the delay in response to emergencies?

- Group Exercise III

What disaster mitigation measures could be most meaningful in your country/region?

- Group Exercise IV

How to ensure involvement of all concerned national institutions (water, health, agriculture, public works, etc.) in pre-disaster planning?

Required Reading

- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies". Chapter 4 (Part 3), Chapters 8-14 (Assessment Checklists each chapter), Annex 1

- UNICEF Field Manual, Book E, Chapter 4

"Role of the Resident Representative in respect of pre-disaster planning and disaster relief" UNDP/PROG/FIELD/110/Rev.1. 12 October 1983. Field Manual Book E, Reference Note: R4)

Supplementary Reading

- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies", Annex 43

- DMC, Disaster Assessment, Chapters 3, 10, 12

- Ron Ockwell, Some observations and comments concerning UNICEF's' participation in response to emergencies, Assessment (of need, post-disaster) p. 24-28

- Peter Cutler, "Food Crisis Detection, Going Beyond the Balance Sheet", Food Policy, August 1984, p. 189-192

Speakers' Preparation Aids

- Fred Cuny, "Early warning and contingency planning"
- Gullmar Andersson, "Early Warning in Armed Conflict Situations"

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Early Warning/Contingency Planning
AUTHOR: Fredrick Cuny

SESSION: EARLY WARNING/PRE-DISASTER PLANNING

***

Early Warning/Contingency Planning

I. Introduction

A. A lot of talk of early warning

B. Much of nation is misplaced - building "systems"

C. Problem not early warning - it's early reaction

D. For early warning to work, we need to 1. shift emphasis and 2. remove obstacles to action - biggest obstacle? - funding

II. Define early warning

The ID, recognition and interpretation of events that indicate an emergency is about to occur

Basically, it's separating the usual from the unusual events

Some types of emergencies are easier than others

III. Let's look at the three elements

A. ID of events - requires:

1. Awareness of normal situation - base line data

Identification of underlying or contributing factors
Understanding of how the society normally deals with stress

2. Understanding what is abnormal

Ex. death rates, malnutrition rates, etc.

3. Monitoring to detect changes

B. Recognition of events: What we are looking for?

Rapid changes in situation

1. Patterns
2. Indicators - especially
3. Triggers

C. Interpretation

1. Patterns
2. Indicators
3. Thresholds

We want to know when a society's ability to deal with stress or an unusual situation is about to be exceeded

How do we know that?

1. Compare to past situations
2. Use internationally recognized standards for indicators
3. Personal, organizational judgment

IV. Practical Exercise

What types of disasters will UNICEF encounter where early warning could have an effect?

- conflicts
- epidemics
- famine

In which sectors is UNICEF likely to be involved?

- water and sanitation
- nutrition
- MCH
- others

Divide into three terms

Identify

- underlying causes and contributing factors to the emergency that can be identified in advance
- indicators to watch
- triggers
- thresholds

V. Discussion

VI. What do you do next? C.R.A.M.

Communicate, react, activate, motivate
How do we get people (systems) to react?

VII. How to get reactions to early warning

1. Multiple messages from different reputable or credible sources

2. Collective action - committee

3. Answer the likely questions - ex. give your evaluation of credibility of others in early warning system

4. Decide what you want to do and seek concurrency - don't ask for suggestions from HQ

5. Report statistics graphically (if possible)

6. Use the correct reporting terms, standards, etc. and refer to baselines, ex. death rates

7. Communicate in person possible

8. Establish and use priority classifications for communications

***

Speaker’s Aid (2)

TITLE: Early Warning in Armed Conflict Situations
AUTHOR: Gullmar Andersson

SESSION: EARLY WARNING/PRE-DISASTER PLANNING

***

EARLY WARNING" IN ARMED CONFLICT SITUATIONS
By J. Gullmar Andersson
***

It is very difficult to come to general conclusions on this subject as armed conflicts develop in so many different ways. In some war situations, escalation may develop hour by hour or an attack may come as a complete surprise.

Civil wars can, on the other hand, take years to erupt although the under laying fundamental issues, that may create a civil war, have been evident for a long time.

The "early warning" in war situations must use other indicators than in "normal" disaster situations. The most important is to keep oneself as well informed as possible. A few suggestions:

a. Mass Media

Follow, to the extend possible, through mass media, political developments both within the country as well as in the region.

b. UNICEF Office

Your own office is often a good source of information as our local staff are well informed through their "knowledge network" of possible developments within the country.

c. Normal Governments and Other Participants

Can be most accurate and good source of information an excellent relationship exists of mutual trust.

d. Production Changes

If a country prepares for war, the industrial production pattern changes to put the country on "warfooting". One indicator can be that certain items disappear from the market without any reason.

e. "Unusual Events"

Always keep an eye on "unusual events". This could be visible unrest in the population, violent strikes, demonstrations, sudden raise in crime rates and unusual high activity of armed forces.

f. Rumors

The general rule is: "Don't listen to or spread rumors". That is a good rule, however, it can be slightly modified to "listen to rumors, carefully evaluate what you have heard - but don't spread it further". There might be some truth in what you hear and that should not be neglected. Try then to verify through other sources.

g. Embassies

Embassies are very useful especially in a developing situation for fundraising, assistance with evacuations, etc. and should always be an important contact point. Some embassies can, however, be a bit "tricky" in obtaining information from, prior to changing situations.

Last but not least: If UNICEF is known in the country to be an efficient and reliable organization, you have solved many of the problems in "early warning" as many will be more inclined to pass on information to you.

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 6: Assessment

Learning Objectives

1) Be familiar with links between ongoing monitoring and emergency assessments, be able to identify thresholds and mechanisms which precipitate assessments.

2) Be able to focus on assessing needs which lead to UNICEF interventions.

3) Be able to compile consistent information to ensure programme credibility and facilitate effective planning, implementation and fundraising.

4) Be able to identify different types of needs assessment recognizing the interative process (monitoring and evaluation).

5) Be able to identify appropriate, timely and focussed methods, tools and work teams for assessment. (Be familiar with suggested formats in handbook as starting point).

6) Know how to communicate assessment information appropriately.

Learning Points

1) Why do assessment:

a) To determine where endangered people are
b) To determine victims needs
c) To help set priorities for action
d) To gather data for programme planning

2) Types of assessment

a) Situation assessment or initial reconnaissance
b) Needs assessment
c) Sectorial assessment
d) Resources assessment: what is available and what needs to be imported
e) Epidemiological surveillance

3) Keys to successful assessment

a) Identify the users

b) Define the information you need for a specific type of response

c) Decide on format that will make the information usable

d) Collect information at the right time (e.g. needs cannot be determined in the immediate aftermath of a cataclysmic disaster)

e) Use standardized classification of information (use recognized international reporting procedures).

4) Key indicators for preliminary assessments: number of affected persons in the population - morbidity/mortality: number of children and women; main risks.

5) Take of stock lessons learned from previous assessments of emergencies, where best information came from, methods of identifying felt needs of victims themselves.

6) Know that international, interagency assessment teams are there mainly for credibility and fundraising not for detailed planning and they don't stay around to implement.

7) Know who should participate in which type of assessment (e.g., ministries, agencies, consultants).

8) Describe concept of resource inventory and that UNICEF is there to ensure that gaps are filled not necessarily by UNICEF but by appropriate entity.

9) Techniques for extrapolating sectoral needs.

10) Techniques for nutritional surveillance and screening and the difference between that and nutritional monitoring. Know its weaknesses and that it is not an early warning tool.

11) Link the concept of assessment with UNICEF's situation analysis - i.e., the importance of base-line data, demographic, nutritional and epidemiological.

12) The importance of having the implementing party take part in the assessment from the beginning so they understand needs and plan realistically.

13) General background on other types of assessment to use results in planning UNICEF response, crop assessment, shelter damage, infrastructure damage and population displacement.

14) Deal with the judgment issues - where info gathering is important but emergencies imply decision-making based on limited information -therefore, be able to weigh the cost in lives and/or money of waiting for detailed information. Different types of emergencies have different time parameters.

Possible Learning Methods

- Lecture with selected use of Cuny materials - outline from Bangkok.

- Group Exercise

As a UNICEF programme officer you were asked to participate in a multi-sector "Rapid Needs Assessment" of an emergency situation caused by a civil conflict resulting in internal displacement of a segment of the population. Your responsibility is to assess the needs of children and women in a) Health; b) Water; c) Nutrition and d) Shelter.

1. What types of information will you seek in each sector in order to assess needs at this stage of "initial assessment" as distinct from that which you would seek when doing a "thorough assessment.

2. How and where would you obtain the information for each sector.

3. What format would you use to present your information to make it usable and easily understood, and which channels would you use to communicate above information to users.

- Divide participants into four groups and ask each group to assess needs in one sector.
- Reconvene in a plenary session and discuss group reports on their assignments.

Required Reading

- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies", Chapter 4 (Part 3), Chapters 8-14. Annex 1.

Supplementary Reading

- DMC, Disaster Assessment, Chapters 3, 10, 12

Speakers' Preparation Aids

- Outline of Fred Cuny's lecture in the Bangkok workshop

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Assessment
AUTHOR: Fredrick Cuny

SESSION: ASSESSMENT

***

Assessment

1. Initial Assessments

a. Made by visiting the disaster area, talking to the victims, monitoring indicators and identifying problems

b. Provides the first firm data on the location of the victims, and what are their needs and priorities

c. From the basis of setting action priorities and gives the initial hard data for subsequent monitoring.

2. Assessment Focus - will depend on the interests of the organization and the type of emergency

a. To obtain a general impression: "do we have an emergency situation?"

b. Needs assessment: long term or short term

c. Sectoral assessment: by health or housing

d. Resource assessment: to collect information of in-country resources

e. Epidemiological assessment: concerned with threats to health - not usually needed after catacylsmic disasters, but essential after long term disasters.

3. Steps in Making an Assessment

a. Planning: preparing checklists, forms, etc., and planning the field trip.
b. Field Trip: complete checklists, etc. and assess indicators
c. Interpretative: look for patterns, analyze data, and make personal interpretations
d. Forecasting: extrapolate
e. Reporting and disseminating - aim at wide distribution and feedback

4. Key to Successful Techniques

a. Identify the user of the assessment: decide what information is needed by that user
b. Timing: not too early, not too late, depending on type of data wanted
c. Use recognized definitions and agreed standard measures.

5. Methodology Options

a. Structure:

1. Observers - team or individual (usually a team with local and expert knowledge is best)
2. Surveys: simple but statistically sound basis essential

b. Coverage:

1. comprehensive
2. Cultural sector analysis

c. Survey Instruments:

1. Checklists
2. Questionnaires
3. Formatted manuals with portable computer systems

6. Specific Topics of Importance

a. Mortality: death rate -


b. Morbidity: Prevalence, severity, responsiveness to control
c. Epidemiological data - especially when unusual concentration of people
d. Cold chain
e. Nutrition Centered Health Approach - data collection limited to supplementary feeding programs.

7. Miscellaneous

Food: rarely needed in case of catalysmic disaster - the problem is usually one of distribution not security. Even in drought, should be introduced carefully to specific targets.

Other Critical Issues

- Ongoing assessment - organization

frequency

- Training suggestions for field workers undertaking assessments to prepare them

- Patterns mentioned but no examples given of common patterns and how to interpret them

- Organization - links to govt: government approval for order collecting activities vital if to get statistics quickly

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 7: Programme Planning

Learning Objectives

- To be very familiar with the cycle and sequence of programme planning activities in an emergency operation

- To describe all the elements of setting up a field operation

- To be able to formulate, document and communicate specific proposals for UNICEF's intervention

- To identify ways and means for speeding up the planning process


Learning Points

1. Common problem in emergency operations: lack of time for comprehensive planning. What problems does this situation create and how to avoid or at least mitigate them.

2. The "fast track" to preparing plan of operation:

a) Identify gaps in the services provided (give examples using Fred Curry's "gap identification sheet") to avoid duplication and fill the gaps in those areas of UNICEF's mandate.

b) Plans of operation should be prepared by field people assisted if necessary by HQs personnel or outside consultants.

c) Be always aware of the available resources (funds, personnel, etc.) and funding alternatives.

d) Reprogramming existing programmes to meet emergency needs.

3. Steps of a plan of action (Table 8 of the Emergency Handbook)

4. Elements of setting up an operation (Table 9 of the Emergency Handbook

5. Common problems in planning emergency programmes

a) Poor definition of the problem from beneficiaries' perspective

b) Failure to be explicit how action relates to UNICEF policy

c) Failure to determine cultural/environmental factors and impact which results in an inappropriate response

d) Agencies often fall to look at different options

e) Using only one strategy or approach to meet a particular need

f) Over extension; more responsibility than they can handle

g) Failure to examine cause and effect relationship (the negative impact)

h) Failure to get appropriate technical expertise at the right time

i) Poor co-ordination (Cuny's observation: "UNICEF is the best in co-ordinating programmes with the Governments and probably one of the worst in co-ordinating with voluntary agencies!")

j) Failure to adequately document and communicate plan of action in a concise way so it can be distributed and adapted for donors as a fund-raising tool

k) Inability to budget quickly

l) Failure to plan for a monitoring component

Possible Learning Methods

- Presentation using the transparency on "Programme Planning"
- Group exercise in critiquing a plan of action (real or fictitious)

Required Reading

- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies", Chapters 3, 5 and 6

Supplementary Reading

- UNICEF, Field Manual, Book E, Chapter 5

Speakers' Preparation Aids

- Transparency on "Programme Planning"
- Sample plan of action (1)
- Gap identification sheet (2)

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Proposals for UNICEF's Role in Emergency Drought Relief and Ongoing Nutritional Surveillance
AUTHOR: UNICEF

SESSION: PROGRAM PLANNING

***

PROPOSALS FOR UNICEF'S ROLE IN EMERGENCY DROUGHT RELIEF AND ONGOING NUTRITIONAL SURVEILLANCE

24 August, 1987

BACKGROUND

The recent drought emergency which has effected large parts of Somalia, involving many thousands of people, has highlighted the inadequacy of the present systems to product the onset, and cope with the existance of a disaster of such magnitude. Despite the obvious concern of the Government of Somalia, the UN and the Voluntary agencies, the mounting of an appropriate surveillance system of the drought affected areas, as well as delivery of any form of relief was considerably delayed. This delay has undoubtedly resulted in death and suffering to the victims of the drought/famine.

PROPOSED RESPONSE

With the above in mind, UNICEF proposes the establishment of a unit with the central objective of establishing a broad based surveillance system to be linked to an appropriate emergency response facility. The realization of such a comprehensive monitoring and responsive machine would require the upgrading of present health delivery facilities (specifically the Regional Hospitals, Maternal and Child Health clinics and the Primary Health Care units) within the drought-prone areas.

IMPLEMENTATION

It is obvious that efforts to improve the collection of data and the functioning of remote health care systems must be done in close collaboration with, and under the guidance of, the appropriate Ministries of the Government of Somalia.

It is hoped that the close and effective relationship which UNICEF presently shares with the Somali Red Crescent Society can be further expanded in order that these two agencies can develop strategy and implement programs on an ongoing basis.

The program would also, of course, require the close collaboration and support of MHO both at local and central levels. The need for support and assistance from the other UN agencies in Somalia would continue as it has in the past (in the response to the current drought and also in the long-term).

Recent discussions of these proposals with representatives from the Faculty of Medicine, University of Somalia, have been most encouraging with suggestions for ongoing programs of data collection and contribution of resources to involve both faculty members and medical students. This would, of course, be an excellent input to the program, with the pooling of experience and expertise of local academics as well as an introduction to the developing programs by the future medical personnel of the country.

The close and effective relationship which UNICEF presently shares with various voluntary agencies, well demonstrated by the three teams presently operating supplementary feeding programs in the Central Rangelands (OXFAM, SCF (U.K.) and Concern Ireland) would continue. It is envisaged that the assistance of NGO's would be sought for (other) specific programs as the need arises, such as the planned collaboration with MSF Netherlands. The experience and expertise available within the Voluntary Agencies is a valued resource which UNICEF greatly appreciates.

The productive relationship which UNICEF shares with various bilateral and multilateral agencies (such as US AID and EEC) would continue with funding as well as the provision of various resource personnel (as was the situation with the rapid deployment of nutritional surveillance teams from CDC Atlanta who collected data early in the drought situation.)

PLANNED ACTIVITIES

The Unit would see its role as meeting the following commitments:

1) A rapid assessment of the extent of the present drought, specifically by nutritional surveys in those areas in which some doubt exists as to the situation. These areas would include Gedo, Bakool and Lower Juba. These assessments would be based on a standardized, reproducable format. Depending on the outcome, some supplementary feeding programs may need to be established. Early dissemination of information to Government agencies, Voluntary agencies and UN bodies would be a priority. It is hoped that reliable and reproducable nutritional data will be available and processed from the above regions by the first week in September.

It is planned that local staff (recruited by the Somali Red Crescent Society) will be field trained in the techniques of nutritional survey with the view to their increasing role in data collection, tabulation and dissemination. These training programs are presently underway and should be expanded at the central and regional level.

2) Using the above data, as well as that presently being collected from the regions in the Central Rangelands (in association with the established Supplementary Feeding Programs) we would plan a repeat survey (in the same format) in three and six months to evaluate nutritional trends and the response to the established supplementary feeding programs. This information would serve as an invaluable data-base for future studies as well as a method of monitoring the nutritional status of the populations which, in conjunction with other information, could serve as input to systems to serve as an 'early warning' to future nutritional catastrophes. As well as the obvious function of identifying pockets of populations which may need nutritional support. The input from established PHC systems need be standardized and closely monitored.

3) The continuation of close ties with the implementing agencies involved by frequent dissemination of information and functional program support.

4) A. The Upgrading of the Maternal and Child Health Facilities in the areas considered 'at risk'. This would include systematized surveys of the state of the clinics at present with recommendations for improvement, early priority would be directed to the following:

a) repair of buildings where necessary

b) Provision of appropriate drugs and medications

c) provision of appropriate monitoring equipment for infant/childhood surveillance, antenatal screening, postnatal screening and family planning.

d) Provision of stationary, filing systems, etc.

e) provision of staff uniforms

f) review of the failure in the provision of supplementary feeding programs at the MCH level

g) where practical establishing a cold-chain

h) development of on-going in-service educational programs with regular visits to regions by educators

l) supply of interesting and appropriate health promotional material

B. The Upgrading of Regional Hospitals with particular attention to the following:

a) Provision of safe and reliable water supply to the hospital

b) where practical provision of diesel fuel for hospital generators for emergency power supply

c) provision of mattresses, minimal linen

d) review of provision of food for in-patients

e) review of drug and medicament supply with efforts to provide and strengthen present systems

f) provision of on-going in-service educational programs for staff with development of a small clinical library in each Regional hospital

5) Rapid dissemination of information collected to all agencies interested, this may take the form of 'news-sheet', monthly meetings or a combination. The unit would be open to interested parties to answer queries, MHO would be asked for frequent input into this process.

6) The need for development of an 'early warning system' specifically in relation to the nutritional status of the population, is apparent. A number of systems already in existance such as the FAO commodity prices listings and the meteorological data-base in which the EEC is involved could be utilized as inputs which could be processed with a view to predicting disaster at a time when appropriate intervention might limit the outcome.

BUDGET

Budgeting for the above proposals is being developed in conjunction with available funds.

TIMING

The time-frame for implementation of the individual proposals will depend on priorities. A full assessment of, and appropriate response to, the present emergency will precede implementation of more long-term programs.


AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

JAN

FEB

RAPID NUTRITIONAL ASSESSMENT

XXXX







ONGOING NUTRITIONAL ASSESSMENT


a) Muduk



XXXX



XXXX



b) Galgudud

XXXX


XXXX



XXXX



c) Bakool

XX

XX


XXXX



XXX


d) Hiran




XXXX



XXX


e) Gedo

XX

XX


XXXX



XXX


f) M/L Shabelle









g) Lower Juba

XXXX



XXXX




MCH/HOSPITAL REVIEW

XXXX







MCH/HOSPITAL INTERVENTION



XXXX

XXXX

XXXX

XXXX

XXXX

COLLECTION/DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

XXXX

XXXX

XXXX

XXXX

XXXX

XXXX

XXXX

INVESTIGATE/DEVELOP EARLY WARNING SYSTEM



XXXX

XXXX

XXXX

XXXX

XXXX

BUDGET FOR UNICEF SOMALIA EMERGENCY PROJECT FOR 1987

Supply Assistance

Donor

US$

Essential Drugs/Medical Supplies

US

110,000

High Energy Biscuits

Switzerland

(D-I-K)

Seeds

US

25,000


Norway

6,000

Freight (offshore)

US

95,000

Logistics (In-country)

US

10,000

Technical Assistance

Project Coordinator

ERF

25,000

Nutritionist




- full time

EEC

15,000


- part time

Norway

8,000

Other support

Norway

6,000

Supplementary Feeding (Assist. NGO's)

Logistics/

Norway

20,000

Food distribution/storage

EEC

15,000

Local distribution (labor/cfw)

EEC

20,000

Repair/Equip fdg centers (MCH Hosp.)

EEC

25,000

Sugar (Local proc't)

EEC

22,000

Contingies (Distribution of Sugar)

EEC

12,000

Nutrition Surveillance (assistance MOH/R.C.)

Transport costs (fuels, spares & tires)

US

10,000


EEC

5,500

DSA for teams (MOH/R.C.)

EEC

9,500

Training/capacity building (MOH/R.C.)

Norway

40,000

Office & field equipment

Norway

10,000

Vehicles for teams

ERF

20,000


Norway

20,000

Maintenance

ERF

5,000

Total Budget


534,000

OVERVIEW OF FUNDING

USAID

250,000

EEC

124,000

Norway

110,000

UNICEF ERF

50,000

Total US$

534,000

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Gap Identification (Emergency Operations)
AUTHOR: Disaster Management Center

SESSION: PROGRAM PLANNING

***

Gap Identification (Emergency Ops)

Plan

Agency Responsible

Person Responsible

Alt

Comment

ACTIONS






PHASE I (1st 24-48 hours)






Coordination






Disaster Assessment






Initial Emergency Needs (Victim)






Damage Assessment and Blockage ID






Survey of Available Facilities






Epidemiological Surveillance






Search and Rescue






Coordination






Assignments






Supplies






Records






Security






Police






Military






Emergency Operations






Lifelines







Hospitals







Electricity







Transport







Roads







Water







Sanitation







Others






Emergency Relief







First Aid







Food for Relief Workers







Food for Victims







Material Aid







Fuel







Shelter Operations






Information Dissemination






Coordination






Verification






PHASE II






Coordination






Detailed Assessment






Interim Victim Needs






Detailed Damage Survey






Priority Repairs ID






Epidemiological Reports






Vital Statistics






Est. of Economic Loss/Damage






Inventory of Resources






Relief Program






Interim Aid







Food







Material







Shelter







Tools







Economic Assistance







Job Programmers/Work Schemes






Salvage Ops






Equipment Recovery






Materials Recovery






Other Ops






DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 8: Water & Sanitation

Learning Objectives

- To identify problems/needs for water supply in an emergency situation.

- To describe the causes for insufficient and unsafe water supply.

- To be aware of practical and expedient measures to provide minimum water supplies.

- To recognize hygiene and sanitation problems/needs, their causes and possible interventions.

- To understand the inter-relationship between water supply, sanitation and hygiene on one side and the health of the individual and community as a whole on the other side.

- To define UNICEF's role, objectives and specific programme interventions in the area of water and sanitation in emergency situations.

Learning Points

Water

- In different situations, review the possible problems/needs:

a) Insufficient safe water for domestic and hygiene purposes
b) Lack of water for animals and irrigation

- What causes water scarcity in emergencies - making it different from endemic needs?

- Causes of water contamination, rural/urban, natural vs. man-made disasters

- Priorities for intervention for UNICEF; what can NGOs and others do? Often what is required is a feasibility approach rather than an attempt to meet all needs.

- Assessment of water supplies and estimating water requirements and budgeting for them.

- Specific objectives of UNICEF's intervention

a) Ensure availability of safe water for hygiene and domestic use

b) Ensure availability and efficient use of water for household and community-level food production

- Detailed review of programme interventions, their cost-effectiveness, technical requirements (potential pitfalls) and time frames for different interventions

- Linkages between emergency action

Sanitation

- Possible needs/problems may arise from:

a) Contamination of water supplies and equipment
b) Proliferation of disease-bearing insects and rodents
c) Inadequate personal and domestic hygiene

- Causes of above

- Priorities:

a) Prevent spread of disease
b) Provide means of reasonable personal hygiene

- Possible programme interventions. Appropriate technology/innovations and lessons learned.

Possible Learning Methods

- Presentation
- Reviews of case studies or evaluation reports from the region

Required Reading

- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies", Chapter 10.
- UNICEF, 'Field Manual, Book E. Sections 6.4 and 6.5.

Supplementary Reading

- DMC, Water and Sanitation in Refugee Camps, Chapter 1.
- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies", Annex 16-23.

Speakers' Preparation Aids

- Leif Rosenhall, "Emergency Water Interventions", Summaries of case studies.

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Emergency Water Interventions-Case Study Summary
AUTHOR: Leif Rosenhall

SESSION: WATER/SANITATION

***

EMERGENCY WATER INTERVENTIONS CASE-STUDY SUMMARY

Topic: Establishment of a contingency plan to cope with anticipated influx of drought victims to eastern Sudan from Ethiopia.

Country: Sudan

Problems:

- Growing population of eastern villages/towns due to influx of Ethiopian drought victims resulting in over utilized water supplies.

- An anticipated growth of 50,000 people to live in towns/camps designed for 5,000 people

Lessons learned:

- UNICEF, being the principal water supply organization in Sudan, took the initiative to establish a contingency plan in 1982.

- The plan consisted of 4 basic elements:

(a) Drilling of tubewells using UNICEF procured drilling equipment (Low-weight, high efficiency)
(b) Installation of India Mark II Handpumps
(c) Train caretakers in maintenance
(d) Construction of community latrines

- The plan was agreed upon between UNICEF, other UN agencies and the Government of the Sudan. Hence, a contingency plan was established in case the situation would go worse.

- Towards the middle of 1983 the situation in the eastern towns of Sudan had further aggravated. At the same time, Sudan itself was badly affected by the drought.

- By the end of 1983 UNICEF had diverted a few drilling rigs to the problem area, and with the speed of 6-8 tubewells per week the situation became manageable.

- To divert drilling rigs from an ongoing drilling program to a totally different part of the country is a major undertaking considering the bureaucracy involved. Without the contingency plan agreed upon in advance many more people would have died.

Prepared by:

Leif Rosehall
Senior Project Officer
UNICEF Rangoon

EMERGENCY WATER INTERVENTIONS CASE-STUDY SUMMARY

Topic: Disaster Preparedness in Burma

Country: Burma

Problems:

1. Disasters most encountered are due to fires, occasionally cyclonic storms and floods.

(a) Fires: The majority of houses are constructed in timber, bamboo and thatch. Due to the nature of construction material it is usual for an outbreak of fire to cause widespread destruction invariably rendering the victims completely destitute. More than 75% of disasters occurring in Burma are caused by fires, normally in congested, low-income (slum) areas.

(b) Cyclonic Storms and Floods: 'With a coastline of approximately 1,200 miles, Burma is often exposed to storms and cyclones during the period of south west monsoon from May to October. These climatic disturbances usually penetrate densely populated areas in the hinterland and immediately beyond with destruction of property, crops and cattles.

2. Bureaucracy in Burma makes it difficult for the Government to request for emergency assistance.

3. Long leadtime for supplies and equipment to arrive.


Experience/Lessons learned:

1. Burma Red Cross Society works closely with the Department of Relief and Resettlement (DRR) to cope with disasters of above nature.

2. UNICEF has since 1981 expressed special interest in stockpiling disaster relief stores in warehouses to facilitate their Immediate issue to victims almost????????

3. Agree in advance on who is in charge once a disaster happens.

4. Establish a core Emergency Management Group to allow for fastest possible action, with members from relevant ministries and international agencies.

Prepared by:

Leif Rosenhall
Senior Project Officer
UNICEF Rangoon

LR/mmh/13/5/87

EMERGENCY WATER INTERVENTIONS CASE-STUDY SUMMARY

Topic: Emergency Advisory Service to the Government of North Yemen following the December 1982 Earthquake.

Country: North Yemen

Problems:

1. Short Term (0-6 months)

- Organize water supply in temporary camps accommodating several hundred thousand villagers.
- Organize excreta disposal facilities in the camps.
- Organize solid waste disposal in the camps.

2. Intermediate Term (6-12 months)

- Regain the confidence of the villagers
- Repair existing damaged water supplies at the village level to allow the villagers to return home
- Rehabilitate systems damaged at the sources (springs) due to ground shearing
- Repair latrines

3. Long Term (12-24 months)

- Invest in new 'safe' systems
- Establish a water/sanitation master plan.

Lessons learned:

1. In vulcanic areas or areas with seismic activity, always maintain a contingency plan.

2. Have international agencies (already established in the country) to agree in advance to the contingency plan. Valuable time was lost trying to convince international agencies for emergency funds once the short term plan was prepared.

3. Agree in advance on who is in charge once a disaster happens.

4. Establish a core Emergency Management Group to allow for fastest possible action, with members from relevant ministries and international agencies.

Prepared by:

Leif Rosenhall
Senior Project Officer
UNICEF Rangoon

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 9: Health

Learning Objectives

- be aware of health needs, particularly of children and mothers that arise in different emergency situations

- identify priority needs that must be addressed and kinds of UNICEF responses which might be appropriate

- understand the role of other agencies (especially WHO), governmental and international, and the fields of their intervention in health in emergency situations

- link any health intervention in emergencies to primary health care programmes in the country

Learning Points

1. possible problems/needs:

a) inadequacy of basic health services
b) inadequate availability of drugs
c) outbreak of specific communicable disease
d) casualties requiring treatment

2. causes of health services disruption and shortages of supplies: destruction, loss of staff, logistics, funds, etc.

3. priorities:

a) to save lives
b) preserve health of survivors
c) prevent/mitigate outbreaks of disease

4. Response must emphasize:

a) preventive and control measures
b) assure necessary food, water, hygiene and environmental - sanitation
c) re-establish and strengthen pre-existing services and Primary Health Care
d) institute epidemiological surveillance

5. Specific objectives and possible programmes for UNICEF's interventions

6. Epidemiology of disasters - man-made and natural - in terms of needs

7. Actions for given needs and possible UNICEF inputs (immunization/ORS)

8. Pitfalls/lessons learned in health operations -set-packing/D-I-K, etc.

9. Focus on displaced/refugee needs - psycho-social

10. Preventive preparedness measure in health as part of long-term programme

11. Similarities and differences between emergency and long-term actions/interventions

12. Institutional capacity building of governments and training

13. Relief and rehabilitation

Possible Learning Methods

- Lecturette

- Presentation and discussion of a case study

- Group Exercises

1) Disasters do not generate "new" diseases but may increase transmission of diseases. Give examples and explain the causes of the increase of common diseases.

2) How feasible is it to link intervention in the health sector with other interventions in nutrition and water supply. Give other examples from your own experience.

Required Reading

- UNICEF Field Manual, Book E, Chapter 6. Section 3
- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies", Chapter 9

Supplementary Reading

- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies". Annex 8-15
- WHO, Emergency Health Kit

Speakers' Preparation Aids

- UNICEF Field Manual, Book E, Chapter 6, Section 3
- Steps in the Development of Health Programmes for Displaced Populations
- Transparencies: Epidemiology of Natural Disasters

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Steps in the Development of Health Programmes for Displaced Populations
AUTHOR: Disaster Management Center/John Seaman

SESSION: HEALTH

***

STEPS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HEALTH PROGRAMMES FOR DISPLACED POPULATIONS

INFORMATION REQUIRED

USE OF INFORMATION

ACTION

IMMEDIATE

* map
* census
* Anthropometric survey

* size and location of population
* number of children
* prevalence of PEM
* requirement for supplementary feeding
* number and location of feeding centres

* vitamin A distribution
* measles immunization
* louse control
* simple improvements in sanitation
* simple outpatient/day care services
* home visiting program
* supplementary feeding program

RECOVERY

* mortality
* outpatient morbidity data
* repeat anthropometric survey
* feeding centre

* monitoring changes in disease
* estimating coverage of supplementary feeding
* changes in prevalence

* development of community health programs
* development of MCH/ antenatal services
* pertussis, polio and other immunizations

LONG-TERM

* surveys of specific diseases e.g. tuberculosis
* anthropometric surveys
* continued collection of morbidity/mortality data

* planning control programs
* nutrition and diseases surveillance

* development of PHC program
* reduction of trained staff to appropriate affordable levels
* possible introduction of services for local population

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 10: Food and Nutrition

Learning Objectives

- Describe the nutrition needs which arise in emergency situations

- Be familiar with assessment both for food production and nutritional status as distinct from growth monitoring but in relation to baseline data

- Be aware of interrelationships between health/water and nutrition

- Identify UNICEF's role in food and nutrition programmes as complementing those of FAO, WFP and other organizations

Learning Points

1. Information needed and data collection techniques for nutrition in early warning, needs assessment and operations planning.

2. Causes of immediate and short-term, medium-term and long-term problems regarding food and nutrition and suggested solutions.

3. There are the three types of feeding programmes:

- Rehabilitation for the severely undernourished
- Food supplementary - general distribution
- Targeted food supplements to groups at risk

4. Describe UNICEF's role, policies and techniques in addressing how:

- to ensure availability of necessary basic food to all;
- to treat severe malnutrition
- to expedite the re-establishment of local food production, processing and distribution

5. Describe how UNICEF has/should complement FAO and WFP, and WHO efforts (examples).

6. Describe how to ensure appropriate food for "vulnerable groups".

7. Possibilities of specific vitamin deficiencies, especially Vitamin A and Vitamin C, and what to do about them.

8. Critical issues of the politics of food aid/family food production/distribution/ethics/morality of supplementary feeding programmes.

Possible Learning Methods

- Lecture
- Case study: Province of Sucros
- Group Exercise:

Pages 62-64. Describe "possible programme interventions" for UNICEF in the area of food and nutrition. Comment on those interventions in regard to:

a) Whether the suggested interventions are realistic considering UNICEF's resources and present emphasis on CSDR

b) Which of the above interventions are more applicable to your country/region and why

c) From your experience in emergency operations, which of the above interventions were applied successfully. Give examples.

Required Reading

- "Assisting in emergencies", Chapter 8
- David Alnwick "Notes for discussion of nutrition issues", UNICEF Nairobi, May 1986

Supplementary Reading

- Assisting in emergencies", Annex 2-7
- Food Quantity calculation techniques

Speakers' Preparation Aids

- Nutrition in Emergencies: Dr Omowale's notes

***

Reading

TITLE: "Notes for Discussion of Nutrition Issues," DMC/UNHCR EMTP
AUTHOR: David Alnwick

SESSION: FOOD AND NUTRITION

***

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP

Nairobi - May 1985

NOTES FOR DISCUSSION OF NUTRITION ISSUES

David Alnwick
UNICEF
Nairobi

OBJECTIVES OF SESSION:

For participants to become aware of issues relating to nutritional needs of refugees, malnutrition. Its causes and ways of alleviating it.

Options for meeting nutritional needs with advantages and disadvantages of each option. Current knowledge and its limitations.

Sources of further information, advice and assistance.

OVERVIEW

Talk:

Elements of nutrition.

Malnutrition - especially child malnutrition and its multiple causes.

Specific problems of refugees liable to make child malnutrition more common.

Methods for assessing and monitoring nutrition.

Options for providing adequate nutrition - short term, longer term.

Treatment of malnutrition.

Difficulties in assessing food requirements - food needs vs other needs.

Methods for assessing adequacy of food provisions. Characteristics of particular foods.

Short term expedients vs longer term development issues in improving nutritional status and maintaining adequate nutrition.

Case study - exercise.

Discussion - Roundup.

These brief notes are intended to supplement and as a background to the material contained in the UNHCR and the UNICEF Emergency Manuals which should be thoroughly studied and kept for reference.

Elements of nutrition

Food is primarily used as a source of energy. All types of food provide energy. If a person is receiving insufficient food, he will be receiving insufficient energy. Such a person will loose weight, become less active, and eventually die (for healthy adult this will take quite a long time).

Children, pregnant and lactating women and old people have special requirements, over and above the requirement to maintain their bodies at a constant desirable weight and to be as active as they would wish.

Children and pregnant women are laying down tissue - this is growth. Extra energy is needed for this growth. If food intake and hence energy intake is insufficient, this growth will not occur or not be adequate. Children who receive insufficient food will not grow adequately - they will be smaller than they should be for their age, babies will be born small, more babies will die before, during or shortly after birth.

Of course, other things are needed by the body apart from just energy. Everybody knows that protein is needed for growth. A diet which does not contain enough protein will not allow a child to grow well. This fact was emphasized much in the past. What was less emphasized was that a diet which does not provide enough energy will not allow a child to grow well either. Quantity is just as important - maybe more important that quality. This is an important point, in the past much emphasis was placed on "balancing the diet" to get the quality right, while people were becoming malnourished because they were simply not getting enough food.

Vitamins and minerals are also needed for good nutrition and health. These are needed not just for "protection" against infection although this is one important function that many vitamins and minerals help to maintain. Vitamins and minerals are also necessary for the body to effectively use the energy and protein in food.

Finally, in this thumb nail sketch of nutritional requirements, we should note that the nutritional value of food not eaten is zero. The food has to be prepared in such a way that people will eat enough of it. A perfectly balanced and adequate diet that tastes bad and which people will not eat will be useless. This is particularly true with young children, where the large bulk of food that a child needs to eat may be a major constraint, and with sick children, who may eat especially tasty or well prepared foods but not other foods.

Foods and nutrients.

In any classical introduction to nutrition, we would generally start by describing what foods contain what nutrients. I will start the other way round. Most foods contain most nutrients, a11 foods contain energy, nearly all foods contain protein - with the exception of refined manufactured foods such as sugar and oil and animal fat. Many foods contain a useful mixture of vitamins and minerals as well.

Contrary to popular opinion, I believe that in most societies, certainly in Africa, the diets that people habitually eat are nearly always mixed diets, consisting perhaps largely of a cereal, some vegetable and occasionally an animal product. People have chosen these diets by tradition and experience, not on the advice of western trained nutritionists, and they have survived and prospered.

Why then are small children malnourished in Africa, even in places where there appears to be plenty of food, no drought or famine, and where people have not been displaced?

Malnutrition - especially child malnutrition and its multiple causes.

The chart contained in "Pacey and Payne" provides a useful summary of the multiple causes of malnutrition.

The child’s food intake depends on many factors, especially his health, the number of times he is fed each day, and the nutrient density of the food given to him. These factors depend in turn on other factors.

Although this chart attempts to look at the causes of malnutrition in general we can see that many of the factors identified will likely be aggravated in a refugee situation

Note especially: Poor living conditions, crowding, poor water, not enough water, mother's time - especially in broken families, situations where mothers have to work or collect water, fuel - as well as the obvious factors of a shortage of food.

Types of malnutrition.

The most common type of malnutrition is caused by an inadequate intake of food. Not enough food leads to not enough energy and not enough protein and not enough vitamins and minerals. If this type of malnutrition is the problem, giving people a little extra protein, or a little food which is particularly rich in some vitamin or other will not be of much use.

An inadequate intake of food results in adults losing weight and children failing to grow at an adequate rate. This type of malnutrition or undernutrition is often called "Protein-energy malnutrition, PEM" or "Energy -Protein malnutrition" to be more trendy.

The most common manifestation or sign of an inadequate food intake in children is a failure to grow adequately. This failure to grow may not be easily detected. A three year old child who has not grown well will look just like a two year old child who has grown well. The majority of undernourished children have no other obvious signs, no red hair or flaky skin or bleeding gums.

If the child's intake of food is particularly drastically reduced, the child will get very thin, bones will show and there will be very little fat under the skin. This condition of extreme thinness is called marasmus. Some undernourished children develop a disease known as Kwashiorkor. The distinguishing feature of this disease is oedema, or swelling, especially of the feet and hands, sometimes legs and face. In the later stages of this disease the child's hair may change color to browny red if black, the skin changes color and flakes off, large burn like sores may appear and the child becomes extremely miserable. The exact causes of Kwashiorkor are unknown, and it is not clear why some children develop Kwashiorkor and some don't although they both may eat identical diets. In the past, Kwashiorkor was regarded as being a sign of a diet that was deficient in protein but adequate in energy. This diagnosis has been challenged. Infections and toxic substances such as aflatoxin and cyanide (In some foods such as cassava) as well as protein and perhaps vitamins may all play a role in the development of this disease but in what exactly way we are not sure. For recent detailed (but fairly technical) review see Golding M. "The consequences of protein deficiency in man and its relationship to the features of Kwashiorkor", in Nutritional Adaptation in Man, Eds Sir Kenneth Blaxter and J.C. Waterlow, Libbey, London, 1985. For a more readable but rather out of date article see Payne, 1974, New Scientist, (attached).

We could imagine diets deficient in any one of a dozen or more specific nutrients and have some idea about the specific diseases associated with them. However, in public health terms in Africa these deficiencies occur most frequently when people are not getting enough of any kind of food, and increasing the overall amount of food people eat may be as important in preventing these deficiencies as taking specific measures to provide foods (or supplements) rich in the particular nutrients identified to be lacking. There are however four deficiencies of specific nutrients which are widespread throughout Africa and which may be exasperated in a refugee situation:

VITAMIN A

A deficiency of this vitamin has been long recognized to result eventually in blindness. Blindness associated with inadequate vitamin A is particularly likely in children following infections such as diarrhea and measles. Recently, evidence from studies in Indonesia indicates that marginal deficiency of vitamin A may result in a markedly increased rate of illness and death in children. Vitamin A may play a very important role in resistance to infection, and ensuring adequate intakes of vitamin A may be a very effective way to reduce young child mortality. (See article from "State of the Worlds Children. 1986, attached)

The early stages of vitamin A are not easy to recognize without some training. They may include night blindness - an inability to see well in low light levels - mothers may report that their children knock themselves in the house at night, and dryness and lack of lustre in the eye. Later stages may include "Bitots spots", small patches of a white frothy substance which sticks to the eye and eventually ulceration and severe and obvious damage to the eye. Children can go blind extremely fast due to vitamin A deficiency they succumb to an infection such as measles.

Deficiency of vitamin A may be associated with low fat diets, fat aids absorption of the vitamin. Rich sources of vitamin A (or its precursor) are dark green leafy vegetables, red and yellow vegetables, and animal products, especially liver.

Vitamin A is stored in the body and supplementation is relatively easy. It is advisable to supplement all new arrivals, especially children. Suggested levels for supplementation are given in the emergency handbook. It is important to note that (unlike the water soluble vitamins - vitamin C for example) too much vitamin A may be dangerous, so steps need to be taken to make sure that children and pregnant women do not get too much vitamin A inadvertently in a supplementation program. This danger only arises with the use of concentrated sources of vitamin A - not with foods rich in the vitamin. Dried milk should be fortified with vitamin A - Check.

ANAEMIA

Anaemia is a low level of hemoglobin, the red pigment in the blood that absorbs oxygen and carries oxygen to the tissues. Anaemia can have multiple dietary causes, and non dietary causes such as parasitic infection with hookworm or malaria.

Anaemia affects especially women of reproductive age and young children and is widespread in tropical Africa.

Most foods contain iron, but iron is poorly absorbed from plant foods and eggs. Meat is the best source of readily absorbed iron. Dark green vegetables, legumes and whole grains are the best plant sources of iron. Vitamin C aids absorption.

Folic acid, another vitamin important for preventing anaemia, especially during pregnancy, is found in fruits, vegetables and liver, prolonged cooking destroys this vitamin. Supplementation for pregnant women would be the best policy.

Iodine, Goitre, Cretinism.

A major public health problem in many parts of Africa is caused by eating food which contains little or no iodine. This lack of iodine in food is caused by a lack of iodine in the soil and this occurs especially in mountainous inland regions.

Refugees may come from an area where goitre is a problem, or they may move into a camp in a goitrous area and start to develop goitre if they stay there for a prolonged period. The disease is very amenable to prevention and treatment by supplementation. Salt can be iodized - probably the best alternative in a camp would be to provide a ration of iodized salt.

Vitamin C deficiency.

This was generally said to be rare in the tropics, but over the last few years scurvy due to a low dietary intake of vitamin C has been shown to be very prevalent in refugee camps in Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia.

The early signs of scurvy in these camps were not the same as those described in standard textbooks. Inability to walk due to pain in the legs was a common early sign.

Scurvy is easily prevented by a small daily intake of vitamin C. Vitamin C is only present in fresh foods however and the supply of these may be a particular problem in refugee situations. In such cases supplementation by vitamin tablets may be an acceptable alternative, vitamin C rich drink powder might be acceptable to children. Dry food aid commodities contain little or no useful vitamin C. Dried skimmed milk contains a small amount of the vitamin, but much of this is lost during storage, especially if stored at high temperatures. Corn Soy Milk (CSM) is fortified at the factory with vitamin C, but again a substantial amount of this vitamin will be lost if the CSM is stored for long at high temperatures. More of the vitamin will be lost during cooking, so short cooking times will help.

The best method of ensuring a supply of vitamin C would be to make provision for refugees to grow green leafy vegetables, whole grain, maize, sorghum, millet, wheat, or beans when soaked and left moist will sprout. The sprouts or shoots will contain significant amounts of vitamin C although the vitamin was absent in the dry grain and this may be an activity worth promoting.

OPTIONS FOR PROVIDING ADEQUATE NUTRITION - SHORT TERM. LONGER TERM.

My feeling is that we should aim to tackle the problem at the family or household level as an overall aim or objective not dismiss this as an alternative until the possibilities of achieving it have been carefully studied and found to be impossible to carry out. This perhaps seems an obvious or naive sort of statement but I am sincerely worried that refugee situations are sometimes seen as opportunities, particularly perhaps by well intentioned "western" agencies, to take away the responsibility of feeding children from "ignorant uncaring parents", and put all the children together in a big tent and make feeding them the responsibility of the agency.

I believe that while this may be necessary in the short term, in the long run it is a disaster.

I believe we should advocate for all families to be allocated enough food for all of their members, including food suitable for feeding young children. Families will also need to be assisted to obtain the necessary fuel, pots, etc to cook it. This would be the best way of maintaining and improving the nutrition of children.

Feeding children at school might be desirable, and there may well be a need for the therapeutic management of severely malnourished children. We should be very careful, however, before rushing into supplementary feeding programs and consider whether our resources would not or could not be better used equipping the family with the means to look after its own children.

All too often supplementary feeding programs become substitute feeding programs, where the food is given to the child separately rather than together with food the child would otherwise receive at home. The parents regard the responsibility for feeding the child as resting with the feeding center. Often the large feeding certers needed to supplementary feed all the children end up being poorly managed and many children get only small quantities of poor food, watery porridge, with much of the oil, milk and sugar provided going somewhere else.

This is not to say that all supplementary feeding programs are bad or that such programs are never necessary. It has been said that a shortage of food nearly always occurs during the early stages of an emergency situation, and providing carefully supervised rations of prepared food to selected individuals may be a good way of managing a small amount of food in the initial stages of an emergency. Such a programme should not, however, be too protracted, and neither should its success detract from the importance of obtaining sufficient food for the family to cater for itself at as early a stage as possible in the emergency.

Treatment of malnutrition

This is now reasonably well understood. Even severely malnourished children can be reasonably quickly rehabilitiated with a very high success rate.

It is not my intention here to go into details, but the treatment starts with rehydration, starting on dilute food, then proceeding to a diet very high in energy (for this purpose oil and sugar are very important - the food donor must understand that sugar may play a vital role in providing an energy rich diet for undernourished children and is not just for sweetening tea). The key activity is closely supervised frequent feeding. Severely malnourished children may need feeding every two or so hours at first, night and day. Special measures such as a nasogastric tube, may be necessary.

Requires skilled staff, high staff patient ratio. Need for medically qualified staff to treat other illnesses. Therapeutic feeding is not a programme that should be started without detailed consideration as to the costs, management and supervision. Alternatives, such as referring severely malnourished children to a hospital that has the expertise should be considered.

Special foods are rarely necessary however. Nearly all children can be successfully rehabilitated on a high energy milk mix made from the common food aid commodities: dried skimmed milk, oil and sugar. A vitamin and mineral supplement will be needed.

See Protein and "Malnutrition", Anne Ashworth, Editorial, Journal of Tropical Pediatrics, Dec 1985, attached.

Difficulties in assessing food requirements - food needs vs. other needs.

Average requirements vs. difficulties of distribution. If total food supplied equals total requirements are things okay? - almost certainly not. Discussed further in case study. If the average amount of food being distributed is just enough for the average requirement, some people are almost certain to be dangerously short of food, due to inequities in distribution.

Methods for assessing adequacy of food provisions.

Discussion - How much food remains in stock - a few days after and many days after a distribution.

Nutritional status of children is not a very good guide to adequacy. There may be much hunger, with reduction in activity, but little measurable malnutrition. On the other hand, there may be a high prevalence of malnutrition in the presence of adequate quantities of food due to a high prevalence of diarrhea.

Characteristics of particular foods

Blended foods, - expensive - available from only one donor, no local substitutions, may be thought of as magic food.

Dried skimmed milk - milk powder - Distributing in its dry form may be very dangerous. May be seen as a breast milk substitute. Demand vitamin A enriched DSM.

Local exchange and barter possibilities. Sugar and oil good - low bulk - high value.

Short term expedients vs. longer term development issues in improving nutritional status and maintaining adequate nutrition.

In long run, health and nutrition programmes in refugee situations should follow national guidelines.

OPTIONS FOR ENSURING ADEQUATE NUTRITION FOR REFUGEES

Listed in approximate decreasing order of desirability in medium and long term.

A. Providing refugees with land and means to produce food with large food handout to last until first harvest and smaller distributions thereafter.

Advantages to refugees.

Obvious - Maintain dignity, ability to work, to choose what they grow and eat, possibility of producing excess for other needs.

Disadvantages to administration.

Also rather obvious - Any agricultural activity may be seen by both refugees and surrounding people as conferring some rights to the land with all that implies. In initial stages at least this likely to be politically highly undesirable and unacceptable.

Disadvantages to agencies.

Long term programme, not very good for whipping up enthusiasm among donors.

B. General Food Distribution

Distributing to head of each household sufficient food for the whole family for a substantial period of time.

Advantages to the refugees.

Providing quantity of food is adequate and some food suitable for preparation for young children, should ensure adequate nutrition for all family members. Some education may be necessary regarding unfamiliar foods.

Maintains dignity of family and structure of family. Preparation of food, eating etc. may be crucial to this. Responsibility for feeding of child rests with mother/parent - is this not best person to take this responsibility?

Young children can be fed early in the morning and late at night.

Provides some income equivalent for essential non food purposes, since trading of less valued food items inevitable.

Advantages for administration and agencies.

Requires least amount of administration, supervision, organization. (Note this may not be an advantage for an agency wishing to have a high profile - being seen to be very busy helping!)

Possible disadvantages for administration and outside agencies.

Confers a considerable degree of decision making and economic power on families. Trading of food will inevitably occur. Reduces total dependency of families, as they may start to develop alternative options which may be politically undesirable.

Food can be packed up and taken elsewhere, allowing refugees to wander in search of work. Food might even be smuggled to undesirables.

Large quantities of fuel needed, may degrade environment unless provided for.

Any trading of food will inevitably be seen as abuse or evidence of excess by naive donor public and media.

C. DISTRIBUTION OF COOKED MEALS - SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING

In any cooked meal system, it will probably be decided that special provision will have to be made for the children, hence supplementary feeding programmes will also be set up.

Advantages to refugees.

May ensure that most deprived get access to food. Weak and sick and those without families may receive food.

Disadvantages to refugees.

Crates total dependency, maximum amount of degradation and humiliation. Weakens family structure.

Children can only be fed at fixed times, perhaps not with other members of family.

Having to queue three times a day for food may prevent other useful activities.

Possible advantages to administration

Cooked food cannot easily be carried elsewhere which keeps refugees in their place. Food cannot easily be smuggled and given to undesirables.

Total control and dependency maintained.

Possible advantages to some agencies

Plenty of high profile work to be done by agency staff, especially feeding thin children. Photogenic, high media profile, very good fund raising possibilities.

Plenty of opportunity for meaningless weighing and measuring to be carried out, plenty of scope for feeling that something is being done about the nutrition situation.

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Nutrition in Emergencies
AUTHOR: Omawale

SESSION: NUTRITION

***

NUTRITION IN EMERGENCIES

I. PRESENTATION

1.1 Learning Needs

(i) Identify the most common types of food and nutrition emergencies.

(ii) Identify the characteristics of those most vulnerable to malnutrition.

(iii) Identify the common indigenous strategies for coping with the threat of a food and nutrition emergency.

(iv) Identify the role of nutrition vis-a-vis other sectors.

(v) Identify information needs and acquisition methods in early warning, needs assessment and operations planning.

(vi) Identify the advantages and disadvantages of the 3 types of feeding programs.

(vii) Identify UNICEF's role vis-a-vis other agencies: FAO, WFP, NGOs.

(viii) Identify UNICEF's role and techniques in addressing how

- to ensure availability of necessary basic food to all;

- to treat those suffering severe malnutrition;

- to expedite the re-establishment and "emergency proofing" of household food procurement (local production, processing, distribution).

(ix) Identify critical issues of the politics of Food Aid and Supplementary Feeding Programs: relief vs development, etc.

(x) Identify opportunities in nutrition emergencies for advocacy, development, etc.

1.2 Key Issues

(i) The nature and causes of vulnerability to food and nutrition emergencies as determinants of appropriate intervention.

(ii) The need to support indigenous strategies for coping with the threat and advent of food and nutrition emergencies.

(iii) The importance of treating infections which commonly accompany malnutrition.

(iv) The importance of identifying the priority dietary needs for most efficient resource use.

(v) The nature of relief can facilitate rapid transition to development or inhibit it.

1.3 Outline

(1) PEM MOST COMMON FORM OF MALNUTRITION IN EMERGENCIES

Sometimes aggravated and complicated with infections and other illnesses like uri, measles, malaria - vitamin A deficiency, vitamin C deficiency, anemia, IDD.

(Annex 7)

(2) VULNERABILITY RELATED TO INADEQUATE HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY: I.E., INADEQUATE FOOD ENTITLEMENT + POOR ACCESS TO HEALTH AND RELATED SERVICES.

(Chapter 8)

(3) SOME COPING STRATEGIES COMPENSATE FOR INSECURITY & POOR ENTITLEMENT:

Multiple Occupations
Diversified Cropping
Stocking (Barns, on the Hoof)
Informal/Traditional Savings
Appropriate Technologies (Including Gathering)

Migration of individuals for Work
Migration of individuals for Food
Migration of Families for Food

(4) LINKS WITH OTHER SECTORS & AGENCIES:

Health

(Who) - Infections

Other Social Sectors

(WFP/FAO) - Employment

Transport, etc.

Water/Fuel/Food/Transport

(Chapter 8)

(5) INFORMATION NEEDS

(Chapter 8, Annex 4) (UNHCR:, Fig. 8-1)

(6) THE 3 TYPES OF FEEDING PROGRAMS:

(Annexes 5 & 6, Annex 3)

(7) FOOD AID, ETHICS AND THE TRANSITION TO DEVELOPMENT

(8) OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVOCACY AND BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE

Child Feeding Practices
Identifying Causes of Vulnerability

II. CASE STUDY

2.1 BACKGROUND

The emergency situation developed in the Province of Sucros which has a population of 2 million, international attention has been alerted by widely published reports of extensive un employment, starvation, a measles outbreak and many deaths from diarrhea and malnutrition.

The Province has several Km of sea coast and a port. Virtually all of the people are of one ethnic and linguistic group although a few people speaking a different language migrated there in an early period of economic boom.

The infant mortality before the crisis was officially estimated to be 72/1000 and it was also estimated that 17% of children under 6 years old were suffering from moderate or severe (Grades II or III) malnutrition. The hospitals are in the urban areas where health centers also tend to be concentrated. Consequently, the 80% of people living in the rural areas have virtually no access to them. For the same reason immunization coverage is very low in the rural areas and the Province's malnutrition estimate is based on the weighing of only 25% of the children with whom the health system has contact.

The Province's economy is based almost exclusively on the production and export of raw cane sugar. This industry provides almost all of the employment and income in the rural areas and stimulates the commercial and service sectors in the urban areas. The cultivation is on extensive plantations, some having their own sugar producing factories. The production is labor intensive and the work force is predominantly unskilled: cane cutters, weeders, etc. Wages are paid on an output basis (e.g. tons of cane cut) and employment is seasonal, varying according to the needs of the planters. The average cane cutter earns about $tars 9/day in season and less during the off season. Two years ago the international prices of sugar fell sharply and the Province's economy nose dived. Production was cut back and employment became scarce.

Many plantation owners who had taken large bank loans during the boom times felt behind in their repayments and a few even migrated abandoning the plantations. It is believed that many had not used the loans for sugar production as proposed but diverted the money to other uses including banking abroad. This is typical of the excessive corruption which permeates all administration, having been sanctioned and nurtured by the previous government,

The cane workers' families live in small groups of 5-6 households each at different points of the plantation. They do not own the land, but live there by permission of the owner with whom they have a patron-client relationship. The owner, apart from providing the only livelihood opportunity, can be expected to arrange and pay for medical treatment of ill family members or to extend small loans against future earnings. Literacy is low and many parents do not know the ages of their children. There are no social organizations for the workers' families although a trade union exists and has been steadily gaining membership and support since the beginning of the crisis. A few NGOs, with links to the sugar planters, exist as do several international service organizations (Lions, Rotary, etc.).

The staple food is rice in which the country is self sufficient. Rice is no longer produced in the province, having long been displaced by sugar production. Some fishing is done in coastal areas but the Province gets most of its other food - vegetables, legumes, fruit, meat - from other provinces. Domestic water comes from wells sunk by the plantation owners who usually allow workers to draw water pumped from such wells. Trees on the nearby mountains used to supply worker's homes with cooking fuel, but they are now denuded and are being increasingly replaced, but this purpose, by the fibrous waste produced in the sugar mills.

The political situation in the Province has been unstable for years with a growing insurgency problem. Since the start of the crisis unemployed youths have joined the insurgents in increasing numbers and the trade union is believed to have links with them. Both unions and insurgents demand land reform as a priority Government action. This has led to a dialogue between planters and Government, the latter proposing Government which has proposed that as part of a restructuring of the economy 30% of the land should be allocated to other cash crops and 10% should be reserved for food crop production by the workers. Some of the more liberal land owners have expressed a willingness to give small portions of land to workers if the Government would settle their outstanding debts with the banks in return.

The crisis developed over the last two years and manifested itself in increased migration of people in search of livelihood in the urban areas as well as in growing numbers of children appearing in health centers and hospitals with severe malnutrition. Two local NGOs have been operating assistance programs during the last year and advocating for the official recognition of an emergency. The government was at first reluctant to admit the existence of an emergency but now an alarming number of deaths due to measles, diarrhea and malnutrition have been widely reported and international assistance is being requested.

One NGO operates a Supplementary Feeding Program with week-end take home rations and week day on-site feeding of children under 6 years of age. Some plantation owners have donated sites for this feeding and children are brought by anyone who hears about the program and knows of those in need. The weights of children have been taken and nutrition education has been given to the mothers who bring children to the feeding sites. The table below shows the results of an analysis of the weight changes of children who have been in the program during the last 11 months. The NGO is also advocating that sugar workers produce (on plantation land) vegetables for home consumption. Oddly, they report that families participating in the feeding do not seem keen to engage in the vegetable production. However, some sugar workers are already enthusiastically producing and selling vegetables, earning up to $tars 9/day in this way.

Another NGO has been doing both on-site feeding and distribution of take home packages for those unwilling to come dally. Unfortunately, the Government has accused them of allowing some of the donated food to go to the insurgents. A bilateral agency is now also proposing to support the extension of the feeding program to include all school children and has invited the collaboration of UNICEF.

2.2 PROBLEMS/ISSUES

1. What do you think of the idea of the school feeding program? Should UNICEF be involved?

2. What does the data in the table tell about the current SFP? What lessons can we learn about this experience?

3. Is there a role for other sectors in combating the malnutrition problem in this emergency?

4. What information would you like to have in order to assess needs and solicit support? How would you go about acquiring it?

5. How would you deal with questions of confidence in the validity of the malnutrition information, given the fact that many parents do not know children's ages?

6. What strategies would you adopt to deal with the problem of malnutrition in this contest - low levens of community organization, endemic corruption, etc.?

7. What should be done to prevent the recurrence of this type of emergency and what are the relevant issues relating to food aid in this situation?

III. GROUP CONCLUSIONS/DEBRIEFING & SUMMARY (6:15 - 17:00)

IV. ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

JOURNAL

International Journal of Disaster Studies and Practices, International Disaster Institute, London, U.K.

ARTICLES/BOOKS

Jackson, A. Against the Grain: the Dilema of Project Food Aid, Oxford: Oxfam, 1982.

Sen, A. Poverty and Famines: an Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981.

Cutler, P. Detecting food emergencies. Lessons from the 1979 Bangladesh Crisis. Food Policy (August: 207-224, 1985)

Handbook for Emergencies. Part One: Field Operations. Geneva, UNHCR, 1982.

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 11: Media Relations

Learning Objectives

- Understand the power of the media and use it as a resource and an opportunity in emergency situations.

- Be aware of the UNICEF guidelines for contacts with journalists in the field

- Understand the concept of different information strategies for various media and audiences.

- Know the advantage of preparing yourself with the message you wish to convey regardless of the question.

- Know importance of consistency, transparency and a positive but honest attitude.

- Be familiar with tactics and techniques for various media presentations.

Learning Points

- Role of media in stimulating public awareness and government response.

- What arrangements should be made and responsibilities assigned for servicing the media locally and internationally

- How to build and maintain an ongoing relationship with members of the media before/during/after and the merits of give and take.

- How to manage an information officer whose task, among others, will be to develop objectives, strategy and messages for different audiences and medias: print, audio, visual, ...

- Importance of a focal point and clearly defined channels for information flow and clearing mechanisms within the office and between field offices, Geneva and New York HQ.

- Highlight possibility of using media to convey messages to victims when appropriate.

- Do's and Don'ts of interviews, how not to be intimidated, go off-record, etc., etc.

- Be able to differentiate messages for local vs. International press with appropriate sensitivities.

- Know procedures for facilitating foreign press coverage.

- Be familiar with local media capacity and be able to mobilize quickly.

Possible Learning Methods

- Presentation. Group Exercise.

A. Divided participants into three groups and give each of the groups one of the assignments listed below (assignments must be given before showing the video).

B. Show the video "What about the U.N.?", on Karamoja emergency.

- I. In your view, what information given by the interviewees was:

a) most useful
b) most harmful
c) least factual

II. If you were interviewed in exactly the same situation, list at least ten things you would not say or do that the interviewees in the film have said or done.

III. Evaluate the CBS coverage of the emergency: was it objective; was it sensational; what effect do you believe it had on the public, donors, UNICEF.

- Reconvene in a plenary session to review group reports and cover other learning points of session.

Required Reading

- Burston and Marstellar, "Media Relations"
- Field Manual, Book E, Chapter 12.

Supplementary Reading

- DMC, Disaster Preparedness, Chapter 8.

Speakers' Preparation Aids

- CBS video on Karamoja "What about the U.N.?"
- Bangkok listening team report

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Media Relations
AUTHOR: Burson-Marsteller

SESSION: MEDIA RELATIONS

***

MEDIA RELATIONS

PREPARED FOR:
ASIAN DISASTER PREPAREDNESS CENTER ASIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

PREPARED BY:

BURSON-HARSTELLER
133/19 RAJPRASONG
BANGKOK, THAILAND

MEDIA RELATIONS GUIDELINES

THE MEDIA

· The media consists of individuals with the same type of career motivations we all have, modified by pressures to get a story out by their next deadline and to "beat" their competition.

· Reporters' needs and behaviour differ greatly, depending on whether they are print or broadcast.

· Newspaper reporters can be expected to need and use more information than their counterparts in television.

· If information is not forthcoming from management, they will solicit it wherever it can be found. Some leeway with daily newspapers.

· Radio reporters with a deadline every hour are the most volatile.

· Most likely to dispatch news to the public without checking with management.

What they are not (necessarily)

· Expert/knowledgeable/specialist
· Supportive or opposed

What they want

· The facts
· A story
· Cooperation

What they dislike

· No comment
· Stalling
· No call backs
· Aggression

What they are

· Powerful
· Influential
· Opinion leaders
· Wielders of influence
· Biased (many reasons)
· Under pressure
· Human

What they will always have

· The last word (if you let them)
· The power to distort or interpret
· Little control over editing or headlines
· No desire to print retractions
· Little patience if they suspect stalling
· Full control over the story - no reading back - may check through
· No respect for "off the record"

N.B. They are all different - styles, level of ethics. They are people. Each one, however, junior or senior demands respect, attention and patience.

The press enquiry

· Evaluate the inquiry:

- What is the reporter/interviewer looking for?
- What does the publication/medium specialize in?
- What are their concerns

· Get help:

No one knows all the facts all the time. If you're unsure of an answer, don't risk a guess.

- make sure you know and confirm the facts
- find the proper spokesman

· Be aware of deadlines:

Every reporter has a deadline, whether he works in print or electronic media. However, if you are faced with a difficult or complex question, don't feel obligated to give an answer on the spot.

· Know the reporter's audience:

Each publication, newspaper, television or radio station has differing focuses and needs. Consider the reporter's audience when you present information or answer inquiries.

Try to determine what will motivate them to accept your point of view.

Ask him about the concept of the story - what other information will he be using, who else he's contacted, how your information will be used, how big it is to be played.

· Know the interviewer:

If possible, try to preview the programme on which you'll appear ahead of time, or read some articles by the reporter who will interview you. Consider the editorial stance of the station or publication. Determine the interviewer's style, orientation and beat. It's a good way to eliminate surprises.

· Check details:

What format? (print, radio, TV)
Length of interview/article
Interview venue

The preparation

· Prepare communications objectives:

- before the interview or appearance, have one or two key ideas or communications objectives that you want to leave with the audience. Make sure that you get these points across, regardless of the reporter's objectives.

- Your goal as an interviewee is to lead or control the interview as much as possible to assure you get your key objectives across.

· Anticipate questions:

You will probably know the questions the reporter will logically ask you. Prepare in advance how you can answer these to your advantage so you can tell your message. But make your preparation loose enough to leave room for the unexpected. Be aware of the "what goes wrong makes news" syndrome.

· Develop your own story:

- Sometimes reporters may not take the time to do the necessary "homework" for a productive interview. This often presents an opportunity for you to tactfully raise topics you want to talk about.

- Don't be shy if you come across a good story subject. The press is always looking for interesting new stories, and no one knows what's going on in your field better than you do. Take the initiative, the story is positive. Be prepared to take the lead and direct the interview into positive areas of information.

· Rehearse:

Do some role-playing and rehearse on your own, with co-workers, colleagues or with someone who is not involved in your industry concerns. Keep your thoughts simple and clear.

The Interview

· Be honest:

A lie to the press can be very damaging. You must decide just how candid you will be. Erroneous information will ruin your credibility with the public and the press. Don't be embarrassed to answer a question with "I don't know."

· Take the initiative/control:

Be prepared to take the lead and direct the interview into positive areas of information about your organization or position. Avoid answering speculative "what if" questions. Turn negatives into positives.

· Be prompt:

Arrive early in order to talk to the reporter ahead of time.

· Be believable:

Credibility is vital to getting your message across.

· Be personal:

Use the interviewer's name once or twice in the course of the interview and look at him.
Anecdotes play well on radio and television, if you have a story that makes a good point for your side.

· Be conversational:

Use layman's terms (not jargon) that the viewers or listeners will understand. Try humour if it's appropriate.

· Be concise:

Remember that a 10-minute interview may wind up being 20 seconds on the air, or 3 lines in the newspaper. It is essential to crystalize your thoughts in a few hard-hitting sentences.

- Use key words. State important facts first.
- Cut out extraneous verbage - keep language non-inflammatory, simple and candid.

Stop when you have answered the question
Unsolicited information can raise some questions.

· Get your objectives in:

Try to get your objectives in early... you may be sidetracked later on.
This is especially true with television interviews.

· Evaluate the question:

When asked a question, especially from an unknown source, you should evaluate it on several levels:

- what the questioner is saying
- how the questioner is saying it
- what the questioner expects to hear back

· Stay cool:

Remember the reporter/interviewer may be fishing to unnerve you so you will divulge proprietary or unrelated information.

· Correct misstatements:

Not all reporters do their homework judiciously. If a reporter is wrong about a fact or position, you must correct his error as soon as possible. However, you should do so in a courteous, non-threatening manner.

GUIDELINES TO EFFECTIVELY HANDLING INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

General situations

· Keep your answers short, straightforward, and candid. It's helpful to repeat the question before answering it.

· If you get a question you can't answer, tell the questioner you'll be glad to provide a complete answer, but you need further information. Don't hesitate to say you don't know the answer.

· Don't get sidetracked into an unrelated or unimportant subject. Get back on the right track by saying:

"I recognize that, but what's important here is..."

or

I'm really not prepared to discuss that particular point here today, so let's focus on..."

· If you get questions on sensitive or proprietary areas, simply state, "I'm afraid that it is proprietary information and I'm not in a position to answer that."

· Maintain eye contact with the interviewer. It adds credibility and candidness to yourself and your answer.

· Refer to the interviewer by name. It helps establish a positive relationship with the interviewer and adds personal credibility.

· Don't say anything "off the record." However well you may know the reporter or feel you understand journalistic practice, do not divulge anything you don't want published or used.

· Don't let words be put in your mouth. If the interviewer starts a question with "You mean to say that...," counter with "What I said was..." or "I was specially referring to...". You control your answer. Not the interviewer.

· Don't guess or speculate. If you don't know, say so. Don't answer "I think..." or "I assume...".

· Don't argue or attack the media. The interviewer will always get the last word. Don't be drawn into an emotional situation. You'll lose the opportunity to present your viewpoint in a firm, direct and objective manner.

SPECIAL SITUATIONS

Situation

Suggested Action

Question is preceded by a hostile remark or inaccurate assumption

Counter the remark or assumption first. Examples:


"First, let me correct a misconception that was part of your question..."


"You're mistaken about..., but I'm glad you raised the point because..."


"Let me explain what we did in that situation, and why we did it. I think you would have done the same thing."


"Before I answer your question, I want to point out..."


"I'm sorry you feel that way, but let me ask you to consider this...

You don't know the answer, but feel it ought to be answered by headquarters.

"I'm sorry, I just don't know the answer to that. But I can get it for you want. Just write your question on this sheet of paper, and give it to me before I leave here today (tonight). Please include your phone number."

Several people at once seek your attention to ask a question.

Recognize the first person you see, then mentally note and come back to the others in order. Try to recognize each person before giving anyone a second opportunity. This will prevent one or two questioners from dominating the session.

You get a series of critical, hostile and even nasty questions.

Make your answers firm and emphatic. Don't be defensive. Maintain your courtesy so you don't lose the goodwill of the entire audience. (Most audiences, though they may be uninformed, or misinformed, will be fair-minded. You'll make your points, and gain credibility, if you avoid letting a heckler bait you into "losing your cool.")

You get a series of critical, hostile, and even nasty, questions from one individual who is dominating the Q&A period.

"You seem to be in fundamental disagreement with what I am saying, it might be useful if you would summarize your views in a few words." (If he accepts, he will quickly expose his bias - and his ignorance; or he may make a vulnerable statement that you can readily refute.)

You get a hostile question that is clearly designed to embarrass you - and you don't want to dignify it by attempting an answer.

"I am ready and willing to try to answer any fair and reasonable questions. But I don't think it would be fair to take the time of this group to dwell on a question like that."

You are interrupted by a hostile remark or question during your comments.

Say you'll answer the question, or comment on the remark, after you have finished your comment.

Someone shouts a hostile one-liner such as "garbage" or "that's a lot of..." while you are talking.

Look at the heckler and say: "We'll take up your special interest in a moment, sir."

Questioner makes a hostile remark that is really funny.

Join in the laughter; indeed laugh louder than anyone; then make appropriate response.

There are no questions.

"You may be interested in one or two questions I've gotten from other groups." Then ask yourself a question that will enable you to emphasize one of your major points.

INTERVIEW FORMATS

· You must be able to adapt your communications message and your style of delivery to a variety of interview formats and reporters.

· Hard news:

In a hard news situation, the reporter is looking for a short declarative statement that tells the whole story.

· Face-to-face:

Face-to-face refers to interviews that have been pre-arranged. A reporter will normally have a wide variety of questions to pose, and will selectively probe some issues while only skimming others. The opportunity exists for you to make a lengthier response, and lead the interview into areas you want to talk about.

HOW TO GET YOUR POINTS ACROSS

· If you are being asked questions that do not lend them selves to the key points which you want to get across, you can try these approaches:

· Answer the interviewer's question and then say ... "But there's a few points of greater interest which I think you should be aware of ... "

or

"But there's some information which I think would be of even greater interest to your audience/readers ..."

· After answering a question, you take the initiative and bring up the information:

"There's an additional point which I think you should be aware of ... "

· Or if you are asked a question which somehow relates to an important point, try this:

"I'm glad you asked that. Let me try to answer it in this way..."

· An additional way of getting your points across is to prepare a FACT SHEET containing your key points and giving it to the journalist when he arrives for the interview.

· Panel interviews or discussions:

Panel interviews or discussions are interviews that are arranged by the reporter or producer to discuss an event or an issue in depth. You may be one of several panelists representing different issues or the panel might contain several media representatives questioning you about your industry. Brevity, accuracy and "keeping your cool" are key ingredients in handling these questions.

· The press conference:

A press conference is often intense and can be distracting. Hot television lights are directed toward you, microphones are everywhere. A subtle rivalry between the various journalists present often exists, which results in one reporter trying to shout down another. Under such circumstances, you must again maintain calm to keep control.

GUIDELINES FOR APPEARANCE ON TELEVISION

Do's

DO wear subdued colored clothes and especially tie (no checks or over-striped suits).

DO check your appearance before going into the studio - tie, hair, buttons, zips?

DO sit upright and tidily.

DO look at interviewer all the time except when you are meant to be addressing the TV audience.

DO speak in simple language; avoid jargon at all costs.

DO make short statements, each holding up on its own.

DO remember to make your most important points as early as possible.

DO avoid tortuous logic.

DO before you begin, discuss with the interviewer what line the discussion will take.

DO remember the interviewer knows less about your subject than you do.

DO have reference material handy.

DO try to have the last word.

DO remember that any taped or videotaped programme is likely to be edited before use.

DO check out the background of your interviewer beforehand - likewise the programme. B-M can help.

Don'ts

DON'T smoke on the air.

DON'T forget the smallest mannerisms show up more obviously on TV.

DON'T accept a revolving or movable chair.

DON'T fidget or fiddle with pens, pencils, lighters, etc.

DON'T forget your hankerchief!

DON'T say "I think" too often, it sounds as though you are uncertain of your subject.

Dealing with the media

· Crystallize points into short, hard-hitting phrases; use them as jumping-off points.
· Support statements with facts/third party evidence.
· Use widest viewpoint/policy rather than individual thought.
· Don't restate critics position.
· Get to your most important points first.

But don't

· Say anything "off the record."
· Let words be put in your mouth.
· Don't guess or speculate.
· Don't argue or attack the media.
· Don't get lulled into a false sense of security.

***

Speaker’s Aid (2)

TITLE: Media
AUTHOR: UNICEF/DMC Listening Team, Bangkok 1987

SESSION: MEDIA RELATIONS

***

MEDIA

Three basic points:

- Media technology, power and influence
- Relation with the media
- Do's and Don'ts of interviews

The technological revolution has had a major impact on the media in recent years which in turn has given the media a powerful and influential role in defining and shaping events.

To ignore this is as grievous as, say, not recognizing the importance of funding in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

There are three elements of this which should be kept in mind:

- the speed of which graphic news can be presented - these days it is almost instantaneous

- the capacity of the media to cover any item it considers of interest

- the growing number of people who have access to the visual media -- their heightened awareness of the issues involved in emergencies

- It should thus be recognized that the media is an important and legitimate factor in emergency situations and must be accorded a high priority in any disaster management scenario.

Failure to acknowledge this will almost inevitably lead to negative repercussions.

Relations with the media

- The importance of constructive and open relations with the media cannot be overemphasized.

There is no "golden rule" on how this can be achieved, but an understanding of, and respect for, the media will help.

- Be particular. It may be useful to remember that the media works completely under pressure ... and imperfection or incomplete presentation is the norm. Few stories could not be rewritten or presented differently.

- A journalist, like a policeman, is never off-duty

- Good media relations are of mutual benefit. A good journalist is keen to develop sound sources and will normally respect and safeguard these

- The concept of a Bureau of Public information is passe; international organizations are by their mandate and nature, public and denying access to it is not only counter-productive but often results in a distorted picture.

In this respect, it is important to remember that the first story makes the most impact...subsequent attempts to modify or change perspectives are not generally or easily successful.

- All agency personnel likely to encounter the media should be familiar with the organizations perspectives and objectives.

Do's and Don'ts of Interviews

- These points are summarized in 'the "handouts" but some additional or further points may be of help.

- Many people and/or organizations see the media as an adversary or "panic" when "confronted" with a journalist or press conference.

- The easiest and most effective way to counteract this is, as already indicated, developing friendly relations with the press and being PREPARED.

- If not already familiar with the journalist, prospective audience orientation, etc. request to see his/her credentials.

- On "being prepared," know your facts and figures and stick to these; avoid getting side-tracked into issues you are not familiar with or outside your area of competence.

- Do not offer personal options and make a clear distunction between is on and off the record.

- Don't be defensive; if constraints are present refer to these but avoid dumping on or blaming others.

- Initiate a dialogue; do not let the journalist control the situation; in particular do not let the journalist put words into your mouth. If a response is misinterpreted or cut short, indicate so politely - such as "what I said was" or "what I was in the process of saying".

- If necessary rehearse or do some role-playing before an interview or press conference; anticipate questions - and the answers you can give to sensitive or awkward queries.

- Maintain eye contact; this is particularly important on television.

- Whatever the provocation or circumstances remain calm - do not fidget, slouch in your seat, or wear clothing that in uncomfortable, too hot or inappropriate.

- Keep answers short and straight-forward, avoid rhetoric, jargon and acronyms.

- If you do not have the correct answer to a query, say so candidly; do not hazard a guess.

- In brief, you know more about your subject that the interviewer. This is what you should get across.

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 12: Supply and Logistics

Learning Objectives

- To be able to plan properly the supply and logistics component of a UNICEF intervention in an emergency situation.

- To be aware of methods and techniques to achieve a successful supply operation.

- To understand guidelines for mobilizing/developing the logistics capacity necessary to deliver emergency assistance.

- To show how supply and logistics are important elements of pre-disaster planning.

Learning Points

- Preparedness for better planning and prompt delivery of supplies depend on knowledge of:-

1. Sources of supplies/potential suppliers
2. Use of emergency stockpile, UNIPAC
3. Stockpiling in country
4. Transport routes and capacities
5. Transport contractors

- Advantages of local procurement vs. overseas
- Provision of adequate specifications and advantages of set packing
- Donations in kind
- Logistics opportunities
- Pros and cons of trucking supplies (e.g. own fleet vs. contracted)
- Supply/logistic as part of pre-disaster planning
- UNICEF procedures and documentation for SLs/SCFs and telex requests in emergency operations
- Arrangements for monitoring the supply "pipeline"

Possible Learning Methods

- Presentation on supply (with overheads)
- Discussion on region specific issues
- Presentation on logistics (with overheads)
- Group work

Required Reading

- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies", Chapter 14, Annex 30-36, 41, 48-50.

Supplementary Reading

- Fred Cuny, "Basic Logistics Concepts"
- UNHCR, Guide to In-Kind Contributions

Speakers' Preparation Aids

- Gullmar Andersson, "Supply Operations in Emergencies": Overhead transparencies
- UNICEF Field Manual, Book E, Chapter 11
- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies", Chapter 14, Annex 30-36, 41, 48-50

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Supply Operations in Emergencies
AUTHOR: J. Gullmar Anderson

SESSION: SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS

***

SUPPLY OPERATIONS IN EMERGENCIES
By J. Gullmar Anderson
***

GENERAL

The success or failure of an emergency operation is how efficient the supply logistics component is carried out. Speed and the right thing in the right place at the right time are of utmost importance

PREPAREDNESS

In order to be able to respond quickly to possible needs for local procurement and in-country transportation following the occurrence of an emergency situation, all field offices should endeavor to be prepared in advance by gathering (and keeping up to date) certain basic information. This should, if possible, be done jointly/in coordination with UNDP, other UN agencies and other organizations which might be active in relief work. This is an important function of supply officers in (or otherwise responsible for) disaster-prone countries.

The "pre-disaster" plan should answer the following questions:

a - Who are potential local suppliers of commonly required relief items?
b - What are the main means of transport and routes to disaster-prone areas?
c - Who are the potential transport contractors?
d - What are the possible means of quickly delivering goods procured overseas to the country?

SUPPLY SOURCES

Within our definition there are three main supply sources, namely:

- Local procurement
- Overseas procurement
- Donations in kind.

The procurement and delivery of terms which are available within the country (local procurement) is often the quickest and most effective way of meeting the most immediate needs of an affected population. Where urgently needed items are available from local manufacturers, wholesalers and/or retailers, the procurement and delivery of initial quantities within the first few days, after a disaster strikes, may be a valuable contribution. A few issues should be kept in mind:

a - Avoid upsetting the local market by depleting stocks within the country, thus creating shortages and/or price increases;

b - Coordinate purchases with other agencies in the same "market";

c - If possible, compare prices with overseas procurement keeping in mind freight costs;

d - Bulky items, such as vehicles and bulk supply, are always very expensive to airlift and may therefore be more advantageous to procure locally even if procurement price within the country is extremely high;

e - Keep the time factor in mind (will the whole quantity be needed at once or can parts be delivered later and could be shipped by sea freight).

Where local procurement is not possible, overseas procurement will be necessary. In UNICEF and many other Agencies, we turn first of all to UNIPAC. The UNICEF Procurement and Assembly Centre (UNIPAC) was created in 1984 with the reorganization of the Supply Division, it's forerunner, the UNICEF Packing and Assembly Centre, was established in 1963 to facilitate supply assistance both in terms of procurement and of shipment and distribution to end-user projects in assisted countries. This is made possible by (a) bulk procurement of individual supply items, and (b) set-packing of supplies and equipment for direct distribution to the health centre, school or other institution in the receiving country. Purchases in bulk enable UNICEF to procure supplies directly from the manufacturers at reduced prices, and the savings thus obtained largely offset the cost of the services provided by the Centre. The establishment of the Centre has resulted in increased efficiency in procurement operations, better quality control and a more rapid distribution of supplies within countries.

UNIPAC is an integral part of the Supply Division and is responsible for warehousing and packing as well as the worldwide procurement of project supplies. Procurement of supplies from the Americas is handled through Supply Division, New York.

United Nationa Agencies, governmental as well as non-governmental organizations, may also draw on the supplies and services available from UNIPAC on a reimbursable basis.

UNIPAC Emergency Stockpile

Recently a revision of the UNIPAC Emergency Stockpile has taken place and the implementation will soon be carried out.

The following criteria was developed to improve the stockpile (lists of all items in the stockpile are attached):

a - items to be included should be of type "most commonly used in early stages of an emergency";

b - items more suitable for local procurement should not be included;

c - Consider whether existing items can be favorably replaced by newer and better items;

d - Delete items not commonly used or suitable for their purpose of meeting early emergency needs;

e - Deleted items from the stockpile should not by implication mean deletion as a UNIPAC stock item.

Set-packing for distribution in emergency situations is of a great value to the field. Although it can sometimes be difficult to create a "balanced" set (e.g. drug sets), the logistics advantages are considerable. The WHO basic drug list is of course a good guideline but needs for various kinds of basic drugs do vary from country to country and emergency to emergency. Therefore certain adjustments may be necessary at later stages in the emergency. One of the great advantages with UNIPAC's sets is that the set can be designed to fit the particular need, in other words, one does not need to follow the standard sets designed, but make the necessary adjustments both with regard to items and quantity.

Another issue that can be a bottleneck is when some items in the ordered set are not in stock at UNIPAC. To overcome this problem, an exchange of information is needed between the field and UNIPAC. Often some minor items, that may hold up the packing, can be distributed later or even cancelled to avoid delays.

The third supply source is "donations in kind." I am aware of the excellent UNHCR guide on this matter. I am therefore making in this paper some short general guidelines:

a - After the assessment of needs is carried out and (a) project(s) formulated, the field office should identify supply components suitable for donations in kind;

b - Headquarters should in the appeal spell out that (although cash contributions are preferred), donations in kind of specific items are acceptable;

c - Shipping costs for such donations are normally requested but should not be an absolute requirement;

d - It may be necessary to obtain certain specifications or other criteria through the field office or Supply Division before a request for donations can be forwarded to possible donors;

e - in cases where unsolicited donations in kind are offered by donors, the field office should always be consulted and have the final say in whether the donation is acceptable or not;

f - Items donated should ideally be identical or similar to goods normally used or provided to the affected population;

g - Donated items should not require special storage, preparation or treatment unless specifically requested.

COMMUNICATIONS

In disaster situations, communications (especially in armed conflicts) can be a very difficult problem both within the country and between country office and Headquarters.

The creation of a good radio network, linking concerned government authorities, UN offices, stores and field personnel, is essential.

A good way to know if all communications reach Headquarters and vice versa is to, from day one of an emergency, establish a "sitrep" (situation report) system. This implies that all information, requests, supply call forwards are included in one daily numbered telex. This is the most effective way to be sure of that all communications reach Headquarters. The same applies for communication Headquarters-field. Another advantage is that, when the emergency is over, you have a good recording of all communications (format of sitreps attached).

It could also be mentioned in this chapter that total reliance on electric appliances, such as computer, electric typewriters and calculators, may create severe problems if electricity is cut or rationed.

LOGISTICS IN EMERGENCIES

In emergencies, apart from correctly identifying the needs of a population, speedy deliveries to the affected area are imperative. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that personnel involved in planning emergency projects are paying special attention to the logistics aspect of the projects. It is of no use to ship large quantities of relief supplies to a "port-of-entry" in a given country if the possibilities of on forwarding the commodities have not been ascertained beforehand, in the writer's opinion, UNICEF is doing a very good job in emergencies, but it is believed that we could further improve our logistics operations apart from other sectors of a relief operation.

IDENTIFYING AND QUANTIFYING NEEDS

When a disaster has struck a country or when any other type of emergency situation has developed, the immediate needs and other data should be obtained, i.e.:

- Total population in need of relief;
- Type of assistance needed;
- Quantity of identified items, etc.

It is of little use to plan that the population needs, say, 1,000 MT of relief supplies per month, and later find out that only 500 MT can be moved to the affected area per month. If such a situation arises, it might be necessary to improve the delivery system as a programme component. If, on the other hand, that is not possible, priorities of certain items or components of the relief programme must be considered. Thus, the logistics component must have an important role in the early planning of a relief programme.

PLANNING OF A DELIVERY SYSTEM

There are certainly many problems and "bottlenecks" that cannot be foreseen in an early planning stage, but there are some aspects that one always has to look into:

A. Deliveries of supplies coming from outside the affected country

First of all, the method of transporting the supplies to the country must be determined, which also will give the "port of entry." If supplies are airlifted. It should be determined which airport would be the most suitable considering the proximity to the disaster area, possibilities of on forwarding, storage capacities and customs formalities. If sea freight is considered, apart from what is stated above, capacities of ports must be known taking into consideration not only the foreseen UNICEF supplies, but all cargo handled by the port.

B. Deliveries of supplies coming from inside the affected country

In many instances, this can perhaps ease many logistics problems and establish a quicker delivery but, unfortunately, it is very seldom that this can be done except as a complement in larger emergencies. This is due to availability of items needed and very often the tendency of creating sharp rises in prices local markets are overtaxed.

C. Staging area/storage

It is often not feasible to transport a large tonnage directly to the affected area, the reason being non-availability of adequate storage facilities or other constraints in war situations. A staging area, therefore, might have to be considered either inside or outside the affected country. The minimum requirement would be good port/airport facilities and sufficient storage available. Another criteria would be "easy" access to the disaster area.

D. Delivery system inside the country

A closer look should be taken at the possibilities of moving the supplies within the country and distribution system to reach the affected population. What are the existing possibilities?: road, rail, air, water.

One constraint in moving UNICEF-provided supplies to vulnerable groups is that the government sometimes sees our supplies as "second priority" to deliveries of staple food and other commodities not particularly earmarked for a group of population. This often puts us at a disadvantage in using a government delivery network.

Thanks to the newly established UNICEF policy to pay inland transportation for commodities, we now have a good solution to this problem. Paying inland transportation is looked upon as "project support," but I would like to go a step further and state that providing funds for inland transportation may, in certain cases, be a project in itself. To assist a government with transport in peak situations may be crucial to a successful operation on the whole.

UNICEF should also, in the writer's opinion, take more interest in "pre-disaster" planning in disaster-prone countries. One component in such planning is an inventory of available means of transport and storage facilities within the country. This type of data would provide us with the most useful information on methods of transport and available facilities before a disaster occurs. On the other hand, this information would also be useful for programme officers concerned in regular UNICEF programmes, where we regularly have a transport component. We should not forget that each and every country has for generations been moving goods and personnel in their own way, and we should study this further.

When all transport problems have been solved and one can safely be sure of deliveries to the disaster area, the wide variety of problems connected with the actual distribution of commodities to the beneficiaries have to be tackled. It is very difficult to comment on this issue as the problems vary so much from one emergency to another, but a few general suggestions can, however, be given:

1. Make sure that the Government's "machinery" is able to distribute the commodities in an efficient manner. If need be, UNICEF assistance could be considered to strengthen this by providing funds for employment of staff for a very limited period of time.

2. Try to involve voluntary agencies (foreign or local), local groups, missionaries and the local populations as additional "outlets" for our assistance. This obviously with the agreement of the government concerned.

3. Assure that storage for a limited period of time is available in the area.

4. Plan deliveries either direct or via a staging area not be exceed available storage facilities.

Because all aspects of logistics would be too large to include in this paper, I will therefore limit my comments to a few points:

a - Airfreight

Supplies for immediate (lifesaving) "relief" are needed very urgently and therefore will probably need to be airfreighted, in general, therefore, due to the shipping cost, only urgently needed supplies should be airlifted. There are two exceptions to this rule. First exception can be made for "high value - low volume" items and secondly careful calculations should be done regarding shipments to land-locked countries where trans-shipment can be very expensive.

b - Shipping in containers

Shipping of relief supplies in containers has several advantages. First of all, it is a very good protection of supplies both in transit and in ports.

The possibility of keeping the goods in the container for part of in-land distribution exists. It is not necessary to off-load the container from the truck in this case thus avoiding the requirement of cranes. The contents of the container is simply off-loaded with the container on the truck.

UNICEF has successfully, to a large extent, used so called "one-way" containers. This means that the container is procured and utilized as storage or for other purposes in the disaster area. The advantage is that, by this method, a store can be created anywhere along the logistics chain. Only be aware that a crane is needed to off-load containers.

c - "Bottlenecks"

In all logistics operations regardless how well planned they are, some unforeseen problems or difficulties will always emerge. It is useful, in all relief operation budgets, to set aside some funds to overcome the "bottlenecks."

d - Monitoring

The availability of up-to-date information concerning the progress of procurement, shipment and utilization of supplies, as well as the financial situation, is vital for a successful operation. A monitoring system should therefore be established as of day one in an emergency.

e. Providing vehicles in emergency situations

It is quite common that one of the first requests received is for a fleet of trucks and land rovers to strengthen the government possibilities of moving supplies. As has happened in some emergencies, trucks and land rovers have been airlifted to the country concerned at a very high cost when the country's own available means have not been studied fully. It is very rare that a spectacular airlift with huge C-130 cargo planes with a few trucks and land rovers on board have helped in a relief operation to defend the cost. To take an extreme example, one can hire a very large number of camels for a long time for the cost of airlifting one truck.

In one instance, a relief organization used small aircrafts to air-drop food supplies in a rather inaccessible area of Ethiopia where camel and donkey trains could have moved a larger tonnage per day at a fraction of the cost.

The use of common transport available within the country as in all instances the writer has been associated with, has proved to be both less expensive and more efficient. Another advantage has been the access to a much larger fleet of vehicles than it would have been the case if provided transport had been utilized. As an example, in the programme for East Pakistani refugees in India, approximately 100 truck loads were sent out from Calcutta dally on the "long-haul" destinations. The turn-around time was approximately 6 weeks for each truck. The cost benefit of providing trucks for traveling over such distances, compared with using commercial transport, speaks for itself.

By stating this, it does not mean that a limited number of transport should not be provided, or in some instances an airlift, being the only alternative in a serious situation, but it is to state that all other available possibilities within the country should first be explored.

MONITORING

The beginning of a relief operation is often confused with lack of data on supplies airlifted or otherwise transported to the country, urgent local procurement and at the same time studying or revising requests received. It is therefore of utmost importance that a proper recording/monitoring system is established from the start. The system should be set up in such a way that one at a glance can see what is in the "pipeline," what is in main stores or staging areas and details of supplies in peripheral stores and actually distributed. As it is very difficult to "back-track" and get proper records at a later date, or even to establish where and how much supplies are in each and every place, a monitoring system is a prerequisite to a successful operation.

COORDINATION

In large emergency operations, many different agencies and organizations are involved in the relief work. Therefore, coordination in all aspects is very important including the logistics component. A common feature is sharing chartered aircrafts to transport urgently needed supplies. It is unfortunately less common that the same approach is taken after the supplies have arrived in the country. If full coordination can be achieved, it is a tremendous improvement in the utilization of transport fleets, storage and distribution "outlets."

Another type of coordination should also be mentioned, namely, the coordination between the field office, New York and UNIPAC. I am the first to praise the very efficient way this is functioning with supplies leaving the UNIPAC emergency stockpile within 24 to 48 hours after the action has been initiated by the field office. Sometimes, however, the supplies are arriving after two to three months; in some instances, the late arrival of supplies render them useless for the intended purpose. Personnel involved in planning emergency programmes should determine latest arrival date of requested items and advised ETA by HQs or UNIPAC must be adhered to. A great help in this would be to enquire the availability of needed items in UNIPAC before a call forward is placed. Maybe one possibility would be to have a latest date of delivery, otherwise the call forward would be automatically cancelled.

REHABILITATION

Many of the points raised in this paper are relevant to rehabilitation projects. The aim should be to restore basic services to its pre-disaster level and it is rather common that rehabilitation projects begin during the relief phase of that certain operation while relief activities may continue during a rehabilitation phase.

This will create logistical problems similar to those during the relief phase and, therefore, special attention must be given to logistics.

Another aspect is that the restoration of basic services can be a prerequisite to the termination of relief projects and, therefore, speedy implementation is of utmost importance.

REVISED EMERGENCY STOCKPILE

KIT A
*****

Code

Item

1506002

ACETYLSALICYLIC ACID TAB 300 MG SCORED TIN OF 1000

1555965

PARACETAMOL TABLETS BP SCORED 500 MG TIN OF 1000

1555355

MEBENDAZOLE TABLETS 100 MG BOTTLE OF 100

1560025

PIPERAZINE CITRATE SYRUP USP BOTTLE OF 30 ML

1505085

AMPICILLIN FOR ORAL SUSPENSION USP BOTTLE OF 60 ML

1557982

PENICILLIN G INJ BP 1 MEGA UNIT WITHOUT DILUENT

1543802

DILUENT (DISTILLED WATER FOR INJECTION) BP AMP 5 ML

1559050

PHENOXYMETHYLPENICILLIN TAPS BP 250 MG BOT 100

1559025

PROCAINE BENZYLPENICILLIN INJ 3 G 3 MIL IU

1537100

CO-TRIMOXAZOLE TABLETS BP TIN OF 500

1569000

TETRACYCLINE CAPSULES BP 250 MG TIN OF 1000

1532000

CHLOROQUINE TABLETS 150 MG BASE BP TIN OF 1000

1533397

CHLOROQUINE SYRUP BOTTLE OF 60 ML

1550010

FERROUS SULFATE - FOLIC ACID TABLETS TIN OF 1000

1550000

FERROUS SALT TAB 60 MG BOTTLE OF 1000

1515020

BENZOIC ACID & SALICYCLIC ACID OINT TUBE OF 40 G

1505120

ANTIBIOTIC DERMATOLOGICAL OINTMENT TUBE OF 20 G

1523000

CALAMINE LOTION 500 ML

1520000

BENZYL-BENZOATE SAPONATED CONC BOTTLE OF 1 LTR

1552002

GENTIAN VIOLET POWDER MEDICINAL BP BOTTLE OF 25 GR

1531500

CHLORHEXIDINE CONC SOLUTION 20% BPC BTL OF 100 ML

1504000

ALUMINUM HYDROXIDE 1000 TABS TIN

1562500

SENNA TABLETS 7, 5 MG TIN OF 100

1561105

SALTS ORAL REHYDRATION POWDER FOR 1 LITRE

1510000

TETRACYCLINE 1% EYE OINTMENT

1543800

DILUENT (DISTILLED WATER FOR INJECTION) BP AMP 2 ML

1543804

DILUENT (DISTILLED WATER FOR INJECTION) BP AMP 10 ML

1583000

VITAMIN A- CAPS HIGH POTENCY 200,000 IU BOTTLE OF 500

1583010

VITAMIN A (25,000 IU) BOTTLE OF 100

REVISED EMERGENCY STOCKPILE

KIT C
*****

Code

Item

782200

SYRINGUE HYPO 2 ML LUER DISPOSABLE

6700378

SYRINGUE HYPO 10 ML LUER DISPOSABLE

747430

NEEDLE HYPO 0.80x40M/21Gx1-1/2" LUER DISPOSABLE

6700379

NEEDLE HYPO 0,5x16MM/G25x5/8

783500

SYRINGUE HYPO 2 ML LUER GLASS

784500

SYRINGUE HYPO 10 ML LUER GLASS

749000

NEEDLE HYPO 1,25x51MM/18Gx2" LUER BOX OF 12

752000

NEEDLE HYPO 0,90x38MM/20Gx1-1/2" LUER BOX OF 12

749500

NEEDLE HYPO 0,90x51MM/20Gx2" LUER BOX OF 12

750500

NEEDLE HYPO 0,70x32MM/22Gx1-1/4" LUER BOX OF 12

751000

NEEDLE HYPO 0,55x19MM/24Gx3/4" LUER BOX OF 12

751502

NEEDLE HYPO 0,45x10MM/26Gx3/8" LUER BOX OF 12

522000

GAUZE-PAD STERILE 12-PLY 76x76 MM SQUARE

563000

SUTURE CATGUT

742990

HOLDER NEEDLE STRAIGHT METZENBAUM BABY 150 MM SS

745000

KNIFE-HANDLE SURGICAL FOR MINOR SURGERY NO 3

727500

FORCEPS HEMOSTAT STRAIGHT ROCHESTER-PEAN 160 MM SS

720500

FORCEPS DISSECTING SPRING-TYPE CVD FINE 115 MM SS

746000

KNIFE-BLADE SURGICAL FOR MINOR SURGERY NO 10 PKT OF 5

773500

SCISSORS SURGICAL STRAIGHT 140 MM S/B SS

774000

SCISSORS SURGICAL STRAIGHT 140 MM S/S SS

774500

SCISSORS SURGICAL STRAIGHT 140 MM B/B SS

774640

SCISSORS SUTURE BABY 114 MM SHARP POINTS SS

481050

THERMOMETER CLINICAL ORAL DUAL CELS/FAHR SCALE

481060

THERMOMETER CLINICAL RECTAL DUAL CELS/FAHR SCALE

686000

STETHOSCOPE BINAURAL COMPLETE

686500

STETHOSCOPE FOETAL PINARD MONAURAL

683000

SPHYGMOMANOMETER ANEROID 300 MM WITH CUFF

661000

OTOSCOPE-OPHTALMOSCOPE-SET W/O BATTERIES

1802212

BATTERY ALKALINE DRY CELL "D" TYPE 1,5 v (2)

777500

SPECULUM VAGINAL BI-VALVE GRAVES MEDIUM SS

778000

SPECULUM VAGINAL BI-VALVE GRAVES LARGE SS

783000

SYRINGE IRRIGATING KRAMER 90 ML METAL

620000

TONGUE-DEPRESSOR 165 MM METAL

373500

TUBE NASAL-FEEDING PREMATURE 5FR 380 MM POLYETHYLENE

373000

TUBE NASAL-FEEDING INFANT 8FR 380 MM POLYETHYLENE

744500

INFUSION SET PAED SCALP VEIN STERILE/DISPOSABLE

328000

GLOVES SURGEON'S LATEX SIZE 6-1/2

328500

GLOVES SURGEON'S LATEX SIZE 7

329500

GLOVES SURGEON'S LATEX SIZE 8

276500

TRAY INSTRUMENT/DRESSING W/COVER 310x195x63 MM SS

210000

BASIN KIDNEY 475 ML (16 OZ) STAINLESS STEEL

256000

JAR, NEEDLE OR OINTMENT WITH COVER & HANDLE 180 ML

225000

BOWL SPONGE 600 ML STAINLESS STEEL

6700381

GAUZE SWABS 5x5 CM IN PKTS OF 100

6700382

GAUZE SWABS 10x10 CM IN PKTS OF 100

6700383

STERILE GAUZE SWABS 10x10 CM IN PKTS OF 5

6700384

EYE PADS (STERILE) IN PKTS OF 10

6700385

PARAFFIN GAUZE DRESSINGS 10x10 CM TIN OF 26

6700386

SANITARY TOWELS PKTS OF 20

519600

COTTON WOOL ABSORBENT NON STERILE 500 G

501050

PLASTER, SURGICAL ADHESIVE TAPE 25 MM x 10 M

512100

BANDAGE GAUZE NON STERILE 25 MM X 9 M

512101

BANDAGE GAUZE NON STERILE 50 MM X 9 M

512102

BANDAGE GAUZE NON STERILE 75 MM X 9 M

541050

PLASTER OF PARIS BANDAGE BPC 3 INCHES X 3 YARDS

6700387

PNEUMATIC SPLINT SET, MULTIPURPOSE

539000

PINS SAFETY MEDIUM SIZE/40 MM BAG OF 12

575000

TOWEL HUCK 430 x 500 MM

552000

SOAP TOILET 113 G BAR UNWRAPPED

514000

BRUSH HAND SURGEON'S WHITE NYLON BRISTLES

6700545

HEALTH CARDS WITH PLASTIC ENVELOPES

1544825

ENVELOPES FOR TABLETS POLYTHENE PKTS OF 100

361000

SHEETING PLASTIC CLEAR VINYL 910 MM WIDE

305000

APRON UTILITY 900 MM x 1 M OPAQUE PLASTIC

690000

TAPE MEASURE 2M/6 FEET CALIBRATED CM/INCHES STEEL

140500

SCALE PHYSICIAN ADULT METRIC 140 KILOS X 100 G

145530

SCALE INFANT CLINIC METRIC SCOOP 10 KILOS X 20 G

114000

HAMPER LINENE FOLDING WITHOUT BAGS

114200

BAG/LINER FOR LINEN HAMPER 114000

156000

STERILIZER DRESSING PRESS CKR 350 x 280 MM/39L FUEL

170000

STOVE KEROSENE SINGLE BURNER PRESSURE TYPE

REVISED EMERGENCY STOCKPILE

Code

Item

SHELTER MATERIAL

5003502

BLANKET COTTON 1.5 X 2 M EMERGENCY USE

5003505

BLANKET WOOL-BLEND EMERGENCY 1.5 X 2 M ADULT SIZE

0512600

BLANKET, BABY 910 X 1270 MM ALL-COTTON

5086010

TARPAULIN-MATERIAL W/EYELETS 4 X 50 M POLYETHYLENE

5070000

ROPE ALL-PURPOSE & FOR TARPAULINS 5086010 7.6 M

5088005

TENT FOR HOSPITAL USE 80 SQM (10 BEDS)

5010000

COT FOLDING M/COTTON COVER ADULT SIZE

0537200

NETTING MOSQUITO NYLON 2.4 M WIDE

COOKING UTENSILS

2036510

COOKING-SET EMERGENCY USE FAMILY-SIZE 12 PIECES

0170000

STOVE KEROSENE SINGLE BURNER PRESSURE TYPE

COOKING POT 50 LITRES CAPACITY

COOKING POT 100 LITRES CAPACITY

4633400

JUG MEASURING 2 LTR X 100 POLYPROPYLENE

2065000

LADLE KITCHEN (DIPPER) 250 ML SS

2170000

PAIL WITH BAIL HANDLE 10 LTR POLYETHYLENE

2051400

BOWL SOUP 385 ML CAPACITY MELAMINE

2054000

BOWL-PLATES-CUTLERY NESTED SET OF 5 PIECES

2051420

CUTLERY (TABLEWARE) SS SET OF 4 PIECES

2069000

MUG DRINKING 350 ML MELAMINE

2076200

PLATE SOUP DIAM 250 MM HEAVY-DUTY MELAMINE

COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT

1888000

TRANSMITTER-RECEIVER TWO-WAY (WALKIE/TALKIE)

BASESTATION

RADIOSET FOR CAR

ANTENNA

KITS

FEEDING-SET FOR 250 CHILDREN (SEE PAGE 12)

9960000

STERILIZATION-KIT FOR SURG INSTRUMENTS/DRESSINGS

9962000

SURGICAL-INSTRUMENT-KIT MAJOR

9662005

SURGICAL-INSTRUMENT-KIT MINOR

MISCELLANEOUS

0552000

SOAP TOILET 113 G BAR UNWRAPPED

FLASHLIGHT, STRONG, POWERFUL

1555500

K-MIX-II + VITAMIN A 10 BAGS OF 2 KG PER CARTON

1555502

VEGETABLE OIL FOR K-MIX-II CANS OF 4 KG

0180000

STRETCHER ARMY TYPE FOLDING

0324970

CUP MEDICINE 30 ML POLYPROPYLENE

0361000

SHEETING PLASTIC CLEAR VINYL 910 MM WIDE

WATERPURIFICATION CHEMICAL 1 TABLET/1 LITRE

WATERPURIFICATION CHEMICAL 1 TABLET/5 LITRES

WATERPURIFICATION CHEMICAL 1 SACHET/1000 LITRES

COLLAPSIBLE WATER CONTAINER

2289405

SHEETING COTTON WIDTH 1.45 M +/- 2 CM

5028000

LANTERN HURRICANE NON-PRESSURE KEROSENE 240 ML

0532300

LANTERN KEROSENE PRESSURE 1.183 LTR/2.5 PINT 400 ML

EMERGENCY OPERATING LIGHT

5675000

TANK WATER COLLAPSIBLE 5000 LTR W/CARRYING BAG

5675001

BAG-CARRYING FOR WATER TANK 5675000

GRINDING MILL, FAMILY SIZE

GRINDING MILL, CAMP-SIZE

GENERATING-SET 10 KVA

1800345

GENERATING-SET GASOLINE 2000 W 120/240 V 50/60 HZ

1802212

BATTERY ALKALINE DRY CELL "D" TYPE 1.5 V

* also included in "C" kit

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 13: Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances

Learning Objectives

1. Be able to identify the "target groups" referred to in general and in emergencies.

2. Know the policy/mandate regarding CEDC and its relative priority in UNICEF.

3. Be able to programme meaningful action for CEDC in a given emergency situation.

4. Be able to assess feasibility and political implications of both advocacy and action oriented interventions for UNICEF, other agencies and the government.

Learning Points

1. Categories of children which are covered in overall policy review.

2. Those most frequently encountered in emergencies, e.g.:

- children in armed conflict
- unaccompanied
- refugees
- displaced

3. Which emergency type is associated with what target groups?

4. What are types of needs of each group, what action is recommended and what should be UNICEF's role in assessing and/or meeting them?

5. Which other organizations are involved in action for CEDC in emergencies. How do we co-operate.

6. Particular attention should be given to the case of children in armed conflict situations. These pose a whole series of programmatic considerations which are complicated by security issues. Interventions can range from advocacy to service delivery but bear implications which are often very political, both domestically and with donors.

7. What is bein done in research/programmatically to find means of addressing and taking action to meet psycho-social needs of refugee and displaced children.

8. UNICEF's mandate for operating in zones of peace is not documented in black or white but gains its acceptance based on previous precedence. Furthermore, the respect of state sovereignty, the preservation of diplomatic immunity must be balanced with survival needs of children and all of the above must be treated delicately in terms of public information with the media. Examine the costs and benefits of zone of peace operations. How can one minimize risks. List some experiences.

9. Can the Convention on Child Rights be used in field office operations as an advocacy tool. What other legal instruments exist of which UNICEF should be aware.

10. How is HQ structured to support field based CEDC initiatives. How does the field access HQ support.

11. What else could be done to support the field.


POSSIBLE LEARNING METHODS

- Presentation
- Group work

1. For children in armed conflict, displaced, unaccompanied, refugee children, have one group address each and answer the following:

- needs assessment framework
- critique prescribed responses/suggest others
- how to overcome risks and obstacles encountered in emergency situations

2. Show video "Children of Terror" and discuss UNICEF's potential for intervention on issues tackled by the video.

REQUIRED READING

- UNICEF, "Assisting in Emergencies", Chapter 13 (pp 106-112), Annex 27-29
- UNICEF, "Children in Armed Conflict Situations", preparedness and actions, 1986 (Cairo papers) (1)
- UNICEF, CF/PD/PRO-1986-004, "Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances"

SUPPLEMENTARY READING

- UNICEF. Children on the Front Line, 1987
- UNICEF, E/ICEF/1986/L.3, Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances Policy Review, 1986
- UNICEF. E/ICEF/1986/L.6, Overview: Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances, 1986

SPEAKERS' Preparation Aids

- "Children of Terror" video, produced by BBC on child soldiers in Uganda
- Everett Ressler, "Unaccompanied Children in Emergencies"

***

Required Reading (1)
“Cairo papers”

Discussion Papers For MENA Regional Staff Meeting

UNICEF POLICY & PRACTICE
For
CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Preparedness Activities, Actions During Conflict & Staff Security

Prepared by M. Hart, at the request of E. Lannert, with input from (a)
J.G. Andersson - core papers,
(b) selected field offices- telex views and (c) UNICEF Cairo consultation

July, 1986

Preparedness Activities
Action During Conflict

Staff Security
Telexed Views

***

Children in Armed Conflicts

Possible Preparedness Activities for UNICEF(1)

(1) This paper attempts to summarize (i) extracts of information, on preparedness contained in the implementation strategy paper on children in conflict situations, (ii) Gullmar Andersson's paper on early warning, (iii) telexed views on this paper obtained from selected field offices as well as (iv) experiences from Cairo Office and the writer & Staff of emergency Unit H.Q. & Geneva.

It is being suggested that preparedness activities in respect of conflict situations can be grouped into three broad categories:

(1) Information gathering for action
(2) Building alliances
(3) UNICEF Office Preparedness.

I) INFORMATION GATHERING FOR ACTION:

i) Data Gathering on Vulnerable Groups:

At country level, efforts to explore the potential areas for action could include:

- initiating studies to identify most vulnerable groups, including for example :

- Children of internally & externally displaced,

- unaccompanied children, orphans or abandoned.

- severely malnourished children.

- war widows/single parents,

- traumatized children.

- delinquent: youths.

- having identified, it is important to try and obtain as much detail on numbers, location and nature of existing or potential vulnerable groups.

- identifying previous patterns of movements by vulnerable groups to facilitate planning a response if necessary to new displacement due to a crisis.

The process of data collection in this regard can also be achieved through forming consultative groups consisting of concerned officials, NGOs and academic consultants.

Having gathered information of this nature, it is important that it be disseminated in a way which creates awareness and sensitizes those who would be possible actors or participants in conflict situations. These may include governments, military, police, press and communities through selective use of media available in country & globally.

Sharing information both regionally and globally also has a valuable role to play in the broader goal of awareness raising and sensitizing decision makers to the effects of conflict on children.

example:

Networking for Children in Conflict:

Pan African Network:

In an effort to explore and assess the dimensions and nature of problems facing children in conflict situations. UNICEF Regional Office in Nairobi has identified a networking agency representing most countries in conflict situations. With UNICEF support, this agency will host a workshop for member countries whose objectives will be:

- To develop jointly strategies for intervening in conflict situations with other countries to defend the rights of children.

- To share material and ideas on improving methods for advocacy and consciousness raising.

- To facilitate the sharing documentation of data and information on the subject.

ii) Inventory of Resources: Who can do What?:

To create a basis for action planning it is essential, in addition to highlighting magnitude of problem areas, to identify the resources, organizational, infrastructural and human, which could be mobilized to take action either to prevent or assist in conflict situations.

This can be achieved by systematically surveying problem areas to become aware of groups who are already taking action and through whom more details of the situation could be made available.

Further to this, it is useful to obtain an overview of logistic, organizational and administrative structures, in place in normal times which could be mobilized in a conflict.

example:

South Africa:

In view of constraints for providing direct assistance to victims of civil strife in South Africa, two proposals are now under consideration.

One involves the identification of an NGO working in the area and providing financial support through the World Council of Churches who are assisting refugees in Crossroads with basic needs including food, shelter and medical supplies.

A second proposal has been received from a private consulting firm to prepare an operations profile for the most affected areas in the country. It is soliciting support from a consortium of humanitarian agencies both NGO and UN. This is designed to provide an information base on geographic logistics, infrastructure, and organizations which would be essential to planning operations.

(iii) Early Warning:

A third, and perhaps more difficult type of information to capture is that which serves as indicator of a turning point or significant deterioration in a volatile conflict situations which can develop over long periods and then flare up unexpectedly. Objective data and subjective perceptions are suggested : as indicators and to be monitored by UNICEF.

a) Mass Media:

Follow, to the extent possible, through mass media, political developments both within the country as well as in the region.

b) Production Changes:

If a country prepares for war, the industrial production pattern changes to put the country on "warfooting". One indicator can be that certain items disappear from the market without any reason.

c) UNICEF Office:

Your own office is often a good source of information as our local staff are well informed through their "knowledge network" of possible developments within the country. In some cases it may be useful to capture this type of information in daily briefing sessions.

d) Normal Government and Other Counterparts:

Can be most accurate and good source of information if an excellent relationship exists of mutual trust.

e) "Unusual Events":

Always keep an eye on "unusual events". This could be visible unrest in the population, violent strikes, demonstrations, sudden raise in crime rates and unusual high activity of armed forces.

f) Rumours:

The general rule is : "Don't listen to or spread rumours". That is a good rule, however, it can be slightly modified to "listen to rumours, carefully evaluate what you have hard - but don't spread it further". There might be some truth in what you hear and that should be neglected. Try then to verify through other sources.

g) Embassies:

Embassies are very useful especially in a developing situation for fundraising, assistance with evacuations, etc. and should always be an important contact point. Some Embassies can, however, be a bit "tricky" in obtaining information from, prior to changing situations.

(iv) UNICEF References:

Awareness of and access to existing references concerning UNICEF's resources and capacities which can be mobilized in situations of crises is extremely important. These include:

a) Five basic reference texts, which should be available in your office and serve as guides to policy and procedures as well as practical guidelines on implementation:

- the resource handbook for UNICEF Field Staff "Assisting in Emergencies ".
- Book E of the Field manual on emergency policy "Procedures".
- UNHCR handbook for emergencies.
- ICRC guide for delegates.
- Guide for unaccompanied children in emergencies.

b) EMOPs in NY maintains a roster of UNICEF Staff (present & previous), as well as consultants with experience in emergency situations. This can be helpful for rapid identification of staff support or technical assistance, as necessary.

c) Details on the contents of UNIPAC emergency stockpile can be obtained from the UNIPAC catalogue. The items are available on demand by air from Copenhagen subject to appropriation of funds from regular programmes, supplementary contributions or the ERF.

d) Information on staff training programmes both in UNICEF and/by other organizations is available from EMOPS in NY or GVA. These courses can facilitate upgrading of skills in emergency management techniques including contingency planning, needs assesment, sectoral interventions and negotiating skills.

II) BUILDING ALLIANCES:

Having identified key actors, decision makers, academics and concerned groups as sources of information, it is essential to build and maintain rapport with them.

This can be done both formally and informally.

On a formal basis, it has proven effective to host or facilitate the establishing of consultative groups who hold regular meetings or workshops where interested parties come together to exchange views and information on the problems in general and/or specific aspects of vulnerable groups and high risk issues. It is hoped that such groups could be mobilized for action in times of crisis. These groups can serve as a forum for advocacy on needs of CEDC as well as child's rights and possibly facilitate promotion of same.

example:

UNICEF in Egypt has taken concrete initiatives in this regard. Setting in motion a consultative process by organizing a group of experts & officials dealing initially with child labour, which will meet on a continuing basis to address other issues relating to children in difficult circumstances. The process is intended to help build alliances, monitor ongoing critical problems and extend the existing network of alliances.

Informally, contacts can be made with concerned organizations and individuals on subjects relating to regular programmes which may serve as counterparts or allies in conflict situation. These are also possible channels for advocacy and promotion on child's rights, adjustment with a human face and children in especially difficult circumstances (CEDC).

example:

UNICEF Egypt has also undertaken to establish and maintain such contacts:

a) University Faculties of Law. Ongoing programmes which include training police officers in international humanitarian law; legal literacy for public.

b) ICRC. ICRC has ongoing dialogue with Justice Department of Armed Forces for building contnt of military education in international humanitarian law.

c) Ford Foundation. Has programme for strengthening human rights concerns in university law faculties, centre for International Legal and Economic Studies at Zagazig University, Union of Arab Lawyers, and Egyptian Police Academy. Another component of the programme aims at providing legal aid to families and individuals who cannot afford it.

d) Press. A leading columnist for Al-Ahram newspaper is supporting public awareness building on impact of war on children.

e) Others. United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (for logistic and communication facilities); UNHCR; Embassies; Rod Crescent Society.

III) UNICEF OFFICE PREPAREDNESS CHECKLIST:

Offices in most vulnerable situations can initiate preparedness measures in advance to allow them more freedom to respond to affected populations in the event of crisis.

Staff:

- Photocopies of passports/LPs/IDs.

- Updated lists of staff dependents, consultants and visitors with home address and telephone numbers.

- Walkie-talkies, chargers and base stations as necessary.

- ensure that more than one or two people are familiar with operating the telex - have instructions and key numbers prepared and kept in a safe place.

Office:

- Shatter proof film for windows.
- Standby generators for telex, lights and office equipment.
- Gas lamps and camp stoves.
- Medical kits.
- Spare keys with essential staff.
- Emergency stocks of canned food and bottled water and can openers.

Vehicles:

- First Aid kits.
- Fuel, oil spare parts, tire reserves.
- Have unmarked and/or marked vehicles as required.
- Have additional UN Flags which be attached to vehicles on discretionary basis.

Logistic/Security:

- Contacts with military and security police.
- Contacts with new established Embassies have international radio links.
- Contacts with other international agencies.
- Iventory of transportation options for evacuation.
- Contacts with UN Forces present in country or region.

Finance:

- Maintain meaningful cash reserves in dollars and in local currencies in case banks close.

ON

EARLY WARNING” IN ARMED CONFLICT SITUATIONS

By J. Gullmar Andersson
***

It is very difficult to come to general conclusions on this subject as armed conflicts develop in so many different ways. In some war situations, escalation may develop hour by hour or an attack may come as a complete surprise.

Civil wars can, on the other hand take years to erupt although the under laying fundamental issues, that may create a civil war, have been evident for a long time.

The "early warning" in war situations must use other indicators than in "normal" disaster situations. The most important is to keep oneself as well informed as possible. A few suggestions:

a. Mass Media

Follow, to the extend possible, through mass media, political developments both within the country as well as in the region.

b. UNICEF Office

Your own office is often a good source of information as our local staff are well informed through their "know-ledge network" of possible developments within the country

c. Normal Government and Other Counterparts

Can be most accurate and good source of information if an excellent relationship exists of mutual trust.

d. Production Changes

If a country prepares for war, the industrial production pattern changes to put the country on "warfooting" . One indicator can be that certain items disappear from the market without any reason.

e. "Unusual Events"

Always keep an eye on "unusual events". This could be visible unrest in the population, violent strikes, demonstrations, sudden raise in crime rates and unusual high activity of armed forces.

f. Rumours

The general rule is: "Don't listen to or spread rumours". That is a good rule, however, it can be slightly modified to "listen to rumours, carefully evaluate what you have heard - but don't spread it further". There might be some truth in what you hear and that should not be neglected. Try then to verify through other sources.

g. Embassies

Embassies are very useful especially in a developing situation for fundraising, assistance with evacuations, etc. and should always be an important contact point. Some embassies can, however, be a bit "tricky" in obtaining information from, prior to changing situations.

Last but not least: if UNICEF is known in the country to be an efficient and reliable organization, you have solved many of the problems in "early warning" as many mill be more inclined to pass on information to you.

Children in Armed Conflict
UNICEF Action for Children During Conflict Situations

In an effort to build practical field experiences into global implementation guidelines concerning UNICEF interventions for children in conflict situations, three papers are attached for consideration and discussion,

The first is an extract from a draft HQ implementation strategy paper for children in especially difficult circumstances addressing the problem of conflict situations.

The second is a paper produced by Gullmar Andersson highlighting opportunities and constraints for action in conflict situations and an addendum on advocacy from his own experiences in Lebanon, Bangladesh and Biafra.

The third is a series of highlights sent by telex to the writer from other country offices commenting on Andersson's paper from their own experiences in : El Salvador. Yemen. Uganda, Sudan, Lebanon and Phillippines.

What is noteworthy from Andersson's paper, is where experience in-country reinforces certain aspects of the strategy paper but suggests caution in others. In some cases, Andersson adds important points not mentioned in the strategy paper.

Because of complexity and diversity in situations experienced in other countries no attempt was made to relate cabled comments to the strategy paper, nevertheless highlights on implementation of actions have been extracted and are considered extremely valuable.

Comparison of Andersson's Paper with Strategy Paper

Elements Where Views are Similar:

Extension of basic services to affected populations is a very effective and needed intervention and provides a natural linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development.

Working closely with UN especially UNHCR and the UN forces UNIFIL was particularly beneficial.

Repair of broken water mains flooding a civilian shelter on the front line was an effective entry point for arranging a cease fire.

Alliance building was extremely important not only with officials on both sides but also with religious leaders, press and unofficial but powerful political groups.

If supporting local peace initiatives, make certain they have sufficient political backing.

Elements where specific country situation suggests caution in implementing strategy:

1-Andersson:

- Military and paramilitary forces can be valuable allies when channeling relief assistance particularly in critical conflict situations for logistics and communications e.g. UN forces in Lebanon, military in El Salvador.

Strategy:

- Channel relief supplies thru non military & non paramilitary structures as far as possible.

2-Andersson:

Being more operational as an agency and not depending on government & NGO counterparts may be a necessity. This is especially relevant in relief operations where financing port handling, clearing inland transport distribution and storage.

Strategy:

- Collaborate closely with other mandated agencies in the field, especially UNHCR, ICRC and other NGO and religious groups and use their collective mandates and moral force to seek and use opportunities to reach children caught on different sides of conflict.

3-Andersson:

Overt advocacy for Human Rights and Child Rights in peak times of conflict may not be productive and could alienate UNICEF from important allies. Informal approach on neutral humanitarian grounds on face to face basis works better.

Strategy:

- International Law. Development and compliance:(e) supporting the development of an efficient and innovative implementation machinery for reinforcing the pro tact ion that international conventions provide to children

4-Andersson:

- Targeting assistance at specific vulnerable groups as not undertaken since the priority needs are affecting entire families and targeting assistance to unique segments might result in splitting families.

Strategy:

Indicative list of groups and risk should he-assessed in situational analysis and priority for action based on intensity of need, numbers affected and opportunities for programmes and strategies and be responsive to local need and priorities.

5-Andersson:

- Safe havens - such as hospitals and schools are not immune to attack during fighting, in fact they were frequently targeted during attacks in Lebanon.

Strategy:

Set up UNHCR/UNICEF/ICRC regional task forces to look into opportunities for intervening on behalf of child victims of armed conflict and promoting the concept of children as zones of peace.

6-Andersson:

- Programmes for child soldiers which involve creating special schools may risk to encourage and facilitate recruitment rather than discourage it.

Strategy:

Actions for Groups at Risk. Child Soldiers, POW's: Promote rehabilitation and special education, recreation and social services.

7-Andersson:

- Direct/open approach in negotiating zone of peace operations can be risky - clearances from both sides are more likely to be obtained informally.

Strategy:

Seek support and endorsement of government and other parties to conflict in order to facilitate access to all children.

New Ideas from Andersson not mentioned in Strategy Paper:

i. Conditions in civil war differ substantially from traditional cross-border conflicts. Delicate and selective alliance building is critical to assure successful implementation. Neutrality is a key and NGO collaboration can often be negative where clearly defined sympathies are evident.

ii. Assisting communities to absorb temporarily displaced groups outside conflict zone may be more effective-than setting up independent centres for affected families only.

iii. Assistance in rehabilitation of basic services in prolonged war situations is a meaningful input in creating an atmosphere of normalization at the community level.

iv. Rehabilitation of schools and support to vocational training serves also to reduce possibilities and pressures leading to child soldiers.

v. Very different programming is implied for prolonged conflict situations as opposed to short-lived flare-ups.

vi. Contacts by the Executive Director to UNICEF committee of opposing country paralleled by direct contact with military in country facilitated in-country operations.

***

Speaker’s Aid

LECTURE:

UNACCOMPANIED
CHILDREN
in
EMERGENCIES

E. RESSLER

***

UNACCOMPANIED CHILD:

An individual who is under the age of majority and not accompanied by a parent, guardian, or other who by law or custom is responsible for him or her.

SAMPLE LISTING OF EMERGENCIES IN WHICH THERE WERE LARGE NUMBERS OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN

1919-:

RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

1936-:

SPANISH CIVIL WAR

1939-:

FINNISH CHILDREN TO SWEDEN

1940-:

ENGLISH CHILDREN

1945-:

WORLD WAR II

1948-:

GREECE

1950-:

KOREAN WAR

1956-:

HUNGARIAN CHILDREN

1960-:

CUBAN EXODUS TO THE US

1960-:

TIBETIAN CHILDREN IN INDIA

1970-:

NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

1970-:

CYCLONE AND TIDAL WAVE IN BANGLADESH

1970-:

BANGLADESH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

1970-:

VIETNAM

1973-:

ETHIOPIA DURING THE SAHEL DROUGHT

1975-:

VIETNAMESE BABYLIFT

1975-:

VIETNAMESE UNACCOMPANIED MINOR REFUGEES

1975-:

FROM LAOS

1979-:

CAMBODIAN REFUGEES TO THAILAND

1980-:

CUBAN EXODUS TO THE US

1980-:

HAITIAN EXODUS TO THE US

1980-:

LEBANESE CHILDREN TO WEST GERMANY

COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS

1. UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN ARE AN EXCEPTIONAL PHENOMENA.

2. THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN IS SMALL

3. THAT ACCOMPANIED CHILDREN ARE ORPHANS OR ABANDONED.

4. MOST UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN ARE INFANTS.

5. THE NEEDS OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN ARE USUALLY MET BY SERVICES NORMALLY PROVIDED TO ADULT POPULATIONS.

BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE CARE OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN

1. CHILDREN ARE BEST-OFF WITH THEIR OWN FAMILIES, CULTURES, AND COMMUNITIES.

2. CHILDREN NEED THE CONTINUOUS CARE OF NURTURANT ADULTS.

3. CHILDREN SHOULD BE PROVIDED CARE THAT MEETS THEIR AGE-RELATED DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

REASONS FOR CHILDREN BECOMING "UNACCOMPANIED"

VOLUNTARY SEPARATION

1. ABANDONED
2. ENTRUSTED
3. SURRENDERED
4. INDEPENDENT
5. CONSCRIPTED

INVOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS

6. ABDUCTED
7. LOST
8. ORPHANED
9. RUNAWAY
10. REMOVED


Children in orphanages Korea 1995-1990


Where Unaccompanied Children are likely to be found


Unaccompanied children may not be totally alone.

REASONS FOR CHILDREN BECOMING "UNACCOMPANIED"

VOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS: WITH THE PARENT'S CONSENT.

1. ABANDONED:

A CHILD WHOSE PARENT (S) HAS DESERTED HIM WITH NO INTENTION OF REUNION.

2. ENTRUSTED:

A CHILD VOLUNTARILY PLACED IN THE CARE OF ANOTHER ADULT, OR IN AN INSTITUTION, BY PARENTS WHO INTEND TO RECLAIM HIM.

3. SURRENDERED:

A CHILD WHOSE PARENTS HAVE PERMANENTLY GIVE UP THEIR PARENTAL RIGHTS.

4. INDEPENDENT:

A CHILD LIVING APART FROM PARENTS WITH PARENTAL CONSENT.

5. CONSCRIPTED:

ENLISTED IN FIGHTING UNITS WITH OR WITHOUT THEIR PARENTS CONSENT OR THEIR OWN.

FOURTEEN BASIC PROGRAM ACTIONS REQUIRED FOR THE CARE AND PROTECTION OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN EMERGENCIES

PRIOR TO THE EMERGENCY:

1. INSTITUTIONAL PREPAREDNESS

AT THE ONSET OF THE EMERGENCY:

2. SITUATION ASSESSMENT
3. PREVENTIVE PROGRAMMING
4. SEARCH FOR UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN

INITIAL CARE: UPON IDENTIFICATION OF AN UNACCOMPANIED CHILD. (PERIOD - DAYS)

5. REGISTRATION
6. EMERGENCY PLACEMENT
7. EMERGENCY SERVICES

INTERIUM CARE: TEMPORARY PERIOD UNTIL LONG TERM CARE IS ARRANGED. (PERIOD - WEEKS TO MONTHS)

8. PLACEMENT
9. BASIC SERVICES
10. DOCUMENTATION
11. TRACING
12. GUARDIANSHIP OR REPRESENTATION

LONG TERM CARE: CARE UNTIL THE CHILD REACHES ADULTHOOD. (PERIOD - YEARS)

13. PLACEMENT
14. SUPPORTIVE SERVICES

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 14: International Relief System

Interagency Alliance

Learning Objectives

- To be aware of the established international relief system and interagency relationships

- Identify guidelines and mechanisms which have lead to successful interagency co-operation in emergency situations in the past (lessons learned)

- To be familiar with the role and functioning of key agencies in relation to emergencies

- To clarify UNICEF role and functions in the relief system and what it can do in the absence of co-ordination/consensus among agencies

- To be cognizant of the differences between the pattern of workings and interrelationships of organizations in normal and emergency situations

Learning Points

1. What constitutes the "international relief system":

- Government
- Intergovernmental organizations (e.g. U.N., Red Cross)
- Non-governmental organizations

2. Donors and intervenors in the relief system

3. The "international relief system" can be divided into three levels:

- International level
- Regional or country level
- Project level

Into these levels are fitted a complex network of organizations, each of which has a specific role or resources to offer following a disaster.

4. Key actors in the relief system: who are they and what makes them play a "key" role (resources they command, contributions of money, goods or technology, influence, etc.)

5. Role of intergovernmental organizations which are often key participants in the "international relief system".

6. Role of host government in co-ordinating all of the above.

7. Problems common to the relief system and the agencies and organizations within it: decision making and authority, donor constraints, lack of accountability to the victims, lack of co-ordination.

8. Examples where the "international relief system" failed and where it succeeded.

Learning Methods

1. Presentation

- Using transparency on "Emergency Systems" define what is meant by the term "international relief system" and its "structure"

2. Case study

- Review a case study of a relief operation in your region (e.g. Kampuchea in Asia, and Ethiopia in Africa) and analyse the role key "actors" - especially U.N. agencies - played in the relief system comparing them with their "mandated" function. Draw lessons from above..

3. Group Exercise

- Divide participants into three groups and ask each to make a checklist of suggestions for the improvement of interagency co-operation in the "international relief system" at their country level.

- Review and comment on group reports in a plenary session and highlight points of consensus.

Required Reading

- UNICEF, Field Manual - Book E, Section 1.3 pp. 1-7
- Fred Cuny, Disasters and Development, PP 107-123

Supplementary Reading

- UNICEF, Field Manual - Book E, R 2
- UNDRO, Case Study on Disaster Management in Western Samoa, 1982

Speakers' Preparation Aids

- UNDRO News, "We Can Improve Relief Efforts - If We Try", 1983 (1)

- Transparency: Emergency Systems (2)

- "International Organizations and Management Arrangements for Emergency Responses". Ron Ockwell (3)


***

Required Reading

TITLE: "The Relief System, Disasters and Development, Chapter 7
AUTHOR: Fredrick Cuny

SESSION: INTERNATIONAL RELIEF SYSTEM/INTERAGENCY ALLIANCE

***

THE RELIEF SYSTEM

Defining the System

Much has been written recently about the foreign aid organizations and their role in international development in the Third World (Eugene Linden The Alms Race 1976; Denis Goulet The Uncertain Promise 1977; John G. Sommer Beyond Charity 1977.) White the workings of these organizations and their interrelationships in normal circumstances are similar to the patterns that occur after disasters, there are enough differences to warrant closer examination.

The relief system consists of donors and intervenors. At the upper levels of the system, those who collect and channel resources to those active in the field are collectively known as the donors. Intervenors are the organizations that carry out the activities in the affected countries. In the middle levels of the system, some organizations are both donors and intervenors (for example, AID). An organization that is a donor in one disaster may be an intervenor in another. Generally, however, roles are firmly established.

What is generally referred to as the "international relief system" can be divided into five tiers: the first three represent the international level, the fourth the regional or country level, and the fifth the project level. Into these tiers are fitted a complex network of organizations, each of which has a specific role or resources to offer following a disaster. If the system is viewed theoretically as a multi-tiered funnel for collecting resources and channeling them into a disaster-affected community, it is possible to visualize the workings and interrelationships at each level.

The Five Tiers

Starting at the top are the individuals and companies that contribute funds or material; these are the primary donors. It is impossible for donors to deliver directly to the victims; therefore, they must donate to an organization that either works in the community or can in turn pass on their gift to an organization that is on the scene. The organizations that receive the gifts, including churches, governments, and foundations, form the second tier.

The second-tier organizations have a number of options in distributing the donations. They can pass them on to the groups in the next level, composed of the international relief and development organizations (known collectively as voluntary organizations or volags), or to international intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States (OAS), or they can bypass this level and give directly to the fourth tier, the local government and nongovernmental organizations. In practice, most funds are passed directly from second-tier to third-tier groups.

Page 109 shows the tiers, the patterns of donations, and the interrelationships of the various organizations. For example, churches normally give to volags in the third tier rather than to lower levels in the system. Governments donate to all levels, depending on the disaster and the political implications of the aid. Foundations contribute to volags, international organizations, and sometimes directly to local nongovernmental organizations, but almost never to the local government. At the third tier, volags and international organizations often support each other. For example, many volags give money directly to specialized UN organizations such as UNICEF, while many of the UN organizations (such as the UNHCR) contract the volags to carry out their programs. Similarly, volags often donate to regional organizations and vice versa, and even laterally to other volags.

The volags serve as a conduit for funds to three of the groups in the fourth tier. First, they support their own field offices and the projects that their staff develops . They also fund other international volags or the local nongovernmental organizations in the affected country. Often, too, they provide funds to missionaries through organizations in the third tier or directly to those in the fourth tier. Volags often also fund each other in the third tier and the UN or regional intergovernmental organizations. In fact, volags have a record of funding just about every type of organization in both the third and fourth tiers, except local governments. Thus, in effect, volags often become not only operating agencies but also de facto foundations. OXFAM U.K. and OXFAM America acted as a foundation following the 1976 Guatemalan earthquake by funding another volag, World Neighbors, which was in turn supporting a variety of projects in the earthquake zone.

The fourth tier represents the first group of organizations in the affected country. It comprises the host government, local nongovernmental organizations, and the offices or field representatives of the foreign volags and missionaries. Their interrelationships are not as complex as at the international level, for here there is a competition for funds. Here too the decisions are made on how the funds will be spent Inside the country, and such decisions are critical for the outcome of the overall relief and reconstruction program.

The final level the resources must go through before reaching the victims is the project level. This fifth tier represents the operational level at which the funds are dispersed and the point at which the victims' needs are resolved.

Most of the organizations in tiers 2 through 4 are both recipients and donors. In terms of the relief system, all organizations in these tiers, and many in the fourth tier, are collectively known as donors.

Motivation

Who are the donors and what motivates them? The individuals and families in the first tier make their donations either spontaneously or in response to a request from an organization in one of the lower tiers. Donations are voluntary and humanitarian concerns are the prime motivation.

Corporations and business organizations are also in the first Her and make donations to second- and third-level organizations, but their motivations are more varied. Humanitarian interests, of course, are a factor, but there are also issues of self-interest that come into play. A corporation with operations in the disaster-affected country cannot ignore a disaster and must demonstrate its concern and goodwill to the victims and host government. It can do this indirectly, but funding the voluntary organizations or the local nongovernmental organizations providing disaster relief or a foundation that will make the choice for the company. Or it can do it directly by setting up small-scale projects that benefit the company's workers or their communities. For example, many corporations have offered low-interest loans to their workers for housing reconstruction.

Corporations may contribute funds to support the national objectives of their own government, especially if these are thought to lead to gains for the corporations in the future. Thus, if a disaster is seen as creating a potential for political instability, governments and corporations alike may offer substantial aid to a wide range of institutions in the affected area.

This combination of self-interest and humanitarian concern on the part of corporations need not be considered negative. As an example of indirect aid, Program Kuchuba'l received an early boost with a donation of $10,000 from the Philip Morris Company, which enabled it to produce a large number of training aids that were used throughout the program. If a corporation becomes directly involved in relief efforts, the results are usually mixed. Even the best-intentioned corporate relief programs often fall short of their objectives, usually because the corporations are not attuned to all the issues involved. A corporation in Guatemala that produced building materials spent approximately half a minion dollars for a housing program that benefited only 100 families. Within several months, most of the low-income families who had moved into the project had sold the houses and left, claiming that the cost of maintaining and running the houses was beyond their means.

The objectives of the churches, governments, and foundations that make up the second tier are more complex. For the churches, humanitarian concerns dominate, but concern about the impact of the disaster on missionary works and a measure of opportunism also prevail. What better chance than a disaster to demonstrate the goodwill and humanitarian efforts of an organization and to establish or expand a presence in a community where previously the denomination had little influence. Churches donate primarily to the relief and development organizations of their own denomination, to affiliated ecumenical groups, or their own missionaries. Occasionally, church donations will be channeled to the voluntary organizations. In some cases, churches will also donate to the United Nations, especially UNICEF and the World Food Program and to other intergovernmental organizations that have a specific program for the disaster-affected area.

Foundations play a limited role among the second-tier organizations and serve primarily as a conduit for corporate and private funds to other organizations. Usually the foundation has a specific interest in a particular country or a particular activity such as agriculture or housing. Foundations are among the organizations most responsive to their donors, especially the large corporations that provide funds (and often direction). The foundations are normally motivated by the wish to achieve a certain set of goals outlined by the founders and donors; these cover a wide range. Generally they can be described as humanitarian or are related to economic development or certain political objectives.

Of all the organizations in the second tier, governments are usually the most influential and powerful. And at the same time, their actions are often the most difficult to define. They are motivated by myriad factors including humanitarian, geopolitical, and economic objectives, by treaties or other prior contracts, and, regrettably, by military objectives. Unfortunately, many of the military objectives are obscured by the true humanitarian objectives and vice versa. In some cases the political and economic objectives can be linked to humanitarian goals. If aid is provided quickly to the government of a country affected by a disaster, continuity and stability can often be ensured, and a timely donation of economic aid can keep an economy from being affected too adversely. Principal businesses and industries can be restored quickly, which benefits not only the recipient but also the donor government. Usually, however, the primary political objective is to maintain or attain influence.

In order to carry out their post-disaster objectives, governments donate to almost every type of organization on the next two tiers. It is the local government with which the donor government has its primary relationship and to which it directs the primary flow of aid. This arrangement can be both a constraint and an opportunity, depending on the capabilities of the host government.

The second pattern of government funding is for the donor to give to the voluntary organizations in its own country that have contracts or programs in the affected area. These donations have drawn much criticism in recent years. Many organizations are so heavily funded by their governments that they become, in effect, an arm of the government's foreign policy. The ready availability of cash and material has "hooked" many organizations, and they are almost totally dependent upon their foreign aid ministries? for support. There has been growing concern that this alliance undermines the credibility of the volags and reduces their ability to be innovative and to operate independently. The implications of this connection cannot be overemphasized. If the national government of the volag does not want it to conduct a relief program in the affected area, it can bring a tremendous amount of pressure on the volag to stay clear. And if it wants a volag to become involved, it can, similarly, make things very easy for the agency. While a few agencies have been able to remain independent of their governments and provide true humanitarian aid without regard to political consequences, the number is unfortunately rather small and dwindling. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that, because governments make extensive resources available to volags, a much wider range of services can be offered. The question facing the volags, then, is where to draw the line and how to accept the government's aid without becoming a pawn in a political game where the true agendas are often hidden.

Governments also contribute to the relief programs of international organizations. Specialized agencies of the United Nations command a large portion of these funds. They are a handy conduit for governments and allow a government without an extensive foreign aid program to make a contribution without actually having to decide the details of how the money is to be spent in the field. Such transfers of funds are effective in that they assure that special problems will receive at least some attention and countries that would not otherwise receive attention will get at least some. For the more influential countries (such as the U.S., Canada, and the U.K.), contributions to these organizations are done more pro forma than anything else.

On the third tier are the volags and the intergovernmental agencies that act as service agencies, and it is here that overall policy and planning for the international relief effort of the nongovernmental organization occurs. Actions at this level are shaped by a variety of factors. Humanitarian concerns are, of course, the prime motivator. When a disaster strikes, most agencies feel compelled to do something, especially if they have programs in the disaster-affected area. The raison d’e of many organizations is to respond to disasters, or at least to respond to human needs in times of crisis. Therefore, they must become involved.

For others, disasters appear to provide an opportunity not only to serve other people but also to expand the range of services and the influence of the organization. Often this is coupled with an opportunity for growth, especially if the disaster is on a large-scale, commanding much public attention. The greater the tragedy and the more extensive the media coverage, the greater the opportunity for a successful appeal. Therefore many organizations, for reasons of self-preservation, start up disaster relief programs.

Some volags enter a disaster to support the political objectives of their own government. During the Vietnam War, several volags began programs to aid refugees and to help war victims in direct support of the American (and indirectly of the South Vietnamese) government.

There is a special factor motivating development organizations in disasters. This is called "development through disaster opportunity." Several organizations perceive disasters as a radical event that will speed up the development process. They reason that disasters create an atmosphere for change and that, with a massive influx of money and material, opportunities exist to have a significant impact on the society. Organizations often choose this moment to begin their development programs, entering first with a relief program, then moving to a reconstruction and later a development program. (Such was the case with the Save the Children Alliance following the Guatemalan earthquake).

The intergovernmental organizations that make up the second group on the third tier, like the volags, have the dual role of being both operational agencies and providing funds. Their primary task is to support the relief and reconstruction operations of their member governments. Thus the primary involvement is with the governments of the disaster-stricken areas. In some cases they do provide funds to volags.

The actions of international organizations are guided by the concerns of their member governments - not only the recipients of aid, but also the most influential donors. Thus their objectives are often more political and economic than humanitarian, and occasionally the objectives have military overtones.

The final members of the third tier are church and missionary organizations. If the organization is denominational, the objectives are usually quite clear and reflect the policies and alms of the membership of that particular religious group. If the organization is ecumenical, however, it may operate under a confusing set of instructions. It must deal with a variety of internal contradictions and myriad philosophies. The ecumenical movement in relief and development is probably too young to be evaluated conclusively; yet at present it is apparent that these organizations often spend more time trying to determine what is acceptable to each of the member religious groups than what is appropriate for the victims. Ecumenical organizations also become entangled in many of the same snares as the nondenominational voluntary agencies. They too are often heavily funded by their national governments. It is always difficult for these organizations to draw the fine line between humanitarian service and political complicity. There can be no doubt that the ecumenical movement offers one advantage, however, namely the ability to generate extensive resources and to provide a single entity for their distribution.

The fourth tier is made up of the local government, the local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the field offices or representatives of the international voluntary agencies, and the missionaries working in a particular country. This tier is classified as both the second level of the relief system and the lowest level of the donor community and can also be considered either as intervenors or as coping mechanisms. Nonetheless they are donors, crucial because they actually have face-to-face contact with the ultimate recipients of the donations: the disaster victims. As with the organizations of the upper tiers, the organizations of the fourth tier have rather clearly defined funding patterns. The government usually gives funds to its own agencies for projects and to the nongovernmental organizations of its own country. Local NGOs generally support their own projects and no one else's. Missionaries similarly fund their own projects or people with whom they have had contact.

Only the volags have a diverse funding pattern and may fund the activities of any of the other three groups (although, if they have their own projects, the bulk of their funding will go to these).

At this level, where face-to-face contact with the victims occurs, aid would seem to be offered for the best of motives. Yet even here, politics and economic objectives often intrude. Governments have been known to show favoritism in the distribution of relief supplies. Local NGOs often support community groups for political as well as humanitarian reasons. And even missionaries have been found using aid as a means of furthering their own religious objectives.

KEY ACTORS IN THE RELIEF SYSTEM

While the entire relief system, especially at the donor level, is composed of hundreds of different organizations, only a relative handful can be considered key actors. What makes these organizations "key" is a combination of the resources they command, the contributions of money, goods, or technology that they can make, or the influence they wield as "pacesetters" relative to the state of the art.

U.S. GOVERNMENT

No other country responds more fully to disasters than the U.S. It responds to some extent at all phases of a disaster and is extensively involved in pre-disaster planning, mitigation, and preparedness. The U.S. is one of the largest sources of funds for disaster relief and operates throughout the Third World.

In the initial stages of a disaster, assistance is coordinated by an office in the State Department. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) sends representatives to the affected area to help the American Embassy officials on site determine what the requirements are and how the U.S. Government can best respond. If the country has an AID Mission, it will be responsible for coordinating the American Government's actions on site. The Mission may decide simply to provide funds for material or a combination of both. If it has an existing program, such as one in housing or agriculture, it may redirect the personnel from that program to the disaster area. Normally, however, the AID Missions prefer to fund the American voluntary agencies active in the country or to provide the funding directly to the host of government.

Because the United States is a major power, there are, of course, many political ramifications to the aid that it provides. Critics have often pointed out that the American aid programs in general tend to support the status quo in the developing countries. In addition, they often criticize the programs for being a mechanism for distributing American goods and thereby providing an indirect subsidy for American agriculture and manufacturing interests. The food programs of the U.S. Government, in particular PL-480 Title II, have drawn the bulk of this criticism in recent years.

The response of the U.S. in any one disaster is normally dependent upon its relationship with the affected country. If the country is considered "friendly" or strategically Important, the aid provided following a disaster can be massive. Typical responses include the sending of Disaster Assessment Teams (DAST) and the immediate provision of a small cash grant to the host government. Within the next few days, several plane loads of relief supplies will be forwarded, including water tanks, family-sized tents, and an initial donation of PL-480 food stuffs.

The U.S. Embassy can arrange for private donors to ship relief supplies at government expense to the affected area and can make available a wide variety of resources to the American and often other agencies working in rehabilitation and reconstruction. If the disaster is particularly severe, OFDA will approach Congress for a large appropriation to help in reconstruction and will notify the host government and the American voluntary agencies that will entertain proposals for the use of these funds.

If substantial clearance and road repair activities are required, teams of military engineers, complete with supporting equipment, may be offered to help restore roads, repair bridges, and reestablish communications.

If extensive search and rescue is required, and there are adequate American military resources nearby, helicopters and small aircraft can be put at the immediate disposal of the host country. Following the 1970 earthquake in Peru, an American helicopter carrier was diverted to the Peruvian coast, where the entire complement of helicopters was assigned for several weeks to assist in the relief and rescue operations (a highly visible, if not cost-effective response).

While these vast resources may seem impressive, especially to the local people, their effectiveness and cost-benefit ratio must seriously be questioned. Could not the money be better spent to stimulate local response using more appropriate technology and emphasizing participation of the victims?

Government Aid Outside U.S.

The second group of key actors among governments includes the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Sweden. All have large and extensive aid programs in their own right, and each has extensive contracts among the disaster-prone countries in the developing world. The U.K. and France are often tied to their former colonial territories by a combination of sentiment and economic interests and thus can be counted on to respond in these areas quickly and on a large scale. Canada and Sweden, on the other hand, are a bit more selective with their aid programs as they do not have the same resources to offer, but can be counted on in a wide variety of situations. Sweden and Canada both are newcomers to the aid game, not having been colonial powers, and therefore often find that their aid is more acceptable in political terms than that of the U.K. or France, which are often constrained by the same limitations as the U.S.

Following a disaster, all of these countries respond in much the same way as the U.S., offering a combination of direct and indirect assistance, cash and material aid, and military personnel and equipment to help in the immediate emergency relief.

The U.K. and France each have a considerable number of private organizations that are normally involved in development or relief activities and can work through these groups. Canada and Sweden, on the other hand, do not have a large number of nongovernmental organizations operating overseas and therefore their aid tends to be more direct.

Smaller Government Aid Programs

The third key group includes West Germany, Holland, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. Each of these has relatively small aid programs, and the programs of Japan and Saudi Arabia are highly regionalized. The Dutch are one of the up-and-coming supporters of international development and relief activities and are generally unique in that they often fund private organizations from other countries.

These governments normally provide financial assistance only and rarely become operational in a disaster. Occasionally they provide material and in a few cases have provided military equipment, such as aircraft or engineering equipment, if it has been requested by the host government. As more private groups develop in these countries, the support they receive will most likely follow the patterns shown for other European governments and the U.S. The continued growth and development of the European Economic Community, with its associated international development and aid programs, will provide another arm of assistance for each of the European countries. Whether the overall effort will be to expand or reduce each country's individual response remains to be seen.

There are, of course, many other governments that provide assistance following disaster and indeed, virtually every government close to the affected area or with religious or economic ties makes some form of contribution.

Communist Bloc Aid

The USSR, China, and Cuba as well as many of the Eastern European nations, also provide disaster relief, through aid from these countries varies greatly in quantity and quality. Normally they provide cash, though on occasion they have donated food or agricultural equipment and have replaced industrial equipment lost in the disaster. Probably their best-known relief operation outside of their normal client states was in Peru following the 1970 earthquake. The Russians organized a massive airlift of food and medical supplies and were involved in the reconstruction of housing around the town of Huaraz.

Cuba's disaster aid program is typical. When its neighbors in the Caribbean are struck by earthquakes or hurricanes, Cuba usually offers a rather small amount of aid, in Nicaragua following the 1972 earthquake, Cuba donated several planeloads of relief supplies including water purification equipment and medicines. It also offered a team of public health workers and a medical field hospital, which proved to be very effective. Political considerations, however, did not allow the Cubans to remain on site for longer than several weeks, and their aid program soon ended.

In recent years the Chinese have become more active in post-disaster assistance; previously they have been involved only with their immediate neighbors and a few countries that were client states in Africa. Chinese relief aid is generally limited to the provision of technical assistance and funds. Since China's own experience with severe earthquakes in 1976, it has shown much interest in sharing information with countries with similar earthquake problems. It is expected that China wilt become a major participant in international relief and reconstruction efforts.

It is difficult to assess the aid provided by Communist countries. The political rhetoric surrounding the aid often obscures the true impact of the assistance, and because it is given in a highly political environment. It is not likely that effective evaluations will be carried out.

Intergovernmental Organizations

The intergovernmental organizations are often key participants in the international relief system. The UN, of course, is the largest, and in various types of disasters, its specialized agencies have major assignments in the overall relief effort. For example, in droughts, the World Food Programme is often designated as the lead agency; in refugee situations, the UNHCR is normally assigned the coordinating role. Within the UN system, almost half its agencies have some responsibility in disasters. There are even special UN agencies created to handle long-term aspects of disasters. UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, was created to handle the Palestinian situation. If an operation lasts for more than a year, a UN special operation will normally be created, with one of the UN agencies designated as the lead agency, as was in the case in the Sahel during the drought of the 1970s.

The UN Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) was established in the 1970s to coordinate the various relief and reconstruction efforts of the UN system and to stimulate prevention and preparedness measures. In the immediate post-disaster period, the UNDRO office in Geneva serves mainly as a coordinator for information on donations and, in the field, as govenor??? of coordination efforts among foreign donors. In recent years UNDRO has placed increased emphasis on its preparedness activities.

UNDRO has had difficulty in defining its role and implementing an effective program. An evaluation of the office in 1980 by the Joint inspection Unit of the UN found "implementation...has been hampered by [the] Imprecise nature of [UNDRO's mandate] and [its] inability to establish a leadership role; by problems in determining UNDRO's functions in 'other' disasters; [by] the proper mix of relief co-ordination, preparedness and prevention work; [by] the extent of an 'operational' role; and [by] the appropriate initiation and termination of its relief efforts" (Alien et al. 1980).

The UN specialized agencies can provide a wide variety of resources ranging from technical assistance to food. UNICEF and the World Food Programme often have their own staffs within a country who are capable of formulating and conducting a relief program . UNDRO normally works through the resident representatives of the Un Development Programme, or may send a member of its staff to the affected country to help carry out the disaster assessment and coordination role.

The European Economic Community (EEC) is rapidly expanding its disaster assistance, serving primarily as a conduit for funds and material to Third World countries that do not have large bilateral assistance agreements with EE member countries. In the future, this role is likely to expand.

Oil-producing nations have become major aid givers since the 1973 oil price increases. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries (OPEC) now supplies more than 25 percent of all aid to the Third World, but as yet little of this aid is for disaster assistance. OPEC members have set up two multilateral development banks that are likely to become major resources for reconstruction financing (New Internationalist 1979).

Another key agency among international organizations is the World Bank. The Bank is unique in that it is a lending institution and works only with governments. It can provide funds by offering credit or soft loans, often supporting them with a wide range of technical assistance. The World Bank grew out of the American aid program to Europe following World War II, and much of its program is still structured in the same manner. The World Bank normally becomes involved only in reconstruction. If it has an ongoing program in the disaster-affected area, the World Bank may increase its level of support during the emergency or transition phase; however, this is rare. The World Bank normally spends its funds on projects that will make a contribution to longer-term development. Favored projects are in the agricultural 9 small business, and housing sectors.

Regional Organizations

The importance of regional organizations in any specific situation depends on the organizations involved and on the location of the disaster. For example, the Caribbean Development Bank could be considered a key organization by governments in that region, though in the overall picture, bilateral aid from the major powers would generally prove to be much more important. Regional organizations rarely have extensive post-disaster aid programs and can generally offer only loans, financial assistance, and occasionally technical assistance.

Volags

Even though the voluntary agencies do not make a large contribution in terms of the amount of resources, they are often "key" simply because they are more flexible and can experiment in terms of both the style and content of their programs.

The volag system has two levels. The first provides coordination at the international level. The League of Red Cross Societies (LORCS), the World Council of Churches, Caritas Internationals, the international Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the international Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), to name a few, serve their member groups by collecting and disseminating information and relief materials, and by providing technical assistance to them. These organizations handle the majority of the appeals and serve as "traffic directors" for much of the material aid that goes from the industrialized countries to the developing countries. The World Council of Churches serves the ecumenical movement made up of the mainline Christian organizations in the West. Caritas serves as coordinator for the Catholic relief organizations, while the League coordinates the relief efforts of the various national Red Cross Societies. The League monitors relief operations and sends delegates to work with the various national societies to help carry out relief operations.

In Geneva, coordination is done through a committee called the LORCS-Volag Steering Committee (Brown 1979). Composed of the League, CRS, Lutheran World Federation, OXFAM, and the World Council of Churches, the committee provides a forum for exchanging information about disasters and for coordinating appeals. The committee has undertaken several joint disaster preparedness activities and has published several disaster preparedness guides and manuals.

In addition to the steering committee, a regular monthly meeting of the League and the other relief agencies, including both governmental and private agencies, is held at the LORCS Secretariate to exchange information and reduce overlap during current disasters.

Each of the coordinating bodies has its own reserve of funds and, sometimes, material, which it can commit immediately when the disaster occurs. It launches an appeal to other member organizations and affiliates as soon as a local organization requests assistance. It may provide aid to assess the needs, but its primary role will be to record and coordinate the assistance dispatched.

There are many problems associated with the rule of coordinator. The staffs represent many different countries and, therefore, the coordinator must be sensitive to many nationalistic concerns-a sensitivity that tends to constrain many organizations. They are also in the difficult spot of being the focal point for appeals and must pass them on to the donors, inadvertently endorsing the appeals, whether they are appropriate or not. While organizations can attempt to investigate requests, normally they cannot pass judgment on them and are therefore often unjustly criticized when inappropriate aid arrives. It has been pointed out that an effective role for these organizations is disaster preparedness; namely, working with affiliates in the disaster-prone countries to identify effective responses and the appropriate assistance.

Worldwide, there are more than one thousand different organizations that might respond to a disaster. Of these, only a few are considered key, because at least one can be counted on to respond in any disaster. Among these are CARE, Catholic Relief Services of the United States, Church World Service (also of the U.S. and a World Council of Churches affiliate), OXFAM, the various national organizations of Save the Children and Terre des Hommes, and World Vision. Of these, the first three are the largest relief organizations in the world, and the resources they command give them an influential role in any operation in which they participate. Each is involved in both relief and development works, and one or the other is generally involved in almost every country in the Third World. CARE has its own programs administered by a professional staff, supplemented in disasters by volunteers. CRS and CWS usually operate through local counterpart organizations, though in a few cases they do have their own programs. Their interests are not restricted to any one sector, and they have entered housing, agriculture, small business, and many other fields, both in normal and in post-disaster times. The programs of the "Big Three" have often been criticized as being too closely linked to U.S. policy2 and, indeed, in many post-disaster situations the U.S. State Department has relied on these agencies heavily. In some cases, they are designated as the official U.S. relief agency for a particular disaster, especially if the U.S. has no AID Mission in the country. The quality of the performance of these agencies is mixed and often depends on whether or not they had a program in the affected area prior to the disaster and therefore a good base upon which to build. Criticism of these programs has centered on the fact that they often tend to be more responsive to the needs and requirements of the U.S. Government than to those of the disaster victims. For example, following a cyclone in Asia, one agency received AID funding to provide emergency housing. The program began within a few days of the disaster, even before many of the victims had returned to the area and before the bodies had been removed. In order to expedite construction, the agency purchased materials in a neighboring state and brought in laborers from outside the affected area to build the houses. When it was pointed out to the agency that the shelters were being built on land whose ownership was not clear and that the victims who desperately needed jobs were not being included in the program, the agency requested that the program be extended in order to revise it. The revisions were rejected, however, because AID had to expend its funds within a ninety-day period.

2. For a discussion of the U.S. Government contribution to agencies, see John G. Sommer, Beyond Charity (1977), especially his table 4 in the appendix.

Other key organizations driver their influence more from experience than from resources. OXFAM plays a dual role in disasters as it is both an operational agency and a funding agency, depending on the country and its prior commitments. OXFAM was founded as a famine relief organization and has evolved into a development organization over the years. It has long been noted as one of the best disaster response organizations, and its programs have been regarded as innovative and relatively successful. Like any organization, it is only as good as its people on the scene, but the field directors have been granted a good measure of autonomy and as a result programs tailored to the needs of people, with extensive participation by the victims, have usually resulted. OXFAM has also been a leader in research in disaster-related technology. In the field of sanitation it is well known for the OXFAM sanitation unit, an innovative, though controversial, system for collecting and storing excreta in refugee camp situations, which was a major innovation for its time. While not all of its investments have proven sound (for example, the OXFAM polyurethane emergency shelters), it has taken the lead in disaster-related research.

Save the Children is an amalgamation of the various Save the Children organizations in Europe and the United States. Each organization has its own field staff, but following disasters in certain areas it is supplemented by staff or volunteers sent by other members of the alliance. Following the earthquake in Guatemala, for example, the alliance sent an American and British team to conduct a disaster assessment and to determine an area for a project. This team was then supplemented by Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, and other American and British team members.

The SCF Alliance, is best known for its work with children and for its medical and feeding teams, though it is not restricted to these sectors.

Terre des Hommes is a European organization with affiliates in Holland, Austria, Germany, and Belgium. It normally provides aid in the fields of medicine, public health, and services to mothers and children. A key organization not so much from performance as resources, it nonetheless has a growing program and a significant impact wherever 1t operates.

World Vision Relief Organization is the relief arm of World Vision international, a U.S.-based, worldwide Christian organization that provides humanitarian assistance in support of the evangelical movement. The organization and its affiliates are one of the largest relief organizations and can marshal vast resources. In the past, the organization has been criticized for allowing its evangelical activities to cross over into its relief work, more so than many of the other church-related organizations. In the early 1980's, World Vision appointed regional disaster officers and began comprehensive disaster preparedness planning for both natural and man-made disasters.

DISASTER RESEARCH

There is a final key group: the disaster research institutions and disaster specialists who provide much of the research and technical assistance that guides the others. Among the research organizations are the Disaster Research Center at Ohio State University, the Natural Hazards Research and Applications information Center at the University of Colorado in Boulder, and the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the Catholic University of Louvain in Brussels. Ohio State has pioneered sociological and behavioral investigations into disasters, the Natural Hazards Workshop has led the field in research on the relationship of natural hazards to the human environment, and the Catholic University of Louvain group, headed by Dr. Michel Lechat, has been the forerunner in the disaster epidemiology.

The international Disaster Institute (IDI) is an organization formed by the merger of the defunct Disaster Research Unit at Bradford University (U.K.) and the London Technical Group, a small nonprofit organization specializing in the medical and health aspects of the disasters. The IDI is striving to become the professional voice of the disaster profession. It publishes Disasters: The International Journal of Disaster Studies and Practice, the major publication dealing with disasters, and provides a forum for the few people who are interested in disasters on a full-time basis.

Mention should also be made of the private consulting firms that specialize in research and technical assistance to governments, and voluntary organizations operational in disasters. They have had a significant impact on disasters by mediating between the research institutions and the operational organizations. Most prominent are the engineering firms that have developed new approaches to building earthquake- and cyclone-resistant structures and organizations such as INTERTECT that provide on-site management and planning assistance.

THE PERSONNEL AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF THE SYSTEM

Perhaps the most important factor in an agency's response to disaster is the quality and level of training of the field staff. An organization's percentage of career and professional staff often depends on its size and its programs in the Third World. Normally, however, the career staff are not the people who actually conduct the relief operation. The career staff are the managers, the specialists at moving aid through diplomatic channels, at planning the overall operation and managing the budgets. The people who actually do the work are rarely full-time members of the organization and almost never professional disaster specialists.

When disaster occurs, a responding organization will normally staff-up in one of two ways. First, the organization already has a development program or a skeleton disaster staff, it will recruit additional persons or seek volunteers to carry out the program. If the organization has no prior experience in the area, it must send a representative there, not only to determine the program, but also to recruit the staff. Generally, fewer than 5 percent of the people involved in disaster relief have ever been involved in such work previously. Even at the managerial level, few program directors or key staff personnel have had prior disaster experience.

In the initial stages, a large portion of the work is carried out by the victims themselves with assistance from volunteers. As a program becomes established, the relief agency will contract a number of persons on a short-term basis to implement the long-term aspects of the program. As each program comes to a close, these volunteers and part-time staff are laid off, and it is highly unlikely that any will ever again be involved in a disaster. As we shall see later, this means that the organization loses its collective memory, which, in turn, affects its ability to learn the lessons of the disaster and incorporate these lessons into its response to the next disaster.

Who, then, are the so-called disaster experts? Generally, they are the upper-managerial level officials and representatives of agencies who go to the disaster scene and initiate a program. However, few of these people started off as volunteers to come up "through the ranks," learning about the operational constraints on a disaster relief program.

Among the few major agencies that do have a professional development program, promotion tends to take them away from the field. Once people do well in the field, they are rewarded by being promoted to a headquarters Job. As people are promoted, they move farther and farther from responsibilities in the field. If the relief and development profession is to improve, we need to reverse this trend.

PROBLEMS WITHIN THE RELIEF SYSTEM

There are a number of major problems common to the relief system and the agencies and organizations within it. As with the influences on the relief system, many are unique and many are a result of the system itself.

Decision Making and Authority

The rules and procedures that govern the fieldwork of relief agencies often hinder or complicate response to disasters.

Decision making at the headquarters level. When agencies respond to disasters in the developing countries, the distances, communications, and transportation difficulties, as well as cultural obstacles, often inhibit effective humanitarian assistance. To be effective in this environment, choices must be made at the field level, and the people making these choices need a supportive, not restrictive, framework of rules, procedures, and policies to assist in this process.

Unfortunately, most organizations attempt to keep a good deal of the decision making at the headquarters level. The first move is usually to try to improve headquarters-field communications. Direct telex links are established; better telephone systems, even radio communications are installed. Next, procedures are revised to try to speed decisions through the headquarters. Stockpiling of supplies, maintaining of computer lists of experts on standby, and many other methods have been (and are being) tried. Yet the results still fall short of the desired response. The basic problem is that revising procedures and improving technology at headquarters does not necessarily improve the field response.

Several organizations working in disasters are seeking alternative approaches. The concepts being explored fall into three categories. The first is called a limited authority approach. The headquarters and local representatives review previous responses and draw up a list of activities that can be handled without consultation with headquarters or that require immediate, on-the-spot decisions that cannot wait for consultation with headquarters. In the first case, the authority to deal with such activities is delegated outright; in the second, policies are developed to provide a framework to guide representatives in making their choices. (This approach is in use today by organizations such as OXFAM and CARE.)

The second approach is called dispatched authority. When an emergency occurs, instead of the representative sending information to the headquarters for action, the headquarters sends a team of specialists to the field with authority to make (most) decisions on the spot. In some cases the team operates under special rules or emergency procedures, but it has been found that with this system few substantial rule changes are required. The ability to make decisions in the field is improved, and response is facilitated. (This approach is used largely by the disaster agencies of governments and by several large volags.)

The third concept is called devolution. Of all the approaches it is the most difficult to put into practice as it requires a fundamental rethinking of the structures necessary to provide relevant management in a Third World environment. Yet this appears to be the most effective structure, and many humanitarian organizations are moving toward this approach. Devolution is the structuring of an organization so that most of the decision making takes place in the affected country. This is accomplished in two ways. First, the headquarters' role is changed from that of decision making to policy making and coordination; and second, the organization is structured so that senior personnel with authority to act, within policy framework and according to the rules of the organization, are placed in offices near the areas where response is required. Among those agencies where this approach has been used (for example, CWS), few changes in the rules were necessary.

This is the background against which decision making should be examined. While procedures can be changed to simplify and speed emergency response within headquarters, overall performance in the field will not be significantly altered as a result.

Donor constraints on gifts. The conflict of authority between donor and agency can be shown in this example: a major donor gives a relief agency funds to conduct a post-disaster medical program. The relief agency asks a medical university to provide volunteers for the assignment. The university agrees, provided that the staff will not be absent for more than sixty days. At the same time, an intergovernmental agency offers to provide additional support and material if the team will work with the staff of one of its existing programs in the affected area. Thus by the time the medical team arrives in the country, virtually all decisions relating to its mission have already been made, and there is little for a field director to do other than to design a program around those decisions. In practice, it is very difficult to reverse these decisions once they have been made, as relief agencies are extremely reluctant to return to donors and ask them to change or modify the conditions placed on their contributions. The problem, however, can be dealt with. Several agencies have realized that the time to influence donors' decisions is prior to the outbreak of a disaster. An agency prepares a guide for donors, outlining the qualifications and policies under which gifts will be received. Donor education is one of the most important aspects to be addressed in improving the performance of the relief system and eliminating the problem of prior constraints.

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Speaker’s Aid (1)

TITLE: "We Can Improve Relief Efforts - If We Try"
AUTHOR: Melissa Wells, UNDRO News, Jan/Feb 1983

SESSION: INTERNATIONAL RELIEF SYSTEM/INTERAGENCY ALLIANCE

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WE CAN IMPROVE RELIEF EFFORTS - IF WE TRY

MELISSA WELLS examines the relief operation in Karamoja, AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN "Exceptional or Complex Disaster."

FEATURE

Let me begin by drawing attention to the words: "complex disasters," exceptional emergencies." These words come straight from paragraphs 9 and 10 of Resolution 36/225,* which was passed during the 1981 General Assembly. These paragraphs also clearly give UNDRO a broadened role in this type of disaster, that is, involving the "complex" or the "exceptional." I personally feel that the passage of this resolution is a very significant achievement in terms of the international community's understanding of disasters as well as the potential for response. There are two very important aspects to this resolution. Allow me to describe them for you.

* See UNDRO News, January 1982.

Before my experience in Uganda I shared the misconception that many people have who have not lived through a disaster situation, namely that these emergencies come along in what you might call "assignable lots." In other words, depending on the nature of the emergency - be it an epidemic, a drought or a population displacement - action can be taken under the mandate of the appropriate UN agency. Well, in many instances it is not that straightforward. In the case of an epidemic, WHO will take action. In the case of movements of peoples across international boundaries, the UNHCR has the clear mandate. But what about displaced people within a country? Say a government has requested assistance for movements of people within the country. There is no recognized point within the UN system to which action can be ascribed for such cases.

Take the Karamoja disaster. The disaster was called a famine. Much of the reporting on Karamoja attributed the famine to climatic conditions. Yet there are many who know Uganda well who will point out that the Karamajong, who as semi-nomads live primarily off their cattle, have survived periodic droughts in the past rather well. When the crops were insufficient during difficult climatic conditions, the Karamajong simply sold some of their cattle in local towns and bought food to tide them over. But in 1979 this was not possible as Uganda's economy had totally collapsed and a marketing and distribution network did no longer exist.

The greatest misery, however, resulted from a unique factor: the looting of the armory in Moroto by the local population when Amin's soldiers tied. It is estimated that 12,000 sub-machine guns and two million round of ammunition simply dispersed among the tribes who had a tradition of raiding each other for cattle...but with spears, arrows and some home-made guns. The escalation of violence with the acquisition of the new weapons was horrendous. As if this were not enough, early in 1980 we had a major outbreak of cholera in the area.

Was the Karamoja disaster a drought? An .epidemic? A war zone? An economic disaster? Was it man-made? Or nature-made? We certainly had large displacements of people but not many of them crossed borders. I hope I have made my point.

So now let me take you back to the recently-passed resolution of the General Assembly, Resolution 36/225. The beauty of this resolution is that it recognizes the complex nature of many disasters and secondly, places the responsibility for mobilizing a UN-system response to this type of situation on UNDRO. Any previous ambiguities in this area have now been clarified by the General Assembly. I consider this an important step forward.

Now let us move on from what we might call "mandates", or assignments of responsibility, to a new topic: "logistics".

I venture that most disasters or emergency situations are first and foremost logistics crisis. In Uganda I had the privilege of working with many people who had participated in some of the major disaster relief operations over the last ten or fifteen years. One of the recurring themes we used to talk about was that time and again the same problem comes up in almost every disaster situation: logistics. The same mistakes are repeated over and over again. And yet their does not seem to be any point within the UN system where an effort is being made to address this question. By logistics, as I use the term here, I refer to communications, transport and distribution.

We are talking essentially about two elements: One is personnel, the other is equipment. Let's talk about personnel first.

In Uganda we ran two distinct relief operations. There was the Karamoja relief operation and one started up subsequently when, in February of 1981., at the request of the Uganda Government, another relief operation was mounted for the West Nile Province. For the relief operation in West Nile we were very fortunate to have a team from the special Swedish unit for disaster relief, following the request of the Government to the Swedish Government. They were there from the start of relief activities for West Nile and stayed for six months. The team included medical and engineering skills, but in particular, a unit that came to manage the logistics of the entire operation.

This unit immediately installed a radio communication network. They managed the fleet of trucks we used on the operation. They maintained the trucks in running order, kept records on fuel used, and on mileage. The unit kept record on all supplies-where they were located, where they were stored, when, where, to whom they were delivered. I may add that they managed the transport and distribution of all supplies for the relief operation, not Just those channel via the UN, but those of the government and of private agencies as well.

The smoothness, the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of that operation were simply remarkable. I am afraid I cannot say the same for the other relief operation in Karamoja. There were several phases of logistics management on the Karamoja operation and it was fraught with problems which only were overcome towards the end of the crisis. In saying this I am not criticizing anyone. If there is any blame. It lies in the fact that we had no-one to turn to give us what we needed in terms of logistics management. As I said, the Swedish unit was committed somewhere else at that time. But within the UN system there was no one who could respond to that need. So we did the best we could. Many of us feel that the lesson to be learned from our Uganda experience is that in a relief operation it is absolutely vital to have one unit with direct operation responsibility for the management of logistics.

The existence of a unit with such a responsibility is first and foremost in the best interests of those who need the help and are suffering, because it makes for more efficient delivery. But such a unit is also in the best interest of the government of the country experiencing the disaster. For example, a complaint frequently heard is that during a relief operation too many makes of vehicles are ordered. Quite often, it doesn't matter which manufacturer you choose, but what you want to avoid is too many varieties of vehicles, because this introduces problems of maintenance, spare parts and so forth. Again, with a professional, integrated approach form the beginning, one is in a better position to say to donors, "we need 'X' number of tires of such-and-such size, and we need the following spare parts..." in order to get existing in-country transport mobilized quickly while waiting for new vehicles to appear. But all this is possible only with a professional assessment on the spot at the beginning of the operation.

I have referred to the Swedish unit that came and worked with us. I am also aware that a number of other countries have already instituted, or else are considering the institution of similar units that can operate in disaster situations. So this indicates that some thinking is going on along these lines. But I also would like to raise the question as to whether a solution should not be found within the UN system. For each agency that works in emergency situations to develop its own logistics unit would create duplication. It would not be, I think, in the best interest of maximizing all our resources. Yet with some imagination and innovation a solution might be devised to the logistics problem. Let me describe an idea that some of us talked about in Uganda.

We had in mind the creation of what you might call a "strike force" of reservists based within the UN system, among the various agencies. You would have volunteers who would agree to serve in a disaster situation at very short notice. These volunteers or reservists would have experience in certain skills: telecommunications, transport management, supply - the various skills required for a logistics management operation.

These volunteers, as I call them, are already functioning in the system. In other words they have been recruited, and are performing functions in their various agencies. But here they would be on a roster, having volunteered to take up duty in a disaster area where they would perform their particular expertise in logistics management. If an effort were made to set up such a system, we would find that a number of agencies not usually associated with emergency operations might be making contributions. Clearly, for radio communications skills, the obvious place to look for this talent (although not exclusively) would be ITU. For such skills as transport management, warehouse control, motor maintenance, access to experienced personnel might come through ILO. I cite ITU and ILO because in Uganda we made very good use of the project personnel of these two agencies. With the agreement of the Government, these people were diverted form their original projects to work on the emergency situation as required. Their areas of expertise encompassed radio communications, driver training, railway management and automotive maintenance.

As an alternative solution to the logistics needs, I think a valid case can be made for an emergency logistics unit to be set up within the World Food Program. Certainly of all the UN agencies, it is the WFP that is most intensively involved in transport problems. Food requirements of varying magnitudes are needed almost in all disaster situations. The WFP is recognized as the co-ordinating agency responsible for moving multilateral food, it is also frequently used by bi-lateral donors to co-ordinate their particular relief shipments to a disaster area. Moving all this food around to reach emergency areas is not a simple task. It is the responsibility of the WFP to deliver the food to the border of the recipient country. In the case of land-locked countries the food is delivered to the border and not simply to the nearest port. But in any event, the transport of the food to the border of the recipient country is at the expense of WFP. In certain exceptional cases, WFO is permitted to pay 50 per cent of the cost of internal distribution of that food.

In the case of Uganda, we qualified for that 50 per cent. But the difficulty was that immediately after the war, and the looting that had taken place (which was when we were faced with the Karamoja famine), the Government was not in a position to come up with its share of 50 per cent. So we had to organize the transport ourselves and find the money to pay for it. It is precisely in circumstances such as these that a valid argument can be made for WFP responding quickly, on its own by instituting its own logistical support unit. In have offered two suggestions on the problem of logistics personnel; but I am sure there must be other possible solutions to this problem. What is Important, however, is that the question be addressed as soon as possible -and on an urgent basis.

Let me say a few words about the other aspect of logistics: equipment. This gets difficult because we are talking about very large sums of money. It is one thing to pre-position medical supplies - this is already being done. The pro-positioning of food has been tried but is more complicated. As far as pre-positioning of vehicles and equipment for logistics support is concerned, I don't think anyone will be able to Implement this. It is just too expensive, too cumbersome. Let me, however, single out one category of equipment which I believe should be an exception, and that is radios. I think it is feasible to set up a stockpile, a readily accessible supply of radios that could be available for Immediate dispatch to a disaster area. I think a logical repository for these radios would be UNDRO. Radios could be made available for a limited period of time for the emergency. They would then be returned and could be re-used. They obviously don't take the kind of beating that vehicles and other equipment take. Radios are a re-usable type of equipment.

As for acquisition of the remaining items used for logistical support -vehicles, tries, spare parts, fuel, tarpaulins, or whatever - this should be determined by that logistics team that I mentioned earlier. Notice that I have not said a word about what we call joint assessment missions. These are missions in which several agencies take part and which then go to the emergency area in order to assess the requirements for food, medical supplies, shelter or other needs. I have not referred to these missions because this aspect of a system response is really rather well-organized within the UN.

What is not organized, and what needs to be addressed, is that when a joint assessment mission goes and lists the requirements, at the same time (in fact as part of that mission, ideally) there should be people who can make a professional assessment of the type of terrain on which the relief operation will be carried out and who can assess what is required in terms of logistical support. When part of that assessment mission goes back and start mobilizing relief supplies, there should be a team left behind to begin working with the government on how to distribute the supplies most efficiently. In certain cases, such a logistical support team may not be required. But the experiences in other disaster areas that colleagues in Uganda shared with me indicates that our difficulties were not unique.

Funding for the logistical support equipment can be dealt with in a number of ways. The Government may have its own resources; a special appeal can be launched; bilateral donors may wish to assist; or one may have to divert resources form development projects. In fact that is what we had to do in Uganda - vehicles in our case. With the permission of the Government, I "hijacked" five trucks form the Ugandan PT & T. They never saw them. As soon as the trucks reached Kampala from Monbasa, I sent them to Karamoja. These trucks were subsequently replaced in a development project.

It is worth saying a few words about emergency procedures. I think it fair to say that over the past few years a good deal of money has been made available to the various UN agencies for emergency use. These funds have been made available by the various governing bodies of the agencies. But the delegation of spending authority must be increased - it must go right down to the field level.

Now this obviously presents problems of accountability and control. But I think that if agencies looked into their emergency procedures, systems could be devised whereby delegation to disburse at the field level could be implemented swiftly as required and we could enhance our relief efforts. Of course, the financial regulations and rules imposed on the system have a long chain of responsibility including auditors and budgetary committees right back to member governments. So the problem of greater spending flexibility in an emergency is not simply one for the agencies.

In one instance, during our relief work in Uganda, a UN agency received a donation of a very substantial investment in transport equipment: approximately three quarters of a million dollars, specifically targeted for the relief operations in Karamoja. As part of the contribution, a consultant was sent to Uganda to assess our transport requirements. Then the donor made available consultants to be there with us when the equipment arrived, in order to get it running. I regret to say that much valuable time was lost - quite literally months, when it should have been weeks - because we were required to follow certain agency purchasing procedures. I am sure these procedures exist for very sound, valid reasons. But we found them totally inadequate for our emergency situation. It is essential that procedures such as these be looked at and reviewed, in order to establish how we can reconcile accountability and other important safeguards with quick purchase and delivery, which are absolutely essential in an emergency.

Any review of administrative procedures in cases of emergency should not be confined solely to procurement. There is also a great need for more flexibility in hiring. Were it not for the fact that staff from several of the voluntary agencies working in Uganda were assigned to our office on a full-time basis, I doubt whether we could have coped. Procedures for hiring locally-qualified people were extremely cumbersome. The recruitment process is headquarters was not producing results. And there you are - you are simply strapped for personnel. This is of course the glory of the voluntary agencies, the NGO's - their flexibility, their ability to move quickly, they don't seem to get tied up in bureaucratic procedures. They are quite truly the first line of action in an emergency operation. I doubt very much that agencies in the. UN system could equal the type of operation flexibility that the NGO's have. The nature of the UN agencies is different. But I think we should introduce greater flexibility into our emergency procedures in order to interact better with the voluntary agencies. This difference in administrative procedure between UN agencies and NGO's is a continuing source of frustration at the field level where you are working in very difficult circumstances.

One way of introducing more flexibility into the hiring process during emergencies is to institutionalize what became an excellent 'ad hoc' arrangement that we worked out with the voluntary agencies in Uganda. I am not suggesting that the UN count on voluntary agencies assigning personnel regularly to UN field offices. Rather, we would permit the voluntary agencies to recruit for us. In other words, if they found qualified people, and we agreed that they were qualified, we could then hire them on a short-term basis. It is important that something be worked out in this area.

Now for a totally new subject: information. A relief operation usually involves several UN agencies and it is important, should there be press interest in the emergency, to give a complete picture of relief activities. I felt the need in Uganda very urgently for the UN to speak with one voice on relief activities - not just to the outside world, the press, but probably even more importantly, to the inside team.

As far as informing the outside World is concerned, I observed tensions that resulted from the fact that some agencies are more gifted, I think that is the best word to use, than others in presenting their case to the public. This issue is a sensitive one within the UN system. But I submit that there are other concerns over-riding agency sensitivity. Quite apart from external information there is a vital need to keep all components of the team working on the disaster adequately informed. Not just the UN agencies involved, but all the voluntary agencies.

You may ask, "Informed of what?" The information to be passed on (in a regular flow) to the whole team, is how this disaster is going to get cleared up, in other words, what is the resource picture? How are supplies to get from A to B? What are the missing resources? This information is available to a limited number of people directly involved in the coordinating aspect of the operation. But they simply don't have the time to keep everybody else informed and get on with their work.

You may ask whether it is important to keep "all the troops" informed. And I would say it is. The most important thing you have going in an emergency situation is morale to do the impossible. This information belt is an essential aspect not only of teamwork but of morale-building when working in difficult circumstances. Nothing short of a professional information officer should be considered for such a post to deal with both the "external" and "internal" information flows.

Let me touch briefly now on the all-important subject of co-ordination. This is addressed explicitly in the General Assembly resolution I mentioned earlier, Resolution 36/225. I am delighted that this is the case because previously there were unclear areas. There were assumptions that so-and-so would act. But it was never clearly spelled out. Now we have a clear plan of action for co-ordination, which is very important. Let me share with you something I witnessed in Uganda.

Relief operations, once they get going, carry a momentum of their own which can greatly benefit the development of that area. When I visited Karamoja in the late spring of 1981, I saw an area that quite literally had been a living hell. This area was now functioning. The seeds had been planted, the early rains at that time had been good, the crops were coming up, the violence had largely subsided, people had been fed, and there were medical facilities around - few and far between, but they were there. Then I was struck by the misfortune of some of the people living further away, around Kampala, desperately poor, who had not known the impact of international emergency assistance. The point is, a relief operation generates a momentum that must not be lost, but carried on into development.

It is essential, therefore, that co-ordination take place within the total development picture of the country. A relief operation does not lead a life of its own. It has its impact on the country; 1t has repercussions far beyond the area in which it is directly working.

Finally, there is the real need for an effort to be made to eliminate bureaucratic obstacles - a more polite term would be technical obstacles. All those who have worked in emergency situations are familiar with the bureaucratic "road blocks" encountered when it comes to border clearances, visas, or trans-shipment of supplies. There is a whole tangled web of administrative procedure that needs to be eased if a relief operation is to take place effectively.

A very interesting study has recently come out, produced by UNITAR, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. It is called Model Rules for Disaster Relief Operations. What this study proposes is the rules - and international code or convention - set up which would cover disaster situations. We know that there are rules covering the protection and assistance given to victims of armed conflict, but nothing similar exists for disaster situations. The draft "model rules" in the study are very comprehensive: they cover communications facilities, packing, documentation requirements, in short, a whole range of administrative obstacles which are hardly controversial but which stand in the way of international humanitarian relief operations. It would be a great help to all future people stricken by disaster, as well as to the many generous men and women who go to their assistance, if an international convention could be drawn up and agreed to.

This is an edited version of a lecture given as part of the 1982 series of UNDRO Lectures.

Melissa Wells was the UNDP Resident Representative in Uganda from September 1979 during the Karamoja disaster - an extremely difficult time for the country, the relief agencies, and the UN system alike. Since March 1982 has worked as adviser to the Assistant Administrator of the UNDP European Office at Geneva.

She joined UNDP after a long career with United States Government, representing her country in a variety of political and economic posts. In the mid-seventies she was Representative (with rank of Ambassador) to the UN's ECOSOC and the UNDP Governing Council.

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Speaker’s Aid (2)

TITLE: Emergency Systems
AUTHOR: Everett Ressler

SESSION: INTERNATIONAL RELIEF SYSTEM/INTERAGENCY ALLIANCE

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EMERGENCY SYSTEMS

NATIONAL SYSTEM

UNICEF SYSTEM

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Community Level





LOCAL GOV'T OFFICES

NGO




LOCAL EMERGENCY OFFICE

SUB - OFFICE


NATIONAL LEVEL







SUPPLY



PROGRAM

LOGISTICS

ADMIN.

OTHER


COORDINATING BODY










EMERGENCY OFFICERS

LINE MINISTRIES







COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVE



UN OFFICES

HEAD OF STATE










COUNTRY OFFICES

EMBASSIES

INTERNATIONAL LEVEL








GENEVA

COPENHAGEN SUPPLY

MHO

WFP

UNDP

etc.


PFD

DIPA

E G T

F P S







SECRETARY GENERAL OFFICE

AID OFF

EMBASSIES







FRONT OFFICE

NGO HQ

UN SECURITY COUNCIL

NAT GOV

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Speaker’s Aid (Reading) (3)

TITLE:

"International Organization and Management Arrangements for Emergency Responses,"

Some Observations and Comments Concerning UNICEF's Participation in Response to Emergencies, Extract


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AUTHOR: Ron Ockwell

SESSION: INTERNATIONAL RELIEF SYSTEM/INTERAGENCY ALLIANCE

Internal organization and management arrangements for emergency responses

22. It is generally agreed that maximum responsibility for decisions concerning both the scale and nature of any UNICEF response to a particular situation should rest in the field, and that any limits and/or repartition of responsibility with HQs (or a regional office) must be very clearly defined at the outset. It has been suggested that even for major, complex emergencies responsibility for operational decisions should be located as close as possible to the theatre of operations and executive staff at HQs take care to avoid becoming involved in operational matters but concentrate on determining policy.

23. It is agreed that responsibility should normally rest with the representative appointed in/to the country concerned, but it has also been noted that abilities and leadership which may be satisfactory for regular program operations may not always be adequate for the demands of major emergency situations and the responses thereto. It must be the responsibility of Regional Directors and senior HQs staff to assess whether this situation prevails and to be prepared to rapidly provide the necessary additional staff capability in support of or, where "necessary, in (temporary) replacement of an incumbent representative or project officer.

24. Even in respect of relatively minor disasters which occur in countries in which UNICEF has only a liaison office, specialist project staff or otherwise weak representation, it is felt that care needs to be taken to immediately define responsibilities and lines of communications between the field offices concerned and HQs, with the efficiency of response and operations as the main criterion rather than what may be normal administrative reporting structures. If it appears that a significant response may be required from UNICEF beyond the capabilities of any resident liaison/project staff in cooperation with other UN agency personnel in-country, appropriate staff should be quickly dispatched/seconded with the necessary ability - and authority - to assess, plan and manage any intervention. Area and Regional Offices should resist the temptation to try to run operations by remote control from a distance, especially to direct actual field operations in circumvention of a local office. Their effort should rather be to support staff in the country concerned whether normally resident or temporarily assigned for the emergency.

25. In situations where UNICEF has no local representation it is noted that UNICEF is dependent, in the first instance at least, on the in-country UNDP resident representative. Depending on the circumstances, it may be sufficient to accept the resident representative's recommendations and also to entrust him with any local implementation; otherwise appropriate UNICEF staff - with authority to take any necessary decision - may need to be dispatched with the minimum possible delay. In some situations - e.g. remote islands - it can also be appropriate for staff from a field office other than the one normally responsible for the territory concerned (but possibly situated closer and/or with better communications) to visit and take responsibility to close coordination with the relevant country/area office.

26. In general it is felt that reports and communications concerning emergency situations and responses should go directly between the UNICEF staff directly responsible in the field and HQs (both NY and OE) with copies to the regional office. In the field this should normally be the country representative or the staff member/team leader specifically assigned for the emergency in the country concerned although, where reliance is placed on the local UNDP office, it might be the responsible UNICEF representative elsewhere.

27. It has been noted that special care needs to be exercised in monitoring (at all levels) the development/deterioration of situations which evolve gradually over time - e.g. those caused by droughts and/or civil strife - and ensuring that decisions on any necessary actions/responses are taken in good time, avoiding series of indecisive missions. Especially in "long-running" situations, care must also be taken to ensure the adequate manning of the relevant field office at all times, including seconding staff to the office from elsewhere to cover periods when key staff members may be absent on leave or for other reasons.

28. It has also been emphasized that, at all levels - the field and HQs - decisions and instructions should be given concerning the priority which is to be accorded to work in respect of the emergency. Locally this must also include defining responsibilities within the office for ongoing regular programme work (which can and should be continued in areas not affected by the emergency) and the designation of a focal point for all operational matters concerning the emergency with special attention to the coordination/organization of logistics and reporting as well as the programming of assistance. This focal point function may be undertaken either by the representative, another resident staff member or, where necessary, by one specifically seconded from elsewhere either individually or as a team leader for the emergency operation. AT HQs' level this must include insuring that the situation receives appropriate priority not only in actions within HQs itself but also in the provision of such (temporary) additional personnel as may be needed: it is stressed that if a situation is deemed to warrant a significant emergency response from UNICEF it also deserves and must receive the services of the best staff available for such work (who may not necessarily hold very senior posts/grades in normal assignments).

29. In respect of "major" emergency operations it is suggested that there is a need for HQs' emergency unit staff to be personally involved and familiar with the situation and any UNICEF operation in the field, and for there to be a focal point within HQs having the necessary experience and status to coordinate and direct actions within HQs in support of field operations - but not to take operational responsibility which must rest in the field. Such a focal point should, however, take care of any political aspects relating to the operation (especially man-made emergencies) and inter-agency coordination at the international level. While recognizing the value and need for HQs' staff to be familiar with the situation, it is also noted that care needs to be taken to restrict the number of visitors to emergency operations, ensuring that all visits do have a valid purpose and interrupt operations as little as possible.

30. It is stressed that the organization must have the mechanisms to move appropriately qualified and experienced personnel quickly into emergency field situations from other locations - HQs, regional or other field offices. It is, however, emphasized that personnel should be selected and assigned for specific, functional assignments and care be taken to ensure that a balanced team of staff (both temporary and normally resident) is created with the necessary mix of abilities required for the particular situation/operation: this should normally include appropriate programming and planning capabilities as well as "operators" and administration/finance support. It has also been noted that the efficiency of operations in the crucial early stages can be considerably enhanced if the members of the "team" are personally familiar with each other. In this connection it is suggested that the "team leader" (whatever his/her title) once designated - by the Executive Director for major operations - should be responsible for choosing the other members to the team (in consultation with other concerned senior staff).

31. Another aspect emphasized - which is greatly dependent on staffing - is the need to establish adequate systems for monitoring, recording and reporting operations from the beginning and to thereby avoid the tendency for ad hoc arrangements to be made and changed as short-term staff rotate.

32. Some feel that the only way to ensure the prompt availability of qualified and experienced staff to move to emergency situations as and when required is to have a number of suitable personnel on permanent stand-by as an emergency team based in HQs. It is suggested that such personnel could be usefully occupied between emergencies in assisting in the organization of preparedness programmes, the evaluation of operations and the training of other staff. Refinement of this concept proposes the need for two distinct teams-one being proficient in English and French, the other in English and Spanish. Others suggest that such specially designated emergency personnel should be assigned to the various regional offices and be available, between emergencies, to assist in regular regional functions as well as emergency-related ones, but not undertaking any functions/commitments which would prevent them moving at very short notice to an emergency situation when required.

33. Other staff express serious reservations about the concept of special "emergency teams" distinct/divorced from normal operations believing, in varying degrees that it is not necessary; that good staff should not and would not be prepared to wait around "fining in time" between emergencies; and, perhaps more importantly, emphasizing the responsibility of staff already assigned in the areas concerned, the need-in assessing situations and planning responses - for combining planning/programming skills together with practical, operational abilities, and the importance of detailed knowledge and understanding of the local social, economic and cultural milieu. Those who hold such views emphasize the need for mechanisms to enable additional staff to be specifically selected and drafted in quickly when necessary for particular situations-through the operation of a roster of suitable and willing staff members in regular assignments, but not the establishment of stand-by "teams" ready to parachute in and take over in all situations.

34. More detailed comments concerning the types of staff which may be required for emergency operations, and arrangements for a roster etc. are reviewed in the section on "personnel".

35. It seems clear that their can be no set formula for all situations but that arrangements are required which will, in the light of the particular circumstances of each emergency, provide the most appropriate blend of abilities and experience, local knowledge and teamwork. Key factors in determining this will be the scale of the emergency and role UNICEF may have to play; the size of the local office and the experience and personal qualities of resident staff; the capacity of the government and other agencies and the nature and adequacy of arrangements for operational coordination both locally and internationally.

Personnel

36. The need for an appropriate combination of skills-within a "team" for major operations-has been emphasized previously. It has been suggested that the following might be the major categories of skills and experience required for many such operations: food/shelter/monitoring; health/water supply; logistics; supply operations; finance and administration; secretariat; and additional specialists as may be required by the situation (e.g. mechanics/technicians; communications; drilling; water treatment). It has, however, also been noted that general programming and planning skills and an empathy for the affected people and country are a vital complement to practical experience and operational abilities, while personality considerations and the ability to work well with others under stress are an absolute necessity.

37. When a number of personnel are required to be "fielded" for any particular assessment or operation it is felt to be important that there should be a specifically designated "team leader" who must have the ability to control and direct together with a sensitivity to personalities and personal relationships-an ability to lead without stifling initiative. Such "leaders of men" must, it is suggested, be cool and congenial, and be selected/appointed irrespective of present grades-but be given temporary grades appropriate to the responsibilities entrusted to them. For major operations it is likely that such a team leader would need the support not only of functional specialists but also of one or more "aids de camp”, young, responsible “^^^^ answers” with energy, ideas and initiative both to undertake the leg-work for the team leader and also to man field out-posts where necessary, always in very close contact with the team leader.

38. Regardless of whether there are or are not any specialist "emergency" staff on permanent stand-by (see previous section on internal organization) it is agreed by all that there is need for a roster of staff who are ready to serve temporary assignments in emergencies. It is, however, emphasized that those on the roster should just not be "volunteers"- although a willingness to undertake emergency assignments is a necessary prerequisite. Staff placed on the roster should, it is suggested, be specifically selected - perhaps by a special panel - on basis of the following criteria:

proven performance in prior emergency situations;

expression of interest in (temporary) service in emergency situations;

experience prior to or during UNICEF service demonstrating good performance under stressful, difficult living and working conditions;

special factors/circumstances such as family responsibilities, language abilities/proficiency, diversification of skills etc.

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 15: Funding

Learning Objectives

1. Be able to identify sources of funds available for emergencies and be familiar with procedures and communication channels for each one.

2. Understand the importance of the premise that needs assessment and planned interventions should precede identification of funding source.

3. Be aware of the importance of accurate and timely donor reporting on use of funds.

4. Understand the time factor in submitting proposals and budget preparation.

5. Understand opportunities of field office with local donor missions, the kind of information which is necessary to maximizing fundraising opportunities and communication requirements.

6. Be aware of linkages with media coverage and how to harness it for fundraising.

Learning Points

1. A solid proposal and a sound reputation for implementing and reporting are a basis for rapid and effective funding of emergency operations, regardless of the source of funds.

2. Funds can come from Emergency Relief Fund (ERF), regular programme, unsolicited supplementary contributions, appeals, committees. They can be tied, untied, cash or kind. Each source has its peculiar requirements and these should be spelled out and understood.

3. Where bilateral contributions are concerned, familiarity with donor preferences for relief vs. rehabilitation or water vs. health is always useful. On this point, an ongoing relation with the donor at the field level is important however reporting and transparency are implied and HQ must be kept informed at all times.

4. In-house sources of funds and procedures for obtaining/spending them:

- diversion of up to $25,000 by representative
- programme amendments
- Emergency Reserve Fund
- Replenishment vs. adoption of funds

5. When donations in kind are being considered, strict respect of the guidelines is highly recommended. Some key issues include:

- field office requests item and the specifications are appropriate
- donor pays freight and inland transport
- Copenhagen certifies for quality control

6. There is a procedural sequence in terms of funds being solicited, pledged, confirmed, received, committed and expended. If this sequence, which may be cumbersome, is interrupted or delayed, problems arise which cause even more delays. UNICEF will not authorize expenditure unless:

(a) the money has been credited to our account
(b) the field has provided project codes to reflect the programme for the expenditure.

7. Both the public and governments are affected by the media at their level of sympathy/charity or sense of obligation to a certain problem. For this reason fundraising efforts should complement/build on media initiatives -similarly, media coverage should be engineered to some extent to promote fundraising.

8. National Committees have a special role and flexibility which ought to be included in planning of fundraising efforts. They have influence at grass roots level with the public and also with business and governments.

Learning Methods

1. Lecture
2. Prepare a budget in groups for different scales of operation ($50,000, $200,000, $1,000.000)
3. Walk through format for reporting based on PRO 93 issued for reporting, and EXD 2895.

Required Reading

1. UNICEF Policies and Procedures Manual - Emergency Book E, Chapter 2

Supplementary Reading

1. PRO 93 and EXD 2895

Speakers' Preparation Aids

1. Transparency: The Resource Flow System for UNICEF Emergency Assistance
2. Gullmar Andersson: Fund-raising


Speaker’s Aid
9 June 1987

SESSION 15: FUND RAISING
Gullmar Andersson

1. Emergency Manager Role

Attention to fund raising is an essential part of the job.

2. Source of emergency funds

A. In-house:

1. Diversion of up to $25,000 by representatives.

2. Reprogramming, i.e. amending current programming (with HQ and governments approval) and diverting supplies.

3. ERF (Emergency Reserve Fund): a total of $3 million per year, released on approval by Executive Director.

B. Appeals:

1. Specific purpose contributions made by Executive Director as is part of approval by Secretary-General Project, Board approval not required.

2. Noted projects (usual procedure).

3. Special Board allocations (rarely happens).

3. Some field attitudes

A. Too much bother: but remember, no money no programme - funds must be obtained.
B. Holding sane funds in reserve: donors do not like it - funds must be spent.

4. Operating points

A. Project documentation: essential to show objectives, actions to achieve item, and number of people affected - by telex if necessary (see Handbook).

B. Contacts (within country) : should be prepared by having established contacts with embassies and bilaterals, share project proposals with then (best chances of getting funds toward the end of their financial year).

C. PFO and GEHQ: send them projects but also keep them fully informed of donors local representatives who are premising.

D. Contacts (outside country): leave to PFO/GEHQ as far as possible.

5. Donor reports

A. It is very important to provide reports to donors suggestions from the floor to reduce the workload were:

1. Generic reports with specific utilization reports should be sent to donors (though apparently sane refuse to accept this system).

2. Provide donors with SITREPS containing fund receipts and expenditure information.

3. PFO should actively address donors to pursuade then to accept simplified reporting procedures for emergency projects.

B. Special Report Officer: advocates for all significant emergency operations.

6. Miscellaneous points

A. Definitions of "Emergency": donors use various definitions, often excluding rehabilitation.

B. Overheads costs: Vary enormously between projects/offices so a flat % not realistic, but should include additional overhead expenditure items in emergency projects. (Where does the 6% go?)

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 16: Key Operating Procedures

KEY OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR EMERGENCIES (Field Office Operations)

Objectives

1. Understand that in general, normal operating procedures provide basis for running emergency operations so that familiarity with them is key to running successful emergency operations.

2. Be familiar with the exceptions which do exist in procedures for staffing, managing funds, handling communications for emergencies, know the rules, formats and checklists for above and be able to apply them.

3. Be familiar with UN security regulations as presented in the security handbook, but also be aware of their constraints and limitations and of other measures which can be taken to minimize risks and hardship.

4. Be aware of preparedness measures in an office which can and should be taken prior to onset of crises, particularly in disaster prone areas.

Learning Points Staffing

1. When you plan an intervention, take into consideration personnel required to implement and monitor in terms of numbers, responsibilities, duration of requirement and budget.

Then you have two options:

(a) see that these are met, or
(b) alter the plans.

2. Some alternatives for meeting staff requirements -

(a) Diversion of existing staff
(b) Borrow from NGO or government or bilateral
(c) Second from another UN agency
(d) Recruit locally
(e) Divert from another UNICEF office of HQ
(f) Recruit internationally
(g) Consultancies local or international

3. Restructuring the organization chart is important both to ongoing programme, the emergency and to phasing out.

(a) Ensure close linkages with permanent ongoing information, supply, admin, shipping and transport section.

(b) In most cases the representative should be senior reporting officer with direct link to senior emergency programme officer.

(c) Determine appropriate balance between independence and integration to assure optimum implementation and minimum disruption of ongoing operations (depending obviously on natural linkages).

(d) Make sure job descriptions, reporting lines are clear for all concerned.

(e) Consider the value of regular section chief or task force meetings to keep office briefed on

4. Do not be afraid to ask HQ for help in identifying needed expertise before it is too late.

5. Procedures are outlined in annexes in Handbook for creating posts, recruiting short-term opening, sub-office, drawing up job descriptions and communicating the appropriate information to HQ. In general, documentation is the same in normal and emergency situations.

6. Staff in emergencies are exposed to and sometimes severely affected by extended exposure to stress either from overwork, security and basic frustration. Always be sensitive to early warning signs of worker stress even if staff member himself does not acknowledge a problem. Consider the options including:

- regular R & R
- staff rotation
- hardship allowance
- good briefing for new comers
- good communication among staff

MANAGING FUNDS

1. Referring to the session on funding, review the basic administrative documentation associated with ERF, diversions, unsolicited contributions and appeal funds.

2. Close monitoring of funds raised, committed and specs is essential for flexible operations as well as for accountable reporting. Existing monitoring systems are ideal and must be kept up-to-date. In the midst of chaos, if this is not possible, other measures may be utilized including the paper trail of sitreps.

3. Ensure adequate cash reserves in the office in local and foreign currency in case banks close.

4. Make sure 2 or 3 staff members are conversant with the above and the emergency handbook.

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Review the format, use ahd benefit of sitreps as a comprehensive document for action, follow-up and de facto monitoring.

2. In disaster prone areas, a preliminary inventory and possible upgrading of communication channels are advisable. This can include radios, radio telephones, ham radio operators, embassies with satellite communications, the military, public radio, the BBC, etc. (The value of monitoring BBC should not be underestimated.) The technical difficulties can be explored in advance.

3. Communication channels need to be assessed at various levels, between, UNICEF staff among UN agencies with other internationals with the military externally with neighbouring countries with HQ.

SECURITY

1. The UN security handbook describes the overall UN security system and how it functions, particularly for international staff (Phase I through V). It fails to address a number of issues and of course does not have all the answers. Personalities, circumstances, often seem to override, nevertheless, the authority of the designated official is absolute and this must be kept in mind at all times. Make sure all staff are briefed.

2. Review checklist for preparedness of office premises and staff.

3. Since security plans rarely materialize the importance of independent, rational and creative decision making.

4. Involving local staff is essential to having access to updated information.

5. In anticipation of crisis, maintenance of an informed network of contacts is extremely valuable. This includes local staff, local merchants, counterparts, neighbours, local and foreign press, diplomats. Members of the press. In particular, tend to have the most up to date information, hence an established rapport is important in a crisis.

Possible Learning Methods

1. Lecture

2. Case study of Lebanon: Analysis of the emergency operation in Lebanon as it related to above issues of staffing, managing funds, communication and security. You may select another case study from your own experience.

3. Group discussion - Identify three realistic preparedness initiatives as relevant to your own country situation.

4. Overheads for BAL amendments and checklists to illustrate points under "managing funds".

Required Reading

1. Handbook:

Chapters on Field Office Operations
Annex - Sitrep format
Annex - Job description/creating post
Annex - Opening a sub-office

2. Role of Emergency Operations Unit (EMOPS)

Supplementary Reading

1. "Children in Armed Conflict Situations", discussion papers for MENA Regional Staff meeting (November 1986. Cairo)

Speakers' Preparation Aids

1. Format for a Sitrep (1)
2. UN Security Handbook
3. BALs and Project Summary examples (2)
4. Lebanon case study with map (3)
5. Comments on UNICEF Staff Security: Gullmar Anderson (4)

FORMAT FOR SITREP 01

(Prepare the telex in the following format, including the headings shown (PRIMO - NATURE AND.... etc.) and presenting the points under each heading as paragraphs AAA), BBB), etc. Leave a blank line after each heading and between each paragraph.)

To: NYHQs; GEHQs; Regional Office

FOR (..director/EOU..)/(..chief programme desk)
INFO (..emergency officer/GEHQs..)/(..Regional Director..)

PRIMO - NATURE AND IMPACT OF EVENTS

· The nature of the situation, its rimary cause and any immediate secondary effects. The date, time and location.

- The geographic area affected and the estimated total population thereof.

· The general-social & economic impact, and particular effects on children. Quote the sources of any official or other reports.

· The reported numbers of dead, injured, hospitalized, and the proportion of the population believed to be affected in specific ways.

· The projected evolution of the situation, including any possible secondary effects (e.g. further flooding or population movements).

SECUNDO - SECTORAL ASSESSMENTS

Brief summary of the main findings of assessment (to date) in terms appropriate to the situation, possibly as follows:

AAA) Food supplies and nutrition
BBB) Health
CCC) Water and sanitation
DDD) Shelter and household needs
EEE) Special child problems

TERTIO - ACTIONS TAKEN AND PLANNED BY GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS

· The financial and organizational capacity of the government to cope. Whether an official request made for international assistance.

· Actions already taken and/or planned by the government and others. Any needs remaining unmet.

· The mechanisms that exist for coordination between concerned agencies and with the government.


QUARTO - UNICEF ACTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
· Whether any UNICEF staff member has visited the area and/or been temporarily assigned there.

· What immediate relief, if any, has been arranged within the representative's own discretion: how distributed/used.

· What, if any, further UNICEF action/assistance is proposed:

- Specific nature of action/assistance;
- Estimated cost;
- Operational means of implementation;
- Time frame/schedule;
- Suggested method of financing;
- Relationship to regular UNICEF programme.

· Whether any further assistance from UNICEF might be proposed later.

QUINTO - ORGANIZATIONAL AND OTHER ASPECTS

· Any security problems for UN/UNICEF personnel.
· Whether any additional staff support is needed: If so, what and when.
· Any other matters of internal-UNICEF management and organization.
· What documents and other materials are being sent (by pouch, mail, courrier).

When" next Sitrep (02) will be issued.


REGARDS (Signature)

FORMAT FOR SITREPS 02, 03, etc.

(Address as for SITREP 01, Annex 37. Include the following aspects, as appropriate, in the order presented here:

PRIMO - NEW DATA

· Particular events, developments or new information since the last report.

SECUNDO - PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS

· Progress and problems in implementation of each programme activity of concern to UNICEF since the last report; mention specifically programme components supported by particular donor contributions.

· Any changes in previously announced plans/intentions, with reasons.


TERTIO - FINANCIAL POSITION

· CFs & POs issued, and expenditures incurred since last sitrep. Balance of funds uncommitted.

QUARTO - NEW PROPOSALS

· Any proposals for new/additional UNICEF assistance:

- Specific nature of action/assistance;
- Estimated cost;
- Operational means of implementation;
- Time frame/schedule;
- Suggested method of financing.
- Relationship to current efforts of UNICEF and others.

QUINTO - INTERNAL UNICEF MATTERS

· Changes in the security situation for UN/UNICEF personnel.
· Personnel movements since last report: present disposition of involved staff.
· Specific problems/questions/needs in matters of supply, finance, personnel, administration.

SEXTO - MISCELLANEOUS

· Particular human interest stories (useful for public information and fund raising purposes).
· Any notable visits/contacts with journalists and other visitors.
· What documents, etc. are being sent.
· When next sitrep will be issued.

REGARDS (Signature)

Differences between the Old and New
"Major Field" Codes, With Explanations

New Code

Major Field or Theme

Remarks

M

Emergency

An Emergency section would not normally be in a country programme BAL when it is initially drawn up. But when UNICEF decides to provide emergency assistance, an Emergency section would be created (with an additional project number "M ---) -

(1) through an amendment to the G BAL (with additional funds from the Executive Director's reserve), or
(2) through a revision to the G BAL (by reshuffling programme commitments), or
(3) by creating or amending an S BAL if special contributions become available for that emergency.

It is important that no call-forwards be made under the normal projects (in the H, N, etc. fields) for assistance which is truly of emergency nature, but that an "M -- " project be created, without which it would be difficult to monitor.

3

Rehabilitation

Care should be exercised in determining what sorts of activity and assistance are truly of emergency nature - usually of short duration, and what follow-up activities should be classified as rehabilitation, frequently of longer duration.

BASIC ASSISTANCE LIST


Project Summary Sheet


Project Summary Sheet


Project Summary Sheet


CASH CALL FORWARD

BASIC ASSISTANCE LIST


Project Summary Sheet


Project Summary Sheet


Project Summary Sheet


SUPPLY CALL - FORWARD (SCF)

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Perspectives on Lebanon
AUTHOR: Moira Hart

SESSION: KEY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES FOR EMERGENCIES

***

PERSPECTIVES ON LEBANON

BACKGROUND

UNICEF, having an established regional office in Beirut Lebanon since the fifties, found itself located in one of the strategic foci of regional hostilities since the outbreak of civil war in 1976.

The country itself, fell effectively outside the mandated criteria for development in terms of health status (unconfirmed) economic indicators (regular program $75,000). As such, the development interventions were proportionality limited both in view of need as well as magnitude, given a population of less than 3 million and covering only 10,000 sq. km. in area.

Nevertheless, the tragedy of strife for deprived communities and vulnerable groups within them, called for the sending of an assessment mission in 1976, as re-entry following evacuation of al missions in 1976. After which we began working in relief with ICRC, food, children clothing - drugs, blankets, shelter materials

Other than the establishment of a UN observes force in Lebanon, UNICEF was the first UN civilian agency to undertake such an initiative and found itself obliged to respond to the unmet needs, of the general population rather than its traditional target group - children and mothers.

Initial Assessment

The combined effects of conflict i.e. (a) displacement (b) administrative -deterioration (c) economic decay (d) widespread physical and functional breakdown in essential government services. Health facilities, schools and water supply required initially, major rehabilitation in terms of structure and equipment.

In view of a significant financial input from special contributions, the government of Lebanon requested UNICEF to implement a fairly extensive program to address this task. This was augmented later from Arab sources and later a major donor conference.

MANDATE

This responded to organizational mandate for rehabilitation phase of emergencies.

(a) restoration of essential services for survival healthy development of children.

(b) In enhancing family capacity to care for children.

(c) facilitate the capacity of the community to return to normal life

(d) provide opportunity for self-help and revitalize local economy

(e) responding in geographic area, where government lacked capacity/and access

(f) Complementing the UN response of military/peace keeping intervention with humanitarian response as well as mobilizing UNICEF resources for civilian needs.

PROJECT PLANNING

With 60 mm Lebanese pounds, from a relatively strong government counterpart plus substantial support from donors and UNICEF, a project was set up with a detailed workplan a set of implementing arrangements with CDR the Council for Development and reconstruction to be undertaken from 1980-1985. The operation was staffed with the chief in Beirut and operational HQ in Qana - South Lebanon. This structure was separate from but reporting to Regional Director and the Emergency Unit in HQ.

OBJECTIVES

Implicit in the implementing arrangements was the idea of maximizing local staff recruitment (expertise available) and employing local economy. Projects were planned, executed in turn key fashion. The counterpart relationship with CDR forward, an ultimate hand over and phasing out of such activities at such time as the over situation allowed.

RELIEF ACTIVITIES

Over the 9 year period of intervention to date, major outbreaks of fighting have resulted in emergency relief needs over the average and above rehabilitation to which the humanitarian community both national and international have responded. UNICEF, without exception mobilized available staff and funds in areas of competence to provide

(a) emergency water supplies & pipe repair in densely populated urban areas hit directly by fighting and then to large populations of displaced persons in temporary urban settings.

(b) medical supplies when called for

(c) relief supplies for displaced persons

All of the above capitalized on established capacity as well as accessibility generated by ongoing presence of knowledge of the complexities of the gee/political environment.

CONSTRAINTS/OPPORTUNITIES

It became evident over the period that ongoing assessment and modifications in the response was required.

With successive events, geographic areas were affected and hence the affected population grew, became displaced and infrastructural repairs became necessary in North of the Litani. The area of preparation expanded to Beirut in 82 after the Israeli invasion and as far north as Tripoli with other conflicts between domestic regional groups. In all cases, very favorable donor response enabled expansion and extension of operations.

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Clearly, security, mobility, political acceptability (neutrality) affected capacity to implement both negatively and positively. However, a sensitive informed flexible management approach facilitated greatly as cumulative experience and understanding. Despite 5 international staff evacuations and a period of 1 year of being cut off from South Lebanon, by road, the project continued uninterrupted. With a total of 900 projects implemented over a 5 year period, clearly systems for planning monitoring operations evolved. Successful application of word processing systems to administrative as well as operational decisions greatly facilitated. The progress report divided sectionally and provided an invaluable tool for ongoing monitoring, reporting and revising of plans.

PUBLIC RELATIONS/DONORS RELATIONS

The attention of the press, the waning interest of the international community resulted in sporadic injection of funds. Nearing the end of the period being discussed, many local bilateral missions having blocked funds, unwilling to implement through government, supported UNICEF's work.

WHAT WAS DONE?

Project type: Repair/Restore/Equipment government services in:

Water
Education
Health
Community Self-Help

WHY?

WHAT WAS PLANNED AND NOT DONE?

WHY NOT?

***

Speaker’s Aid

TITLE: Comments on UNICEF Staff Security
AUTHOR: Gullmar Andersson

SESSION: KEY OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR EMERGENCIES

***

COMMENTS ON UNICEF STAFF SECURITY

By J. Gullmar Andersson

UN security plan

I believe there exists a UN security plan in all countries where a Designated Official of the United Nations is established. This plan contains more or less all aspects of what to do and what not to do in emergency situations. The problem with this type of detailed planning regarding evacuation and so on is that it is very rarely implementable in full if a chacotic situation develops. In all situations where I have been involved with evacuation of dependents or staff with clearly developed security plans, it has not been possible to fulfill and one has to improvise to carry out the evacuation of staff.

On the other hand one can still extract very useful information from the plan itself and how to enable the precaution and safe-guarding of staff in emergency situations.

Office security

Especially in civil disturbances UN offices can attract various sources of actions such as demonstrations, bombs or other actions by groups of population. It is therefore important that the control of visitors to the office be very strict. This can be done by creating a reception that screens all visitors.

I have found it very useful in cases of demonstration of which the United Nations had been informed in advance to try to meet with the organizers such a demonstration to go out of hand. Still, I must point out that it is very often a risky business to meet the demonstrators if they are in large groups and it can be of use to rather receive a smaller delegation in your office than meet the whole group of demonstrators outside. It is even more dangerous to not to meet with demonstrators, so a very diplomatic approach is recommended.

In situations of civil unrest in a country I would urge all heads of offices to be outmost flexible with regard to working hours. To safeguard staff traveling from their home to the office it can be useful to let them stay at home in the morning until they have heard the morning news on local radio stations to enable them to find a safe route to the office. The same applies to letting staff go home early to avoid traveling in darkness if the situation so requires.

Senior staff of the office should, if there are indications of possible kidnapping, be permitted to use flexible working hours so that they can every day travel at different times and use different routes to avoid a possible ambush.

An emergency stock of tinned food and drinks should always be kept in the office to facilitate a stay over in the office for several days if necessary. If the office space permits it is also very useful to stock blankets and camp beds.

To prevent splinters from windows in cases of explosions there are now on the market both transparent plastic films to cover windows or curtains that absorb glass splinters. The plastic film was used very successfully in Beirut.

In times of unrest the Chief of the office should decide on all trips staff wish to take outside the office in their line of duty. As a general rule, keep trips to the minimum.

Security at home

The security plan normally spells out that one should stock tinned food, drinks, candles, operating transistor radios, store water, etc. In addition, have all travel documents and some cash at hand.

In my opinion, the most important issue regarding security at home is discipline. Staff members and dependents should always inform each other where they are going, with what means and when they are expected to return home. The planned schedules should be strictly adhered to. The same applies for advice given by Designated Official, Chief Warden or Wardens. One should always keep in mind that acting against instructions and ending up in a dangerous situation often means that somebody else will have to take risks to save you.

A common problem is when fighting suddenly erupts and children are at school. It might be impossible to bring them back home. Parents should always discuss what arrangements have been made by the school to meet this type of emergency. Normally the school would keep students until fighting has died down and children can be collected. But it is always useful to find out exactly what arrangements have been made in advance of any emergency.

It is always useful to reinforce doors and windows in your house or flat. A most useful protection is a "peep-hole" in the door to check on who is calling on you. As a general rule, never open the door to anybody you don't know or expect.

A big dog is also a method of improving your protection at home.

Communications

Communications in emergency situations are very important. A complicating factor is that in fighting situations telephone and electricity are often cut off. Therefore a radio network is very important and should exist in all duty stations.

A problem with a radio network is that batteries need to be charged and that is often forgotten and subsequently the walkie-talkie is not functioning when needed.

It is important to maintain fixed hours for transmissions as otherwise it is more or less impossible to reach everybody with a message.

National staff

The rules governing the United Nations responsibility are unclear and in many instances subject to interpretation. It frequently happens that ad hoc measures have to be adopted for later clearance with the Headquarters. Some measures made in Lebanon, and not strictly "according to the book" proved successful:

a - Permit staff to remain at home during periods of heavy fighting although staff would be able to reach the office (the idea behind is that it is of little use to have staff sitting in the office, worrying about their families and producing very little).

b - Establish a "skeleton" staff group that, either are living close to the office, or are volunteers to come to the office even in the most difficult situations.

c - Remove national staff and their families (if their home is in a "hot" area) to a hotel or another accommodation outside the area of fighting. This is an expensive but effective method to protect national staff and their families.

In accordance with the United Nations rules, the office should always keep an up-to-date list of all national staff, their dependents and home addresses.

In agreement with the Designated Official, the head of the office may give national staff up to two months salary in advance and, if needed, a special grant to remove themselves to a safe area.

Still, in my opinion, much more could be done to protect and assist national staff as they, in many instances, are in a much more dangerous situation that the expatriates.

Transport

Transport is another crucial issue. In war situations, law and order break down, there are fuel shortages and public transport systems cease to operate.

Vehicles are therefore very attractive for thefts or hijacking, both by fighting parties and common criminals. The more "attractive" vehicle, the greater risk.

Vehicles that can be used for military purposes should be avoided to the extent possible (Landrovers, Toyota Landcruisers, VW combis, etc...). The rule should be: "the smaller the car, the better it is."

It is very useful to have at least some vehicles equipped with radio transceivers linked to the UN security net. Although it increases the risk of theft/hijacking, it is a great advantage to have instant contact if there are difficulties.

If serious trouple is expected, always keep fuel tanks filled up and establish a fuel reserve. This is particularly important if a planned evacuation is going to be carried out by car.

In some situations the risk of cars being "booby-trapped" exists. It is important that staff who drive cars have at least an elementary training in how to detect explosives in the car. Several different devices exist in the world today for quick search and detection of explosives in cars.

If the situation in the country is friendly towards the United Nations, it may be useful to waive the rule one can carry a UN flag on the car and let all official cars carry the UN flag.

It goes without saying that all cars should be equipped with First-Aid-Kit ("heavy-duty," not the normal type) and fire-extinguisher. It may be useful to equip staff, moving in particular "hot" areas with bullet-proof vests and possibly helmets.

Movements

Another rule which should be observed in times of disturbances is "the less you move, the less exposure to fighting you have." There are evidences of UN officials who have not had a situation under full control and who started moving staff to assembled areas in the midst of fighting. This should never be done. Staff are safer if they are in the office or at home and the movement should be postponed until the end of fighting.

Staff relations

In cases of civil disturbances, some staff members may not be able to cope with the situation and would like to leave the country immediately. It is my firm belief that such staff members should be evacuated in the shortest time possible to avoid a damage to their health and almost always, a very nervous staff member kept in a country more or less against his will is a danger both to himself and to his colleagues.

Rest and recuperation

To work and live in a war situation is to exist in an extreme stressful condition.

UN rules have very small provisions to assist staff in this regard. When other agencies, more specialized in working under war conditions, rarely keep staff in such situations more than three months, after which a proper "de-briefing" is carried out, the United Nations tend to look at the problem more in line with "accelerated home leave." This is far from being enough in prolonged war situations. The Head of the office has a great responsibility in closely observing the staff to detect when stress is reaching a too high toll and in doing whatever can be done to get the staff member out of the war zone so he can have some rest and recuperation.

This is also an issue for the G.S.A. to discuss and which hopefully will lead to more generous conditions for UN staff in war situations.

Relations with Governments/fighting groups

In a war between two countries, normal relations with the governments can be maintained. This is more difficult in a civil war situation. It is on one hand very difficult to implement projects without contact with all sides in the conflict. In some instances, it may be possible to obtain at least the tacit agreement of the government to have informal contact with opposing sides.

It is in all situations a very sensitive issue which requires a lot of "diplomatic skills." The danger is always to end up being identified with one side in a conflict which makes the other side looking at UNICEF as the enemy.

Threats

Frequently, in war situations, threats are given to either the UN office or to individual staff members. All threats should initially be taken seriously. It is better to be too careful than the other way around. When a threat has been received, always try to eliminate the risks (evacuate staff members, close office, etc.) and at the same time quietly investigate, through contacts, the seriousness of the threat.

LAST BUT PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ADVICE ONE CAN GIVE TO STAFF WORKING IN A WAR SITUATION,

DON'T BE A HERO!

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 17: Applications of Emergency Manual and Handbook

Learning Objectives

- To demonstrate the usefulness and limitations of the Emergency Field Manual and Handbook in addressing policy and operational issues of emergency operations.

- To enable participants to understand the process of making decisions in the absence of clear or detailed guidelines in the Manual and Handbook.

- To list recommendations and suggestions for the improvement of the above documents.

Learning Methods

- Introduce subject and explain the objectives of the exercise below.

- Divide participants into four groups to answer the following questions (two questions per group) and then report to plenary with their findings.

- The session moderator should highlight the points of agreement/disagreement and suggestions made as regards the manual and handbook.

Questions

1. Does the Field Manual give sufficient "incentives" to the UNICEF country office to develop and/or follow-up with the parties concerned an early warning contingency system to prevent and/or limit the effects on children and mothers of possible emergencies.

If yes, please indicate where and your interpretation.

2. Let us suppose that a medium size emergency (i.e. 50,000 severely affected children and mothers) has developed suddenly and requires immediate action within 48 hours, e.e. local purchase of materials for a value of US$ 100,000. It is not possible to divert materials from regular programmes.

Would the Country office be in a position to respond to such need in time?

If yes, how? Does the Field Manual indicate how?

3. A larger size emergency (i.e. 250,000 severely affected children and mothers) has developed. Neither UNDP/UNDRO/WFP/RED CROSS have shown much concern about it and it is not well known outside the Country. However, the Government made an unofficial request to UNICEF for assistance amounting to US$ 500,000 for some materials and expertise not available within the Country Office/Government. The lead time for response is four weeks and the Emergency Reserve Fund is not in a position to release more than US$ 75,000.

How does the Field Manual address this issue?

4. The Country Office is fully engaged in regular immunization and ORT programmes with Government to save a substantial number of lives which have been estimated at 20,000 (for immunization) and 75,000 (for diarrhoea) each year.

With only three Programme Officers, little else can be done by UNICEF. An emergency has developed suddenly in one area threatening the lives of 10,000 children and mothers "only" and requiring UNICEF intervention in Water and Sanitation and Child Feeding Programme for a period of six months followed by a rehabilitation programme. Other agencies have not shown much interest. The starting of operation is expected within 15 days by the Government.

5. A particular Country has been affected by civil war for more than ten years. Between 500,000 and 1,000,000 people are continuing to be severely affected. A substantial percentage are women and children. Rehabilitation is partially successful. What is needed is mostly relief type of operation to keep people alive. Donors and other agencies are tired of this endless emergency and noted funds are only meeting 20 per cent of UNICEF requirements for the activities it supports

How does the Field Manual answer this problem?

6. For quite a few years now, UNICEF HQ emphasized Child Survival in Silent Emergencies and seems to have toned down Child Survival in loud Emergencies.

Is the Field Manual sufficiently clear as to what are the priorities?

7. The Field Manual mentioned UNDRO as a specialized Agency for Disasters. Following your opinion, is UNDRO capable to play its role of co-ordinator and, if not, what should be its role?

8. Are there other aspects of the Field Manual on Emergency that you would like to be clarified/amended?

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Session 18: Training of Trainers

Learning Objectives

To enable participants to acquire basic skills in planning and conducting "mini workshops" in emergency operations for staff in their offices. By the end of the session, the participants should be able to:

- adapt the general objectives of the workshop and the objectives of individual sessions to meet the training needs in their offices.

- differentiate between various training methods and in what situation they can be best used.

- select and or condense lesson plans from the training package for their training "event".

- list necessary administrative steps for planning and organizing a training event.

Learning points

1. General introduction to training: definition, need for training, alternatives to training.

2. Identification of emergency training needs in country offices: who needs to be trained, why, when and how.

3. Curriculum: what should the curriculum include:

a) Objectives of the course and content outline

b) The general methods which will be used to train the staff members in order to reach the above objectives

c) Timetable

d) The methods to be used to evaluate the course

4. Lesson plans: what they are, why they are needed, how to adapt the existing lesson plans of this workshop for use in the training or sharing the information with other staff in the country office.

5. Introduction to teaching/learning methods:

- What are the teaching methods and how to select the most appropriate one
- Learning principles: How do adults learn best
- Teaching techniques: Role of the trainer, presentation skills, use of audiovisual aids

6. Setting and maintaining a learning climate: venue, timing, comfort, facilities, seating arrangements, providing refreshments, avoid participants' resistance, etc.

7. Evaluation of training:

- Purpose of evaluation
- What to evaluate
- Instruments of evaluation

8. Administrative steps in planning and organizing a training event.

Possible Learning Methods

Lecture, video, group exercises

- Introduce topic by discussing general and specific objectives of session (use transparency).

- Divide participants into three groups and ask them to discuss and report to the plenary on the following topic:

"In your view, who in your office needs to be trained/briefed on emergency management issues? Why?" Discuss group reports in plenary.

- Show video "Meetings, Bloody Meetings". Ask participants referring to the video, to identify causes/problems that may contribute to the failure or success of a training programme. Conclude this segment by highlighting the essential steps in planning and conducting a workshop/training event.

- Ask participants (in plenary or groups) to reflect on the previous sessions of the Emergency Workshop and list the training methodologies used in various sessions and which was more effective and why. Complement the participants' findings by listing other training methodologies and their recommended use.

- Using overhead transparencies, discuss the use of audio-visual materials as an effective learning aid giving examples from previous sessions. Ask participants to prepare lesson plans for a topic of their choice (preferably dealing with an emergency issue) and evaluate the results.

- Discuss administrative and financial aspects of planning and organizing a training event.

Note

In specifying needs, developing objectives and selecting training methodologies, always refer to various sessions of the workshops and use them as examples.

Required Reading

- How to Organize and Run Training Workshops: A UNICEF Training Guide (Prepared by the Training Section, December 1987).

Supplementary Reading

- "Designing Training Programmes: Guidebook for the Training of Organizers", UNESCO, 1987.

Speakers' Preparation Aids

How to Organize and Run Training Workshops: A UNICEF Training Guide (Prepared by the Training Section, December 1987).

UNICEF, "Group Discussions - A Handbook," William Cousins

DAILY EVALUATION FORM

Day _______________
Session ____________

1. In your view, what were the key points learned in this session?

2. Comment on the application of these within UNICEF and your situation.

3. Suggest any additional critical points that should have been covered.

4. Do you have comments on the suggested reading?

Suggest any additional information sources for sessions of the day.
Texts:
Persons:
Case Studies:
Film:
Other:

5. Comment on the learning methodology (lectures, group work, films) used in the session.

Transparencies


OF 38 SHEETS

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

SELECTED TRANSPARENCIES SPEAKERS' AIDS

UNICEF TRAINING PACKAGE


Figure 1-1: DISASTER SPECTRUM


DISASTER CONTINUUM

Table 3-A

POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSESSMENT TEAMS (BY DISASTER TYPE)


Part I General Assessments

Disaster Type

DAST

Designated Specialists

Local Staff

Key Man

Two Person Teams

Earthquake

good

good

good

poor

fair

Windstorm

good

good

good

poor

fair

Rood

good

good

good

good

good

Drought

good

good

fair

poor

fair

Famine

good

good

fair

poor

fair

Part II Sector Assessments (when critical sector is affected)

Sector

DAST

Designated Specialists

Local Staff

Key Man

Two Person Teams

Housing

good

good

fair

good

good

Lifelines

fair

good

good

fair

fair

Public Health

fair

good

good

fair

fair

Medical

good

good

good

good

good

Agriculture

good

good

good

poor

poor

Economic

fair

good

good

poor

fair

programme planning STEPS

ONE

: POLICY

TWO

: OBJECTIVES

THREE

: PRIORITIES

FOUR

: TIMING

FIVE

: QUANTIFY THE NEEDS

SIX

: DETERMINE THE STRATEGY

SEVEN

: BUDGET

EIGHT

: DELEGATE RESPONSIBILITIES

NINE

: NEEDS

TEN

: SET UP AN ORGANIZATION

programme planning

COMMON PROBLEMS

1. POOR DEFINITION OF THE PROGRAMME
2. FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A POLICY
3. FAILURE TO DETERMINE CULTURAL/ENVIRONMENTAL PATTERNS
4. AGENCIES OFTEN FAIL TO LOOK AT DIFFERENT OPTIONS
5. ONLY ONE STRATEGY FOR ONE NEED
6. OVEREXTENSION: MORE RESPONSIBILITY THAN THEY CAN HANDLE
7. FAILURE TO EXAMINE RELATIONSHIP EFFECTS/NEGATIVE IMPACTS
8. FAILURE TO GET TECHNICAL EXPERTS

9. POOR COORDINATION

programme planning

critical issues

1. QUANTIFICATION OF NEEDS TO BE MATCHED AGAINST EXISTING RESOURCES IN THE COUNTRY AND THOSE TO BE IMPORTED(UNIPAC)

2. REPROGRAMMING OF EXISTING PROGRAMMES .. SHORTAND LONG TERM CONTINGENCY PLANS


3. EXAMPLES FOR EACH STEP IN DEVELOPING A PLAN WITH REFERENCE TO UNICEF STRUCTURE

Death and Injury


Fig. 1 Frequency distribution of deaths from 78 earthquakes in Iran during the period 1903-1978. Data obtained from Berberian [9].

Death and Injury


Fig. 2. The relationship between mortality and number of houses reported destroyed in 19 Turkish earthquakes during the period 1912-1976. Sources: Altay [1]; Ilhan [33]; London Technical Group [41].

Epidemiology of Natural Disasters


Fig. 6. Numbers of patients admitted to hospitals on successive days following three earthquakes. a. San Fernando 1971 - all admissions and hospital out-patients. Data from Olsen [53]. b. Guatemala 1976 - number of admissions (solid line) and bed occupancy (broken line) in percent, to US field hospital. Data read from published graph in de Ville de Goyet et al. [70]. c. Managua, Nicaragua 19 72-patients admitted to US emergency tent hospital. Data from Whittaker et al. [76].

Death and injury

Table III. Causes of death in the Indiana and Topeka tornadoes

Topeka

Lebanon, Ind.

Head and chest injuries

4

skull and brain injury

14

Chest injuries

4

'crushed chest trauma'

2

Head injuries

2

cervical spine fracture and cord injury

1

Massive trauma to body

1



Shock, abrasions and lacerations

1



Total

12


17

Data from Beelman [6] and Mandelbaum et al. [46].

Epidemiology of Natural Disasters


Fig. 7. Age- and sex-specific mortality rates in the area affected by the Bangladesh cyclone and storm surge of November 1970. Figures for males based on 1,359 enumerated deaths; figures for females on 1,583 enumerated deaths. Data from published graph by Summer and Mosley [60].

Death and Injury


Fig. 8. Age- and sex-specific mortality in the February 1, 1953 Netherlands flood. Numbers in bars represent absolute numbers of deaths. Data from Baesjou [3]. Calculated using population data for December 31, 1952, from Statistical Yearbook of the Netherlands 1953-1954. Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Communicable Disease and Disease Control after Natural Disasters


Fig. 2. Daily hospital attendance’s for dog bites in Guatemala City after the 1976 earthquake. Data read from published graph in Spencer et al. [34].

Communicable Disease and Disease Control after Natural Disasters


Fig. 1. Percent of malaria-positive blood slides by month in zone affected by the 1963 Haitian hurricane. Drawn from data in Mason et al. [23].

Communicable Disease and Disease Control after Natural Disasters


Fig. 3. Graph of weekly hospital admissions for viral hepatitis and typhoid fever after the 1980 earthquake in southern Italy. Histogram of monthly notifications of viral hepatitis and typhoid fever for the 2 months before, and the 4 months after the earthquake, and for the same period in 1979. Data read from published graph in Greco et al. [17].


Fig. 3. Graph of weekly hospital admissions for viral hepatitis and typhoid fever after the 1980 earthquake in southern Italy. Histogram of monthly notifications of viral hepatitis and typhoid fever for the 2 months before, and the 4 months after the earthquake, and for the same period in 1979. Data read from published graph in Greco et al. [17].

Media relations guidelines

The media

· The media consists of individuals with the same type of career motivations we all have, modified by pressures to get a story out by their next deadline and to "beat their competition.

· Reporters' needs and behaviour differ greatly, depending on whether they are print or broadcast.

· Newspaper .reporters can be expected to need and use more information than their counterparts in television.

· If information is not forthcoming from management, they will solicit it wherever it can be found. Some leeway with daily newspapers.

· Radio reporters with a deadline every hour are the most volatile.

· Most likely to dispatch news to the public without checking with management.

What they are not [necessarily]

· Expert/knowledgeable/specialist
· Supportive or opposed

What they want

· The facts
· A story
· Co-operation

What they dislike

· No comment
· Stalling
· No call backs
· Aggression

What they are

· Powerful
· Influential
· Opinion leaders
· Wielders of influence
· Biased (many reasons)
· Under pressure
· Human

What they will always have

· The last word (if you let them)
· The power to distort or interpret
· Little control over editing or headlines
· No desire to print retractions
· Little patience if they suspect stalling
· Full control over the story - no reading back may check through
· No respect for "off the record"

N.B. They are all different - styles, level of ethics. They are people. Each one however junior or senior demands respect, attention and patience.

Guidelines for appearance on television

Do's

DO wear subdued coloured clothes, and especially tie [no checks or over-striped suits].

DO check your appearance before going into the studio -tie, hair, buttons, zips?

DO sit upright and tidily.

DO look at interviewer all the time except when you are meant to be addressing the TV audience.

DO speak in simple language - avoid jargon at all costs.

DO make short statements, each holding up on its own.

DO remember to make your most important points as early as possible.

DO avoid tortuous logic.

DO before you begin, discuss with the interviewer what line the discussion will take.

DO remember the interviewer knows less about your subject than you do.

DO have reference material handy.

DO try to have the last word.

DO remember that any taped or videotaped programme is likely to be edited before use.

DO check out the background of your interviewer beforehand - likewise the programme. B-M can help.

Don'ts

DON’T smoke on the air. :
DON’T forget the smallest mannerisms show up more obviously on TV.
DON’T accept a revolving or movable chair.
DON’T fidget or fiddle with pens, pencils, lighters etc.
DON’T forget your handkerchief!
DON’T say "I think" too often. It sounds as though you are uncertain of your subject.

Dealing with the media

· Crystallise points into short, hard-hitting phrases -use them as jumping-off points.
· Support statements with facts/third party evidence.
· Use widest viewpoint/policy rather than individual thought
· Don't restate critics position.
· Get to your most important points first.

But don't

· Say anything "off the record".
· Let words be put in your mouth.
· Don't guess or speculate.
· Don't argue or attack the media.
· Don't get lulled into a false sense of security.

SUPPLY OPERATIONS IN EMERGENCIES

I. SUPPLY/LOGISTICS PREPAREDNESS
II. SOURCES OF SUPPLY
III. MONITORING SUPPLY/LOGISTICS OPERATIONS
IV. DISCUSSIONS
V. KAMPUCHEA EMERGENCY SUPPLY/LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

VI. STOCKPILING FOR EMERGENCIES

SUPPLY/LOGISTICS OPERATIONS IN EMERGENCIES

FAILURE OR SUCCESS DEPENDS ON THE 3R'S

- RIGHT SUPPLY ITEMS
- RIGHT PLACE

- RIGHT TIME

I. SUPPLY LOGISTICS PREPAREDNESS

TO COLLECT INFORMATION ON:

- POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS OF COMMON ITEMS
-MEANS OF TRANSPORT AND ROUTES TO SITES
-POTENTIAL TRANSPORT CONTRACTORS

-MEANS OF DELIVERY FOR OFFSHORE GOODS

II. SOURCES OF SUPPLY

- LOCAL PROCUREMENT
- OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT
- DONATIONS IN KIND

LOCAL PROCUREMENT

QUICKEST AND MOST EFFECTIVE FOR IMMEDIATE SUPPLY NEEDS

POINTS TO CONSIDER

- Create shortages/price increases
- Coordinate with other agencies for procurement in some markets
- Compare prices with offshore prices, including freight
- Bulky supplies and vehicles
- Identify immediate needs for local procurement and balance for offshore procurement
- LOCAL PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY

US$ 5,000

- REPRESENTATIVE'S AUTHORITY FOR DIVERSION

US$ 25,000

OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT

- Global procurement from Copenhagen
- UNIPAC warehouse standard items
- Regional procurement by regional office
- Bulky purchases from manufacturers

® low price

- UNIPAC standard set packings

® easy and rapid distribution

- Other government/UN/NGOs benefit from UNIPAC
- REGIONAL PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY

US$ 5,000

DONATIONS IN KIND

- Confusion and problems if not planned
- Establish overall supply needs
- Consider/accept donations in kind for those needs
- Specifications to be cleared by field office and supply division
- Donations in kind items should not require special storage
- Field offices should have final say on unsolicited donations in kind

- Consult with UNHCR Guide on donations in kind

III. MONITORING SUPPLY/LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

- ESTABLISH SYSTEM RIGHT FROM VERY BEGINNING
- FROM WHERE THE SUPPLY ITEMS WILL COME
- TO WHERE THE SUPPLY ITEMS WILL GO
- WHAT SUPPLY ITEMS ARE IN THE PIPELINE

- USEFUL FOR REPORT PREPARATION AND EXPERIENCE SHARING

IV. DISCUSSIONS

- Standardization of supply items desirable, but difficult for donations in kind situations, e.g., trucks

- Confusion and supply/logistics problems resulting from unsolicited donations in kind (identification/sorting out)

- Contract local transport organizations if possible (familiar with local operations)

- Use containers but consider in-country capacity and handling facilities

- Consider stockpiling and staging areas

- Fund allocation for unforeseen expenditure, e.g., hiring trucks

- REPRESENTATIVE'S AUTHORITY FOR DIVERSION US$ 25,000

- LOCAL PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY
US$ 5,000

- REGIONAL PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY


US$ 5,000

V. KAMPUCHEA EMERGENCY SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

LESSONS LEARNED

- Need of one coordinator: a senior person with emergency experience and managerial skills
- Form task force for coordination with government/UN/NGOs to avoid confusion and duplication
- Need for adequate support staff with experience
- Need of early and systematic assessment of needs
- Need of clear and complete specification purpose and use
- Effectiveness of local procurement and local contracting
- Supply requests need to be for real, immediate requirements for local procurement consideration
- Early delivery is overriding factor in life-saving operations

- Supply staff should undertake local procurement and not programme staff to avoid confusion within organization and with suppliers

VI. STOCKPILING FOR EMERGENCIES

- UNDRO stockpiles in Pisa, Italy
- Finland country stockpiles for donations
- Japan regional stockpiles
- UNIPAC stockpiles

- revised list will be included in 1988 UNIPAC Catalog (287 to 171 items and total value US$1 million)

- use WHO standard health kits for 10,000 persons for 3 months (10 sets each packed ready for immediate shipment and another 10 sets as loose items)

- other items still available as loose items

- kit contents should be grouped under general subgrouping

- include users' instructions in each kit


- measurement' weight kits for storage and transport


EMERGENCY SYSTEMS


BOOK E


Restoration of Government Infrastructure


STAFFING

RECONSTRUCTION - SOUTH LEBANON

1980-1985

UNICEF - CDR

Total Budget:

$ 60 m.

Staff:

85

Time:

8 years

Offices:

2

# Projects:

800

Reporting:

HQ

HEALTH
WATER
EDUCATION

Area of Operation:

South Lebanon (South of Litani)
South Lebanon (South of Damascus road)
Greater Beirut & Tripoli

WHAT WAS DONE? WHY?

WHAT WAS NOT DONE? WHY NOT?

CRISIS ASSESMENT RESPONSE

(Hardware)

Donor Impact

Geopolitical Jungle

- Funds

- Bureaucrateic Government

- Activities

- Military - geog.

- Area of Operation

- Crisis - Security

Operation

Linkage - Regular

- Staffing


- Systems


- Handover


Collaboration

Vulnerable Groups Priorities:

- UNIFIL

- Immunization / ORS

- HCR

- Unaccompanied Children

- NGO

- Self - Help

Handover - Local Staff Only

WHAT WAS DONE?

WHY?

Direct:


Restoration of basic Government Services. (hardware, water).

default

Emergency water supply. (direct victims, darkest days).

save lives

Relief of displaced. (equilibrating)

Integrated response

Indirect:

Mobilized Communities - Encourage return of displaced
Stimulated employment - local contractors in cut off areas.
Channeled frozed bilateral aid budgets

WHAT WAS NOT DONE?

Staffing: No budget (gov't)

Training: No staff (gov't)

No Transition of Regular Program: Persistant civil strife

Assistance to Vulnerable Groups:

Plan, Structure, Staff, tailored to rehab.

An entirely different assessment/response is required, ideally from the onset.