(introduction...)

Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)
Universitatholique de Louvain (UCL)

CRED Occasional Paper
September 1996

Support for this bulletin from ECHO-Commission of the European Union is gratefully acknowledged

1. INTRODUCTION

Civil conflicts and related armed instabilities are of increasing concern to the international community. Since 1989, eighty three countries have been involved in some form of armed conflict. Many of these are currently suffering from continued civil insecurity. The implications are not only political but have serious human dimensions for millions of civilians, in particular women and children. Since the end of the Cold War, political, developmental and humanitarian policy has been confused and the international community clearly unprepared to respond to the apparent needs. Despite the large amount of money devoted to peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts (21 new operations were launched between 1988 and 1994), there have been no spectacular successes except in a few situations such as those prevailing in Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia or El Salvador.

Both political and human development (including humanitarian) policy require rational analysis and a coherent information base to make effective progress. In the area of civil conflict this basic element has not been adequately addressed. As a result decisions, even of a technical or humanitarian nature, tend to be ad hoc. In the long term this approach is detrimental to world peace and is a serious setback to ongoing development efforts.

The CRED has recently started an initiative to compile data on conflicts from various sources bringing together human, legal and political perspectives on conflicts which have occurred since the demise of the Communist bloc. This exercise includes both published and unpublished sources in a standardised format. Although this initiative is still in its infancy, the early results of this initiative are presented hereafter in the form of tables and graphs.

If the search for common denominators, without negating the nuances of each conflict, seems a dubious exercise, similar problems are present when trying to draw trends over a limited period. There are, however, common denominators which are more striking when examined within a regional perspective. The report therefore includes two parts, the first dealing with conflict occurrence with an emphasis on a regional approach, the second investigating the human impact of current conflicts, i.e. the estimation of fatalities and the number of displaced populations. For the methodology and definition of terms used appendix 1 can be referred to, while appendix 2 gives a list of present conflicts with their main features.

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As shown in figure 1, after a dramatic increase in the number of conflicts in the immediate post cold war period, the situation has improved gradually but steadily. This can be seen as a combination of two factors. Firstly, it seems that after the chaos following the end of the bipolar order, the situation is now calming down, as if an adaptation to the new geopolitical background is now underway. Just as many secessionist movements have succeeded in laying their claims in the early nineties, many others have died out and certain countries are now showing a strong determination to avoid further fragmentation. Secondly, many conflicts, though they remain unsolved, are producing less violence due to external intervention and/or an externally brokered truce/cease-fire. This is the case of Western Sahara, Cyprus, Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Croatia and Abkhazia (Georgia).

Figure 1 - Number of high and intermediate intensity conflicts by year (1990-1995)

Source: CRED

While some conflicts have ended with the final victory of one of the protagonists (Rwanda, Eritrea, Yemen), many others that arose during the cold war and were considered as “war by proxy” are dying out, following a slow process of exhaustion of at least one of the parties deprived of their former support (Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Philippines, Peru, El Salvador, Turkey and Laos).

Figure 2 shows that classic inter-state conflicts have nearly disappeared - with the exception of two border disputes in Latin America, Africa and the Gulf war - but that many secessionist wars have turned international following the recognition of the secessionist entity involved. This was the case of the Azerbaijan-Armenia and Yugoslavia-Croatia conflicts. In addition, many internal conflicts -such as Rwanda, Bosnia, Liberia, Iraq or the conflicts that have arisen on the territory of the former USSR- have been “internationalised” by armed foreign intervention. Lastly, three conflicts remain as remnants of the decolonisation process and hence may legally be viewed as international: one of them has ended (South Africa vs. the ANC), one does not produce any violence (Western Sahara) while the third is in the process of normalisation (Palestine).

Figure 2 - Ratio international/internal conflicts for the 1990-1995 period

(1) Internal conflicts which are to be considered international due to an external armed intervention

(2) National liberation wars

2.1. Conflict intensity

Further comparisons can be drawn out from a regional-based study. It can be seen in figure 3 that if Asia holds the higher number of conflicts, it is the African continent which holds the unwelcome record of high intensity conflicts. The definition of high intensity conflict used in this study (see annex 1) is based, inter alia, on a threshold of one thousand dead per annum which is comparatively low: if it is raised - for instance up to five hundred thousand killed a year - the difference between Africa (10 wars) and Asia (4 wars) becomes more significant. In fact, many African conflicts are either protracted (Sudan, Somalia. Ethiopia, Liberia) or at least recurrent (Rwanda, Burundi) and show little sign of slowing up. In Asia many middle and low intensity conflicts have died out (Myanmar, Philippines) and many others have lost some of their intensity (Punjab, Cambodia).

Figure 3 - Conflict intensity by region/or the 1990-1995 period

2.2. Conflict types

Africa has experienced all types of conflict, territorially or politically inspired, and few countries have experienced tranquillity over the last decade. Certain confrontations have died out, as is the case in Uganda, Eritrea, Mozambique and Angola. An explosion of violence has also been avoided through the multi-racial elections held in South Africa. Certain conflicts, though still unresolved, produce less or no violence (Western Sahara, Egypt, Senegal, Djibouti, Chad). Many others still persist (Somalia, Liberia) or have acquired exceptional proportions (Rwanda, Burundi). Moreover, new ones have made an appearance on the map of conflicts, in Zaire (Shaba, Kasa Ghana and Sierra Leone. What is particularly conspicuous is the quasi-general agitation presently reigning. Political instability, social disorder, access to land, ethnic and tribal troubles, religious intolerance, the cult of the personality and territorial quarrels, when combined with under-development, become the culprits in drowning a country in a deep sea of crises. Rwanda is an all too apt case in point.

Figure 4 - Types of conflicts by continents for the 1990-1995 period

Source: CRED

One traditional area for political struggles, Latin America, has continued to be hit by violent conflicts in Guatemala, Peru and Colombia. However, the first two have shown signs of abatement, one through the exhaustion of one of the parties, the other by the establishment of a peace plan. Moreover, the Salvadorian and Nicaraguan conflicts were extinguished by the fruitful Esquipulas II conference in August 1987 and neighbouring Guatemala is on the path to a national reconciliation, although the Mexican conflict has drawn attention to the precarious condition of the minority Indians - Mayas in Guatemala, Miskitos and Sumos in Nicaragua and Chiapas in Mexico. As in Africa and Asia, the disappearance of ideological antagonisms has lead to a more spontaneous violence, close to banditry, which is taking over in rustic Indian areas as they become conscious of their alienation. This explains the slower peace process in Guatemala - where the minority Mayas are numerous - in comparison with Salvador. Elsewhere, the recent frontier conflict between Peru and Ecuador is a reminder of the fragility of the territorial situation in Latin America, since no less than six frontiers are the objects of interstate disputes. Other subjects of concern are social chaos and, most importantly, the systematic resort to amnesty law which leads to an accumulation of resentment and, hence prevents a fair redistribution of power.

Europe for its part has witnessed a spectacular increase in ethnic based conflicts. The fall of the iron curtain led to acute ethnic turbulence in eastern Europe, particularly in the Balkans and the Caucasus. But the dramatic situation experienced in the early 1990’s has since settled down with the resolution of conflicts, such as the ones in former Yugoslavia, Ossetia or Moldova. Others like Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia or Northern Ireland are in the process of being resolved while violence in Chechnya continues unabated.

If this wave of open ethno-communitarian conflicts is relatively recent in Europe, this is certainly not the case in Asia. The centrifugal forces which shook India can be traced to the period immediately after decolonisation. While the Punjab conflict seems to have abated of late, other minority groups continue to make themselves heard: the Nagaland Christians between India and Myanmar, the Assam Hindus and the Kashmir Muslims, as well as the secessionist ambitions of the Tamul Hindus from the majority Cingali Buddhists in neighbouring Sri Lanka. Moreover, the states in south-east Asia are not nation-states but ethnic and religious mosaics: the Muslims in the Philippines are revolting against the Christian majority, in Myanmar, the Muslims of Arakan and the Christian Karen, Kachin and Naga are fighting against the Burmese Buddhists, and in Indonesia, the Melanesian Christians of Irian Jaya and of East Timor have risen up against their Muslim occupants. All these disputes are born out of the concept of identity which has manifested itself in different ways from political confrontation to armed secessionist movements and even passive requests for autonomy which have then become armed Furthermore, there is no reason why even wider disputes may not hit other minorities.

3. THE HUMAN IMPACT OF CONFLICTS: REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED

Among the problems raised by contemporary conflicts, few are raised as often as that of refugees. There are no fewer than 15 million refugees today, this number only including those people who have fled across an international frontier, fulfilling the condition of benefiting from the protection of the international community. Recent changes in conflicts whose causes are predominantly cultural have had a direct link with the multiplication and magnitude of refugee flows: many have their origin in deliberate acts by governments against minorities seeking to prevent the creation of homogeneous states.

As the total number of refugees is Just a part of the total amount of displaced populations (there were more than twenty million internally displaced in 1995), the main agencies dealing with refugees have had to revise their programmes and solutions over the last five years. Traditional case-by-case approaches have been replaced by global, and often blurred, preventive approaches - which may be doubtful in terms of effective protection, as was illustrated in Northern Iraq, Bosnia and Rwanda.

The UNHCR mandate has been readjusted to cope with “internal refugees”: their activities inside the country of origin of the refugees is justified by selected relief programmes targeting the internally displaced on one hand (Yugoslavia) and by large-scale programmes of repatriation on the other (Cambodia, Salvador, Rwanda).

This attitude, coupled with a more and more “protectionist” approach to the refugee problem from asylum countries, has led to a global reduction in the number of refugees worldwide.

Figure 5 - Number of refugees by year and region (1990-1995)

Source: World Refugee Survey

While the period began with a worrying situation in Asia: the total of six million refugees from Afghanistan and two million internally displaced people in fact gave rise to major initiatives tending towards repatriation and returning home. Despite the continuation of conflict at a high level of intensity until 1995, the number of displaced has decreased steadily -even if the current number is still unacceptable (2.3 million refugees and 0.5 million IDPs). Other voluntary repatriation programmes in Asia included Cambodia, where 360,000 refugees were repatriated after the 1991 Paris Agreement; Vietnam, where the saga of boat-people has come closer to ending; and Myanmar, where the massive repatriation of the Rohingyas refugees continued during 1995, leaving only 55,000 of the 250,000 refugees who fled in 1992 to neighbouring Bangladesh.

Myanmar, Sri Lanka and the Philippines (although figures for this country vary widely) also hold large amounts of the internally displaced. In the first two cases, the situation can be explained to a certain extent by insularity, the case of Myanmar unfortunately the result of ongoing repression by the authorities and, at times, the attitude of neighbouring governments (an estimated 60,000 involuntarily returned from Bangladesh during 1995 alone).

The serious situation in Africa shows few signs of particular improvement or further deterioration. New disorder has matched the slow process of recovery in countries which experienced conflicts during the cold war period. Three refugee-producing zones can be singled out in Africa and amount to nine tenths of the total refugee population: the horn (1,391,600 refugees in 1995), the Great Lakes area (1,903,600 refugees in 1995) and western Africa (1,200,000 refugees in 1995).

This ominous situation should not overshadow the improved situation in several African states which has allowed the return of millions of refugees and to a certain extent their rehabilitation. This is the case of Mozambique, Ethiopia, Uganda, South Africa, and - to a lesser extent - Namibia, each of which had a known large-scale exodus in the 1980’s (over one million refugees for the first four). Internal displacement remains the major problem in Africa, since two-thirds of the displaced populations are inside their own countries. Within southern Africa, Angola and South Africa have a special status because current displacements are remnants of major protracted conflicts which occurred in the last thirty years.

Figure 6 - Number of IDPs by year and continent (1990-1995)

Source: World Refugee Survey

Conflicts in America have also given cause for limited optimism. However, besides the spectacular recovery of El Salvador, the slow improvement in Guatemala has not yet produced much of the expected return of refugees. Human rights abuses remain wide-spread and returnees are often targeted either by governmental forces or by paramilitary groups or guerrillas. Nevertheless, in Peru the weakening of the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas has allowed many families to return home.

Europe, with no displacements resulting from conflict-like situations at the beginning of the period, has since experienced major conflicts which have uprooted more than five million people. A large amount is due to the outburst of the war in the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent and imperfect peace resulting from the Dayton process has failed to bring a large-scale return of the million refugees from abroad

4. CONCLUSION

Despite the dramatic figures characterising some conflicts, not all hope is lost. Firstly, 1994 and 1995 were marked by a scaling-down of many conflicts, due to one or a combination of the following elements: the exhaustion of the parties cut from their traditional support since the end of the cold war, the victory of one of the opponents, or an external intervention - armed or otherwise. Secondly, the new atmosphere of global consciousness is undoubtedly positive even if media-inspired and if sometimes the cause of unwelcome effects. Moreover, new initiatives have shown a preference for conflict prevention: efforts in global democracy have never been so fervent and some initiatives for preventing the spread of existing conflicts have, for the first time, been successful.

The new elements of the international community require a new framework which can only be put together gradually and they need a real and common political will which has rarely been seen to date. Indeed, one may observe that existing tensions have elicited varied reactions and levels of sensitivity in this new era of quasi-multipolarity. Many of the remnants of the cold war have pointed towards possible settlements, whilst others have remained unchanged or chosen the path of increased turmoil and destruction, occasionally dragging in surrounding parties and making outside intervention all the more complex.

5.1. Annex 1: Methodology and definitions

5.1.1. Human impact of conflicts

Refugees

The figures used in this report in general come from international organisations which collect their data in the field, such as the UNHCR, or which use information provided by the governments concerned, such as the Committee for Refugees in the USA In each case, the figures are second-hand, with all the advantages and disadvantages that represents. Certain governments may have an interest in altering the data relative to the exact number of displaced people requiring assistance on their territory. The figures may reflect the number of refugees receiving direct aid from one organisation or another, to the exclusion of illegal immigrants, those integrated into local populations or other displaced persons outside of the camps administered by the organisation in question. Finally, some refugees are more mobile than others, which makes accurate counts difficult

The evolution of conflicts in the course of recent years, characterised by a growing violence towards civilians, is matched by a proportional growth in the risks attached to massive population movements. As a result, it is also very difficult to make precise estimations of the number of people affected.

Recent conflicts are notable equally for their long duration, which obviously affects the methods of counting. Movements are often particularly important during initial periods of crisis, but they can follow each other with a frequency and intensity that varies as a conflict continues. Occupied territories, repeated ethnic conflicts and prolonged civil wars are notable examples.

Internally displaced

As far as internally displaced people are concerned, assessment of the populations concerned can be blocked by political and legal obstacles, which rely on the principle of “sovereignty”.

In general, the intervention of outside bodies of assistance is clearly very delicate. More specifically, the protection offered by certain organisations such as the UNHCR is essentially international and their mandate rarely extends to the internally displaced.

5.1.2. Conflict intensity

The expression “intensity level” to measure the intensity of conflicts according to specifications has already been employed by various authors (see, for example: Wallensteen, P. and Axell, K., Conflict Resolution and the End of the Cold War: 1989-93, 31 JPR 333, 1994) and makes the distinction between:

· “low intensity conflicts” where the number of victims does not exceed 1000 or conflicts causing the death of 1000 persons where there have not been more than 50 victims per year in the three preceding years.

· “intermediate conflicts”, where the number of victims exceeds 1000 for the entire conflict and is between 25 and 1000 for the year 1995;

· “high intensity conflicts”, where the number of victims for the year in question has exceeded 1000.

This strictly quantitative approach avoids the obstacles which arise when trying to attach more complicated definitions to conflicts. Certain specialists - in particular lawyers - have tried to define internal conflicts using several objective criteria, such as the existence of structured and armed opposition groups, an openly hostile situation or the occupation of pans of national territory by factions. These criteria are usually too exclusive, because they exclude conflict situations such as those connected to the activities of terrorist groups.

In our document, situations considered as conflicts include situations characterised by a link between two parties where one is the recognised government and the other an armed group which contests the authority of the said government, over all or a pan of the national territory, and which cause the death of at least 25 people within one year through armed opposition. The opposition group need not necessarily be part of an established hierarchy nor particularly organised, but it must recognised by one means or another and have recourse to force to achieve its objectives.

That being the case, if the figures constitute a useful basis for research, they are not necessarily easy to collect or to analyse.

Also, the statistics available often do not indicate more than the total number of victims after the beginning of a conflict. Moreover, the date itself is subject to uncertainty. For example, should the conflict in Cambodia be calculated from 1970 or from 1978 - the date of external intervention? And is it necessary to consider the hostilities which came after the peace accords signed in Paris in 1991 as a new conflict?

Certain reports published in the immediate aftermath of particularly tragic episodes only take account of the confirmed victims and not those disappeared and presumed dead. They must therefore be revised at a later stage.

Clearly it is easier to obtain accurate and trustworthy data if the country concerned possess well-established institutions, as in the case of terrorist activities which do not profoundly menace or affect the institutions of the state. Likewise, information is easier to gather when the conflict takes place at a defined front or in a well-defined region. If such information comes from a country destroyed by war, where the administration and public authorities are totally disrupted or non-existent, it must be treated with the utmost caution.

Finally, it is necessary to complete the balance by adding the indirect victims of conflict, the populations living in regions or countries where the conditions are particularly dangerous and exposed to illness - notably cholera - and malnutrition.

5.1.3. Conflict types

Two traditional classifications have been used for this study, the first based on the possible elements of extraneity affecting the conflict (internal-international), the second on the remote cause of the conflict. For this second, a distinction has been drawn between:

* Minority conflicts: those composed of one minority ethnic group and another majority.

* International conflict: in this category are standard wars of aggression between two states, one with claims on the territory belonging to the other. In most cases, these conflicts are based on border disputes stemming from the division of boundaries by colonial powers and by the status quo imposed after their retreat. Although these confrontations are historically very important, they have become fewer in number.

* Political conflict: that created by socio-economic or political upheaval and particularly through revolution connected to the access to wealth or power. The motives of those involved are usually material than purely egalitarian.

* Secession conflict: a hybrid type of conflict as it is most often connected to minority conflicts to which secessionist claims give them a territorial scope. Two elements are required, the existence of a particular people and a territorial upheaval. It is therefore an exacerbation of a minority conflict, where the community in question are seeking no other outcome than a clear and simple separation from the country of origin.

5.2. Annex 2: General tables

Table I - Conflicts main characters

Country	Parties (1)	Duration (2)	Cause	HL Type (4)	Involvement
Africa
Algeria	FIS, GIA (Islamic groups)	New	Government	Internal	-
Angola	UNITA Cabinda (FLEC)	Protracted	Government	Internal	UN PKF* & OM** (UNAVEM), UN sanctions
		New	Secession	Internal	-
Burundi	Palipehutu	Recurrent	Government	Internal	Int’l mediations
Chad	CNRPD	Protracted	Government	Internal	-
Djibouti	FRUD	New	Government	Internal	-
Ethiopia	Eritrea (EPLF)	Protracted	Secession	Internal	Observer mission (UNOVER)
	Afar, Oromo	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
Ghana	Konkombas	New	Minorities	Internal	-
Kenya	Masai	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
Liberia	NPFL, Ulimo,...	New	Government	Int’l*	ECOWAS PKF, UN & OAU OM (UNOMIL), UN sanctions
Mali	Azawad	New	Minorities	Internal	-
Mauritania	Mauritania-Senegal	New	Territorial	Int’l	-
Mozambique	Rename	Protracted	Government	Internal	UN PKF (ONUMOZ)
Niger	Azawad & A	New	Minorities	Internal	-
Rwanda	FPR	Recurrent	Government	Internal	UN PKF (UNAMIR & UNOMUR), Humanitarian interv. (FR), UN sanctions
Senegal	MFDC (Casamance)	Protracted	Secession	Internal	-
Sierra Leone	Revolutionary Utd Front	New	Government	Internal	-
Somalia	Military Factions	New	Government	Int’l*	UN & Int’l PKF (UNOSOM/UNITAF), UN sanctions, UN OM (UNOSOM)
South Africa	ANC, Inkhata,...	Protracted	Government	Int’l**	UN Sanctions
Sudan	SPLA (Nuba, Nuer,...)	Protracted	Secession	Internal	-
Togo	Military Factions	Recurrent	Government	Internal	-
Uganda	Democratic movements	Protracted	Government	Internal	-
Western Sahara	Maroc vs Polissario	Protracted	Territorial	Int’l**	UN OM (MINURSO)
Zaire	Military factions	Recurrent	Government	Internal	-
America
Colombia	ELN, FARC & EPL (left)	Protracted	Government	Internal	-
El Salvador	FMLN	Protracted	Government	Internal	UN PKF (ONUSAL)
Guatemala	URNG	Protracted	Government	Internal	UN HRVM (MINUGUA)
Haiti	Military Junta	New	Government	Int’l*	UN Sanctions & PKF (UNMIH), UN/OAS OM (MICIVIH/ONUVEH)
Mexico	EZLN (Chiapas)	New	Minorities	Internal	-
Peru	Peru-Ecuador	New	Territorial	Int’l	Inn Mediation
	Sendero Lunminoso/MRTA	Protracted	Government	Internal	-
Venezuela	Military factions	New	Government	Internal	-
Near & Middle East
Cyprus		Protracted	Territorial	Int’l*	UN PKF (UNFICYP)
Egypt	Islamic Groups	New	Government	Internal	-
Iran	Mujahideen Khalq	Recurrent	Government	Internal	-
	KDPI (Kurdistan)	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
Iraq	PUK, DPK (Kurdistan)	Recurrent	Secession	Int’l*	UK, France & US PKF
	SAIRI (Shi’ites)	Protracted	Minorities	Internal	-
Kuwait	Iraq-Kuwait & Int’l forces	New	Territorial	Int’l	UN Armed Intervention, UN sanctions & UN OM (UNIKOM & UNSCOM)
Israel	PLO, Hamas,...	Protracted	Territorial	Int’l**	Int’l Mediation, UN PKF (UNDOF), UN OM (UNTSO)
Lebanon	Lebanon. Syria, Druze, PLO,...	Recurrent	Government	Int’l*	UN PKF (UNIFIL)
Turkey	PKK (Kurdistan)	Protracted	Secession	Internal	-
Yemen	North vs South	Recurrent	Government	Internal	-
Asia
Afghanistan	Military Factions	New	Government	Internal	Int’l Mediations
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts	Protracted	Minorities	Internal	-
Cambodia	PDK (Khmers rouge)	Protracted	Government	Internal	UN PKF (UNTAC), UN OM (UNAMIC)
India	JKLF (Kashmir)	Protracted	Minorities	Internal	-
	KCF/KLF (Penjab)	Protracted	Minorities	Internal	-
	Tripura	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
	Assam/Bodo	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
	Nagaland	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
	Jharkhand	New	Minorities	Internal	-
	Manipur	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
	India-Pakistan	Protracted	Territorial	Int’l	UN PKF (UNMOGIP) & UN OM (UNIPOM)
Indonesia	Aceh Merdeka	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
	OPM (West Irian)	Protracted	Territorial	Internal	-
	Fretilin (Timor)	Protracted	Secession	Internal	-
Laos	ULNLF (left)	Protracted	Government	Internal	-
Myanmar	KNU (Karen)	Protracted	Minorities	Internal	-
	KIO/IOA (Kashin)	Protracted	Minorities	Internal	-
	Mon & Shan	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
	Arkan rebels	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
	ABSDF (Democratic mvmt)	New	Government	Internal	-
New Guinea	BRA (Bougainville)	Recurrent	Secession	Internal	UN mediation
Pakistan	MQM (Mohajir)	New	Minorities	Internal	-
Philippines	NPA (left)	Protracted	Government	Internal	-
	Moro Factions	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
Sri Lanka	LTTE (Tamils)	Protracted	Secession	Internal (<90)	Indian PKF
	JVP (Sinhalese)	New	Government	Internal	-
Tadzikhistan	PDA (Democratic Army)	New	Government	Internal	CIS PKF, OSCE & UN OM (UNMOT)
Europe
Azerbaijan	Husseinov Factions	New	Government	Internal	-
		New	Territorial	Int’l (>93)	Rusian Mediation, OSCE negociations
Bosnia	Herceg-Bosna	New	Territorial	Int’l*	UN PKF (UNPROFOR), UE Mediation
	Republika Srpska	New	Territorial	Int’l*	UN PKF (UNPROFOR), UN sanctions NATO/UN Armed Interv.
Croatia	Serbian Rep. Krajina & Yugoslavia	New	Territorial	Int’l*	UN PKF (UNPROFOR/UNCRO) UN Mediation, UN sanctions
Georgia	Anti-Gvnmt Alliance	New	Government	Internal	Russian PKF
	South Ossetia	New	Secession	Int’l*	Russo-Georgian PKF, OSCE OM
	Abkhazia	New	Secession	Int’l*	Russian PKF, UN OM (UNOMIG)
Moldova	Dniestr Republic	New	Secession	Int’l*	Russo-Moldavian PKF
Russia	Inguch Rebels	New	Minorities	Internal	-
	Chechen Rebels	New	Secession	Internal	OSCE mediation
Spain	ETA	Recurrent	Minorities	Internal	-
United Kingdom	IRA	Protracted	Minorities	Internal	Int’l mediation

(1) The name of the parties opposed to the government or the region claiming independence/autonomy
(2) Duration of the conflict i.e. protracted, recurrent or new
(3) Parties’ Claims (Secession, Minorities, Government or Territory)
(4) Humanitarian Law Type i.e. International (Int’l) or internal and:

Int’l*: Internal conflict which is to be consider international due to an external armed intervention
Int’l** National liberation war

*PKF = Peacekeeping force
** OM = Observer mission

Table II - Conflicts figures

Conflicts-Parties		Start	Intensity Level (1)	Refugees (2)	IDP (2)	Killed	End
Africa
Algeria		1992	High (92-94)	-		25,000	-
Angola	(UNITA)	1975	High (90-94)	435,700 (93)	2,000,000 (93-94)	500-900,000	95
	(FLEC/Cabinda)	1992	Intermediate (92)				-
Burundi		1963	High (93-95)	780,000 (93)	500,000 (93)	200,000	-
Chad		1965	High (90)	290,000 (95)	n.a.	100,000	93
Djibouti		1991	Low (91-94)	10,000 (94-95)	140,000 (93)	200	-
Ethiopia	(Eritrea)	1961	High (90-91)	1,046,300 (90)	1,000,000 (90-91)	1,500,000	91
	(Oromo/Afar)	1961	High (90-91)				-
Ghana		1994	High (94)	10,000 (95)	150,000 (95)	2,000	-
Kenya		1995	Low (95)	-	300,000 (93)	< 100	-
Liberia		1989	High (90, 92 & 94)	784,000 (94)	1,100,000 (94)	150,000	94
Mali		1990	Low (90 & 94)	115,000 (94)	n.a.	200-1,000	-
Mauritania-Senegal		1989	Low (90)	79,900 (91)	-	500	90
Mozambique		1976	High (90-91)	1,428,000 (90)	3,500,000 (92)	900,000	92
Niger		1990	Low (90-92)	20,000 (94-95)	-	see Mali	-
Rwanda		1991	High (90-92 & 94-95)	1,715,000 (94)	1,200,000 (94)	500,000	94
Senegal		1982	Low (90 & 92-95)	40,000 (93)	-	> 500	-
Sierra Leone		1991	High (95)	364,000 (95)	1,000,000(95)	15,000	-
Somalia		1991	High (90-95)	864,800 (92)	2,000,000 (96)	350,000	-
South Africa		1950	High (90-94)	23,200 (91)	4,100,000 (90-92)	21,000	-
Sudan		1983	High (90-95)	535,000 (95)	5,000,000 (92)	1,500,000	-
Togo		1967	Low (91 & 94)	240,000 (93)	150,000 (93)	n.a.	-
Uganda		1981	High (91)	29,000 (91)	n.a	107.000	91
Western Sahara		1975	Low (90)	165,000 (90-92)		> 15,000	-
Zaire		1992	High (93-94)	79,000 (93)	700,000 (93)	> 2,000	-
America
Colombia		1965	High (90 & 92-94)	4,000 (91)	600,000 (94-95)	50,000	-
El Salvador		1979	High (90)	37,200 (90)	400,000 (90)	75,000	91
Guatemala		1968	High (92)	183,400 (90)	200,000 (93-95)	150,000	-
Haiti		1991	Low (91 & 94)	6,950 (94)	300,000 (93)	> 3,000	94
Mexico		1994	Low (94)	-	-	200-400	94
Peru-Ecuador		1995	High (95)	-	-	n.a.	95
Peru		1980	High (90-94)	-	600,000 (93-94)	20-35,000	-
Venezuela		1992	Low (92)	-	-	300	92
Near & Middle East
Cyprus		1964	-	-	265,000 (90-95)	9255	-
Egypt		1992	Low (92-94)	-	-	> 400	-
Iran	(Mujah. Khalq)	1979	Intermediate (92 & 94)	211,100 (90)	260,000 (93)	> 50,000	-
	(Kurdistan)	1979	Intermediate (90 & 92)				-
Iraq	(Kurdistan)	1980	High (91)	1,547,100 (92)	1,000,000 (93-95)	180,000	-
	(Shi’ites)	1980	High (91)			100,000	-
Iraq-Kuwait		1990	High	360,500 (90)	-	35,000	91
Israel		1967	Intermediate (90-95)	3,942,500 (93)	-	3,500	-
Lebanon		1975	High (90)	110,000 (90)	800,000 (90)	> 130,000	90
Turkey		1974	High (92-95)	17,000 (95)	2,000,000 (94.95)	> 12,500	-
Yemen		1994	High (94)	n.a	110,000 (94)	7,000	94
Asia
Afghanistan		1989	High (90-95)	6,600,800 (91)	2,000,000 (90-91)	> 1,000,000	-
Bangladesh		1971	Intermediate (90-94)	75,000 (90)	n.a.	< 6,500	-
Cambodia		1975	High (94-95)	392,700 (91)	199,000 (92)	> 1,000,000	-
India	(Kashmir)	1947	High (90-95)			9,000	-
	(Punjab)	1981	High (90-92)	-	280,000 (92)	25,000	92
	(Tripura)	1993	High (91)			n.a.	-
	(Nagaland)	1956
	(Jarkhand)	1993	Low (90-92)
	(Manipur)	1950s
	(Assam)	1979	High (91)			> 3000	-
India-Pakistan		1947	Intermediate (90 & 92)	-	-	2,000	-
Indonesia	(Aceh)	1970s	High (90)			n.a.	-
	(West Irian)	1974	Intermediate (94)	9,700 (94)	n.a.	> 5,000	-
	(Timor)	1975	Intermediate (92)			100,000	-
Laos		1975	High (90)	67,400 (90)	-	1,000	90
Myanmar	(Karen)	1948	High (92 & 94)			130,000	-
	(Kachin)	1961	Intermediate (90-92)	639,500 (93)	500,000 (91-95)		93
	(ABSDF)	1989	Low (91)
	(Arakan)	1977	Low (92-93)				94
	(Mon & Shan)	1952	Intermediate (94-95)				-
Papua-New Guinea		1988	Low (90 & 92-94)	-		100	-
Pakistan		1993	High (95)	n.a.	-	1,800	-
Philippines	(NPA)	1986	High (90-93)	-	1,000,000 (91-92)	110,000	-
	(Moro)	1972	Intermediate (90)				90
Sri Lanka	(Tamils)	1983	High (90-95)	228,000 (90)	1,000,000 (90)	76-100,000	-
	(JVP)	1989	High (90)				90
Tadzikhistan		1992	High (92-94)	170,400 (95)	400,000 (92)	30-50,000	-
Europe
Azerbaijan		1993	Low (93)	-	-	n.a.	93
Azerbaijan-Armenia		1990	High (92-94)	625,000 (94)	5,195,000 (94)	> 25,000	-
Bosnia	(Herceg-Bosna)	1991	High (93)	1,767,800 (92)	1,300,000 (93-95)	> 50,000	95
	(Rep. Srpska)	1992	High (92-94)
Croatia		1990	High (91 & 95)		350,000 (93)	10-50,000	95
Georgia	(South Ossetia)	1992	Low (92)	149,000 (93)	280,000 (95)	> 3,000	93
	(Abkhazia)	1992	High (93)				-
Moldova		1992	Low (92)	80,000 (92)	20,000 (92)	>100	92
Russia	(Inguchia)	1991	Low (91-92)	n.a.		n.a.	92
	(Chechnia)	1993	High (95)	n.a.	250,000 (95)	n.a.	-
Spain		1959	Low (91-92)	-	-	900	-
United Kingdom		1969	Intermediate (90-94)	-	-	3,200	94

(1) The highest intensity the conflict reach for the period
(2) The highest figure for the 1990-1995 period

5.3. Bibliography

*	AhlstrCh. et Nordqvist K-A., Victimes des conflits, rapport destine a la campagne mondiale pour la protection des victimes de la guerre, Drtement de recherche sur la paix et les conflits, Unit’Uppsala, 1991.
*	UNHCR, Les rgidans le monde, en qu de solution, Paris, La Duverte, 1995.
*	UNHCR, Les rgidans le monde, l’enjeu de la protection, Paris, La Duverte, 1993.
*	Mcins Sans Frontis, Populations in danger 1995, Paris, La Duverte, 1995.
*	Jongman, A.J., Contemporary conflicts, a global survey of high- and lower intensity conflicts and serious disputes, Pioom Newsletter and Progress Report, vol. 7 n°1, pp. 14-23.
*	Cranna, M. (Ed.), The true cost of conflict, London, Earthscan Publications, 1994.
*	US Department of Slate, Country reports on human rights practices for 1994, Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1995.
*	United States Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices for 1993, Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1994.
*	Stockolm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI Yearbook 1995, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995.
*	US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1996, Washington, 1996.
*	US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1995, Washington, 1995.
*	US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1994, Washington, 1994.
*	US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey 1993, Washington, 1993.
*	Amnesty International, Report 1995, London, Amnesty International Publications, 1995.
*	Human Rights Watch, Report 1995, New-York, Human Rights Watch Publications, 1994.
*	Rapport sur la 51 session de la Commission des Droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies, New-York. UN Doc. E/1995/23, 1995.
*	Burr, M., Quantifying genocide in the southern Sudan, Washington. US Committee for Refugees, 1993.
*	Gurr, T.D. et Harff, B., Ethnic conflict in world politics, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994.
*	Gurr, T.D. et Harff, B., Victims of the State: Genocides, Politicides and group repression from 1945 to 1995, Pioom Newsletter and Progress Report vol. 7 n°1, 1995, pp. 24-38.
*	d’Aoust, E., Questions juridiques et politiques li aux conflits de l’aprguerre froide, CRED Working Paper, 1995.
*	Le Monde Diplomatique, Conflits fin de sie, Mani de voir n°29, Fier 1996.
*	Le Monde Diplomatique, Le bouleversement du Monde, Mani de voir n°25, Fier 1995.
*	Le Monde Diplomatique, Le drdre des Nations, Mani de voir n°21, Fier 1994.
*	Mcins Sans Frontis, Face aux Crises..., Paris. Hachette, 1993.
*	Ganguly, S., Ethno-religious conflict in South-Asia, Survival vol. 35 n°2, 1993.
*	US Department of Stales, Patterns of global terrorism, Washington, 1994.
*	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World disasters report 1995, Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1995.
*	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World disasters report 1994, Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1994.
*	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, World disasters report 1993, Dordrecht, M. Nijhoff, 1993

For further information on this bulletin, contact:

Mr Edouard d’Aoust
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)
Universitatholique de Louvain
School of Public Health
Clos Chapelle-aux-Champs, 30.34
1200 Brussels - Belgium
Tel: (32-2) 764.33.27 - Fax: (32-2) 764.34.41 - E-mail: Below@epid.ucl.ac.be