Emergency Management (United Nations Children's Fund, 390 p.): Transparencies

Emergency Management (United Nations Children's Fund, 390 p.)

		(introduction...)
		Note to the Trainer
		Note to the Participants
		Workshop Session
		Transparencies

Transparencies

OF 38 SHEETS

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

SELECTED TRANSPARENCIES SPEAKERS' AIDS

UNICEF TRAINING PACKAGE

Figure 1-1: DISASTER SPECTRUM

DISASTER CONTINUUM

Table 3-A

POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSESSMENT TEAMS (BY DISASTER TYPE)

Part I General Assessments
Disaster Type	DAST	Designated Specialists	Local Staff	Key Man	Two Person Teams
Earthquake	good	good	good	poor	fair
Windstorm	good	good	good	poor	fair
Rood	good	good	good	good	good
Drought	good	good	fair	poor	fair
Famine	good	good	fair	poor	fair
Part II Sector Assessments (when critical sector is affected)
Sector	DAST	Designated Specialists	Local Staff	Key Man	Two Person Teams
Housing	good	good	fair	good	good
Lifelines	fair	good	good	fair	fair
Public Health	fair	good	good	fair	fair
Medical	good	good	good	good	good
Agriculture	good	good	good	poor	poor
Economic	fair	good	good	poor	fair

programme planning STEPS

ONE	: POLICY
TWO	: OBJECTIVES
THREE	: PRIORITIES
FOUR	: TIMING
FIVE	: QUANTIFY THE NEEDS
SIX	: DETERMINE THE STRATEGY
SEVEN	: BUDGET
EIGHT	: DELEGATE RESPONSIBILITIES
NINE	: NEEDS
TEN	: SET UP AN ORGANIZATION

programme planning

COMMON PROBLEMS

1. POOR DEFINITION OF THE PROGRAMME
2. FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A POLICY
3. FAILURE TO DETERMINE CULTURAL/ENVIRONMENTAL PATTERNS
4. AGENCIES OFTEN FAIL TO LOOK AT DIFFERENT OPTIONS
5. ONLY ONE STRATEGY FOR ONE NEED
6. OVEREXTENSION: MORE RESPONSIBILITY THAN THEY CAN HANDLE
7. FAILURE TO EXAMINE RELATIONSHIP EFFECTS/NEGATIVE IMPACTS
8. FAILURE TO GET TECHNICAL EXPERTS

9. POOR COORDINATION

programme planning

critical issues

1. QUANTIFICATION OF NEEDS TO BE MATCHED AGAINST EXISTING RESOURCES IN THE COUNTRY AND THOSE TO BE IMPORTED(UNIPAC)
2. REPROGRAMMING OF EXISTING PROGRAMMES .. SHORTAND LONG TERM CONTINGENCY PLANS

3. EXAMPLES FOR EACH STEP IN DEVELOPING A PLAN WITH REFERENCE TO UNICEF STRUCTURE

Death and Injury

Fig. 1 Frequency distribution of deaths from 78 earthquakes in Iran during the period 1903-1978. Data obtained from Berberian [9].

Death and Injury

Fig. 2. The relationship between mortality and number of houses reported destroyed in 19 Turkish earthquakes during the period 1912-1976. Sources: Altay [1]; Ilhan [33]; London Technical Group [41].

Epidemiology of Natural Disasters

Fig. 6. Numbers of patients admitted to hospitals on successive days following three earthquakes. a. San Fernando 1971 - all admissions and hospital out-patients. Data from Olsen [53]. b. Guatemala 1976 - number of admissions (solid line) and bed occupancy (broken line) in percent, to US field hospital. Data read from published graph in de Ville de Goyet et al. [70]. c. Managua, Nicaragua 19 72-patients admitted to US emergency tent hospital. Data from Whittaker et al. [76].

Death and injury

Table III. Causes of death in the Indiana and Topeka tornadoes

Topeka		Lebanon, Ind.
Head and chest injuries	4	skull and brain injury	14
Chest injuries	4	'crushed chest trauma'	2
Head injuries	2	cervical spine fracture and cord injury	1
Massive trauma to body	1
Shock, abrasions and lacerations	1
Total	12		17
Data from Beelman [6] and Mandelbaum et al. [46].

Epidemiology of Natural Disasters

Fig. 7. Age- and sex-specific mortality rates in the area affected by the Bangladesh cyclone and storm surge of November 1970. Figures for males based on 1,359 enumerated deaths; figures for females on 1,583 enumerated deaths. Data from published graph by Summer and Mosley [60].

Death and Injury

Fig. 8. Age- and sex-specific mortality in the February 1, 1953 Netherlands flood. Numbers in bars represent absolute numbers of deaths. Data from Baesjou [3]. Calculated using population data for December 31, 1952, from Statistical Yearbook of the Netherlands 1953-1954. Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics.

Communicable Disease and Disease Control after Natural Disasters

Fig. 2. Daily hospital attendance’s for dog bites in Guatemala City after the 1976 earthquake. Data read from published graph in Spencer et al. [34].

Communicable Disease and Disease Control after Natural Disasters

Fig. 1. Percent of malaria-positive blood slides by month in zone affected by the 1963 Haitian hurricane. Drawn from data in Mason et al. [23].

Communicable Disease and Disease Control after Natural Disasters

Fig. 3. Graph of weekly hospital admissions for viral hepatitis and typhoid fever after the 1980 earthquake in southern Italy. Histogram of monthly notifications of viral hepatitis and typhoid fever for the 2 months before, and the 4 months after the earthquake, and for the same period in 1979. Data read from published graph in Greco et al. [17].

Media relations guidelines

The media

· The media consists of individuals with the same type of career motivations we all have, modified by pressures to get a story out by their next deadline and to "beat their competition.
· Reporters' needs and behaviour differ greatly, depending on whether they are print or broadcast.
· Newspaper .reporters can be expected to need and use more information than their counterparts in television.
· If information is not forthcoming from management, they will solicit it wherever it can be found. Some leeway with daily newspapers.
· Radio reporters with a deadline every hour are the most volatile.
· Most likely to dispatch news to the public without checking with management.

What they are not [necessarily]

· Expert/knowledgeable/specialist
· Supportive or opposed

What they want

· The facts
· A story
· Co-operation

What they dislike

· No comment
· Stalling
· No call backs
· Aggression

What they are

· Powerful
· Influential
· Opinion leaders
· Wielders of influence
· Biased (many reasons)
· Under pressure
· Human

What they will always have

· The last word (if you let them)
· The power to distort or interpret
· Little control over editing or headlines
· No desire to print retractions
· Little patience if they suspect stalling
· Full control over the story - no reading back may check through
· No respect for "off the record"

N.B. They are all different - styles, level of ethics. They are people. Each one however junior or senior demands respect, attention and patience.

Guidelines for appearance on television

Do's

DO wear subdued coloured clothes, and especially tie [no checks or over-striped suits].
DO check your appearance before going into the studio -tie, hair, buttons, zips?
DO sit upright and tidily.
DO look at interviewer all the time except when you are meant to be addressing the TV audience.
DO speak in simple language - avoid jargon at all costs.
DO make short statements, each holding up on its own.
DO remember to make your most important points as early as possible.
DO avoid tortuous logic.
DO before you begin, discuss with the interviewer what line the discussion will take.
DO remember the interviewer knows less about your subject than you do.
DO have reference material handy.
DO try to have the last word.
DO remember that any taped or videotaped programme is likely to be edited before use.
DO check out the background of your interviewer beforehand - likewise the programme. B-M can help.

Don'ts

DON’T smoke on the air. :
DON’T forget the smallest mannerisms show up more obviously on TV.
DON’T accept a revolving or movable chair.
DON’T fidget or fiddle with pens, pencils, lighters etc.
DON’T forget your handkerchief!
DON’T say "I think" too often. It sounds as though you are uncertain of your subject.

Dealing with the media

· Crystallise points into short, hard-hitting phrases -use them as jumping-off points.
· Support statements with facts/third party evidence.
· Use widest viewpoint/policy rather than individual thought
· Don't restate critics position.
· Get to your most important points first.

But don't

· Say anything "off the record".
· Let words be put in your mouth.
· Don't guess or speculate.
· Don't argue or attack the media.
· Don't get lulled into a false sense of security.

SUPPLY OPERATIONS IN EMERGENCIES

I. SUPPLY/LOGISTICS PREPAREDNESS
II. SOURCES OF SUPPLY
III. MONITORING SUPPLY/LOGISTICS OPERATIONS
IV. DISCUSSIONS
V. KAMPUCHEA EMERGENCY SUPPLY/LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

VI. STOCKPILING FOR EMERGENCIES

SUPPLY/LOGISTICS OPERATIONS IN EMERGENCIES

FAILURE OR SUCCESS DEPENDS ON THE 3R'S

- RIGHT SUPPLY ITEMS
- RIGHT PLACE

- RIGHT TIME

I. SUPPLY LOGISTICS PREPAREDNESS

TO COLLECT INFORMATION ON:

- POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS OF COMMON ITEMS
-MEANS OF TRANSPORT AND ROUTES TO SITES
-POTENTIAL TRANSPORT CONTRACTORS

-MEANS OF DELIVERY FOR OFFSHORE GOODS

II. SOURCES OF SUPPLY

- LOCAL PROCUREMENT
- OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT
- DONATIONS IN KIND

LOCAL PROCUREMENT

QUICKEST AND MOST EFFECTIVE FOR IMMEDIATE SUPPLY NEEDS

POINTS TO CONSIDER

- Create shortages/price increases
- Coordinate with other agencies for procurement in some markets
- Compare prices with offshore prices, including freight
- Bulky supplies and vehicles
- Identify immediate needs for local procurement and balance for offshore procurement
- LOCAL PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY

US$ 5,000

- REPRESENTATIVE'S AUTHORITY FOR DIVERSION

US$ 25,000

OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT

- Global procurement from Copenhagen
- UNIPAC warehouse standard items
- Regional procurement by regional office
- Bulky purchases from manufacturers

® low price

- UNIPAC standard set packings

® easy and rapid distribution

- Other government/UN/NGOs benefit from UNIPAC
- REGIONAL PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY

US$ 5,000

DONATIONS IN KIND

- Confusion and problems if not planned
- Establish overall supply needs
- Consider/accept donations in kind for those needs
- Specifications to be cleared by field office and supply division
- Donations in kind items should not require special storage
- Field offices should have final say on unsolicited donations in kind

- Consult with UNHCR Guide on donations in kind

III. MONITORING SUPPLY/LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

- ESTABLISH SYSTEM RIGHT FROM VERY BEGINNING
- FROM WHERE THE SUPPLY ITEMS WILL COME
- TO WHERE THE SUPPLY ITEMS WILL GO
- WHAT SUPPLY ITEMS ARE IN THE PIPELINE

- USEFUL FOR REPORT PREPARATION AND EXPERIENCE SHARING

IV. DISCUSSIONS

- Standardization of supply items desirable, but difficult for donations in kind situations, e.g., trucks
- Confusion and supply/logistics problems resulting from unsolicited donations in kind (identification/sorting out)
- Contract local transport organizations if possible (familiar with local operations)
- Use containers but consider in-country capacity and handling facilities
- Consider stockpiling and staging areas
- Fund allocation for unforeseen expenditure, e.g., hiring trucks
- REPRESENTATIVE'S AUTHORITY FOR DIVERSION US$ 25,000
- LOCAL PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY
US$ 5,000
- REGIONAL PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY

US$ 5,000

V. KAMPUCHEA EMERGENCY SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

LESSONS LEARNED

- Need of one coordinator: a senior person with emergency experience and managerial skills
- Form task force for coordination with government/UN/NGOs to avoid confusion and duplication
- Need for adequate support staff with experience
- Need of early and systematic assessment of needs
- Need of clear and complete specification purpose and use
- Effectiveness of local procurement and local contracting
- Supply requests need to be for real, immediate requirements for local procurement consideration
- Early delivery is overriding factor in life-saving operations

- Supply staff should undertake local procurement and not programme staff to avoid confusion within organization and with suppliers

VI. STOCKPILING FOR EMERGENCIES

- UNDRO stockpiles in Pisa, Italy
- Finland country stockpiles for donations
- Japan regional stockpiles
- UNIPAC stockpiles

- revised list will be included in 1988 UNIPAC Catalog (287 to 171 items and total value US$1 million)
- use WHO standard health kits for 10,000 persons for 3 months (10 sets each packed ready for immediate shipment and another 10 sets as loose items)
- other items still available as loose items
- kit contents should be grouped under general subgrouping
- include users' instructions in each kit

- measurement' weight kits for storage and transport

EMERGENCY SYSTEMS

BOOK E

Restoration of Government Infrastructure

STAFFING

RECONSTRUCTION - SOUTH LEBANON

1980-1985

UNICEF - CDR

Total Budget:	$ 60 m.	Staff:	85
Time:	8 years	Offices:	2
# Projects:	800	Reporting:	HQ

HEALTH
WATER
EDUCATION

Area of Operation:

South Lebanon (South of Litani)
South Lebanon (South of Damascus road)
Greater Beirut & Tripoli

WHAT WAS DONE? WHY?

WHAT WAS NOT DONE? WHY NOT?

CRISIS ASSESMENT RESPONSE

(Hardware)

Donor Impact	Geopolitical Jungle
- Funds	- Bureaucrateic Government
- Activities	- Military - geog.
- Area of Operation	- Crisis - Security
Operation	Linkage - Regular
- Staffing
- Systems
- Handover
Collaboration	Vulnerable Groups Priorities:
- UNIFIL	- Immunization / ORS
- HCR	- Unaccompanied Children
- NGO	- Self - Help

Handover - Local Staff Only

WHAT WAS DONE?	WHY?
Direct:
Restoration of basic Government Services. (hardware, water).	default
Emergency water supply. (direct victims, darkest days).	save lives
Relief of displaced. (equilibrating)	Integrated response

Indirect:

Mobilized Communities - Encourage return of displaced
Stimulated employment - local contractors in cut off areas.
Channeled frozed bilateral aid budgets

WHAT WAS NOT DONE?

Staffing: No budget (gov't)

Training: No staff (gov't)

No Transition of Regular Program: Persistant civil strife

Assistance to Vulnerable Groups:

Plan, Structure, Staff, tailored to rehab.
An entirely different assessment/response is required, ideally from the onset.