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close this bookThe Long Road to Recovery: Community Responses to Industrial Disaster (UNU, 1996, 307 pages)
View the document(introductory text...)
View the documentNote to the reader from the UNU
View the documentIntroduction
close this folder1 Improving community responses to industrial disasters
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View the documentIntroduction
View the documentThe nature of industrial disaster
View the documentIndustrial disaster burdens
View the documentThe evolution of responses
View the documentRoutine disasters
View the documentSurprises
View the documentCoping with surprise
View the documentReducing the impact of industrial disaster surprises: The range of choice
View the documentRecovering from surprise
View the documentConclusions
View the documentNotes
View the documentReferences
close this folder2 Responses to Minamata disease
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View the documentIntroduction
View the documentWho are the victims of Minamata disease?
View the documentOfficial recognition of Minamata disease and the initial response
close this folderChisso's grip on the local community
View the documentThe making of Minamata
View the documentEnvironmental destruction before Minamata disease
close this folderNeglect in preventing the spread of disease
View the documentManoeuvres to avoid a ban on fishing
View the documentObstacles to identifying the cause of Minamata disease
View the documentEfforts to halt the dumping of contaminated wastes
close this folderProblems associated with relief and reparations
View the documentRelief
View the documentReparations
View the documentMeasures to aid the fisheries
View the documentHow the local community suppressed the victims
View the documentConclusions
View the documentEditor's postscript
View the documentChronology
View the documentNotes
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close this folder3 Environmental contamination, community transformation, and the Centralia mine fire
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View the documentIntroduction
View the documentCentralia: A dependent town
View the documentThe Centralia mine fire
View the documentA stage model of industrial contamination
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View the documentImplications
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close this folder4 Seveso: A paradoxical classic disaster
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View the documentIntroduction
close this folderOverview
View the documentThe chemical release
View the documentDioxin
View the documentThe Seveso Directive
close this folderThe European Community's institutional response to Seveso
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View the documentThe Directive and its annexes
View the documentOther institutional effects of the Seveso Directive
close this folderThe lessons of Seveso
View the documentA model for managing uncertainty
View the documentModelling the Seveso disaster
View the documentModelling the Seveso Directive
View the documentModelling the Karin B incident
View the documentA moral paradox
View the documentA scientific paradox
View the documentIndustrial accidents, industrial society, and recovery
View the documentConclusion: ''Seveso'' - A paradoxical symbol
View the documentAcknowledgements
View the documentChronology
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close this folder5 Long-term recovery from the Bhopal crisis
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View the documentIntroduction
View the documentThe Bhopal toxic gas leak crisis
close this folderAntecedents and failures
View the documentInside the plant
View the documentOutside the plant
View the documentA multiple-perspectives understanding of crises
close this folderRecovery of the victims and their community
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View the documentMedical recovery
View the documentEconomic recovery
View the documentStruggle for compensation
View the documentVictims remain victims
close this folderRecovery of Union Carbide
View the documentFinancial restructuring
View the documentLegal battles and the ''sabotage'' defence
close this folderRecovery of the government
View the documentPolitical management of the crisis
View the documentLearning by government institutions
close this folderImplications for long-term disaster recovery
View the document(introductory text...)
View the documentCrisis morphology
View the documentThe permanence of victims
View the documentRevising stage models of disasters
View the documentPolicy implications
View the documentNote
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close this folder6 Iranian recovery from industrial devastation during war with Iraq
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View the documentIntroduction
View the documentMilitary and strategic context
close this folderImpacts of the war on human health and long-term habitability of the region
View the documentHuman losses
View the documentEnvironmental damage
View the documentDamage to human settlements and the economy
close this folderRecovery from war
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View the documentNational reconstruction plans
View the documentSupport from international organizations and local communities
View the documentUrban reconstruction
View the documentHousing reconstruction
View the documentIndustrial reconstruction
close this folderConceptual framework for a model of post-war reconstruction and industrial hazard recovery
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View the documentA reconstruction strategy
View the documentThe reconstruction process
View the documentImproving recovery and policy implications
View the documentNotes
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close this folder7 The Chernobyl disasters Its effect on Belarus and Ukraine
View the document(introductory text...)
View the documentIntroduction
close this folderThe accident and its immediate aftermath
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View the documentThe accident is ''under control''
View the documentFocus on the West
View the documentInternational cooperation
View the documentThe affected community
close this folderRegeneration and recovery
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View the documentVictim action groups
View the documentInternational aid
close this folderTowards a model for nuclear and industrial accidents
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View the documentStages of crisis management
View the documentThree Mile Island, 1979
View the documentThe international nuclear energy industry's response to Chernobyl
View the documentSummary
View the documentSuggestions for a general model of recovery from industrial accidents
View the documentAcknowledgement
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View the documentMedia sources
close this folder8 The Exxon Valdez oil spill, Alaska
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View the documentIntroduction
close this folderThe oil industry and the spill
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View the documentThe accident
close this folderHistorical and cultural contexts
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View the documentThe Katmai eruption
View the documentThe great Alaskan earthquake
close this folderThe oil spill: Community impact
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View the documentPsychological, social, and cultural impacts
View the documentThe villages
View the documentTown responses
close this folderRecovery
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View the documentLitigation initiatives
View the documentThe communities
View the documentOrganizational responses
View the documentNew risks
View the documentOther kinds of recovery activities
View the documentBut, what is recovery?
View the documentConclusions
View the documentChronology of the first 10 days
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close this folder9 Signposts on the road to recovery
View the document(introductory text...)
View the documentSurprising events and disquieting outcomes
close this folderResponding effectively to industrial disaster surprises
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View the documentAwareness
View the documentInformation
View the documentAction
View the documentRecommendations
View the documentReferences
View the documentContributors

International aid

The Chernobyl disaster has resulted in a substantial campaign of international aid to the former Slavic republics of the USSR. Aid has been offered by foreign governments; the international scientific community; independent activist groups, such as Greenpeace International; the International Red Cross; and scores of individual organizations of a humanitarian nature, some of which developed in the Ukrainian diaspora. Most of the funding that is currently used to deal with effects of Chernobyl comes from such sources. Though enduring and vital, this kind of support suffers from certain drawbacks and restrictions that are discussed below.

Organizational constraints
The question has often been raised by external humanitarian groups: with whom should we deal in offering aid? Between 1986 and 1990, the most substantial assistance was offered through the central authorities (and, correspondingly, the Soviet Bank) in Moscow. This development was resented in the republics, especially by those people who were trying to divert attention from the centre of the USSR to their own areas. It signified that, after the surprising collapse of the USSR, many aid groups were left without a known contact when administration of Chernobyl problems was transferred from Moscow to the republics. Russia, though widely affected by Chernobyl, was not as seriously damaged as Belarus and Ukraine, and yet most of the central ministries were readapted as purely Russian variants. Conversely, many international groups had no wish to deal with organizations based in the republics that, before 1991, had little or no decision-making experience or authority.

International aid groups
In both Ukraine and Belarus, the ending of Soviet hegemony has not made it easier for grass-roots organizations to aid Chernobyl's victims. True, the dominant political systems are less oppressive than in the past, but they are often staffed by the same individuals. Moreover, independent associations face severe financial handicaps that preclude large-scale action. A plethora of such groups vies for public support and the ear of decision makers. In Belarus, it has been speculated that the government has deliberately tried to organize groups with independent-sounding names to facilitate the diversion of funds away from charitable associations. In mid-1991, for example, there were 13 officially registered charitable Chernobyl funds (as listed in Narodnaya hazeta, 20 July 1991), namely:

1. The Belarusian Social-Ecological Union "Chernobyl," founded on 16 November 1990 to protect the rights of citizens suffering from the catastrophe;

2. The Belarusian-Japanese Society "Chernobyl-Hiroshima," formed on 19 November 1990 as a technological provision programme for the "liquidation of the accident";

3. The Charitable Center "Otklik" (Response), founded on 19 November 1990 to offer charitable aid to those "suffering from the catastrophe";

4. The Belarusian Charitable Fund for the Children of Chernobyl, registered on 20 November 1990 and described above;

5. The Belarusian Committee "Children of Chernobyl," founded on 21 November 1990 to give aid to those suffering from the disaster;

6. The Belarusian Action Committee "Echo of Chernobyl," formed on 23 November 1990 for the same purpose;

7. The Belarusian Union of Participants in the Liquidation of the Consequences of the Catastrophe at Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, created on 6 December 1990 to provide social, material, and medical aid to those in need;

8. The Fund of International Cooperation for Social Protection "Byelorussian," founded on 20 December 1990, whose mission is described in its title;

9. The Belarusian Union of the Participants in the Liquidation of the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe "Pripyat," formed on 24 December 1990 to protect the interests of the clean-up crews;

10. The "Chernobyl" Union of the Belarusian SSR, founded on 6 February 1991 - a state and government organization aimed at protecting the rights of those affected by Chernobyl;

11. The Young Ecological Movement of the Belarusian SSR "Belarus," formed on 30 April 1991, which was involved in the state programme to eliminate Chernobyl's consequences;

12. The Belarusian Society of Radiobiologists, created on 30 April 1991 to study the results of the disaster;

13. The Belarusian Homeopathic Association, which dates from 28 March 1991 and was devoted to medical assistance for the victims of Chernobyl.

With so many apparently praiseworthy competitors it has been difficult for any single fund to receive the scale of aid that is required to make real inroads on the problems engendered by Chernobyl. Moreover, the fact that the government itself has organized several of the associations named above may have precluded "fair competition" between them. Almost all newspapers in the republic are funded by state and government organs and can draw attention to official rather than to privately run charitable bodies.

Information problems
A third problem, and perhaps the major one to date, has been the lack of accurate information about radiation fallout and the health effects of the disaster. We have seen that the first maps of the fallout were released only in the spring of 1989, and the overall picture has emerged only since that time. It is still not clearly defined. There is not even an accurate tally of deaths. There is no single and complete data bank that encompasses those affected by Chernobyl, and may never be.38 The effects of low-level radiation on the population are not known. On the one hand, some scientists maintain that there have been no discernible effects; others state that the results are already being seen and that even very small rises in background radiation can cause changes to the human organism. We do not know the precise area of all radiation fallout, particularly hotspots of plutonium, caesium, and strontium fallout in parts of Russia and the Baltic republics. Ultimately establishing the effects of Chernobyl radiation may come down to mundane questions (such as what people were doing at the time of the accident) and to matters of general health (such as how healthy were such people in April 1986; did they smoke; did they have access to clean food?). All these factors render Chernobyl one of the most difficult disasters about which to offer definitive statements.