Mismatch between demand and supply of cognitive skills: Implications for women
The case for complying with such demands for upgrading women's
skills arises from the projected estimates of a mismatch between demand and
supply of certain types of cognitive skills in all parts of the world.
As Figure 2.1 shows, the importance of labour-intensive work is
declining in the planning horizon of the industrialized world, with the
introduction of computer-aided systems of production. Corporate organizations
mainly need an assured supply of the requisite management and technical skills
in order to meet the challenges of information-intensive methods of production.
Even in the midst of world-wide recession, companies of the western world and of
Japan face shortages of workers who possess such technical qualifications.
Hence, those developing countries which can offer a supply of scarce skills
become the favoured destinations for relocated manufacturing work from the
developed part of the world.
The demographic trend in the western world accentuates this
process. It indicates an impending shortage of skilled young workers in the
developed world. From 1985 to 2000, the world's workforce is expected to grow by
some 600 million people; 570 million of them will join the workforce in the
developing world. In countries such as Pakistan and Mexico the workforce will
grow at about 3 per cent a year. In contrast, growth rates in the United States,
Canada and Spain will be closer to 1 per cent a year. Japan's workforce will
grow by just 0.5 per cent a year and Germany's workforce will actually decline.
The resultant shortages of skilled (and unskilled) workers are unlikely to be
relieved by greater female participation in the developed world; this is because
the developed nations have already absorbed a much higher percentage of women
into the labour force than the developing world.
Figure 2.1 Expected
changes in the volume and occupational structure of employment in the UK
manufacturing industry
Source: Derived from figures supplied by the FAST
Commission of the European Union (1984)
The ageing population of the developed world, compared with the
youthful workforce of the developing nations, is likely to be less flexible and
hence less amenable to the challenges of information-intensive jobs. Companies
and countries in the richer parts of the world will increase their dependence on
international sourcing for the requisite expertise; the trend will become more
pronounced as the developing nations will produce an ever-increasing share of
the world's graduates in science, mathematics and engineering. Between 1970 and
1985, the proportion of the world's college students from the United States,
Canada, Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan dropped from 77 per cent to 51 per
cent, and by the year 2000, students from developing nations will make up
three-fifths of all students in higher education.6
For some countries and some companies, measures to attract scarce
human capital have become an important strategic policy, even in the face of the
political explosiveness of the immigration issue. According to experts in INSEE
(Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques), between now and
the year 2010 it will be necessary for France to admit 100,000 immigrants per
annum - perhaps through yearly quotas by profession - if it is to avoid economic
'anaemia' arising out of shortages of skilled labour.7
Alternatively, the companies of the developed world will have to
relocate the information and knowledge-intensive jobs to countries where the
youthful population is well-equipped to take up the challenges of the new tasks.
The extent and direction of foreign direct investment (FDI) from
the developed to the developing world is already influenced by this trend. A
small number of Asian countries, mostly located in East Asia, have experienced
an upsurge in the inflow of foreign direct investment (Table 2.1).8
Significantly, these are the countries, such as China and the Republic of Korea,
which have a relatively highly trained female workforce and possess adequate
industrial infrastructures.
In the pioneer days of electronics, employers needed the nimble
fingers of women workers for connecting tiny wires to a semi-conductor. The same
task is now being done by a machine, with as many as ten machines under the
charge of just one woman. It is not only the labour content that is decreasing;
the quality of labour that is being demanded of electronic workers by the global
companies is rising at the same time.9
The need for skilled workers also arises from the changing nature
of marketing strategies adopted by corporate organizations. In semiconductors,
for example, the global trend is away from mass-produced 'jelly-bean' chips to
high-value-added, application-specific, integrated circuits
(ASICs).10 The production of ASICs, unlike that of standardized
semiconductors, involves a far greater input of circuit design and of software
programming. The limited supply of design engineers thus poses an obstacle for
moving up in the product cycle.
In other words, a country can entice investments from global
companies by offering cheap skilled labour. It is, of course, not possible for
all countries to produce these cognitive skills in the right quantities to
attract adequate FDI. It is unlikely that the majority of women in any country
will have access to the relevant training and education. A handful of elite
women can be trained for new openings in management, technical or software
programming jobs, but it will be difficult for a vast number of blue-collar
workers to be trained, in a short period, in the multiple skills that computer
technology and the global companies demand. For them, it will be important to
explore alternative avenues of employment - perhaps in the small and
medium-scale sectors.
Table 2.1 Foreign direct investment in selected South East
Asian countries (US$ trillion)
|
1986
|
1987
|
1988
|
1989
|
1990
|
1991
|
1992
|
|
ASEAN Countries
|
|
Malaysia
|
489
|
423
|
719
|
1,668
|
2,332
|
3,998
|
4,469
|
|
Thailand
|
263
|
352
|
1,105
|
1,775
|
2,444
|
2,014
|
2,116
|
|
Indonesia
|
258
|
385
|
576
|
682
|
1,093
|
1,482
|
1,774
|
|
Philippines
|
127
|
307
|
936
|
563
|
530
|
544
|
228
|
|
Singapore
|
1,710
|
2,836
|
3,655
|
2,773
|
5,263
|
4,395
|
5,635
|
|
Total ASEAN (a)
|
2,847
|
4,303
|
6,991
|
7,461
|
11,662
|
12,433
|
14,222
|
|
Total as percentage of global inflow into developing
countries
|
20.0
|
25.1
|
25.1
|
27.3
|
37.3
|
31.8
|
27.6
|
|
China
|
1,875
|
2,314
|
3,194
|
3,393
|
3,487
|
4,366
|
11,156
|
|
Korea
|
435
|
601
|
871
|
758
|
715
|
1,116
|
550
|
Sources: UNCTAD, 1992 and 1994
(a) excluding Brunei. which has small negative flows, reaching
US$4 million in 1992
The general mode of training in large companies could also be
incompatible with the needs of blue-collar workers. Women's ability to make use
of formal training schemes depends much on their position in the society and in
the family. A woman worker often has to cope with violence and abuse in the
family, along with the responsibilities of childcare. These factors affect her
ability to pursue education and career progression. Informal training - such as
is often gained by women in the small and medium-scale sector - could be of
greater relevance for blue-collar workers.
For blue-collar workers, employment prospects in the high-tech era
remain uncertain. Computer-aided technology improves productivity and wages, but
it also reduces the need for unskilled labour. In some situations, when the
market expands continuously to absorb the surplus labour, the volume of
employment of blue-collar workers widens or remains unchanged in spite of new
technology. In Bangladesh, for example, a worker displaced by new technology
could easily find another job with the same employer or have an option in
employment with another enterprise (UNIDO, 1993). The possibilities are not
always so optimistic, particularly when the technology is coupled with radical
organizational innovations. The innovations demand not only less labour on the
factory floor but different and complex skills to which blue-collar workers, who
are women, rarely have access. In Malaysia, for instance, the introduction of
the JIT system in the semi-conductor sector increased the demand for expertise
in material control systems such as Materials Requirement Planning (MRP), and
Materials Resource Planning (MRPII).11 The result of introducing JIT
has been impressive. In one firm, the use of JIT and automation has, since 1984,
halved the labour and the factory space needed and resulted in a reduction in
the working week to four days (Narayan and Rajah, 1990). Most firms in Penang
have reduced machine set-up time and manufacturing lead time.
The increased overall productivity, however, has meant a reduction
in the share of female employment in the electronics industry of Malaysia.
Whereas in the first phase of the industry up to 80 per cent of the workers were
women, a 1986 survey showed that female representation had fallen to 67 per
cent. Retrenchment, automation and the decentralization of work have mainly
affected female assembly-line workers. When automation did create new
opportunities, they were largely in the male-dominated professional, technical
and maintenance categories.
The experience of the pharmaceutical and other chemical industries
in India has been similar. Increased sub-contracting in the 1980s has entailed
huge job losses for women assembly-line workers (Gothoskar, 1990; Gothoskar
et al. 1991: pp. 100-102). Most new recruitment, in contrast, has been in
the 'core', executive and managerial categories where women have negligible
representation (Gothoskar et al., 1991: p. 101).
Retrenched women, and by definition older women, find it difficult
to gain access either to in-service training or to academic training
institutions that equip them for jobs in the formal sector. It is the
small-scale satellite companies that often absorb retrenched workers in the
labour-intensive assembly
operations.