
| The Long Road to Recovery: Community Responses to Industrial Disaster (UNU, 1996, 307 pages) |
| (introductory text...) |
| Note to the reader from the UNU |
| Introduction |
| 1 Improving community responses to industrial disasters |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | The nature of industrial disaster |
![]() | Industrial disaster burdens |
![]() | The evolution of responses |
![]() | Routine disasters |
![]() | Surprises |
![]() | Coping with surprise |
![]() | Reducing the impact of industrial disaster surprises: The range of choice |
![]() | Recovering from surprise |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
| 2 Responses to Minamata disease |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Who are the victims of Minamata disease? |
![]() | Official recognition of Minamata disease and the initial response |
![]() | Chisso's grip on the local community |
![]() | The making of Minamata |
![]() | Environmental destruction before Minamata disease |
![]() | Neglect in preventing the spread of disease |
![]() | Manoeuvres to avoid a ban on fishing |
![]() | Obstacles to identifying the cause of Minamata disease |
![]() | Efforts to halt the dumping of contaminated wastes |
![]() | Problems associated with relief and reparations |
![]() | Relief |
![]() | Reparations |
![]() | Measures to aid the fisheries |
![]() | How the local community suppressed the victims |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | Editor's postscript |
![]() | Chronology |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
| 3 Environmental contamination, community transformation, and the Centralia mine fire |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Centralia: A dependent town |
![]() | The Centralia mine fire |
![]() | A stage model of industrial contamination |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | Implications |
![]() | Recommendations |
![]() | References |
| 4 Seveso: A paradoxical classic disaster |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Overview |
![]() | The chemical release |
![]() | Dioxin |
![]() | The Seveso Directive |
![]() | The European Community's institutional response to Seveso |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | The Directive and its annexes |
![]() | Other institutional effects of the Seveso Directive |
![]() | The lessons of Seveso |
![]() | A model for managing uncertainty |
![]() | Modelling the Seveso disaster |
![]() | Modelling the Seveso Directive |
![]() | Modelling the Karin B incident |
![]() | A moral paradox |
![]() | A scientific paradox |
![]() | Industrial accidents, industrial society, and recovery |
![]() | Conclusion: ''Seveso'' - A paradoxical symbol |
![]() | Acknowledgements |
![]() | Chronology |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
| 5 Long-term recovery from the Bhopal crisis |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | The Bhopal toxic gas leak crisis |
![]() | Antecedents and failures |
![]() | Inside the plant |
![]() | Outside the plant |
![]() | A multiple-perspectives understanding of crises |
![]() | Recovery of the victims and their community |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Medical recovery |
![]() | Economic recovery |
![]() | Struggle for compensation |
![]() | Victims remain victims |
![]() | Recovery of Union Carbide |
![]() | Financial restructuring |
![]() | Legal battles and the ''sabotage'' defence |
![]() | Recovery of the government |
![]() | Political management of the crisis |
![]() | Learning by government institutions |
![]() | Implications for long-term disaster recovery |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Crisis morphology |
![]() | The permanence of victims |
![]() | Revising stage models of disasters |
![]() | Policy implications |
![]() | Note |
![]() | References |
| 6 Iranian recovery from industrial devastation during war with Iraq |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Military and strategic context |
![]() | Impacts of the war on human health and long-term habitability of the region |
![]() | Human losses |
![]() | Environmental damage |
![]() | Damage to human settlements and the economy |
![]() | Recovery from war |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | National reconstruction plans |
![]() | Support from international organizations and local communities |
![]() | Urban reconstruction |
![]() | Housing reconstruction |
![]() | Industrial reconstruction |
![]() | Conceptual framework for a model of post-war reconstruction and industrial hazard recovery |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | A reconstruction strategy |
![]() | The reconstruction process |
![]() | Improving recovery and policy implications |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
| 7 The Chernobyl disasters Its effect on Belarus and Ukraine |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | The accident and its immediate aftermath |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | The accident is ''under control'' |
![]() | Focus on the West |
![]() | International cooperation |
![]() | The affected community |
![]() | Regeneration and recovery |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Victim action groups |
![]() | International aid |
![]() | Towards a model for nuclear and industrial accidents |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Stages of crisis management |
![]() | Three Mile Island, 1979 |
![]() | The international nuclear energy industry's response to Chernobyl |
![]() | Summary |
![]() | Suggestions for a general model of recovery from industrial accidents |
![]() | Acknowledgement |
![]() | Chronology |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
![]() | Media sources |
| 8 The Exxon Valdez oil spill, Alaska |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | The oil industry and the spill |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | The accident |
![]() | Historical and cultural contexts |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | The Katmai eruption |
![]() | The great Alaskan earthquake |
![]() | The oil spill: Community impact |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Psychological, social, and cultural impacts |
![]() | The villages |
![]() | Town responses |
![]() | Recovery |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Litigation initiatives |
![]() | The communities |
![]() | Organizational responses |
![]() | New risks |
![]() | Other kinds of recovery activities |
![]() | But, what is recovery? |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | Chronology of the first 10 days |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
| 9 Signposts on the road to recovery |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Surprising events and disquieting outcomes |
![]() | Responding effectively to industrial disaster surprises |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Awareness |
![]() | Information |
![]() | Action |
![]() | Recommendations |
![]() | References |
| Contributors |
Like the earthquake that was followed by a series of tsunamis, the oil spill was followed by a series of metaphorical tsunamis of the emotions. It became a media event with powerful, disturbing images, especially of oiled birds and sea otters (Davis 1990).
The section that follows draws on many kinds of data: (a) community-specific accounts by sociologists and anthropologists (Araji 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1993); (b) corporate, state, and federal reports (US GAO 1989, 1991b); (c) selected media coverage; as well as (d) my own research on the ferry Tustemena (7-14 May 1989) and in seven communities during July and August 1989 (Davis 1989b). Some conclusions are also based on observations made while living in Anchorage during most of the first four years following the oil spill.