
| The Long Road to Recovery: Community Responses to Industrial Disaster (UNU, 1996, 307 pages) |
| (introductory text...) |
| Note to the reader from the UNU |
| Introduction |
| 1 Improving community responses to industrial disasters |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | The nature of industrial disaster |
![]() | Industrial disaster burdens |
![]() | The evolution of responses |
![]() | Routine disasters |
![]() | Surprises |
![]() | Coping with surprise |
![]() | Reducing the impact of industrial disaster surprises: The range of choice |
![]() | Recovering from surprise |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
| 2 Responses to Minamata disease |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Who are the victims of Minamata disease? |
![]() | Official recognition of Minamata disease and the initial response |
![]() | Chisso's grip on the local community |
![]() | The making of Minamata |
![]() | Environmental destruction before Minamata disease |
![]() | Neglect in preventing the spread of disease |
![]() | Manoeuvres to avoid a ban on fishing |
![]() | Obstacles to identifying the cause of Minamata disease |
![]() | Efforts to halt the dumping of contaminated wastes |
![]() | Problems associated with relief and reparations |
![]() | Relief |
![]() | Reparations |
![]() | Measures to aid the fisheries |
![]() | How the local community suppressed the victims |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | Editor's postscript |
![]() | Chronology |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
| 3 Environmental contamination, community transformation, and the Centralia mine fire |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Centralia: A dependent town |
![]() | The Centralia mine fire |
![]() | A stage model of industrial contamination |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | Implications |
![]() | Recommendations |
![]() | References |
| 4 Seveso: A paradoxical classic disaster |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Overview |
![]() | The chemical release |
![]() | Dioxin |
![]() | The Seveso Directive |
![]() | The European Community's institutional response to Seveso |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | The Directive and its annexes |
![]() | Other institutional effects of the Seveso Directive |
![]() | The lessons of Seveso |
![]() | A model for managing uncertainty |
![]() | Modelling the Seveso disaster |
![]() | Modelling the Seveso Directive |
![]() | Modelling the Karin B incident |
![]() | A moral paradox |
![]() | A scientific paradox |
![]() | Industrial accidents, industrial society, and recovery |
![]() | Conclusion: ''Seveso'' - A paradoxical symbol |
![]() | Acknowledgements |
![]() | Chronology |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
| 5 Long-term recovery from the Bhopal crisis |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | The Bhopal toxic gas leak crisis |
![]() | Antecedents and failures |
![]() | Inside the plant |
![]() | Outside the plant |
![]() | A multiple-perspectives understanding of crises |
![]() | Recovery of the victims and their community |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Medical recovery |
![]() | Economic recovery |
![]() | Struggle for compensation |
![]() | Victims remain victims |
![]() | Recovery of Union Carbide |
![]() | Financial restructuring |
![]() | Legal battles and the ''sabotage'' defence |
![]() | Recovery of the government |
![]() | Political management of the crisis |
![]() | Learning by government institutions |
![]() | Implications for long-term disaster recovery |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Crisis morphology |
![]() | The permanence of victims |
![]() | Revising stage models of disasters |
![]() | Policy implications |
![]() | Note |
![]() | References |
| 6 Iranian recovery from industrial devastation during war with Iraq |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Military and strategic context |
![]() | Impacts of the war on human health and long-term habitability of the region |
![]() | Human losses |
![]() | Environmental damage |
![]() | Damage to human settlements and the economy |
![]() | Recovery from war |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | National reconstruction plans |
![]() | Support from international organizations and local communities |
![]() | Urban reconstruction |
![]() | Housing reconstruction |
![]() | Industrial reconstruction |
![]() | Conceptual framework for a model of post-war reconstruction and industrial hazard recovery |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | A reconstruction strategy |
![]() | The reconstruction process |
![]() | Improving recovery and policy implications |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
| 7 The Chernobyl disasters Its effect on Belarus and Ukraine |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | The accident and its immediate aftermath |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | The accident is ''under control'' |
![]() | Focus on the West |
![]() | International cooperation |
![]() | The affected community |
![]() | Regeneration and recovery |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Victim action groups |
![]() | International aid |
![]() | Towards a model for nuclear and industrial accidents |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Stages of crisis management |
![]() | Three Mile Island, 1979 |
![]() | The international nuclear energy industry's response to Chernobyl |
![]() | Summary |
![]() | Suggestions for a general model of recovery from industrial accidents |
![]() | Acknowledgement |
![]() | Chronology |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
![]() | Media sources |
| 8 The Exxon Valdez oil spill, Alaska |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | The oil industry and the spill |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | The accident |
![]() | Historical and cultural contexts |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | The Katmai eruption |
![]() | The great Alaskan earthquake |
![]() | The oil spill: Community impact |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Psychological, social, and cultural impacts |
![]() | The villages |
![]() | Town responses |
![]() | Recovery |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Litigation initiatives |
![]() | The communities |
![]() | Organizational responses |
![]() | New risks |
![]() | Other kinds of recovery activities |
![]() | But, what is recovery? |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | Chronology of the first 10 days |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | References |
| 9 Signposts on the road to recovery |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Surprising events and disquieting outcomes |
![]() | Responding effectively to industrial disaster surprises |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Awareness |
![]() | Information |
![]() | Action |
![]() | Recommendations |
![]() | References |
| Contributors |
The range of concerns, irritations, and benefits varied greatly among the affected towns during the summer of 1989. Polarizations, between those who worked for Exxon or its contracted service organization VECO Inc. and those who did not, set people against each other in new ways. Many looked favourably on opportunities to make large sums of money ($16.69 an hour) on clean-up activities, or to charter their boats (up to $6,000 a day), or to provide other well-paid services. Those not hired, or who spurned Exxon or VECO, scorned their neighbours who accepted the employment. If a fisherman or any local resident wanted to make money, the opportunity generally was available. If, on the other hand, a fisherman refused to work for the oil company that was perceived as being responsible for the mess, then he was doubly penalized - he lost the chance to make money from the clean-up and he also lost expected income from fishing areas that were closed because of fears about oil contamination. Disagreements among the fishermen were intense and painful. Lack of resolution, combined with a sudden decline in chum salmon during the summer of 1993, led frustrated fishermen to block tanker traffic on Valdez Arm in a desperate attempt to force a discussion with Exxon about their claims. Litigation, and decline in fish stocks, prices, and permit value, have unquestionably slowed recovery for this segment of the population.
As a community, Cordova appears to have suffered the greatest disruption for the longest time and gained the least. Before 1989 it was already a conflict-ridden town; the oil spill may just have offered a new arena for traditional hostilities and exacerbated some of the old problems. But this may also be a misreading of the evidence because more data have been gathered - and made available - on Cordova than on other towns (Picou et al. 1992; Dyer, Gill, and Picou 1992; Reynolds 1993).
Nevertheless, the sources of dispute in Cordova were many: they included the fishermen's willingness or unwillingness to help; inequities of hire by Exxon and Veco; closure of the fishing season; a sudden decline in the number and price of chum salmon, from 40 cents a pound in 1990 to 12 in 1991; decline of fish permit values; the suicide of Cordova's Mayor (Enge 1993); protracted litigation; the fishermen's boycott of oil tankers in August 1993; and the announcement, in September 1993, that 74 of the boycotting boats might face fines from the Coast Guard. Clearly, during 1993, the fishermen from Cordova had not recovered. For many, as reported by Reynolds (1993), "the 1989 oil spill was still an unfolding disaster. Spillrelated problems, fears, and conflicts were widespread." And they still are.
Conditions were different in Valdez. Here, the community was inundated by people, goods, guards, media, and traffic. The oil industry had long been a mainstay of the community and most people had benefited directly or indirectly from the presence of the Alaska pipeline terminus. As the clean-up progressed, there was a massive convergence of people and materials on Valdez. Everyone who wanted to work, could. New bed and breakfast accommodations were opened. People rented their extra bedrooms; some even rented their whole houses and left the state. But, as the population climbed from 2,500 to 10,000, the strain was too much, even for a town that claimed to be accustomed to similar fluctuations. Local residents found they had to forego eating out in restaurants, baby sitters, visiting friends, and going to baseball games. Even the traditional Gold Rush Day celebrations were cancelled in 1989. By July 1990, local people were out of patience with the oil spill and its aftermath; the town had the exhausted feeling that comes with being in a war zone (Robbing, E. 1993).
Seward, like Valdez, was accustomed to increased traffic brought by seasonal tourism, but to nothing like that experienced during the summer of 1989. Unlike some other communities, people in Seward took control of the situation before oil actually approached the area (US DOI 1993a, 1993b).
Of all the impacts on Alaskan towns the uproar in Kodiak is perhaps the most thoroughly documented (Impact Assessment Inc. 1990; US DOI 1993a, 1993b; see, especially, Endter-Wada et al. 1993). Kodiak processes the third-largest volume of fish of any port in North America, and, although little oil reached the town, extensive disruption did.
In summary, the impacts of Exxon Valdez on the communities of southern Alaska varied greatly. Towns and villages experienced different levels of threat; different volumes of oil, and different degrees of contamination; different amounts of access to money and other clean-up benefits; and differences in the quantity and quality of research that was accomplished.