
| Technological Independence The Asian experience (UNU, 1994, 372 pages) |
| (introductory text...) |
| Note to the reader from the UNU |
| Introduction |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | The region and the global historical setting |
![]() | Post-second world war geopolitics |
![]() | New technologies |
![]() | The study |
![]() | Notes |
| 1. India |
![]() | Background |
![]() | Development perspectives in the indian economy |
![]() | Technology policy |
![]() | R&D and self-reliance |
![]() | India's technological capability: an international comparison |
![]() | Case-studies |
![]() | Factors in technological development |
![]() | Concluding remarks |
![]() | Notes |
| 2. China |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Historical perspective |
![]() | National factor endowments |
![]() | Case-studies in the different economic sectors |
![]() | Exogenous sources for technological progress and self-reliance |
![]() | A desirable path and a strategy for S&T development |
| 3. The Republic of Korea |
![]() | Preamble |
![]() | History |
![]() | Development policies and strategies from the 1960s to the 1980s |
![]() | The plans |
![]() | Impact on the agricultural and industrial sectors |
![]() | Science and technology in korea before the 1960s |
![]() | The role of science and technology in recent development |
![]() | Science and technology and the exogenous environment |
![]() | Education and training |
![]() | Research and development |
![]() | Reassessment of the policy and strategy |
![]() | Achievements in industrial development |
![]() | The electronics industry as a case-study |
![]() | Self-reliance targets at each stage |
![]() | Problems and issues |
![]() | Future plan for self-reliance of science and technology |
![]() | The long-term goals and strategy of national development |
![]() | Role of science and technology for future development |
![]() | Long-term goal of S&T development |
![]() | Summing-up and regional cooperation |
![]() | Regional cooperation |
![]() | Bibliography |
| 4. Thailand |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Traditional path of development |
![]() | Development of the country in the national plans (1961-1986) |
![]() | An evaluation of thailand's present S&T situation: a macro-level study |
![]() | Case-studies in agriculture |
![]() | A desirable path |
![]() | Bibliography |
| 5 The Philippines |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | The historical roots of technological dependence |
![]() | S&T policy: rhetoric and reality |
![]() | Case-studies |
![]() | Case-study results |
![]() | Technological dependence: nature and consequences |
![]() | S&T in the Philippines: inputs and outputs |
![]() | The vicious circle paradigm |
![]() | The anatomy of technology transfer |
![]() | The search for models: learning from Asia |
![]() | Vision and commitment |
![]() | Toward a leap-frogging strategy |
![]() | Notes |
![]() | Bibliography |
![]() | Appendix 1 |
![]() | Appendix 2. major achievements of S&T in the Philippines |
| 6. Japan |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Five stages from ''technology transfer'' to ''self-reliance'' |
![]() | Three stages to technological self-reliance |
![]() | Degree of self-reliance of technology |
![]() | Low estimation of imported technology |
![]() | Historical perspectives on self-reliance |
![]() | Case-studies |
![]() | Japan's experience and Asian perspectives |
![]() | Japanese multinational enterprises and their role in technological self-reliance in Asia |
![]() | Performance of Japanese affiliates in Asia |
![]() | Technological self-reliance in Asia: in search of a new international technology order |
![]() | Notes |
| 7. The lessons from Asia: From past experience to the future |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | China |
![]() | India |
![]() | Republic of Korea |
![]() | Thailand |
![]() | Philippines |
![]() | Japan |
![]() | The geopolitical environment and the local socio-economic situation |
![]() | Formal S&T structure and industry |
![]() | The rural-urban relationship |
![]() | Informal and formal sectors |
![]() | New generic technologies |
![]() | Social shaping of technology |
![]() | Conscious shaping of the technology |
![]() | Existing agendas for shaping technology |
![]() | Concluding remarks |
![]() | Notes |
| Contributors |
| Other titles of interest |
The Chinese communists, during the years of their guerrilla struggle,1 had managed to achieve some manufacturing output. By the time they took power, therefore, they had by force of circumstances developed an implicit industrial policy. Yet in the years immediately following the revolution, they followed the Soviet model, although modifying it as a result of their own unique experiences. The Soviet formal system of science and technology, with its very rigid structure, was thus transplanted to China. Soviet technology was also transferred, largely through complete sets of equipment from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. After the break with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, the small number of imports of technology that then occurred came from Japan and Western European countries.
In the late 1950s, China attempted, through its "Great Leap Forward,"2 a mass mobilization in technology acquisition, to catch up with some of the advanced countries. This partially involved "backyard" technology, and was reminiscent of the period of guerrilla struggle. During the period following the break with the Soviet Union, a policy of "Walking on Two Legs," amounting to near-autarky, was strongly emphasized. Although this latter emphasis was later modified after the 1970s, the basic strategy of combining traditional labour-intensive methods with modern technology remained a part of general Chinese technological strategy.
After 1978, with the opening to the outside world, a major transfer of technology from abroad was attempted.3 But the earlier, relatively rigid, Soviet-inspired formal system of S&T, which lacked active and organic linkages with the economy, still persisted. The R&D system lacked horizontal linkages with the economy, and the organization of the R&D institutes was over-centralized; consequently they could not develop their full potential. The system emphasized a technology "push" in the economy and was not generally responsive to demand. By the 1980s, the Chinese authorities were admitting that they were not only behind the developed countries, but also behind some of the NIEs.
The S&T system has consequently been considerably reformed in recent years, the new reforms aiming at developing organic linkages between the S&T system and the economy. These reforms have varied from changes in organization to personnel development.
By the early 1990s, at a time when new technologies such as information technology and biotechnology were beginning to transform the available technology spectrum in developed countries, China had gone through several learning phases in technology acquisition and had built up a considerable technology infrastructure. It was allocating roughly 1 per cent of its GDP to R&D, which, though low by developed-country standards, was high by developing-country standards, and by 1985 it had nearly 800,000 scientific and technical personnel.