
| The Global Greenhouse Regime: Who Pays? (UNU, 1993, 382 pages) |
| List of contributors |
| Preface |
| Acknowledgements |
| Part I Measuring responsibility |
![]() | 1 Introduction |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | The greenhouse effect |
![]() | What was decided at Rio? |
![]() | Protocol negotiating difficulties |
![]() | Key issues for climate change negotiations |
![]() | References |
![]() | 2 The basics of greenhouse gas indices |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Apples and oranges |
![]() | Implications |
![]() | Conclusion: indices do matter |
![]() | References |
![]() | 3 Assessing emissions: five approaches compared |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Comprehensiveness compared |
![]() | Accuracy by category |
![]() | Regional and national emissions by source |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | References |
![]() | Appendix A: Estimates of greenhouse gas emissions |
![]() | Appendix B: Calculating cumulative and current emissions |
![]() | 4 Who pays (to solve the problem and how much)? |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Indices of allocation: a brief review |
![]() | Accountability |
![]() | Equity and efficiency |
![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | References |
| Part II Resource transfers |
![]() | 5 North-South carbon abatement costs |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Climate change convention |
![]() | Method overview |
![]() | Implications for the South |
![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | 6 North-South transfer |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Obligation to pay indices |
![]() | Redistribution of incremental cost |
![]() | Benchmarks |
![]() | UN scale of payments |
![]() | Financing mechanisms |
![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | 7 Insuring against sea level rise |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Insurability of losses |
![]() | Oil pollution |
![]() | Nuclear damage |
![]() | Implications |
![]() | The insurance scheme proposed by AOSIS |
![]() | The Climate Change Convention |
![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | Appendix: Scheme proposed by AOSIS for inclusion in the Climate Change Convention |
| Part III National greenhouse gas reduction cost curves |
![]() | 8 Integrating ecology and economy in India |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Emissions inventory |
![]() | Energy efficiency and fuel substitution |
![]() | Emissions and sequestration from forest biomass |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | References |
![]() | 9 Carbon abatement potential in West Africa |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Long-term energy and carbon emissions scenarios |
![]() | Options for rational energy use and carbon conservation |
![]() | Economic opportunities for implementation |
![]() | Policy issues for the region |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | References |
![]() | 10 Abatement of carbon dioxide emissions in Brazil |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Brazil energy economy |
![]() | Energy subsector analyses |
![]() | Changing land-use trends |
![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | References |
![]() | 11 Thailand's demand side management initiative: a practical response to global warming |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | End-use energy efficiency policies |
![]() | Costs and benefits of the DSM master plan |
![]() | CO2 reductions from the DSM Plan |
![]() | Why should other developing countries adopt DSM? |
![]() | The role of the multilateral development banks |
![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | References |
![]() | 12 Carbon abatement in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Energy-environment nexus |
![]() | Scenarios for the future |
![]() | Country results |
![]() | Policy implications |
![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | References |
![]() | 13 Greenhouse gas emission abatement in Australia |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Abatement of energy sector emissions |
![]() | Economic impact of abatement strategies |
![]() | Non-energy emission abatement |
![]() | Australia's international role |
![]() | Carbon taxes, externalities and other policy instruments |
![]() | References |
| Part IV Conclusion |
![]() | 14 Constructing a global greenhouse regime |
![]() | (introductory text...) |
![]() | Conditionality and additionality |
![]() | Technology transfer |
![]() | Multi-pronged approach |
![]() | Implementation procedures |
![]() | Regional building blocks |
![]() | North-'South' conflicts |
![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | Notes and references |
| Appendix: The Climate change convention |
![]() | Introduction |
![]() | Background |
![]() | Climate change convention |
![]() | Article 1. Definitions |
![]() | Article 2. Objective |
![]() | Article 3. Principles |
![]() | Article 4 Commitments |
![]() | Article 5. Research and systematic observation |
![]() | Article 6. Education, training and public awareness |
![]() | Article 7. Conference of the Parties |
![]() | Article 8. Secretariat |
![]() | Article 9. Subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice |
![]() | Article 10. Subsidiary Body for implementation |
![]() | Article 11. Financial mechanism |
![]() | Article 12. Communication of information related to implementation |
![]() | Article 13. Resolution of questions regarding implementation |
![]() | Article 14. Settlement of disputes |
![]() | Article 15. Amendments to the Convention |
![]() | Article 16. Adoption and amendment of annexes to the Convention |
![]() | Article 17. Protocols |
![]() | Article 18. Right to vote |
![]() | Article 19. Depositary |
![]() | Article 20. Signature |
![]() | Article 21. Interim arrangements |
![]() | Article 22. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession |
![]() | Article 23. Entry into force |
![]() | Article 24. Reservations |
![]() | Article 25. Withdrawal |
![]() | Article 26. Authentic texts |
A different approach from that adopted by the Oil Pollution Fund Convention has been adopted in the case of nuclear damage. The 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the field of Nuclear Energy, concluded under the auspices of the OEEC (now OECD) was the first international convention to regulate the liability for risks arising out of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
The purpose of the Paris Convention is to harmonize national legislation with regard to third party liability and insurance against atomic risks and to establish a regime for liability and compensation in the event of a nuclear incident. The Convention generally applies only to nuclear incidents occurring, and damage suffered, in the territory of Contracting States. In 1963, a supplementary convention to the Paris Convention was adopted ('the Brussels Supplementary Convention'.)
Article 3(b) of the Brussels Supplementary Convention (as amended by the subsequent 1964 Protocol) provides that the contracting parties undertake that compensation in respect of damage caused by a nuclear incident (other than one occurring entirely in a territory of a non-contracting State) shall be provided up to an amount of 120 million units of account per incident as follows:
1 up to an amount of at least 5 million units of account, out of funds provided by insurance or other financial security, such amount to be established by the legislation of the contracting party in whose territory the nuclear installation of the operator liable is situated;
2 between this amount and 70 million units of account, out of public funds to be made available by the Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear installation is situated;
3 between 70 million and 120 million units of account, out of public funds to be made available by the Contracting Parties according to the formula for contributions specified in Article 12 of the Brussels Supplementary Convention.
Article 12(a) of the Brussels Supplementary Convention provides that:
The formula for contributions according to which the contracting party shall make available the public funds referred to in Article 3(b)(iii) shall be determined as follows
(i) as to 50%, on the basis of the ratio between the gross national product at current prices of each contracting party and the total of the gross national product's current prices of all Contracting Parties as shown by the official statistics published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development for the year preceding the year in which the nuclear incident occurs;
(ii) as to 50%, on the basis of the ratio between the thermal power of the reactors situated in the territory of each Contracting Party and the total thermal power of the reactors situated in the territories of all the Contracting Parties . . .
The Brussels Supplementary Convention therefore creates an international pool out of which the highest layer of compensation is payable in the event of damage from a nuclear incident, and levies contributions toward that pool from Contracting States according to a formula based upon GNP and total capacity of their nuclear reactors.
Unlike the Paris Convention, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage is potentially of worldwide geographical application. The Vienna Convention also establishes a regime for liability and compensation for nuclear incidents, but it permits the Contracting State within whose territory the installation is situated to limit the liability of the operator.
By Article VII, the installation State undertakes to require the operator to maintain insurance or other financial security covering his liability for nuclear damage in such amount as the State shall specify. But the installation State is bound to meet compensation claims up to the operator's limit of liability, if the operator's insurance or other financial security is inadequate to meet such claims. There is, however, no provision similar to the Brussels Supplementary Convention either in the Vienna Convention or elsewhere for any international pooling arrangement to pay compensation above the operator's limit of liability.