Cover Image
close this bookThe Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities (UNU, 1997, 628 pages)
close this folderPart I Globalization and Africa: The challenge of urban growth
View the document2 Global forces, urban change, and urban management in Africa
View the document3 Urbanization, globalization, and economic crisis in Africa

2 Global forces, urban change, and urban management in Africa

Carole Rakodi


Il est possible de distinguer en Afrique diverses phases d'urbanisation partiellement liées à l'évolution des conditions suivant lesquelles le continent s'est intégré dans l'économie mondiale. S'il existe de grandes disparités en termes de ressources naturelles et de passé historique, il est néanmoins possible d'établir une distinction d'ensemble entre les périodes pré-coloniale, coloniale et celle suivant immédiatement l'indépendance et les vingt dernières années. Pour chacune de ces phases, les tendances et modèles d'urbanisation peuvent être mis en relation avec la nature des relations politiques extérieures en même temps que la situation physique, sociale, politique, économique et culturelle intérieure. Ce sont aussi bien des forces extérieures que la situation interne qui ont influencé les choix de méthodes de gestion et d'aménagement urbain. Après avoir brièvement passé en revue les périodes pré-coloniale et coloniale, l'on étudie de façon plus approfondie la période allant des années 50 au milieu des années 70, puis les 20 années suivantes. L'examen porte d'abord sur l'impact des influences politiques et économiques extérieures sur les pays d'Afrique, puis sur les tendances de l'urbanisation et enfin sur les politiques et gestions urbaines. Malgré l'ouverture économique de l'Afrique, le continent ne présente qu'une importance marginale pour l'économie mondiale; tout en étant vulnérable à des forces économiques extérieures, il est exclu des récentes tendances à la mondialisation qui ont enrichi un nouveau groupe de pays aux revenus jusqu'alors inférieurs. C'est ce qui le fait dépendre de l'aide extérieure et lui impose d'accepter des conditions en matière de politique économique et aussi de politique urbaine. L'on démontre ici à quel point les résultats des réformes de politique économique et d'urbanisation préconisées par les donneurs d'aide, en particulier les institutions multilatérales, sont loin des objectifs visés par les donateurs comme par les bénéficiaires. Il ressort notamment de cet examen qu'une mauvaise compréhension des problèmes suscités par les réformes et l'incapacité de les surmonter que ce soit aux niveaux international, national ou local, l'insuffisance des données de référence, la faiblesse des remèdes aux erreurs politiques et les contradictions entre les ensembles de politiques recommandées par les institutions de financement risquent de se combiner pour continuer de freiner une croissance économique plus équitable, la stabilité socio-politique et une meilleure gestion des villes.



The aim of this chapter is to assess the ways in which global forces have impacted upon the development of Africa and upon the process of rapid urbanization that is occurring in that continent. Africa has been integrated into the world trade system on unfavourable terms and has become dependent on international assistance. Phases of urbanization can be distinguished which are related in part to the shifting terms on which Africa has been integrated into the world economy. The pre-colonial phase will be dealt with briefly, before examining the colonial phase, the results of which, in terms of economic development, settlement patterns, and urban form, are relatively well known. Ending in most countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1960s, a transitional period ensued in which the achievement of autonomous economic and political status was attempted by means of state-centred, interventionist strategies paralleled by a regulatory approach to urban development. By the 1970s it became clear that the endeavours of the central and local state were far from achieving economic or urban development goals. The debate over the relative roles of the terms of Africa's integration into the world economy, state weakness, and domestic policy mistakes in explaining Africa's continued underdevelopment is ongoing. What is clear is that the continent's economic difficulties have made it reliant on and thus vulnerable to the policy dictates of the international agencies, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Rapid urbanization in a situation of continued poverty has outpaced the financial and administrative capacity of governments to ensure that cities provide efficient locations for economic activity and satisfy the basic needs of all their citizens. Much of the chapter will be devoted to an examination of trends in the past 20 years. The role of global forces in Africa's development, including trade, foreign investment, flows of international finance capital, and flows of Official Development Assistance (ODA), will be explored. The latter have been accompanied by policy conditionalities that have affected economic development paths, urban development processes, and urban management strategies. The appropriateness of current national and international urban policies and management approaches will be assessed.

As has been noted in chapter 1, Africa is a continent of enormous contrasts. North Africa, with its political, economic, and cultural ties to Europe and the Middle East, is frequently dealt with separately from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Distinctions can be drawn between countries based on their colonial histories (colonial power, system of rule, date and means of achieving independence), their natural resource base, their geographical location (especially coastal/landlocked), their cultural composition (ethnicity, religion), and their political history (form of the state, significance in global politics, nature of the political system). These have affected the way in which countries have been integrated into the world economy; the domestic policies they have adopted; the interests represented in the state, and the ability of these interests to advance their own causes and of the state to pursue policy goals consistently; and the urbanization process. Generalizations are, therefore, dangerous, but common trends, problems, and pressures can be identified. These will be emphasized in this chapter, although, to avoid overgeneralization, and within the usual constraints on space, attention will be drawn to contrasting features as well.

Pre-colonial Africa

Urban settlements have been widespread in Africa for centuries. In North Africa, Greek colonialism dating from the fourth century BC interacted with local kingdoms: cross-Mediterranean trade encouraged the emergence of flourishing ports, such as Carthage and Alexandria (Bonine, 1983). Many of these remain significant settlements today. In most of SSA, towns were the seats of kings, political rulers with religious overtones. They accommodated courts and gave rise to the production of arts and crafts, but remained small because of their dependence on locally produced food. Royal power involved some control over exchange, although trade also seems to have occurred independently of urban settlements. The prevalence in many areas of shifting agriculture and the close association of urban settlements with kingship meant that the sites of many towns shifted. Some cities and kingdoms were ephemeral, linked to the reign of a particular ruler; others, such as the Yoruba towns of south-west Nigeria, prospered through many regimes and continue to be important today (Mabogunje, 1968). Some kingdoms, especially in West Africa, expanded into empires, in which cities emerged as seats of government and trading centres - for example, Mali between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, Songhay in the Sudan in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and Benin between the twelfth and eighteenth centuries (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978; Mehretu, 1983; Winters, 1983; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991; Chandler, 1994).

Islam was spread across North Africa in the seventh century and Arab neighbourhoods were generally established outside existing ancient cities (Bonine, 1983). Tunis, for example, was founded 15 km from the site of the ancient city of Carthage (Findlay and Paddison, 1986). By the Middle Ages, Cairo was the capital of an alien dynasty, the Mamelukes, who were interested only in collecting taxes (see also Chandler, 1994). It was only by the eleventh or twelfth centuries that most of the inhabitants of North African cities had converted to Islam. Integration of relatively self-contained kingdoms elsewhere in Africa into wider economic systems seems to date from the extension of medieval Muslim trade into the Sudan, southwards along the Nile Valley and Africa's eastern coast, and across the Sahara. Trans-Saharan trade initially focused on gold and salt (Amin, 1972). The empire of Ghana, whose power peaked in the ninth century, was based on control of the gold trade (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978). Trade was followed by religion. At break-of-bulk points, on the northern and southern fringes of the Sahara, where savannah met forest (for example, Timbuktu), where water and land routes crossed (in the Niger and Nile valleys), or at ports, trade stimulated urban growth. The Hausa towns of northern Nigeria, such as Kano, Katsina, and Maiduguri, were state capitals and trading centres. These settlements focused on the mosque and the market and were controlled by a merchant elite. The East African coastal settlements, such as Zanzibar, Lamu, and Mombasa, were closest in character to the Muslim cities of the Middle East, while in the Sudan and the Sahel Muslim influences on earlier African settlements were partial and varied (Winters, 1983). The fall of the Songhay empire to Morocco at the end of the sixteenth century marked the close of an era, although trans-Saharan trade continued and Arab mercantilism (and trade in slaves) continued in East Africa until the second half of the nineteenth century (Amin, 1972; see also Chandler, 1994). The pre-colonial cities of North Africa sometimes reached considerable sizes: Cairo is estimated to have had a population of 300,000 in the eleventh century and 500,000 at the beginning of the fourteenth century, although, as Yousry and Aboul Atta show in chapter 4, it subsequently declined; Marrakesh and Fès probably each had 100,000 inhabitants in the eleventh century and grew to 150,000 and over 200,000, respectively, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Chandler, 1994). Urban settlements in SSA, although significant in administrative and trade terms, were generally small, few exceeding 100,000.

Portuguese mercantilism expanded into Africa from the mid-fifteenth century; it was followed by British and French traders in the next century. The West African coastal trade was initially in gold and was carried on by leave of local rulers, although the Europeans played one kingdom off against another to prevent the emergence of powerful states (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978). Benin, for example, had been engaged in regional trade until the late fifteenth century, when trade with the Portuguese in slaves, pepper, etc. developed. Although control over trade was a royal monopoly on both sides, it was carried on by merchants, those from Benin acting as intermediaries between the Europeans and hinterland cities (Ono-kerhoraye, 1975). The slave trade became increasingly important from the sixteenth century, drawing more and more African leaders into it and having a devastating effect on the economies and political structures of the coastal and forest kingdoms (Amin, 1972; Gugler and Flanagan, 1978). An estimated 12 million slaves were taken from Africa in Christian- and 7 million in Muslim-owned ships (Chandler, 1994). Evidence on the impact of the slave trade on urbanization patterns is scarce and contradictory. Algiers was, according to Chandler and Tarver (1993), the largest slave port, following the appointment of a Turkish governor in 1520.

Inland, earlier patterns of urban development evolved slowly (Chandler, 1994). In the interior of Ghana, small city-states developed that were later absorbed by the Ashanti empire, centred on Kumasi. The power of this empire lasted until 1873-74, when it was finally defeated in a clash with the British over its attempts to assert control over smaller coastal states (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978). Although urbanization continued in Ghana in the seventeenth century, the earlier urban culture was weakened as the slave trade peaked in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Yoruba urbanization also continued, in response to the insecurity caused by internal conflicts over control of channels for slave trading (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991).

Successive waves of European traders gradually shifted the focus of economic activities from the northern savannah areas of West Africa towards the forest belt and the coast, leading to stagnation for earlier trading centres (Salau, 1990). From the first Portuguese contact at the mouth of the Senegal River in 1445, they extended trading networks down the west coast and eventually round to East Africa. During the sixteenth century they founded Bissau in Guinea; Luanda, Benguela, and São Salvador in Angola; and Lourenço Marques, Sena, and Mozambique in Mozambique; as well as temporarily wresting control of Zanzibar and Mombasa from Arab traders. The Dutch founded Cape Town in 1652 and the French and British a number of West African ports, including Conakry, Accra, Sekondi, Cape Coast, and Calabar (Mehretu, 1983). Napoleon invaded Egypt, the brief French occupation (1798-1802) being a precursor of greater European influence (Bonine, 1983). In 1830 the French invaded Algeria, and then Tunis and Morocco. However, the European presence was generally confined to defence and trade in coastal settlements and there was little penetration inland. Meanwhile, Egyptian incursions into Sudanese sultanates aimed at extracting slaves and other wealth and establishing political control (Amin, 1972).

Colonial Africa

The economic role of colonialism

The mercantilist period evolved into colonialism proper in the second half of the nineteenth century. The development of capitalism in Europe gave rise to a search for cheap raw materials and agricultural produce and for markets for manufactured exports. In West Africa, the destructive effects of the slave trade on pre-existing social formations made it possible to shape a system of large-scale production of goods such as cocoa, palm oil, timber, and rubber by organizing a trade monopoly, taxing peasants, providing support to local rulers, and forced labour. In southern and parts of central and eastern Africa, colonial capital wished to exploit minerals and engage in agriculture. To obtain a cheap labour force, for mining, settler agriculture, and later manufacturing, land was expropriated, taxes imposed, and African agriculture discriminated against. In contrast with Africa of the colonial-trade economy and Africa of the labour reserves, large parts of central Africa were opened up to plunder by concessionary companies. The colonial system thus organized African societies so that they produced exports that provided only minimal returns to local labour (Amin, 1972). It restructured peasant agriculture, introduced new administrative systems, and changed the pattern of urbanization.

While economic competition was responsible for the penetration of African economies, it was paralleled by political competition. Belgian and German annexation of territory upset the balance of power, and the scramble for partition and political control that followed coincided with and was related to economic and social transformation. Colonial rule was established by a combination of persuasion and coercion, often arbitrary boundaries were drawn, and interaction between the colonial administration and indigenous rulers had an important influence on the type of administrative system established. Generally, British paternalist philosophy found expression in decentralized administrative practice, which was adapted to existing local institutional and political structures, while the doctrine of assimilation underlay direct centralized control in French, Portuguese, and Belgian territories. In practice, the distinction was less clear cut than this and perhaps greater contrasts can be seen between the colonial and settler societies. Settlers demanded not only opportunities for colonial accumulation, but also political and other rights, giving rise to more extensive influence and tighter control over indigenous economies, cultures, and socio-political systems, seen above all in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Algeria, and to a lesser extent in the Portuguese colonies and Kenya (Bell, 1986).

Colonial urbanization

Colonial cities developed not as industrial centres, but to facilitate the extraction of commodities and the politico-administrative system on which this depended. Many coastal settlements that were already engaged in international trade expanded. Lagos is an important example in west Africa and Tunis in north Africa (see chap. 6; Findlay and Paddison, 1986). In order to fulfil their functions as administrative and commercial centres, transport infrastructure, especially railways, was developed to connect the ports to their hinterlands (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978; Mehretu, 1983; Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991). In some parts of Africa, earlier urban systems had decayed and "new" colonial settlements were established, sometimes from scratch and sometimes on the sites of earlier settlements (O'Connor, 1983). Elsewhere, colonial settlements were superimposed on and attached to existing towns and cities, while the choice of transport routes gave a boost to or bypassed existing settlements. Port cities thrived at the expense of inland settlements (Bonine, 1983; Findlay, 1994).

Although traditional manufacturing survived in some parts of the continent, especially in the north, rarely was industrialized manufacturing introduced, except in the settler societies, where import-substituting industry designed to meet the needs of the substantial European populations was developed with government help, and reinforced the new pattern of urban settlements that had been established. Even in the parts of Africa that were never directly colonized, links between their economies and the outside world grew and European influences on urban form can be detected, for example in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia (O'Connor, 1983). Within an increasingly global economy, King (1990) suggests, a capitalist-industrialist urban culture grew, overlaying or replacing the more culture-specific pre-industrial and pre-capitalist urban forms of the mercantile era. Metropolitan cities were increasingly linked to colonial cities through their relative roles in the international division of labour.

In the early period, the trading fort model was the best tool for coercion, surveillance, and exploitation, but colonial officials' conceptions of "civilisation and power clashed with the sordid realities they created" (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991). Health concerns and the need to provide colonial administrators and early settlers with an acceptable living environment gave rise to environmental sanitation measures and the establishment of rudimentary local government (King, 1990). Until the 1930s, rural-urban migration was typically temporary and seasonal. This suited both employers, enabling them to pay wages insufficient to meet the full costs of reproducing the labour force (Gregory and Piché, 1982), and peasant farmers, whose needs for cash were still limited. However, especially in the labour reserve economies, shortages of labour led to the strengthening of mechanisms designed to ensure an adequate labour supply. The collapse in commodity prices in the 1930s' depression had knock-on effects in the African colonies. Urban property markets slumped, unemployment rose, and African residents returned to their villages (Skinner, 1986). From the 1920s on in the Belgian Congo and the 1940s onwards in South Africa and Southern and Northern Rhodesia, the desire of mining and manufacturing capital for a more stable labour force led to changes in government policies (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991; Rakodi, 1986a, 1995a). Although older patterns of migration persisted, it became acceptable for a man and his family to live in urban areas for the duration of his working life. Acceptance of a more stable labour force and growing urban population had a variety of impacts on urban policy and management, in particular:

(a) A desire to ensure land for urban development and the provision of services, especially to the European population, led to the strengthening of local government, under the control of appointed administrator-mayors in the French colonies (Skinner, 1986) and the European population in the British colonies, with sufficient revenue-raising capacity not to be a drain on central or metropolitan government funds and based on an imported legislative framework.

(b) The need to stimulate provision for and maintain control over the labour force led to public sector provision of rental housing, often subsidized. Such housing was often physically separate from areas of indigenous urban development, where the newly enacted legislation did not apply and forms of government and/or access to land and housing were based on existing local structures and mechanisms (Chandler and Tarver, 1993). Elsewhere, existing tenure systems were swept away or the colonial state became the main landowner (King, 1990).

(c) A desire to restrict the urban African population to that necessary to provide a labour force for colonial enterprises led in some of the colonies to (mostly unsuccessful) attempts to control and eradicate other types of economic enterprise (the informal sector) and housing development (squatter areas or other unauthorized settlement).

(d) For political, social, and cultural reasons, the residential areas and social lives of urban residents (Europeans, Syrian-Lebanese traders, an imported Asian commercial class in eastern and southern Africa, mixed race people, and Africans) were segregated, despite the essential but differently valued contribution of each to the urban economy (Simon, 1992; see also Christopher and Tarver, 1994).

By 1950, at the beginning of the main decolonization period, Cairo (population 2.41 million) and Johannesburg (915,000) were the largest cities, followed by Casablanca, Cape Town, Durban, the East Rand, Tunis, Algiers, and Ibadan, each with over 400,000. Overall, only 15 per cent of the continent's population lived in urban areas and in most countries the urban population was heavily concentrated in one or two cities, normally including the colonial capital.

The independence decade

In a sense, it is misleading to speak of the independence decade as the 1960s and early 1970s. Liberia's independence was recognized in 1847, South Africa became independent but minority ruled in 1910, Egypt has been independent since 1922, Libya gained its independence in 1951, followed by Morocco, Tunisia, and the Sudan in 1956, Ghana in 1957, and Guinea in 1958. The Portuguese colonies, Namibia, and Eritrea have gained their independence, and Zimbabwe and South Africa majority rule, since the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, of over 50 African countries, the great majority gained their independence in the 1960s. For this reason, and because this was a decade of relative economic prosperity before major changes occurred in the world economy in the mid-1970s, as a transitional period it is significant for both national political economies and the process of urbanization. Although for Egypt, because of its longstanding self-rule, this period is not of such dramatic importance, the economic pressures were similar. The settler societies of Zimbabwe and South Africa commenced the period with more developed commercial agricultural and industrial sectors than other African countries did, but faced increasing internal resistance and external ostracism.

Political independence: Reality or myth?

Independence implies autonomy to make political decisions and the capacity to carry them out. By the 1950s, it was in the interests of both France, following the Algerian war, and Britain to hand over political rule. In juridical terms the new states were strong, but politically and socially they were weak:

in the great majority of states there was no shared culture... and the typical state was characterised by ethnic pluralism, linguistic diversity, the strength of communal ties and loyalties, and an educational system which hitherto had benefited only a minority of the population. (Tordoff, 1984, p. 77)

Nationalist movements had incorporated divergent interests, and the initial problem for the inexperienced politicians who took power, on the basis of political systems modelled on those of the metropolitan powers, was to establish their legitimacy and balance conflicting ethnic and economic interests. The inherited bureaucracies were generally fairly well developed (except in the ax-Portuguese and ex-Belgian colonies), but they were costly to run and hard to manage without expatriate expertise. However, heavy demands were placed on the political and bureaucratic structures, while the uncertain relationship between them gave rise to misunderstanding and conflict (Tordoff, 1984; Chazan et al., 1988). The apparent need for state economic development planning and, in the absence of foreign control of major economic sectors, for it to take on productive roles led to the establishment of planning machinery and large parastatals, which further strained the capacity of the state to manage its affairs (Tordoff, 1984). An additional problem has been the role of the military - only 18 countries had escaped successful military coups by the end of the 1980s. Once constitutional rules have been discarded, the conditions in which factionalism, mutual distrust, fear, and counter-coup flourish are reinforced (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990). Many countries have been subject to military repression, civil war, and ethnic pogroms.

For a variety of reasons, including economic management and resource allocation to fulfil developmental goals, the need to foster a sense of national unity, fear of strong or opposition-controlled local government, and scarcity of skilled and experienced public servants, strong government has been equated with centralization. However, this has facilitated the abuse of power, increased the propensity to error, slowed down and bureaucratized responses to changing circumstances, and made access to the central state the prime source of opportunities for personal accumulation. Except in "strong man" governments, there have been attempts at decentralization, but these have typically been flawed and unsuccessful (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990). The relative weakness of state structures in the first decades of independence is thus attributed by Chazan et al. (1988, p. 62) to "scarcity of resources, politicized patterns of social differentiation, overexpanded state structures, insufficient state legitimacy, inadequate state power and the lack of adaptation of alien institutions to local conditions." Politics has been characterized by personal rule and political domination and political life has pivoted around individual leaders, while domination by particular social groups has been resisted. In some countries, a degree of continuity, stability, and accountability has been achieved, but more commonly political processes have been marked by repression, instability, inequality, dishonesty, ineffectiveness, and disorder (Chazan et al., 1988).

In addition to state weakness, political autonomy has been eroded by superpower interest, continued identification with the ax-colonial powers, and the relationship between political and economic dependence. The United States and the USSR sought to channel post-colonial change in their own interests, the former to contain Soviet influence and the latter to establish a presence in the continent. The USSR tried to extend its influence by supporting regimes that asked for assistance, not all of them sporting socialist ideologies, and a reliance on arms supply as the main lever, especially in its areas of strategic interest in the Horn and North Africa. US policy has been anti-communist, leading to support of reactionary and repressive governments, especially in Zaire and the Horn, and assistance to friendly capitalist regimes, especially Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa (Chazan et al., 1988). Other external interference with national sovereignty has originated within the continent itself, most notably the destabilizing activities of South Africa in the front-line states, but also the activities of Algeria in supporting anti-colonial activity and of Libya in the trans-Saharan region. Ties to ax-colonial powers, for example by membership of the Commonwealth, have remained strong. France in particular has deliberately maintained its influence in its ax-colonies by political, technical, and military support, especially for conservative and moderate regimes (Chazan et al., 1988). It has been able to do so because of the economic dependency of most of the states, their small size and political fragility, and the longstanding policy of cultural assimilation. In return, "most of the Francophone states show solidarity with France in voting at the UN General Assembly" (Tordoff, 1984, p. 275). Tordoff argues that, despite these dependencies, African regimes have exercised political autonomy and that their ruling classes cannot be portrayed merely as puppets on strings pulled by external forces. However, a distinction can be drawn between political influence based on continuing economic dependency and political interference during crises, during which African élites have been ready and willing to exploit superpower rivalry in their own interests (Chazan et al., 1988).

Economic autonomy and progress: A mirage?

The economies inherited by African countries at independence imposed considerable constraints on policy choices. Exports were overwhelmingly of raw materials and agricultural products (93 per cent from SSA in 1965 - World Bank, 1992, p. 249), most economies depended on fewer than three products for over three-quarters of their export earnings, rendering economies very vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity prices, and trade was often monopolized by large European companies. In SSA, industry accounted for only 9 per cent of GDP in 1965 and manufactured exports were unimportant. Trade was largely with the colonial powers, an industrial base was almost non-existent except in some of the settler economies, and education and training had been exceptionally poor.

The favoured development strategy during the independence decade was based on modernization, industrialization, economic diversification, and indigenization of the economy. Given the heavy reliance on imported manufactures - both consumer goods and capital equipment (76 per cent of SSA imports in 1965; World Bank, 1992, p. 247) - the logical place to start was with import substitution. Given the obstacles (inadequate infrastructure oriented mostly towards colonial trade, absence of an industrial workforce, small domestic markets, dearth of indigenous capital), high levels of protection, a substantial role for the state, and a search for external assistance were inevitable.

External assistance was obtained mostly from transnational corporations (TNCs). The colonial trading and mining companies were international firms. However, the search within capitalism for increased rates of profit results in tendencies for monopoly, vertical integration, expansion, and concentration. These forces, and the role of developments in telecommunications and transport technology in facilitating central control and coordination of worldwide operations, have led to growth in the scale, reach, and significance in the world economy of TNCs (Jenkins, 1987). Said to offer scarce capital, technology and know-how, employment creation, tax revenue, and access to export markets, their share of mining and manufacturing investment and world trade was increasing. Although foreign direct investment (FDI) underestimates the role of TNCs, much of whose investment is financed from local profits and borrowing, published data refer to it.

FDI in Africa grew in the 1960s, and by the mid-1970s was concentrated in Nigeria, Liberia, Zaire, Gabon, Kenya, and the Côte d'Ivoire. Although starting from a small base, investment in countries such as Botswana, the Gambia, Niger, Tanzania, and Malawi grew rapidly in the decade. In 1972, 20.7 per cent of all FDI was in Africa (excluding South Africa, for which information was not available), but by 1975 still over half (52.2 per cent) of all the FDI stock in Africa (excluding South Africa) was invested in the primary sector compared with 26.5 per cent of FDI in all developing areas, and only a third (32.3 per cent) in the secondary sector compared with 53.2 per cent overall (Cantwell, 1991, p. 188). In practice, TNC investment in manufacturing had a number of disadvantages: restrictive practices often prohibited local subsidiaries from production for export, to prevent them from competing with other subsidiaries of the same TNC; the use of capital-intensive techniques generated relatively few jobs; and the goods produced were often considered to be inappropriate for local markets, using advertising to promote luxury items and imported brand names over local products. Despite increasing insistence on local public or private sector participation, import substitution industrialization did not live up to its promise. It proved to be import intensive, because capital equipment, components, and spare parts had to be imported; quasi-monopolistic behind protective walls and thus inefficient, resistant to reducing protection, and unable to compete in export markets; high cost and thus discriminatory against other economic sectors dependent on it for inputs and a drain on what local capital was available for investment. Policies associated with import substitution industrialization included an overvalued exchange rate, inefficient public ownership, and inappropriate choice of industries and technologies (Chazan et al., 1988). Although increases in manufacturing output and urban employment were recorded for the continent as a whole, economic diversification based on industrialization proved elusive, especially in SSA.

The capital requirements of mineral extraction were clearly beyond indigenous entrepreneurs or most of the smaller African governments and so mining was dominated by TNCs. From its traditional base in South Africa, multinational investment in mining rapidly grew after independence. US-based TNCs, for example, invested in copper in Zaire, bauxite in Guinea and Ghana, iron in Gabon, and copper nickel in Botswana, increasing the American share in total FDI and challenging the older colonial-based interests, such as copper in Zaire and Zambia (ROAPE, 1975). Soon the disadvantages of TNC operations - repatriation of profits and reluctance to develop in-country processing - were seen to outweigh the supply of capital, technology, and export outlets. The only alternative open to governments appeared to be nationalization, either by expropriation or by acquisition of majority shareholdings. By no means discomfited by such moves, TNCs have maintained a high degree of control by licensing agreements, management contracts, provision of refining and manufacturing facilities, and overseas marketing.

Chazan et al. (1988) argue that SSA's agriculture at independence was relatively healthy. Cash crop production was widespread, in most places it had not been established at the expense of food crops, and there was scope for increased production of both. However, the slow rise in agricultural production combined with rapid population growth turned a food surplus into a deficit by the mid-1970s. Explanations for the poor performance of the agricultural sector were complex: they included environmental constraints, as well as anti-agriculture government policies aimed at extracting surplus as taxes and subsidizing urban food. Exacerbating these were lack of recognition of the strengths of peasant agriculture, leading to disastrous and wasteful experiments with large-scale mechanized state farms, bias in favour of plantation agriculture in research and development, allocation of inputs, and extension, and failure to develop adequate infrastructure (Chazan et al., 1988). Declining per capita food production led to increased dependence on food imports and, even more damagingly, food aid.

Overall, the real value of many significant exports, such as cotton, iron, and cocoa, did not rise as rapidly as that of imported manufactured goods. In addition, reliance on one or two exports rendered countries particularly vulnerable to price fluctuations, for commodities such as copper, and Northern protectionism, for crops such as sugar. The pattern of development in most newly independent countries was regarded as "neo-colonialism," signifying the impossibility of formulating and implementing development policy based on local resources when economic growth depended so heavily on external conditions of demand and foreign capital (Amin, 1971; Williams, 1981; Jamal and Weeks, 1993). Within this overall perspective, however, views differ on both the scope for indigenous industrial development and the extent to which incipient national bourgeosies played and continue to play a comprador role with respect to foreign capitalist interests (Bell, 1986).

Rapid urbanization

At the beginning of the 1960s less than a fifth of Africa's population lived in urban areas (table 2.1). Although the proportion of southern Africa's population that was urban was twice this (42 per cent) and levels of urbanization were also relatively high in North Africa (30 per cent), the remainder of African countries, with few exceptions, had very low levels of urbanization. In East Africa, Somalia and Zambia were relatively highly urbanized, with 17 per cent of their populations in urban areas, while Zimbabwe had 12 per cent, compared with the regional average of 7 per cent and the predominantly rural nature of the two countries with the largest populations in the region, Ethiopia (6 per cent) and Tanzania (5 per cent). In Middle Africa, 31 per cent of Congo's population was urban, nearly double the regional average. In North Africa, levels of urbanization varied from 10 per cent in the Sudan to 38 per cent in Egypt; while, in West Africa, Ghana (with 23 per cent) and Senegal (with 32 per cent) far exceeded the regional average, the latter heavily influenced by the most populous country, Nigeria (14 per cent). Despite the extractive nature of colonial economies, the limited development of manufacturing, and attempts at influx control, however, urban areas had been growing at between 4 per cent and 6 per cent per annum in the 1950s, except in southern Africa.

The rate of urban growth, which had been accelerating prior to the main wave of countries attaining independence, continued to do so. Although rates of natural increase also steadily increased, reaching 2.5 per cent per annum for Africa as a whole in the early 1960s, 2.6 per cent per annum later in the decade, and 2.7 per cent per annum in the early 1970s, the urban growth rate was nearly double this (UN, 1993). The most marked increases in urban growth rates occurred, on the whole, in the least urbanized countries, including those that attained independence without significant urban centres, such as Mauritania (which was previously governed from Senegal) and Rwanda (previously administered from Burundi). In contrast, slower rates of urban growth were experienced in some countries that inherited oversized capitals, for example Congo and Senegal, where Brazzaville and Dakar had been the administrative centres for the whole of French Equatorial and West Africa, respectively (O'Connor, 1983). In the later 1960s urban growth rates reached 8 per cent per annum or more in Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Libya, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Benin, and Mauritania. By the early 1970s these had been joined by, for example, Kenya, Mozambique, Cameroon, and Gabon. In the eight, mostly francophone, countries of West Africa examined by Zachariah and Condé (1981), almost half the urban growth between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s came from migration, mostly from the rural areas, but some from smaller urban centres and some international. The anticipated inhibiting effect of urban residence on fertility was outweighed by the relatively young age profile of migrants, the lower mortality rates in urban areas, and the increase in family migration (Standing, 1984; Salau, 1990).

Table 2.1 Urbanization in Africa










% urban at the beginning of period





























































Average annual rate of growth





























































Source: UN (1993), p. 74.

In 1950, there were only two cities in Africa with more than 1 million inhabitants (Cairo and Alexandria). By 1960, Casablanca and Johannesburg had also reached 1 million, while by 1970 there were eight cities of this size - four in north Africa, two in South Africa, and only two elsewhere in the continent: Lagos and Kinshasa, which had grown, insofar as it was possible to tell in the absence of reliable census results, at about 10 per cent per annum consistently throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Other large cities with particularly rapid rates of growth (10+ per cent per annum) in the 1960s and early 1970s included Abidjan, Conakry, and Tripoli, and Dar es Salaam after 1965, along with many of the smaller capital cities. A pattern of increased concentration of rural-urban migration in the largest city within a country was widely evident (Zachariah and Condé, 1981).

Early migration theories suggested that the volume of migration was related to urban-rural income differentials. Faced with continued rapid migration in the face of increasing unemployment and the inability of formal sector job creation to keep up with growth of the urban labour force, the model was modified to consider not only urban wages but also the probability of obtaining a formal sector job. This theory underlay the belief that urban bias in investment and policy, backed by a politically powerful elite and wage labour force paid above market wages, discriminated against agriculture and rural areas, thus encouraging out-migration (Lipton, 1977). The assumptions underlying these theories have been subjected to serious criticism by Jamal and Weeks (1993), amongst others.

Migration is an extremely complex process, comprising a variety of different patterns of migration movement (see chap. 13) and influenced by underlying structural causes, immediate explanations for household and individual behaviour, and the presence of facilitating conditions. Any explanation of the rapid rates of urbanization and urban growth observed in African countries must take into account a wide range of structural factors. Incorporation of the African peasantry into the national and international economy started in the mercantilist era, was consolidated in the colonial era, and was desired both by governments reliant on extracting foreign exchange and revenue from cash crop exports and food for their urban populations from food crop surpluses and by farmers, who had become used to and dependent on cash purchases. The role of subsistence agriculture in meeting part of the costs of reproduction, as a way of maintaining low wages for colonial enterprises, has already been mentioned. As long as migrants retain rural ties, they can remain permanently in the urban areas, but the effect, it is suggested, is to withdraw surplus from the rural economy to maintain the urban labour force. Eventually the effect is to reduce rural incomes to the point that out-migration occurs despite a lack of urban opportunities (Standing, 1984). In some areas, population growth and environmental deterioration placed pressure on land and other means of production, while increasing life expectancy and larger families reduced the prospects of access to land. Although migration was not the only response, it was a common one (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978; Standing, 1984). While there are examples of unemployment rates being decreased by out-migration, it may also have an impact on the productivity of the household unit, forcing other members to enter the wage labour market and even creating a labour shortage (Standing, 1985). An example of the latter is amongst the Mossi in Burkina Faso, where out-migration to the Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana forced all adults to work in collective fields, with the result that individual fields, weaving cloth, and capital formation such as the digging of wells were neglected (Gregory and Piché, 1982). In some areas, commercialization of agriculture and changes to tenure led to increased differentiation and landlessness, although this was not widespread in the years under discussion (Oberai and Bilsborrow, 1984). Elsewhere the rural economy broke down because of civil strife, for example in Zaire, where the urban population rose from 1.2 million in 1955 to nearly 6 million in 1975, while numbers in Kinshasa rose by 350,000 to 1.7 million (O'Connor, 1983; see chap. 7). Finally, it was suggested that government policies reduced producer prices in the interests of exports and cheap urban food, reducing the returns to agriculture.

All cities yield economies of agglomeration for secondary and tertiary economic activities, producing growth and increased concentration in the largest cities, as illustrated in the continued growth of already well-established cities in the continent. In African countries, a number of changes associated with independence in the 1950s and 1960s increased the attraction of cities. The growth of civil services, attempts to industrialize, and the abandonment of remaining relics of influx control gave a boost to rural-urban migration. The centralization of politics and bureacracy formed a further attraction to investors who needed access to the state machinery. The process of decolonization resulted in the emergence of many new states, each generating a new or enlarged national bureaucracy. Thus the former colony of French West Africa, for example, was dissolved into eight new states (Standing, 1984). What urban centres there were became the locus of power and investment and new states invested heavily in infrastructure and amenities in their capitals because of their international and national visibility (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978; Mehretu, 1983; Skinner, 1986). The creation of additional subnational units (states) in Nigeria gave rise to a further impetus to develop state capitals, while construction of the first of the new capitals was started in this period. Nigerian National Development Plans in the 1970s, for example, devoted over 80 per cent of non-agricultural public capital investment to urban areas (Salau, 1990, p. 163). The exploitation of new resources led to new growth in cities such as Port Harcourt, centre of Nigeria's oil industry, while other mining centres declined in relative terms, for example in Zaire and Zambia (Rakodi, 1992a).

Both Todaro's migration model (1994, p. 268) and the belief that urban bias accounts for the perpetuation of poverty rest on the concept of a labour aristocracy, paid above-market wages in a substantial formal sector. In some countries, for example Kenya, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Morocco, and Tunisia, the large-scale sector dominated urban employment and the availability of wage jobs attracted migrants. In others, however, small and intermediate enterprise accounted for a large proportion of urban employment even at independence, for example Kumasi with 60 per cent and Accra with 45 per cent in 1960, Kaduna with 44 per cent in 1967, Abidjan with 44 per cent and Brazzaville with 37 per cent in 1974 (O'Connor, 1983, p. 143). In addition, despite the concentration of a large proportion of all manufacturing in countries' capital cities (one-third in Accra and Lagos, half in Conakry, two-thirds in Abidjan, three-quarters in Freetown, 87 per cent in Dakar, and 100 per cent in Banjul and Monrovia - O'Connor, 1983), the empirical evidence that wages were higher and employment more secure than in the informal sector was said to be scarce (O'Connor, 1991; Jamal and Weeks, 1993). Where colonial labour policies had resulted in an urban age-sex structure dominated by men of working age, the trend toward convergence with national age-sex structures that had begun with labour stabilization policies 20 or more years before intensified, as increasing numbers of women either joined their husbands in the cities or migrated in their own right. In South Africa, however, apartheid policies and the use of migrant labour from surrounding countries maintained a relatively slow rate of urban growth and a gender imbalance. A secondary attraction in some places was the better access to social and educational facilities available in town, while transport improvements and greater awareness of opportunities because of better access to education and the media facilitated the process. Remittances by urban migrants to rural areas were significant and complicated the relatively simple picture portrayed by Todaro (1994, p. 268) and Lipton (1977).

The inherited philosophy, legal and financial basis, and institutional system for planning and managing urban development changed only incrementally in most countries in the early years after independence. The balance between continuity and change, Simon (1992) suggests, was influenced by the nature of the anti-colonial struggle; the fate of the ax-colonial elite; the policies pursued by the new elite with respect to national integration and relations with the world economy; national modes of production and means of social reproduction; and the extent to which urban legislative change was instituted. Governments were preoccupied with national political and economic issues and generally paid relatively little attention to urban administration. Where centralized structures existed, these persisted, especially in francophone Africa (Stren, 1989a). Where urban local government on the British model had been established, apart from a rapidly enlarged franchise at independence, it was retained more or less intact. However, the scope of urban local government functions was reduced before independence in some cases by the establishment of separate statutory bodies. In other cases, previously local functions were taken on by central government after independence for ideological and practical reasons, particularly education and the police (Rakodi, 1986a). The potential contradiction inherent in central-local government relations led to the erosion of local government autonomy in most post-colonial societies (although the extent to which this occurred and the form it took varied between and even within countries). This erosion was exacerbated by the lack of administrative capacity at the local level. The inherited British ideology of impartial officials guided by notions of technical rationality, advising elected councillors who viewed the exercise of power as a moral non-political activity - a poor description of the authoritarian and self-interested reality even in colonial times - was particularly inappropriate in a post-independence situation in which political office was used to fulfil traditional social obligations, further personal interests, and increase popular support and power bases (Rakodi, 1986b).

Local institutional systems were designed to facilitate accumulation by capital, much of which was in foreign hands, by ensuring an environment conducive to business and the maintenance of lifestyles for European residents. This was achieved by infrastructure provision; by land-use planning in the parts of the settlement used for trade, administration, and European residence (and sometimes manufacturing); and also, in many settlements, by the public sector provision of housing for African residents. The urban spatial structure and built environment that resulted reflected the underlying ideology of separate development, based on racially segregated residential areas and radically different standards of service provision and construction. The imported land administration system survived independence, but the speed of urban growth far outpaced its capacity to cope, and the years after independence were marked by a proliferation of unauthorized residential development. The problems arising from the superimposition of an imported system on indigenous tenure systems, its role in producing the segregated colonial built environment, its considerable administrative and skill requirements, and its function as one of the main bases for local revenue generation, were not resolved. The system of private individualized land tenure, with the opportunities it presented for accumulation, was extended on independence to many more indigenous urban residents, entrenching their interest in maintaining and extending private property ownership. These issues are taken up and analysed in more detail in chapter 11.

The extension of unauthorized development, central government expenditure constraints, and the lack of a buoyant local revenue base together resulted in infrastructure provision and maintenance falling further and further behind demand. Even where inherited administrative structures were changed after independence, as, for example, in the nationalization of the British private monopoly company that ran the public transport system in Dar es Salaam, the change more often led to a deterioration than to an improvement in services. The philosophy underlying colonial housing policy in some countries, that of providing housing for temporary urban residents (Africans and, in many countries, Europeans too), which had led to a system of contractor-built tied subsidized rental housing, was apparently not reconsidered. Most post-independence housing policies were based on similar assumptions; they proved to a greater or lesser extent unable to keep pace with the housing needs of the growing urban population and rapidly gave rise to vested interests in their continuation (Rakodi, 1986a; Stren, 1989b). In the countries where pre-colonial settlements existed, and elsewhere, the public sector had much less of a role, and private sector construction was relied upon to a greater extent to provide houses for low-income residents, for example in Zaire, Uganda, the Sudan, and Nigeria until the mid-1970s (Stren, 1989b). In these, as in the former cases, the continuation of spatial planning as a technical/regulatory activity undertaken by a section of the bureaucratic elite and/or foreign consultants and the failure to reconsider land administration meant that a large proportion of urban development occurred without reference to any guiding framework. Resources that were available for investment in infrastructure, service provision, and regulatory activities, to produce basic environmental standards for all urban residents rather than high standards for a few, were not used to best effect.

Global forces in the past two decades of African development

It has been important to sketch the history of African globalization because the impress of mercantilist trade and above all of colonial control left an enduring political, economic, and spatial legacy which not only determined countries' room to manoeuvre on their attainment of independence but also, as seen in the recent history of the continent, is far from spent. The global forces that impact upon African countries and cities today have their origins in the historical relationship between the continent and the world economic system. However, the character of globalization has continued to evolve and its differential effects have become more marked. In this section we will explore how Africa is situated with respect to these global economic forces, before concluding the chapter with a more detailed examination of their implications for urban development and urban management.


The nature of Africa's continued integration into the world trading system was revealed by a number of incidents and trends in the 1970s, above all the deteriorating terms of trade for primary commodities and the oil price increases of 1973/74 and 1979. In 1965, 93 per cent of SSA's merchandise exports were primary commodities. By 1990, this was unchanged, although the range of primary products from which export earnings were derived had changed (see also Adedeji, 1993; Husain, 1993): 91 per cent of export earnings were still from primary products, although fuels, metals, and minerals accounted for two-thirds of this compared with a quarter in 1965. Unlike low- and middle-income countries elsewhere in the world, therefore, which had increased the share of manufacturing in their export earnings from 26 per cent to 50 per cent, and had increased their share of world trade, Africa remained marginal to the world trade system. Africa's marginal position was not, as often implied by the IMF, for want of effort - export volumes from SSA grew at 6.1 per cent per annum between 1965 and 1980 and 0.2 per cent per annum in the 1980s (World Bank, 1992) and from Africa as a whole by 1.9 per cent per annum between 1971 and 1993 (IMF, 1993, p. 70) - but because demand for primary commodities has weakened in developed countries. Because of deteriorating terms of trade, the volume of imports that can be purchased with the earnings has decreased. Even the IMF admits that the terms of trade for African countries as a whole deteriorated in six out of the eight years between 1984 and 1992 (IMF, 1993).

Imports to SSA countries were, inevitably, dominated by manufactured goods in 1965 (76 per cent), much as imports of low- and middle-income countries as a whole were (66 per cent) and this continued to be the case in 1990. However, despite Africa's position as an exporter of agricultural products, food continues to constitute 16 per cent of imports (World Bank, 1992). Exports grew at a faster rate (6.1 per cent per annum) than imports (5.6 per cent per annum) between 1965 and 1980, but during the 1980s, while exports continued to grow slowly, imports fell by -4.3 per cent per annum (World Bank, 1992). The slow growth of export earnings resulted in reduced capacity to import and this in turn resulted in under-utilization of manufacturing capacity and constraints on economic growth and economic diversification throughout the later 1970s and 1980s, with adverse effects on urban employment opportunities (IMF, 1993).

Perhaps the most crucial incidents affecting Africa's trading position have been associated with oil prices. The fourfold increase in oil prices in 1973/74 and further increases in the later 1970s, which resulted in an overall real price increase of over threefold between 1973 and 1980, had differential effects: the terms of trade of the only high-income oil-exporting country, Libya, improved by 241 per cent in the seven years after 1973 and those of the other oil exporters (including Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, and Cameroon) by 195 per cent, whereas those of the great majority of countries, which were oil importers, declined to 85 per cent of 1973 levels (Nafziger, 1990, p. 52). The immediate impact on transport, energy, and agriculture forced countries to borrow to foot the increase in import bills. At the time, the massive influx of petrodollars into the world financial system was resulting in negative real interest rates and the strategy seemed both necessary and rational.

The OPEC countries used about three-quarters of the oil revenue for imports, but were also determined to use the wealth to finance their own industrialization, again with differential results. Libya increased its manufacturing production from 3 per cent of GDP in 1965 by 13.7 per cent per annum in the following 15 years (World Bank, 1992). The Middle Eastern countries had insufficient indigenous labour for industry and construction and so imported between 40 and 85 per cent of their labour forces, mostly from the Indian subcontinent, parts of East Asia, and North Africa. Remittances constituted a major flow of capital, much of which was invested in urban property. In 1986, for example, workers' remittances were equivalent to over half the earnings from merchandise exports in Morocco and Egypt (Nafziger, 1990, p. 360), or 6.0 per cent and 13.1 per cent of GNP in 1989, respectively, as well as 3.7 per cent of GNP in the Sudan and 4.8 per cent in Tunisia (UNDP, 1992). Significant impacts on urban property markets followed (see also chaps. 4 and 11). However, these flows proved vulnerable when later oil price falls and world recession led to labour shedding.

Nigeria benefited from increased oil prices and its economy grew by 7.0 per cent per annum between 1965 and 1975. The boom, however, stimulated extravagant investment and the use of the state machinery by the elite, civil servants, and intermediaries for foreign capital to further their own interests. The naira was allowed to appreciate, leading to a decline in the volume and relative significance of agricultural exports, so that, when the oil-based boom came to an end at the end of the 1970s, not only did Nigeria have little other than increased inequalities, increased concentration of activity in the south of the country including Lagos (see chap. 6), and wasteful prestige projects to show for it, but also alternative sources of export earnings had not been developed. As a result, Nigeria rapidly entered the slow-growth group of economies and its GDP actually fell by 2.5 per cent per annum between 1975 and 1986. Cameroon, although a smaller producer, was equally dependent on oil exports. Better-managed economic policies, however, enabled it to avoid the worst effects of the oil price falls (Nafziger, 1990).


For the majority of African countries, their additional borrowing in 1973/74 was to have adverse effects in the longer term, because real interest rate increases coincided with yet higher oil prices at the end of the decade, producing the debt crisis of the early 1980s. By world standards, Africa is not a major borrower. By 1986, Egypt was the seventh-largest debtor country, Nigeria the fourteenth, and Algeria the eighteenth amongst less-developed countries (LDCs), with the Côte d'Ivoire not far behind (Nafziger, 1990). A few countries, including Nigeria, Gabon, and the Congo, have been the main commercial borrowers, mainly for oil exploitation. Another reason for borrowing has been to cover current account deficits (which for Africa as a whole averaged between 4.5 and 5.4 per cent of GDP between 1985 and 1988, although they have, under IMF and World Bank pressure, been steadily reduced since then, to 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1992 - IMF, 1993, p. 154).

By 1992, Africa's debt: GDP ratio was over 70 per cent and its debt: export ratio over 400 per cent. Its debt service ratio had, as a result, doubled as a proportion of GDP from 2 per cent in 1980/81 to 4.5 per cent in 1990/91, and repayments consistently absorbed 25 per cent of export earnings between 1985 and 1992, even though 67 per cent of the debt in 1992 (excluding IMF loans) was owed to official, mostly bilateral, concessional creditors and only 33 per cent to commercial lenders. In SSA, official debt formed an even larger proportion of the debt overhang (78 per cent) and commercial bank debt (13 per cent) was even less significant (IMF, 1993, p. 187; see also Husain, 1993). The burdensome nature of this debt to the countries concerned is illustrated by comparing SSA, which had outstanding debt equal to 324 per cent of exports of goods and services and 109 per cent of GNP in 1990, with East Asia and the Pacific (91 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively) or Latin America and the Caribbean (257 per cent and 42 per cent) (World Bank, 1992).

Africa's indebtedness is variously a result of necessity, extravagance, and the opportunities offered, as noted above, by its strategic importance. In the poorest countries, heavy reliance on aid has been unavoidable. However, much of the money has been squandered, especially in countries such as Zaire, Ghana, and Nigeria (Nafziger, 1990). Growing aid dependence and its implications will be discussed below. Most African countries have not been able to borrow at all extensively from commercial banks since the early 1980s, because they have been unable to repay debts incurred earlier. The extent to which the continent's earlier share of FDI has been maintained since the mid-1980s will be examined in the next section.

Foreign direct investment

On average over 95 per cent of investment in any developing country is financed from domestic savings (IMF, 1993). As discussed above, however, FDI is sought for its anticipated advantages in giving access to technology and export markets (Jenkins, 1987). Much has been concentrated in a small number of countries with large domestic markets, rich natural resources, or advantages as a base for export-oriented production. In 1975, 19 per cent of the world's stock of FDI was in LDCs. By 1982, the proportion of global FDI that was in LDCs had increased to 24 per cent but Africa's share of it had decreased from 21 per cent to 11 per cent (Cantwell, 1991, pp. 187189). Its share of new FDI was even less (Cantwell, 1991). The IMF acknowledged that, even when the smaller, resource-poor African countries offered substantial incentives and imposed few restrictions, they were unsuccessful in attracting investment (IMF, 1985, p. 4). Thus between 1976 and 1986 significant net inflows occurred to only half a dozen countries. Most countries experienced net disinvestment, not least because of the effects of structural adjustment (see below; Cockcroft, 1992, p. 337).

The sectoral composition of worldwide FDI changed over the period, initially away from oil, mining, and agriculture to manufacturing. Nationalizations and the effect of policies to restrict entry of new foreign capital lessened TNC interest even in oil and mining in Africa (IMF, 1985; UNCTC, 1991). Nevertheless by the early 1980s half the total stock of FDI was still in the extractive sectors, compared with about 20 per cent in non-African LDCs, and almost 40 per cent of foreign-owned primary commodity enterprises, concentrated in oil extraction and the mining of copper, iron, bauxite, and uranium, were in Africa. To the extent that FDI occurred in manufacturing (about a quarter of the stock in Africa by the beginning of the 1980s compared with half in Asia and over half in Latin America), it has been in import substitution and resource-processing industries in the larger, more developed economies and so has been of only limited importance to urban economies (Cantwell, 1991).

Between 1983 and 1989, FDI outflows worldwide increased 29 per cent per annum, as the global economy recovered from the early 1980s' recession, although the share of LDCs in this investment fell to about a fifth (UNCTC, 1991). The destination for over three-quarters of these flows continued to be 10 countries, of which only Egypt was in Africa. Although Africa's share of worldwide FDI remained stable, at just over 2 per cent throughout the 1980s, and its share of FDI in LDCs increased slightly in the second half of the decade, the volume of investment was minute by world standards and concentrated on oil-related investment in Egypt and Nigeria (UNCTC, 1991). Low-technology, low-value-added import substitution (IS) industries continued to dominate most countries' industrial structure, yielding lower rates of return to foreign investors than manufacturing elsewhere in the world (Bennell, 1990). Only a tiny share of investment originating in Japan and the United States goes to Africa. Most FDI in the continent originates in the former colonial powers (UNCTC, 1985), although Bennell concludes that, for British industrial capital as a whole, Africa is now of only marginal and decreasing interest (Bennell, 1990).

FDI in manufacturing worldwide has continued to grow over the past 10 years. However, a further sectoral shift, which had started in the 1970s, gathered pace in the 1980s. Services FDI, including business and financial services, trade, tourism, and construction, grew to comprise over half of all annual flows of FDI and 40 per cent of FDI stock worldwide. Intermediate services, such as financial, business, and professional services, and those competing for the discretionary income of consumers, are concentrated in developed countries, whereas FDI in services in LDCs traditionally concentrated in trade and construction, and has more recently diversified into tourism and banking, especially in those countries offering "tax haven" facilities (UNCTC, 1989). Recent growth in FDI in services in Africa has been concentrated once again in a few countries (Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria) and in the traditional areas of trade and construction, rather than the financial services sector, which has been so important globally. However, a very high proportion of the tiny but growing Japanese investment is in trade and financial services (UNCTC, 1989). Although Africa has shared in the increased global flows of investment in services, as with manufacturing its position is marginal.

Development in Africa has been held back not only by limited flows of FDI but also by low levels of domestic savings and investment, which fell from 27 per cent of GDP between 1971 and 1975 and 30 per cent between 1975 and 1981 to 21-22 per cent in the 1980s and early 1990s (IMF, 1993; see also Husain, 1993). Reinforcing the shortage of capital for investment, FDI has had a negative effect on the balance of payments: outflows of dividends, royalties, management fees, etc. exceed inflows of new investment and are financed from commodity exports, while the investment in manufacturing is generally for the domestic market and absorbs rather than earns foreign exchange (Cockcroft, 1992). The limited volume of FDI in manufacturing has exacerbated the difficulties experienced by African countries in generating sufficient wage jobs for growing urban labour forces.

Aid dependence

External and internal shocks, a general deterioration in the terms of trade for many of Africa's most important products, and economic mismanagement have, as we have seen, led to a continued need for foreign exchange, which is not satisfied by earnings from exports, commercial bank borrowing, or FDI. As a result, Africa became the largest recipient region of Official Development Assistance (ODA) by the 1980s, accounting for 43 per cent of all bilateral and multilateral development assistance by 1990 (12 per cent to north Africa and 30 per cent to SSA) (Simon, 1995). Aid receipts as a percentage of GNP were 9.6 per cent for SSA as a whole in 1990 or US$34 per capita. The poorest and most aid-dependent countries were Mozambique, its economy wrecked by civil war, in which 66 per cent of GNP in 1990 came from aid (US$60/head), Tanzania (48 per cent of GNP, US$47/head), and Somalia (46 per cent of GNP, US$55/head). Although other countries were less aid dependent, in several between a fifth and a third of GNP came from aid. The recipients of the largest volume of aid per capita, however, were not the poorest countries: the level in Mozambique was exceeded by four other countries, none among the poorest (Egypt US$108/head, Mauritania US$107/head, Senegal US$100/head, and the Congo US$92/head) and that in Tanzania by a further four, with relatively rich countries such as Morocco and Tunisia not far behind (US$39/head) (World Bank, 1992). Aid receipts, clearly, are related to factors other than need. It should also be noted that, whereas net credits from the IMF were positive in the early 1980s, they were negative later in the decade (Bird, 1993; ODI, 1993).

The reliance of African countries on aid has rendered them vulnerable to policy conditionality, both by the multilateral agencies, which supplied just under one-third of ODA to SSA during the 1980s (although a much smaller proportion to north African countries), and, in their wake, by the bilateral donors, especially the United States. Policy conditions have affected both general economic management and approaches to urban development. The latter will be considered in the next section.

The difficulties caused for African countries by the external shocks of the 1970s and early 1980s (oil price increases, world recession, and increased interest rates) were initially seen as temporary trade crises and tackled by IMF stabilization packages. However, endogenous shocks (drought, civil strife) and economic mismanagement combined with external vulnerability showed that the economic crisis had deeper roots, resulting in the addition of structural and sectoral adjustment programmes to the stabilization programmes. By the end of the 1980s, 30 African countries had adopted structural adjustment policies, many implementing a succession of programmes. Only a few small countries had no IMF/World Bank programmes and several had introduced some kind of "home grown" programme (Jesperson, 1992). As a result, 29 per cent of IMF commitments by value were to SSA countries in April 1989 (ODI, 1993, p. 2).

The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) adopted by most countries comprised three basic components:

(1) "[A] reform of the system of economic incentives with the objective of changing the structure of incentives in favor of tradeables versus nontradeables, accompanied by measures to liberalize economies so that factors of production can seek their highest returns" (Seralgeldin, 1989, p. 5). Thus the strategies advocated are typically export led, aiming above all to increase export earnings in order to foster economic growth and enable the repayment of outstanding debt. The main macroeconomic policies urged on countries are:

- devaluation, to encourage exports and discourage imports;

- trade liberalization, by removing controls on imports, foreign exchange, and foreign investment;

- price decontrol, to remove distortions that discriminate against export sectors and agriculture and protect inefficient industry. This includes decontrol of the price of labour. The intention is to increase the efficiency of industry by ensuring appropriate prices for the factors of production and by shedding labour where overmanning has occurred, thus enhancing domestic and export competitiveness. In addition, price subsidies are to be removed, inter alia to remove the bias in favour of urban consumers;

- strict control of money supply and credit expansion, by increasing real interest rates. The latter is also intended to fight inflation, promote saving, and allocate investment capital to the highest bidders;

- tax reform to replace taxes on production with taxes on consumption and value added.

(2) "[S]treamlining the public sector... while directing scarce public financial resources toward the provision of basic infrastructure; supporting vital economic services; and developing human resources... and freeing of domestic resources for private sector investment and production" (Seralgeldin, 1989, p. 5). This is to be achieved by:

- reduction of public expenditure. Although the World Bank holds that this can be achieved by improving revenue generation, in practice streamlining of the civil service is required, based on reducing the number of civil servants employed and freezing wages;

- privatization of government enterprises and parastatals, to reduce the size of the public sector and increase efficiency; reorientation of public sector investment towards fostering productive sectors, especially agriculture, and providing basic services in education and health. In a climate of general expenditure cutbacks, the provision of basic services is to be accompanied by the introduction or raising of user charges and the removal of subsidies.

(3) "[A] comprehensive restructuring of external debt with the objective of relieving the resource constraint" (Seralgeldin, 1989, p. 5); restructuring debt (rather than writing it off, although some write-offs may be negotiated) and improving repayment are intended to encourage new flows of aid and commercial investment.

To achieve these aims, macroeconomic policies aimed at removing distortions in markets are needed, in particular to favour trade, as well as sectoral policies to encourage the development of productive sectors and resources, and policies to improve resource mobilization, both private investment (domestic and foreign) and public resources, by a balance between improved revenue generation and public expenditure cut-backs. By the end of the 1980s, the Bank's emphasis had shifted from stabilization and growth to place rather more emphasis on equity, stressing the need for programmes to foster the participation of the poor in the process of economic growth, by improving their access to jobs, income-generating assets, and basic services, and to "provide for action programs to avoid social distress in the short term" (Seralgeldin, 1989, p. 7). The latter, generally termed the "social aspects of adjustment," are compensatory transitional provisions to protect vulnerable groups' access to services and to compensate redundant workers and enable them to make a new start (Ribe et al., 1990). SAPs have continued to evolve in response to both donor and country experience and the negotiations between them as programmes are extended (Green and Faber, 1994).

Despite the difficult circumstances in which, it is acknowledged, most countries have adopted and pursued SAPs (fluctuating and/or declining terms of trade, high real interest rates exacerbating the debt burden, and droughts), Seralgeldin detected a number of positive experiences in the first two-thirds of the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1985, in 20 countries relatively little affected by unusual weather or external shocks, World Bank figures suggested that real GDP growth rates (allowing for inflation and population growth) of 1.5 per cent per annum on average were experienced. However, in 1986/87, GDP growth more than doubled to about 4 per cent per annum in countries that were considered to have had sustained adjustment programmes, whereas it fell by half in non-adjusting countries. In addition, in adjusting countries inflation and the fiscal deficit are said to have been reduced, and real interest rates to have become positive (Seralgeldin, 1989, pp. 3-4).

Not all assessments are so positive, and some reach contrary conclusions. Mosley and Weeks (1993) concluded that, contrary to World Bank assertions, Africa as a whole did not recover after 1985, although there was some improvement for some countries; countries with Bank-supported structural adjustment did no better than those without; and "there may have been no significant difference between the economic performances of 'strong' and 'weak' adjusters that can be attributed to structural adjustment packages" (p. 1588). Difficulties in assessing the outcomes arise from methodological problems, differences in definitions, and disagreement over the relative roles of domestic policy reform and exogenous shocks or the effects of war and civil disorder (Green, 1993). As a result, adjustment measures have not been disaggregated and assessed in a way that is useful to improving policy. In partial recognition of these and other criticisms, the World Bank's most recent assessment (World Bank, 1994) is more measured in its conclusions." It notes that there has been more progress with liberalizing trade than with reforms in the agricultural, financial, and public sectors, and, although it acknowledges external constraints on achieving economic growth, it attributes growth in per capita GDP, exports, and industrial and agricultural production in those countries that have achieved these primarily to far-reaching and consistent domestic policy reforms (see also O'Brien, 1994).

Killick, however, in an assessment of the outcome of IMF programmes, concludes that the effects of Fund programmes and their ability to influence macroeconomic policy (with the exception of exchange rates) are overrated. High programme failure rates and lack of clear evidence that objectives are being achieved throw doubt on the Fund's ability to operate in low-income countries. Although the programmes have, he acknowledges, raised awareness amongst some governments of the importance of financial discipline, the increased inflow of private capital expected to result has not, as noted above, materialized (Killick with Malik, 1992; ODI, 1993). Riddell (1992), Stewart et al. (1992), and Jesperson (1992) are even more critical:

Broadly speaking, stabilization achieved positive but modest results in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s... [but] [w]ith few exceptions, stabilization was accompanied by sharp losses in GDP growth, investment and human capital development... The belt-tightening undertaken by most African countries would perhaps have been acceptable if adjustment had triggered the desired changes in economic structures and eventually led to expansion in food production, manufacturing activities and non-traditional exports. However, from this perspective also, the improvements realised in the 1980s were not satisfactory, despite profound reforms in privatisation, the liberalisation of prices and foreign trade and the mobilisation of external resources. (Jesperson, 1992, p. 14).

An analysis of 24 countries that initiated adjustment programmes in the 1980s showed that:

(i) capital accumulation slowed in 20 of the countries, owing to low rates of public and private (domestic and foreign) investment;

(ii) the share of manufacturing in GDP increased in only 6 of the countries (in 10, industrial output declined and in a further 9 it stagnated or grew very slowly; Stewart et al., 1992);

(iii) export volumes increased in only 11 countries, although even in these countries "the impact on the balance of payments was almost always negligible because of the fall in the export prices of primary commodities" (Jesperson, 1992, p. 14). In the other 13 countries, export volumes stagnated or diminished.

Overall, in SSA in the 1980s, only 12 countries (representing less than a fifth of the region's population) recorded positive rates of growth of per capita GDP. Per capita GDP fell in the remaining 21 countries, including many that had achieved growth in the previous 15 years (see also Stewart, 1991; Helleiner, 1992; Stoneman, 1993). Even including the more buoyant economies of north Africa, IMF figures show that, whereas real GDP growth was positive between 1973 and 1992 (increasing at about 3 per cent per annum in the 1970s and 2 per cent per annum in the 1980s), per capita real GDP was stagnant or negative in seven out of the eight years between 1983 and 1990 (Bird, 1993). There was little change in the overall picture in the first half of the 1990s. These conclusions conceal marked variations in implementation and outcomes, which themselves need careful explanations related to political and institutional as well as economic factors (Harvey, 1993).

SAPs have also had uneven impacts on economic groups within countries. It was hoped, for example, that increased producer prices and reduced food and services subsidies would benefit rural populations, especially small farmers, redressing the perceived anti-agriculture and anti-rural bias in government policy. In practice, these impacts have been more complex than anticipated by the multilateral agencies and in many cases strongly negative, despite half-hearted compensatory programmes and lip-service paid to integrating anti-poverty measures into SAPs (Gibbon, 1992). Many of the impacts have affected urban populations in particular and will be analysed in more detail below. An even more recent aspect of policy conditionality has been the association of political liberalization with economic reform. However, as has been shown in ODI (1994) and Simon (1995), the relationship between type of political system and economic policy is complex and the nature and significance of democratization imperfectly understood in either theoretical or practical terms.

Although policy reform was needed in African countries, their increased dependence on external assistance in the 1980s made them susceptible to uniform policy prescriptions, determined, despite apparent opportunities for negotiation, largely by outside agencies. Although the donors claim that there is now evidence of improved macroeconomic performance as a result, few others are convinced. Instead, the policy formulation hegemony of the colonial powers to which Africa was subjected in the first half of the twentieth century seems to have been substituted by a new hegemony which no less clearly has the interests of transnational capital and northern countries at heart (Bier, 1994). Such a hegemony, it is argued, is illustrated by the lack of influence of alternative agendas for reform, such as that of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 1989; Stewart et al., 1992; Parfitt, 1993; Simon, 1995).

Urban change and urban management

What, in the context of Africa's external dependence and vulnerability, marginalization and aid dependence, has happened to cities? What effects has the economic deterioration precipitated by the first oil price increases and reinforced by subsequent exogenous and endogenous forces had on the rate of urbanization, on the economic structure of cities, and on urban management? In the first part of this section, urban trends will be related to the internationalization of capital and their manifestation in Africa will be explored. Aid dependence, and especially the implementation of SAPs, have had particular implications for urban populations, in terms of both incomes and access to jobs and services. Finally, the donors, especially the UN, the World Bank, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), have adopted a series of policies related to lending for urban development which reveal congruences and contradictions with their wider policy stances.

Global cities and urbanization in Africa

One of the manifestations of the internationalization of capital has been the emergence of a hierarchy of cities with particular roles in the capitalist economic system. At the apex of the system are the so called "world cities," sites for the control and management of TNC operations, specialized business services to back these up, and nodes in the world banking and commercial system (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Sassen-Koob, 1985; Thrift, 1987; Sassen, 1994). Second to these global cities are regional or continental cities, which perform similar functions within the world capitalist system to global cities, but within a more restricted geographical region (Sit, 1993). LDC cities of most obvious regional significance are those in the newly industrialized countries (NICs), which are increasingly integrated into functional networks of economic linkages with global or core cities, especially in Asia, where TNC headquarters and R&D functions remain in Tokyo but investment occurs in a regional network of cities in East and South-East Asia. Within these regional networks, "growth triangles" have been identified based on complementarities across national boundaries and urban corridors based on mega-cities (Yeung and Lo, 1996). At the third level in the hierarchy are national cities, which are foci for national accumulation but also provide a location for transnational offices and operations, banks, and corporate services, and are thus linked into the world economic system (Sit, 1993; Simon, 1992, 1993).

Not unexpectedly, as Simon shows in earlier work (1992, 1993) and in chapter 3, given Africa's marginality to the world economic system, none of the world cities is located in the continent, although Cairo, Nairobi, and increasingly Johannesburg have regional roles. Africa is not even part of the semi-periphery, and the functional city systems linked across national borders that have begun to emerge in Asia are not evident in Africa except insofar as cities in the interior must use ports in other countries for trade. Most large African cities are centres of national economies, although they are connected to the world economy through the unequal trade, investment, and aid relationships analysed above.

Despite its marginal position in the world economy and the economic difficulties experienced more or less consistently since the mid-1970s, urbanization has continued (table 2.1). By 1990 it was estimated that a third of Africa's population was urban compared with a quarter in 1975. The rate of urban growth was about the same in the 1980s, it was suggested, as in the post-independence decade, running at just under 5 per cent per annum. As in the earlier period, rates of growth in the least urbanized regions (east and west Africa) were above the average for the continent as a whole, while those in the most urbanized regions (south and north Africa) were below (UN, 1993). However, there are major difficulties with these figures: of the 53 countries included, only two-thirds had had a census since 1980 (14 in the early 1980s and 17 since 1985); figures for 19 were based on censuses carried out in the 1970s and 3 in the 1960s. Not only the recency but also the reliability of the figures varies widely: of the five largest countries (20 million+ in 1980), only three have had reasonably recent semi-reliable censuses (Ethiopia, South Africa, and Egypt²), while Zaire appears to have had only one (1984) and Nigeria's last reliable one was in 1963, because there are some doubts even about the most recent (1991) census: these latter two countries account, on 1980 estimates, for 22 per cent of the continent's total population and 23 per cent of its urban population.

The inability of so many African countries to carry out regular and reliable censuses is a symptom of their poverty and underdevelopment, as well as of civil war and political instability. Much of the data on recent urbanization trends is, therefore, unreliable and many of the apparently precise figures are mere estimates, based on extrapolations of earlier trends. This is a theme that is developed in more detail by Simon and taken up again in later chapters, especially chapter 13. In addition, given the series of exogenous and endogenous shocks that have affected the development of most African countries, it is risky to make assumptions based on previous patterns.

By 1970 there were eight cities of 1 million+ in Africa, and by 1990 there were estimated to be 24, in 18 countries (UN, 1993). So far, the number of very large cities is limited. The emergence of Cairo in Egypt, as elaborated upon by Yousry and Aboul Atta in chapter 5, owes much to the country's geography (the limited stock of fertile, watered agricultural land, the significance of the Nile as a source of water and transport route), as well as to its long urban history and the economies of agglomeration which operate in any major city (Rondinelli, 1988). However, efforts to encourage urban and industrial growth elsewhere, especially in Alexandria and also to some extent in the new towns, have borne some fruit and the proportion of Egypt's urban population that lives in Cairo is expected to decline from a peak of 39 per cent in 1980 to 34 per cent by 2000. Lagos has never been as dominant in Nigeria as Cairo has in Egypt. It accounted for only 8.5 per cent of Nigeria's urban population in 1950, but has increased its dominance in succeeding decades and now is estimated to accommodate a fifth of the country's urban population (UN, 1993). From its colonial origins as a port and administrative centre, a history of concentrated public and private sector investment underlain by poor communications with the rest of the country, political and administrative dominance combined with a politics of patronage, and dependence on imported inputs for industry and construction has, as Abiodun shows in chapter 6, reinforced its early dominance. Beavon (chap. 5) describes the early mining and later manufacturing economic base of Johannesburg which, together with its services functions, accounts for its growth and agglomeration into the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging conurbation. Even in countries that do not have very large cities, the proportion of the urban population that lives in the largest city is high and increasing, while secondary cities and small urban centres continue to be underdeveloped (Rondinelli, 1988).

The relationship between economic and urban growth, as Simon shows in chapter 3, is complex and far from direct. Despite Africa's economic difficulties, many large cities have continued to grow - they are communications and transport hubs, and often the seats of government, and rates of natural increase are high despite the spread of AIDS. Their location as the place of residence for politicians, senior civil servants, and diplomats has helped to bias public expenditure on specialist health and other services and infrastructure towards them; this and the need for access to government offices has in turn made them the most likely locational choice for both transnational and domestic investment in manufacturing and for the offices of TNCs with mining or agricultural enterprises elsewhere in the country. Even though transnational investment in services in African countries is limited, what there is occurs in the largest cities, the fulcrums of flows of international capital, travel, and communications (Thrift, 1987). FDI is even more concentrated than domestic investment in the largest cities, because of executives" greater knowledge of the city economic environment and the presence of commercial facilities to intermediate between extraction/production and the international market where necessary (Sit, 1993). In 1988 over half of all urban wage employment in Kenya was in Nairobi (Simon, 1992, pp. 94-97; see chap. 9).

The locational attractions of the city are often magnified by policy with respect, for example, to transport tariffs, energy and service prices, and incentives for industrial development. Official policies to encourage decentralization are often counteracted by the spatial effects of non-spatial policies: Oberai (1993) quotes the example of Nigeria, where over 90 per cent of total net subsidies granted to industries benefited those located in Lagos.

The leading economic functions in the international and national economy have a multiplier effect, generating both formal and informal sector employment in wage and consumer goods and services industries. Despite the decreasing ability of the formal sector to absorb increased numbers in the labour force, as described by Rogerson in chapter 10, the cities continue to exert an attraction for migration. Many rural areas provide few economic opportunities for their growing populations, despite the pro-agriculture policy changes which have formed part of SAPs. Although the deterioration in infrastructure and services that has resulted from public expenditure cut-backs has been countrywide, rural areas started in a disadvantaged position. The chance of a better life in the cities, however much of a gamble, continues to attract migrants (Dogan and Kasarda, 1988). The evolving economic, social, political, and physical characteristics of these cities, marked as they are by so-called "informalization," are the subject of both the city case-studies and the thematic chapters in parts II and III of this volume.

Aid dependence and urban management

Rapidly growing urban populations place increasing demands on land, housing, services, and infrastructure, but weak revenue bases, lack of technological and administrative capacity amongst the agencies responsible for urban development, and vulnerability to evasion or exploitation by those with political and economic power prevent provision keeping pace with need. The result is environmental damage, deteriorating living conditions, especially for the urban poor, and lack of the political legitimacy needed to improve revenue collection and regulatory processes. Recognition of urban bias in spatial investment and non-spatial policies by the 1970s led to an overreaction. Aid flows switched almost entirely to rural development, with the partial exception of those from the World Bank and USAID. Governments, despite the political power of urban populations, had declining volumes of resources and often misdirected them into ineffective or prestige investment. The result was that local administration and services deteriorated. In this chapter, the particular role of external agencies is the focus of attention and, as a result, the analysis applies predominantly to the most aid-dependent countries. Urban management more broadly will be considered both in the course of the city case-studies and also in part III.

Africa's aid dependency has brought with it policy conditionality not merely for economic policies but also for spatial investment. The World Bank's first attempt to tackle urban problems started in the early 1970s (World Bank, 1972). Although it had previously funded some macro-infrastructure projects, its new interest in urban problems coincided with its president's attempts to reorient its lending towards poverty-focused priorities, in particular the needs of the bottom 40 per cent of the income distribution. Its search for appropriate locations for pilot projects based on the principles of affordability, cost recovery, and replicability coincided with the dawning realization in low-income countries that traditional methods of catering for newly formed urban households by the construction of complete conventional housing units for rent or sale were unrealistic in situations of rapid population growth and strained resources. In Senegal and Zambia, the World Bank identified promising locations for its first two projects, both based on sites and services, with the latter also incorporating upgrading of unauthorized areas. Although the Bank envisaged the first projects as both pilot and demonstration projects, and located them in the capital cities of the respective countries in the hope that they would later be replicated throughout the urban system, their large scale, the conditions of World Bank lending, and other problems slowed their implementation and prevented modifications being made as design problems emerged. For various reasons, neither project was replicated, although some of the lessons were fed into later projects of the same type in other African countries. Other early projects were located in Botswana and Tanzania, and between 1972 and 1978 there were 12 altogether in SSA (Okpala, 1990) and by 1984 a further 13 (World Bank, 1986). Few, however, were 100 per cent successful with respect to the principles on which they were based: most sites and services projects were not affordable by the poorest, hidden subsidies were common, cost recovery problems were widespread, and replication rare. Other funders, especially USAID, which was funding 14 projects in 1984, adopted similar approaches (World Bank, 1986). Thus in 1985, out of the 72 projects identified for the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless in 28 African countries, 60 per cent were externally funded (Okpala, 1990).

By the later 1970s it was clear to many observers that there were problems associated with project-based lending, some of which resulted from the external funding and some from the process of project planning and implementation. The requirement for most of the significant decisions with respect to project design, implementation, and cost recovery to be agreed at the appraisal stage, prior to loan approval, and for agreed schedules of implementation to be adhered to, firstly deterred participation in project planning even in unauthorized areas and where local political and official forces were sympathetic and, secondly, made it difficult to modify project components that proved inappropriate or unworkable in practice. The establishment of separate project units to implement externally funded projects was a mixed blessing: they permitted external agencies to keep track of funds and insist on their correct use, and local implementors were able to avoid red tape and recruit appropriate staff, but they also led to problems of integrating newly serviced areas into ongoing systems of administration and service operation and maintenance. In addition, few of the projects resulted in an improved capacity with respect to land delivery, infrastructure provision, operation and maintenance, building materials production and supply, or housing finance (Rakodi, 1991; see also Rakodi, 1992b).

By 1983 the World Bank had also begun to recognize some of these problems (World Bank, 1983; Cohen, 1983, 1990) and the emphasis of its lending programmes and those of USAID shifted. Inadequate local revenue generation and the limited volume of mortgage funding that the public sector was able to make available were perceived to be major constraints on the larger-scale provision of serviced plots. Attention was paid to local revenue generation from the mid-1980s, when, for example, a USAID study in Burkina Faso was carried out (Mabogunje, 1990). A desire to tap into private sector funds for low-income housing, an ideological belief that private sector institutions would be more efficient in disbursing and recovering loans than public sector institutions, and an underlying desire to extend the reach of international and domestic large-scale capital led to a major focus on housing finance. USAID had established a Housing Guarantee programme in the early 1970s, which mobilizes private bank funding in the United States through a Congressionally sanctioned government loan guarantee. Attempts were made to create self-supporting financial intermediaries capable of making loans to low- and moderate-income households and to reduce and restructure housing subsidies (especially to eliminate subsidized interest rates) (World Bank, 1993). This was much easier in Asia and Latin America, with their more developed financial sectors, than in Africa and, although the worldwide volume of Bank shelter-related lending increased, it also shifted towards higher-income countries (World Bank, 1993, p. 57). The limitations of the approach and its vulnerability to economic downturn are revealed by the Zimbabwe experience (Rakodi, 1995b; see also Pugh' 1994). Following an overall review of experience (UNCHS, 1987), the new emphasis was nevertheless endorsed by the UN (UNCHS, 1990) and the World Bank (1993) as a strategy for housing based on enabling and facilitating the private sector to address the housing needs of all income groups including the poor.

Parallel with this attention to the housing sector was a recognition that most cities were so poorly serviced that they could not maintain their roles in national economies as the centres of administration and suppliers of rural inputs, let alone satisfy the basic needs of their inhabitants. By the mid-1980s, in the face of "worldwide economic stagnation, the economic benefits of urbanization were revisited" (Stren, 1993, p. 127) and the inhibiting effects on private sector investment of infrastructure neglect recognized (Peterson et al., 1991; Lee, 1993; Becker et al.' 1994). In Tanzania, for example, while the economy stagnated, the per capita decline in expenditure on infrastructure and services was -11 per cent per annum between 1978/79 and 1986/87. As a result, large firms had to lay off workers sporadically in response to irregular water and electricity supplies; this in turn resulted in lower production, lower profits, and lower yields from taxation (Stren, 1993, p. 128). Simon examines urban basic needs satisfaction in chapter 3, using the example of Maputo in Mozambique.

In 1991 a World Bank policy document set out a new agenda designed:

(i) to improve urban productivity by remedying infrastructure deficiencies, rationalizing regulatory frameworks, strengthening local government, and improving the financing of urban development;

(ii) to alleviate urban poverty by increasing demand for the labour of the poor, investing in health and education, and supporting safety nets and compensatory measures to deal with transitional problems caused by SAPs; and

(iii) to protect the urban environment by raising awareness, improving the information base, and developing city-wide environmental strategies and programmes of action (World Bank, 1991a; Cohen, 1992; Cohen and Leitmann, 1994).

To implement this agenda, an increase in World Bank lending was anticipated, and a shift in emphasis from neighbourhood investments in shelter and infrastructure to city-level policy reform, institutional development, and city-wide investment in infrastructure. The Urban Development Cooperation Strategy of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), "Cities, People and Poverty," shares the goals of making cities economically viable and productive, as well as environmentally sustainable, and strengthening the capacity of local government. It apparently places much more emphasis than the World Bank on the need for social justice and participation, by means of poverty alleviation measures, including assistance to small-scale enterprises; enabling and participative strategies for the provision of infrastructure and services; and support for initiatives by non-governmental organizations to improve the environment (Cheema, 1992).

Together with the UN Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) and UNDP (and later some bilateral donors too), an urban management programme (1986-1999) was agreed that aims to work with developing countries to strengthen the contribution that cities and towns make toward economic growth, environmental quality, and the reduction of poverty. The programme now works in five areas: land management, infrastructure management, municipal finance and administration, environmental management, and poverty alleviation (World Bank, 1991b). It operates in Africa through a regional office, initially in Accra and now in Abidjan, using city and country consultations as a basis for policy formulation and regional networks of expertise to provide technical advice on the implementation of action plans. The programme is underpinned by earlier World Bank research (for example, Bahl and Linn, 1992, on urban finance) and an ongoing research programme as part of which a series of research and advisory publications are being produced. By the late 1980s, lending to strengthen municipal finance, infrastructure investment and management, and land management had increased (Wegelin, 1994).

As yet, there have been neither published in-house evaluations nor independent external evaluations of the World Bank's new urban agenda and the urban management programme (UMP). However, concerns have been expressed about the assumptions upon which it is based, the gap between policy and implementation, and its relationship to the wider economic policies advocated by the same institutions (Jones and Ward, 1994). Harris (1992), for example, considers that the measures intended to increase urban productivity are not based on an adequate understanding of the structure, competitive advantages, and disadvantages of city economies. Stren (1993) criticizes the agencies' failure to define what is meant by urban management, although he recognizes that this is in part to retain organizational flexibility. The term has become popular, Stren suggests, because of its ideological appeal, given its association with business management, and the desire of the funding agencies to harness private sector resources. Nevertheless, it can be used to encapsulate conceptual and practical advances in approaches to planning for urban growth (Devas and Rakodi, 1993). There is, in addition, a certain political naively in the published documents (Jones and Ward, 1994). For example, the mentions of participatory approaches seem to be made with little understanding, as exemplified by the suggestion by UNDP's programme manager that "we [sic] must organize the urban poor at the community level to increase their capacity to make demands on the urban system" (Cheema, 1992, p. 27). It is unclear if he is implying that the international donor agencies intend to adopt a more proactive role in local political systems, from which they have typically distanced themselves. Harris (1992) also points out that many World Bank and UMP projects are still concerned with traditional land management, household services provision, and housing rather than city-wide institutional strengthening.

Structural adjustment lending, with its economic and political conditionalities, forms the context within which the new emphases in urban lending will be implemented. Although the municipal development funds being established in a number of countries as part of World Bank-funded projects promise a more regular supply of capital funds, they do not of themselves solve all the difficulties in the political relationships between the central ministry responsible and local councils. The ability of local authorities and other agencies to achieve good yields from a variety of revenue sources is threatened by the pressure on them to lay off staff and the likelihood that, in a situation of declining real wages, staff are likely to have to continue and diversify the survival strategies they have already developed. Without adequate administrative capacity, service delivery is often not good enough to persuade users to pay their charges or taxes; poor service delivery in turn diminishes the political legitimacy of local authorities and makes it more difficult to enforce regulatory instruments and tax collection.

By the end of the 1980s, the World Bank (1991a) was more explicit about the expected impacts of adjustment on urban populations. Firstly, urban labour markets were expected to contract and unemployment to increase as a result of civil service cut-backs and labour shedding by industries adversely affected by import liberalization. Secondly, there would be what was hoped to be only a short-term decline in real incomes, as wages stagnated and prices of imports and subsidized goods and services rose. Thirdly, cuts in expenditure on and increased charges for education and health services might reduce access to them by the urban poor, unless compensatory mechanisms were introduced. It was also thought likely that the slow-down in formal sector employment and wages was likely to hurt the informal sector, although it was considered that this might be partly compensated for by increased demand for informal sector products and services both when these substitute for imports and where rising rural incomes lead to increased demand. It was considered possible that rates of rural-urban migration would decline as employment opportunities shrank in urban areas, and that the transition would be eased by reliance on extended family networks. The realities of economic and social trends are analysed by Rogerson in chapter 10 and Potts in chapter 13 respectively.

Adjustment programmes in African countries have typically been associated with very slow growth or a decline in formal sector employment; reductions in public sector employment, even if less extensive than planned (World Bank, 1994), have not been compensated for by increases in private employment, because rapid trade liberalization has undermined local industries given too little time to adjust to changed local circumstances. Real (non-agricultural) average and minimum wages fell 25 per cent between 1980 and 1985 in two-thirds of the countries for which data are available (ILO-JASPA, 1989, quoted in Jesperson, 1992), and country studies show a continuation of this trend in the later 1980s. Although deliberate policies aimed at reducing labour costs were intended to increase competitiveness, lower real wages have a dampening effect on consumer demand and thus on domestic markets for formal and informal sector products. They also have adverse effects on efficiency in both the public and private sectors when they fall below the amount necessary to support a household. What evidence there is shows that urban populations in most cases have responded by devoting increased time to a diversified set of informal economic activities, rather than by return migration to the rural areas (O'Connor, 1991; see chap. 13). The informal sector has expanded to absorb increasing numbers of people, but many of the economic opportunities yield limited returns, especially those available to people without access to capital (Jesperson, 1992; see also Stewart, 1991, and chap. 10). The unstructured markets favoured for capital, it has been pointed out, do not level the playing field between large and small enterprises; they discriminate against the latter (Stewart et al., 1992). The optimism with which the agencies expect the informal sector to absorb additional labour is threatened by shrinking demand as the formal wage bill shrinks, while former civil servants and formal sector employees do not necessarily have the skills and qualifications necessary to be successful in self-employment. The shrinkage of the formal sector may also decrease tax revenue, since any form of tax is harder to collect in informal systems of marketing, employment, or housing development. However, municipalities need a sound financial base, well-trained staff, and political legitimacy in order to improve their administrative procedures and service delivery.

Real government expenditure per capita stagnated or fell in most countries in the region, as required by SAPs, and the pattern of expenditure also changed. Despite World Bank encouragement for appropriate micro-credit schemes, expenditure on public works for upgrading and maintenance of urban infrastructure, and "shielding public expenditure on key health, education, nutrition and other basic welfare services" (Seralgeldin, 1989, p. 50) in order to protect those most vulnerable to cuts, spending on health care, education, economic services, and infrastructure was disproportionately cut (Stewart, 1991; Logan and Mengisteab, 1993). Such cuts reflected not government policy changes but the resources available once increased debt repayments had been allowed for (Jesperson, 1992). Some governments made efforts to redirect expenditure towards primary education and basic health care, but these efforts were threatened or negated by reduced resources and the introduction of user charges. In theory, prices for water, energy, health, education, etc. can be structured progressively. In practice, the balance of interests in most countries has militated against political commitment to progressive price structures (Jones and Ward, 1994), while measures to protect the poor from price increases have often been badly designed and under-resourced (Rakodi, 1995c). As a result, and exacerbated by falling real wages and increased unemployment, defaults have increased, so that the flow of revenue is insufficient to build up local capacity to provide the quality of service people will be willing to pay for. Although evidence is patchy, and sometimes contradictory and inconclusive, there is some indication of worsening nutritional and health status among vulnerable groups, declining school enrolment, and deteriorating basic educational achievements. The pressures have had a particularly adverse impact on women (Stewart, 1991). Reduced expenditure on education and training adversely affects the quality of the available workforce, as does the poor health associated with deteriorating infrastructure, inhibiting the mobilization of private sector investment in manufacturing, while poor health reduces the ability of children to absorb education (Harris, 1992; Stewart et al., 1992).

Programmes introduced to compensate the newly unemployed (severance payments, retraining, credit, etc.) have generally absorbed most of the available funds without reaching the poor, while programmes to assist the chronically poor (public works schemes, nutrition support, and targeting of subsidized education, health care, and food) may mitigate some of the immediate adverse effects of impoverishment but do not address its structural causes. Meanwhile, basic SAP policy packages have not been redesigned either to eliminate these adverse effects or to reduce poverty (Stewart, 1991). Whether lessons from better-designed programmes, such as the GAPVU programme in Mozambique (Schubert, 1995), or recent work at the Bank (Moser et al., 1993) will succeed in improving these programmes remains to be seen.

The blanket faith in the private sector on which SAPs have been based has also been subject to criticism. We have noted above that FDI is unlikely to show any marked increase in volume. It cannot be relied on for the development of manufacturing and is even less likely to be interested in investment in infrastructure and housing. Development will, therefore, depend on the level of domestic savings and investment, which, it is hoped, will increase with interest rate reforms. Some doubt, however, has been thrown on the expectation that higher interest rates will generate increased investment (Helleiner, 1992). It is by no means certain that the funds will be there for local authorities to borrow from the private sector or that the housing finance system will be able to rely on private sector savings. Investment is a function of household income and, as long as incomes are depressed, it is unrealistic to expect savings - for investment in formal sector financial institutions, owner-occupied housing, or small enterprises - to increase at the cost of consumption (Jamal and Weeks, 1993).

The new approaches to housing and urban development are, in many respects, to be welcomed. This brief and incomplete assessment has shown that many of the assumptions on which they are based fit logically with the premises of SAPs. However, not only can many of these assumptions be challenged (Jones and Ward, 1994), but there are notable inconsistencies between the effects of SAPs and the aims of the new urban agenda, as recognized even by some World Bank staff (Cohen, 1990).


The main foundations for Africa's incorporation into the world economic and political system were established during the colonial period, which left a political, economic, and urban legacy that survived the 1960s, despite the attempts of African countries to secure both political independence and economic autonomy. Political independence did bring a degree of autonomy, but this was eroded by superpower interest and continued economic dependence. In addition, with respect to domestic politics, states were beset by a wide range of difficulties, resulting in political instability and administrative weakness. Both took a variety of forms and in many cases influenced patterns of urbanization and adversely affected the capacity of the public sector, especially local government, to manage urban development. The colonial period was marked by a reorientation of urban patterns to serve the needs of trade and administration. Some existing settlements prospered, while others stagnated or decayed, and a series of new centres was established. There has been relatively little change to this pattern since independence, and what change has occurred has been associated with administrative rather than economic change. The rate of urban growth increased, owing, inter alia, to expansion of public sector employment, attempts to industrialize, an increased rate of natural increase, and relative neglect of rural areas. Per capita economic growth was fairly widespread in the 1960s and some progress was made in some countries towards economic diversification and indigenization.

However, the 1970s and 1980s were marked by a series of setbacks, many, but not all, of which were outside the control of African governments. Some, for example oil price increases and deteriorating terms of trade for primary commodities, were exogenous and some, such as drought, endogenous. They are a crucial element in the explanation of Africa's continued underdevelopment and its inability to break free of the vicious circle into which it is locked. The structure of production in north Africa has become more industrialized, with a reduction in the role of agriculture from about a quarter to less than 20 per cent of GDP in most countries, while manufacturing is now just under a fifth and services a half. However, in SSA, despite a relative decline in the importance of agriculture (from 40 per cent of GDP in 1965 to 32 per cent in 1990) and minerals, services and especially manufacturing are still relatively unimportant. This failure to industrialize can partly be explained by external factors, but a variety of domestic factors must also be taken into account, including economic policies, the effects of personal rule, historical and social structure, the role of the state, and low levels of literacy and skills (Killick with Malik, 1992).

The globalization of manufacturing has been reflected in the emergence of a new international division of labour, which has provided a basis for industrialization in the early and more recent NICs. African countries sought FDI in order to develop their manufacturing sectors, and in a number of countries considerable progress with import substitution industrialization was made. However, the desired progression from import substituting to export industry has been elusive. Although some aspects of the reforms advocated by the IMF and World Bank are desirable to counteract previous biases against export industry, these will not necessarily enable countries to gain access to markets, while import substitution industry has been adversely affected, at least in the short-medium term, by rapid trade liberalization. The main thrust of SAPs has, however, been to encourage increased primary commodity exports to earn foreign exchange and repay debt. This has, firstly, by flooding world markets with increased volumes of certain commodities, exacerbated the problem of declining terms of trade and, secondly, re-emphasized colonial trade patterns (static rather than dynamic comparative advantage) (Jamal and Weeks, 1993). Meanwhile, the increased flow of FDI in manufacturing anticipated following liberalization has not materialized and even the international agencies now recognize its volume is unlikely to grow in most countries (Husain, 1993).

In part because of the financial demands of internationalized manufacturing capital, the globalization of services has also occurred and has contributed to the emergence of "world cities," pre-eminent in financial and business services. The congruence of a global services sector and dynamic export-oriented manufacturing in the West Pacific Rim countries has given rise to rapid development of systems of cities with Tokyo at the apex (Yeung and Lo, 1996). Although there has been some increase in services FDI in Africa, it is mostly in the trade and construction sectors, and the FDI stock as a whole remains concentrated in the primary sector and in relatively few countries. Most of the continent remains marginal to the interests of global capital, the economic underdevelopment and political instability of African countries interacting to perpetuate their marginalization. FDI has an influence on patterns of urban economic activity and development and is crucial to many African economies, because of its interlinkages with trade, technology, and financial flows, despite its low volume in world terms (UNCTC, 1991; Helleiner, 1992). However, it cannot be relied upon to provide the necessary impetus to enable Africa to break out of the vicious circle of underdevelopment, and dependence on aid is likely to continue.

This chapter has reviewed how such dependence renders countries vulnerable to the imposition of doctrinaire economic policies, which have tried to achieve rapid adjustment at the cost of longer-term development goals (Stewart et al., 1992). The agencies promoting such policies have also failed to recognize that economics can never be divorced from politics, social processes, and culture, and that individual countries cannot be treated as if they are independent of their neighbours and of the global political economy (Logan and Mengisteab, 1993). Further, the policies have had adverse impacts on the well-being of a variety of social groups, notably the urban poor (Stren, 1992). In the absence of recent census results, the impact of Africa's economic difficulties on urban growth is uncertain, a point that Simon also emphasizes. Despite policy reforms intended to redress a perceived anti-agricultural, anti-rural policy bias, and some efforts to encourage investment in secondary cities and small urban centres, further concentration in the largest cities has probably occurred, because they continue to provide the most profitable locations for investment and the best prospects for migrants, despite the decline in formal sector employment resulting from recession and SAP implementation. Increased unemployment is seen by the funding agencies as a temporary problem, its effects cushioned by the anticipated expansion of informal sector activity and reliance on extended family networks. However, not only is future growth in formal sector employment at best unpredictable and at worst unlikely, but reductions in the number of employees and declining real wages have a knock-on effect on the ability both of those in informal sector occupations to earn reasonable incomes and of local authorities to collect adequate revenue.

Recognition of the adverse impacts of SAPs on welfare and productivity, together with a realization that cities without adequate infrastructure and services do not provide an efficient location for economic activity, has given rise to a new aid agenda which aims to strengthen the capacity of public and private sector institutions to manage urban growth. Aid for urban development in the past has been influential on policy despite its small volume because much of it has taken the form of technical assistance, although reliance on consultants has given rise to a variety of problems (Meikle, 1988; Okpala, 1990). Aid has also been biased towards the larger cities (Blitzer et al., 1983), perhaps reinforcing their dominant position. Some aspects of the new policy approaches are desirable, but experience with earlier lending gives rise to some doubt about whether the policy packages offered are either appropriate or feasible in the African context, especially given the contradictions between the urban policies being promoted and the design and outcome of SAPs. Further, in the absence of debt write-off, neither the economic nor the urban problems of African countries are going to be solved by increases in lending, which have consistently been less than promised.


1. Although the classifications and methodology adopted are not consistent with its earlier analyses.

2. Ethiopia 1967, 1984, and 1989; South Africa 1951, 1960, 1970, and 1985; Egypt 1947, 1960, 1966, 1976, and 1986.


Adedeji, A. 1993. The case for remaking Africa. In: Action in Africa: The Experience of People Involved in Government, Business and Aid. James Currey, London, pp. 43-57.

Amin, S. 1911. Neo-colonialism in West Africa. Penguin, Harmondsworth (transl. 1973).

Amin, S. 1972. Underdevelopment and dependence in black Africa origins and contemporary forms. Journal of Modern African Studies 10(4): 503-524. Reprinted in D. L. Cohen and J. Daniel, eds., Political Economy of Africa. Longman, London, 1981, pp. 28-44.

Bahl, R. W. and J. F. Linn, 1992. Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries. Oxford University Press for the World Bank, Oxford.

Becker, C. M., A. M. Hamer, and A. R. Morrison. 1994. Beyond Urban Bias in Africa: Urbanization in an Era of Structural Adjustment. Heinemann, Portsmouth, NH.

Bell, M. 1986. Contemporary Africa. Longman, London.

Bennell, P. 1990. British industrial investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Corporate responses to economic crisis in the 1980s. Development Policy Review 8(2): 155-177.

Biel, R. 1994. Role of the IMF and the World Bank in Developing Countries. Quaker Peace and Service, London.

Bird, G. 1993. Sisters in economic development: The Bretton Woods institutions and developing countries. Journal of International Development 5(1): 1-25.

Blitzer, S., J. E. Hardoy, and D. Satterthwaite. 1983. The sectoral and spatial distribution of multilateral aid for human settlements. Habitat International 7(1/2): 103127

Bonine, M. E. 1983. Cities of the Middle East and North Africa. In: S. D. Brunn and J. F. Williams, eds., Cities of the World. Harper & Row, New York, pp. 280-322.

Cantwell, J. 1991. Foreign multinationals and industrial development in Africa. In: P. J. Buckley and J. Clegg, eds., Multinational Enterprises in Less Developed Countries. Macmillan, London, pp. 183-224.

Chandler, T. 1994. Urbanization in medieval and early modern Africa. In: J. D. Tarver, ed., Urbanization in Africa: A Handbook. Greenwood, Westport, Conn., pp. 15-32.

Chandler, T. and J. D. Tarver. 1993. Urbanization in colonial Africa. Africa Insight 23(4): 250-254.

Chazan, N., R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhill, and D. Rothchild. 1988. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. Macmillan, London.

Cheema, G. S. 1992. The challenge of urbanization. In: N. Harris, ed., Cities in the 1990s: The Challenge for Developing Countries. UCL Press, London, pp. 24- 33.

Christopher, A. J. and J. D. Tarver. 1994. Urbanization during colonial days in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: J. D. Tarver, ed., Urbanization in Africa. A Handbook. Greenwood, Westport, Conn., pp. 33-48.

Cockcroft, L. 1992. The past record and future potential of foreign investment. In: F. Stewart, S. Lall, and S. Wangwe, eds., Alternative Development Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Macmillan, London, pp. 336-367.

Cohen, M. A. 1983. The challenge of replicability. Regional Development Dialogue 4(1): 90-99.

Cohen, M. 1990. Macroeconomic adjustment and the city. Cities 7(1): 49-59.

Cohen, M. 1992. Urban policy and economic development - the agenda. In: N. Harris, ed., Cities in the 1990s: The Challenge for Developing Countries. UCL Press, London, pp. 9-24.

Cohen, M. A. and J. Leitmann. 1994. Will the World Bank's real "new urban policy" please stand up? Habitat International 18(4): 117-126.

Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. 1991. The process of urbanization in Africa (From the origins to the beginning of independence). African Studies Review 34(1): 1-98.

Devas, N. and C. Rakodi, eds. 1993. Managing Fast Growing Cities: New Approaches to Urban Planning and Management in the Developing World. Longman, Harlow.

Dogan, M. and J. D. Kasarda. 1988. Introduction: How giant cities will multiply and grow. In: M. Dogan and J. D. Kasarda, eds., The Metropolitan Era. Vol. 1, A World of Giant Cities. Sage, Newbury Park, Calif., pp. 12-29.

Findlay, A. M. 1994. The Arab World. Routledge, London.

Findlay, A. M. and R. Paddison. 1986. Planning the Arab city: The cases of Tunis and Rabat. Progress in Planning 26(1): 1-82.

Friedmann, J. and G. Wolff. 1982. World city formation: An agenda for research and action. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 6(3): 309-343.

Gibbon, P. 1992. The World Bank and African poverty, 1973-91. Journal of Modern African Studies 30(2): 193-220.

Green, R. H. 1993. Neo-liberalism and the political economy of war: Sub-Saharan Africa as a case-study of a vacuum. In: C. Colclough and J. Manor, eds., States or Markets? Neo-liberalism and the Development Policy Debate. Clarendon, Oxford, pp. 238-259.

Green, R. H. and M. Faber. 1994. The structural adjustment of Structural Adjustment: Sub-Saharan Africa 1980-1993. IDS Bulletin 25(3): 1-8.

Gregory, J. W. and V. Piché. 1982. African population: Reproduction for whom? Daedalus, Spring: 179-209.

Gugler, J. and W. G. Flanagan. 1978. Urbanization and Social Change in West Africa. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Harris, N. 1992. Productivity and poverty in the cities of the developing countries. In: N. Harris, ed., Cities in the 1990s: The Challenge for Developing Countries. UCL Press, London, pp. 173-195.

Harvey, C. 1993. Recovery from macro-economic disaster in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: C. Colclough and J. Manor, eds., States or Markets? Neo-liberalism and the Development Policy Debate. Clarendon, Oxford, pp. 121-147.

Helleiner, G. K. 1992. Structural adjustment and long-term development in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: F. Stewart, S. Lall, and S. Wangwe, eds., Alternative Development Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Macmillan, London, pp. 48-77.

Husain, I. 1993. Trade, aid and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: Action in Africa: The Experience of People Involved in Government, Business and Aid. James Currey, London, pp. 75-106.

IMF (International Monetary Fund). 1985. Foreign Private Investment in Developing Countries. IMF Occasional Paper 33, Washington D.C.

IMF (International Monetary Fund). 1993. World Economic Outlook. IMF, Washington D.C.

Jamal, V. and J. Weeks. 1993. Africa Misunderstood: Or Whatever Happened to the Rural-Urban Gap? Macmillan for the ILO, London.

Jenkins, R. 1987. Transnational Corporations and Uneven Development. Methuen, London.

Jesperson, E. 1992. External shocks, adjustment policies and economic and social performance. In: G. A. Cornia, R. Van der Hoeven, and T. Mkandawire, eds., Africa's Recovery in the 1990s: From Stagnation and Adjustment to Human Development. St Martin's Press, New York, pp. 9-90.

Jones, G. A. and P. M. Ward. 1994. The World Bank's "new" urban management programme: Paradigm shift or policy continuity? Habitat International 18(3): 3351.

Killick, T. with M. Malik. 1992. Country experiences with IMF programmes in the 1980s. The World Economy 15(5): 599-632.

King, A. D. 1990. Urbanism, Colonialism, and the World-Economy: Cultural and Spatial Foundations of the World Urban System. Routledge, London.

Lee, K. S. 1993. How Nigerian manufacturers cope with infrastructural deficiencies: Private alternatives to public provision. In: G. S. Cheema, ed., Urban Management: Policies and Innovations in Developing Countries. Praeger, Westport, Conn., pp. 253-260.

Lipton, M. 1977. Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development. Temple Smith, London.

Logan, I. B. and K. Mengisteab. 1993. IMF-World Bank adjustment and structural transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Economic Geography 69(1): 1-24.

Mabogunje, A. L. 1968. Urbanisation in Nigeria. University of London Press, London.

Mabogunje, A. L. 1990. Urban planning and the post-colonial state in Africa: A research overview. African Studies Review 33: 121-203.

Mehretu, A. 1983. Cities of Sub-Saharan Africa. In: S. D. Brunn and J. F. Williams, eds., Cities of the World. Harper & Row, New York, pp. 243-279.

Meikle, S. 1988. The performance of aid-funded human settlement projects. Habitat International 12(4): 125-133.

Moser, C. O. N., A. J. Herbert, and R. E. Makonnen. 1993. Urban Poverty in the Context of Structural Adjustment: Recent Evidence and Policy Responses. World Bank, Transportation, Water and Urban Development Department DP 4, Washington D.C.

Mosley, P. and J. Weeks. 1993. Has recovery begun? "Africa's adjustment in the 1980s" revisited. World Development 21(10): 1583-1606.

Nafziger, E. W. 1990. The Economics of Developing Countries. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

Oberai, A. S. 1993. Urbanization, development and economic efficiency. In: J. D. Kasarda and A. M. Parnell, eds., Third World Cities: Problems, Policies and Prospects. Sage, Newbury Park, Calif., pp. 58-73.

Oberai, A. S. and R. E. Bilsborrow. 1984. Theoretical perspectives on migration. In: R. E. Bilsborrow, A. S. Oberai, and G. Standing, eds., Migration Surveys in Low Income Countries. Croom Helm, London, pp. 14-59.

O'Brien, S. 1994. Some reflections on country experiences with Structural Adjustment. IDS Bulletin 25(3): 51-54.

O'Connor, A. 1983. The African City. Hutchinson, London.

O'Connor, A. 1991. Poverty in Africa: A Geographical Approach. Belhaven, London.

ODI (Overseas Development Institute). 1993. Does the IMF Really Help Developing Countries? ODI Briefing Paper, London.

ODI (Overseas Development Institute). 1994. Political Liberalisation and Economic Reform in Developing Countries. ODI Briefing Paper, London.

Okpala, D. C. I. 1990. The roles and influences of external assistance in the planning, development and management of African human settlements systems. Third World Planning Review 12(3): 205-229.

Onokerhoraye, A. G. 1975. Urbanism as an organ of traditional African civilization: The example of Benin, Nigeria. Civilisations 25: 294-305.

Parfitt, T. W. 1993. Which African agenda for the 'nineties? The ECA/World Bank alternatives. Journal of International Development 5(1): 93-106.

Peterson, G. E., G. T. Kingsley, and J. P. Telgarsky. 1991. Urban Economies and National Development. USAID, Office of Housing and Urban Programs, Washington D.C.

Pugh, C. 1994. Development of housing finance and the global strategy for shelter. Cities 11(6): 384-392.

Rakodi, C. 1986a. Colonial urban policy and planning in Northern Rhodesia and its legacy. Third World Planning Review 8(3): 193-217.

Rakodi, C. 1986b. State and class in Africa: A case for extending analyses of the form and functions of the national state to the urban local state. Society and Space 4: 419-446.

Rakodi, C. 1991. Developing institutional capacity to meet the housing needs of the urban poor: Experience in Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia. Cities 8(3): 228243.

Rakodi, C. 1992a. Urbanization in Zambia. Papers in Planning Research, Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Wales, Cardiff.

Rakodi, C. 1992b. Housing markets in third world cities: Research and policy into the 1990s. World Development 20(1): 39-55.

Rakodi, C. 1995a. Harare. Inheriting a Settler-Colonial City: Change or Continuity? Wiley, London.

Rakodi, C. 1995b. Housing finance for lower income urban households in Zimbabwe. Housing Studies 10(2): 199-227.

Rakodi, C. 1995c. The household strategies of the urban poor: Coping with poverty and recession in Gweru, Zimbabwe. Habitat International 19(4): 447-472.

Ribe, H., S. Carvalho, R. Liebenthal, P. Nichalos, and E. Zuckerman. 1990. How Adjustment Programmes Can Help the Poor: The World Bank's Experience. World Bank DP 71, Washington D.C.

Riddell, J. B. 1992. Things fall apart again: Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies 30(1): 53-68.

ROAPE (editors of the Review of African Political Economy). 1975. The multinationals in Africa. Reprinted in D. L. Cohen and J. Daniel, eds., Political Economy of Africa. Longman, London, 1981, pp. 67-74.

Rondinelli, D. A. 1988. Giant and secondary city growth in Africa. In: M. Dogan and J. D. Kasarda, eds., The Metropolis Era. Vol. I, A World of Giant Cities. Sage, Newbury Park, Calif., pp. 291-321.

Salau, A. T. 1990. Urbanization and spatial strategies in West Africa. In: R. B. Potter and A. T. Salau, eds., Cities and Development in the Third World. Mansell, London, pp. 157-171.

Sassen, S. 1994. Cities in a World Economy. Pine Forge Press, Thousand Oaks, Calif.

Sassen-Koob, S. 1985. Capital mobility and labour migration: Their expression in core cities. In: M. Timberlake, ed., Urbanization in the World Economy. Academic Press, Orlando, Fla., pp. 231-265.

Schubert, B. 1995. Poverty and poverty alleviation programmes in the urban areas of Mozambique. Habitat International 19(4): 499-514.

Seralgeldin, I. 1989. Poverty, Adjustment and Growth in Africa. World Bank, Washington D.C.

Simon, D. 1992. Cities, Capital and Development: African Cities in the World Economy. Belhaven, London.

Simon, D. 1993. The World City Hypothesis: Reflections from the Periphery. Research Paper 7, Centre for Developing Areas Research, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey.

Simon, D. 1995. Debt, democracy and development: Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s. In: D. Simon, W. van Spengen, C. Dixon, and A. Närman, eds., Structurally Adjusted Africa: Poverty, Debt and Basic Needs. Pluto, London.

Sit, F.-S. 1993. Transnational capital flows, foreign investments, and urban growth in developing countries. In: I. D. Kasarda and A. M. Parnell, eds., Third World Cities: Problems, Policies and Prospects. Sage, Newbury Park, Calif., pp. 180-198.

Skinner, E. P. 1986. Urbanization in Francophone Africa. African Urban Quarterly 1(3-4): 191-195.

Standing, G. 1984. Population Mobility and Productive Relations: Demographic Links and Policy Evolution. World Bank Staff Working Paper 695, Washington D.C.

Standing, G. 1985. Circulation and the labour process. In: G. Standing, ed., Labour Circulation and the Labour Process. Croom Helm for the ILO, London, pp. 1-45.

Stewart, F. 1991. The many faces of adjustment. World Development 19(12): 1847-1864.

Stewart, F., S. Lall, and S. Wangwe. 1992. Alternative development strategies: An overview. In: F. Stewart, S. Lall, and S. Wangwe, eds., Alternative Development Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Macmillan, London, pp. 3-46.

Stoneman, C. 1993. The World Bank: Some lessons for South Africa. Review of African Political Economy 58: 87-98.

Stren, R. E. 1989a. Urban local government in Africa. In: R. E. Stren and R. R. White, eds., African Cities in Crisis: Managing Rapid Urban Growth. Westview, Boulder, Colo., pp. 20-36.

Stren, R. E. 1989b. The administration of urban services. In: R. E. Stren and R. R. White, eds., African Cities in Crisis: Managing Rapid Urban Growth. Westview, Boulder, Colo., pp. 37-68.

Stren, R. E. 1992. African urban research since the late 1980s: Responses to poverty and urban growth. Urban Studies 29(3/4): 533-556.

Stren, R. E. 1993. "Urban management" in development assistance: An elusive concept. Cities 10(2): 125-139.

Thrift, N. 1987. The fixers: The urban geography of international commercial capital. In: J. Henderson and M. Castells, eds., Global Restructuring and Territorial Development. Sage, London, pp. 203-233.

Todaro, M. P. 1994. Economic Development, 5th edn. Longman, New York and London.

Tordoff, W. 1984. Government and Politics in Africa. Macmillan, London.

UN. 1993. World Urbanization Prospects: The 1992 Revision. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, New York.

UNCHS (United Nations Centre for Human Settlement - Habitat). 1987. Global Report on Human Settlements, 1986. Oxford University Press for UNCHS, Oxford.

UNCHS (United Nations Centre for Human Settlement - Habitat). 1990. The Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000. UNCHS, Nairobi.

UNCTC (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations). 1985. Transnational Corporations in World Development: Third Survey. Graham & Trotman for UNCTC, London.

UNCTC (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations). 1989. Foreign Direct Investment and Transnational Corporations in Services. UNCTC, New York.

UNCTC (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations). 1991. World Investment Report 1991: The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment. UNCTC, New York.

UNDP. 1992. Human Development Report 1992. United Nations Development Programme, New York.

UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa). 1989. African Alternatives to Structural Adjustment Programmes: A Framework for Transformation and Recovery. UNECA, Addis Ababa.

Wegelin, E. 1994. Everything you always wanted to know about the urban management programme (but were afraid to ask). Habitat International 18(4): 127-137.

Williams, G. 1981. Nigeria: The neo-colonial political economy. In: D. L. Cohen and J. Daniel, eds., Political Economy of Africa. Longman, London, pp. 45-66.

Winters, C. 1983. The classification of traditional African cities. Journal of Urban History 10(1): 3-31.

World Bank. 1972. Urbanization Sector Working Paper. World Bank, Washington D.C.

World Bank. 1983. Learning by Doing: World Bank Lending for Urban Development 1972-82. World Bank, Washington D.C.

World Bank. 1986. Aid flows for urban projects remain relatively low. Urban Edge 10(2): 4-5.

World Bank. 1991a. Urban Policy and Economic Development: An Agenda for the 1990s. World Bank Policy Paper, Washington D.C.

World Bank. 1991b. Urban Management Program: Revised Prospectus. Capacity Building for Urban Management in the 1990s. World Bank, Washington D.C.

World Bank. 1992. World Development Report. World Bank, Washington D.C.

World Bank. 1993. Housing: Enabling Markets to Work. World Bank, Washington D.C.

World Bank. 1994. Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Wunsch, J. S. and D. Olowu. 1990. The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa. Westview, Boulder, Colo.

Yeung, Y.-M. and F.-C. Lo. 1996. Global restructuring and emerging urban corridors in Pacific Asia. In: F.-C. Lo and Y.-M. Yeung, eds., Emerging World Cities in Pacific Asia. United Nations University Press, Tokyo, pp. 2-47.

Zachariah, K. C. and J. Condé. 1981. Migration in West Africa: Demographic Aspects. Oxford University Press, Oxford.