4 Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats
I have already alluded to the utmost importance of the role of the state
bureaucracies in the Manaus Free Trade Zone, meaning the Brazilian federal state
bureaucracies - basically Suframa and subsidiaries - and not (unless otherwise
stated) the bureaucracies of the State of Amazonas. As is well known, in
situations of retarded economic development the state and its bureaucracies tend
to assume some of the functions that otherwise devolve upon private enterprise.
And the economic role of the state is all the more important in Brazil due to
the omnipresence, throughout the whole history of both Brazil and its
motherland, Portugal, of what Brazilian sociologist Raymundo Faoro has termed
the "bureaucratic estate" (estamento burocrático), which
commands
... both the civil and the military branches of the public administration,
seizing and leading the economic, financial, and political spheres. In the
economic field, going well beyond the regulative function accorded to it by the
ideology of liberalism, surpassing even the system of regulated concessions, the
bureaucratic estate assumes the direct management of enterprises. Acting
directly upon the economy or using incentives are but alternative means to reach
the same goals. (Faoro, 1979: 738-9)
Indeed, the Free Trade Zone of Manaus can be described as a condominium of
private entrepreneurs and state bureaucrats, each side receiving, in a direct or
an indirect wad,11 a share of the profit generated by the industrial
and commercial activities of the economic enclave. This is why I suggest that
the concept of Oriental, or hydraulic, despotism, as formulated by Karl
Wittfogel (1957, 1968), be adopted for the understanding of some of the basic
features of the Zona Franca. I use the concept in a very broad sense, as
Wittfogel himself understood it. Thus he considered the Inca empire, located on
the Andean plateau, as "a purely Oriental society".12
Conversely, many societies which are located in the Orient from a purely
geographic point of view have nothing in common with despotism as understood by
Wittfogel.
Although the historical prototypes of Oriental despotism are derived from the
hydraulic societies of ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, China, and others, its main
characteristic consists less of the presence of public works on a grandiose,
pharaonic scale, not missing in Brazil as a whole or in Brazilian Amazonia, than
of the role of the large state bureaucracies. Although these do not own the
means of economic production, they nevertheless exert, or share, control over
the basic economic activities of the society. Either through the management of
some essential resource (such as water) or through regulations, incentives,
restrictions, and the like, state bureaucracies are able to appropriate a
significant part of the wealth - or of the "surplus value," if one
prefers this expression - generated in the same society. In point of fact, the
concept of "Oriental despotism" might well be used for the
understanding not only of the Free Zone of Manaus with its controlling
bureaucracies at Suframa and Fucapi, but also the North-East of Brazil (where
state bureaucrats have as one of their basic tasks the management of hydric
resources in the strict sense), and even Brazilian society as a whole.
The preceding considerations can be summed up in the two following
hypotheses:
1. The hypothesis of a "pariah capitalism," that is, the
expectation that entrepreneurial activity in the Manaus Free Trade Zone has a
largely speculative character, taking advantage of the system of tax incentives
offered by the government and being associated with ethnic and religious groups
who tend to play a peripheral role in the general context of world trade (East
Indians of certain castes and certain regional origins, SouthEast Asians, Middle
Eastern Jews and Arabs, etc.). This would seem to constitute a typical case of
what Max Weber called speculative capitalism, turned, as he said, toward
"irrational and political opportunities of gaining a profit" and
opposed to "the rational organization of the enterprise oriented toward a
real market" (Raphael, 1982; Weber, 1988);
2. The hypothesis of the "hydraulic," or bureaucratic, despotism,
that is, the expectation that there exists, in the Free Trade Zone of Manaus, an
elite of state bureaucrats which is more than merely functional to the task of
planning, regulating, and managing the economic activity of the enclave. In a
direct or indirect way, this bureaucratic elite is able to appropriate part of
the profit generated by commerce and industry in the area.
Whereas these were my two major research interests in Manaus, I did not
disregard a few other relevant topics. Thus, entrepreneurship appeared to have
not only a "speculative" rather than, in the Weberian sense of the
word, a "rational" character, but it also tended to be represented in
the area by the local managers of firms with headquarters elsewhere in Brazil,
or abroad, and therefore wielding a rather limited power to take major
decisions. Sheer speculative entrepreneurship appeared to be more typical of the
enclave's commercial sector and merely managing, surrogate entrepreneurs were
mainly found in the industrial sector. Yet these two categories are by no means
mutually exclusive.
I was also very much interested in the mechanisms and subtleties of the
formal and informal decision-making process in the Free Trade Zone concerning,
first and foremost, the allocation of import quotas to both trading and
manufacturing enterprises. This power seems to be essentially vested in the
person of the Superintendent and his immediate assistants. Indeed, since the
establishment in 1976 of a ceiling of importations into the enclave, this
official has acquired an almost imperial importance. Nevertheless, as the
"hydraulic despotism" in the Zone is, after all, tempered by an
abundant legislation that emanates from the central Brazilian government (and
even to a certain extent from the government of the state of Amazonas) and the
procedural labyrinth that derives from it, one can easily understand that the
office of the Superintendent is subject to the influence of persons and groups
capable of making good use of laws, regulations, and subterfuges of several
kinds.
I never forgot the biggest query of all. Who, in the end, profits from the
Free Trade Zone? What persons, groups, strata, social classes are actually the
beneficiaries of the incentive system of Manaus? A definitive answer to this
all-important question far surpasses the scope of my research. But the data I
could gather do provide me with the elements of what is perhaps more than a mere
tentative answer to that big riddle. I will return to
it.