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close this bookSuccesses in Anti-Poverty (ILO, 2000, 232 p.)
View the document(introduction...)
View the documentThe International Labour Organization
View the documentILO Publications
View the documentPreface
View the documentAcknowledgements
View the document1. The problem and the approach
View the document2. Outline
close this folder3. Anti-poverty success: National-level performance
View the document(i) Assessing performance: Poverty, damage, and the level of resources
View the document(ii) Poverty, GNP, consumption: Links and positive deviants
View the document(iii) Delinking poverty and resource scarcity from damage and misery?
View the document(iv) Poverty and damage: An assessment
close this folder4. Credit: Rules for success in anti-poverty action32
View the document(introduction...)
View the document(i) Measuring success
View the document(ii) Successful pro-poor credit: Towards synthesis - and some problems
close this folder(iii) Thirteen rules for successful pro-poor credit
View the document(introduction...)
View the document1. Respect fungibility of credit
View the document2. Seek poverty focus, but by means other than direct targeting
View the document3. Void anti-poor rules and actions
View the document4. Find alternatives to physical collateral
View the document5. Cat poor borrowers' transactions costs
View the document6. Reduce covariance of repayment, e.g. by nesting peer-monitoring groups
View the document7. Avoid lending monopolies
View the document8. Ensure that extra credit can be productive before raising its supply
View the document9. Subsidize transactions costs and administration, not interest
View the document10. Avoid politicizing or softening repayment but anticipate emergencies
View the document11. Infrastructure and education may complement credit
View the document12. Savings requirements improve borrowers' performance
View the document13. Create incentives to lenders and borrowers for repayment
close this folder5. Public works to create employment for the poor
View the document(i) Introduction
View the document(ii) Scale
View the document(iii) Apparent impact on the poor
View the document(iv) Targeting on the poor
close this folder(v) Public works: Rules for success against poverty
View the document(introduction...)
View the document1. Designing employment for low opportunity cost
View the document2. Seek alternatives to direct targeting - but wage effects are complex
View the document3. Use scheme rules and conditions to discriminate for the poor
View the document4. Allow for poor workers' frequent physical difficulties
View the document5. Minimize poor participants' transactions costs
View the document6. Reduce covariate stresses on public works resources
View the document7. Use retailer, employer, and public works competition ''for the poor''
View the document8. Before starting, check that low demand for labour causes poverty
View the document9. Subsidize coverage, sustainability, graduation - but seldom above market wages
View the document10. Encourage grassroots pressure groups to improve the scheme
View the document11. In performance and outreach, employment schemes complement others
View the document12. Build up capacity of schemes and workers before works begin
View the document13. Use performance incentives for officials and participants
close this folder6. Land, farming, social services, food, towns: Testing rules of anti-poverty success; implications for governments, NGOs
View the document(i) Introduction
View the document(ii) Land reform
View the document(iii) Agricultural growth and technology
View the document(iv) Health, education and poverty reduction
View the document(v) Food distribution and subsidization51
View the document(vi) Whatever happened to the towns?
View the document7. Conclusion: The ''Rules of success against poverty'' reviewed
close this folderAppendices
View the documentAppendix A: Some issues in poverty measurement
View the documentAppendix B: Predicted poverty and the outliers
View the documentAppendix C: Analysis of positive deviants
View the documentAppendix D: Comparison of results with those of Anand and Ravallion
View the documentAppendix E: New international evidence on resources, poverty reduction and human development
View the documentBibliography
View the documentOther ILO publications
View the documentBack cover

1. Designing employment for low opportunity cost

This implies ensuring that the scheme is available in the slack season (which is why agricultural labour seldom features in such schemes). However, it is not obvious that the poor are best served by making public works employment offers strictly seasonal, as in Botswana, where Labour Relief "jobs were temporary, stopping during the cropping season for two or three months" [Harvey and Lewis 1990: 302]. That certainly maximizes "stabilization benefits" to the poor, but may reduce their "transfer benefits"; for public works, if continued in the peak season, could tighten the market for private labour and thus bid up the wage rate. That effect is much less likely in the slack season, when labour is plentiful, and demand for it therefore wage-elastic [Ravallion 1990; Gaiha 1994: 114]. In the Kosi area of Bihar State in India, public works in the slack season only may have reduced the equilibrium private-sector wage rate in the peak season [Rodgers 1973] (though the reverse result is also possible if people substitute leisure for income as the latter rises [Robbins 1930]). Use of public works to raise peak demand for labour implies a political choice: to increase the bargaining power of the workers [Dev 1994: 8], at the possible cost of alienating big-farm employers from the scheme. Whether this renders the scheme more sustainable politically, or less so, is a context-specific political judgement; the point to note is that the choice needs to be explicit, when timing the provision of works (or guarantees of employment) in a scheme. Of course, if the works or the guarantees of employment become rationed (rule 2), this decision is constrained, tainted, or made altogether infeasible.

In most schemes, limited resources and high wage and other costs impose a need to ration, at least, the times and places where work will be made available. Usually, social safety nets are not plentiful enough to permit the designers of employment schemes the luxury of going for "transfer benefits" rather than "stabilization benefits" and, if the labour-market conditions so indicate, crowding much of the scheme work into the busy agricultural season. There is urgent need to provide employment income to those without reserves in a drought, or a slack season following a below-average harvest; providing maximum job chances to the poor at such times, when there are few job opportunities elsewhere, takes priority over transfer benefits. Only the physical feasibility of works - such as roadbuilding or irrigation maintenance in soggy land - constrains capacity to time employment into slack periods.

As indicated, substantial numbers of scheme employees are women, and it is desirable that this should be so. It is therefore important to ask whether the opportunity cost of women's participation is affected by the timing or other details of a scheme. Evidence from Kerala [Kumar 1977] indicates that, in some seasons but not others, reductions in child care when women do extra work can outweigh the benefits, for small children, of improved income and nutrition. The compulsory provision of cres in EGS is certainly one reason why high female participation has not been associated with any such opportunity cost there. Moreover, while over half the EGS participants are women, NREP - where there are no cres and no employment guarantee - attracts only 15 per cent [World Bank 1991].

Small and decentralized works, which can be located near each of many villages, reduce transport time and hence opportunity cost. This is especially important for the poor, who are likeliest to be compelled to use slow and time-consuming transport, and for women. The de facto rationing that took place after 1988 in EGS, when it was compelled to double its wage rates (see below), mostly took the form of much more distant job offers. That excluded not only those less desperate for the work, but those less mobile and further away.