|Law in Humanitarian Crises, Volume II : Access to Victims: Right to Intervene or Right to Receive Humanitarian Assistance? (ECHO)|
The views expressed in this book are not those of the European
Le contenu de cet ouvrage ne refl pas l'opinion de la Commission europne.
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this
Une fiche bibliographique figure a fin de l'ouvrage.
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
Luxembourg: Office des publications officielles des Communauteuropnes, 1995
Vol. II: ISBN 92-827-5339-5
Vols. I to/I: ISBN 92-827-5337-9
© ECSC-EC-EAEC, Brussels ·
© CECA-CE-CEEA, Bruxelles · Luxembourg, 1995
Printed in Portugal
Public and scientific debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention was, up to 1991, erratic. From time to time certain events created waves of political and legal arguments for and against a legal justification of humanitarian intervention. The military intervention of one or more states in the affairs of another state is often seen as an example of a publicly justified "humanitarian intervention". Hostage rescue operations undertaken by a military force on the territory of another state which openly or clandestinely supported terrorist activity is another example. After these incidents the debate typically faded away only to be taken up again with the next military intervention justified on humanitarian grounds.
The reactions of states to such incidents were quite similar and can be categorised into three groups. In the first group, states reacted by opposing military intervention through disputing the facts put forward to justify intervention, by criticising the concept that military forces can act on humanitarian grounds and by questioning the existence of the right under existing international law of humanitarian intervention. The second reaction of states was to embrace the humanitarian benefits of military action brought about by the rescue of victims. A third reaction of states was simply to acquiesce the action taken, without expressing a legal position.
Without going into too much detail at this point, it can be safely concluded that humanitarian intervention in the international community has been a topic dictated by the requirements of each individual case. The efforts of some states to argue in favour of the acceptance or establishment of a unilateral right of humanitarian intervention has never been successfully implemented. With some exceptions, most lawyers are also opposed to a unilateral right for humanitarian intervention. However, to avoid a situation whereby states can justify political and military intervention under the auspices of humanitarian intervention, a catalogue was produced laying down certain criteria which needed to be fulfilled before humanitarian intervention through military force could be justified. Amongst states, however, the catalogue was rejected largely because no consensus could be reached over such issues as the circumstances surrounding the right to humanitarian intervention, what the final objective of intervention should be and which specific rules should regulate its execution.
As described above, the debate on humanitarian intervention in the decades following the Second World War concentrated on conforming to the United Nations Charter system. Besides some debate following the United Nations operations in the Congo, practical cases of United Nations military involvement in humanitarian intervention operations did not exist. In this respect the multilateral, organisational and structural aspects of humanitarian intervention did not generate much attention. A United Nations role with regard to humanitarian intervention at that time was not foreseeable. Seen from today's perspective, humanitarian intervention had a retrospective implication.
It must be asked whether the past is relevant to today's discussion. Present cases play an important part in the debate on the legality of humanitarian intervention. The military interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Liberia are the key cases quoted in most recent legal evaluations describing the state of humanitarian intervention today. The present discussions also endeavour to define the rights of individual states or groups of states with regard to humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, the present debate has two new and distinct features. Firstly, most of the articles concerned with humanitarian intervention now concentrate on the function of the United Nations and states authorised by the United Nations to execute humanitarian interventions. Secondly, as the debate within the United Nations demonstrates, humanitarian intervention is seen by some states as being one of the major internationally based activities within a future concept of the collective security system of the United Nations.
If these observations are correct, we can see that the debate has changed considerably. It appears that the retrospective perspective of humanitarian intervention has been replaced by a vision of an international system able to respond effectively with military forces to situations threatening human beings. In this respect the debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention by an individual state or a group of states without United Nations authorisation is less important than in the past. The real question today is whether the existing legal order is consistent with the expectations of those who advocate the above mentioned vision. Volume II of the series of books on law in humanitarian crises therefore concentrates on some of the most important new aspects of the debate on humanitarian intervention.
Mario Bettati deals with the present debate on droit d'ingnce, discussing traditional as well as new arguments and emphasising their legal and political background. By analysing the most recent state practice with regard to humanitarian interventions in cases such as Rwanda and Bosnia, he outlines the actual international law framework on access to the victims of armed conflicts. The second contribution to the book by Gerard Tanja provides a clarification of terms used in the international debate on humanitarian intervention. Having outlined the present framework of collective humanitarian intervention under the Charter of the United Nations, he discusses in depth the contemporary scope and status of humanitarian intervention, relating it to the nature and scope of humanitarian assistance under present-day international law. Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo's essay concentrates on the balance between the obligations of the state receiving humanitarian assistance and the obligations of those providing such assistance within the framework of humanitarian intervention operations. His essay offers food for thought on the question of an erga omnes right of the victims vis-is an obligation of states to assist. In the last contribution to the book Marie-Josomestici-Met concentrates on legal questions related to the term access to the victims and their foundations in international humanitarian law. Her contribution provides an analysis of the basic treaty rules as well as the most recent state practice. In a second part of her essay she focuses on the legal nature of the right of assistance and its foundation under general international law.
We have added some of the most important legal documents with relevance to the concept of humanitarian intervention. Some documents are referred to in the contributions of the authors. Others are most recent documents of international organisations, the results of international conferences and reports about humanitarian operations. The selection of the documents and excerpts does not imply any specific position towards humanitarian intervention.
As the co-ordinator of this book, I would like to express my appreciation for the hard work undertaken by the members of the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV) of the Ruhr-UniversitBochum. My special thanks go to Mr. Ralph Czarneckei and Mr. Guido Hesterberg for their invaluable and tireless efforts in the editing process.
Bochum, October 1995
Gerard J. Tanja
In his Annual Report to the General Assembly of 1991 the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali made a most interesting and important, though quite often wrongly interpreted, observation on the preferred attitude of the international community towards systematic violations of fundamental human rights by a State. He stated in rather unambiguous terms:
"[i]t is now increasingly felt that the principle of non interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated without impunity. The fact, that in diverse situations, the United Nations has not been able to prevent atrocities cannot be cited as an argument, legal or moral, against the necessary corrective action, especially when peace is threatened [...] The case for not impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States is by itself indubitably strong. But it would only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even in this day and age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of controlling strife or insurrection ".
This statement goes to the core of an issue which has attracted much scholarly attention over the last 600 years: the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, its (il)legality, scope and contents in international law. Or, in other words, whether and when, and in which situations, is it permitted to use armed force by a State, or group of States, against another State or States, in order to intervene for humanitarian reasons (i.e. in situations of continuing atrocities and when gross violations of fundamental human rights occur), in the internal affairs and domestic jurisdiction of the latter State(s) without the consent of the government(s), thereby knowingly violating the territorial sovereignty and political independence, in order to protect the civilian population of the target State.
The question of the legality and scope of humanitarian intervention, therefore, is in fact a discussion on the relationship and frictions between sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence and the prohibition on the use of force on the one hand - generally regarded as fundamental principles of the present world order and the international legal system -, and the requirements and obligations imposed by international law to effectively protect fundamental human rights in situations of extreme and systematic violations, on the other. As such, it concerns questions of international peace and security.
In the post-1945 or UN Charter era, the doctrinal interest was at its height in the seventies and eighties following interventions in, inter alia, the Congo (Belgium and the United Kingdom, 1964), the Dominican Republic (United States, 1965), East Pakistan (India, 1971), East Timor (Indonesia, 1975), Zaire (Belgium, 1978), Grenada (combined forces of six East Caribbean States and the United States, 1983), Panama (United States, 1988), whereas in the first half of the 1990s international lawyers, again, showed an increasing engagement with the topic after the military interventions of the Allied Forces in Iraq and the ensuing actions to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Shiites in the south (establishment of the two no-fly zones; 1991), the intervention in Somalia (1992-1993) and the - still continuing - tragic events in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
However, as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the corresponding change of atmosphere in the UN Security Council, the debate at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s has also touched upon a different and, within the context of humanitarian intervention, hitherto unknown and unrelated feature of that concept proper: aspects and features related to what is generally described in doctrine as the concept of "humanitarian assistance".3 The recent practice of the Council has further stimulated this debate (see infra).
During the early years of the 1990s various authors, inspired by an explosion of civil and interstate strife, ethnic and religious violence, and "micronationalism", have introduced new terminology like "intervention for humanitarian purposes ", "intervention on humanitarian grounds", "the law of democratic intervention", or refer to a "droit d'ingnce" or right to humanitarian assistance and "emergency humanitarian protection and assistance", or speak of an "obligation" to provide this assistance, even when the consent of the government of the affected State has not been obtained, when serious and systematic human rights violations take place.
In the words of one prominent commentator those heated debates have only resulted in "unproductive polemics".
As has been indicated above, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as such is, despite this renewed interest and the recent flow of information on humanitarian intervention, a very "classic" one in public international law. But it cannot be denied that the already controversial issue of the meaning, scope and contemporary status of humanitarian intervention in international law, has received an extra dimension with the emergence of the concept of humanitarian assistance and "emergency relief operations" in state practice and in academic discussions. This has not only contributed to a further legal complexity, but has also caused confusion and misunderstanding among international scholars, relevant non-governmental organizations and governmental representatives.
The purpose of this contribution is, therefore, to attempt to identify the issues at stake, to determine as far as possible, and necessary, the legal scope and contents of the concepts involved by means of an analytical investigation, with the aim being to develop a conceptual framework within which the underlying concepts - humanitarian intervention and humanitarian assistance - operate and will develop in the future. Only then it is possible to determine the relationship between humanitarian intervention and humanitarian assistance in present-day international law and to make a correct distinction between the two. This is, furthermore, important because different sets of legal and normative principles have to be applied in and result from different situations.
In doing so, this contribution will focus primarily on the contemporary scope and status of humanitarian intervention and assess the nature and scope of humanitarian assistance under present-day international law in the light of these findings.
In this context some preliminary observations must be made with regard to the term "humanitarian assistance" as used in this study.
Most of the confusion and inconsistent, or even incorrect, use of "humanitarian intervention" as a legal concept in relation to "humanitarian assistance", results from situations in which humanitarian operations take place involving the use of armed force and/or in situations of armed conflict (ius in bello).
For this reason, the attempt to develop a practical, clear and transparent conceptual framework is limited to such situations.
It will be argued that the two concepts are of a fundamentally different nature and should therefore not be confused and have, in both theory and state practice, very little in common.
At the same time it is concluded that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, as it is commonly understood and defined in legal literature and referred to in state practice, is becoming less relevant in international relations as a result of the changes which took place within the framework of the United Nations system after the end of the Cold War and, more specifically, after the adoption of the famous, but often incorrectly understood, "humanitarian" Resolution 688 of 4 April 1991 of the Security Council and its ensuing practice.
The large majority of writers on the issue of humanitarian intervention have nowadays accepted the idea that in the pre-Charter period there was no customary norm on humanitarian intervention, in the absence of consistent state practice and opinio iuris. Since both humanitarian intervention and humanitarian assistance necessarily have to operate within the context of the UN Charter, this will be the legal framework from which to commence the investigation. This is important, as it will be shown that this determination has a fundamental impact on the conceptual and legal framework.
It seems, secondly, rather futile and unproductive to try to define humanitarian intervention in exact legal terms in the light of the abundant but rather inconsistent literature, the broad range of views on this topic and the absence of consistent, uniform and transparent state practice. is
Hence the purpose of this article is not to search for an "authentic" definition or to attempt to develop criteria or conditions necessary to determine the "legality" of a humanitarian intervention. It is, therefore, not the intention to determine the legal relation between hitherto "sacrosanct" principles of international law like the prohibition on the use of force, territorial integrity, sovereignty etc. and the nowadays generally accepted opinion that gross and systematic violations of human rights are no longer exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of a State (according to some commentators the reason for speaking of the emergence of a right to humanitarian intervention). The intention is to provide a conceptual framework.
A third fundamental restriction is to acknowledge that humanitarian intervention by definition implies the use of armed force and the absence of valid consent by the lawful government for the humanitarian actions undertaken by a third State or groups of States. These legal requirements, or constitutive elements, are cumulative. If one of those elements is missing, the operation may, however, still qualify as one providing humanitarian "assistance" (see infra), but not be characterized as humanitarian intervention.
This means that, legally, at least five situations are not covered by the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, even if humanitarian concerns are present within the context of such operations:
a) actions Involving the Use of Armed Force on the Invitation of the Lawful Government (Including Those Based on Agreements);
b) actions which occur within the framework of a traditional peacekeeping operation of the United Nations;
c) military operations which are undertaken by a State in order to rescue its own nationals abroad from an imminent danger to their lives and/or serious injury;
d) coercive actions not involving the use of armed force; and
e) operations involving the use of armed force undertaken in the absence of the consent of the lawful government, but without having predominant . humanitarian motives.
Actions qualifying under category a. do not, in principle and from a theoretical point of view, violate the territorial integrity and political independence or sovereign equality of States, as the consent of the government has been obtained. It should be observed that there are situations in which it will be difficult to ascertain what the lawful government is or whether the consent has been validly given, but this aspect is, as such, unrelated to the concept of humanitarian intervention.
So far, the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations have always been undertaken with the consent of the host State and on the basis of an agreement with the United Nations. The tendency within the UN Secretariat to introduce notions like "UN cease-fire and/or enforcement units" not only go beyond traditional peace-keeping, but have also not yet been sufficiently developed in UN and state practice and would, furthermore, be based on a previous cease-fire agreement reached by the respective parties.
Military rescue operations to save the lives of nationals abroad, do not fall under the concept of humanitarian intervention as those operations are based on the right of self-defence as formulated under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Neither the question of the scope and legality of such rescue actions under the UN Charter, nor the situation in which military operations are undertaken which involve both the rescue of own nationals and measures to protect citizens of the affected country against imminent danger to their lives, will therefore be touched upon.
Actions qualifying under the fourth category which involve coercive measures short of armed force, like economic and political measures, are unrelated to humanitarian intervention, as this aspect is related to the issue of the prohibition on the use of force under the UN Charter, its scope and contents.
Which actions qualify under the fifth category is, as has been proven in state practice and doctrine, always very difficult to ascertain, since it depends upon the (subjective) interpretation of "political" facts and diplomatic declarations and the prevailing political relation between the actors involved. But, for our purpose, the relevant point at stake is that here we are confronted with military operations in the context of, for example, assisting a people with the realization of their right to self-determination, actions to counteract aggression or to assist the government in an internal war (sometimes on the explicit invitation of the lawful government and, hence, possibly also falling under category a., or military operations undertaken without the consent of the lawful government but directed towards maintaining or strengthening economic and/or political interests. The nature of this type of military operations and the legal questions involved, however, are of a fundamentally different kind than the questions which must be answered in relation to humanitarian intervention.
Fourthly, sometimes the term "humanitarian intervention" is used to denote situations in which, actually, humanitarian assistance to a population is urgent because large-scale natural disasters have taken place, or a similar emergency situation exists, which cause great human suffering and result in the loss of human life, the destruction of property and the mass displacement of populations.
This issue has for the first time been comprehensively dealt with at a global level in the Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee of the General Assembly in 1988 and has resulted in GA Res. 43/131 of 8 December 1988, called "Humanitarian assistance to victims of natural disasters and similar emergency situations". After having recognized the responsibilities of the international community towards the victims of such disasters and emergency situations, the General Assembly went on to stress that the access to the civilian population and the supply of food, medicines or health care and other forms of rapid relief, may avoid an increase in the numbers of victims. Access to victims is open to both governmental and non-governmental organizations.
However, the General Assembly made it absolutely clear that in such situations the consent of the State concerned is a prerequisite for any relief operation, irrespective of whether those actions are undertaken at a governmental or non-governmental level:
"Reaffirms also the sovereignty of affected States and their primary role in the initiation, organization, co-ordination and implementation of humanitarian assistance within their respective territories;[...]".
Such relief operations, once commenced, must be undertaken in a neutral and impartial way.
The requirement of the consent of the State was furthermore confirmed in an Annex to GA Res. 46/182 of 19 December 1991 on the "Strengthening of the co-ordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations".
"3. The sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and in principle on the basis of an appeal by the affected country".
This type of humanitarian assistance, or humanitarian relief operations, for which the politico-legal framework has been determined by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and appropriate programmes, agencies and departments of the United Nations, however, falls outside the scope of this contribution, as it bears no relation whatsoever to the concept of humanitarian intervention as used in international law, nor does it involve the type of humanitarian assistance which is covered by our investigation. For neither is it dependent upon the consent of the affected country, nor is it in itself a response to gross and systematic violations of fundamental human rights in this affected country, nor does it involve the use of armed force, and neither is it applicable in a situation of armed conflict.
It may, therefore, be preferable to describe this type of operation in legal terms as a "humanitarian emergency relief operation", given its already rather well-defined and delimited legal framework, and to reserve the term "humanitarian assistance" for operations undertaken in situations as indicated in the Introduction (armed conflict situations).
In the light of the current position of the law and within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations there thus seem to be two theoretical - situations in which humanitarian intervention could be applicable.
The first involves the use of armed force in a situation in which a government systematically and massively violates human rights or, to put it in different terms, where a government subjects its own population to a systematic policy of terror (e.g. the former Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia). The second may be described as a situation in which a population is confronted with a collapsed government and total chaos and anarchy results from this collapse in the country, leading to ethnic, religious and/or civil strife as a consequence of which human rights are grossly violated (i.e. "failed state").
Independent of whether we are confronted with the first or the second situation, the relevant means - in this context: types of armed action - to redress this tragic situations are, as Malanczuk has correctly observed in his study on the legitimacy of the use of armed force, twofold:
"[...] intervention as a collective action by, or authorized by, a competent global or regional organization and, second, multilateral or unilateral action by states without such authorization".
1. Armed Intervention by, or Authorized by, the United Nations
The legality and nature of the use of armed force under the collective security system of the UN Charter in order to protect fundamental human rights must be determined and evaluated in the light of the well-known Charter provisions and the relatively recent UN practice.
Article 2 (4) provides that:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations ".
There are two exceptions to this absolute prohibition: Article 42 and Article 5 1.
Article 51 confirms the "inherent right of individual or collective self defence" and falls outside the scope of this study.
Article 42 permits the use of force by the Security Council, once the Council has decided on the basis of Article 39 of the Charter that a situation constitutes a "[...] threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression". On the basis of Article 24 of the Charter, only the Security Council can determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and is, therefore, the only organ under the UN collective security system to decide "[...] what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security". Article 39, therefore, legally authorizes and sanctions the Council to exercise its political discretion with a view to determine measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. It is, as Verwey has correctly stated, the exercise by the Security Council of a "right of auto-interpretation " to determine which situations constitute a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and what enforcement measures should, in the light of such a decision, be taken under Article 42, if the Council decides that this is necessary and appropriate.
Are there legal barriers for the Security Council to be found in the provisions of Article 2 (7) of the Charter? It does not seem so, since Article 2 (7) explicitly states:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII".
Apart from our earlier observation that it is generally accepted in state practice and doctrine that systematic and gross violations of fundamental human rights no longer belong to the domain rrvf the State, the last sentence of Article 2 (7) leaves no room for ambiguity: the Council has the power to indicate enforcement measures under Article 42 if it has determined under Article 39 that atrocities and other systematic or gross violations of fundamental human rights within a State, constitute a threat to the peace or affect the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.
The Council has two options under Article 42: it may adopt enforcement measures authorizing military action by the Council, or it may authorize Member States to resort to armed force. Because of the absence of the special agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the Charter, the Council will not decide upon military enforcement directly by the Council itself, unless ad hoc arrangements prove feasible, efficient and politically possible.
If, however, an authorization, or mandate, is given to the Member States, an individual State is neither obliged nor under a duty, to individually resort to armed force to redress the situation in the target State (although the enforcement measures are binding on both the target and the other States); it is a "recommendation which justifies in law the use of armed force otherwise prohibited by Article 2 (4) of the Charter, [...]".
A further question is whether the Security Council is, in practice, inclined to decide upon enforcement measures under Articles 39 and 42 in situations described at the beginning of this paragraph. This will be examined under the next heading.
2. Recent Security Council "Enforcemen tMeasures"
In the aftermath of the Second Gulf War the Security Council adopted by ten votes in favour, three against (Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe) and two abstentions (China, India), the "humanitarian" SC Res. 688 of 5 April 1991. For many commentators this resolution constituted a landmark in the Council's practice under Chapter VII; in their view the resolution provided a sound legal basis for the intervention by the allied forces, the creation of "safe havens" and the imposition of the "no-fly zones". According to those opinions the resolution authorized the first truly Chapter VII operation for humanitarian purposes: egregious human right violations and barbaric acts against the civilian population (primarily the Kurdish population in the north of Iraq) by the Iraqi Government had been proven superior to the hitherto sacrosanct principle of sovereignty.
Upon reflection it is questionable, however, whether the intervention, the creation of safe havens and the imposition of the no-fly zones of the allies could indeed be based on the resolution. In other words, the views on SC Res. 688 still reflect the old discussions between the "realists" and the "academics" or, between the proponents of a right to humanitarian interventions and those arguing that such a right does not exist under international law in the Charter era.
It has already been observed that "only" ten members of the Security Council voted in favour; at least four members, particularly Yemen and India, made it very clear that they considered military enforcement measures under SC Res. 688 illegal. China expressed the view that an operation involving "military enforcement " measures under SC Res. 688, would be vetoed. Those States considered it a non-binding resolution.
The language of SC Res. 688 neither mentioned Chapter VII, nor did it repeat the language which appeared in SC Res. 678, which had called upon all Member States of the United Nations to "use all necessary means ° to "restore international peace and stability in the area°. Furthermore, in the Preamble of the resolution, Article 2 (7) is explicitly inserted, whereas the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and of all States in the area, is expressly referred to.
In the operative part of the Resolution it is the Secretary-General of the UN who is requested to 'pursue his humanitarian efforts" and "to use all the resources at his disposal" to address urgently the critical needs of the Iraqi civil population. Nowhere in the resolution there is an authorization by the Council for the Member States to intervene by means of armed force, nor is there any reference to collective enforcement measures under Article 42.
The view that the resolution did not provide the legal basis for the actions which would follow, is not only evidenced by the travaux prratoires and actual language of the resolution but, furthermore, confirmed by the opinion of the Legal Office of the United States' State Department when it was explained that the no-fly zones were nonenforceable; the resolution was "[...] humanitarian in intention and not enforceable, since it did not cite Chapter VII of the UN Charter ".35
The factual situation also indicates that it was not the intention of the drafters (Belgium and France, later co-sponsored by the United Kingdom and the United States) to place a binding resolution before the meeting, since the United States accepted the idea of the creation of safe havens five days after the adoption of the resolution.
What is true, however, is that in the operative part of the resolution the "repression of the Iraqi civilian population" is condemned and the Council insists that Iraq must "allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations". There are, however, "consequences" to this situation; i.e. the "massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers" and "cross border incursions", which threaten international peace and security in the region. One can, therefore, only agree with Malanczuk who concludes that the resolution:
[...] cannot be cited as a precedent for the proposition that the Security Council views massive, but purely internal human rights violations as such, without transboundary effects, as a direct threat to international peace and security. For cases with such external effects of human rights violations it is indeed an important precedent".
Firm conclusions can also not be deduced from the Council's practice with respect to the Yugoslav crisis.
It seems that specific enforcement measures were not primarily based on the atrocities and serious human rights violations in the Former Yugoslavia and, later, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the Council condemned the atrocities many times, enforcement measures under Article 42 solely on this basis were not foreseen. This is aptly illustrated by SC Res. 770 of 13 August 1992. The resolution recognized in its Preamble that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina constituted a threat to international peace and security and that gross violations of human rights continued to take place. The Council also recognized that the 'provision of humanitarian assistance D was an important element in the "efforts to restore international peace and security in the region" (see infra). But apart from "demanding" under Chapter VII that unimpeded and continuous access to camps, prisons and detention centres be granted to the ICRC and other humanitarian organizations, the Council was not prepared to take the next step: military enforcement measures to redress the internal human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also not without importance that the first preambular paragraph reaffirms the "need to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ", a phrase which has, since then, been consistently inserted in every resolution on Bosnia and Herzegovina.
SC Res. 771 (also of 13 August 1992) condemned the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and expressed:
[...] grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina including reports of mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and abuse of hospitals and ambulances,impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian population, and wanton devastation and destruction of property ".
But despite those "widespread violations" the Council, acting under Chapter VII, again, did refrain from deciding upon enforcement measures. Instead, the Council indicated that in case of non-compliance it "will need to take further measures under the Charter". Such further measures, however, were also not decided upon in SC Res. 787 of 16 November 1992 concerning the enforcement of economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. States were authorized to take measures to enforce the embargo, but the Council refrained from authorizing the Member States to take measures in the context of the gross violation of human rights and the on-going practice of ethnic cleansing. A weak response also came from the Council when atrocities occurring in detention camps and women's camps ("mass-rape") were detected: the Council condemned these "acts of unspeakable brutality" and decided to "remain seized of the matter".
Compared with SC Res. 688, the Council did change, however, its attitude with respect to purely internal human rights violations; it seems that with respect to the continuous and gross violations of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council has accepted, although not unequivocally, that this situation as such may constitute a threat to international peace and security. This becomes clear from the "safe havens" or "safe area" resolutions of the Security Council, most notably SC Res. 815 of 30 March 1993 on the mandate of UNPROFOR, SC Res. 819 of 16 April 1993 and SC Res. 824 of 6 May 1993. In SC Res. 824 the Council, furthermore, seemed prepared to take the next step, if considered necessary:
"Declares its readiness, in the event of the failure by any party to comply with the present resolution, to consider immediately the adoption of any additional measures necessary with a view to its full implementation,[...]".
Although not using the already well known formula "all necessary means", this came very close to indicating its readiness to decide upon military enforcement measures to address an internal human rights situation.
However, the Council's ambiguity again became apparently obvious when it adopted SC Res. 836 of 4 June 1993, where it observed that the concept of safe areas was adopted "to respond to an emergency situation ° which could make a "valuable contribution" to a lasting peace on the basis of the Vance-Owen plan, but "should not in any way be taken as an end in itself, but as a part of the Vance-Owen process [...]". In the same Resolution, however, the Council took the final step and authorized UNPROFOR, "acting in self-defence ", to use force in reply to:
"[...] bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys".
More important, operative paragraph 10 authorized Member States, in close co-ordination with the Secretary-General and under his authority, to take "all necessary measures " to support UNPROFOR.
Compared to the Iraqi question it seems that the Council is now prepared to accept the idea that an internal human rights situation may constitute a threat to international peace and security, independent of external effects. Whether the Council has also accepted in unequivocal terms the idea that military enforcement measures may be undertaken by the Council, is still not sufficiently clear. After all, the various relevant resolutions with humanitarian contents affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and must be appreciated in the context of the comprehensive picture of the conflict. Most important, however, it should be remembered that the Bosnian authorities have repeatedly and explicitly asked for military enforcement measures to protect the safe havens; the implicit consent of the Bosnian government in the event of the use of armed force was therefore obvious.
The unwillingness of the Security Council to decide upon enforcement measures including the use of armed force and the consistent careful balancing of human rights protection against the principle of sovereignty, indicate that the Council is, although it has the authority, still rather hesitant to sanction enforcement measures under Article 42 in answering internal human rights situations in order to restore international peace and security.
If the situation was still rather ambiguous in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council acted swiftly and determinedly in the situation of Somalia culminating in the adoption of SC Res. 794 of 3 December 1992.45 After the Council had determined that
"[...] the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security",
the resolution unequivocally authorized Member States, co-operating with the United Nations, to use armed force ("use all necessary means ") to "establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia".
A clear precedent for the proposition that the Security Council views massive, but purely internal human rights violations as such, without trans-boundary effects, as a direct threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, the Somali case study shows that the Council is prepared to accept the use of military enforcement measures (permissible use of force) to redress such situations.
There may be one disclaimer in the Somali situation:
"Recognizing the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful of its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and exceptional response".
This paragraph was inserted on the insistence of African States, afraid of a too broadly formulated precedent. On the other hand, the concept of a "failed state" is an exceptional situation par excellence. It seems inevitable, however, to conclude that the Council has indeed set some remarkable precedents, enlarging the hitherto known scope of both Articles 39 and 42 and implicitly elevating human rights norms vis-is sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention.
An almost identical step was taken by the Security Council in respect of the situation in Rwanda. In SC Res. 929 of 22 June 1994 the Council, be it in rather abrupt language, recognizing the uniqueness of the Rwandan situation and determining that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis constituted a threat to the peace and security in the region, Member States were authorized, co-operating with the Secretary-General, to conduct a military enforcement operation ("using all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives [...]").
3. Evaluation of UN Practice
What is important from a conceptual point of view is that the actions within the framework of the UN collective security system as laid down in the UN Charter, indeed indicate and confirm that enforcement measures under Articles 39 and 42 (Chapter VII) may and will be taken by the Security Council in order to redress human rights violations, once it has been determined that such an internal situation constitutes a threat to the peace or affects international peace and security. The Security Council has this authority and does, therefore, not act ultra vires under such circumstances.
But such binding measures decided upon by the Security Council under Chapter VII may not be characterized as falling within the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Instead, we deal with enforcement measures under Articles 39 and 42 of the Charter. One could argue that in situations where the Security Council authorizes Member States to use armed force in order to intervene in another State for humanitarian purposes, such intervention could be described as "enforcement measures for humanitarian purposes". Legally and conceptually, however, this is not to be preferred since binding enforcement measures, whatever their scope, contents and nature, are directed towards the maintenance and/or restoration of international peace and security. They are not undertaken for humanitarian purposes and the introduction or use of this terminology might contribute to further misunderstandings and ambiguities.
It may be preferable to speak of enforcement measures under Article 42 of the Charter to ensure humanitarian assistance in order to contribute to a restoration of the peace and security. The measures as such are just one form of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter; it is neither a specific legal category, nor has the concept of humanitarian assistance as used in the Security Council's practice a specific legal scope and contents (see infra).
4. Humanitarian Intervention Outside the Scope of the Charter
The observations with regard to the question whether international law sanctions a right to humanitarian intervention in the Charter era can be rather brief. Such a right does not exist. For the sake of clarity, here we deal with international humanitarian intervention proper or, in other words, "classic" humanitarian intervention:
"The threat or use of force bya state or states abroad, for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a serious violation of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to life, of persons, regardless of their nationality, such protection taking place neither upon authorization by relevant organs of the United Nations nor with permission by the legitimate government of the target state".
As has already been noted in the introduction, quite extensive literature exists on this topic. However, it has not been possible to bridge the gap between the proponents (for example, D'Amato, Chan Leng Sun, Duke, Gallant, Helton, Lillich, McDougal, Reisman, Simon, Teson and others) and the opponents (for example Farer, Henkin, Malanczuk, Ofodile, Rodley, Suy, Verwey and others). But doctrine, being a "secondary" source of international law, does not make law, and no definitive conclusion can be drawn from legal writings!
Legally more convincing, however, are the findings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nicaragua Case, where the Court determined that international law does not sanction a right to intervention when exercised without the blessing of the Security Council. The Court did not accept the unauthorized use of force by a State to redress serious human rights violations in another State. Further evidence can be found in GA Res. 2625 and GA Res. 3314 concerning the definition of aggression.
This also seems to be the position taken by the large majority of writers on this subject.
Malanczuk cites from an official British FCO document:
"But overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention, for three main reasons:
First, the UN Charter and the corpus of modern international law do not seem to incorporate such a right; secondly, state practice in the past two centuries, and especially since 1945, at best provides only a handful of genuine cases of humanitarian intervention, and on most assessments, none at all; and finally, on prudential grounds, that the scope for abusing such a right argues against its creation".
The concept of "humanitarian assistance", as frequently used in international law, is in fact neither a legal concept, nor has the concept a well-defined meaning, scope and contents, although the principles which operate and which are applied within the framework of "assistance" are not alien to international (humanitarian) law and are, quite often, legal principles. In the context of our research and the two questions formulated above, it thus seems that there may be two situations in which humanitarian "assistance" may be invoked (as was stated under II., peace-time assistance or "emergency humanitarian relief operations" fall outside the scope of this contribution).
The first situation is a situation in which the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols of 1977 to these Conventions are applicable. In those treaties the term "humanitarian assistance" does not appear and is not used, but the various principles involved - all with certain restrictions and in varying terms - are familiar to the international lawyer and are related to the regulation of "humanitarian actions and operations" (like health issues, food, or the supply of other forms of relief, like those mentioned in Article 23 of Convention IV or Article 70 of Protocol I) in order to alleviate the suffering of the victims of an armed conflict
Both States and the ICRC "or any other impartial humanitarian organizations" are addressed by the Conventions and Additional Protocols in this respect, "subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned".
Under international humanitarian law as laid down in those international agreements the provision that the High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions will "respect and [...] ensure respect for the present Conventions", this is not to be interpreted as an authorization to intervene by force as this falls outside the scope of ius in bello.
It is not the intention to describe the various principles involved which operate within situations of armed conflict covered by international humanitarian law. What is important from a conceptual point of view is to recognize that humanitarian "assistance" used under international humanitarian law is in fact a description of a multitude and variety of legal principles belonging to international humanitarian law (ius in bello); a generic and fluid term without a specific legal connotation, scope and contents. It has nothing in common with the legal concept of humanitarian intervention.
The second situation where the term "humanitarian assistance" is quite often used, is a situation as referred to under III.1.- III.3. This is a relatively new use of the term "assistance" and it may be useful to enumerate the various manifestations of "humanitarian assistance" as they appeared in the Security Council's practice since the adoption of SC Res. 688.
For practical reasons this overview will be limited to the resolutions mentioned above.
The concept of "humanitarian assistance" appeared in various manifestations; some of the resolutions mentioned the concept of "humanitarian assistance" without further qualifications (SC Res. 767, SC Res. 794, SC Res. 819, SC Res. 836), others referred to "humanitarian relief assistance" or "humanitarian relief operations/activities", (SC Res. 794, SC Res. 814), or simply to the "delivery of humanitarian relief" (SC Res. 836) and "assistance" (SC Res. 688). In some resolutions not adopted under Chapter VII the element of "co-operation" between the State (SC Res. 688; Iraq) and with the United Nations, or with the various parties and factions on the one hand and the United Nations, its specialized agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and the ICRC on the other, was stressed (SC Res. 767).
With regard to the manifestations of "humanitarian assistance" - the rather consistent used generic term by the Security Council -, various "types" of assistance may be distinguished.
In some resolutions the problems relating to "access" or obstruction to the delivery of humanitarian assistance were dealt with, like, inter alia in SC Res. 688 ("access to all those in need',), SC Res. 824 (access to "safe areas'') and SC Res. 836 ("obstruction " to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Other resolutions demanded the need for an urgent delivery of the humanitarian assistance to the civilian population (SC Res. 767) and indicated that impediments to such activities, in particular the delivery of food and medical supplies, would not be tolerated and are a violation of international humanitarian law (SC Res. 794, SC Res. 819).
The safety of the personnel engaged in the delivery of such humanitarian assistance (both UN personnel, intergovernmental and non-governmental as well as ICRC personnel) and the ensuing obligation to "take all measures necessary byby the target State and/or parties, was repeatedly stressed by the Security Council (SC Res. 794, SC Res. 814, SC Res. 819, SC Res. 824). SC Res. 836 indicated that this extended to so-called 'protected convoys".
Three resolutions contained language indicating that the humanitarian "assistance" also extended to operations relating to the protection and repatriation of refugees and resettlement of displaced persons (SC Res. 688, SC Res. 929, SC Res. 814), whereas another three resolutions were devoted to the creation of "safe areas" (SC Res. 819, SC Res. 824, SC Res. 836) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was demanded that those areas be given full respect by the warring parties, whereas the areas would be protected by UNPROFOR "with the agreement of the Governments contributing forces" (SC Res. 836).
It follows from this enumeration that the scope and limits of the concept of humanitarian assistance have not been fully defined. Under the rather recent enforcement measures of the Security Council various manifestations of humanitarian assistance have appeared; sometimes already existing under international humanitarian law, sometimes hitherto unknown in international law.
The concept of humanitarian assistance is still developing and it may still be too soon to draw firm conclusions about possible new manifestations of "assistance". It is, however, beyond any doubt that the concept offers promising prospects for the future.
The recent practice of the Security Council, which commenced to a certain extent with SC Res. 688, to address internal human rights violations as falling within the scope of Article 39 of the Charter and to indicate the Council's willingness to take enforcement measures under Article 42 of the Chapter to redress such purely internal situations, is an enormous improvement of the United Nations collective security system. Continuation of the practice of the Security Council would offer various opportunities for a further development of the concept of humanitarian assistance and may, furthermore, lead to a more effective implementation of principles of international humanitarian law, as far as such principles can be described as manifestations of humanitarian assistance. Such principles are already well known and have been laid down in various treaties like the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. Whether it is preferable to refer to those accepted principles instead of using the generic term "humanitarian assistance" within the concept of enforcement measures, is of course another question.
At the same time it must be acknowledged that the Security Council has taken the liberty to explore new avenues and has introduced new notions of assistance which were hitherto unknown in international humanitarian law. It is still too early to assess these developments and to evaluate the usefulness of the generic term "humanitarian assistance", but it cannot be denied that in a relatively short time, new trends have emerged. This practice seems, furthermore, to have been accepted by the public at large.
On the other hand, the Security Council should work towards a more consistent use of terminology and reserve terms like "humanitarian relief operations" or "emergency relief action" for peace-time operations.
Another, almost inescapable, conclusion is that with the recent Security Council practice on humanitarian assistance and the Council's willingness to consider purely internal human rights violations as a threat to the peace, the prospect for the doctrine of humanitarian intervention seems rather bleak: if one accepts the difference between humanitarian intervention as it is generally understood in international law and enforcement measures under Chapter VII, it may very well indeed become an echo from the past.
State Practice on Intervention (D. J. Scheffer)
Charter of the United Nations (excerpts)
Maastricht Treaty (excerpts)
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
EP Resolution on the right of humanitarian intervention
Cannes European Council - Presidency Conclusions (excerpts)
CSCE - Budapest Document 1994 (excerpts)
Lisbon Declaration - WEU Council of Ministers (excerpts)
Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
The standard list of precedents collected by D. J. Scheffer is as follows:
1. Intervention to protect religious or ethnic minorities.
a) Greece (1827-1830). Great Britain, France and Russia intervened. Greece gained independence in 1830.
b) Syria (1860-1861). France intervened in Syria to restore law and order, and to protect the Christian population.
c) Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria (1877-1878). Russia intervened with the consent of Austria, Prussia, France and Italy to protect the Christian population in the Ottoman empire.
d) Macedonia (1903). Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia intervened in order to protect the Christian population.
2. Intervention to end internal aggression or human rights atrocities.
a) East Pakistan (1971). India invaded East Pakistan in order to redress widespread human rights violation, but claimed self defence.
b) Cambodia (1978). Vietnam intervened to end the genocide which took place under the government of Pol Pot (Khmer Rouge). Vietnam claimed self-defence and the occupation lasted until 1989.
c) Uganda (1979). In 1979, Tanzania invaded Uganda claiming self defence in reaction to earlier Ugandan attempts to attack Tanzania. After the intervention Tanzania invoked humanitarian intervention.
3. Intervention to rescue or protect citizens abroad and other endangered individuals (strictly speaking this is not humanitarian intervention but the exercise of self-defence).
a) The Congo, Stanleyville (1964). Belgium intervened and freed 2,000 foreign residents on the invitation of the Congo government, which could not control the rebellion.
b) The Dominican Republic (1965). The United States
"To preserve the lives of American citizens and citizens of a good many other nations - 46 to be exact, 46 nations". Dep't State Bull.20 (1965).
c) Entebbe, Uganda (1975). Israeli commando forces rescued Jewish and other passengers.
d) Grenada (1983). The United States and forces of six Caribbean states intervened on the basis of: "The narrower well-established ground of protection of United States nationals". Letter from the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, 18 Int'1 Law, pp.381, 386 (1984).
4. "Other" rescue operations:
a) Panama (1989). According to the United States to protect U.S. nationals. In effect it resulted in the overthrow of the military regime of General Manuel Noriega.
b) Rwanda (1990). On a request by the Rwandan President, Belgium and France agreed to militarily assist the Hutu government against Tutsi attacks.
c) Chad (1990). France intervened to evacuate 1,200 foreigners.
d) Liberia (1990). The United States rescued 125 foreigners.
e) Zaire (1991). France and Belgium intervened and rescued their nationals and other foreigners.
Purposes and Principles
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces. their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.
The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
PROVISIONS ON A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
A common foreign and security policy is hereby established which shall be governed by the following provisions.
ARTICLE J. 1
1. The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of the Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.
2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union; - to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways; - to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; - to promote international cooperation; - to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
3. The Union shall pursue these objectives; - by establishing systematic co-operation between Member States in the conduct of policy, in accordance with Article J.2; - by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common.
4. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.
1. Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform on the common positions.
3. Member States shall co-ordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fore. In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.
The procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by foreign and security policy shall be the following:
1. The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action. Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation.
2. The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority. Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority pursuant to the preceding subparagraph, the votes of its members shall be weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and for their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least fifty-four votes in favour, cast by at least eight members.
3. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.
4. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.
6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council decision, Member States may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The Member State concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.
7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.
1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.
2. The union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.
3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.
4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.
5. The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer co-operation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such co-operation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title.
6. With a view to furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised as provided for in Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then.
ARTICLE J. 5
1. The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of common measures; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organizations and international conferences.
3. In the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the presidency shall be assisted if needs be by the previous and next Member States to hold the Presidency. The Commission shall be fully associated in these tasks. 4. Without prejudice to Article J.2(3) and Article J.3(4), Member States represented in international organizations or international conferences where not all the Member States participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.
The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission Delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organizations, shall cooperage in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented. They shall step up co-operation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
ARTICLE J. 7
The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy. The European Parliament may ask questions of the Councils or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.
1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy.
2. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines adopted by the European Council. It shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions and in the case referred to in Article J.3(2).
3. Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign policy and may submit proposals to the Council.
4. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.
5. Without prejudice to Article 151 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a Political Committee consisting of Political Directors shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission.
The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.
On the occasion of any review of the security provisions under Article J.4, the Conference which is convened to that effect shall also examine whether any other amendments need to be made to provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy.
Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly on 9 December 1948.
The Contracting Parties,
Having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world;
Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and
Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required;
Hereby agree as hereinafter provided.
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
The following acts shall be punishable:
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.
Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition.
The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.
Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.
The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948.
The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid.
Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that Contracting Party is responsible.
On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary-General shall draw up a procverbal and transmit a copy of it to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member States contemplated in Article 11.
The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession.
Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession.
The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming into force.
It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period.
Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the 3 present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.
A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.
The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member States contemplated in Article 11 of the following:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in
accordance with Article 11;
(b) Notifications received in accordance with Article 12;
(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with Article 13;
(d) Denunciations received in accordance with Article 14;
(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with Article 15;
(f) Notifications received in accordance with Article 16.
The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.
A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States contemplated in Article 11.
The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.
Official Journal of European Communities No C 128/225, A3-0227/94
Resolution on the right of humanitarian intervention A3-0227/94
The European Parliament,
- having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr.Cano Pinto on behalf of the Socialist Group on the right of a state to noninterference in its internal affairs (B3-0494/90),
- having regard to its earlier resolutions on the subject,
- having regard to the outcome of the hearing on the right of humanitarian intervention held in the European Parliament on 25 January 1994,
- having regard to its resolution of 8 February 1994 on the role of the Union within the UN and the problems of reforming the UN,
- having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security ant the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights (A3-0227/94),
A. whereas the situation in the world after the Cold War is characterized by a degree of uncertainty which may represent a greater danger to stability and a greater risk of armed conflict than the situation prior to 1989,
B. having regard to the risk, both within and outside Europe, of interethnic conflicts spreading and taking on international dimensions, thus constituting a threat to international peace and security,
C. whereas old and new conflicts, fuelled by ethnic differences, resurgent nationalism and historically conditioned distrust, can no longer be kept in check by the involvement of the superpowers,
D. whereas the repercussions of armed conflicts on innocent civilian populations are a constantly increasing cause for concern,
E. noting with concern that the number of armed conflicts taking place at any one time in the world has grown from approximately 35 during the Cold War to approximately 60 at present, and that, as a result, the need for humanitarian aid and intervention has greatly increased and public opinion in democratic countries is calling for a major commitment to solidarity,
F. whereas one of the most serious consequences of the numerous conflicts is the large number of refugees and all associated problems,
G. whereas the 'usefulness' of the United Nations for resolving conflicts and keeping or restoring international peace and security has grown and altered with the disappearance of the East-West conflict,
H. whereas, demands are being made with increasing frequency on the United Nations Organization, which is in danger of being overburdened; recalling is aforementioned resolution of 8 February 1994, which stressed the need to reform and strengthen the UN and to achieve greater specialization and decentralization of its interventions through UN regional organizations,
I. whereas international law has traditionally followed the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state; whereas, however, the traditional justification of national sovereignty for giving carte blanche to all internal abuses is no longer acceptable,
J. whereas it is generally accepted that human rights, as defined in the Universal Declaration of human rights and the UN International Conventions on civil and political rights and economic and cultural rights, are universal, and whereas important international documents such as the Helsinki Final Act and the Fourth Lomonvention include provisions according to which the human rights situation in a country does not form part of its internal affairs,
K. aware of the valuable role played by non-governmental organizations in the protection of human rights and in providing assistance in emergency situations,
L. having regard to the need for a political stance to be taken as regards the admissibility of humanitarian intervention.
1. Defines the concept of humanitarian intervention as the protection, including the threat or use of force, by a state or group of states of the basic human rights of persons who are subjects of and/or resident in another state;
2. Considers that current international law does not necessarily represent an obstacle to the recognition of the right of humanitarian intervention;
3. Notes that international law is significantly shaped by what individual Member States actually do;
4. Considers that, where all else has failed, the protection of human rights may justify humanitarian intervention, whether military force is used or not;
5. Considers, moreover, that intervention should preferably take place on the initiative of the UN Security Council or with the agreement of a legitimate government, but considers that the option of humanitarian intervention must be left open if there is no reasonable alternative;
6. Considers that a wide range of instruments for humanitarian intervention must be devised and implemented, form the use of political, diplomatic and economic pressure to the sending of observers or arbitration missions and, possibly, the threat or use of force under UN authority, the level of intervention being determined by criteria of justice and effectiveness;
7. Considers that the concept of humanitarian intervention must not undermine the ten principles of the Helsinki Final Act including the territorial integrity of a state and its political independence and unity;
8. Notes that all decisions on humanitarian intervention must take full account of the wishes of the populations directly affected and aim to restore without delay the necessary conditions for self-sufficiency and democratic self-government;
9. Considers it necessary, partly in order to meet existing objections against humanitarian intervention, to draw up criteria which must be satisfied when a state or group of states intervene in this manner;
10. Considers that humanitarian intervention should take account of the following criteria:
(a) there must be an extraordinary and extremely serious situation of humanitarian need in a country where those in power can not be made to see reason other than through military means;
(b) it must be apparent that the UN apparatus is unable to take effective (and timely) action;
(c) all other means must, in so far as possible or reasonable, have been exhausted and must have failed;
(d) the intervenor must be relatively disinterested in the situation in so far as the protection of human rights should be the primary objective and no other motives of a political or economic nature play a role; stresses in this connection the importance of full implementation of the agreements barring the presence of armed forces which might generate further instability;
(e) states which have been formally condemned by the international community for unlawful intervention in a region must not be allowed to take part in humanitarian intervention in other regions until they have put an end to all their unlawful operations;
(f) intervention must be limited to specific objectives and must only have minimal political consequences for the authority of the state concerned;
(g) the use of force must be temporary and not be disproportionate;
(h) the intervention must be reported immediately to the UN and not be subject to UN condemnation;
(i) the intervention must not represent a threat to international peace and security to the extent that it causes a greater loss of life and greater suffering than that which it aims to prevent;
11. Stresses the need for consistency in the application of these criteria;
12. Considers that strict and objective standards must be set, in agreement with the United Nations, with regard to the conduct of military troops engaged in humanitarian intervention and that any illegal actions or other deviation from international laws and legal principles must be penalized as appropriate so as to avoid illegal intervention involving violations of human rights and undermining peace;
13. Underscores the right of non-governmental organizations to intervene in the territory of a country on behalf of the victims of natural disasters, acts of war and/or famine;
14. Calls on the Commission and the Council to support the action of non-governmental aid organizations in carrying out their humanitarian aid operations;
15. Urges the Commission and Council to adopt a position favouring the recognition of the right of humanitarian intervention and calls on them to support the above criteria, thereby encouraging international legal developments in this direction within international bodies;
16. Calls on the European Union to underpin preventive diplomacy as necessary and involve regional organizations such as the CSCE, whose mission is to safeguard peace, maintain existing borders and protect human rights;
17. Considers that agreements between the Union and third countries should all be conditional on their respect of human rights; urges the Council to use more extensively its economic and political leverage to ensure implementation of the existing international human rights instruments in those countries;
18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission and the Council of the European Union and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, to the United Nations Secretary-General and the CSCE secretariat.
SI (95) 500
Meeting with 15 Member States for the first time, the European Council has considered the basic questions which confront the Union today and how they might be tackled, on both the internal and external fronts. It has thus laid solid foundations for a new stage in the process of European integration, with revision of the Union Treaty, completion of economic and monetary union and the achievement of a further major enlargement.
At home, the Union must provide an improved response to its citizens' legitimate expectations, that is to say, it must make it a priority to mobilize all its resources, including those of the Member States, to combat the scourge of unemployment effectively. This means implementing a broad range of measures at both national and Community level in full compliance with the convergence criteria; compliance with these criteria is also a precondition for introduction of a single currency: in particular, the Community's economy must be made more dynamic, by making sure that it remains competitive with its principal rivals and by mastering new technologies, especially information technologies. Finally, people's desire for security must be satisfied.
Externally, the Union is determined to work towards stability and peace on the continent of Europe, by preparing for the accession of the associated European countries. Their presence here in Cannes today provides confirmation that they are destined to join the Union. The Union also intends to strengthen relations in all spheres with the Mediterranean countries, to implement the customs union with Turkey as part of a developing relationship with that country, to establish close and balanced relationships with Russia and the CIS countries, to strengthen its special relationship with the ACP, to give fresh impetus to transatlantic relations and forge closer links with Latin America and Asia.
To be able to achieve these ambitions, the Union will need to complete preparation for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference in the next few months; the discussions of the Reflection Group set up in Messina will be a contribution to that process.
The European Council heard a statement from the President of the European Parliament, Mr Klaus Hch, on the main questions dealt with.
STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION
Meeting in Cannes on 26 and 27 June 1995, the European Council sends the following message to the leaders and peoples of former Yugoslavia:
1. The European Union solemnly reaffirms its opposition to the settlement of the conflict in former Yugoslavia by force. It calls for a moratorium on military operations and for the conclusion of an agreement to cease hostilities.
2. Since the beginning, the European Union has lent its support to the efforts of the United Nations to contain the war, to come to the aid of the civilian population and to promote the peace process. It now wishes to emphasize its support for resolute action by UNPROFOR.
As regards the action of the United Nations and its military aspects, the European Union reiterates its support for the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force, as approved by the United Nations Security Council, for the purposes of enabling UNPROFOR to accomplish its task in the best possible conditions of security and with greater efficiency. The objective is to enable UNPROFOR to act and react. The Member States of the European Union are demonstrating their solidarity with the Rapid Reaction Force by offering it their assistance as far as they are able and by urging the United Nations to ensure that all the members of the Organization contribute to the financial support of the Force.
The European Union strongly advises all the parties in the conflict to refrain from placing obstacles in the way of the freedom of movement and action of UNPROFOR and of the humanitarian organizations bringing aid to the civilian population. It warns them that the peace forces are determined to overcome such obstacles. The siege of Sarajevo must be lifted. The European Union demands freedom of access to Sarajevo, its enclaves and the safe areas.
The European Union confirms the authorization to open negotiations for a trade and co-operation agreement with Croatia but would reiterate its stern warning against any attempt to settle the situation in Krajina by force.
3. The European Union confirms that it is its first resolve to speed up the finalization of a peaceful settlement. It reiterates its confidence in and its full support for the mediator it has appointed, Mr Carl Bildt as co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. It has noted with the keenest interest the outcome of his first visit to the region.
The European Union asks Mr Bildt urgently to seek ways of re-opening the dialogue with all the parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European Union, the United States and Russia have devised a plan which is based on a fair division of territory and on future constitutional arrangements which will preserve the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and ensure equitable and balanced treatment for the Croat-Bosnian and Serb-Bosnian entities. This plan must be accepted as the basis for the resumption of negotiations.
The European Union at the same time asks Mr Bildt to pursue the efforts to secure mutual recognition of the States which have emerged from the former Yugoslavia. It understands the urgency attaching in an initial stage to the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It would refer to the proposals made, in particular on the question of sanctions, in order to achieve that mutual recognition as soon as possible.
The European Union urges in this context the importance of strict observance of the closure of the border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It calls on all States to see to it that the monitoring mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia has adequate resources.
The European Union asks Mr Bildt to encourage the Zagreb Government and the Krajina Serb leaders to resume talks, revive the economic Agreement of 2 December 1994 and accept the draft Agreement known as plan Z4 and to urge the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to support that plan.
In view of the success already achieved to bridge the gap between Croats and Muslims, to which the Muslim-Croat Federation and the action of the European Union Administrator in Mostar stand witness, the European Union is convinced that solutions can be found to establish satisfactory relations between all communities in the former Yugoslavia.
The European Union asks its Mediator to keep the Ministers for Foreign Affairs informed of the initial results of his efforts at the next Council meeting on 17 July.
4. These are the European Union's immediate objectives for its own action and that of Mr Bildt. Overall peace will not be restored unless the rights of each community are safeguarded everywhere. In this respect the European Union will remain vigilant concerning the fate of the people of Vojvodina, Sandjak and Kosovo: full reintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the community of nations depends on satisfactory developments.
DECLARATION EUROPEAN COUNCIL, CANNES, 26 AND 27 JUNK 1995
Subject: Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations
"Today, the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Charter of the United Nations in San Francisco, the European Council:
- solemnly reaffirms the European Union's attachment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and renews its commitment to serving the ideals and action of the United Nations;
- emphasizes the extent to which the United Nations, which was created in response to the tragedy of the Second World War, helped in the reconstruction of Europe and in aiding the refugees of the conflict;
- pays tribute to the work of the United Nations over fifty years and to its major contribution to consolidating international law, maintaining peace and international security in co-operation with the regional organizations, to disarmament, to decolonization, to development and humanitarian aid, to protecting and promoting human rights and to co-operation between nations in the most diverse fields;
- vigorously affirms the need, in a world facing political, economic, cultural and social challenges of increasing complexity, to preserve and develop a forum in which universal commitments are made and in which co-ordinated initiatives are implemented in co-operation with the regional organizations;
- points out that the success and the proper functioning of the United Nations depend above all on the political support of its Member States and on the resources which they put at its disposal, notably by full, punctual and unconditional payment of their financial contributions;
- calls on the United Nations and its Member States to pursue and develop the reform programme under way, in order to remedy the weaknesses in some areas and to be ready to take up the challenges of the next century;
- hopes in this regard that progress will be made in adapting UN structures and institutions, including the Security Council;
- supports the Secretary-General's moves to strengthen the Organization's preventive diplomacy capacities and to adjust its peacekeeping tasks and resources, a field in which the UN plays an irreplaceable role, since only the UN may decide on the use of force in international relations;
- also expresses its attachment to the United Nations' revival of a global sustainable development policy centred on human beings, incorporating the achievements of the major Conferences which it has organized and laying stress on aiding the poorest countries, in close consultation with bilateral donors and other multilateralagencies;
- calls on the Secretary-General to step up further his drive to increase efficiency in the Organization's operation and in the management of its staff and financial resources;
- reaffirms that the European Union, which is by far the Organization's largest financial provider, the leading contributor in troops to peacekeeping operations, the principal donor of multilateral development aid and of humanitarian aid, intends, for its part, to continue to support the United Nations."
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE IN BARCELONA
POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
II. POLITICAL AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: ESTABLISHING A COMMON AREA OF PEACE AND STABILITY
B. Stability, security, good-neighbourly relations:
The partners could affirm that peace and stability in the Mediterranean region are a common asset, which they undertake to preserve and strengthen by all means at their disposal.
A security partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean should be based on respect for the following principles:
1. (Sovereign equality). Commitment by the partners to respect each other's sovereign equality and all rights inherent in their sovereignty, in accordance with international law. Commitment by the partners to fulfil in good faith the obligations they have assumed under international law.
2. (Non-interference). Commitment by each partner to refrain from any direct or indirect intervention contrary to the rules of international law in the internal affairs of another partner.
3. (Respect for territorial integrity). Commitment by the partners to respect the territorial integrity and the unity of each of the other partners.
4. (Non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes). Renunciation by the partners of any recourse, in their mutual relations, to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another partner, or any other action that is incompatible with the aims of the United Nations. Commitment by the partners to consider joint mechanisms of preventive diplomacy and to settle their disputes by peaceful means.
5. (Fight against terrorism, organized crime and drugs). Commitment by the partners to cooperage to prevent and combat the threat of terrorist activities by ratifying and implementing the international instruments and commitments to which they subscribe in this connection, and by taking other appropriate measures. Commitment by the partners to fight together against the expansion and diversification of organized crime and to combat the drugs problem in all its aspects.
6. (Objectives in relation to disarmament and non-proliferation). Commitment by the partners to fulfil in good faith their commitments under the arms-control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions to which they are party.
7. Call for all the partners to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on Chemical Weapons and the Convention on Biological Weapons and to commit themselves to practical action in favour of chemical biological and nuclear non-proliferation.
8. Commitment by each partner not to develop military capacity beyond its legitimate individual or collective security requirements. The partners could accordingly reaffirm their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence at lower levels of conventional weaponry.
9. (Good-neighbourly relations, confidence and security-building measures). Commitment by the partners to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves. The partners should support the processes of regional integration, emphasizing their importance for the stability of the region. They could also undertake to consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken jointly with a view to the creation of an "area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean", drawing for example on the Stability Pact for the Central and Eastern European countries.
Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era Budapest decisions
[II] REGIONAL ISSUES
Intensification of CSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
1. Deploring the continuation of the conflict and the human tragedy involved, the participating States welcomed the confirmation by the parties to the conflict of the cease-fire agreed on 12 May 1994 through the mediation of the Russian Federation in co-operation with the CSCE Minsk Group. They confirmed their commitment to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and welcomed the political support given by the Security Council to the CSCE's efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict. To this end they called ofthe parties to the conflict to enter into intensified substantive talks, including direct contacts. In this context, they pledged to redouble the efforts and assistance by the CSCE. They strongly endorsed the mediation efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group and expressed appreciation for the crucial contribution of the Russian Federation and the efforts by other individual members of the Minsk Group. They agreed to harmonize these into a single co-ordinated effort within the framework of the CSCE.
2. To this end, they have directed the Chairman-in-Office, in consultation with the participating States and acting as soon as possible, to name co-chairmen of the Minsk Conference to ensure a common and agreed basis for negotiations and to realize full coordination in all mediation and negotiation activities. The co-chairmen, guided in all of their negotiating efforts by CSCE principles and an agreed mandate, will jointly chair meetings of the Minsk Group and jointly report to the Chairman-in-Office. They will regularly brief the Permanent Council on the progress of their work.
3. As a first step in this effort, they directed the co-chairmen of the Minsk Conference to take immediate steps to promote, with the support and co-operation of the Russian Federation and other individual members of the Minsk Group, the continuation of the existing cease-fire and, drawing upon the progress already achieved in previous mediation activities, to conduct speedy negotiations for the conclusion of a political agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict, the implementation of which will eliminate major consequences of the conflict for all parties and permit the convening of the Minsk Conference. They further requested the co-chairmen of the Minsk Conference to continue working with the parties towards further implementation of confidence-building measures, particularly in the humanitarian field. They underlined the need for participating States to take action, both individually and within relevant international organizations, to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of the region with special emphasis on alleviating the plight of refugees.
4. They agreed that, in line with the view of the parties to the conflict, the conclusion of the agreement mentioned above would also make it possible to deploy multinational peacekeeping forces as an essential element for the implementation of the agreement itself. They declared their political will to provide, with an appropriate resolution from the United Nations Security Council, a multinational CSCE peacekeeping force following agreement among the parties for cessation of the armed conflict. They requested the Chairman-inOffice to develop as soon as possible a plan for the establishment, composition and operations of such a force, organized on the basis of Chapter III of the Helsinki Document 1992 and in a manner fully consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. To this end the Chairman-in-Office will be assisted by the co-chairmen of the Minsk Conference and by the Minsk Group, and be supported by the Secretary General; after appropriate consultations he will also establish a high-level planning group in Vienna to make recommendations on, inter alia, the size and characteristics of the force, command and control, logistics, allocation of units and resources, rules of engagement and arrangements with contributing States. He will seek the support of the United Nations on the basis of the stated United Nations readiness to provide technical advice and expertise. He will also seek continuing political support from the United Nations Security Council for the possible deployment of a CSCE peacekeeping force.
5. On the basis of such preparatory work and the relevant provisions of Chapter III of the Helsinki Document 1992, and following agreement and a formal request by the parties to the Chairman-in-Office through the co-chairmen of the Minsk Conference, the Permanent Council will take a decision on the establishment of the CSCE peace keeping operation.
1. Faced with the alarming situation in the Republic of Georgia, which has been even further aggravated by the recent events in Abkhazia, the participating States reiterated their strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders. On the basis of these principles, a settlement of the conflicts in Georgia must be reached. The interests of the multi-ethnic population in the areas of conflicts must also be taken into account.
2. The participating States expressed their concern about the unilateral acts of 26 November 1994 by the authorities of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia. This undermines both United Nations and CSCE efforts to promote a peaceful political settlement through negotiations between the conflicting parties in Georgia.
They expressed their deep concern over "ethnic cleansing", the massive expulsion of people, predominantly Georgian, from their living areas and the deaths of large numbers of innocent civilians.
They expressed their hope that the efforts conducted under the auspices of the United Nations and with the assistance of the Russian Federation as facilitator and with the participation of representatives of the CSCE will improve the situation in Abkhazia and thus permit the early return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in safety and with dignity. In this context, they called on the parties to the conflict to adhere strictly to the principles and recommendations set forth in the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions as well as in agreements reached in the course of the negotiating process.
3. The participating States noted with satisfaction that certain positive steps have been taken towards a peaceful resolution of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, building upon the work accomplished by the joint peacekeeping forces (established under the Sochi Agreement as Joint Peacekeeping and Law Enforcement Forces, JPLEF) in maintaining the cease-fire in the conflict area.
These encouraging developments were facilitated by the activities of the CSCE Mission to Georgia and the efforts of the Russian Federation. The participating States encourage the Mission to persevere in its efforts to promote political dialogue between all parties to the conflict, thus contributing to reconciliation and the preparation of a broader political framework in which a lasting settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict can be achieved on the basis of CSCE principles and commitments.
They take note of the activities of the joint peacekeeping forces, established under the Sochi Agreement of 24 June 1992, and welcome the present negotiations to achieve further progress toward a political solution, with the participation of the CSCE Mission. They call upon the CSCE Mission to continue to fulfil its mandate with respect to monitoring the activities of the joint peacekeeping forces.
The participating States welcomed the agreement of all the parties reached on 31 October 1994 to reconvene the Joint Control Commission (JCC) in which the Mission will actively participate.
4. The participating States expressed their appreciation for the efforts undertaken by the Government of Georgia to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to build legal and democratic institutions and to assure full transition to a market economy. The Mission will remain actively engaged in assisting the Georgian authorities in these efforts. They urge appropriate governments and international organizations to provide political support and humanitarian and technical assistance to the Republic of Georgia.
5. The participating States consider that it may be desirable to convene at the appropriate time international conferences under the auspices of the CSCE and the United Nations, and with the participation of other international organizations and interested States, to review progress towards settling the conflicts and the development of a democratic society in Georgia.
CODE OF CONDUCT ON POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY
The participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE),
Recognizing the need to enhance security co-operation, including through the funkier encouragement of norms of responsible and cooperative behaviour in the field of security,
Confirming that nothing in this Code diminishes the validity and applicability of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations or of other provisions of international law,
Reaffirming the undiminished validity of the guiding principles and common values of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and the Helsinki Document 1992, embodying responsibilities of States towards each other and of governments towards their people, as well as the validity of other CSCE commitments,
Have adopted the following Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security:
1. The participating States emphasize that the full respect for all CSCE principles embodied in the Helsinki Final Act and the implementation in good faith of all commitments undertaken in the CSCE are of fundamental importance for stability and security, and consequently constitute a matter of direct and legitimate concern to all of them.
2. The participating States confirm the continuing validity of their comprehensive concept of security, as initiated in the Final Act, which relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It links economic and environmental co-operation with peaceful inter-State relations.
3. They remain convinced that security is indivisible and that the security of each of them is inseparably linked to the security of all others. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States. They will pursue their own security interests in conformity with the common effort to strengthen security and stability in the CSCE area and beyond.
4. Reaffirming their respect for each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, the participating States will base their mutual security relations upon a- co-operative approach. They emphasize in this regard the key role of the CSCE. They will continue to develop complementary and mutually reinforcing institutions that include European and transatlantic organizations, multilateral and bilateral undertakings and various forms of regional and subregional cooperation. The participating States will co-operate in ensuring that all such security arrangements are in harmony with CSCE principles and commitments under this Code.
5. They are determined to act in solidarity if CSCE norms and commitments are violated and to facilitate concerted responses to security challenges that they may face as a result. They will consult promptly, in conformity with their CSCE responsibilities, with a participating State seeking assistance in realizing its individual or collective self-defence. They will consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be required in defence of their common values.
6. The participating States will not support terrorist acts in any way and will take appropriate measures to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms. They will co-operate fully in combating the threat of terrorist activities through implementation of international instruments and commitments they agree upon in this respect. They will, in particular, take steps to fulfil the requirements of international agreements by which they are bound to prosecute or extradite terrorists.
7. The participating States recall that the principles of the Helsinki Final Act are all of primary significance and, accordingly, that they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.
8. The participating States will not provide assistance to or support States that are in violation of their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act.
9. The participating States reaffirm the inherent right, as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, of individual and collective self-defence.
10. Each participating State, bearing in mind the legitimate security concerns of other States, is free to determine its security interests itself on the basis of sovereign equality and has the right freely to choose its own security arrangements, in accordance with international law and with commitments to CSCE principles and objectives.
11. The participating States each have the sovereign right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, and to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties, including treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality. Each has the right to change its status in this respect, subject to relevant agreements and procedures. Each will respect the rights of all others in this regard.
12. Each participating State will maintain only such military capabilities as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account its obligations under international law.
13. Each participating State will determine its military capabilities on the basis of national democratic procedures, bearing in mind the legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to contribute to international security and stability. No participating State will attempt to impose military domination over any other participating State.
14. A participating State may station its armed forces on the territory of another participating State in accordance with their freely negotiated agreement as well as in accordance with international law.
15. The participating States will implement in good faith each of their commitments in the field of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building as an important element of their indivisible security.
16. With a view to enhancing security and stability in the CSCE area, the participating States reaffirm their commitment to pursue arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures.
17. The participating States commit themselves to co-operate, including through development of sound economic and environmental conditions, to counter tensions that may lead to conflict. The sources of such tensions include violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and of other commitments in the human dimension; manifestations of aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-semitism also endanger peace and security.
18. The participating States stress the importance both of early identification of potential conflicts and of their joint efforts in the field of conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes.
19. In the event of armed conflict, they will seek to facilitate the effective cessation of hostilities and seek to create conditions favourable to the political solution of the conflict. They will cooperate in support of humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering among the civilian population, including facilitating the movement of personnel and resources dedicated to such tasks.
20. The participating States consider the democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as of intelligence services and the police to be an indispensable element of stability and security. They will further the integration of their armed forces with civil society as an important expression of democracy.
21. Each participating State will at all times provide for and maintain effective guidance to and control of its military, paramilitary and security forces by constitutionally established authorities vested with democratic legitimacy. Each participating State will provide controls to ensure that such authorities fulfil their constitutional and legal responsibilities. They will clearly define the roles and missions of such forces and their obligation to act solely within the constitutional framework.
22. Each participating State will provide for its legislative approval of defence expenditures. Each participating State will, with due regard to national security requirements, exercise restraint in its military expenditures and provide for transparency and public access to information related to the armed forces.
23. Each participating State, while providing for the individual service member's exercise of his or her civil rights, will ensure that its armed forces as such are politically neutral.
24. Each participating State will provide and maintain measures to guard against accidental or unauthorized use of military means.
25. The participating States will not tolerate or support forces that are not accountable to or controlled by their constitutionally established authorities. If a participating State is unable to exercise its authority over such forces, it may seek consultations within the CSCE to consider steps to be taken.
26. Each participating State will ensure that in accordance with its international commitments its paramilitary forces refrain from the acquisition of combat mission capabilities in excess of those for which they were established.
27. Each participating State will ensure that the recruitment or call-up of personnel for service in its military, paramilitary and security forces is consistent with its obligations and commitments in respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
28. The participating States will reflect in their laws or other relevant documents the rights and duties of armed forces personnel. They will consider introducing exemptions from or alternatives to military service.
29. The participating States will make widely available in their respective countries the international humanitarian law of war. They will reflect, in accordance with national practice, their commitments in this field in their military training programmes and regulations.
30. Each participating State will instruct its armed forces personnel in international humanitarian law, rules, conventions and commitments governing armed conflict and will ensure that such personnel are aware that they are individually accountable under national and international law for their actions.
31. The participating States will ensure that armed forces personnel vested with command authority exercise it in accordance with relevant national as well as international law and are made aware that they can be held individually accountable under those laws for the unlawful exercise of such authority and that orders contrary to national and international law must not be given. The responsibility of superiors does not exempt subordinates from any of their individual responsibilities.
32. Each participating State will ensure that military, paramilitary and security forces personnel will be able to enjoy and exercise their human rights and fundamental freedoms as reflected in CSCE documents and international law, in conformity with relevant constitutional and legal provisions and with the requirements of service.
33. Each participating State will provide appropriate legal and administrative procedures to protect the rights of all its forces personnel.
34. Each participating State will ensure that its armed forces are, in peace and in war, commanded, manned, trained and equipped in ways that are consistent with the provisions of international law and its respective obligations and commitments related to the use of armed forces in armed conflict, including as applicable the Hague Conventions of 1907 and 1954, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols Additional thereto, as well as the 1980 Convention on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons.
35. Each participating State will ensure that its defence policy and doctrine are consistent with international law related to the use of armed forces, including in armed conflict, and the relevant commitments of this Code.
36. Each participating State will ensure that any decision to assign its armed forces to internal security missions is arrived at in conformity with constitutional procedures. Such decisions will prescribe the armed forces' missions, ensuring that they will be performed under the effective control of constitutionally established authorities and subject to the rule of law. If recourse to force cannot be avoided in performing internal security missions, each participating State will ensure that its use must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement. The armed forces will take due care to avoid injury to civilians or their property.
37. The participating States will not use armed forces to limit the peaceful and lawful exercise of their human and civil rights by persons as individuals or as representatives of groups nor to deprive them of their national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity.
38. Each participating State is responsible for implementation of this Code. If requested, a participating State will provide appropriate clarification regarding its implementation of the Code. Appropriate CSCE bodies, mechanisms and procedures will be used to assess, review and improve if necessary the implementation of this Code.
39. The provisions adopted in this Code of Conduct are politically binding. Accordingly, this Code is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. This Code will come into effect on 1 January 1995.
40. Nothing in this Code alters the nature and content of the commitments undertaken in other CSCE documents.
41. The participating States will seek to ensure that their relevant internal documents and procedures or, where appropriate, legal instruments reflect the commitments made in this Code.
42. The text of the Code will be published in each participating State, which will disseminate it and make it known as widely as possible.
WEU Council of Ministers, Lisbon, 15th May 1995
1. Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the WEU nations gathered in Lisbon on 15th May 1995. They warmly welcomed the accession of Greece to WEU as a full member and the consequent entry into force of the Associate Members' status and the Associate Partners' status, as well as the fact that Austria, Finland and Sweden became Observers following their accession to the European Union.
2. Ministers recalled that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence. They also recalled the role of WEU as defence component of the EU and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the priority which they therefore attached to the development of its operational capabilities. They recalled that, in the Petersberg declaration, preparedness was expressed to deploy WEU military units for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis-management. They reaffirmed their resolve to work, on the basis of the preliminary conclusions adopted in Noordwijk on the formulation of a common European defence policy, to ensure that this policy can effectively take shape in the years ahead. Ministers expressed their appreciation of the significant progress made by WEU since their last meeting and discussed in particular the following issues:
1. WEU development
(a) Operational development
1. Ministers examined the implementation of their previous decisions, in particular those taken at their Petersberg, Kirchherg and Noordwijk meetings, regarding the development of WEU operational capabilities. They approved a decision which, inter alia:
- provides WEU with new decision-making mechanisms and structures, in particular the establishment of a new politico-military group in support of the Council, a Situation Centre, and an Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell;
- refines procedures and objectives for the identification of Forces Answerable to WEU;
- provides WEU with preliminary conclusions and transitional arrangements for the financing of WEU operations.
Ministers underlined the need to gain practical experience of the provisions contained in this decision through appropriate exercises. In this context they welcomed the intentions expressed by Portugal to organise an exercise. They also welcomed the agreement reached by the member states of the Eurocorps to carry out the exercise WEU crisis 95-96, within the framework of the Petersberg declaration, and took note of the decision to propose this exercise to the Council in order to verify the procedures established in the relevant operational documents of the organisation.
2. Ministers welcomed the progress made in WEU in identifying those assets and capabilities that WEU will need in its future operations, as well as in defining its views on the mechanisms and procedures for the use of such assets and capabilities which the alliance could make available to WEU.
3. Ministers welcomed the presentation of a report of the Secretary-General on the reinforcement of the Secretariat in the politico-military, field, which will constitute the basis for decisions to be taken by the Permanent Council before the next Ministerial Council, allowing for the reinforcement to begin by January 1996.
4. Ministers welcomed the decision of France, Italy and Spain to organise a land force (EUROFOR) and a maritime force (EUROMARFOR). They noted that these forces will be open to WEU member states. In this context, they welcomed the agreements reached on the participation of Portugal in EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR since their establishment. They also noted that these forces would be declared "forces answerable to WEU", that they would be employed as a priority in this framework, that they could likewise be employed in the framework of NATO, so as to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance, and that the fulfilment of their missions will not prejudice the participation of their units in the common defence missions provided for by Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Ministers believe that these initiatives will contribute to the development of the European security and defence identity and strengthen Europe's own military capabilities for operations conducted pursuant to the Petersberg declaration.
5. Ministers tasked the Permanent Council, on the initiative of the participating states, to detail the relations between WEU and these forces, together with the conditions for their use in the WEU framework.
6. As a follow-up to the decision taken at their last meeting in Noordwijk, Ministers endorsed a document on "emergency responses to humanitarian crises: a role for a WEU humanitarian task force". The document, based on an Italian/United Kingdom proposal on the principles and modalities for establishing a WEU humanitarian task force and on the use of military assets in humanitarian crises, is fully consistent with the above decision in paragraph 3. They tasked the Permanent Council to complete the work on this subject as a matter of priority and requested the Planning Cell to take forward as a matter of urgency its generic planning in this area.
7. Ministers also marked their interest in the initiative by France and the United Kingdom on peace-keeping and conflict-prevention in Africa. In this connection, they welcomed the preliminary reflections taking place in WEU in parallel with the discussions within the European Union and against the background of the debate in progress at the United Nations; they instructed the Permanent Council to take forward its reflections on this subject.
8. Ministers also examined progress made in the field of WEU space activities. They approved a decision on the establishment of the Satellite Centre as a permanent WEU body. They also approved a decision tasking the Space Group to continue its activities, concentrating on the study of the three proposed approaches to developing WEU's capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes, namely the establishment of a WEU satellite system, participation in a developing multinational programme or procurement of imagery with the aim of presenting a proposal to their autumn 1995 ministerial meeting.
9. Ministers took note of the report by the presidency on the Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting held on 20th April 1995 in Lisbon.
10. Ministers took note of documents on WEU's role in evacuation operations", "generic planning, and intelligence support to the Planning Cell: short-term measures. They considered these documents as a significant contribution to the implementation of their decisions on the development of WEU operational capabilities.
11. They looked forward to the conclusion of the work on other operational aspects identified in the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy, approved in Noordwijk.
12. Ministers took note with appreciation of the reports on the Portuguese Presidency's missions to Mostar and the Danube and welcomed the recent visit to Mostar of the presidency's Foreign Minister, Mr. Durao Barroso. They also noted with great interest the information provided to the Council by the EU Administrator for Mostar, Mr. Koschnick.
13. Ministers reiterated the importance they attach to the WEU contribution to the EU Mostar administration, and to the Danube and Sharp Guard operations, which are visible expressions of WEU's commitment to European security. They expressed their appreciation and gratitude to all those participating in these operations and thus contributing to their success.
14. Ministers welcomed the agreement between the parties concerned on the implementation of the first phase of the establishment of a unified police force of Mostar (UPFM) and regarding the structure of the future UPFM. They believe that these important steps should lead to the implementation of the UPFM. Ministers agreed to continue to encourage the parties, in particular via the presidency, to secure agreement to the subsequent implementation phases and the establishment of the UPFM. Ministers welcomed the forthcoming participation of Austria, Finland and Sweden in the WEU police element, in addition to the contributions provided by the member states.
15. Ministers welcomed the successful results accomplished by the WEU police and customs mission on the Danube, which contribute to the full implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.
16. They also expressed their satisfaction at the continued positive results achieved in the joint WEU-NATO Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic.
(b) Common reflection on new European security conditions
1. Ministers welcomed progress achieved on the common reflection on the new European security conditions. They emphasised the importance of the fact that, for the first time, such an exercise is taking place among the 27 WEU nations. They approved a document which indentifies their common interests, as well as potential risks to European security. This analysis will be further reviewed in the light of the second phase of the exercise.
2. Ministers noted that, in the second phase, WEU countries will examine how to enhance and strengthen their common security through possible responses to the potential risks already identified. They asked the Permanent Council to submit at their next meeting the final results of the exercise along the lines of paragraph 6 of the Noordwijk declaration with a view to a decision on the publication of a white paper on European security.
3. Ministers welcomed the French initiative concerning the organisation in autumn 1995 of a European session to reflect on a European security policy, which will bring together representatives of the 27 WEU nations.
(c) Other questions
1. Ministers welcomed the Permanent Council decision on the implementation of the Associate Partners' status which will allow for the extension of their participation in WEU working groups, for the conclus~on of ha~son arrangements between them and the Planning Cell, as well as for the identification of their forces which may be made available for WEU operations. They welcomed the progress already achieved on the identification of forces and looked forward to the full and rapid implementation of the above mentioned measures.
2. Ministers underlined the importance they attach to the role played by the Assembly in the debate on security and defence in Europe and its substantive contribution to the wider consideration of these issues. They welcomed the regular and constructive dialogue between the Council and the Assembly.
3. Ministers welcomed the Permanent Council decision on the gradual transformation of the Institute for Security Studies into an Academy.
4. Ministers welcomed the signature of the WEU security agreement on 28th March 1995.
2. Relations with the European Union
1. Ministers had an exchange of views on the relations between WEU and the European Union. They stressed the importance of developing further this relationship for the future of the two organisations and for European security as a whole.
2. Ministers recalled their decision in Noordwijk last November that WEU should make a timely contribution to the work of the 1996 EU intergovernmental conference (IGC). Ministers held a first exchange of views on this contribution, which will re-examine and further develop the role of WEU and the provisions agreed at Maastricht, taking account of the progress made and experience acquired since the WEU Maastricht declaration of December 1991 and the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union.
3. Ministers tasked the Permanent Council to present a report at their next meeting in November in Madrid. In this respect, they welcomed the intention of the incoming Spanish Presidency to present a reflection document on the WEU contribution to the IGC to serve as the basis of the Permanent Council's report. They noted that the possibility of holding a meeting at summit level to finalise the WEU contribution to the IGC continues to be considered.
4 In this context, Ministers welcomed as significant contributions to the forthcoming debate the presentation of the proposals made by the British Prime Minister, of the Netherlands Government memorandum and of other national positions. These, together with the ongoing work in the European Union started under the French Presidency, would be important inputs to this debate.
5. Ministers welcomed the initiative of the Portuguese Presidency to organise a seminar in Sintra on 3rd and 4th June on the WEU contribution to the future European security and defence architecture.
6. Ministers noted with satisfaction that measures to develop a close working relationship between WEU and KU, foreseen in the Treaty on European Union, were now being given practical effect. They particularly welcomed the close co-operation between the EU and WEU Presidencies regarding the EU administration in Mostar including the WEU police deployment, the first occasion when WEU, in carrying out an operation, is implementing a decision of the Union. In this context they also welcomed the fact that, for the first time, the WEU and EU Presidencies had carried out a joint demarche which contributed to the successful agreement to the first phase of the unified police force Mostar (UPFM).
7. Ministers noted with appreciation co-operation between WEU and EU in the framework of the informal group of government experts of WEU/WEAG and EU member states to study options for a European armaments policy. They noted that all items of the agreed programme of work have already been covered. They looked forward to the report being finalised shortly.
8. Ministers welcomed the first meeting of the WEU Presidency, the Secretariat and the Planning Cell with the EU Troika of Consular Affairs' experts on WEU's role in evacuation operations. They tasked the Permanent Council to ensure that the work on this subject is continued in close co-ordination with the relevant EU bodies.
3. Relations with NATO
9. Ministers welcomed the decisions taken recently by both the WEU Council and the North Atlantic Council, regarding the co-operation between both organisations and noted with appreciation that they are already under implementation. These decisions represented a further step in the development of working links between WEU and the alliance, including joint councils and co-operation between secretariats.
10. Ministers stressed the importance, for future co-operation between WEU and NATO, of the progress made in WEU in identifying those assets and capabilities that WEU will need in its future operations, as well as in defining its views on the mechanisms and procedures for the use of assets and capabilities which the alliance could make available to WEU. They stressed the importance of NATO comments for pursuing joint work in this field. They also invite NATO to work with WEU to develop a list of assets and capabilities that could be made available. Ministers recalled the importance they attach to WEU having an effective intelligence handling facility and to the conclusion of the discussions in this field with NATO.
11. Ministers welcomed the continuing co-operation and the institutional dialogue between WEU and NATO to develop further the CJTF concept, including joint meetings of the WEU Politico-Military Working Group and NATO's Provisional Policy Co-ordination Group and attendance of the Planning Cell and cross-representation of secretariats in the meetings of those groups.
12. These are all significant developments which illustrate the new level of mutually reinforcing co-operation reached in WEU-NATO relatin s.
UN Doc. S/1995/297,9 April 1995
1. The present report is submitted in response to Security Council resolution 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mion for Rwanda (UNAMIR) for a period of six months, until 9 June 1995. Under that resolution, the Council requested me to report by 9 February and 9 April 1995 on the implementation of UNAMIR's mandate, the safety of populations at risk, the humanitarian situation and progress towards the repatriation of refugees. The present report covers developments since my report of 6 February (S/1995/107).
2. During the reporting period, a mission of Security Council members visited Rwanda on 12 and 13 February 1995 and submitted its findings to the Council in a report of 28 February (S/1995/164). The Mission stressed that, as long as 2 million Rwandese remained in camps in or outside their country, the situation in Rwanda would remain inherently unstable. In this connection, it underlined the interrelated issues facing the Government: repatriation, reconciliation, reconstruction and the need for justice. It called on the Government to intensify its efforts to create favourable conditions and an auspicious climate inside the country to encourage and facilitate repatriation.
II. POLITICAL ASPECTS
3. It has been a year since Rwanda was engulfed in a genocide that left at least 500,000 people dead. In the message I sent to the Government and people of Rwanda on the first anniversary of those horrors, I conveyed my deepest sympathy and stressed that never again should the perpetrators of such crimes be permitted to get away with impunity. I also pledged the continued support of the United Nations to the building of a new Rwandese society based on tolerance, harmony and justice.
4. In the nine months since the new Government of Rwanda assumed office, the overall situation in the country has improved considerably. The private sector has revived in an atmosphere of relative security; markets, shops and small businesses have sprung up, agricultural activities have restarted and schools have reopened.
5. Radio UNAMIR commenced broadcasting on 16 February and is on the air seven days a week in three languages, in an effort to present objective information to the Rwandese people at home and in refugee camps abroad. Plans are in hand to increase Radio UNAMIR's broadcast time.
6. In my report of 6 February, I noted that, while Rwanda continued to face problems in regard to repatriation, reconciliation and rebuilding its administrative structures, the overall situation was evolving positively. Over the past two months, however, tensions and frustrations have surfaced and the security situation in the country has deteriorated. The Prefect of Butare was murdered in an ambush on 4 March; armed saboteurs have reportedly entered Rwanda; and more and more people are being detained by the Government.
7. These developments have contributed to a considerable decline in the repatriation of Rwandese refugees from Zaire, the United Republic of Tanzania and Burundi. In addition, over 200,000 internally displaced persons remain in camps because they fear insecure conditions in their home communes or because of intimidation by extremist elements in the camps.
8. There are reports that the armed forces of the former Rwandese Government are training and rearming. Over the past two months, soldiers of the forces of the former Government have reportedly been apprehended in Rwanda, carrying arms, grenades and anti-personnel mines. As a result, the Rwandese Patriotic Army has tightened security and strengthened its border patrols.
9. These measures against possible infiltrators have also led to incidents involving United Nations and international staff. United Nations vehicles and staff have been searched and supplies of goods and equipment have been stopped at Kigali airport. In addition, government authorities at the middle and lower levels are often uncooperative. Last month, Radio Rwanda initiated a propaganda campaign of surprising virulence and broadcast unfounded allegations of misconduct by UNAMIR personnel. After a protest by my Special Representative, however, Radio Rwanda has reverted to a more balanced attitude towards UNAMIR.
10. The relationship between UNAMIR and the Rwandese Patriotic Army has been discussed by my Special Representative with the President of Rwanda, Mr. Pasteur Bizimungu, and with the Vice-President and Minister of Defence, Major-General Paul Kagame. Both the President and the Vice-President reaffirmed their Government's support for UNAMIR and said minor incidents should be cleared up at fortnightly joint staff meetings. The Vice-President added that some of the frustrations, especially at the lower level, were the result of the perception that the Government could not exercise complete sovereign authority in Rwanda as long as there was a large UNAMIR military presence in the country. In this connection, both the President and the Vice-President felt that, at an appropriate time, UNAMIR's mandate and its possible phase-out from Rwanda should be discussed.
III. LEGAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS
11. In response to the rise in tension in parts of the country, the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda strengthened its monitoring activities during the reporting period. As of 1 April 1995, the Field Operation was composed of 113 staff in 11 field offices, including 55 short-term staff; 30 United Nations Volunteers (UNVs); 12 human rights officers from the European Union and 8 experts provided by the Governments of the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland. It is expected that a further contingent of some 28 human rights officers contributed by the European Union, as well as additional UNVs, will be deployed on 19 April.
12. The human rights officers work directly with the population, as well as with government officials and civic leaders throughout the country. They seek to promote respect for the rights of individual citizens and a sense of confidence and stability.
13. The establishment of an effective judicial system is one of the most pressing problems facing the Government. Although efforts are often made by the Government and its security forces to follow correct procedures, arrests are sometimes arbitrary. Many individuals are held without hope of timely trial proceedings. There are approximately 27,000 people in Rwanda's desperately overcrowded prisons. Kigali prison, for example, built to accommodate 1,500 detainees, currently houses over 7,000. On 16 March, 24 people died in a police detention cell.
14. The Technical Co-operation Unit of the Field Operation
recently issued a comprehensive programme addressing the needs of the Government
in establishing a civil society based on respect for human rights. This
programme, which was developed in close consultation with the relevant
government ministries, includes recommendations on measures to facilitate the
prosecution of suspects accused of serious human rights violations. It also
proposes a strategy for introducing human rights education in Rwandese schools
15. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Jose Ayala-Lasso, has launched an international appeal with a view to assisting the Government of Rwanda to re-establish the judicial system. He has also appealed for funds to recruit more human rights monitors who, as part of their duties, would work closely with the judiciary. During his visit to Rwanda from 1 to 3 April, the High Commissioner had the opportunity to discuss many of the above issues with government officials.
IV. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
16. By its resolution 977 (1995) of 22 February 1995, the Security Council decided that the International Tribunal for Rwanda would have its seat at Arusha (United Republic of Tanzania). A team composed of experts from the United Nations Secretariat and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia will visit the United Republic of Tanzania shortly to secure premises for the International Tribunal for Rwanda and to negotiate the necessary agreements with the Tanzanian authorities.
17. On 7 March, I addressed a letter to all States Members of the United Nations, as well as to non-member States maintaining permanent observer missions at United Nations Headquarters, inviting them to nominate judges for the Tribunal. I requested that these nominations be made by 7 April 1995.
18. The Office of the Prosecutor for the International Tribunal was established in Kigali in January 1995 and the Deputy Prosecutor, Mr. Rakotomanana, took office on 20 March. In a statement issued by the Chief Prosecutor, Judge Goldstone, on 5 April, it was announced that the Tribunal was processing about 400 cases and that the first case for trial was expected in the second half of the year. Since January, Tribunal staff have been gathering information and evidence in Rwanda and other countries. In view of the importance and volume of the work involved, more expert personnel are required and efforts to secure the necessary staff are under way. I welcome the voluntary contributions pledged by some Member States to support the activities of the Tribunal and I appeal for more such assistance to enable the Tribunal to carry out its tasks.
V. MILITARY ASPECTS
19. As at 1 April, UNAMIR's force strength stood at 5,529 troops and 297 military observers (see annex). Since my report of 6 February, an Indian signals company has been deployed, the inter-African battalion has been replaced by a Senegalese battalion of 241 all ranks, the Malawi company of 181 and the Australian medical support group of 293 have both been rotated and the Canadian logistics support group of 95 has been fully deployed.
20. UNAMIR has been working under additional pressure as a result of the recent deterioration in security. Instances of harassment and intimidation directed at UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel, property and installations have, as noted earlier, increased during the reporting period.
21. On 15 February, UNAMIR headquarters at Mutura, east of Gisenyi, where the Tunisian battalion is located, was hit by grenades and small arms fire in a deliberate and unprovoked attack against a UNAMIR signals installation. The following day, while investigating the circumstances surrounding the attack, eight members of a UNAMIR patrol were injured by a land-mine probably planted by the attackers. On 5 March, three grenades were thrown at the Nigerian contingent's guardpost at Byumba, injuring two soldiers, one of them seriously.
22. These are the first incidents since the end of the civil war in which United Nations troops appear to have been deliberately targeted. My Special Representative and the Force Commander have informed the authorities of their serious concern and members of the Government have expressed regret for these attacks, indicating that they were isolated acts. Investigations are under way to determine the circumstances and the identities of those involved.
23. Mechanisms have been put in place to enable UNAMIR and the Rwandese Patriotic Army to liaise and exchange views at both the command and the staff officer levels. These arrangements facilitate the resolution of complaints and enhance co-operation and co-ordination. However, the worsening security situation has strained relations between UNAMIR and the Rwandese Patriotic Army. Indeed, the Rwandese Patriotic Army has frequently restricted the movement of UNAMIR personnel and denied it access to certain areas. This has affected UNAMIR's ability to discharge its mandated tasks fully and effectively.
24. Difficulties have also been encountered on the occasion of troop rotations, when UNAMIR personnel have been held up or denied entry at Kigali airport. It should be recalled, in this connection, that the Model Status of Forces Agreement (A/45/594), which reflects the customary principles and practices of United Nations peace-keeping operations, contains provisions regulating the entry, residence and departure of personnel of peace-keeping operations. The agreement on the status of UNAMIR and its personnel, concluded on 5 November 1993, contains identical provisions. Following the modification of UNAMIR's mandate under Security Council resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994 and the installation of the present Government in July 1994, an exchange of letters to constitute an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Rwanda was initiated. The purpose of this was not to reaffirm the applicability of the agreement concluded on 5 November 1993, which in accordance with well-established principles of international law is not in doubt, but to supplement it by reflecting the changes in UNAMIR's mandate. However, despite several reminders, the Government has not yet replied. It is my hope that this matter will be promptly resolved and that the Government will agree to honour its obligations under the agreement.
25. There is a pressing need for a comprehensive mine-clearance programme. However, the Government of Rwanda has not yet responded to the offers of the United Nations for assistance in mine clearance and minefield survey and marking. Such a programme would, among other things, open up many areas to returnees, including agricultural fields. A team of mine experts from the United States Department of Defense recently visited Rwanda and held discussions with UNAMIR concerning a possible plan of action in this area. In the meantime, UNAMIR explosives demolition teams continue to carry out limited mine-clearing operations, especially in urban areas.
VI. CIVILIAN POLICE
26. In my report of 6 February, I noted that UNAMIR was pursuing its efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in training a new integrated national police force. The training of 300 gendarmes and 20 instructors, which started on 19 December 1994, is expected to conclude by the end of April. The Government has requested that UNAMIR train an additional 400 gendarmes before beginning the training programme for 100 instructors, which was scheduled to commence in June.
27. Following a request from the Government, a UNAMIR civilian police observer has been assigned to assist the Chief of Staff of the National Gendarmerie in determining operational requirements to ensure that, upon completion of their training, gendarmes are ready and properly equipped for deployment.
28. Owing to financial and material constraints, the training programme for communal police, which was scheduled to begin in February, has been delayed. The Government has informed UNAMIR that it is intensifying its efforts to obtain the necessary resources to permit training to begin at the earliest opportunity. Once funding is secured, UNAMIR will begin a training programme for approximately 1,500 communal police.
29. As part of its monitoring and investigatory activities, the UNAMIR civilian police component has teams of 3 to 4 observers in each of the 11 prefectures in the country. These observers work in close co-operation with local authorities, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations, and assist human rights monitors and UNAMIR personnel in the performance of their respective duties.
30. UNAMIR continues to face an acute shortage of civilian police personnel, a situation which seriously impairs the discharge of its expanded tasks. While, in accordance with resolution 965 (1994), the strength of UNAMIR's civilian police component was increased to 120 police observers, only 58 are currently deployed. These observers are from Djibouti (7), Germany (9), Ghana (10), Guinea-Bissau (8), Mali (10), Nigeria (10) and Zambia (4).
31. As stressed in previous reports, there is a particularly urgent need for additional French-speaking civilian police observers. In this connection, on 22 February, I again approached Member States, including 13 French-speaking countries, to ascertain their interest in providing additional civilian police observers. I have not, so far, received any positive responses.
VII. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS
32. At the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) round-table conference, held at Geneva on 18 and 19 January 1995, the international donor community pledged some $587 million to support the Government's rehabilitation and reconstruction programme. The slow process of turning donor pledges into actual support, however, has led to problems and growing frustration on the ground.
33. The humanitarian programme in Rwanda maintains its emphasis on the provision of emergency relief to the affected population, as well as on activities aimed at enabling the Government to function effectively. Progress in these areas, however, has been affected by the paucity of resources available. To date, a relatively small portion of the contributions pledged at the UNDP round-table conference has been converted into actual disbursements. This is also true of the response to the 1995 consolidated inter-agency humanitarian assistance appeal launched in January 1995. The Trust Fund for Rwanda totalled $4,710,857 as at 1 April, most of it being disbursed to support the national judicial system.
34. There are substantial food shortages within the country and the subregion. The recent Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)/World Food Programme (WFP) crop assessment indicates that the January 1995 harvest was significantly smaller than in previous years. If the threat of starvation and malnutrition is to be averted for some 3 million refugees and internally displaced persons from Rwanda and Burundi, rapid and substantial food aid from the international community is required. In the meantime, United Nations non-governmental organizations are distributing seeds and tools to the affected population. There is also a programme of seed and livestock protection for the benefit of vulnerable groups. The WFP food-for-work programmes seek to promote the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the strengthening of food security.
35. Problems affecting children continue to receive special attention. United Nations and non-governmental organizations are registering unaccompanied minors and attempting to reunite families. So far, approximately 3,000 children have been reunited with their families and psychosocial counselling and trauma recovery programmes are expected to be enlarged in the near future. Agreement has been reached with the Ministry of Justice to permit 400 children between the ages of 11 and 17, imprisoned for alleged involvement in the genocide, to be moved to a separate location for children only. As a result of consultations with the Ministry of Defence, some 4,000 "child soldiers" are expected to be demobilized shortly.
36. There have been some improvements in the health sector. Nearly half of the 280 vaccination centres which were operational before April 1994 have reopened and a programme to equip them has begun. Some 26 nutritional centres for unaccompanied children have reopened and receive supplementary food aid. It is planned to have 100 nutritional centres operational during 1995. Projects relating to family planning, maternal care and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) are being promoted vigorously.
37. The humanitarian agencies have intensified their efforts to ensure wider access to education. This has included the distribution of basic classroom resources and supplies and an emergency curriculum for over 140,000 primary schoolchildren. Teacher emergency packages have been distributed to over 7,000 teachers serving about 600,000 children in Rwanda. Moves are under way to adapt the packages for young people in prisons and for literacy and basic skill-training programmes, especially for youth and women. A pilot project for implementing teacher emergency packages in refugee camps was launched in February.
38. Activities are taking place, within the context of Operation Retour, to expedite the voluntary return of internally displaced persons. Six camps for internally displaced persons have been closed and some 40,000 people have been resettled in their home communities, where agencies are implementing rehabilitation projects. The remaining camps hold more than 200,000 displaced people. In certain quarters in Rwanda, these camps are viewed as breeding grounds for destabilization activities and the Government is anxious to close them as soon as possible.
39. The recent deterioration in the security situation, together with the lack of resources, has had a negative impact on the resettlement of returnees. The increased screening of them by the Rwandese authorities has also inhibited progress towards a faster rate of refugee repatriation. Recent arrangements made by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees with the Governments of the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire, aimed at assuring security in Rwandese refugee camps in those countries, were expected to help reduce intimidation and thus permit a higher rate of repatriation. However, most of the estimated 60,000 refugees who returned to Rwanda during the first two months of the year were from the 1959 case-load. Most of the more recent refugees who have returned so far are women and children. United Nations organizations are facilitating their repatriation through reception and transport facilities.
40. Returnees from the 1959 case-load are currently estimated at over 600,000. Their resettlement has become a major problem for the authorities, since many of them have illegally occupied the homes and land of recently departed refugees, some of whom have also begun to return home. The Government urgently needs resources to accommodate both groups of returnees in a manner that ensures justice and promotes reconciliation. To facilitate their reintegration, returnees will have to be provided with assistance in education, housing and job training. A grave concern associated with the returnees from the 1959 case-load is the large number of cattle (estimated at 500,000) that they have brought with them. Lack of adequate grazing areas and water for these herds, combined with livestock diseases, threaten an ecological disaster.
41. Solutions to the humanitarian challenges faced by Rwanda are a vital element in international efforts to contribute to national reconciliation and economic recovery. Continued assistance is indispensable if progress is to be achieved, particularly in view of the disastrous consequences of the war and the continuing lack of resources available to the Government.
VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS
42. The General Assembly, by its resolution 49/20 of 29 November 1994, authorized me to enter into commitments for a four-month period from 10 December 1994 to 9 April 1995, at a monthly rate not to exceed $15 million gross, in connection with the maintenance of UNAMIR. This amount was based on the then authorized strength of 320 military observers, 5,500 troops, 90 civilian police and 398 civilian personnel. Subsequently, the Security Council authorized an increase in the strength of the civilian police component from 90 to 120 police observers. My report on the financing of UNAMIR for the period from 10 December 1994 to 9 June 1995 and for the maintenance of the mission on a monthly basis after 9 June 1995 (A/49/375/Add.2) has been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its current session.
43. As at March 1995, unpaid assessments to the UNAMIR Special Account amounted to $46.5 million, and the total amount of outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations was $1,662.8 million.
44. The progress achieved in Rwanda over the past nine months is threatened by renewed tensions. It is incumbent on the Government and the international community to take the steps necessary to put Rwanda back on the road to stability, national reconciliation and reconstruction.
45. These goals are likely to remain elusive, however, as long as 2 million Rwandese remain in camps outside their country. The indignation and deep sense of injustice felt by many Rwandese after the genoc is certainly understandable, but it cannot be allowed to frustrate the healing process that must take place if Rwanda is to be restored to peace and harmony. The Government is therefore urged to make more determined efforts to foster a climate of trust and confidence and to create conditions that will encourage refugees and displaced persons not suspected of involvement in the genocide to believe that they can return to their homes in safety. At the same time, steps must be taken to bring to trial, at the earliest opportunity, those who are guilty of genocide.
46. I therefore welcome the adoption by the Security Council on 27 February of resolution 978 (1995), in which it called on Member States to arrest persons against whom sufficient evidence existed of criminal responsibility for genocide. It is my hope that Member States will take the necessary follow-up action and help ensure that the International Tribunal for Rwanda becomes operational as soon as possible. The need for such steps is underlined by the recent disturbing reports of military training and an arms build-up by elements of the armed forces of the former Government of Rwanda in neighbouring countries. The Governments on whose territory such activities may be taking place must ensure that their countries do not become bases for incursions into Rwanda.
47. Rwanda's needs with regard to the rehabilitation of its administrative structures and social and economic reconstruction are great. It is clear that limited resources mean that the Government cannot by itself address all the problems facing the country. It needs the assistance and co-operation of its neighbours and the international community. I therefore urge donors to do all they can to accelerate the flow of aid to Rwanda. In this connection, Member States may wish to consider channelling funds through the Trust Fund for Rwanda, which can disburse assistance quickly and effectively.
48. The increasing harassment of United Nations and international staff serving in Rwanda is another source of serious concern. UNAMIR remains an essential confidence-building mechanism and its presence adds an important dimension to the Government's efforts to promote a climate of stability, trust and security. UNAMIR's presence also helps to create conditions conducive to the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and to the provision of reconstruction assistance. I therefore urge the Government to extend to UNAMIR the necessary co-operation without which the Mission will not be able to carry out its mandate and the international community will find it more difficult to respond to Rwanda's rehabilitation needs. I should also like to remind the Government of its responsibility for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel, as well as for ensuring that their freedom of movement and access throughout the country is respected.
49. UNAMIR's present mandate, as defined under Security Council resolutions 918 (1994) and 965 (1994), will expire on 9 June. Senior Rwandese officials have pointed out that the situation in the country has changed since last July and that, at the appropriate time, the mandate and role of UNAMIR should be reviewed. I have, accordingly, requested my Special Representative to consider, in consultation with the Government, adjustments which could be made to the Mission's mandate. On the basis of his advice, I will, in my next report, submit to the Security Council recommendations on the role which UNAMIR could play in Rwanda after 9 June 1995.
50. The Council has emphasized the need for an international conference on security, stability and peace in the region. In accordance with the Council's most recent call for States of the region to organize such a conference, I intend to carry out necessary consultations with those States with a view to determining the type of assistance they may require in this regard.
51. In closing, I should like to thank my Special Representative, Mr. Shaharyar M. Khan, the Force Commander, Major-General Guy Tousignant, and all UNAMIR civilian, military and civilian police personnel, for their contribution to peace and stability in Rwanda under very trying circumstances.
Mario Bettati, nn 1937, est actuellement Professeur de Droit International 'Universite Paris 2 et Directeur du D.E.S.S. de Droits de l'homme et de Droit humanitaire; il est lement Doyen honoraire de la Faculte Droit de Paris-Sud. Il est diplome l'Acade de Droit International de la Haye et Prdent de ['Association Franse pour les Nations Unies. M. M. Bettati est Laur de l'Acade Diplomatique Internationale.
De juillet 1988 992, il fut successivement charge mission, puis Conseiller auprde M. B. Kouchner, Secrire d'Etat 'Action Humanitaire, puis de 1992 993 il fut Conseiller dans le Cabinet de M. G. Kiejman, Ministre dguuprdu Ministre des affaires angs et enfin Consultant au Cabinet de Mme L. Michaux-Chevry, Ministre dguux droits de l'homme et 'action humanitaire (1994- 1995). Depuis 1988 M. M. Bettati est quasi sans interruption membre de la dgation franse aux sessions de l'Assemblgrale des Nations Unies ew-York (43, 45-50). Depuis 1991, il est membre de la Commission de la Fonction Publique Internationale de l'ONU.
Publications principales: L'avenir des Organisations internationales, Economica Paris, 1984; L'Asile politique en question, P.U.F., Paris, 1985; Les ONG et le Droit International ( en collaboration), Economica, Paris, 1986; Le Droit des organisations internationales, P.U.F., Paris, 1987; Le devoir d'ingnce (en coll.), Deno Paris, 1987; L'ONU et la drogue, Ed. Pedone, Paris, 1995.
Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo
Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, nn 1934, est Professeur de Droit International Public 'Universite Slle. Ancien membre de la Commission Europne des Droits de l'Homme (1979- 1985). Ancien juge a Cour Europne des Droits de l'Homme (1986 - 1990). Diplcum laude de l'Acade de Droit International de La Haye (1959).
Directeur du Centre d'de et de recherche de droit international de l'Acade de Droit International de La Haye (1988). Membre de l'Instituto Hispano-Luso-Americano de Derecho Internacional. Membre de l'Institut de Droit International. Membre du groupe national espagnol de la Cour Permanente d'Arbitrage.
Publications principales: El Derecho Internacional en perspective hista, Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 1991; Le role du Conseil de sritans l'organisation et la rementation de droit d' assistance humanitaire, dans: Le dloppement du rdu Conseil de sritColloque de l'Acade de Droit International de La Haye, Nijhoff, 1993; The Place of the European Convention of Human Rights in International Law, dans: The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, Nijhoff, 1993; Algunas consideraciones sobre el valor jundico de la Declaraciniversal de Derechos Humanos, dans: Mnges Diez de Velasco, Madrid, 1993; Espana y la proteccie los derechos humanos, dans: Archiv des Vrrechts, vol. 32-2, 1994; Soberande los Estados y Derechos Humanos en Derecho internacional contemporo, Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 1995.
Marie-Josomestici-Met est actuellement Professeur agr de la Faculte Droit et de Science Politique de l'Universitix-Marseille III. Wile est Docteur en Droit, Dipl d' Etudes Supeures de Sciences Politiques, Licencilettres, Ancien auditeur de l'Acade de Droit International de La Haye. Depuis 1991, elle est Coordinatrice du Programme de Recherches sur [' Aide Humanitaire du Centre d' Etudes et de Recherches Internationales et Communautaires d'Aix en Provence; depuis 1994, Mme Domestici-Met est Directrice du D.E.S.S. d'Aide humanitaire "Aide humanitaire internationale. Urgence et rbilitation".
Publications principales: Recherches sur le Concept d'Ordre Public en Droit International Public (Th de Doctorat), 1979; Aspects juridiques rnts de ['aide humanitaire, dans: Annuaire Frans de Droit International, 1989; Golitique de ['Aide humanitaire, (rgn collaboration avec les professeurs Roosens et Frognier pour le rau NOAH), 1994; Typologie des formes de protection arm CERIM Montpellier, 1994; L'aide humanitaire dans le Droit international contemporain, Editions Economica, 1995: Direction de la publication et rction des contributions: Laide humanitaire, terrain de consensus et espace de controverses; L' affaire kurde, ou l'ingnce fugace; La Somalie, ou ['illusion d'un monde sur l'humanitaire; L'ex-Yougoslavie, ou l'humanitaire des paradoxes; La neutralitn vole d'extinction?; Au deles polques nominales, les vrais dts.
Gerard Jacob Tanja
Gerard Jacob Tanja, born 1956, General Director of the T.M.C. Asser Instituut (Institute for Private and Public International Law, International Commercial Arbitration and European Law) since 1994. Legal Advisor to the Netherlands Government - Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, duration 1990-1994. Between 1985- 1990 University Lecturer in Public International Law, University of Leiden. Researcher, Department of Legal History, University of Leiden (part-time) from 1982 to 1985.
His publications include: The Legal Determination of International Maritime Boundaries. A Study into the Progressive Development of Continental Shelf, EFZ and EEZ law, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer, Boston, 1990; Liber Amicorum Frits Kalshoven by A. J. M. Delissen, G. J Tanja (eds.), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Challenges Ahead, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991; West African States and the Legal Development of Maritime Delimitation Rule, Leiden Journal of International Law, Volume 4, no. 1, 1991; L. Lijnzaad & G. J. Tanja, Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict: The Iraq-Kuwait War, Netherlands International Law Review, Volume XL, Issue 1993; Recent Developments Concerning the Law for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Leiden Journal of International Law, Volume 7, no. 1, 1994; Peaceful Settlement of Disputes within the Framework of the CSCE: A Legal Novelty in a Political-Diplomatic Environment, Martinus Nijhoff, 1994; The War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: Commentary and Selected Documents, K.L.I. (1995) (forthcoming publication).
American Association for the Advancement of Science
Annuaire frans de droit international
Ai de Mcale Internationale
Airlift Operations Cell, Geneva
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
Autoritrovisoire des Nations Unies au Cambodge
Convention de Gen
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Cour internationale de Justice / Commission internationale de juristes
Comisinternacional de los Profesionales de la Salud
Commission Indndante sur les Questions Humanitaires
Centre des Nations Unies pour les blissements humains
Cour Permanente de Justice internationale
Conseil de srit/TD>
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Canadian Society for International Health
Economic Community of West African States
Elnt mcal militaire d'intervention rapide
Food and Agriculture Organization of the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Force Internationale Unifi
Force de protection des Nations Unies
Front Patriotique Rwandais
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General Assembly - Official Records
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Institut frans des relations internationales
International Commission of Health Professionals
International Court of Justice
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Legal Materials
Joint Airlift Operations Cell
Johannes Wier Foundation for Health and Human Rights
Mission des Nations Unies pour ['assistance au Rwanda
Memorandum of Understanding
Mcins Sans Frontis
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Organisation de ['aviation civile internationale
Organisation mondiale de la sant/TD>
Organisation(s) non gouvernementale(s)
Organisation des Nations Unies
Option des Nations Unies en Somalie
Organisation du traite l'Atlantique du Nord
Programme alimentaire mondial
Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement
Revue grale de droit international public
Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge
Special Operation for Former Yugoslavia
Union de l'Europe occidentale
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Children's Fund
Unified Task Force
United Nations Organization
United Nations Operation in Somalia
United Nations Protection Force
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
Western European Union
World Health Organization
Law in Humanitarian Crises
Volume ll: Access to victims: Right to intervene or right to receive humanitarian assistance'?
Le droit face aux crises humanitaires
Volume ll: L'accaux victimes: droit d'ingerence ou droit 'assistance humanitaire?
Luxemhourg: Office for Official Publications of' the European
Luxemhourg: Office des publications officielles des Communauteuropnes
1995 - 246 p.- 16.2 x 22.9 cm
Vol.II: ISBN 92-X27-5339-5
Vol. I to/I: 92-827-5337-9
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Vol. II: ECU 10
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