|Aid and Entrepreneurship in Tanzania (Dar Es Salaam University Press, 1993, 165 p.)|
1. This is also a central point in the Danida study of the international drug provision program, Munishi (1989).
2. The question of regional/ethnic autonomy and the possibility of a federal type of state in Tanzania is discussed in Gran (1988). The article compares processes of state formation in Norway and Tanzania.
3. See Indgjerd (1987) for a comparative study of private organizations' and state aid agencies' management of district development projects. Her thesis is that the private organization Save the Children (Redd Barna) has more leeway for efficient district development projects than the public aid agency NORAD.
4. The report on the community development project RUDEP in Rukwa, Tanzania (Manger 1990) describes a somewhat different picture of the management of NORAD aid to community development. There it is told that NORAD, instead of working through the existing regional administration, set up more or less autonomous organs within the administration to administer/ channel the NORAD inputs. RUDEP has its own hierarchical organization interspersed into the Regional Development Directors Office (planning officers, project officers and activity supervisors). The report states: "The RUDEP system is however emerging as a system in its own right. This is due to the fact that RUDEP has /its own/ financial resources,... manpower resources... and political opportunity to realize its aims..." (Manger 1990:7). The general conclusion is that "the results on the ground after five years seem meager." Government officers seem to be the prime and sole beneficiaries and "the time when Tanzanians can take over seem remote" (Manger 1990: vii).
5. Chama Cha Mapinduzi, CCM, created in 1977 through a merger of TANU, Tanganyika African National Union and the Afro Shirazi Party on Zanzibar, that party created in 1957.
6. Mwapachu (1983) says that the Tanzanian state constitutionally is subordinated to the party: "The Constitution of Tanzania provides for the supremacy of the Political Party over Government" (p. 18). He also points to how the Public Corporations Act of 1969 enhanced the power of the president by making it possible for him to establish public corporations "by a simple order published in the Government Gazette" (p. 15). Earlier such establishments were the prerogative of Parliament. Shivji (1988) points to the fact that the People's Militia was established by a Party directive that has not been enacted by Parliament as of that year (cited in Havnevik 1988:102).
7. Mwapachu (1983:15) says that by 1979 there were 380 parastatal organizations in Tanzania "covering agriculture, industry, mining, electricity, construction, trade, finance, transport, real estate, legal, auditing, research and other services."
8. This concept was introduced in a discussion of our findings with professor Munishi, University of Dar es Salaam.
9. Data from the 1970's. The advisor, in a comment, corrects the data: "In 1980 the timber output/sawn timber was 22897 m3., in 1990 27300 m3."
10. In a note dated 14.08.1991, the advisor comments: The training program was a NORAD approved policy from 1986. "Unfortunately... further implementation of the training program should cease according to NORAD's new strategy... the order to stop is most embarrassing (because several training arrangements will be aborted)".
11. It has been suggested to us that the incalcitrance of the Tanzanian government was motivated by a belief that by demanding low "social" fares NORAD would at last agree and cover the difference between the income of the fares and the actual costs of running the company with necessary investments and a profit. And that Tanzanian government was taken by surprise when NORAD stuck to its position - support to the NFDS line - and withdrew.
12. Checking for variations on this question between Norwegians and Tanzanians and between the three institutional arenas gave negative results with registered differences significant at the 38% level.
13. It would be interesting to investigate if Norwegians working long term for other public and private institutions in developing countries generate the same kind of negative reaction from their counterparts in the country, or if the reaction is specific for NORAD.
14. Note that research on administration in industrialized countries often demonstrates that the typical bureaucratic and professional role conceptions often cover over political and interest specific functions of most categories of administrators and professionals.
15. Called the ICA-T study, "Institutional Consequences of Aid - the case of Tanzania". After this hypothesis generating study it would be of interest: (a) to make comparative studies of NORAD's role in other aid receiving countries and (b) to compare NORAD's mobilization capacity with that of other donors both in Tanzania. (Kavura at IFM, Institute of Finance Management in Dar es Salaam is doing comparative studies of donor strategies).
16. Talcott Parsons (1947:62) describes Max Weber's distinction between patriarchal and patrimonial administration. Patriarchal administration is guided wholly by traditional rules and routines. Patrimonialism is a system with a larger room for leadership manoeuvre. "Where this [room for manoeuvre] is used to develop a complex administrative staff under the personal control of the chief, and not involved in a system of traditionally stereotyped statuses with which he cannot interfere, Weber speaks of 'patrimonialism' ('patrimony': property inherited from one's father or ancestors, heritage).
17. It was said that substantial allocations to trunk road maintenance decided on in Dar es Salaam, were completely consumed at decision levels above the operative maintenance level in Mbeya and Tanga. The district engineer in Mbeya could not pay his 25 workers with the total budget he had available.
18. See also Gran (1990) on the organizing of the Sao Hill Sawmill where the Tanzanians made the same point when interviewed in 1980. Mehlum (1990) has interviewed NORAD experts in Zambia and Tanzania, especially on their relation to local cultures. His conclusions are: (1) NORAD's competence in recruiting, training and integrating employees in their jobs and task environments is weak; (2) The experts job motivation is mainly of a private personal character; (3) The experts are mostly sceptical and critical to the development value of the projects they are on; (4) Integration into the local community is limited; (5) The language barrier is seen as the main barrier.
19. Endre Stiansen har trukket frem en rekke analyser som reiser spl til denne forutsetningen, analyser som viser at overskuddsproduksjon kan drives fram innenfor subsistensjordbruk, uten intervensjon fra eksterne moderniseringsagenter og uten at det etableres 'fremmede' moderne vekstsentra innenfor subsistensjordbruket. (Endre Stiansen i en privat kommentar. Han viser blant annet til Ali, "How to reach the small farmer? An Islamic formula", IFDA Dossier, January/April 1990.