Cover Image
close this bookAid and Entrepreneurship in Tanzania (Dar Es Salaam University Press, 1993, 165 p.)
close this folderIII NORAD'S ORGANIZATION IN TANZANIA AND ORGANIZATION STRUCTURES
View the documentNORAD's organization
View the documentThe NORAD organization in Tanzania
View the documentThe structure of the Tanzanian state

The NORAD organization in Tanzania

NORAD had 123 persons employed in Tanzania in 1990 (NORAD lists, June 1990). Of these 36 or 29% were classified as NORAD experts and 28 or 23% as volunteers - these two categories representing 49% of all. 15 persons had diplomatic status and 16 had Tanzanian citizenship. 20 were nationals of other countries than Norway and Tanzania. 6 were employed in the Embassy and 12 in technical services (clinic and airline). About 1/3 of the 123 persons were females. 60%, 72 persons lived and worked in Dar es Salaam. Otherwise the NORAD personnel were quite evenly distributed over 14 regions. The 123 were distributed on the following positions/professional activities:

Table 4. Main categories of NORAD personnel in Tanzania 1990

Nos.

%

Project leaders

5

4

Senior administrators

28

23

Administrators

22

18

Technicians

21

17

Teachers

14

11

Health workers

10

8

Secretaries and workers

23

19

Totals

123

100

The professional structure in the NORAD-D office was complex. Among the seven project officers we interviewed there were 2 economists, 1 political scientist, 1 psychologist, 2 trained in the liberal arts and 1 engineer. This complexity was different from the concentration of engineers in the parent government institutions (6 of 9 professionals) and the concentration around administratively trained personnel (9 of 29) and engineers (14 of 29) among project personnel.

Table 5. Professional variations between institutional arenas. Percentages.

Tanz. gov.

NORAD-D

Projects

Total


%

%

%

%

Engineers

67

14

48

47

Management

22

0

31

24

Others

11

86

21

29

Totals

100

100

100

100

N =

9

7

29

45

This complexity of professionals in NORAD-D caters to planning capabilities (variation in problem conceptions), but also to limited consistency in problem definitions and action strategies. The professionals may see the organization's relations to the environment differently. Such a lack of consistency may make the organization insecure and force it into a closed and defensive strategy relative to strong actors in the environment.

The NORAD-D organization was structured on the projects and programmes it was responsible for. There are 9 offices with one project/programme officer in each (See Appendix (1). The mixture of projects and programmes makes it difficult to discern an organizing principle behind the formal structure. There are offices named according to economic sectors: Agriculture, Hydropower and shipping, Infrastructure (roads, oil, construction, water supply) and Fisheries. There is a separate office for Education, research and culture. There are offices catering for more general aspects of Tanzanian society: Women and Rural development. There are two functional offices: Fellowships and Personnel administration. There is a separate administration department and an economist in a staff position under the resident representative (RR), the head of NORAD in Dar es Salaam. The Peace Corps is organized in a separate section with four people employed.

The activities in the organization, within and between the offices in NORAD-D have not been part of the present investigation, except for the role of NORAD-D relative to the selected projects. From the project-related interviews in NORAD-D, from the descriptions of NORAD-D given by the project personnel and the government personnel in the parent institutions, we might formulate the following three hypotheses on how the NORAD-D organization works:

(1) The structure resembles a classic sector-oriented public administration. It invites cooperation between sector responsible officers and the RR, and discourages cooperation between offices. It is a structure that invites efficiency in the sector activities, where firms and organizations cater directly to the defined sector (agriculture, hydroelectric power, shipping etc.). It is a structure where offices catering to more general goals easily lose out (women, rural development, environment) because their task-environments are more complex and require more complex operations in defining and implementing tasks.

(2) The broad and shallow pyramidal structure enhances the power of the top leadership. We would therefore expect a high degree of homogeneity in the external policy of the organization, all officers strongly guided by the policy preferences of the RR. The formal organization structure does not identify regions or districts of Tanzania, thus discouraging region-specific knowledge in the organization. There might well be such knowledge within each office, but the organization does not have a formal structure that invites pooling of that knowledge, except in meetings with the RR with all or most programme officers present.

(3) The organization does not have a formal unit specifically focussed on -policy analysis and policy development (e.g. a board). In the existing organization we would expect the RR and Deputy RR taking care of most of the strategic contacts with ministries and government institutions. We would also expect relatively little cooperation between project personnel located at project site and project officers in NORAD-D, since each office has only one incumbent with scant possibilities of support from other persons/units in the organization.

The NORAD representation in Dar es Salaam has a wide set of responsibilities, towards the projects, towards the Tanzanian government and towards the Norwegian government, parliament (Storting) and interested public. NORAD is thus subject to cross pressures and has to defend itself against different kinds of criticism from different sources. One question is how it balances these different responsibilities, what priority it gives to dealing with conflicting demands from different interested parties in its environment. NORAD-D probably experiences a dilemma between control and mobilization: to what degree should the organization implement projects efficiently, using Norwegian resources and professional competence and accepting established, often not popular values among project responsible authorities in Tanzania? To what degree should it focus on mobilizing Tanzanian initiative, training and participation, taking the time and frustrations and lack of "efficient" implementation implied in such a strategy?

NORAD-D has a strong project focus. The organization's apparatus for scanning the environment for new project initiatives and for monitoring how projects function in their environment and for policy analysis (Tanzanian government policies, policies of other aid agencies etc.) is not focussed in the formal structure.

The new strategy that NORAD made public in 1990, after Per Grimstad took over as General Manager of NORAD-Oslo, may indicate that NORAD will be integrated more closely into the World Bank/IMF strategy (programme aid through governments that give priority to traditional capitalist market economies). The NORAD strategy (NORAD 1990) argues two principles (that also could be discerned in the Tanzania Country Study, Havnevik 1988): (1) more rationality and efficiency into the Norwegian aid exercise, more goal-and result-oriented decision-making in the organization; and (2) more programme type aid through the existing government institutions in the recipient countries.

The head of NORAD-D said (in interview) that the power of NORAD and donors relative to the Tanzanian government had increased over the last five years (1985-90), notwithstanding that official donor policy was the opposite, that more control should be allotted to the Tanzanian government. The reason: a continuous weakening of Tanzanian administrative capacity, economic crisis, wages with continuously reduced value, corruption and low output of Tanzanian professionals. He described a deteriorating public administration in Tanzania: More dependency on aid, poor quality of planning and policy-making, "the administration better at begging from donors than managing them", and less, if any, coordination between ministries. He gave the example of the trawler at the Mbegani Fisheries Centre. It was to be redefined from a fishing to a training vessel. It just did not happen because the required ministerial organs could not get in touch. Tanzanian authorities invited and applauded the increased power and intervention of NORAD and NORAD personnel, even if they also officially adhere to the principle, that aid should be managed by Tanzanians. The NORAD-Oslo decentralization policy, giving NORAD-D more power and autonomy, affected Tanzanian government adversely. "It increases our economic- and policy-making power and makes it more difficult for Tanzanian authorities to control and manage our aid". His experience was that the Tanzanian government's attempts at planning and coordinating donors was a pure formality. The government's power started and ended with the formal agreement on assistance. NORAD is in practice alone as implementor. He cited an example of a community development project in Rukwa where there were no proposals from the Tanzanian side. NORAD becomes local government, taking over all aspects of public engagement in community development.4