|Aid and Entrepreneurship in Tanzania (Dar Es Salaam University Press, 1993, 165 p.)|
|V THE DIFFICULT TASK OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT|
IDM is a parastatal organization not under the Ministry of Education but under the President's Office (PO), the Civil Service Department. Earlier IDM was under the Ministry of Labour and Manpower Development (MLMD). The reason for both arrangements is that IDM is seen in terms of manpower production, as a supplier of personnel to the Tanzanian public administration. The philosophy has been that IDM should be kept separate from academia so that candidates from IDM are "practical people". Dalin, in an IDM evaluation (Dalin 1989) cites a MLMD statement from 1981 about the role of IDM):
Government intention has always been that the IDM should be an essentially practical, down to earth, work-related, training institution dedicated to training course participants to perform specific jobs efficiently (Dalin 1989:14).
The problem is how do you realize that intention? How do you organize teaching and training of students to serve that laudable intention? How do you recruit and inspire teachers? What kind of training do the teachers need to be able to contribute to that goal? And how do you organize the school administratively? Is a subordination under the government's personnel department necessarily the best line of command and control? Is keeping IDM isolated from academia in Tanzania and abroad necessarily an advantage etc.?
In 1989 the government of Tanzania approved adding a masters programme to IDM. The first group of masters candidates (18) graduated in 1990. NORAD and some Norwegian teachers were against the idea. They argued that the masters programme threatened the goal of "down-to earth" candidates from IDM.
IDM had in 1990 the capacity for upkeep and teaching of 1100 students. It had about 100 teachers and 610 workers. 990 hostel beds were available, 159 staff houses and 72 offices. Up to 1984 NORAD had contributed about 60 million NOK to IDM, covering somewhere around 60% of the total and yearly budget. Between 1984 and 1989 NORAD contributed 48 million NOK, of which 13 million NOK were for physical rehabilitation of the campus. Wages and allowances are set by SCOPO (Government Standing Committee on Parastatal Organizations).
Students are largely recruited from public institutions in Tanzania. Employees request IDM training and are chosen and forwarded by their institution, which also pays tuition fees to IDM. IDM then delivers all the services students need at the school including housing, food, books etc. From the data on IDM expenditures we can see that salaries have continuously become a smaller part of the total budget and that maintenance has taken a varying proportion of the budget over time (See appendix 6).
The Principal of IDM is appointed by the President of Tanzania. IDM has a board appointed by the President. In 1989 it had representatives from the National Bank of Commerce, Ministry of Finance, MLMD, the Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of Education, Juwata (the National Workers Union), the Cooperative Union and the University of Dar es Salaam. The teachers and the students appoint 2 representatives each. The workers at IDM have one representative. The principal can appoint other members of the IDM management to attend Board meetings.
IDM has a complex administrative structure. It is divided into four departments: Business studies, Administrative studies, Graduate studies and the Department for Short Courses and Consultancy. The departmental heads are answerable to the Principal and the Director of studies. Under the Principal are heads of buildings, of personnel, accounting etc. Then there are units responsible for the subjects taught at IDM, called subject panels. All teachers within a subject are members. There are seven subject panels: (1) quantitative methods and systems; (2) management; (3) law; (4) economics; (5) development studies; (6) business management and (7) accounting and finance. In addition, in 1990 there were two NORAD supported project groups under the Principal: (1) the Academic Improvement Project and (2) the Rehabilitation Project. Both projects had one Norwegian advisor recruited and financed by NORAD, but employed formally by IDM. Each project was headed by Tanzanian members of the IDM staff.
There are several committees, one of which is the Committee for Research and Publications (RAP). It is composed of one representative from each subject panel and two from the academic departments, business and administrative studies.
We see the following traits: (1) that the top leader of the institution is appointed, not elected. The Board is heavily manned by people appointed by government. (2) A division between the material and the academic administration of IDM. The Principal controls the central administration of both. Academic matters are taken care of in subject panels, but even decisions in the subject panels are channeled upwards through the departmental system. (3) Students are weakly represented and are not represented in the subject panels.
IDM was evaluated in 1989 by a team under the leadership of a Norwegian, Per Dalin. Recommendations were made to create a more open organization with ability to learn and discuss/plan its activities. It recommended an open competition for the position of Principal and a more competitive incentive structure. It recommended a stable financial aid to IDM. The study applied a modern, rational and open-organization concept. It did not raise the question of how that model is related to the management cultures embedded in Tanzanian institutions. What types of knowledge and management training do central administrative and productive Tanzanian organizations need to progress in realizing their legitimate goals? How and to what degree does the IDM organization have the ability to understand and meet those demands? How does the aid/expatriate element at IDM affect that ability?
IDM was originally created as a transfer of an institute of management science at the University of Dar es Salaam to a college for local government at Mzumbe. The Nordic countries and Canada entered in the early seventies into an agreement to support the expansion of IDM at Mzumbe. Investments in buildings and equipment were given and some 20 teachers from western countries were paid for by the donors. In the 1980's the contingent of foreign teachers was phased out. By 1990 there were only one or two foreign teachers on the staff, none of them financed by regular donor contributions.
During the same time however, NORAD engaged in a new form of support to IDM, called academic improvement. NORAD engaged a Norwegian business school as an assistant to academic and other improvements at IDM. The Norwegian Business School (Bedriftsmisk Institutt) was engaged. In 1989 The Agder College in Kristiansand was engaged. The idea was that teachers and administrators from the Norwegian school could assist in improving the curriculum and the organization of IDM, as consultants or advisors to IDM management. In 1989 NORAD also approved assistance to a physical rehabilitation programme for IDM. The buildings and school materials had in the 1980's deteriorated and the IDM management did not seem to manage maintenance.
IDM is at present putting out some 200 candidates each year. The demand from public institutions in Tanzania for IDM graduates is high. IDM has gained some consultancy contracts through its Department for Short Courses and Consultancies, but there are indications (given in interviews at other selected NORAD supported projects) that IDM is rated below other management institutes in Tanzania and Eastern Africa. There was in 1990 hardly any research being done at IDM.
NORAD's assistance to IDM at present is organized along two principles. (1) That the Norwegian personnel should be formally employed in the IDM organization and management system, and get paid by NORAD and (2) that both the academic improvement and the rehabilitation assistance should be managed by management teams separate from the regular IDM administration, headed by Tanzanians with the Norwegian personnel as advisors. As far as we can see, this arrangement, combined with the massive NORAD controlled economic contribution, gives NORAD large power over the IDM organization. The arrangement allows control of the use of NORAD monies. It puts the regular IDM administration and decision-making organs in a passive, subordinate, client relation to NORAD. The academic improvers have rearranged curriculum and study periods. The rehabilitation team has intervened into maintenance at IDM in a way that threatens to pacify and alienate the regular maintenance department. The rehabilitation team has used a Norwegian contractor to repair most of the roofs, bypassing Tanzanian contractors that could have done the job, if not as good and with shorter guarantees.
The head of the Research and Publications Committee (RAP) gave a picture of a college without research activities. The main problem seemed to be the lack of incentives in the form of basic pay for teachers and in the form of research funds. The head of RAP reported that research, mostly financed internationally directly to researchers at IDM, seldom meets international or even national standards. The basic problem, according to our interviewee, was the organization of IDM, with a deep structural cleavage between the administrative and the academic organization of the college.
The organizational aspects that thwarted academic advancements and research seemed to be:
- Dominant power to the college administration, with the politically appointed board on top. Within the administration there was a high degree of centralization with close to dictatorial powers in the hands of the Principal and his team.
- All communication with the outside world was channeled through the administration and the Principal. That channel distorts contacts and funds away from academic activities in the direction of material improvements of the school.
- The administrative leadership is a closed coalition, dominated by the Principal. That coalition was in practice in control of board decision-making. Teaching and research is not understood, not conceptualized.
- Money to IDM is fully controlled by the administration and is distributed according to the interests and priorities of the management. Research monies seldom reach the research level. Donors who channel research monies through the college administration lose their established contacts often to find other researchers selected by the administration to do the work.
The chairman of the Business Administration Panel described the functions of the panels as follows: to develop staff, to distribute the teaching workload and to link with other panels on subject/teaching coordination. The panel was especially engaged in the subjects of marketing and materials management. The panel cooperated with the Consultancy Department in structuring courses offered to paying clients. NORAD resources has made external masters degrees possible for three panel members. According to the chairman, the need for training and further education of IDM staff is "enormous". The IDM management has not been favourable to teacher training. PhD grants from NORAD have been misused. Engaging parent colleges in Norway into the IDM project has partly been a response to these academic deficiencies at IDM.
As to the creation of the Graduate School at IDM, the chairman felt that NORAD's opposition was ill-founded, mainly because the Graduate School would be important for creating incentives for academic renewal and improvement in the existing undergraduate courses at IDM, stimulating research work and research organization among the graduates and teachers at IDM and for stimulating teachers' post graduate training. The advisors from Agder College had also been negative to the Graduate School, creating a rather massive NORAD opposition against a government- and board approved expansion of IDM's educational programme. This opposition, combined with the economic power of NORAD, has been a major obstacle to the strengthening of IDM at all levels for the last few years.
The teachers at IDM have their own organization (IDMASA). It is an official part of IDM, but has no decision-making power. It is an officially approved trade/professional organization for the teachers. It was created in 1976 as a response to a bureaucratic, basically non-academic power structure at IDM. IDMASA is on the defensive relative to management. IDMASA has not struggled against bureaucratic dominance at IDM. It has not been an advocate for increased academic pluralism within the school, for a model of school management giving the academics some power, and for a reduction of NORAD power.
A member of the Board gave his description of the top management system at IDM. The Board is appointed by government, the Principal appointed by the President. It had in 1990 21 members working as a collective, but also dividing into three different committees: the Academic Planning Committee, the Finance and Development Planning Committee, and the Appointments and Staff Development Committee. One characteristic of this system is the presence of the Principal and his team in all the organs.
Sitting on the Board is lucrative. The total cost of the Board meetings in 1989 was approximately 4.4 million shillings (NOK. 150000). The problem according to our source was basically that the Board had no policy, leaving the direction and character of developments at IDM to the top administrative elite. The problems of the manual workers at IDM (650 persons) are of little concern to the Board. The decision-making in the Board is usually consensus-oriented, seldom voting. But the Board is often "stacked" by the central management. The elite invites its allies to the meetings, so that management nearly always has the upper hand, the majority. Earlier mismanagement of funds was rampant (pre-payments of goods). In 1990 economic management improved. But the management system is also open for ethnic alliances. At present (October 1990) the Principal and the Chairman of the board are from the same family. The Chairman was also head of the recruitment committee appointed by government to find candidates to the board.
There is a Workers Council at IDM supposed to meet four times a year. The Principal is the chairman of the Workers Council. It should discuss and vote on the IDM budget, but the Council very seldom does. Workers are afraid of speaking up in the Council, well knowing that the Principal, the CCM- and Juwata leaders are present. One consequence is that the IDM management has little and skewed information about workers' conditions. Another consequence is over-employment. There are too many employees compared to tasks and compared to available work equipment - for example many more typists than typewriters.
This system of IDM management seems to make the elite control all organs of importance and all communications internally and externally. It makes for a system with little open communication and discussion. Many individuals and groups at IDM suppress their voice and try to find other channels for defending their interests (monopolizing positions, functions and recruitment processes, sending skewed information etc.) The academic and physical improvements of IDM is under the present system subordinated to the power and material interests of the management elite.
The personnel manager gave some insights into IDM management strategy. He told of an understaffed IDM relative to the approved size of the college: Administrative staff and workers approved: 610, actually employed 550. Teachers approved 140, actually employed 100. There is high turnover at IDM. There are many applicants for administrative positions, but when good teachers leave "we are always in trouble".
The turnover among administrative staff is partly because the old age benefits we can offer are very scant. IDM needs new and better trained staff. We have established a printing press. We have started the Graduate School and approved the creation of a Research Council (to initiate, monitor and fund research at IDM). Good teachers leave for more lucrative jobs in the state bureaucracy.
Research was not forthcoming from IDM because of lack of resources. IDM hopes that the creation of a Research Council within the central administration of IDM will improve the situation.
NORAD at IDM
NORAD's help to IDM up to 1988 has weakened IDM's autonomy, said the personnel manager. The assistance was focussed on material aid and the NORAD money was kept out of IDM control. IDM management did not have a voice in the use of the money. The problems were aggravated by a NORAD mediator at IDM who did not function. After 1988 NORAD has demanded project groups at IDM to plan and monitor NORAD inputs. The two current projects, Academic Improvement and Buildings Maintenance, are organized under such project groups. The Academic Improvement Programme has implemented large changes in the curriculum and organization of teaching at IDM. The Building Maintenance work was first channeled through IDM's own maintenance organization, but NORAD was not satisfied with efficiency and accountability. Then a separate NORAD/IDM maintenance organization was set up. All these decisions have been joint IDM/NORAD decisions, according to the personnel manager.
The Norwegian, NORAD-paid member of the Academic Improvement Project (AIP), the academic advisor, described the agreement between IDM, NORAD and BI in Norway as the beginning of the AIP. In the 1980's NORAD wanted to transfer project responsibility to Norwegian institutions. AIP is administered by a separate group under the Principal and the Director of Studies. The role of the group was described as "planning the NORAD aid to academic activities at IDM". The AIP has been engaged in a wide span of activities at IDM: - supporting IDM teachers for masters courses abroad (6 month programmes), - scholarship programme for all categories of academics, - book and stationery support, - workshops on specific themes, especially workshops on methodology, - institutional cooperation with Agder College.
The NORAD support for 1991-95 is about 48 million NOK., divided 50-50 for rehabilitation and AIP (later in the summer of 1990, NORAD-D decided to increase the rehabilitation input, so that 2/3 goes to rehabilitation and 1/3 to AIP). The NORAD support represents about 60% of the total IDM budget. Accounting is fully implemented and controlled by NORAD-D. There is no separate AIP account at IDM.
The advisor interpreted his role as one of intervention into all and any aspects of the academic activities of IDM. He said that the Principal had defined his task in such broad, all inclusive terms, but that a more specified task would have increased his efficiency. He had engaged in curriculum planning, publications, consultancies, research planning and institutional cooperation (teacher and student exchanges). He was actually an advisor to the Principal, but in practice he had to engage in implementation of agreed upon activities. Formally he was placed under the Department of Administrative Studies. That had historical reasons. Earlier there were several advisors, with one also under the Department of Business Studies. He saw his loyalty primarily to IDM. He was an IDM employee. But in practice he was a mediator between NORAD and IDM. The advisor confirmed that NORAD and NORAD advisors had been negative to the creation of the Graduate School, and even after its creation, NORAD had not given it support. Reason: NORAD is afraid of a "theoretical" IDM. However, NORAD at the same time supports teachers getting masters education in other countries. NORAD was also negative to the introduction of computers at IDM.
Generally the advisor was of the opinion that NORAD lacked a consistent policy relative to the IDM support. A major task for the future was to increase research activities at IDM. The new Research Council could be of value. The incentives for research were too weak. There was inadequate research training of teachers. The short courses were much more lucrative.
The Rehabilitation Project (RP)
The RP was organized as the AIP, in a separate project with a steering committee of nine members. The NORAD paid Norwegian advisor on the RP, underscored that he was an IDM employee and that his advisory position implied no executive authority. His formal role was to advise the Principal. In practice he worked closely with the RP manager. His role was primarily one of initiating activity, of mobilizing people to engage in institutional (instead of personal) activities. His impression was that the Principal was in command - alone - in most questions at IDM. ("There is only one person in command at IDM. He says I when he means IDM."). IDM had, according to the RP advisor good competence at the general administrative level. "However, little is done because the system from the foreman down does not work."
When the advisor came to IDM no maintenance was being done. The NORAD financed materials rotted in containers. The BEM department (maintenance) was hardly functioning and money was being siphoned away from official tasks. The NORAD aid was in shambles. Thus the advisor "had to make an impact". A new maintenance organization beside BEM was created. Specific maintenance tasks were initiated. "NORAD money was channeled to a separate account in Morogoro, controlled by the Principal, the head of RP and myself." The RP recruited some workers from BEM. The RP initiated a separate repair yard. The RP administered building repair work through a Norwegian contractor, NOREMCO. The RP thus became a separate organization within IDM, with much autonomy and power, through the NORAD funds. The idea was that the RP gradually should be phased out and taken over by the BEM. The NOREMCO maintenance work was obviously efficient, building new roofs on several buildings and repairing old ones with specially produced Norwegian ISOLA roof tiles (The NOREMCO team included a consultant from ISOLA).
The Tanzanian RP manager took over maintenance management in 1988. Between 1985 and 1988 the NORAD support to maintenance at IDM had collapsed. According to the manager the reason was the NORAD employed advisor at the time. Useless materials were bought and stocked. Equipment that BEM could not make use of, for lack of familiarity, was brought in. In 1988 NORAD was at the verge of withdrawing its support to IDM, but discussions led to a new initiative focussed on organizing the NORAD aid efficiently into IDM. Then the RP concept was created: a project group independent of BEM and a contractor to do the work and the creation of a separate RP repair yard.
One of the tasks of the manager in 1990 was to build a production yard, for building, electrical and plumbing maintenance. The idea was that after some time the yard was to be transferred to BEM. That idea was supported by NORAD (in November 1990). The RP paid efficient workers a bonus in addition to regular pay. The RP paid somewhat higher wages to workers than BEM. The Tanzanian RP manager was busy constructing a new maintenance administration, with a manager at the head of work groups, functionally defined: carpenters, masons, electricians and painters. The manager had only recently engaged himself in the administrative question, and alternative maintenance administration models had not been discussed.
British aid to IDM
The subject panel on economics at IDM is supported by British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) through Bradford University. This support has given the subject panel autonomy, making separate short courses and consultancies possible for members of the panel without having to request support from higher organs at IDM. Research has been difficult because of lack of client interest in funding it. Bradford has become a central training institution for academics within the economics subject panel. The panel has its main clients in the Ministry of Agriculture, in the central Planning Commission and in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO).
The initiative for the cooperation between IDM and Bradford came from the work of development economists in Tanzania like Andrew Coulson and Steven Curring. There was a working relation between IDM teachers and teachers at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM). This tripartite alliance pushed for ODA support through the British Council, and succeeded. Then between 1982 and 1988 the subject panel at IDM was without ODA aid. A review team concluded in 1988 that the project from the early 1980's had been sustainable at IDM. It did not collapse when support was phased out.
In 1989 a new ODA support was given, this time for training at Bradford. Eight teachers have participated in the training and one major consultancy has been done with ODA support (a study of the Korogwe Tea Project by Dr. Nagu - at the time of writing this book he was head of the Graduate School at IDM). A number of workshops on project planning have been held at IDM. A major problem with the workshops is participation. The incentives needed to spur participation have been lacking.
According to the head of the economics subject panel, British aid to IDM is selective, directed at equipment and specific meetings and workshops, requiring IDM to finance all local personnel costs. NORAD in contrast, seems to follow a different model, financing everything within a defined project, including infrastructure, wages, allowances etc. to locals. NORAD has not entered IDM selectively, supporting specific activities, but developed the idea of supporting and managing IDM as a whole, affecting the whole structure of IDM, from top management down to the specific courses given at the school. The head of the economics panel doubted the sustainability of that approach, making the IDM management and teachers too dependent on NORAD support. Due to that, the head of the panel said the IDM management had lost nearly all its autonomy to NORAD.
NORAD's role at IDM
Our investigation discloses two dual structures at IDM: (1) A duality of decision-making systems, one formal system based in the bureaucratic organization structure (from Board to Principal, to Department and Subject Panel heads, to teachers, students, workers etc., with Juwata, IDMASA and CCM as participating organizations). The other structure is based in informal power groups within the school, without formal representation or existence, but with some control of recruitment and decision-making. (2) A duality of management systems between the regular IDM management (administrative and academic management, with the Principal on the top) and the NORAD project managements (Academic Improvement and Rehabilitation Projects), the latter system having much power through control of massive and independent resources. The effect of the separate NORAD controlled administration, we suggest, weakens the routine IDM administration, even demobilized and left it to deteriorate substantially for lack of resources and decision-making authority. In this sense NORAD, through its management model, drains the IDM institution for competence and demobilizes local entrepreneurial capacity.
IDM is a public institution, a parastatal. Its management appears heavily centralized, focussed on the material rather than the academic problems and dominated by a closed elite, with strong allies in other government institutions. NORAD assistance, money and personnel, strengthens the position of the commanding bureaucratic elite relative to workers, students and teachers. NORAD's management model makes IDM management heavily dependent, even subservient to NORAD. Here is a vicious circle. NORAD controls massive resources and demands separate project teams, draining competence from the regular IDM administration, making the IDM management heavily dependent on the NORAD system. NORAD on its side puts in advisors without formal decision-making power, and therefore persons quite out of control of management organs at IDM.
Again NORAD seems to lack a policy of the middle range, that is a policy of how Norwegian money, materials and personnel can assist in mobilizing entrepreneurial capacity within the existing school/college administration. NORAD has abstract aid principles on the one hand and puts resources into IDM through Norwegian personnel/project groups on the other. The crucial question that NORAD offers little attention is how to assist IDM in strengthening its own administration and organization so that Norwegian (and other donor's) resources serve accepted IDM goals and activities. Because of this void in the middle range, NORAD becomes a powerful supporter of bureaucratic elitist power at the school.
NORAD becomes defensively control-oriented. In this way main aspects of IDM's organization and NORAD aid become understandable: lack of support to the Graduate School and to research work (difficult to control); demands for separate project teams to control NORAD money; heavy powers to BI and Agder Colleges in Norway to implement "efficient practical improvements"; and a massive exit of good teachers from the school.
The NORAD management strategy
From the five projects we can discern a common pattern, a management strategy, and we can reflect on its effects on entrepreneurial mobilization within the Tanzanian organizations and public administrations. Both NORAD-D and the Tanzanian government allot considerable autonomy to the projects. After agreements have been signed the projects receive little or no policy guidance from the government authorities. The project managers on their part lament for this lack of guidance, not because they feel pressure from external project evaluations demanding that the projects should serve radically different development goals. NORAD has increasingly mobilized Norwegian consultants, firms and colleges/universities in Norway to participate in the implementation of projects. Only to a very limited degree has NORAD managed to mobilize Tanzanian organizations and entrepreneurs. Despite the aid character of the projects, the Norwegian consultants etc. had a large degree of autonomy in their activities within the projects. Generally the Norwegian personnel recruited to the projects were formally employed within the Tanzanian institutions, but in practice they often functioned as a group controlled by NORAD (FORINDECO recruited Norwegians at Sao Hill, project groups at IDM, personnel from a Norwegian shipping company at Tacoshili and strong management teams at RRM Tanga and Mbeya, even with one Norwegian administrator travelling between the two projects, standardizing administrative arrangements). We might call this a Chinese box strategy, with NORAD control of a NORAD recruited team within the project administrations.
Our finding is that NORAD has controlled the recruitment of the Norwegian group and the Norwegian money flowing to the projects, but that NORAD lacked a project specific strategy or long term plan. NORAD did not have a clear definition of state organized aid to Tanzania, that is a definition of NORAD's role as an agent of development aid in Tanzania and a definition of the aid component in the projects, that is how the sawmill, the road maintenance projects, the college and the coastal transport company should function as assistance to mobilizing Tanzanian entrepreneurial and administrative capacity within the projects. NORAD lacked an identity or a strategy of the middle range. Our materials demonstrate that the project managers, both Norwegian and Tanzanian, felt a need for such a definition and that managements within the parent institutions would have appreciated closer relations to NORAD, with more assistance from NORAD in organizing efficient relations to the selected projects. In this sense NORAD-D was a withdrawn, somewhat haughty organization, active in making agreements on projects and programmes, and in recruiting Norwegian management groups (and evaluation teams), but without capacity to help define how the Norwegian component in the projects should serve Tanzanianization. This lack of a strategy of the middle range can be part of the explanation why NORAD pushed for rapid results and local rationality, that is isolating the projects from 'disturbing' participation of Tanzanian entrepreneurs.
Our finding is that NORAD was pressed to define the projects in consistent with Norwegian aid principles, a task that was difficult, hence creating a vicious circle. Sao Hill should engage more women. RRM should use labour intensive technology and mobilize support for its activities in the villages. Tacoshili should relate more symbiotically to the local dhow transports and IDM should educate bureaucrats that were professionals rather than servants for non-official power groups in the Tanzanian state, etc. Our interpretation is that this pressure meant an overload of goals within the projects, creating frustrations among project managers often recruited on their specific technical competencies. This goal-overload generated problems of identity in the project managements and made for ambiguous organizing and unclear authority structures. At IDM and at Sao Hill Norwegians were defined as advisors. Within RRM and Tacoshili the counterparts should have decision-making authority. In all the projects NORAD grants made rational budgeting and accounting difficult. An alternative strategy could have been to let the projects concentrate on their core technology, employ Norwegians and Tanzanians on their competencies within projects and assist the parent institutions develop capacity to manage the projects and integrate them (gradually) into Tanzanian productive, educational and administrative routines. That could mean assisting parent institutions in recruitment of personnel, in supplying infrastructure to the project and project environments, develop educational programmes for project personnel, secure reasonable taxation of the economically productive projects, develop investments plans for them etc. Instead it seemed that NORAD concentrated strictly on organizing the projects and loading all the different aid goals into them, a strategy inviting failure.