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close this bookHydropolitics along the Jordan River. Scarce Water and Its Impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (UNU, 1995, 272 pages)
close this folderAppendices
View the documentAppendix I: Maps
View the documentAppendix II: Zionist boundaries, 1919
View the documentAppendix III: Hydronationalism
View the documentAppendix IV: PRINCE political accounting system
View the documentAppendix V: JRDNRVR. BAS projection model
View the documentAppendix VI: Med-Dead/Red-Dead desalination project

Appendix IV: PRINCE political accounting system

The views of each political entity regarding a possible interbasin water transfer are likely to be dependent on the individual relationships among the entities as well as on attitudes toward "target entities."

To summarize the political positions of each of the players, I use a Political Accounting System (PAS) as described by Coplin and O'Leary (1974; 1976) and incorporating modifications for hydropolitics by Frey and Naff (1985). Each player's political attitude (Issue, Power, and Salience) is ranked for each of the feasible coalitions. Issue Position is scored from -3 to +3, reflecting, respectively, strongly negative and strongly positive attitudes towards each coalition.

In the case of hydrologic disputes, power can include riparian position and legal strength as reflected in a water-sharing treaty, as well as the more traditional military and political aspects, and is ranked from 0 to 3 to reflect increasing levels of power. Issue Salience is, simply, how important a proposal is to a political entity, and is also rated from 0 to 3 to show increasing salience. This measure includes also a summation of internal forces, many of which are described by Endtner (1987).

While I recognize both the general lack of enthusiasm for quantitative political analysis, and the elementary and subjective nature of the PAS (see, for example, Ascher [1989] for a thorough critique of the PRINCE method), I feel that its inclusion in the model is a useful first step in an attempt to incorporate political considerations in an interdisciplinary model.

Once each component is evaluated for each player for participating in each coalition, multiplication across will give a measure of a player's overall level of support or opposition to a proposed coalition. Adding these values for each actor involved will provide a ranking value for the proposal as a whole, which can be compared with the values for other coalitions, a higher number reflecting greater likelihood of support.

Coplin and O'Leary (1983) suggest a Modified PAS that provides an absolute measure to estimate the likelihood of a coalition being established. This is achieved by calculating A/(A + B + C), where A is the total scores of all the players in support, B is the absolute value of the total scores of those in opposition, and C is one-half the value of those with a neutral position.

Results of the PRINCE Political Accounting System, as applied to a series of possible coalitions for interbasin water transfers to the Jordan River watershed, are shown in table AIV.1 (from Dinar and Wolf 1992). The results are reported in chapter 4.

Table AIV.1 Results of the PRINCE Political Accounting System applied to possible coalitions for interbasin wafer transfers to the Jordan River watershed: Modified political accounting systems for the regional game

Riparian and target entities Issue position Power Salience Total Probability
Coalitions (EG), (IL), (GS), (WB)a 1.00
Coalition (KG; IL) 0.23
Nile Basin
Egypt -2 3 3 -18  
Sudan -3 2 2 -12  
Ethiopia -2 2 2 - 8  
Targets
Israel + 2 2 3 +12  
Gaza -1 1 1 -1  
West Bank -1 1 1 -1  
  Total -28  
Coalition (KG; GS) 0.89
Nile Basin
Egypt + 2 2 3 +12  
Sudan + 2 1 2 +4  
Ethiopia -1 2 2 - 4  
Targets
Israel + 1 2 3 +6  
Gaza + 3 1 3 +9  
West Bank + 2 1 1 +2  
  Total +29  
Coalition (KG; IL; GS) 0.64
Nile Basin
Egypt + 1 2 3 +6  
Sudan - 2 2 2 -8  
Ethiopia - 2 2 2 -8  
Targets
Israel + 2 2 3 +12  
Gaza +3 1 3 +9  
West Bank + 2 1 1 +13  
  Total    
Coalition (KG; IL; WB) 0.64
Nile Basin
Egypt + 1 2 3 +6  
Sudan - 2 2 2 - 8  
Ethiopia - 2 2 2 - 8  
Targets
Israel + 2 2 3 +12  
Gaza + 2 1 1 +2  
West Bank + 3 1 3 +9  
  Total +13  
Coalition (KG; IL; WB; GS) 0.73
Nile Basin
Egypt + 1 2 3 +6  
Sudan - 2 1 2 -4  
Ethiopia - 2 2 2 -8  
Targets
Israel + 2 2 3 +6  
Gaza + 1 1 2 +2  
West Bank + 1 1 2 +2  
  Total +14  
Coalition (IL; GS) 0.0
Coalition (IL; WB) 0.0
Coalition (IL; WB; GS) 0.0

Source: Dinar and Wolf (1992) a. (EG), Egypt; (IL), Israel; (GS), Gaza; (WB), West Bank.