|Hydropolitics along the Jordan River. Scarce Water and Its Impact on the Arab-Israeli Conflict (UNU, 1995, 272 pages)|
|3. Towards an interdisciplinary approach to water basin analysis and the resolution of international water disputes|
3.2. The nature of water conflicts
3.3. Paradigms for analysis of international water conflicts
3.4. An interdisciplinary approach to water basin analysis and conflict resolution
Till taught by pain, men know not water's worth. Byron
In chapter 2, I presented the hydropolitical background of the Jordan River watershed, which has been described as "having witnessed more severe international conflict over water than any other river system in the Middle East" (E. Anderson in Starr and Stoll 1988, 10). I concluded the chapter with the question "What is to be done?" In this chapter, I develop a framework to try to answer that question.
Just as natural water flow ignores international boundaries, so, too, does the evaluation of water resources transcend the analysis of any single discipline. Water, by nature, necessitates an interdisciplinary analysis. Through its physical components, we measure the quantity, quality, and variability of water sources. Because we need to develop an infrastructure to harness water for human use - storage and delivery systems, for example - an engineering component should be incorporated into the analysis. Furthermore, because water can be owned, bought, sold, and traded, its analysis takes on legal, economic, and political aspects as well. Finally, because water is a resource that, when scarce, can induce both conflict and cooperation, water can become a subject for alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
After a short description of the particular nature of international water conflict, and of water as a unique strategic resource, this chap ter explores separately how each of several disciplines treats water as a resource and as a subject of conflict. The disciplines offered are the physical sciences, law, political science, economics, game theory, and ADR.
In the final section, "An Interdisciplinary Approach to Water Basin Analysis and Conflict Resolution," I try to bring together lessons learned through each discipline in a single framework for evaluation. The technical and policy options that might be proposed for any watershed are listed, and a method for evaluating each option, dependent on three measures of viability - technical, economic, and political - is described. In chapter 4, I apply this "interdisciplinary approach" specifically to the Jordan River watershed.
As a nation reaches and surpasses its hydrologic limits, impetus toward either international conflict or cooperation may increase. For the purposes of this work, I define "competition" as two or more entities, one or more of which perceives a goal as being blocked by another entity (what Frey  refers to as an "issue"). If power is exerted to overcome the perceived blockage, I refer to this as "conflict." If there is coordination of behaviour among entities to realize at least some common goals, I (after Frey 1992) refer to this as "cooperation." The strategies one might employ to further any of these ends are discussed in later sections. To understand how this competition/cooperation dichotomy may diverge, however, we should delve briefly into the nature of water conflict.
To begin with, we might draw parallels between evolution and conflict resolution to see what lessons nature may provide. As species evolve, they become more efficient in their use of the scarce resources they need for survival. If the resource becomes more scarce, the species must either become adept at competing with other species, or it must learn to cooperate and develop symbiotic relationships in order to survive. Maruyama (1963), in his discussion of the "second cybernetics," gives the case of a moth and its predator as an example of resource competition, which, itself, becomes more efficient as the interspecies deviation amplifies - that is, as the differences between them are enhanced. The moth develops better camouflage to avoid its predator, which in turn becomes more adept at discovering the moth's camouflage.
Competition seems to be the more common strategy in human re source conflicts, and, as in nature, once the path towards competition is chosen, Maruyama's "deviation-amplification" would tend to increase.
On the other hand, nature provides lessons in cooperation, as well. A rainforest plant that hosts an ant population, for example, secretes a glucose-rich liquid on which the ants thrive and they, in turn, trim back other plants and vines that compete for sunlight with their host. Such true examples of symbiosis may seem rare, unless one considers that each individual in nature is made up of single cells, which cooperate to achieve the most efficient distribution of scarce resources within that individual.
As in nature, human conflict over resources at its most basic level can be dealt with through either competition or cooperation. Returning to the lessons of cybernetics, both options might be seen as positive feedback loops regarding relations with neighbouring states, in that each aspect reinforces the other : however, only the latter case can truly be seen as "positive." Competition begets ill will, which increases competition, while, conversely, cooperation encourages better relations, thus creating an environment conducive to increased cooperation.
The choice between ever-increasing conflict or cooperation in hydropolitics is discussed by Frey (1992). Frey cites the "Catastrophe Theory" of sociology (E. Zeeman, cited in Frey 1992), which describes how small changes in a social structure, once begun, can develop and increase quickly, much like the effects of resonating sound waves amplifying to shatter a wineglass:
The tension and threat (of transnational water shortage) can apparently be resolved either by sharply escalating the conflict or by accepting the necessity of some form of cooperation. Dire conditions promote cooperation, but those same conditions also make severe conflict more likely. (Frey 1992)
How salient is water as an issue of conflict? Maslow (1954) categorizes and ranks basic human needs according to their level of motivating behaviour. From inner to outer, these are (1) physiological needs, (2) safety needs, (3) belongingness and love, (4) esteem, and (5) self actualization. Water for personal consumption is clearly a most basic human need, as would be water for subsistence agriculture. Water allocated to export, or cash-crop agriculture, or industry, would probably fall within safety needs still a fairly fundamental issue. Water is occasionally used as an esteem item, in elaborate fountains or private swimming pools for example, and even for self-actualization, in baptisms and other ritual purification.
Because of the properties inherent to human water needs, competition over water as a scarce resource, when it occurs, can be especially intense:
At the individual level, the demand for water is highly inelastic, although fairly readily satiable. Personally, we do not need much, but we need that small amount urgently and reliably ... The sinister corollary of this, however, is that if such basic needs are not met, they override more sophisticated interests and become absolute and obsessive. (Frey and Naff 1985)
Along with water's particular salience, it has other singular and elusive characteristics that differentiate it as a unique strategic resource. Like timber or agriculture, fresh water is usually treated as a renewable resource. Next year's rains are counted on as inevitable, albeit allowing for some deviation in amount. Much water, however, particularly fossil groundwater, is nonrenewable, more like oil or minerals. Unlike most other renewable and nonrenewable resources, however, property rights for water, surface or ground, are far from clear.
This is complicated by the fact that water, like air resources, is both pollutable, from point and non-point sources, and mobile, adding another possible point of contention between states. Moreover, water is creatable, or at least purifiable, with the input of enough energy. This adds economic ambiguity to legal ambiguity, by the need to know both from where the water comes and to what use it will be put, before determining efficient allocation.
Water, in short, seems to share only the most contentious characteristics with other resources, particularly in the international setting, making analysis of international water conflicts especially difficult.
3.3.1 Physical sciences and technology
3.3.3 Political science
3.3.5 Game theory
3.3.6 Alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
It is a truism of conflict analysis that there will never be a lack of subjects to study. Conflicts abound, from interpersonal to international, and approaches to solving them are almost as numerous. As we have seen, water conflicts are particularly difficult to define, evaluate, and resolve.
What follows is a brief description of how various disciplines approach conflict in general, and international water conflict in particular.
The technical implementers of water policy are the physical scientists, who have traditionally borne the responsibility for making sure that water supply meets demand. These hydrologists, hydrogeologists, engineers, and chemists manage the supply, delivery, storage, and quality of each entity's water to match the needs of each user. On the demand side, agricultural researchers develop new delivery systems, greenhouse technology, and bioengineered crops to lower the need for water on the farm. This section examines the contribution of the physical sciences to alleviation of the water conflict in the Middle East by offering possibilities both to increase supply and to decrease demand.
Increasing supply - New natural sources
No new "rivers" will be discovered in the Middle East, but increased catchment of winter flood water anywhere along an existing river system can add just as well to the water budget. This applies to small wadis as well as to large storage projects such as the Maqarin Dam, which alone could contribute a saving of about 330 MCM/yr by storing winter run-off that otherwise is lost to the Dead Sea. When it is possible to store water underground through artificial groundwater recharge, even more water is saved - that not lost to evaporation in a surface reservoir. Less evaporation also means less of a salinity problem in the remaining water. Israel currently stores 200 MCM/yr from its National Water Carrier project by this method (Ambroggi 1977, 25).
Underground is the only place to look for any major new water supplies within the basin. In 1985, Israel confirmed the discovery of a large fossil aquifer in the Nubian sandstone underlying the Sinai and Negev deserts. Israel is already exploiting 25 MCM/yr from this source and is investigating the possibility of pumping 300 MCM/yr in the twenty-first century (Issar 1985,110). Jordan has also been carrying out a systematic groundwater evaluation project in recent years, and has begun to tap the fossil Disi aquifer along the Saudi border for 80 MCM/yr (E. Salameh in Garber and Salameh 1992, 114).
Increasing supply - New sources through technology
Projects such as iceberg-towing and cloud-seeding, though appealing to the imagination, do not seem to be a likely emphasis for future technology: the former involves great expense and the latter can be, at best, a small part of a very local solution. Although a representative of Israel's water authority claims that 15 per cent of Israeli annual rainfall is due to their cloud-seeding programme (Siegel 1989), this has been documented only within the northern Galilee catchment and results seem not to have the consistency necessary for reliable planning.
The three most likely technologies to increase water supply for the near future are desalination, waste-water reclamation, and water imports.
The Middle East has already spent more on desalinating plants than any other part of the world. The region has 35 per cent of the world's plants with 65 per cent of the total desalinating capacity, mostly along the Arabian peninsula (E. Anderson in Starr and Stoll 1988, 4). Israel, too, included plans for both conventional and nuclear desalination plants in its water planning until 1978, when they were abandoned as "technologically premature and economically unfeasible" (Galnoor 1978, 352).
It is this problem of cost that makes desalinated water impractical for most applications. Although drinking-water is a completely inelastic good - that is, people will pay almost any price for it - water for agriculture, by far the largest use in the Middle East, has to be cost-effective enough for the agricultural endproduct to remain competitive in the market-place. The present costs of about US$0.80-$1.50/m3 to desalt sea water and about $0.30/m3 for brackish water (L. Awerbuch in Starr and Stoll 1988, 59), do not make this technology an economic water source for most uses. Efforts are being made, however, to lower these costs through multiple use plants (getting desalinated water as a byproduct in a plant designed primarily for energy generation), increased energy efficiency in plant design, and by augmenting conventional plant power with solar or other energy sources.
One additional use of salt water is to mix it with fresh water in just the quantity to leave it useful for agricultural or industrial purposes, effectively adding to the freshwater supply. This method was used in Israel in the 1975/76 season to add 141 MCM/yr to the water budget (Kahhaleh 1981, 40).
WASTE WATER RECLAMATION.
The other promising technology to increase supply is cleaning and reusing waste water. Two plants in Israel at the time of writing treat 110 MCM/yr or 40 per cent of the country's sewage for reuse, and projections call for treating 80 per cent by 1990 (State of Israel 1988, 8). The treated water is currently used to irrigate some 15,000 hectares - mostly cotton (Poster 1989b, 42). It is anticipated that full exploitation of purified waste water will eventually constitute 45 per cent of domestic water needs (State of Israel 1988, 147). This type of project could be developed throughout the region (a World Bank loan helped to finance the Israeli project). The obvious limit of this technology is the amount of waste water generated by a population.
INTERBASIN WATER TRANSFERS.
Other sources of water could come from neighbouring watersheds that currently have a water surplus. At one time or another, Israel has eyed the Litani and the Nile, Jordan has looked to the Euphrates, and all of the countries in the area have been intrigued by the "Peace Pipeline" proposed by Turkey in 1987. The western line of this project would deliver 1,200 MCM/yr from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers to Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia (C. Duna in Starr and Stoll 1988, 119). Despite Prime Minister Özal's belief that "by pooling regional resources, the political tensions in the area can be diffused," at a cost of US$20,000 million this project probably will not be diffusing tensions in the near future.
Other recent proposals include bringing Turkish water to Israel in barges (Starr 1991), or towed in plastic "Medusa bags," each with a volume of 1 MCM (Cran 1992). Boaz Wachtel (1992) has devised a branch of the "mini-peace" pipeline to come from Turkey, through Syria, to the Golan Heights. This last branch would be in an open canal, doubling as an antitank barricade, then dropping water to both Jordan and Israel for hydropower.
Some proposals have focused on economic incentives as a means of overcoming the political reluctance to transboundary water transfers. Countries upstream to Egypt may have a legal say in any transfer of Nile water, for example. Dinar and Wolf (1992) suggested a technology-for-water exchange between Israel and Egypt, and calculated the economic "pay-off" that would be generated to induce such co operation. Another cost-cutting option might be to use facilities that are already in place, such as the TAP line, an abandoned oil pipeline that extends from Lebanon to the Persian Gulf.
Once additional water is introduced to the Jordan basin, arrangements can be made for exchanges within the basin from one region to another for the most efficient overall distribution. Nile water, for example, could be brought to Gaza and/or the Israeli Negev Desert for less expense than most alternative sources (Kelly 1989; Dinar and Wolf 1991). Increased water from the northern Jordan could then be made available to other parts of Israel, the West Bank, or Jordan. Similar exchanges could be arranged for Litani or Turkish water as well.
The guiding principle to decrease demand for any scarce resource should be, "Can it be used more efficiently?" This does not always work, however, especially when there is an emotional value associated either with the resource itself or with the proposed solution. Unfortunately, when dealing with water, emotions usually charge both aspects of the issue. For example, one way to cut long-term demand for Middle East water is to limit population growth in the region. However, in an area where each national group and religious and ethnic subgroup seems to be locked in a demographic race for numerical superiority, this is not very likely to occur. Many of the sectors most susceptible to efficient restructuring are also those most laden with emotion.
Some aspects of decreasing agricultural water demand are noncontroversial and have made the region a showcase for arid-agriculture water conservation. Technological advances such as drip-irrigation and micro-sprinklers, which reduce water loss by evaporation, are about 20-50 per cent more efficient than standard sprinklers and very much more so than the open-ditch flood method used in the region for centuries (Hillel 1987). Computerized control systems, working in conjunction with direct soil moisture measurements, can add even more precision to crop irrigation.
Other water savings have come through bioengineered crops that exist on a minimal amount of fresh water, on brackish water, or even on the direct application of salt water (C. Hodges in Starr and Stoll 1988, 109-118).
As a result of using a combination of these conservation methods, Israel's irrigated area has increased from 172 million hectares in 1973 to 220 million hectares in 1988, with total production increasing by 100 per cent, while water consumption for agriculture remained nearly constant (State of Israel 1988, 144). It has been speculated that the irrigated area in the West Bank could, similarly, be doubled without increasing the demand for water (Heller 1983,130). Meanwhile, these techniques have been spreading throughout the region, and it is reasonable to assume that increased water efficiency will continue to be an important aspect of Middle East agriculture.
Encouraging cooperation in research and development between the countries in the region, possibly in cooperation with other areas facing similar problems, such as the arid south-west United States, can help with this diffusion of technology. Some such programmes exist, but they usually exclude pairing of any two countries with hostile relations, creating a serious technological barrier precisely where the free flow of information and technology is most important. Starr and Stoll (1988) have advocated regional research centres for the Middle East, sponsored by the United States.
Emotional charge enters into the water debate when it is suggested by economists or planners that greater hydrologic efficiency might be gained if less water were used in agriculture in general, as described in the section on economics, below.
Variability in supply and demand
It should be emphasized that an analysis of such a fragile "hydropolitical" situation as exists in the Middle East is actually more complicated than so far discussed, because of tremendous variability in the system. Some fluctuation is natural. Even in "normal" years, rainfall is extremely variable in both space and time. Almost all of the year's rain falls in the four winter months, and varies from the lush Mount Hermon and Golan Heights, to the desert areas around the Dead Sea. Further, average annual rainfall can vary from year to year by as much as 40 per cent (Stanhill and Rapaport 1988). These fluctuations introduce tremendous challenges to water managers and the water delivery and storage infrastructure on which they rely.
Middle East hydropolitics are made even more difficult to plan for by human-induced variability. Aside from the volatile nature of politics in general, and Middle East politics specifically, two other factors complicate the present precarious situation - one climatic, and one demographic.
Many climatologists are currently investigating what changes will occur in regional weather patterns, given an anticipated rise in average global temperature (see, for example, Lonergan and Kavanagh 1991). One possible climatic scenario is a northward shift in the distribution of winter rainfall, away from the Jordan Basin. Difficult though they are to predict on a regional scale, the effects of shifting annual precipitation patterns in the Middle East could have profound impacts on the politics of the region, depending on how dramatic the changes are that actually develop. As global, and finally regional, modelling and forecasting improve, this subject will have to be investigated further in order for appropriate planning measures to be taken.
A second, more imminent, change is already beginning to occur in the region, which could dramatically affect issues of water distribution and usage. Israel expects at least a million Soviet immigrants in the coming decade, possibly two million (Bank of Israel 1991). Jordan recently absorbed 300,000 Palestinians who left Kuwait in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Furthermore, if political negotiations were to result in an autonomous Palestine on the West Bank, that entity might absorb a percentage of the 2.2 million Palestinians registered worldwide as refugees (Jaffee Center 1989). Heller (1983) has suggested that 600,000 refugees might immigrate to the West Bank under such conditions.
Based on current domestic consumption, Israel would require an additional 94 MCM/yr, or a little over 5 per cent of the current water budget, just to provide for personal use by one million immigrants. Jordan would need 17.5 MCM/yr additional supply for its refugees, and the West Bank would need an additional 15 MCM/yr, or a 14 per cent increase in its water budget, to provide for the personal water needs of 600,000 immigrants.
Admittedly, these numbers represent simple extrapolations based on current water use. However, given not only that hydrologic limits are being reached but also that annual supplies are routinely being surpassed, questions as to the absorptive capacity of the region's water resources for immigrants and refugees should at least be asked.
RELIABILITY OF DATA.
Water supply in general, and groundwater availability and flow in particular, are difficult to evaluate. Estimates of rainfall, evaporation, transpiration, run-off, and percolation to the water-table each can be in error, even by orders of magnitude. Because each measurement adds reliability to available data, the difficulty in measuring and evaluating water resources may add impetus to dialogue within a watershed. Both Kolars (1992) and Starr (1992) have suggested cooperative water data gathering and sharing as an important starting point for regional cooperation.
Authors who have specifically addressed international water law include Caponera (1985), Cano (1982; 1989), and Bilder (1975), while Utton (1982), Hayton (1982), and Hayton and Utton (1989) have focused on the law of international aquifers.
What follows is a brief description of the current state of international water law, the legal ambiguities inherent to Jordan River hydropolitics, and some alternative approaches that others have taken to resolve similar disputes. One procedural note: the critique that follows is of the applicability and enforceability only of the international legal structure - not of treaties. It is argued that, while a legal code can offer general guidelines, it is precisely a treaty, born out of the process of conflict resolution, that offers an appropriate means for agreement.
International water law
The Charter of the United Nations stipulates that states in dispute have an obligation to "first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice." Of the options presented, only "judicial settlement" refers specifically to law. According to Alheritière (1985), "states not uncommonly still prefer to bring their dispute to an ad hoc arbitral forum rather than settling it in well established courts." When one examines the painstakingly incremental movement of the international legal structure to grasp and incorporate hydrologic complexities, this lack of legal emphasis in conflict resolution is not surprising.
According to Cano (1989), international water law did not substantially begin to be formulated until after World War I. Before that time, human consumption, industrial waste, and diversion for irrigation, were not deemed major issues. Rivers were used primarily for navigation and log flotation, both of which were covered for Europe in the Congress of Vienna of 1815.
During this century, organs of international law tried to provide a framework for increasingly intense water use. The concept of a "drainage basin," for example, was accepted by the International Law Association in the Helsinki Rules of 1966, which also provided guidelines for "reasonable and equitable" sharing of a common waterway (Caponera 1985). Article IV of the Helsinki Rules describes the overriding principle:
Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.
Article V cites all of the factors that must be taken into account for "reasonable and equitable" use, including, but not limited to, the following (cited in Caponera 1985, 567; Housen-Couriel 1992, 5): (a) the basin's geography and the extent of the drainage area in the territory of each basin state; (b) the basin's hydrology, including the contribution of water by each basin state; (c) the climate affecting the basin; (d) past and existing utilizations of basin waters; (e) economic and social needs of the basin states; (f) population dependent on the waters of the basin within each basin state; (g) comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying (e); (h) availability of other resources; (i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the use of the waters; (j) the practicability of compensation as a means of adjusting conflicts among users; (k) the degree to which a state's needs may be satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin state. There is no hierarchy to the above components of "reasonable use"; rather, they are to be considered as a whole. One important shift in legal thinking in the Helsinki Rules is that they address rights to "beneficial use" of water, rather than to water per se (Housen-Couriel 1992, 5).
The International Law Commission, a body of the United Nations, was directed by the General Assembly in 1970 to study "Codification of the Law on Water Courses for Purposes other than Navigation" (Cano 1989). It is testimony to the difficulty of marrying legal and hydrologic intricacies that the Commission, despite an additional international call for codification at the UN Water Conference at Mar de Plata in 1977, has not yet completed its task. After 20 years and nine reports, only a few articles have been provisionally approved.
The final product, which also only establishes general principles for, for example, "equitable use and apportionment" and "prohibition of considerable, substantial, or appreciable harm," would not have the force of law until approved by the General Assembly (Falken-mark 1987; Solanes 1987). The general principles being codified include (after Caponera 1985):
- limited sovereignty,
- duty to cooperate in development, and
- protection of common resources.
The problems arise when attempts are made to apply this reasonable but vague language to specific water conflicts. According to Rogers (1991), there are at least five, often conflicting, doctrines for sharing water in international basins:
More locally to the region in question, both Talmudic and Islamic law each address water rights, the latter in somewhat more detail. Talmudic law mentions only surface water, and that only in the context of irrigation, providing that an upper riparian should have rights to divert for irrigation prior to downstream neighbours. Not surprisingly, given its roots in arid regions and in societies so dependent on wells and oases, the most sophisticated historical treatment of groundwater came out of Islamic law. The Islamic code grants ownership to the person who digs a well, provides a surrounding "prohibited area" to prevent drawdown, and obligates the owner to share domestic (although not irrigation) water with others (Hayton 1982). Bedouin code likewise provides for an order for watering at a well, with the largest family having first rights.
It should be noted that one aspect of water law in today's Middle East - the issue of ownership - is somewhat more clear within each nation than it is, for example, in the United States. In all of the countries riparian to the Jordan River, as well as in most of Europe, water within a nation's borders is nationalized. What users gain rights to is the use of water, not ownership of the water itself.
As might be imagined, issues of international groundwater have been especially perplexing. Before the Helsinki guidelines, international agreements referred only to specific wells and "in no event is there any manifestation that a whole international aquifer was intellectually comprehended, much less embraced by treaty" (Hayton 1981).
Since the Helsinki Agreement, which mentions "under-ground water" in passing, some progress has been made, particularly linking ground and surface water, and allowing for pollution control. Nevertheless, discussion of international groundwater still takes place "'on the frontier,' if not in no man's land" (Hayton 1981). Probably as a consequence, as of 1982, international courts have issued no decisions specifically on the question of groundwater (Utton 1982).
Even given a detailed law code and a more authoritative court, initial negotiations would still be required, or at least somewhat conciliatory relations would be necessary, between the states involved. The International Court of Justice refers to the following guidelines, in order of precedence, for its rulings (Cano 1989):
Moreover, the Court can hear cases only if the parties involved consent.
To summarize, then, general guidelines, although not binding law, are the best that can be expected from the legal structure, for the following reasons (after Caponera  and Cano ):
The legal challenge of Jordan River hydropolitics
SHIFTING RIPARIAN POSITIONS.
Given the difficulty of defining the rights of riparians in international law, one can imagine the compounded complications of applying such a code where the riparian positions themselves, and resulting legal claims, continue to shift over time. Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan were all upper riparians between 1948 and 1967, and their corresponding legal claim, therefore, was mostly of "absolute sovereignty" of the Jordan River. This conflicted, during the Johnston negotiations (1953-1955), with the United States' desire for "optimum development," and the Israeli claim to its "riparian rights." Because Jordan was somewhat restrained, being also a lower riparian further downstream, a compromise Arab claim was of rights to water allocation proportional to a territory's contribution to its source (Lowi 1985).
From 1964 through 1967, Syria and Lebanon began building a diversion of the Jordan headwaters, again claiming "absolute sovereignty," to thwart a downstream Israeli diversion that threatened Jordanian water supply. The Jordanians challenged the Israeli plan to move water out-of-basin, arguing that it was entitled to the river's "absolute integrity," and that first priority should be given to in-basin uses (Naff and Matson 1984).
After 1967, Israel became the upper, and predominant, riparian and moved towards a claim of "absolute sovereignty," although remaining, for the most part, within the confines of the (unratified) Johnston allocations (Naff and Matson 1984).
Complicating riparian positions even further is the unresolved issue of groundwater. Israel currently receives about 30 per cent of its water budget from aquifers that recharge in the West Bank. Ownership and rights to this water are in conflict, with Israel claiming "prior appropriation," limiting Palestinian groundwater development in the West Bank. Palestinians have objected to this increasing control. As mentioned earlier, legal arguments often refer, at least in part, to the Fourth Geneva Convention's discussion of territories under military occupation (see, for example, Dillman 1989; El-Hindi 1990). In principle, it is argued, the resources of occupied territory cannot be exported to the benefit of the occupying power. Israeli authorities reject these arguments, usually claiming that the Convention is not applicable to the West Bank or Gaza because the powers that these territories were wrested from were not, themselves, legitimate rulers (El-Hind) 1990). Egypt was itself a military occupier of Gaza and only Britain and Pakistan recognized Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in 1950. Furthermore, it is pointed out that the water that Israel uses is not being exported but, rather, flows naturally seaward and, because Israel has been pumping that water since 1955, it has "prior appropriation" rights to the water. Both Israel and Jordan insist that any future allocation to the West Bank must come out of the other's share (Naff and Matson 1984).
RECOGNITION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY.
As mentioned previously, international legal code is applicable only to states that adhere to a court's jurisdiction. This principle runs into two types of problems in the Jordan watershed:
As seen, submission of the dispute over the Jordan River to the international legal system would strain the existing state of interpretation and enforcement well past its current limits.
Alternate legal venues: Treaties and river commissions
In contrast to the development and application of a general law code, treaties and river commissions have been established and perpetuated for water systems throughout the world. They were created through direct or indirect agreements, negotiation, or mediation, even between hostile states.
According to Rogers (1991), there are more than 200 river basins shared by two or more countries. This accounts for more than 50 per cent of the land area of the earth, and more than 280 treaties have been negotiated to resolve the inevitable water conflicts. Treaties are brought about either directly between the parties involved (ne gotiation) or with the help of a third party (mediation). A treaty, once ratified, has the force of law and is the highest precedent recognized by the International Court of Justice (Cano 1989).
Negotiating a treaty is often the first step in ongoing conflict resolution. Onethird of all international agreements contain compulsory dispute settlement clauses (Alheritière 1985). One method of providing a forum to resolve disputes is through the establishment of a river commission. For friendly nations, this process might take place directly, between only the parties involved. A good example is the Rhine River Commission, established in 1831 after a lengthy process dating back to 1785. The Commission, with representatives from six nations, provides consultation and technical assistance, although it can also undertake research and make non-binding recommendations. Commissions exist for the Danube, for US-Canadian joint waters, and for dozens of shared waterways throughout the Americas, Europe, and Africa (Caponera 1985).
If relations are less friendly, commissions can be established through the "good offices" and sponsorship of an interested third body. One example is the Indus River Treaty of 1960, which established the Permanent Indus Commission between India and Pakistan with heavy involvement of the World Bank (Caponera 1985). Under the terms of the treaty, the basin was divided and developed, giving each nation exclusive rights to its own tributaries. Any cooperative measure requires unanimity among the Commission members (Saliba 1968). Another example is the Committee for the Lower Mekong River, established in 1957 between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Viet Nam, with close cooperation with the United Nations. Along with hydrologic and management achievements, the Committee deserves special mention for operating uninterruptedly since its inception, despite political differences and occasional armed conflict (Caponera 1985).
Treaties and river commissions have reached a certain level of success, probably because they fill precisely the gaps left in generalized international water law. They address only local conditions and incorporate the vested interests of the specific parties in conflict. In this context, it is not surprising that most law schools in the United States now offer courses in environmental negotiation (Falkenmark 1987). The initial process still requires a certain amount of good will on both sides or, barring that, particularly strong encouragement from a third party. The challenge is to get the parties together initially and, once there, to induce ongoing cooperation. This is a process best served by ADR strategies, as addressed in the following sections. Nevertheless, as Robert Hayton (1982), a professor of law himself, concludes, "just as war is too important to be left to the generals, water law is too important to be left to the lawyers."
Relevance of political science to international water conflict is found in several aspects of the field. The first is the purely theoretical aspect. The Functionalist Theory of International Politics, an alternative to the fairly self-explanatory Power Politics, claims that states will willingly transfer sovereignty over matters of public concern to a common authority (Mitrany 1975, as cited in Lowi 1990). Cooperation over resources, then, may induce cooperation over other, more contentious and emotional, issues. In hydrologic terms, this might be justification for the viability of river commissions and the claim that they are useful even among hostile neighbours. The Realist critics of Functionalism respond that states that are antagonists in the "high politics" of war and diplomacy tend not to be able to cooperate in the realm of "low politics" of economics and welfare. Lowi (1990) concludes in favour of the Realists on the question of Middle East hydropolitics, suggesting that, until larger issues of recognition and refugees are settled, cooperation on water management would be futile.
The theoretical approach tends to view politics as a passing wave, the forces of which can be analysed and, if one is skilful, perhaps the impacts of which can be predicted. Other approaches tend to take a more deterministic view, as, for example, the branches of institutional and policy analysis, and of international relations. If there is conflict, perhaps either the institutions that make policy or the policy itself may be flawed, and competent analysis will reveal methods for improvement. In the international arena, one should also investigate the likelihood, or even the advisability, of increased cooperation.
Institutional and policy analysis
Several authors approach water conflicts from this angle. Lynne et al. (1990) describe how scarcity can lead to potential conflict between water institutions and the people they serve. Ingram et al. (1984) offer guidelines for effective implementation of water policy.
Among those dealing with Middle East water scarcity, however, the question is occasionally asked "How does one translate the static and dynamic hydrologic realities of the Middle East into terms that the affected populations can understand?" The question is a conceptual one, based on the premise that any political process must ultimately be understood by the people affected by it.
In the context of Middle East hydropolitics, it is probably more important to investigate the validity of the premise: that is, for whom it is really important to "take possession of the issue," before tackling the larger issue of how it should be done. This section presents a discussion of the salience of water in general, and an investigation of the interests and power of different populations within each political entity, notably Israel and Jordan, affected by the water conflict. For simplicity these groups are divided into (a) domestic and industrial water users, (b) agricultural users, (c) technical implementers of policy, and (d) policy makers, and interests of each are assumed to be similar on both sides of the Jordan River.
In Naff and Matson (1984), the most thorough examination of regional hydropolitics to date, each actor in the Jordan River conflict Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel - is analysed according to its respective "riparian position," "power," and "interest." This approach seems to be based on some derivation of Coplin and O'Leary's (1976) PRINCE method's categories of "issue position," "power," and "salience" for political analysis. Whether described as "interests" (Naff and Matson 1984), or "motivations" (Meltsner 1972), it is clear that the aspects referred to here as "salience" - "the importance each political actor attaches to the particular issue" (Coplin and O'Leary 1976) and "power" - whether legal, political, riparian position, or military- are crucial to political analysis. The "issue" is assumed to be, "where can (or should) water policy emphasis be placed?"
DOMESTIC AND INDUSTRIAL USERS.
Every person is a member of this category over and above any other category. Domestic water consumption includes primarily the requirements for each individual's biology, but also other needs around the house, including water for hygiene, cooking, dishwashing, and lawns. The salience of water for domestic consumption depends on the use to which it will be put.
As mentioned earlier, Maslow (1954) categorizes and ranks basic human needs to their level of motivating behaviour. From "inner" to "outer," these are physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and love, esteem, and self-actualization. Water for biological needs would clearly be a most basic human need, with other domestic uses varying in importance.
One conclusion that might be drawn, then, is that water is (or should be) a highly salient issue for the entire Middle East population. Before jumping to policy conclusions, however, one should recognize not only that water for domestic consumption is a comparatively small portion of the total water budget for each country from 10 per cent in Jordan to 22 per cent in Israel (Poster 1989b) but also that the region already has among the lowest per capita consumption rates in any arid area (Falkenmark 1989b).
Moreover, even with a high degree of "salience," domestic consumers cannot significantly affect a country's water budget. This is particularly true, given the price inelasticity of water for personal use. Darr et al. (1976) suggest that, in Israel, consumption is more a function of factors such as geographic location and family size, than it is of price. Policy makers looking to increase political flexibility by decreasing demand would be hard pressed to find meaningful cuts in the domestic sector.
In contrast, industrial users account for a minor portion of each entity's water budget - from close to 0 per cent in the West Bank and Gaza to 5 per cent in Israel and Jordan - but have little influence in water decision-making. In the recent drought, price increases were levied most against the industrial sector, even though several analysts, including those within the Israeli Water Commission, advocated a shift of water resources from agriculture to industry because of the relatively higher contribution to the GNP of the latter per unit of water.
The vast majority of Middle East water (73 per cent in Israel to 85 per cent in Jordan) is used in the agricultural sector. Water for agriculture for one's own population might be categorized in Maslow's terms (Maslow 1954) as "physiological needs" the most basic type. Even though water for agricultural export may be less crucial to survival, agriculturalists certainly have a vested interest in portraying all agriculture in terms of "food security."
The Israeli agricultural sector gains relevance through its ties to settlements and, in turn, to security. Settlements on the Golan Heights, for example, are viewed as more than a source of agricultural production: they are also outposts, the presence of which creates a kind of first line of defence against the Syrians, whom Israelis view as the likely antagonist in a subsequent war.
The high degree of salience of agriculture, the high volume of water in question, and the political power of agriculturalists, probably give the agricultural sector more impact on national water policy than any other. The same national water ethics that give agriculture great economic influence in the region, also give it great political influence. The Water Commission in Israel, the ultimate authority for all water planning and operations in a country where all water is nationalized, is under the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture. In Jordan, the Water Minister is a cabinet-level position, and the primary responsibility of the Jordan Valley Authority is to the farmers in that region. Any cuts to this sector in both Israel and Jordan, even during the 1988-1990 drought, came only after heated political debate.
TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTERS OF POLICY.
This group, the technological talent to assess and monitor the resource base, is made up of, in effect, the hydrologic "keepers of the flame" of water policy. Policy makers rely on this group of hydrologists, hydrogeologists, engineers, chemists, and economists to implement national policy within the limits imposed by
Agriculturalists and domestic users, similarly, count on this group to guarantee that, when a tap is opened, adequate, clean water comes out.
By definition, this group has a high degree of salience and knowledge of water issues but also, interestingly, has been the group most amenable to compromise in the international arena, even without formal power, Scientists on all sides, though constrained by political forces, do have access to each other through scientific journals and international conferences, Possibly as a consequence, along with the tangible nature of water science (as opposed to water politics), technical implementers have found agreement, notably in the 1953-1955 Johnston negotiations over Jordan River allocations, and 19671969 planning for nuclear "agro-industrial complexes." Both plans collapsed when the technical committees sent their recommendations to the political level.
This group, however knowledgeable and indispensable, seems often to be taken for granted, particularly by policy makers, for whom water is not adequately emotionally charged to take advantage of politically. The question posed might be restated, then, rather than as, "How to increase salience of water on the part of the population?" as the alternative, and probably more relevant, "How to increase the salience of technical realities on the part of the policy makers?"
One example of such synergy between the two groups can also be gleaned from the Johnston negotiations, which, in 1953 were deadlocked when, according to Wishart (1990), an engineering study was completed that suggested that larger areas of Jordan could be irrigated with less water than was thought. This allowed the manoeuvrability that led to the negotiations' (limited) success.
Policy makers receive pressure for policy from the bottom up - that is, from the sectors described above. Domestic users want adequate water "no matter what," and can suggest as much with their votes. It is an interesting contradiction that, salient though water is for survival, it is difficult to picture one actually voting for a "water platform" or the "hydrologic party." Perhaps a new term, such as "unconscious high salience," with its seeming contradiction, would be useful.
Agricultural users have greater water needs, and corresponding political influence. Policy makers incorporate these pressures with the advice of technicians to develop national and international policy, the impacts of which are then felt from the top down.
CONCLUSIONS "SALIENCE," POWER, AND POLICY.
Water is more or less salient to all segments of the Middle East population depending, in large part, on whether there is ample supply to accommodate demand. For example, water was a more common subject, from boundary disputes to government information packets, until the 1967 war, when hydrologic allocations shifted with political borders. In recent years, the highest salience has been among agricultural users and technical implementers, although occasional droughts induce awareness on the part of domestic consumers, and policy makers as well.
The interests of each group are summarized as follows:
These interests suggest the following guidelines for internal policy:
The technical steps that might be taken to increase water supply or decrease demand were investigated earlier. The summary above does suggest, however, that in making sure that policy is a reasonable reflection of the hydrologic realities, the most vital step that might be taken in both Israel and Jordan is the removal of responsibility for these policies from its current place in the heart of agricultural and political pressures.
In Israel, for example, this might mean shifting water-policymaking from the Agricultural Ministry to a body less susceptible to constituent interests - perhaps the Ministry of the Environment, as Galnoor (1978) has suggested. An advisory body might then be established, led by technical implementers with input from the other sectors, which could more easily implement the necessary technical and economic policies, within the confines of fluctuating hydrologic limits. A similar framework might work in the institutional hierarchy of Jordanian government.
Water policy in this region is at present drawn up within the boundaries of a nation, rather than within those of a watershed. Because the flow of water does not respect the political boundaries, it should be clear that regional management, at the watershed level at least, would be a much more efficient approach. In fact, the only point on which the water policy analyses surveyed earlier do agree is on the need for planned water sharing and joint water development, as Eric Johnston envisioned 35 years ago.
Regional cooperation would open the door to a host of new water distribution alternatives. For example, surface water from the Yarmuk or the upper Jordan could be provided to the West Bank, allowing increased development in that area while alleviating Israeli fears of overpumped Palestinian wells. Alternatively, Israel and Jordan might cooperatively develop both banks of the Jordan, eliminating the current redundant costs of separate delivery systems within each country. In addition, the larger the region cooperating, the more efficient a regional plan can be developed. It is cheaper, for example, to bring water from the Nile to the Negev than it is to pump it from the Sea of Galilee, as is the current practice (Kelly 1989, 305).
It has been argued that one need not wait for the cessation of hostilities before developing such water-sharing plans:
A regional water plan need not await the achievement of peace. To the contrary, its preparation, before a comprehensive peace settlement is attained, could help clarify objectives to be aimed for in achieving peace. (H. BenShahar in Fishelson 1989, 7)
It should be clear that any dreams of regional cooperation in the Middle East run at least the same dangers of confronting issues of deep national emotion as do public policy solutions - probably even more. Listing all the reasons why regional cooperation may not work in the Middle East is certainly well beyond the scope of this work. However, one question is particularly relevant to the proposal of joint water projects, and deserves mention.
Elisha Kally (in Fishelson 1989, 325) contends that "the successful implementation of cooperative projects ... will strengthen and stabilize peace." This concept of inducing increasing integration, even between actors with some hostility, is also a strategy employed in the United States by the US Army Corps of Engineers (interview, Jerry Delli Priscoli, June 1992), and recommended for international settings by their representatives.
As the regional politics increase the political viability of some of these international projects, we might re-examine whether greater interdependence is actually an impetus to greater cooperation or is, in fact, the opposite, leading to greater conflict.
Many of the hostilities that have occurred in the region over water seem to have come about precisely because the water destined for a downstream user was controlled by an upstream party. Many "cooperative" projects might only provide additional opportunity for suspicion and potential for contention. Lowi (1990) suggests that issues of regional water sharing can not be successfully broached in the Jordan basin until the larger political issues of territory and refugees are resolved.
One point where contention seems most likely to develop is over control of a major source of water. Many proposed water transfers, such as the Egyptian offer of Nile water to Israel, have fallen through partly because of concern for whose hand is "on the tap." Tensions were raised immediately before the Gulf War when Turkey closed off the Euphrates River for one month to fill its Ataturk Dam. Some of the greatest resistance to the Johnston proposals was encountered whenever an aspect of the plan called for relinquished control by any of the parties, such as joint storage in the Sea of Galilee or an international Water Master. G. White and co-workers (in Glassner 1983, 491) suggest that, in many group situations, water users prefer private to communal water sources if there is a choice, "to avoid situations where there is risk of irritating confrontation."
I recognize the advisability of striving towards ever-increasing integration between political entities. As has been pointed out, "lasting peace among nations is characterized by a broadly based network of relations" (H. BenShahar in Fishelson 1989,1). I suggest, however, that for resource conflicts in general and for water conflicts in particular, an initial condition that should be met is that each entity has adequate control of an equitable portion of its primary source. Past and present grievances need to be addressed before embarking on projects of cooperation or integration. For water projects, this would involve (a) assigning property rights to existing resources, (b) guaranteeing control of a water source adequate to meet future needs, and (c) addressing the issue of equity within the design of any project for cooperative development.
The fact that projects would have to be weighed in terms of the conflictalleviating tendencies of more efficient water distribution, as opposed to the possible conflict heightening of greater hydrologic interdependence, should not be a reason to abandon the concept. Nor, by any means, should the concept of regional planning be tarnished because of uncertainty about specific projects. Rather, in planning for watershed development and in designing transnational water projects, the ultimate goal might yet be ever-increasing integration. In the initial stages, however, the reluctance by parties to relinquish control of a resource as vital as water should be addressed and might even be incorporated in the project design. This issue of "control" and cooperationinducing project design is taken up again later in this chapter and in chapter 4.
Economics, with the individual as a rational maximizer of satisfaction in a world of relative scarcity, offers a useful paradigm for water conflict analysis. When deciding between several possible water development options, for example, the benefit-cost analysis - an economic tool by which all of the future benefits and costs of a project are reduced to a single amount representing the net benefits in current monetary units - can help one to determine which project would be the most beneficial.
Economic theory also provides guidelines for policy options for efficient water distribution. Economic theory argues, for example, that only when the price paid for a commodity is a reasonable reflection of the true cost, can market forces work for efficient distribution of the commodity. In the Middle East, as elsewhere, the cost of water to the user is highly subsidized, especially water earmarked for agriculture. The true cost of water would reflect all of the resource development, pumping, treatment, and delivery costs of that water, most of which are not passed on to the user. In Israel alone, 20 per cent of the country's energy is used solely to move water from one place to another (Naff and Matson 1984, 12).
Subsidized water, it is argued, leads to waste in agricultural practices, to too little incentive for research and development of conservation techniques and practice, and finally, to too much water being allocated to the agricultural sector as opposed to industry. Take away subsidies and allow the price to rise, and market incentives are created for both greater efficiency on the farm and a natural shift of water resources from the agricultural sector to industry, where contribution to gross natural product per unit of water is often much higher. Since, in each of the areas discussed, between 75 and 95 per cent of water use is allocated for agriculture, the savings in water could be substantial (Wishart 1990). Thomas Naff has recommended such a shift of between 35 and 40 per cent of agricultural water in both Israel and Jordan (lecture, University of Wisconsin-Madison, March 1990).
If the price of water reflects the true costs of its development, and if property rights to water are clear, then a "water market" can be established to allow buying and selling, ensuring, through the "invisible hand" of the market-place, that each unit of water is being used most efficiently. Water markets, whether national or international, can provide clear incentives for efficient use and guidelines for trades or transfers. Howe and Easter (1971) derived the necessary conditions for economically efficient interbasin water transfers in the United States, and Dinar and Wolf (1992) discussed international water markets using a hypothetical transfer from the Nile to the Jordan basin as a casestudy. Zeitouni et al. (1992) discussed trading water rights in an international context and Gonzalez and Rubio (1992) showed that the amount of water to be transferred between basins in a Spanish case could be reduced if economic factors were considered, as opposed to straight extrapolations of need.
Economic analysis may also create a framework for easing regional water tensions. According to Wishart (1990), "conflicts over water rights are easier to resolve if transaction costs of resolution are lower, and if opportunities exist for improving the efficiency of water use and discovery." In other words, if it is cheaper for people to cooperate and save water than it is to fight, they would rather cooperate.
Some other considerations that have been used in the past to enhance the potential for economic cooperation between players include the following:
There are, however, problems inherent to using economic theory as the tool for water conflict analysis - problems that can lead to weaknesses in the economic solutions prescribed. For one, water is not a pure economic good. Options to the consumer of most goods include migrating to where it is cheaper or abstaining from it altogether if the price is too high. Given small countries with contentious borders, migration to water sources is not a viable alternative, nor, for more obvious biological reasons, is abstaining. Presumably, however, the analysis is restricted to water for agriculture, where there is ample room for reducing demand before running into such limits.
Another problem with economic analysis is more serious because it has to do with a force much more fundamental than economic theory - that is, the emotions of a nation. As mentioned earlier, all of the countries in the area were built from the farm up, and the agriculturalist, whether the fellah or the kibbutznik, holds a special mystique on both sides of the Jordan. Both Arabic and Hebrew ideologies are rife with slogans of "making the desert bloom" and "nations rooted in their land." In this context, water invariably becomes the "life blood" of a nation. One result of this has been a certain leeway granted to agriculture in the area, both political, as noted previously, and economic.
One striking example of water "diseconomy" is the case of Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights. The 24, mostly agricultural, settlements of the Golan have a population of about 3,500. In 1980, approximately 80 per cent of the 50 MCM/yr used by these settlements was pumped up from Lake Kinneret - a height differential of 600 m (Davis et al. 1980, 27; Inbar and Maos 1984, 22). Each cubic metre of water weighs a metric ton. Were the settlers to include the costs of the energy required to lift that much water that high, their crops could not possibly be competitive in the market-place. But settlements on the Golan Heights are viewed as more than a source of agricultural production: as mentioned earlier, they are also outposts, the presence of which creates a kind of first line of defence against the Syrians, whom many Israelis view as the likely antagonist in an ensuing war.
This perceived connection between settlements and security holds true throughout the country. As Frey and Naff (1985) write,
Israeli agriculture is not merely an ordinary economic sector. It is linked to the crucial matter of settlements, and settlements are linked to defense and national security.
This, then, is what makes Golan cotton competitive in the eyes of the nation.
Overlooking this fundamental aspect of a "national water ethic" of any of the countries involved, can occasionally confound an economist, especially one from outside the region. Cal Burwell, once the Director of Research for the proposed Agro-lndustrial Complex, mentioned recently that "Some of what's valuable to the folks over there just doesn't fit into what our folks would call 'good economics"' (interview, February 1990).
The economist increasingly recognizes the sometimes overpowering noneconomic values that water users occasionally attribute to their water. These might include (from Wolf 1992a):
This last represents a departure from historic economic arguments in the Middle East. In Israel, for example, water has been subsidized for years as a means of promoting population dispersion and food security. These subsidies have dwindled somewhat in recent years, as the Ministry of Agriculture has accepted more of a market approach. Lately, however, as the population soars with natural growth and extensive immigration, the suggestion has been made to increase subsidies once again as a way to keep open space among the extensive developments (interview, Martin Sherman, November 1991).
Additional factors often convolute the possibility for a traditional economic analysis, particularly in an international setting. Some of these possible political and institutional constraints to economic cooperation are as follows:
Even while recognizing its limits, one can still use economic analy sis as a useful tool to provide some guidelines to increase hydrologic efficiency. It has been suggested that following these guidelines can be especially crucial, particularly as water limits begin to be reached:
Whereas diseconomies dictated by ideology could be tolerated under condi tions of conventional water sufficiency, they cannot continue indefinitely, especially with regard to investments under conditions of system's short age. (Galnoor 1987)
Game theory, like economics, assumes enlightened self-interest and "rational behaviour." A quantitative analysis can be performed to show how n number of players should react to a competitive setting in order to "win." A rational outcome is defined by an equilibrium point ("pareto-optimality" to economists), where no player can gain by unilaterally moving away from that point.
Game theory has been applied to a variety of issues as diverse as national security, social justice, and the existence of superior beings, but it has been applied to international water conflicts only sporadically. Rogers (1969) analyses conflicting interests along the Lower Ganges and suggests strategies for cooperation between India and Pakistan. Dufournaud (1982) applies game theory to both the Columbia and the Lower Mekong to show that "mutual benefit" is not always the most efficient criterion to measure cooperative river basins. Dinar and Wolf (1992) use cooperative game theory to explore the economic pay-offs that might be generated in a technology-for-water exchange between Israel and Egypt, and how those payoffs might be distributed to induce cooperation.
As political science asks, "Does cooperation beget cooperation?," game theory poses, somewhat less didactically, the question "What is the correlation between cooperation and efficiency?" In theory, according to R. Axelrod, a player who in an opening move acts generously and on a responding move acts cooperatively, never initiating attack, will outscore any other strategy, given time and averaging. (Cited in Painter 1988)
In practice between competing nations, however, a strong positive relationship exists between tendencies to initiate and to receive international conflict. The correlation between cooperative initiation and receptive tendencies, however, is much weaker. (Platter and Mayer 1989)
Either game theory has not yet developed to the point where it can adequately model complex international decision-making, or the nations surveyed had neither the time nor the faith in time and averaging to pursue "efficiency."
Nevertheless, game theory offers a framework for some level of analysis for water conflict. When the water demand of a population in a water basin begins to approach its supply, for example, the inhabitants have two choices that can be modelled (see Falkenmark [1989a] and LeMarquand  for related work):
These options are equally true for the inhabitants of a single basin that includes two or more political entities. A third option exists, of course, and is practiced most often in arid countries that are less developed or are racked by military strife: they can make no changes in planning or infrastructure and face each cycle of drought with increasing hardship. Since the most reasonable prescriptions in such a case are usually beyond game theory modelling, this case is not considered further.
For the game theorist, this dichotomy between two parties of whether to work unilaterally (defect) or to cooperate is recognizable as a familiar two-player, two-strategy game (Rogers  discusses game theoretical aspects of water resources). The strategies chosen by each player often depend on the geopolitical relationship between them. For two water basins within the same political entity, with clear water rights and a strong government interest, the game may resemble a "stag hunt," where mutual cooperation is the rational strategy.
Between somewhat hostile players, either within a state but more often internationally, the game becomes a "prisoner's dilemma," where, in the absence of strong incentives to cooperate, each player's individual self-interest suggests defection as the rational approach. In cases of high levels of hostility, a game of "chicken" can develop, with each player competing to divert or degrade the greatest amount of water, before the opponent can do the same.
As the amount of water surplus decreases over time, however, the impetus towards conflict or cooperation (pay-offs) might change, depending on such political factors as relative power, level of hostility, legal arrangements, and form and stability of government.
Of the disciplines surveyed, ADR with its subfield of environmental dispute resolution, uses examples of water disputes quite widely as, for example, in Amy (1987) and gingham and Orenstein (1991). Although international relations in general are treated extensively in the ADR literature by, for example, Kriesberg (1988), Stein (1988), and Ury (1987), application of ADR techniques to international resource conflicts is rare. Dryzek and Hunter (1987) describe mediation as a mechanism to resolve international environmental problems, and Zartman (1992) discusses the challenges presented in in ternational environmental negotiations. An excellent summary of ADR's potential specifically with regard to the problems of international water conflicts can be found in Delli Priscoli (1992).
For an overview of ADR, the works of four sets of authors - Fisher and Ury (1981), Lewicki and Litterer (1985), Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), and Amy (1987) - are compared and contrasted in terms of concepts, methods, and critiques that they offer the field of ADR. The ideas relevant to international water conflict in the Middle East are then culled for inspection.
Four works in ADR - A comparison
Much of ADR literature is divided between works written by mediators or negotiators themselves about their own work, case-studies by outside observers, and a growing body of theoretical work. Of the four works discussed, three - Lewicki and Litterer (1985), Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), and Fisher and Ury (1981) - are each combinations of the three approaches, with the look and feel of "how-to" manuals for the successful resolution of conflict. The fourth, Amy (1987), is a critique of the specific field of environmental mediation, and is best considered separately.
Each of the three works that deal generally with the process of ADR makes several important distinctions. The first is between distributive, or zero-sum, bargaining - negotiating over one set amount where one party's gain is the other's loss - and integrative, or "win-win," bargaining, where the solution is to everyone's gain. Lewicki and Litterer (1985) and Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) each have sections on both, while Fisher and Ury (1981) focus on how to avoid the pitfalls of the former in order to reach the latter - "get to YES."
Each of the works agrees that the integrative arrangement, being of mutual benefit to the parties in conflict, is a much-desired arrangement, and they vary mostly in the path they advise taking. Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) have a fairly procedural approach, dividing the negotiations into three phases prenegotiation, negotiation, and implementation - and offering concrete suggestions, such as "joint fact-finding" and "inventing options for mutual gain," in order to build consensus in an unassisted process. In assisted negotiations (facilitation, mediation, and arbitration), the authors are more vague, suggesting that whether the outcome is distributive or integrative depends primarily on the personal style of the negotiator. They offer some specific advice, mentioning that a "team spirit" may develop in the course of face-to-face negotiations. They do offer the interesting note that "negotiation researchers have established that cooperative negotiators are not necessarily more successful than competitive negotiators in reaching satisfactory agreement."
Lewicki and Litterer (1985) go into a little more detail. They identify five styles of conflict management in a "dual-concern model" along a gradient of the degree of concern for one's own outcome compared with the degree of concern for the other's outcome. The five styles possible, then, are avoidance, compromise, and collaboration (as equal concern for both parties), and competition and accommodation (as completely selfish and selfless, respectively) (see fig. 3.1). The key is to reach a collaborative arrangement. Both the difficulties and the conditions necessary are fairly clearly spelled out, as are guidelines to the process itself. Of special concern are the "factors that make integrative bargaining difficult." These include, primarily, the failure to perceive a situation as having integrative potential, the history of the relationships between the parties, and "black-white" thinking. Ury (1991) offers specific advice to getting past historically difficult and valuebased conflicts - "getting past NO."
Given these common pitfalls, it should be mentioned that Lewicki and Litterer (1985) also provide the most detailed description of distributive bargaining of the three works considered. Recognizing that, often, a conflict situation involves fixed resources for which both sides compete, the authors provide useful concepts and strategies to "maximize" one's share of the outcome. In win-lose bargaining, each side comes to the table with a "bargaining mix" including their starting, target, and resistance points. Strategies offered range from the comprehensive - influencing the other's resistance point - to the mundane - scheduling negotiations for when the opponent has jet lag.
One element mentioned in both Fisher and Ury (1981) and in Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) should be introduced at this point - the concept of a BATNA, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement. The latter authors point out that no one should be at a bargaining table to begin with if their BATNA away from the table is likely to be higher than can be gained through negotiations. A clear understanding of one's own BATNA and, if possible, of the opponent's, gives a fairly clear idea of what the bargaining range is likely to be.
Lewicki and Litterer (1985) conclude their discussion with "strategies of integrative bargaining," useful concepts that are common in one form or another to much of ADR literature (including Fisher and Ury, whose terminology for similar concepts is presented in parentheses):
The difference in tone between Lewicki and Litterer (1985) and Fisher and Ury (1981) suggests a subtle but distinct difference in outlook throughout the works and, consequently, a probable reason for the success of the latter work. Fisher and Ury (1981) are indefatigably optimistic. They do not offer much detail for successful distributive bargaining (what they call "positioning bargaining"), only suggestions to "change the game" to "principled negotiation." Their examples of success (and where mistakes were made) are from everyday life and show how conflict at every level can be resolved amic ably. The language throughout is simple, upbeat, and, one can see, appealing: one would prefer to "invent" or "focus" rather than the clinical "generate." One's conflicts are resolved by "controlling" rather than by passively "evaluating." In short, Fisher and Ury (1981), though covering much the same material as in other ADR literature, are accessible.
Amy (1987) provides an altogether different approach to ADR, one of harsh criticism. The author suggests that, since most studies of mediation are carried out by mediators, there is relatively little criticism of the fundamental claims made by the field. Roughly the first half of the work is an examination of the claims made by ADR proponents. He begins by reviewing the advantages claimed by mediation over legislature, bureaucracy, and the courts to resolve environmental conflicts and concludes that mediation tends to be justified only when (a) there is a relative balance of power between the disputants and (b) an impasse has been reached in the conflict; that is, neither side can move unilaterally in what they perceive as their best interest. He also contests the common assertions that environmental mediation is cheaper, faster, and more satisfying than other approaches, especially litigation.
Amy approaches his critique from the perspective of political science, and his most important observations are of power distributions throughout the process of mediation and of some resulting drawbacks. The main thrust of his argument is that the same power relationships that exist in the real world are brought into the negotiating process. In the classic environmental dispute of developer versus conservationist, the former will usually have the power advantage. As such, the developer will enter into negotiations only if he or she somehow has that power blocked through, say, a restraining order. The mediator, then, usually approaches a conflict looking for a compromise, which will be found between the two initial positions. The problem may be rooted in fundamental differences in values or principles, however, for example as to whether development should even take place - representing an alternative "not on the table."
Further, if one party believes strongly one way or the other, any compromise is capitulation. In other words, positions or interests can be compromised but not principles. A mediator is usually not entrusted with finding the "right" solution, only the best compromise, and a mediator who becomes an advocate, either against disproportionate power or in favour of any specific world view, will not be likely to find ready employment. Amy (1987) therefore recommends that, for disputes of basic principles, the best venues for resolution are still the traditional ones of court, bureaucracy, or legislature.
ADR and the Jordan River watershed
The works presented offer guidelines for how one might approach the facilitation of dispute resolution between the parties involved in conflict over the Jordan River basin. What follows are some specific guidelines and cautions for a presumed facilitator involved in assisted negotiations. The ideal goal, as suggested by the four works cited, is an integrative solution but, given the length and depth of the conflict on this and other issues, a reasonable distributive solution might be more than acceptable to the parties involved. Much of the terminology is from the three "checklist" works. Although it is used interchangeably, the emphasis is from Fisher and Ury (1981).
IDENTIFY THE ACTORS, INTERESTS (SALIENCE), AND POWER.
Borrowed from the conflict-analysis literature (e.g. Coplin and O'Leary 1976), this is perhaps the most difficult and most important step in conflict resolution, particularly given the intense hostility between the parties involved. This point, therefore, receives special attention.
The primary assumption of the works examined above and, in fact, of most ADR literature is that the parties at conflict not only wish to hold negotiations but are already at the bargaining table. The parties in question here, however, not only have never negotiated officially but either do not recognize other parties' right to existence or do not acknowledge other parties' national aspirations. A crucial task, along with identifying the actors themselves, is to induce, entice, or coerce mutual acceptance not only of legitimacy but also of the desire to negotiate. This process would presumably be under the auspices of an interested (and, it is to be hoped, powerful) third party, and would take place in conjunction with comprehensive issues other than solely the water conflict. It is assumed for this analysis that the various other issues would take place simultaneously but separately.
One other issue that should be resolved early is, "What kind of conflict is it?" Delli Priscoli (1992) suggests that five different kinds of conflict - data, interest, structural, relationship, and value conflicts each have different components, each of which informs different strategies to conflict resolution. Water conflicts have aspects of each of the five conflict types listed, not only complicating the negotiations but also offering the potential for "spillover effects" of any breakthroughs into other realms.
Once the actors have been brought to the table, some of Amy's conclusions (Amy 1987) become relevant to the facilitator, particularly those relating to power inequity. As noted by Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), each party will negotiate only as long as its interests can be served best at the negotiating table. Further, Amy (1987) warns that "only when politics of power are exhausted can politics of cooperation become a viable possibility." It should be remembered that, in contrast to the examples of national environmental disputes that Amy (1987) presents, international courts are not necessarily a more egalitarian option than negotiation (see the description of international water law above), nor are the UN forces or economic sanctions, the international equivalents of law enforcement, liable to be mobilized if negotiations fail. Nevertheless, a third party, such as the US State Department or the World Bank, can hold out economic incentives as either a "carrot," by offering aid on a cooperative project, for example, or as a "stick," threatening to withhold aid if cooperative steps are not taken. Both have been used successfully in the Middle East in the past. Here it will be up to the facilitator, and the body he or she represents, to act as advocate not just for compromise but for fairness.
One important point to consider as the facilitator evaluates the "bargaining range" is that, in international relations, armed conflict is sometimes chosen by a state as the BATNA. Predictors, as determined by relative positions and power, of when water conflict may help lead to warfare, are suggested by Naff and Matson (1984), Lowi (1900), and Frey (1992).
As the negotiating process is initiated, it will be crucial to "separate the people from the problem." In our context, the problem is too little water for too many people, not Palestinian national aspirations versus Israeli security. Nevertheless, the issues of water, security, and nationalism are so intertwined that ignoring the ties between them can condemn potential cooperation to failure. This pattern has been seen repeatedly in past attempts at cooperation in the Middle East, such as the Johnston negotiations and the "water-forpeace" process. Ury (1991) and others recognize that "satisfying unmet interests" is a crucial step in "getting past NO."
Furthermore, each state's interests are informed by sectoral conflict agricultural needs compared with those of industry or domestic consumption and even intersectoral pressures: which crop gets the most return per unit of water, for example. The work of Frey and Naff (1985) in developing "cognitive maps" of national views of water would be useful in identifying from where the pressures on an entity's position are likely to come.
INSIST ON COMMON CRITERIA FOR ANALYSIS.
Getting the parties to focus only on people and water will be only half of the hydrologic battle. Determining the technical and policy alternatives that can help to alleviate the water crisis will depend, first, on establishing a common base of information for the physical hydrography of the region. This crucial step is not always straightforward, as data are presented and contested. Kolars (1992) and Starr (1992) offer suggestions for a regional centre for water data gathering and exchange, as a first step in regional cooperation.
Even once the physical parameters are agreed, finding a mutual definition of such concepts as "ownership" and "value" can be equally difficult. Fisher and Ury's suggestion of using fair and mutually agreed standards for criteria for measurements as a step in "focusing on interests, not positions" (Fisher and Ury 1981) is well taken (although one might question their belief in "objective" criteria). Some of the possible paradigms for evaluating the rights to, and value of, water, including legal and economic guidelines, are explored above.
One additional useful tool for evaluating efficient distribution is the concept of "per capita availability" (PCA) of a nation. Falkenmark (1987; 1989a) describes the technical options that are useful, and the common political pressures that are likely, given a state's PCA (the total amount of water available per person). This is especially helpful, both in determining a likely target for the water from diversion or desalination projects and because PCAs can be projected into the future, adding a dynamic element to the search for solutions.
INVENT OPTIONS FOR MUTUAL GAIN.
As mentioned, a mutual distributive solution to the problem of Middle East water allocation would be a great step forward for the parties in question, but even an agreed distribution scheme for existing resources will not solve the regional shortage. Without cooperation, each entity's quest for more water supply or less demand will take place unilaterally, with the probability of duplicate efforts and foregone opportunities. It might be shown, however, that cooperative efforts both are more efficient and allow for greater options. Access to independent and creative expertise necessary for generating "elegant solutions" would be crucial to the facilitator to be able to prompt the bargaining from distributive to integrative.
DETERMINE A FEEDBACK MECHANISM FOR PERPETUATING AGREEMENT.
A viable agreement must incorporate mechanisms for any future misunderstandings to be resolved. This is a final, but crucial, step that has to be taken for a negotiated arrangement to last beyond the signing ceremony. The circumstances that brought about a conflict to begin with are seldom static, nor are the conditions of agreement. This is particularly true for hydrologic conflicts, where supply, demand, and understanding of existing conditions all change from season to season, from year to year. Crisis management for droughts, floods, and technical (e.g. dam or sewage facility) failures, must also be addressed.
The section above on law examines the kinds of multinational bodies of joint research, development, and management that might be established for the Jordan River watershed and that would help guarantee the perpetuation of a negotiated arrangement.
A comparatively recent subfield in ADR, "dispute systems design," is a process of integrating the potential for ADR in public institutions and other organizations that deal with conflict. Described by Ury et al. (1988a), "dispute systems design" may offer lessons in cooperation enhancement in water systems as well. Although most of the work in this field describes incorporating cooperation-inducement within organizations, some of the same lessons for "enhancing cooperation capacity" (Kolb and Silbey 1990), or "design considerations" (O'Connor 1992) and "guidelines" (McKinney 1992), might be applicable to technical or policy systems as well. A water-sharing agreement, or even a regional water-development project, for example, might be designed specifically to induce cooperation in ever-increasing integration from the beginning. This possibility is explored in more detail in chapter 4.
The conflict over the Jordan watershed provides a particular challenge for the application of ADR guidelines offered by the works of four groups of authors. One can imagine Lewicki and Litterer developing a new category for the basin, called "Factors that make integrative bargaining difficult - with a vengeance": the actors do not recognize each other's legitimacy; the enmities between them are deep and ancient; the hydrology is intricate, poorly understood, and seems arranged almost to spite the contentious political boundaries; and everyone is running out of water.
On the other hand, once a strategy for resolving international water conflicts is developed for the Jordan basin, other applications of ADR probably could not get much more complicated.
3.4.1 Summary of disciplinary survey
3.4.2 Towards an interdisciplinary approach
3.4.3 Water and its evaluation
In the survey of disciplines relevant to the analysis of water basins and water conflicts, I examined the applicability of several paradigms to water issues in general, and to the conflict over the waters of the Jordan River watershed in particular. I showed, in the process, that each discipline offers several useful tools and guidelines for water basin analysis, but that no single discipline can provide all the answers necessary for a thorough study. In this section, I select useful tools from each discipline and compile them in a single interdisciplinary analytical framework that might be applicable to any international watershed.
Each of the disciplines surveyed offers useful tools and guidelines for water basin analysis. The physical sciences offer several practical options, both for increasing water supply through such measures as desalination and waste-water reclamation, and for decreasing demand, through more efficient agricultural practices. Other technical options offered included other political entities - through shared information and technology - and other water basins, through water transfers.
A discussion of law has revealed that, although assignment of water rights is requisite both for addressing past and present grievances, and for the establishment of water markets, the current state of international water law is not sufficiently developed to handle the task. Treaties, which can be negotiated using the principles of ADR and incorporating the guidelines of "dispute systems design" to encourage ongoing conflict resolution, are both site and conflict specific. Emphasis, therefore, might be placed on water-sharing and basin-development treaties, incorporating the contentious issues raised historically of "equity" ("Who gets how much?") and "control" ("From where, and whose hand is on the tap?").
Political science suggests strategies for reducing water use within each country, informed by the relative salience and power of each of the groups of water users. A discussion of international relations has suggested some ambiguity over whether increased international integration of water planning and projects leads to increased stabilization or the opposite, to increased points for contention. This discussion, combined with the lessons offered in the section on history and in the field of dispute systems design, may reinforce the contention that both joint planning and joint water projects may be designed in a progression of cooperation toward the goal of ever-increasing integration, but starting with "small and doable" projects safeguarding the need for each political entity to have direct control over its own primary water source.
Economics offers the useful tools of the benefit-cost analysis, to help provide a method of comparative measurement of water projects, and the water market, which could help to increase efficiency both within each entity and internationally. Prerequisites for the latter include allowing the price of water to reflect its true costs and the clear assignment of water rights, both of which, we found, present difficulties under the current conditions. Some policy guidelines were offered as well, including allowing the price of water to reflect the costs associated with its development, treatment, storage, and delivery, as mentioned above, which might lead to greater efficiency of water use and greater incentive both for water-saving research and even for international cooperation.
A brief discussion of game theory has suggested that the field offers options both in terms of predicting the strategies that might be chosen by entities in competition over water, and for analysing the distribution of pay-offs for potential cooperative projects, for a variety of possible coalitions.
Finally, ADR offers guidelines for the process of resolving conflicts, from prenegotiation, to the process itself, to guidelines for implementation. Suggestions have been made for when a party should, or should not, be at the negotiating table to begin with, and what can be expected, given each party's "bargaining mix." The recent subfield of ADR, "dispute systems design," offers methods to incorporate the dynamics of conflict resolution into the institutions that deal with conflicts. Some of these methods may be applicable to physical systems of cooperation as well.
The discussions of history and physical science have conveyed a sense of water basin planning as an ongoing dynamic process, as water quantity, quality, and demand factors all fluctuate over space and time. Political science also shows the equally fluctuating political pressures that act on water policy markers, both within each political entity and internationally. From ADR, we have found that successful conflict resolution should be equally dynamic, with constant feedback and iteration incorporated within the process to match the variability of both the physical and the political systems.
Even while recognizing the fluctuations inherent to water basin analysis, we can also recognize the need to examine each option available and its viability at a certain point in time. To bring options and evaluations together, I begin by listing each of the technical options presented in the section on physical science, and adding the policy options recommended by economics. Each option can then be evaluated for its viability, as recommended in three sections - physical sciences, economics, and political science.
I offer three phases to the process of water conflict analysis, parallel to ADR's prenegotiation, negotiation, and implementation (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987). Within each phase, I offer guidelines as suggested by the previous disciplinary discussions. The justification for each phase from ADR is included in parentheses, as are the disciplines that inform each of the guidelines.
- Survey positions, salience, power (political science, ADR)
(Insist on Common Criteria for Analysis)
- Establish overall goals
- Choose an appropriate planning horizon
- Determine future water supply and demand.
- Determine technical and policy options (physical science, economics, political science)
- Measure technical, economic, political viability (physical science, economics, political science).
- "Dis-integrate" resource control to address past and present grievances (history, law, political science)
- Examine details of initial positions for options to induce cooperation (ADR)
- Design plan or project, starting with small-scale implicit cooperation, and building towards ever-increasing integration, always "leading" political relations (political science, ADR dispute systems design).
To match the technical, economic, and political dynamics of the system, I suggest that the process of analysis be both interactive and iterative, as described below.
Preliminary watershed analysis
To develop a suitable strategy for a water basin under conflict, one must determine what technical and policy tools are most appropriate, given the specific physical and political parameters.
The first stage of a preliminary watershed analysis ought to include a brief survey of the current hydropolitical position of each of the actors. Attitudes and power relationships might be examined, which, in addition to future water needs, might suggest what bargaining mix each player will bring to the table. Power, in hydropolitical terms, may include riparian position and legal water rights, in addition to the more traditional forms of political and military power.
Both defined overall goals and a reasonable planning horizon should then be determined. For an overall goal, I suggest "providing for future water needs while alleviating water-related political pressures." I have chosen a 30-year planning horizon, which both allows observation of long-term effects of shortterm policy decisions and provides time for larger technical projects to be implemented and their effects studied.
The next step is to project adequately the water needs for each entity over the planning horizon. For this purpose, a "water stress index," as developed by Falkenmark (1989a), is used that relies on an index of per capita water availability (PCA). Falkenmark (1989a; 1989b) and Falkenmark et al. (1989) describe the combined PCA for a population in a semi-arid region as follows:
Falkenmark combines all uses - domestic, agricultural, and industrial - in her calculations, and includes only natural sources - no additions for reclaimed water or desalination, for example. In actuality, industrialized countries willing to invest heavily in water technology and management might not be under the same "stress" as another country with the same PCA. Nevertheless, from the categories presented, it is clear that policy options are different for countries in different categories. The concept of "drought," for example, might mean a lack of water for survival in Ethiopia, a lack of water for agriculture in Jordan, or a lack of delivery infrastructure in Spain. As described in the next chapter, each of the riparians to the Jordan watershed falls well below the "water barrier."
The next step is to calculate water supply and demand dynamically over the planning horizon. There are dangers associated with any extrapolations over time, which increase, the further into the future a model projects. Patten (1976) and Bossel (1986) discuss ecosystem modelling and the hazards of extrapolation. It is recommended, by these authors and others, that any predictive model should incorporate any of a variety of possible scenarios and that a range of results should be presented. In a model of water supply and demand, these scenarios might include population variations, based on changing birth or death rates or on immigration or emigration. Supply fluctuations from the natural system might be included, as might gains from technical advances or increased cooperation, or losses from global warming or the demands of a higher standard of living. The uncertainties of resource estimates, such as aquifer yield and surface water supplies, should also be included.
A framework for evaluation: Options and viability
TECHNICAL AND POLICY OPTIONS.
Once one knows the planning horizon and goals of a watershed plan, and has calculated what the future water needs are likely to be, one can look to the technical and policy options described in previous sections to determine the most useful strategy over time. These options for overcoming shortages in a watershed, taken from the physical sciences and from economics, are as follows:
- greenhouse technology;
- genetic engineering for drought and salinity resistance.
MEASURES OF VIABILITY.
Once the technical and policy options are known, the next, and probably the most crucial, step is to develop a method for evaluating the options against each other; that is, to create a hierarchy of viability. As explored in previous sections, many disciplines provide their own version of viability. Where an engineer might ask, "Can it be done?", an economist might add, "At what cost?", a political analyst could suggest, "Is it politically feasible?", and anyone environmentally aware might counter, "Should it be done at all?"
One problem with these varied standards of viability is that they often measure at cross purposes, arriving at differing or even contradictory conclusions. Dinar and Wolf (1991), for example, evaluate a potential transfer of water from the Nile to the Jordan basin, in terms of both economic and political viability. Their findings using each standard are in diametric opposition to each other: whereas an economic analysis suggests greater payoffs for larger coalitions of cooperating states, a political investigation shows that the likelihood of such coalitions actually forming decreases as the size of the coalition increases, and that the most likely action is no cooperation whatsoever.
What I propose here is a unified approach to overall viability that incorporates established measures for technical (including environmental), economic, and political viability. Technical viability measures the physical parameters of a system or proposal: how much water might be produced; what is the quality; how reliable is the source, and what are the likely environmental impacts? Economic viability has one primary standard efficiency. For relative water projects, one might use the results of a benefitcost analysis and use the resulting net present value of benefits as a measure or, more directly, the cost per unit water that would result from each project. An im portent economic point is that costs are not fixed over time. A "resource depletion curve" for any project would show at what rate the utility, or value, of a unit of water would begin to drop and, consequently, what the most efficient rate of development would be.
The most tenuous measure is political viability. To incorporate this important parameter in an integrated model, one must use a relative scale for a value that is difficult to quantify. While I recognize the general lack of enthusiasm for quantitative political analysis for its necessarily subjective nature (see Ascher 1989, for a good critique), I recommend the inclusion of results of a process such as the PRINCE Political Accounting System. Coplin and O'Leary (1976) describe the method of incorporating each player's "position," "power," and "salience," for any of a number of policy options, to arrive at a relative ranking of political viability. In Coplin and O'Leary (1983) they extend the process to provide an absolute measure of the likelihood of a policy action taking place. Appendix IV shows how the PRINCE Political Accounting System might be applied to derive a measure for political viability, in this case for a number of possible coalitions for a transfer of water from the Nile to the Jordan basin (Diner and Wolf 1992).
Two other qualitative measures might be used for political viability. For projects within a country, how well a proposal "fits" with national goals might be evaluated. Population control, for example, which might be successful in western Europe or the United States, runs counter to both Israeli and Palestinian interests in numerical superiority. International projects might be determined in terms of relative measures for "equity" of project costs and water distribution, and "control" by each political entity of its own major water sources.
The above measures of viability can be described in qualitative terms (+, 0, - , for example, representing good, neutral, or poor) adequate for a preliminary analysis. If the resources are available to perform a detailed feasibility study, the results can be described quantitatively as well. Listed below are the proposed measures of viability, followed by the possible quantitative standards that might be used:
- quantity (e.g. MCM/yr);
- quality (e.g. ppm salinity or pollutants);
- reliability of source (e.g. standard deviation of flux);
- environmental impact (e.g. detail of potential damage).
- efficiency (net present value of benefits, or cost per unit of water).
- as political probability from PRINCE model, or equity of project cost and water distribution, and control of source by each entity.
RESULTS, ITERATION, AND INTERACTION.
Table 3.1 shows the technical and policy options listed lengthwise, and the possible measures of viability along the top, so that any possible option can then be evaluated with each measure of viability. By examining the results, it should be possible to sense which options are more viable than others, and why. It should be remembered that these results are for a particular geographic location, and for a single point in time.
Although a column is provided for a measure of "overall viability," it is recommended that, if this column is used at all, it be used with great caution. First, each measure does not necessarily have equal weight, and each was arrived at with both some subjectivity and some uncertainty. Adding or multiplying across would therefore only compound and accumulate error. Instead, by leaving the measures separate, one acquires a greater sense of why options are viable and where emphasis can be placed for the future in order to help boost viability. Public awareness, for example, has been shown to be a very cost-effective method of saving water, but the total amount that can be saved is rather small in comparison to the total water budget. In contrast, unlimited water can be made available through desalination, but at a relatively higher cost. The latter might change with technological breakthroughs, but the former is likely to remain fairly constant over time.
As mentioned above, each measure can be evaluated in qualitative terms, such as +, O. - , to represent good, neutral, or poor, or quantitatively, using the values described above. Chapter 4 includes a discussion of the options available to the Jordan River watershed using qualitative values, and several examples of quantitative evaluation are also presented.
It should be emphasized that this evaluation process should be iterative repeated often to allow for the constant changes of so many of the parameters over space and time. Changes that can affect viability include the following:
Table 3.1 Evaluation table for tools to decrease demand or increase supply of water
|Population control||_/_/_/_||________||________ =||________|
|Public awareness||_/_/_/_||________||________ =||________|
|Allow price to reflect true costs (incl. na tional water markets)||_/_/_/_||________||________ =||________|
|Genetic engineering for drought and sal inity resistance|
|Waste-water reclamation||_/_/_/_||________||________ =||________|
|Increase catchment and storage|
|Fossil aquifer develop ment|
|Cooperative Shared information and technology|
|International water markets|
|Interbasin transfers||_/_/_/_||________||____/___ =||________|
|Regional planning||_/_/_/_||________||____/___ =||________|
a. Quantity/quality/reliability/environmental impact.
c. National goals (or international: equity/control).
- Fluctuations in seasonal and annual water supply, as well as long-term changes due to global warming
- Changes in water quality
- Technical breakthroughs
- Relative infrastructure for each party in:
- research and development
- storage and delivery
- Changes in understanding of physical system.
- Movement along the resource depletion curve
- Expense for water resources development
- Changes in efficiency of water use.
- Power relationships
- riparian position
- legal (e.g. clarity of water rights)
- form and stability of government
- Level of hostility.
The evaluation process should also allow for interaction, with ongoing feedback between the disciplines, to reflect real-world influences. For example, a project with extremely positive economic results might help overcome political reluctance to enter into cooperation. Likewise, political constraints can effectively cause a project, which has been judged worthwhile in terms of its technical and economic value, to be vetoed.
Based both on the information of the preliminary watershed investigation and on the ranking of technical and policy options from the evaluation framework described above, a plan can be developed for the watershed in question, both to overcome projected deficits in the water budget and, in the process, to help alleviate water-related political pressures. Lessons from political science in general, and from the region's history of hydropolitics specifically, can be combined to develop a plan for increasing cooperation and integration as political relations develop. The process techniques from ADR can help to guide the actors through the negotiation process and allow feedback for ongoing conflict resolution in the future.
The general steps that might be followed include the following.
DIS-INTEGRATING THE CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES TO ADDRESS PAST AND PRESENT GRIEVANCES.
The previous discussion of history, law, and political science suggests that, because much water conflict has been over ambiguities over water rights, any attempt at cooperative projects preceding the clarification of these rights would be building on years of accumulated ill will. It was also mentioned, in the section on economics, that the clear establishment of property rights is a prerequisite for any market solution. As also discussed previously, the political viability of international planning or projects depends on each entity agreeing on the equity of the project (who gets how much), and on control of the resource (from where, and who controls it). The necessary steps include (a) negotiating property rights to existing resources, (b) guaranteeing control of a water source adequate to meet future needs, and (c) addressing the issue of equity within the design of any cooperative project. As these steps involve a separation of control as a precondition to "integration," we might refer to the process as "disintegration."
EXAMINING THE DETAILS OF INITIAL POSITIONS FOR OPTIONS TO INDUCE COOPERATION.
Each party to negotiations usually has its own interests uppermost in mind. The initial claims, or "starting points" in the language of ADR, often seek to maximize those interests. By closely examining the assumptions and beliefs behind the starting points, one might be able to glean clues for inducing some movement within the "bargaining mix" of each party. These underlying assumptions and beliefs may also provide indications for the creative solutions necessary to move from distributive bargaining ("win-lose") over the amount of water each entity should receive, to integrative bargaining ("win-win") - inventing options for mutual gain.
DESIGNING A PLAN OR PROJECT, STARTING WITH SMALL-SCALE IMPLICIT COOPERATION, AND BUILDING TOWARDS EVERINCREASING INTEGRATION, ALWAYS "LEADING" POLITICAL RELATIONS.
Building on the first two steps, the riparians of a watershed, who have clear water rights and control of enough water for their immediate needs, might begin to work slowly towards increasing cooperation on projects or planning. Even hostile riparians, it has been shown, can cooperate if the scale is small and the cooperation is secret. Building on that small-scale cooperation, and keeping the concerns of equity and control firmly in mind, projects might be developed to increase integration within the watershed, or even between watersheds over time.
The design of a plan or project can incorporate a feedback loop to allow for greater cooperation as political relations develop, encouraging the project always to remain on the cutting edge of political relations. A process for ongoing conflict resolution would also help to relieve tensions that might arise owing to fluctuations in the natural system.
The "cooperation-inducing design" process described in this section can be applied to water rights negotiations, to watershed planning, or to cooperative projects for watershed development, as described in chapter 4.
Because of water's particular "salience" and its singular characteristics as a resource, it is not surprising that water poses a particular challenge for the disciplines that attempt to analyse conflict. Delli Priscoli (1992) lists five kinds of conflicts: value, interest, structural, data, and relationship conflicts. Water has been, and will no doubt continue to be, the source of many conflicts of all five types.
As is seen in this chapter, the disciplines through which we seek to evaluate conflicts have parallel roles, sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory, in the long-term assessment of water basin development. One important point that should be mentioned is that none of the paradigms are autonomous. Just as political considerations can effectively block a project with an otherwise favourable economic evaluation, a project that can be shown to bring greater economic welfare to a region might influence the political decision-making process to allow the necessary cooperation.
Because these disciplines become so intertwined in issues raised by international water scarcity, the proponents of each approach increasingly have to become not only aware, but thoroughly knowledgeable, of the criteria and concerns of the other.
As the interdisciplinary needs of water resources planning draw the worlds of the physical scientist, the economist, and the political analyst increasingly closer, each will have to learn at least a little about the other. Hydrologic variations in water supply and demand, political considerations of equity, control, and ideology, and economic measures of marginal utility and relative advantage, all interact to determine overall viability of solutions to interbasin water issues. But new opportunities to influence, rather than strictly to analyse, the needs and opportunities of a water basin can ensue from a united language, resulting in increased options for the ever-desperate inhabitants of water basins. The results, finally, should be well worth the effort.
One such interdisciplinary framework for water conflict analysis, presented in this chapter, might be applied to any number of the more than 200 international water basins. The results of such an analysis are extremely site specific, however, depending on the unique combination of hydrology and politics of each basin. In chapter 4 this interdisciplinary framework is applied to the Jordan River watershed, to explore options for watershed development and cooperationinducing project design.