|Central Eurasian Water Crisis: Caspian, Aral, and Dead Seas (UNU, 1998, 203 pages)|
|Part IV: The Dead Sea|
|10. Principles for confidence-building measures in the Jordan River watershed|
1. For an update on the Middle East peace talks as related to water resources, see gingham et al. (1994).
2. Flow data are taken from Bakour and Kolars (1994), Garbell (1965), Inbar and Maos (1984), Naff and Matson (1984), p. 182.
3. Not included in this list are the Carmel aquifer, lying wholly in Israel, with a safe yield of 375 MCM/yr, or the sandstone Gaza aquifer, whose 80 MCM/yr yield is currently being seriously overmined.
4. The factors comprise a basin's geography, hydrology, climate, past and existing water utilization, economic and social needs of the riparians, population, comparative costs of alternative sources, availability of other sources, avoidance of waste, practicability of compensation as a means of adjusting conflicts, and the degree to which a state's needs may be satisfied without causing substantial injury to a co-basin state.
5. See, for example, proposals by Kally (1989). Kally contends that "the successful implementation of cooperative projects... will strengthen and stabilize peace" (p. 325). This concept of inducing increasing integration even between actors with some hostility toward each other is also a strategy employed in the United States by the US Army Corps of Engineers, recommended for international settings by Corps representatives.
6. For good information on non-conventional desalination projects, see Murakami (1995).
7. For interesting examples of direct sea-water irrigation, see Hodges et al. (1988).
8. Wishart (1989) provides a good economic analysis of Jordan River water.
9. Most of the following projects are described in detail in Kally (1989).
10. All of the numbers provided here are direct extrapolations of the data provided in the section of this paper entitled "Current water use."
11. For the past decade, the Israelis have sought to build a canal from the Mediterranean Sea that would provide 800 MW of hydro-power by dropping 800 MCM/yr of salt water 400 m at the Dead Sea, the lowest point on earth. Such a Med-Dead Canal would also make possible power generation in "solar ponds," a new technology that takes advantage of heat trapped in the lower layer, which has much higher salinity than that of the Mediterranean. If the focus of the canal project became desalination, rather than strictly power generation, and if Negev and Sinai land were to be set aside for reclamation, many of the regional benefits for immigrant/refugee absorption and for political cooperation of the agro-industrial complex could be realized.