Comparing Country Experiences

In this section, the experiences of the case study countries are compared with respect to the following variables: economic growth (in real per caput GDP), poverty and income inequality, national food security (per caput dietary energy supply) and household food security (proxied by percentage expenditure allocated to food). The economic and food security policies that related to these outcomes are also described.

Key

Model 1

GDPR2 = (GDPRATE + 6)
PREV2 = -PREVRATE

R squared = 0.56
F = 24.9
n = 42

Model 2

R squared = 0.47
F = 35.9
n = 42

Model 1 is equivalent to: PREVRATE = -0.2976 - 0.1794 GDPRATE - 0.03148 (GDPRATE.GDPRATE)

Source: ACC/SCN (1994) p.5

Indonesia

A high real annual per caput GDP growth rate of 6.7% was sustained throughout the 1970s, before dropping to 2.3% between 1980-88. Per caput GDP grew by 110% in real terms between 1970-88 (indicating more than a doubling of real per caput income), a rate surpassed only by Egypt (120%). Growth also was relatively equitable - the incidence of poverty declined from 40% population in 1976 to 15% in 1990, while the ratio of income of the richest 20% to the poorest 20% population dropped slightly from 5.1 in 1981 to 4.7 in 1990. These achievements resulted from a growth strategy based on a labour-intensive approach to agricultural development, with massive investments in rural infrastructure and a programme focusing on providing income-earning opportunities for the marginal poor (Soekirman et al. 1992). The proceeds of oil resources were channelled towards development, particularly into agriculture, where the Green Revolution programmes in rice production transformed the country from a rice importer in the 1970s to self-sufficiency by 1984. Agricultural development was based on appropriate production incentives (through price protection, fertilizer subsidies and a sound credit policy), large-scale investment in irrigation and new technologies that successfully raised both labour demand and agricultural incomes in rural areas. Price policy on rice was crucial to attaining and maintaining self-sufficiency. The government-run food marketing agency (BULOG) ironed out any inter-seasonal and inter-annual fluctuations in rice production by establishing floor and ceiling prices to contain the market, at some cost. This economic performance flourished against the backdrop of political and social stability in the country.

A series of external oil shocks occurred between 1982-87 which stabilized the poverty rate at between 27-29% during this period. In response, a range of structural reforms and adjustment policies were adopted and the government mitigated adverse effects on the poor by re-allocating development expenditure to important social and economic programmes, including agriculture. Between 1987 and 1990, the poverty incidence continued its decline from 27% to 15%. While socially equitable, economic growth was however less regionally so - in 1987 the incidence of poverty in Eastern Indonesia was 25% as compared to 19% in Java and Bali, and less than 10% in the Western islands.

The per caput food production index in 1988-90 of 123 (relative to 1980) was second only to Malaysia, with the mean daily calorie supply of 2750 kcals in 1989 being on a par with Brazil, and up from 1947 kcals per caput in 1968-70. However, the consumption of meats, fish, fruits and vegetables is low in Indonesia which partly determines the high levels of micronutrient deficiencies which exist (Soekirman et al. 1992).

Thailand

Thailand has been transformed from a subsistence agrarian society into a rapidly industrializing country in less than thirty years. Sustained economic growth was achieved in both the 1970s and 1980s, with some of the highest GDP growth rates in the world during the late 1980s, reaching 12.0% and 13.2% in 1988 and 1989. By 1988, real per caput GDP had grown 90% since 1970, equivalent to Malaysia's performance. Growth in the 1960s and 1970s was fuelled by the introduction of predominantly capital-intensive, large-scale technologies, which failed to benefit the majority of semi-subsistence farmers and also those urban poor who moved from the rural areas hoping for a better life. Some benefits of growth did trickle down to the poor, but income distribution and poverty became a major concern in the 1980s. The Gini coefficient of income inequality which was 0.41 in 1962/63 had risen to 0.50 by 1986, approximately that found in Malaysia. Income gaps are widening between agriculture-dependent workers and the rest of the nation and also between regions, with the North and Northeastern regions being poorer than Bangkok and its vicinity (in 1988, per caput income for the Northeastern region was two-thirds the national average). Poverty incidence declined from 57% population in 1962-63, to 39% in 1968-69,31% in 1975-76 and 24% in 1981, when the Poverty Alleviation Plan (PAP) was initiated.

The Poverty Alleviation Plan included programmes that focused on rural job creation, village development, provision of basic services and agricultural production - all targeted to areas with relatively high incidences of poverty. The World Bank estimated that the percentage reduction in poverty was 33% between 1962 and 1986 (World Bank 1991), lower than the figure for Indonesia (41 %, 1970-87) but higher than that of Malaysia (23%, 1973-87) and Singapore (21 %, 1972-82). Poverty incidence however increased by 6% during the recession of 1981-86 in Thailand. Economic gains in the near future are thought more likely to benefit the already better-off households, reliant more on non-agricultural occupations, as a result of foreign capital inflows which largely finance development in non-agricultural activities.

With respect to national food security, Thailand is not only self-reliant in rice, the country's main staple but also one of the world largest exporters (35% of world market in term of quantity, ranking first in 1986). Although food production has been expanding faster than population growth, agriculture's share of GDP had declined to 15% by 1989 compared to 27% in the late 1960s. Food security at the household level is determined in large part by price policies (particularly rice) of the government. Rice contributes 40-90% to calorie intake, and accounts for nearly 20% of the household budget. As one of the largest exporters of rice in the world, Thailand collects a substantial amount from export taxes and uses export control to regulate domestic prices. This has been successful in keeping domestic rice price low -thus, benefiting net purchasers who are predominantly the poorer households. In 1980-85, on average just 30% household expenditure was allocated to food purchases - a lower proportion (indicating stronger food security) than any of the countries studied here, except Malaysia. The latest 1989 estimates put daily caloric supply at 2316 per caput.

Brazil

The economy in Brazil grew at a relatively high rate in the 1970s (averaging 4.0% annual growth in real per caput GDP) before completely stagnating, to -0.2% between 1980-88. Brazil has been characterized as an example of "unaimed opulence" (Dreze and Sen 1989) whereby the overriding objective is a higher per caput GNP, regardless of the means adopted or their results. The findings of Iunes and Monteiro (1992) to a large degree bear this out. For example, while real per caput GDP in 1990 was 3.4 times that in 1960, the proportionate share of the poorest 40% of the population remained at around 7% during this entire period. The ratio of the income of the highest 20% of the population to the lowest 20% was 26.1 for Brazil in 1990 compared to 4.7 for Indonesia (World Bank 1991). The Gini coefficient increased from 0.50 in 1960 to 0.64 in 1989 - among the highest values recorded. The Gini for landholding is even higher, at 0.86 in 1980 (UNDP 1993, p29). This high degree of social and regional inequality resulted from a capital-intensive, regionally-biased route to growth. There was however a decline in the proportion of Brazilian population living below the poverty line⁵, from 58% in 1970 to 27% in 1980 mostly driven by the huge growth of the 1970s. As growth stagnated in the 1980s, poverty worsened, and the proportion of the population below the poverty line rose to 35% by 1989. In the poor Northeast, the poverty decline in this period was from 77% in 1970 to 50% in 1980 and 60% in 1989, while in the rich Southeast the corresponding figures were 38%, 12% and 24%. Much rural poverty in Brazil translated into urban poverty with rural-urban migration accounting for the fall in the proportion of the rural population below the poverty line. Thus, regional disparities increased although significant improvements in growth-mediated poverty reduction occurred in all areas of the country in the 1970s (Iunes and Monteiro 1992). The nutritional achievements of the past two decades in Brazil can considered in the light of two important outcomes of the growth of the 1970s - the substantial reduction in the proportion of people living under conditions of extreme poverty, and the increase in resources available for social investments (see next section).

⁵ This poverty line uses the minimum wage of May 1980 as a basis, and controls for the possibility of the government choosing to hold the minimum wage below the rate of inflation.

Food entitlements acquired through non-income channels apparently have had a limited influence on the nutritional improvement observed in Brazil, due largely to the low effectiveness of the Brazilian nutritional programmes. The behaviour of food prices, in aligning very closely to inflation, while not a contributing factor to the improvements, did not represent an obstacle either (Iunes and Monteiro 1992). Per caput dietary energy supply in 1990 was 2751 kcals (equivalent roughly to Malaysia and Indonesia), up from 2472 kcals in 1970.

Mexico

Like Brazil, the economic growth of the 1970s (mean annual per caput real GDP growth of 3.7%) began to be reversed in the 1980s (-1.8% between 1980-88), although both the increase and decline where less dramatic than in Brazil. Real per caput GDP in 1988 was 20% higher than in 1970, compared to Brazil's 70% real growth in this period. Poverty incidence dropped from 76% of the population in 1960 to 45% in 1981, before rising to 51% in 1987. In 1984, 50% of income was owned by the wealthiest 20% population, just over 10% was owned by the poorest 40%, and only 1.3% by the poorest 10% - proportions that have changed little since the late 1960s. By the mid-1970s, the Mexican government's high level of social expenditure was increasing rapidly ahead of public sector revenues, and external borrowing became an important source of revenue. The country's foreign debt grew from US$ 4.5 billion in 1970 to US$ 85 billion in 1990, implying a per caput debt of close to US$ 1,000. Fiscal austerity measures were first implemented in 1976, but the discovery of new oil reserves soon thereafter encouraged the government to maintain high levels of public spending. Inflation, however, continued to soar, reaching 98% in 1982. Moreover, Mexico became increasingly dependent on oil-export revenues while non-oil exports deteriorated. By 1982, the recessionary conditions of the developed countries, falling oil prices, and rising interest rates, led to massive capital flight and further economic decline. The country faced the most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression. Mexico declared a moratorium on its external debt, precipitating a major debt crisis. The government responded by implementing a three-year stabilization programme formally agreed upon with the IMF in late 1982. With lower investment, on the one hand, and restrictive demand management, on the other, there was no cumulative real growth between 1982 and 1988, and per caput GNP continued to severely fall. The country finally showed signs of recovery in 1987/88. Wage earners suffered severe economic hardships during the 1980s: surveys carried out by the National Consumer Institute and the National Nutrition Institute show that in 1988, the purchasing power of wages was 50% less than in 1980.

As well as social inequality, regional biases operated against the southern largely Indian population during its growth process (Chavez et al. 1992). About 29% of the Mexican population reside in rural areas, and of these, 80% population are below the poverty line, and 40% in 'extreme poverty' - the latter group comprises most of the Indian population, migrating workers, cane sugar cutters, coffee pickers, and small unirrigated landholders. In the 1970s and 1980s, various rural development programmes were implemented, albeit concentrated in the richer irrigated north. The National Solidarity Programme (PRONASOL), implemented by the present administration is a multi-faceted poverty alleviation programme targeted to the rural and urban poor, and Amerindian communities.

Agriculture accounts for only 9% of GDP but employs around 26% of the total working population, mainly smallholders. The agricultural sector decelerated in growth in the 1950s, was stagnant in the 1960s and 1970s and had negative growth in the 1980s, reflecting the urban biased pattern of development in Mexico. Corn is the principle staple and Mexico was able to export large quantities in the mid-1960s. Since the early 1970s, food imports of corn and other cereals have steadily grown. In 1990, the country imported 4 million metric tons of corn out of a total consumption of 18.6 million tons, which permitted the maintenance of a relatively high dietary energy supply - 3052 kcals per caput in 1990 -albeit at a high price.

Regarding household food security, hyperinflation rose rapidly in the late 1980s and caused serious hardships for workers since wages did not keep up with these price increases (although the food price index rose more slowly). The purchasing power of the minimum legal wage in Mexico City dropped steadily throughout the 1980s, hitting its lowest level in 1988 when it bought only one-half the value of 1978. The proportion of families that spent more than 60% of their wages on food increased from 22% in 1981 to 35% in 1987. The government has taken some action to help the food insecure during the late 1980s phase of structural adjustment, through eliminating many general food subsidies which were not reaching the poor, and emphasizing instead the use of income-targeted subsidies. By 1989, more than one-third of the $1.4 billion devoted to food subsidies was used for targeted programmes such as these, despite criticisms of inefficient targeting.

India

Since the late 1970s the Indian government's economic policies have tended towards liberalization of trade, with flexible exchange rates to encourage the growth of exports. Foreign debt has risen due partly to a disappointing export growth, and reluctance on the part of the government to raise taxes, thus creating the need to borrow from other countries for revenue. IMF-induced cuts on fertilizer subsidies have caused food prices to rise in the 1990s. The economic growth of India during the 1970s was nil (with a mean annual real per caput GDP growth rate of -0.0%.) This improved significantly in the 1980s to 2.8% (bettered only by Pakistan and Thailand). The real per caput GDP in 1988 however was only 20% higher than in 1970 (the second lowest aggregate proportionate growth in this period behind Nigeria). Government expenditure has been burdened with major commitments to defense, which curtails investment in production and the social sector.

Agricultural policy is one of the main development policies in India and particularly relevant to nutrition. In the early days of the Green Revolution there was a considerable degree of "betting on the strong" - focusing the new technologies on the richer farmers (through preferential access to credit and institutions) who would be in a better position to make rapid gains. Now however, as a result of the polarization between the rich and poor that this initially caused, the application of technologies has become more scale-neutral. Poorer farmers now find it somewhat easier to obtain credit to purchase the new technological package of fertilizers, pesticides and irrigation, and the degree of social inequality has declined to some extent. Landless labourers also benefit in that agricultural demand has increased and cropping can be done year round.

Alongside this conventional agriculture-based growth strategy, the public food distribution system (PDS) and a battery of poverty-alleviation programmes have been aimed at maintaining equity and social security. While the Government of India has continued to be guided by the principle of economic growth with equity, in practice the economy has been two-track - with conventional growth on the one hand and special poverty alleviation programmes ostensibly for those groups not benefiting, on the other. The latter included the National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) since renamed Jawahar Rozgar Yojana, and the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) - the former based on wage employment on public works, the latter on income-generation through asset and credit endowment. Along with the PDS, these programmes however did tend to suffer from a common paradox in that they existed and tended to work better where they were least needed. This was partly a consequence of their top-down nature, being demanding on an centrally-controlled administrative structure for implementation. Decentralization to block levels has been recommended to increase their relevance for the poor. Nevertheless, the PDS and the NREP are likely to have made a significant contribution in terms of the observed reductions in poverty and inequality in rural India, and to buffering the food security of the most nutritionally vulnerable households (Reddy et al. 1992).

This two-track strategy led to the incidence of poverty dropping from 48% population in 1977-78 to 29% in 1987-88. Income distribution also improved, with the poorest 40% of the population owning 21 % of income in 1989-90 (and the Gini coefficient dropping below 0.3). Kakwani and Subbarao (1990) argue that the poverty and income inequality reductions between at least 1977 and 1983 were associated with these poverty alleviation programmes, rather than any trickle-down effect of economic growth via increases in aggregate foodgrain production. In contrast, economic growth in the mid-1980s was felt to have been the main driving force behind the more recent change.

Since the mid-1970s, the National Nutrition Monitoring Bureau (NNMB) have shown that, at the household level, calorie and other nutrient consumption has remained more or less unchanged on average, at 2,300-2,400 kcals per adult equivalent in the 1980s. There was some indication of reduced inequality of consumption as the energy intakes of landless labourers increased slightly during the decade, unlike other occupational groups. The calorie intake of preschool children also increased, suggesting an intrahousehold adjustment. Thus, although there has been a reduction in the incidence of rural poverty and inequality, the household food security situation in India has not changed since the mid-1970s.

As social inequality may be lessening in India, however, regional inequality seems to be worsening. 'Green revolution' technologies were only effective if a constant supply of water and fertilizer could be assured. In the (usually poorer) villages dependent on rainfed agriculture, there was no "revolution". This was also reflected in comparisons by state, with the Punjab, Maharasthra, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka benefiting most from the new technologies. At state level, a strong positive relationship between agricultural growth and poverty reduction has been demonstrated in studies in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and the Punjab (Jazairy et al. 1992). There are likewise marked inter-state variations, with percentages 'in poverty' (in 1987-8) ranging from 41 % in Bihar to 7% in the Punjab. A poverty belt stretches across central-eastern India with the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar Orissa and Madhya Pradesh containing high concentrations of poor people.

Pakistan

At the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan had a very small industrial base. During the 1950s, a successful policy of import-substituting industrialization was pursued. During the 1960s, the government embarked on an export promotion strategy, while maintaining high protective barriers for its domestic industry, and private investment broadened into new areas, such as chemicals and fertilizer. In 1972, wide scale nationalization took place and public investment increased rapidly while growth in private industry stagnated. Growth in manufacturing fell to less than 4% per annum during this period. In 1977, the government sought to de-regulate the economy. The new planners relied heavily on privatization, the elimination of subsidies and promotion of large-scale manufacturing. Economic growth was slow in real terms in the 1970s, with an annual growth of real per caput GDP of 1.3%. In the 1980s, however, growth took off (with a mean annual rate of 4.0% between 1980-88 - the highest of all countries reviewed in this period). The economy thus grew by 40% in real per caput terms between 1970 and 1988, proportionately twice the growth in India.

While structural transformations occurred, with an increasing role played by the manufacturing and service sectors, the economy experienced healthy growth rates in nearly all sectors. Increasing real wages brought about by the expanding domestic economy and the strong demand for agricultural labour following the 'green revolution' and the migration of the rural workers to the Middle East in the 1970s has managed to spread the gains from this growth. These trends in income have been translated into reduced poverty in the country as a whole. Poverty alleviation strategies also sought to improve the productivity and growth of the rainfed agricultural regions, improve cottage industries, strengthen rural social services and invest in rural infrastructure. The national-level population incidence of poverty declined markedly from 54% in 1969-70 to 30% in 1984-85, with rural incidence being slightly higher than that for urban areas. The income share of the poorest 40% of the population in 1991 was 21%, similar to the India figure. The Gini coefficient for landholdings was quite high in 1980 at 0.54 (UNDP 1993, p29), indicating greater inequality in land than income. As in India, these positive proportionate trends were offset in absolute terms by the rapid population growth rate. Pakistan has also had a major burden of defense spending.

Pakistan remains a predominantly agricultural-based economy, with about 50% of its population directly dependent on agriculture for its livelihood. The agricultural sector experienced low growth until the mid-1960s when the green revolution' initiated an era of rapid output expansion. The early phase of agricultural growth depended on expanding the extensive marginal lands, made possible by large scale canal irrigation projects and tubewell irrigation. By the early 1970s, the best cultivable land was brought into cultivation, and further gains in output growth had to come from improved yields. This has occurred in the last ten years with improved water management, greater use of fertilizer and availability of credit. The early gains associated with the 'green revolution' continued, with production increasing by 50% between 1978-81 and 1990. Compared to most developing countries, Pakistan has a low level of agricultural production instability, which is due mainly to its extensive irrigation system. The government's involvement in the agricultural sector has been successful in maintaining stable wheat prices. The wheat storage and stabilization policies were able to move wheat from surplus to deficit years and from surplus to deficit seasons, to ensure a flow of supply at most times. High population growth rates have however placed a burden on per caput dietary energy supply, which has remained between 2000-2200 kcals for the last two decades (as in India). A food distribution system using ration shops, started in 1947, continued in various forms until 1987 when it was eliminated, as a result of ineffective targeting of the rural poor. The system was replaced with a more general subsidy on wheat, which reduced the price of wheat and increased consumer welfare as well as reducing the unauthorized rents that accrued under the old system.

Egypt

The real per caput GDP growth rate in the 1970s was greater than that achieved by any of the other countries studied (8.4% mean), while growth slowed to 1.5% between 1980-88. Overall, however, the economy of Egypt grew by 120% in real per caput terms between 1970 and 1988. This was achieved through following a regionally-biased pattern of development which concentrated growth in a few sectors. The economic policies involved the protection of the urbanized sector of the economy at the expense of the rural poor; in the mid-1980s, rural incomes, on average, were only a third of urban incomes. After experiencing rapid economic growth in the late 1970s, Egypt's economic position started to deteriorate in 1981, when the oil-related sources of foreign exchange started to fall. From 1985 onwards, the country faced significant difficulties in covering its debt service obligations, and the economy took a downturn in the late 1980s. Since 1986, the government has been gradually implementing structural reforms to reduce its deficit imbalances, involving social sector cutbacks, designed to reduce inefficiency in current social programmes. In contrast to Indonesia though, Egypt was less successful in translating these gains into reductions in the incidence of poverty - which remained between 30-35% of the population between 1958-59 and 1984. It should be noted however that the poverty line is based on the level of income necessary to purchase a minimum nutritionally-adequate food basket, at official market prices. Thus, the effect of the massive food subsidies is not taken into account in this measure of poverty - consequently poverty, in this case, may not be strongly correlated with nutrition. The Gini coefficient for landholding, however, was quite low at 0.35 in 1984 (UNDP 1993, p29). Poverty alleviation programmes included measures for the redistribution and reclamation of land, and subsidies on agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and credit. Although very costly, the massive general food subsidy programme undoubtedly has had a positive impact on nutrition (although the opportunity cost is unknown).

Regarding national food security, the government's exchange rate and trade policies which encouraged imports of food, particularly wheat, led to a relative decline in the country's ability to feed itself (production was less than a quarter of the consumption of wheat in 1988). In spite of this decline in food self-sufficiency however, dietary energy supply rose from 2500 per caput kcals in 1970 to over 3300 kcals in 1990 - at a high cost in foreign exchange for the food imports. The government's commitment to low food prices for consumers led to the imposition of tight regulations placed upon agricultural producers which acted as production disincentives. Under a liberalization programme, launched in 1986-87 in connection with an IMF Stand-by Arrangement, the government reduced its intervention in crop planting decisions, opened up marketing channels, and raised producer prices for some commodities, which raised production of some crops in the latter half of the 1980s. Liberalization measures however also meant increased food prices and thus increased expenditures for net purchasers. Until the early 1990s, Egypt had one of the largest food subsidy schemes in the world, which successfully increased per caput dietary energy supply to levels comparable to developed countries, as mentioned. A 1981 survey of actual food intake of the population showed levels of consumption in excess of requirements; on average, caloric intake per caput was 2840 kcals. In 1989, approximately 93% of the population received some form of ration card, with wheat, flour, and bread being sold at a fixed subsidized price, uniform throughout the country, in unlimited quantities. As part of the structural adjustment programme, attempts were made to identify targeted interventions to more efficiently benefit low-income consumers who would otherwise be significantly hurt by the increased prices.

Tanzania

The poorest of the countries reviewed, Tanzania emerged slowly from prolonged economic decline during the 1980s. Real per caput GDP in 1988 was just $488 - only 30% higher than the 1970 figure. Annual real per caput GDP growth averaged 3.0% in the 1970s, before becoming negative (-0.5%) in the 1980-88 period. The first half of the 1980s was characterized by a severe economic crisis when production in all major sectors declined steadily, leading to a decline in per caput incomes, while in the second half, a structural adjustment programme was implemented. There is no trend data in the incidence of poverty, although World Bank data on income distribution show a deterioration between 1970-75 and 1991 when the share of the poorest 40% population dropped from 16% to 8%. Future growth is said (Kavishe 1993) to require an increasing return from the country's main cash crops - coffee and cloves, although world prices for both of these products have been low and remain unreliable.

Although not a famine-prone country, Tanzania cannot be described as food-secure. For the majority of Tanzanians, agriculture is the main source of livelihood, engaging some 85-90% of the country's labour force on mostly small-scale farms. Although well-endowed with land resources, Tanzania imported huge amounts of grain every year, and growth in the agricultural sector was slow, with a rate of only 1.4% on average between 1978-88. Despite the occasional maize and rice surpluses, there were severe internal food distribution problems. Most of the production occurs around the borders of the country, necessitating transport into the central populous urban centres, creating problems of transport and seriously questioning the long-term economic viability of such an approach to national food security. The situation is compounded by the growing urban population resulting from high birth rates and migration from the countryside.

In the 1980s, per caput dietary supply dropped from 2461 kcals in 1980 to 2206 kcals in 1990. In the early 1980s, scarcities of basic food staples became widespread, leading to extensive government controls, with essential goods rationed through special permits. Prices of food outstripped the growth in the overall consumer price index. On average, Tanzanians allocate 64% of their expenditure to food (the highest proportion of countries reviewed) indicating the high cost of household food security. The real value of formal sector earnings depreciated by 20% during the 1980s. Whereas in 1980 a days minimum wage could buy nearly 13 kgs of maize flour (the basic urban staple), in 1990 it could buy less than 2 kgs. The situation was made worse by the scarcity of commodities including food during the first half of the 1980s.

Zimbabwe

Economic growth was 2.4% (mean annual per caput real GDP growth) in the 1970s, before dropping to -1.3% between 1980-88 (second lowest behind Nigeria). Real per caput GDP in 1988 was just 30% higher than the 1970 figure, and the economy's decline has accelerated in the early 1990s (per caput GNP from $640 in 1990 to $450 in 1992). Data for poverty and income distribution are virtually non-existent, although one national poverty survey in 1988 gave a high figure of 60% rural population below the poverty line.

Zimbabwe inherited an economy with structural problems characterized by high levels of inflation and government deficit. Some economic growth occurred during the early post independence years primarily as the result of successive good agricultural seasons. Real incomes for the majority of wage earners increased substantially in 1981-82 as the result of minimum wage policies and subsidies on a number of basic food commodities. Drought and international recession however soon led to decreasing per capita GNP from 1983. In 1983, the government began to implement a series of economic stabilization and adjustment measures to improve the economy, including devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, restrictions on government spending and the removal of consumer subsidies. At independence, the agricultural sector reflected colonial policies of segregation and preferential treatment of whites, resulting in the creation of a dualistic farming system. Large commercial farms on fertile land were owned by a small white minority, while less-fertile land owned by Africans was given over to subsistence production. While the government attempted some resettlement programmes, more extensive effort was made to raise production on smallholder farms, through high producer prices, input subsidies and extension services. During 1980-86, smallholder producers increased their contribution to total agricultural production from 15% to 35%, to marketed maize from 10 to 40%, and to cotton production from 7% to 53%. The agricultural sector grew by 4% per year in real terms during this period. However, the eroded productive base for maize since 1986 can no longer guarantee a national surplus, even during a normal rainfall year. The serious drought conditions in 1991 exhausted the country's stocks. The drought continued into 1992 (when agricultural sector output dropped by 40%), requiring substantial food aid from donor countries. Trends in calorie availability per caput had been fluctuating between 2100 to 2300 in the 1980s - generally lower in the drought years.

The Zimbabwean government's main policy response to chronic and transitory (seasonal) food insecurity has been drought relief food transfer programs, which currently feed over a million people per month. The need for these costly short-run programmes became apparent only after long-run food policies had failed. The manifestation of this failure was the absence of direct trade between grain surplus and deficit areas and its replacement with circuitous grain flows featuring redundant transport routes, overcentralized and high-cost milling operations, and artificially inflated consumer prices of staple food. This appears to be a major cause of food insecurity and loss of real income among the rural and urban poor. If national maize shortages persist, the government's ability to cushion vulnerable groups through conventional food and income transfers will be affected.

Nigeria

In the 1970s, the Nigerian economy grew at a mean annual per caput real GDP growth rate of 1.1%, before it collapsed to -5.3% in the 1980-88 period. In 1988, real per caput GDP was 80% what it had been in 1970. As one of the major oil-suppliers in the world, Nigeria experienced huge windfall profits from the high oil prices of the late 1970s. Exports were boosted from US$ 4 billion in 1975 to US$ 26 billion in 1980. The per caput GNP rose from US$ 440 in 1975 to over US$ 1,000 in 1980. The oil boom, however, did not significantly contribute to manufacturing or agriculture, but rather saw the rise of the urban service sector. This contributed in turn to an increased rate of rural to urban migration, and a significant rise in imports. The end of the oil-boom started in 1981, when Nigeria was forced to reduce extraction to boost oil prices. The government dealt with declining government revenues by public sector borrowing, running down international reserves, and accumulating large payments arrears on external trade deficits. Real wages declined severely by more than 50% between 1982 and 1986; a statutory wage freeze in both the public and private sectors, introduced in 1982, was compounded by salary cuts in 1985 of up to 20% for public sector employees.

When the oil price collapsed in 1986, the Nigerian economy went into a slump. The GNP per capita fell to US$ 370 in 1987 and US$ 290 in 1990. The new government in 1986 was prompted by the IMF to undergo a structural adjustment programme, which included devaluation of the naira, and stringent debt management among other reforms. Many Nigerians faced a decline in their standard of living during the 1980s. Expansionary policies in 1987-1988 exacerbated a weather-related drop in food production, resulting in a 40% increase in the rate of inflation. Until 1991, the government refused to adjust the minimum wage, although food prices were rising rapidly. While Nigeria has somewhat reduced its dependence on oil, this still accounts for 95% of foreign exchange earnings and 80% of government revenue.

In the 1960s, Nigeria was self-sufficient in food, except for wheat and dairy products, which were imported. Since 1972, however, food shortages became common due to neglect of the agriculture sector, and food imports rose dramatically throughout the 1970s. The structural adjustment programme in 1986 raised producer prices, removed input subsidies and, as a result of shifts in relative prices, induced some farmers to shift from food crops to cash crops. In 1985, the government banned imports of food items such as maize, rice, and wheat in order to stimulate local food production. Despite large price rises (about 300% between 1988 and 1989) however, production has not kept pace with demand.

Trends in calorie availability per caput show a deterioration over the last 20 years. The calorie supply reached 2412 per caput in 1974, declining to around 2147 in 1990. Households earning less than 450 naira (urban) and 300 naira (rural) a month are defined as living below the poverty line. The 1985-86 data showed that 22% of urban households and 17% of rural households have expenditures of less than 250 naira per month. It is widely accepted that the urban areas of the country are more food-insecure than the rural areas, due to rising food prices. Retail prices of all food crops increased at a tremendous rate, by 250 to 700% between 1986 and 1989. For most of the last two decades, the food price index increased more than the general consumer price index. While this benefited producers of cash crops such as cocoa and cotton, and, to a smaller extent, cassava and rice, it caused serious hardship for consumers as incomes did not rise correspondingly.

Regionally, the Southern part of the country is the most vulnerable; it has the highest rates of urbanization and the lowest average landholding size per caput. This is reflected in estimates of average calorie consumption in these regions - the 1985-86 surveys showed that the Southwest and Southeast regions had daily per capita calorie intakes ranging from 1830 to 1860 compared to over 2000 for the Northwest regions.