Policies and Programs for Reducing Food Insecurity

What, then, have been the main policies and programs initiated to prevent famine? Why has progress been slow? What approaches seem promising?

Changing National Food Policies

The economies of Ethiopia and Sudan are dominated by agriculture, but the treatment of the agricultural sector has differed in each country, which has had important implications for their food security status. Prior to the mid-1970s both invested in agriculture mainly to raise exports through mechanized and irrigated farming. However, after the 1973/74 food crisis, they reoriented their priorities toward increasing domestic food supply.

The Sudanese government implemented a "breadbasket" strategy in the late 1970s specifying the goal of national self-sufficiency in wheat and sorghum. In the early 1980s, the government advocated the key role of smallholder rainfed agriculture. Although these plans were never fully realized, the goals remained highly visible in the public policies of subsequent governments. A combination of monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, and institutional reforms were brought to bear on the problems of low agricultural productivity, marketing constraints, and declining export revenues. However, widespread food insecurity deepened into famine in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. The government employed an extensive, largely urban-focused food subsidy system for bread and a rationing scheme for sugar to assure basic access to food. The system became unsustainable during the foreign exchange and food crises of the late 1980s.

Macroeconomic reforms that were associated with frequent shifts in government priorities, partial programs, and piecemeal measures, together with the debilitating effects of several years of continuous drought and war in the south, contributed to poor performance of the agriculture and food sector. Current needs are so extreme that the food security policies now in place will have to be totally redesigned in the context of comprehensive macroeconomic reform.

In Ethiopia, the 1974 famine was responsible for reorienting policy away from irrigated export farming toward smallholder agriculture. There were fundamental changes in land tenure, asset ownership, and labor laws, but agricultural investment remained concentrated in the capital-intensive state farm and cooperative sectors. Although an extensive procurement and distribution system of basic staples existed to assure access to food, the new policies proved incapable of forestalling either a continued decline in domestic cereal production (which has fallen at an annual rate of 4 kilograms per capita from the 1960s), or the 1984/85 famine. The policies based on centralized planning and mass ownership of assets were abandoned, and liberalization of trade, price, and ownership laws were pursued in 1989/90. But as in the case of Sudan, such changes could only have a medium-term effect and came too late to prevent renewed famine in 1991. The new government of Ethiopia is in the process of redefining its food security agenda.

Programs and Projects to Improve Food Security

In addition to public manipulation of prices, markets, and capital investments, the overall policies outlined above were also pursued through the implementation of numerous food security projects and programs. A selection of these are considered below, grouped according to their primary objectives.

Production Enhancement Projects

The generation and dissemination of improved agricultural technology is key to sustainable long-term food security in the two countries, both through the potential of the technology to enhance productivity and through its related capacity to increase rural employment and income. Innovations have to some extent been promoted in Ethiopia and Sudan. These innovations include advanced irrigation technology (Ethiopia), genetically-improved livestock (Ethiopia and Sudan), improved animal traction (Ethiopia), and greater use of chemical fertilizers and higher-yielding cultivars (Ethiopia and Sudan).

In Sudan, for example, the Jebel Mara Rural Development Project in Darfur is a long-term rural development project that has an agricultural technology promotion component. The project provides participants with access to improved cultivars, fertilizers, animal traction, and extension advice. The project is located in a relatively high potential area, given the conditions of Darfur. During the 1984/85 crisis, villages participating in the project and thus having access to modern inputs through extension services were better able to cope than nonparticipating villages (Table 2). Furthermore, within the participating villages, households that participated in the project had higher grain production per capita and enough to meet calorie needs, which meant that fewer household members were forced to migrate in search of food. In households with no access to the improved crop technology, twice as much migration out of the area occurred and the proportion of female-headed households doubled to 47 percent in the crisis year. The proportion of female-headed households remained constant at 10 percent among farm households with access to improved crop technology.²⁵ A concentration of technological change in a comparatively high potential area provided respite for drought refugees from a large surrounding area.

Table 2 - Grain production before, during, and after 1984/85 drought by participation in Jebel Mara Project, Sudan

Source: Tesfaye Teklu, Joachim von Braun, and Elsayed Zaki, Drought and Famine Relationships in Sudan: Policy Implications, Research Report 88 (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 1991).

The success of this project in coping with the 1984/85 drought highlights the key role that improved agricultural technology can play in famine prevention and mitigation. To rebuild productive capacity of households, nonfood emergency relief included sometimes the distribution - often on credit - of oxen, cows, goats, seeds, farm equipment, and other like assets. The distribution of such assets is designed to accelerate post-famine rehabilitation of the rural economy, and, therefore, shorten the period of food insecurity. Although distribution of assets has been useful in reducing suffering, the long-term impact has been limited. In Ethiopia, many animals died quickly due to diseases and a lack of fodder, and many of the poorest households were forced to sell their assets before the next cropping season because their immediate need for food was so great. To protect such long-term assets requires short-term support packages of food or cash.

Income and Employment Projects

Agricultural production promotion is vital but not sufficient for famine prevention because households that have been displaced and have lost productive assets become increasingly vulnerable and dependent on the labor market. Public works projects that are labor intensive can play a vital role in supporting the purchasing power of the poor. Such projects, which involve the building of infrastructure such as roads and bridges upon which further development depends, prevent migration away from the area to camps or cities. Such projects have been used as a tool for food and/or income relief in both Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ethiopia has an unusually rich experience with public works programs dating back to the 1960s. Attempts have been made to mobilize labor for environmental conservation and enhancement activities (mainly soil and water conservation and afforestation), and at the same time to improve the food security of the poor. Participants of most projects have been paid in food. The World Food Program (WFP) operates the largest food-for-work program in Africa in Ethiopia. It provides 27 million workdays of employment per year and 250,000 tons of food.²⁶ Participating households are paid a standard ration of 3 kilograms of cereal per day. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has also operated similar projects that pay wages in cash.²⁷ A recent survey of several such projects found that when local and regional markets functioned effectively, most participants favored wages in cash.²⁸ Project evaluations of public works have generally been satisfactory, but concerns remain about post-project asset deterioration due to insufficient maintenance and poor technical standards (see Table 3).²⁹

Table 3 - Selected public works programs, Ethiopia

^a F = food wage; C = cash wage; V = voluntary participation (no wage); S = self-help (cash to support private initiatives).

Source: Patrick Webb, Joachim von Braun, and Yisehac Yohannes, "Famine in Ethiopia: Policy Implications of Coping Failure at National and Household Levels" (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., 1991, mimeo).

Although public works have not been as widely used in Sudan, experience in this country dates back to employment programs for famine prevention in the 1920s that were modeled along the lines of successful Indian programs.³⁰ In 1984, a large project in White Nile Province came into operation that combined irrigation, erosion control, and road building works. This project has provided wage employment of more than 300,000 man-days between 1984 and 1988.³¹ Wages were paid in a combination of food and cash.

It should be noted that during the 1984/85 famine, most food-for-work projects, when most needed, came to a standstill because of logistical and administrative problems. Indeed, both Sudan and Ethiopia are a long way from being able to expand their public works rapidly during crises (as India has been able to do), and, thereby, capitalize on the potential of this tool to mitigate famine.

Labor-intensive public works programs have a great deal of potential for addressing food insecurity, providing direct and sustainable poverty alleviation, and strengthening self-help capacities. In addition, they can be designed to reach the neediest: when wage rates are set properly, they attract only the poor. The lack of adequate institutional capacities is a real constraint, but one that can be overcome. Food security issues need to enter more fully into policy formulation. Similarly, public works programs need to be integrated into the national planning system for infrastructure and other public goods provision to ensure useful and sustainable asset creation. Especially where whole communities get involved, community participation in setting priorities needs to be strengthened to encourage commitment to maintenance.

Storage and Distribution Policies

One of the immediate responses to the droughts of the late 1960s and early 1970s was a move toward improving the domestic cereal stocks, both as a way to stabilize prices and to establish security reserves for future production shortfalls.

Community-level grain storage is rare in Ethiopia and Sudan, but attempts were made in both countries in the 1970s to establish national food security reserves that would contribute to price stabilization and timely food aid distribution. In Ethiopia, the RRC, founded in 1974, is responsible for monitoring and alleviating the effects of drought. While the RRC has received much praise for its early-warning and aid coordination activities, its success in establishing a food reserve has been limited because donors have preferred to keep aid stocks under their own control. As a result, strategic reserves have never reached planned levels, and the drawing down of stocks has had little effect on reducing the gap between production shortfalls and need.

In Sudan, the Agricultural Bank of Sudan has maintained cereal buffer stocks in an effort to stabilize prices since the 1960s. Capital and storage constraints have limited the size of such stocks to less than 10 percent of total domestic production in any one season.³² The tardy and ineffectual role played by the government in distributing food during 1984/85 was at least in part due to such constraints on the system.

There is little doubt that both Ethiopia and Sudan would benefit from effectively managed grain reserves placed near high-risk areas under the control of local authorities. The drawing down of such reserves would have to follow clear guidelines regarding eligibility, timing, and mode of distribution, for instance in the context of labor-intensive public works programs. In the food-deficit regions of the worst famine-prone countries, this remains an important responsibility of the public sector that the private sector will not be assuming in the foreseeable future.

Early Warning Systems

A precondition for effective emergency relief is the operation of appropriate early warning systems. Much effort has been put into the development and fine-tuning of information systems relevant to crisis prediction and prevention in the study countries.

Ethiopia set up Africa's first early warning system in 1977 and in 1980 extended this with an Early Warning and Planning Service operated by the RRC. Sudan established an RRC in 1985 and in 1986 it established an early warning unit of agencies that assemble and distribute information relevant to crisis prediction. However, the lack of financial or administrative capacity for responding to warning signals reduces the relevance of these agencies. Neither country systematically monitors nutrition indicators within these systems. In 1991, there was even less information available about the nutritional situation of the population, particularly children, in the affected areas of western Sudan than there was during the 1985 famine, when some monitoring took place. But early warnings have not proven to be sufficient for preventing famine. In both Ethiopia and Sudan, there was plenty of information warning of the 1984/85 famine long before it assumed unmanageable proportions. Thus, the success of famine prevention or mitigation rests on political will and financial and bureaucratic capabilities, which in both countries have been poor.

Food Aid

Ethiopia and Sudan have become highly dependent on food aid during the past 10 years. There were major waves of food aid into Sudan in 1984/85, 1988, and 1989. While the food arrived too late to prevent mass migration from the western and central parts of the country, it did serve to prevent deaths on an even greater scale than what occurred.

Ethiopia has received even more food aid than Sudan since 1984, with imports exceeding 1 million tons in 1988 and again in 1991. IFPRI surveys suggest some effectiveness in targeting the most needy. Households consuming only 1 meal per day during the famine received more food aid than households consuming 3 meals, and women-headed households received at least as much food as those headed by men.³³ However, universal eligibility also diluted the amounts available, and an average of only 180 kilograms was received per household during the worst year - sufficient to maintain a family of six for only two months.

Health and Sanitation

Food emergencies in Ethiopia and Sudan have often been accompanied by health service emergencies. Not only does reduced dietary intake lead to increased health risks but, at the same time, health services and - in drought-prone areas - access to safe water are also reduced. Analyses explaining nutritional status (weight-for-age) of preschool children in Sudan find that after access to food, the prevalence of diarrhea and distance to a health center are the most powerful explanatory variables.³⁴ The prevalence of diarrhea was found to be much influenced by the access to piped water.

Public action groups can play a key role in preventing these adverse health effects. And, in Ethiopia and Sudan, United Nations agencies and NGOs have stepped in to fill the gaps during times of crisis. Maintaining and enhancing the response capabilities of health services to food emergencies is as important for preventing deaths as is responding to the food crisis.