|New Approaches to New Realities (University of Wisconsin / Universidad de Wisconsin, 1996, 508 p.)|
|Theme ONE: Identification and Planning of Emergency Settlement|
This paper was prepared by Pat Reed and Jim Good. In addition to the resources listed in the paper, significant contributions were provided by:
John Telford - the founder of EMMA, Ltd. an Irish company offering humanitarian emergency management consultancy services.
This paper is a synthesis of the efforts of all of those cited above and as such does not express the viewpoint of any single resource, contributor or organization.
Planning - the act of thinking before doing is deceptively simple to describe yet difficult to do well in practical application. This short paper looks at a basic set of planning principles which can be applied to a wide variety of emergency settlement situations and relates them to best practices in carrying out some of the planning functions typically required in relation to emergency response. The paper draws heavily on materials developed for the UNHCR Emergency Management Training Programme and other sources related to a wider range of disaster responses.
1. Planning for emergency settlements before they occur is essential to the rapid response and protection of the affected communities.
Planning is a vital component of emergency response. Emergencies can be better managed if responders have thought them through before they happen. Planning, in the most fundamental sense, involves the idea of readiness or preparedness for future actions, including both scheduled events, as in operations planning, as well as hypothetical events, as in contingency planning. Preparedness involves forecasting and taking precautionary measures prior to an imminent threat when advance warnings are possible. Preparedness planning improves the response to the effects of a disaster by organizing the delivery of timely and effective rescue, relief and assistance (DMTP, 1992, p. 1).
2. The scope of planning for emergency settlement includes all likely management tasks, (technical, social, legal and administrative) for the emergency response.
Good planning should lead to an environment in which the affected people - refugees, displaced, de-stabilized, and besieged can meet their own needs quicker and better during an emergency. This includes their physical, psychological, political, social, and economic needs - whether managed locally or internationally. This planning must be both comprehensive and integrated to be useful.
Planning should be comprehensive to the degree that psycho-social needs, for example, are anticipated and addressed as well as physical needs. The planning should be integrated to the extent that assistance-sectors and their mutual linkages are assessed and programmed.
3. Planning for emergency settlements must include the stages of preparedness, early warning, contingency planning, operations planning, and the eventual phase-out of assistance.
Being prepared for an emergency includes establishing and maintaining early warning systems, continually assessing the pre- and early-emergency context and planning for contingencies, mobilizing resources, and preparing structures and systems. All of these aspects will necessarily be based on a continual cycle of assessment - of targeting problems and possible solutions. The larger picture, the vision of a community transcending the effects of emergency and becoming more productive and less vulnerable to future setbacks must be kept in mind, and planned for from the beginning.
4. The responsibility for anticipating, through early warning, and contingency planning for populations likely to be caught in emergencies is shared by government and humanitarian assistance agencies.
Early warning is the identification, interpretation, and recognition of events that would indicate a potential emergency (Cuny, 1988). Early warning involves collecting information from numerous sources, interpreting that information, and identifying signs that warn of a developing crisis. Scenarios concerning the potential flow of displaced people need to be developed. As the emergency starts to escalate, operating partners should be notified and information exchanged so that planning for the response can begin. In the case of internally displaced people and refugees the local offices in the areas of origin and destination must be responsible for establishing early warning systems, monitoring events, and taking proactive action.
5. Responsibility for preparedness/planning for emergency settlement is useless without the actual capacity to carry out these activities.
Despite the many calls to develop an effective early warning system for both natural and human-made disasters, no such system is well established and respected today. Instead of an early warning system, there is a collection of people and institutions that pay some attention to early warning signs. Early warning systems for refugee and other related emergencies have long been considered a weak part of the international response system (Clark, 1989).
Donors have shown little interest in responding to impending events, even when emergency outcomes are extremely likely. As Reed Brody (1993) the executive director of the International Human Rights Law Group has said: Early warning is not enough, however, without the political will and the institutional ability to respond effectively to such warnings. In other words, early warning is meaningless without early action. Both Bosnia and Rwanda are clear examples of situations that the international community was not willing to respond to until they became fully-developed disasters.
6. Preparedness, including all levels of planning for emergency settlement must be owned by those who will be involved in the actual response.
Adequate planning will not happen solely on the grounds of mandated responsibility. Even adequate capacity in addition to mandate will not be enough to propel planning forward if motivation is lacking. Planning must be conducted from the inside of those agencies, ministries, and other bodies which will actually carry out the humanitarian response to emergency settlements. UNICEF has found, and disaster research also confirms, that preparedness, like emergency response, is not an activity to be initiated as an extraneous effort or outside initiative. It must be actively carried out by whomever will have a role in providing emergency services and it must be integrated into on-going services and programmes (UNICEF, 1995 p. 2).
Preparedness for response to situations of emergency settlement can only be derived from a vital ongoing process, not from any plan, isolated stage, phase, or time-limited series of actions. The limits to preparedness are determined by the resources available and the political will to invest them in this process. The principal result of a good preparedness process is not a plan, but rather an improved physical, psychological, political, social, and economic environment for response. This environment will facilitate the humanitarian response to situations of emergency settlement.
Preparedness can include establishment and operation of early warning systems, continual assessment, and various levels of planning activities as well as more intensive resource mobilization, including staff selection and development, and preparation of administrative systems and structures. Even after an emergency situation has developed, preparedness activities should continue (for example contingency planning) in preparation for greater or changing needs. As early warning, assessment and planning are all integral elements of preparedness, they are all part of this ongoing process as well.
Emergency preparedness includes the actions taken by individuals and organizations to prepare for an emergency (Cuny, 1988). It includes developing contingency plans, generating organizational systems, stockpiling supplies, training people, and working with staff to monitor and recognize the signs of an impending crisis.
Preparedness includes a variety of activities:
· Setting emergency policy
· Setting up an emergency system, including staffing
· Making a contingency plan
· Training people in emergency management
· Setting up a protection plan (specifically for refugees) or other sectoral plans
· Delegating emergency responsibilities
· Developing standard operational procedures (for convoy movements, transit and reception center operations, and communications)
· Identifying supply sources
· Stockpiling and pre-positioning supplies and equipment (UNHCR 1990)
According to the WFP handbook Food Aid In Emergencies many of the natural hazards which can lead to situations of emergency settlement are foreseeable, and therefore should be prepared for.
Many of the natural phenomena which cause natural disasters are not unforeseeable even if the timing of their impact may not be predictable much in advance, if at all. It is therefore possible for communities, government services, and assistance agencies to plan ahead for threats to which particular areas are known to be exposed - to be prepared to respond when need arises.
There are a number of distinct aspects to preparedness:
(a) Awareness of vulnerability
(b) Public warning systems
(c) Response capability - information and organization
(d) Response capability - resources (WFP, 1991, pp. A2-A10).
This understanding of preparedness is based on the assumption that it is better to make decisions about emergency response before the emergency starts, when a thoughtful analysis of a situation is possible, than it is to react later, when information is still incomplete and confusing, but the time constraints are much greater. Preparedness should take those aspects of decision making which are not situation-specific out of the crisis-mentality prevalent during emergencies and pro-actively move it into the more manageable planning stage. It gives an organization time to mobilize its resources and lets it respond rapidly to unique situations as they develop.
International preparedness for emergencies which are by their nature international (refugee flows for example) and those which quickly surpass the ability of the National government to manage alone should be based within those organizations most likely to respond, and the donor community. Combined with this preparedness should be a working coordinating mechanism for the efficient deployment of resources in situations where there is not a clear lead agency or organization. In such cases, the key to disaster preparedness and response is flexibility. Plans, structures and the people involved ought to be adaptable to changing situations, needs, and resources.
National preparedness for situations of emergency settlement should be community-based and community-driven. It is a continuous process, not an isolated stage, nor a limited series of actions. The resources available and the political will to invest them in this process will determine the limits of local preparedness. When an emergency occurs, this process continues. To compartmentalize aspects of preparedness may be counterproductive and may give the impression that preparedness is no more than a set of steps to be followed in order, rather than a continual integrated process.
Community preparedness can also be carried out through societal measures. These non agency-specific measures are typically awareness raising exercises that serve to expose community members to the hazards likely to occur and prepare them for individual and community response. This may be done through regular awareness campaigns or through more specific awareness events. In some countries, the anniversary of a major disaster is remembered as Disaster Awareness Day - 1 September in Japan, 20 September in Mexico, and the month of April in California, USA. On this day drills are performed, ceremonies and activities held to promote disaster mitigation. The United Nations General Assembly in its adoption of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (Resolution 44/236, 22 December 1989) designated the second Wednesday in October as an International Day for Natural Disaster Reduction which may be an opportunity for many other countries to carry out disaster awareness activities (Coburn et al, 1991, p.25).
As the preparedness process must be sustained if it is to be useful, an understanding of its day to day effects on those conducting the work is essential. One principal aspect of all preparedness planning is the implicit statement that the possibility of disaster is real. This simple declaration will involve serious political implications. In many cases, the suggestion of the probability of disaster (especially human-made disaster) is frequently seen as beckoning it. In some cases, this acknowledgment amounts to assigning responsibility for the situation, and further recognizing that someone (generally those in positions of power or authority) should either reduce risks, or prepare for alleviating the consequences. Therefore, in many situations, planning for preparedness is seen as a political threat.
While the political situation described above is common and understandable, the idea of preparedness as a non-threatening task must be actively promoted. Tact and understanding in the furthering of this approach are essential. An awareness of local, national, and international sensitivities is a requirement for anyone actively advocating for preparedness.
The overall approach to preparedness through planning for response in situations of emergency settlement will naturally depend on the nature of the organization or agency responding. The approach may be technical and highly quantifiable, or may be more general with many intangible aspects to the situation taken into consideration. Common approaches tend to be either relief-oriented (saving lives)or development-oriented (promoting better life situations). The following three approaches reflect different basic approaches for response to emergency settlements which form a spectrum from short-term survival issues to longer-term development issues.
Needs and resources approach - This word pairing of needs and resources represents an approach that is highly quantifiable, practical, and immediately operational in its basic structure. Needs are requirements for human existence such as food, water, and shelter which may be quantified in some useful way, and thereby compared to resources, which are the available material reserves from which needs may be satisfied. This balance sheet approach is most appropriately used by immediate action planners, logisticians, site and shelter experts and others involved in the efficient provision of material goods and services to those in need. Needs which are unmet usually represent problems for planners as described in the approach below.
Problems and solutions approach - This pair of words represents a different approach from the one above as it adds a more deeply analytical perspective to planning. A problem represents a state of being which does not agree with the organizations or individuals vision (see the annex of planning terms at the end of this paper). Problems are similar to needs as expressed in the approach above, but the term is more widely defined. When paired with solutions it describes a planning approach which is not necessarily constrained by the definition of needs. This approach is considered to be more creative and less narrow in scope than the practitioners use of the terms needs and resources.
Vulnerabilities and capacities approach - This pair of terms comes from a more developmental perspective in planning. While similar in usage to the problem and solution approach just described, it is more truly developmental since the problems and solutions are presented from the viewpoint of the affected individuals or communities rather than from the viewpoint of the outside responder. Vulnerability is the degree or likelihood to sustain damage due to lack of ability to control ones own situation.
Capacity is the degree of strength or ability to resist damage and to succeed in achieving a situation in accordance with ones own vision.
One aspect of this approach that must be considered is that it is not instant. The danger of speed is that, in a rush, an agency will focus entirely on victims and their needs, problems, and suffering and fail to note capacities. Capacities-building requires consultation and involvement; this does not take vast amounts of time, but it does necessitate an approach which assumes that local people, not outsiders, are in charge.
When compulsion for speed means that an NGO assumes all responsibility for the management and logistics of relief, this is apt to override existing local capacities (Anderson, p. 50, 1989).
In planning for emergency response, humanitarian workers must rely on the affected community in many ways. For example, the affected community provides much of the information in the assessment and can help identify available resources. One of the most important elements in any successful program is the affected populations participation in decision making, particularly in determining objectives, allocating resources to achieve the objectives, and implementing programs.
To be successful, a process must be based on the people it is meant to serve: the communities potentially affected by the disaster or emergency. Local people must run the process, even though external support will often be needed. The fact that the disaster has not yet occurred does not lessen the need to involve the community. Even the analysis of what areas are most at risk should involve the communities. The structure of the society involved and its intricacies must be understood and tapped by whoever is promoting preparedness.
The need for specialized, sometimes external, resources such as program expertise can also be important. Although external experts may use information, techniques, and equipment not available to locals, the analysis of their results should be community based. Outside assistance - on such areas as disaster risk analysis - may also be required. Which outside resources will be needed will depend on the community, likely situations causing emergency settlement and its access to such resources.
Emergency planners should keep in mind that the standard international response is often different from local responses. Internationals might send dry food, such as flour, maize, and food parcels, but local responses might include baked bread and vegetables. The international shelter response is frequently tents, but local communities provide existing structures: public or religious buildings, and, in some cases, their own homes. If preparedness is possible, local responses ought to be considered.
Planning cannot be done without incorporating objectives of the outcomes with the plan. Considering the preceding discussion of the importance of the process over the plan, it is necessary to return to focus on the planning document itself. The written plan does have tremendous value if well written and followed. The writing of the plan - and subsequent redrafting when required - crystallizes the planning into snapshots of the process at the time of the preparation. While not reflecting the whole range of planning activities or the idea of the evolution of the plan over time, these snapshots are necessary to communicate the idea to others as well as to clarify the thoughts and plans of the authors through its preparation and review of its objectives.
Objectives should have four basic characteristics:
(1) they should be expressed in writing;
(2) they should be measurable;
(3) they should be specific as to time;
(4) they should be challenging but attainable. Placing the goals in written form increases understanding and commitment. Confusion as to what the goals actually are is less likely to occur when they are written (Monty et al, 1988, p. 89).
The concept of early warning has been integrated into preparedness planning for a broad range of circumstances, including natural disasters, refugee influxes, and populations caught in civil conflicts. The implementation of permanent early warning systems, however, have been established much more firmly in relation to natural disasters than for political and military upheavals. For example, well established storm and tsunami warning systems are installed across the globe, are well established and function properly. There is also an extensive network of earthquake and tremor monitoring equipment which has proven beneficial in providing early warnings of destructive earthquakes and volcanic eruptions in many instances.
Disaster managers have long felt a need to incorporate this vision of and regularized early warning to the more variable world of human events in order to establish early warning systems for refugee flows and other human-made humanitarian emergencies. The difficult political aspects of this vision have been difficult to overcome. In addition, governments of regions producing forced migrations may see active early warning systems as an interference in their internal affairs. National governments may doubt the humanitarian intent of the early warning systems and may also fear that early warning which leads to preparations to receive migrants might constitute a pull factor that could intensify the tendency to flee.
Humanitarian responders to refugee emergencies need to think through several questions as they describe the main influx scenarios:
(1) What are the likely emergency situations in the country of origin?
(2) What determines who among the emergency-affected population will leave?
(3) What specific trigger events might lead to an emergency refugee flow?
To answer these questions, several factors should be collected and analysed:
· Push factors - Push factors are events that may force people to leave their country. They can be divided into two categories:
¨ Root causes - Often, root causes have existed for a number of years. Racial or religious conflicts, long-standing border disputes, and ecological conditions such as desertification are examples. Root cause information is not specific, and therefore it may be difficult to use it to predict how many people will leave at a given time. Root causes affect different people in different ways: some may flee, while others choose to stay and fight; still others face the situation without resistance.
¨ Proximate events - Proximate events are the specific ways that root causes produce suffering. For example, racism, the root cause, may be expressed through a new law that prohibits certain ethnic groups from living in a particular part of the country. This is the proximate event. To estimate whether the movement will be small, medium, or large, one needs to determine who these people are, where they live, and their approximate numbers.
· Constraints and alternatives - For the purpose of early warning, it is may be good to ask, Why did some people remain in the country of origin? Internationally displaced refugees are a minority in many refugee situations. These constraints and alternatives can be as powerful as the push factors in determining who will flee his/her country, in what numbers, in what condition, and when. Among the intervening factors are:
- Internal displacement
- Official migration
- Joining resistance movements
- Staying at home and accepting the situation
- Seasonal weather
- Crop or planting season or cycle
- Military or police control of exit routes
- Poor health
- Difficulty of terrain
- Lack of transport
- Lack of knowledge of the routes
- Lack of resources
- Bandits, troops, mines, et cetera along the route
· Triggering events - Early warning information should lead to closer monitoring of the situation to detect possible triggering events, those final critical occurrences that may convince significant numbers of people to leave their country. Among them are:
¨ Crop failure
¨ Economic failure
¨ Outbreak of war
¨ Passage of oppressive legislation
¨ Seasonal changes such as the end of the rainy season
The most useful factors for early warning are those that can be fairly accurately predicted by society or nature. For example, farmers will probably migrate if rains fail to arrive by a certain time of the year.
It may be difficult to get good information about events inside the country of origin. Therefore, there are some situations where it will be difficult, or impossible, to make early warnings. But identifying patterns for large influxes may be easier than it appears. Most of the larger influxes takes several months, possibly longer, to develop. Small influxes may occur before they become large enough to qualify as a mass influx.
This means that there is time and relevant data to develop an early warning analysis. The most critical early warnings may take place after a flow has started. Therefore, one must avoid spending all ones time dealing with the immediate emergency or the warning signs will go unheeded.
There is at least one major problem with early warning systems - no one pays much attention to them. The international community knew, for example, that Rwanda was likely to be a problem for months before the crisis occurred, yet few organizations did much to keep the killings from taking place after the presidents plane was shot down.
People and governments tend to not get interested in a potential emergency until it becomes a real one, until thousands of people have died or are headed for a border.
Early warning systems are useless without corresponding early action. Early warnings for any emergency scenario, whether natural, or human-made can provide invaluable time for planning. This information can be used:
· To avoid or lessen detrimental effects
· To provide better relief assistance in a more timely manner
For emergencies involving refugees and other displaced people, there are two points that must be remembered:
· Early warning analyses should include a range of scenarios
· Mass influxes are the most important scenario
Several sources can provide information for early warning of emergency displacement. Among them are:
· Religious leaders from the community
· Other community leaders
· Insurgent or guerrilla forces
· relatives of potential migrants who have already fled or who have otherwise been forced to move
· Government liaison offices
· International media
· Local media
· Nongovernmental organizations operating in the area
· Local and international human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Africa Watch, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and the Center for Human Rights
In general management terms, contingency planning is the development of different plans to be placed in effect if certain events occur (Monty et. al., 1988, p. 728). The more typical usage among humanitarian aid providers concerned with emergency settlement relates more specifically to emergencies. Contingency planning is comprised of the actions taken to prepare for an impending emergency (Cuny, 1988). It covers food, health, water, sanitation, logistics, and physical planning. Typically contingency planning is used to:
· identify scenarios
· set priorities and goals
· identify activities and tasks
· allocate resources
· develop procedures
· Ensure access to technical inputs
· allocate responsibilities
for the general areas of:
· Protection (especially for refugees)
· Assistance sectors (water, food, shelter, etc.)
· Program management, coordination, and administrative support (UNHCR 1995)
Contingency planning begins when the displaced or threatened population crosses certain thresholds, such as moving to an area near a likely crossing place or exhibits other signs of imminent mass migration. At that point, steps should be taken to activate the organization and its partners to begin preparing for the emergency.
Based on the contingency plan, emergency response managers must determine the most useful functional and geographical areas in which to operate in preparation for their response. The place where refugees are most likely to enter a neighboring country, or where internally displaced might resettle may be identified from topographical features, social and cultural ties, previously used transportation routes, and natural barriers such as rivers and mountains. Communities at risk of becoming emergency settlements in situ may also be identified due to assessment of various risk factors. Then, based on these scenarios, potential operational theaters can be identified. Within those operational theaters, settlement sites, logistics bases, etc., can be identified. In most cases, these areas should be surveyed to verify whether they are suitable. Data on roads, railways, airports, and river transport facilities should also be collected.
In many developing countries food may need to be imported from other places. In some locations, this could take as many as ninety days, perhaps longer, from the time the food is ordered until it arrives. That means the window for decision making is limited. Food must be ordered when it appears likely large numbers of people will cross the border. Failure to do this early means one of two things will happen:
1. Large numbers of people may not receive adequate food.
2. The relief agency must take extraordinary measures to get food to the area.
If the people are malnourished, a high mortality rate can be expected. Failure to make an early decision means that the range of choices is limited. Rather than shipping food at a relatively cheap cost by sea or land, the agency will have to transport it by air. The costs will therefore increase tenfold. The longer a decision is delayed, the more likely it will be a least-worst-choice option (Cuny, 1988b).
Even in light of the above discussion, there are several reasons why contingency planning may be ignored. Agencies or ministries may be too busy with the emergency to look at the plans; or the people may believe that planning is less important than action. But other reasons may be equally important:
· The organization may think it is too small to divide its time and resources between ongoing operations and newly developing ones.
· The organization may have a mandate or philosophy that restricts action until after the emergency presents itself.
· The issues involved may be too complex politically to allow the organization to act.
· The organization may fear becoming involved in another lengthy or difficult operation (UNHCR, 1994a).
However, such arguments mask long-term problems in dealing with potential emergencies. Most organizations want to relieve human suffering as their goal. Therefore, a delay in responding to an emergency is bad tactics as well as bad ethics. If it is not ignored or misused, early warning information can lead to quicker responses, better coordination, and more efficient humanitarian assistance. However, if the staff can no longer handle the day to day crises, they may resist diverting their scarce resources to what may be a false alarm. Political reasons for not addressing an emergency may also exist. Some people may find preparing contingency plans for emergencies difficult to defend. But this resistance can be overcome only by normalizing contingency planning. The risk of diverting resources from ongoing work must be balanced against the risk of not being prepared should an emergency occur (UNHCR, 1994a).
Organizations should always stress that the planning exercise is a valuable option in its own right, whether or not the emergency materializes. Planning for an emergency is always a risk, since the emergency may not happen. But the plan must be recognized as valuable. If planners plan for an emergency that does not happen, they are not wrong. Planning is an end in itself. Planning can strengthen the organizations future operations. It also can strengthen inter-organizational efforts, even when the emergency does not occur.
An operations plan differs from a contingency plan, since the emergency being planned for is now a reality - a refugee or displaced persons situation exists. The emergency response workers will want to define the best actions they can take (UNHCR, 1994a).
In putting together an operations plan, the first question the emergency response workers want to ask is: is there an agreed contingency plan? If there is, they need to compare it with reality. How close is it? They will then adapt the plan, based on how it differs from the scenario that has materialized. The locations, numbers, profiles, and other relevant aspects of the affected population must be assessed to determine who will take what action, where and when it will be taken. The workers need to specify their objectives - and the standards to judge their success in achieving them (UNHCR, 1994a).
Although there are no hard and fast rules for developing a Plan of Action (Operations Plan), the planning process itself is straightforward. In a sense planning is a structured problem-solving approach based on a rational assessment of needs and resources. It includes these steps:
1. Prioritize needs
2. Assess material and financial resources, as well as local capabilities and limitations
3. Identify a vision of the goals of the operation, what and how much assistance is required, and what it might cost
4. Define a set of realistic objectives, the accomplishment of which will ensure that the goals can be met.
5. Generate a range of alternative methods and tasks to accomplish the objectives
6. Choose the most effective and efficient methods and tasks
7. Identify who is responsible for implementing the chosen methods and tasks
8. Devise means to monitor and evaluate plan implementation
9. Establish procedures to adjust the Plan of Action based on implementation experience, changing circumstances, and new information and constraints
10. Identify government liaison and secure government approval to proceed (IOM, 1994, p.70).
To respond quickly and effectively, two sets of activities need to be carried out:
1. Assessment - Emergency assessment is the survey and information-collection activities carried out to determine the status of an emergency, the condition of the affected people, the adequacy of the services being provided, and the conditions of their settlement (Cuny, 1988). At this stage, the affected population is the main source of information. Techniques for evaluating operations should be used to reevaluate the situation, to monitor various systems, and to adjust program management. An important aspect of the initial assessment is the provision of sufficient information for planning and adjusting the emergency response. Research must be thorough but rapid. (See the Emergency Settlement paper Needs and Resources Assessment for a more thorough discussion.)
Initial interventions - The response to an emergency should assume some problems will be present until an assessment proves otherwise. Actions are built on an epidemiological understanding of what causes morbidity and mortality: malnutrition, communicable disease, diarrhea, and dehydration. The priority activities - food, immunization, and clean water - can be conducted without highly trained technicians. Although the host government is responsible for the initial response, few governments are capable of meeting these needs. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations, and local Red Cross/Red Crescent societies are often brought in.
Priorities that require early decisions are:
· Ordering and pre-positioning food
· Identifying disease threats
· Ordering vaccines for immunization
· Establishing a cold chain for medicines
· Finding a supply of clean drinking water and protecting it
· Providing decent sanitation
· Making sure that logistics are adequate (Cuny, 1988).
Widely agreed standards on planning for emergencies are not known to exist. The Emergency Settlement Project will explore the value and viability of establishing such standards through the conference discussions as well as in subsequent activities.
The following short glossary is intended as a guide to the planning terminology used in this paper, and their definitions are presented below.
Activity - An activity is a discreet action which leads to the completion or attainment of an objective.
Goal - A goal is the central and overriding aim of an organization which is summarized in its mandate or charter. The goal is the state of things as they should be according to the vision of the organization or its founders.
Objective - An objective is a quantifiable step or concrete action which can be used to measure progress in a strategy.
Strategy - A strategy is the method or approach which is implemented to achieve a goal - a plan of action. As opposed to a state of being (a goal to be attained), a strategy is a methodology by which a goal is achieved.
Vision - A vision is the mental image of how things should be. This may be applied to the personal, group or organizational level, and represents the top of the planning hierarchy under which the supporting levels of goals, strategies, objectives, and activities fall.
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