Report on the Nicaraguan Indian Peace Initiative: A Search for Indian Rights Within the Arias Peace Plan -- Indian Law Resource Center, April 1988
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DOCUMENT: ARIASPAX.TXT
Indian Law Resource Center
601 E Street, Southeast, Washington, D.C., 20003
(202) 547-2800
REPORT ON THE NICARAGUAN INDIAN PEACE INITIATIVE:
A SEARCH FOR INDIAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE ARIAS PEACE PLAN
April 4, 1988
The Indians of Nicaragua, after more than seven years
of war, have entered into promising peace talks with the
Sandinista government. These talks are completely separate
from the "contra" peace talks. The negotiators from the
Yatama Indian organization, led by Miskito leader Brooklyn
Rivera, already have achieved an accord spelling out some
basic Indian rights and establishing a truce during the
pendency of the talks. A full ceasefire, autonomous self-
government for the Indian region, and other issues will be
addressed as the talks continue.
This progress toward resolution of the Sandinista-
Indian war has occurred within the Arias Peace Plan, the
Esquipulas II Accord. Nicaraguan Indian leaders saw the
August 1987 peace plan of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias
as an opportunity to promote a new peace initiative of their
own with the Sandinistas. Although the Arias Plan makes no
mention of the Sandinista-Indian war, and no reference to
Indian rights, the Indian leadership decided to explore the
possibility of renewed Indian peace talks that would be
separate from the political initiatives of the Nicaraguan
Resistance (the "contras"), but within the framework and
spirit of the Plan. The Indian leaders wanted an Indian
peace initiative that would address the demands for Indian
rights and Indian autonomy that have fueled the seven-year
war in the Indian territory of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast.
The war between the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Indians and
the Sandinista government has been widely recognized as
separate and distinct from the contra-Sandinista war. The
Indian war began in February 1981, before the contras were
organized. The principal Indian demands -- for their rights
to land, natural resources, self-determination, culture and
religion -- have little in common with the demands of the
contras. The Indians are not trying to seize power in
Managua, and they fear that the contra leadership is as
unwilling to recognize Indian rights as the Sandinistas have
been.
The Indian war has been fought by Indians, on Indian
land, against military forces brought into the Indian
territory by the Sandinistas. Those outside forces have
occupied many Indian communities. Over the years, the
Sandinistas tried to impose their political control on
Indian communities, forcibly relocated and uprooted tens of
thousands of Indians, destroyed scores of Indian villages,
imprisoned hundreds of Indians, killed and "disappeared"
many Indians who resisted, and committed many other human
rights abuses. Yet the Indian fighters have survived against
the superior firepower of the Sandinista military, and the
Indian communities have continued to resist the government,
despite the widespread suffering the war has caused. Both
the Sandinista government and the Indians have good reasons
to look for a way out of this war.
THE FAILED INDIAN PEACE INITIATIVE
OF 1984-85
President Arias's insistence on political initiatives
to resolve warfare in Central America was welcomed
especially by the Nicaraguan Indian leadership. Most of the
Indian leaders have long insisted that the political fight
for Indian rights is more important than the military.
One prominent leader, Brooklyn Rivera, undertook a
political effort to make peace with the Sandinistas in late
1984, but that peace initiative foundered in May 1985, after
four rounds of formal talks in Colombia and Mexico. Those
earlier negotiations were the first peace talks between the
Sandinistas and any of the armed resistance. They were
strongly opposed by the contras (then called the FDN or UNO)
and the United States. Those talks resulted in a preliminary
accord reducing armed hostilities and expanding humanitarian
assistance to Indian villagers, the Mexico City Accord of
April 1985, But talks foundered when the Sandinistas refused
to address the fundamental Indian rights issues and insisted
on discussing only a cease-fire. That breakdown of the
political process led to three more years of Sandinista-
Indian warfare on the Atlantic Coast.
INDIAN PLANS TO UTILIZE THE ARIAS
PEACE PLAN
When the Arias Plan was announced, Brooklyn Rivera and
the other Indian leaders did not respond by joining ranks
with the contras. Instead, the Indian leaders developed
their OWN plan to assert their OWN rights and interests.
First, they had extensive meetings for several weeks with
Indian refugees, Indian fighters and other Indians in exile.
Through these meetings, they arrived at a broad-based
decision to launch a new effort to enter into talks with the
Nicaraguan government within the framework of the Arias
Plan. Then they released a public statement in early
September endorsing that broader peace effort and calling
for international attention to the rights and needs of the
Indian peoples of Nicaragua.
Through press statements and meetings with public
officials, the Indians emphasized that their war was not
about the East-West conflict. They resolved to stop the
manipulation of their people by forces of the left and the
right. They informed government officials and the general
public that the Indian war would not be ended unless the
Indian rights issues were settled by agreement with
legitimate Nicaraguan Indian leaders.
The Central American presidents who signed the Arias
Plan were reluctant to address the Nicaraguan Indian issue.
Because each Central American country fails to guarantee
Indian rights within its own borders, none had clean hands
to accuse the Sandinistas on this point. Nevertheless,
progress was soon made through the diplomatic initiative of
Rivera and the other Indian leaders, and the Indian peace
initiative soon got the support of President Arias.
SANDINISTA-INDIAN PEACE TALKS ALMOST
BEGIN IN OCTOBER 1987
In September and October, there were serious talks
between Brooklyn Rivera and the Sandinista government. These
talks were conducted through intermediaries. Rev. Andy
Shogreen, head of the Nicaraguan Moravian Church was the
most important intermediary. Nobel prize winner Adolfo Perez
Esquivel served as mediator for a time in October, and a
Mennonite mediator, John Paul Lederach, also played an
important role. Senator Edward Kennedy provided valuable
assistance from Washington. On the Sandinista side, the
principal official was Tomas Borge, the Sandinsita commander
and Interior Minister who is responsible for Atlantic Coast
affairs. Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto was
also involved.
President Arias and his foreign minister met with
Brooklyn Rivera in October, and President Arias publicly
commended the Indian peace effort. Privately, the Costa
Rican government helped in many ways to move the Indian
peace process forward, communicating regularly with Rivera
and the Nicaraguan government.
A preliminary agreement was made to begin the new
Sandinista-Indian talks in Nicaragua in late October.
Despite the opposition of Honduran officials, United States
officials, and the Nicaraguan Resistance, a ten-member
Indian negotiation commission, headed by Rivera, assembled
in San Jose in preparation for the trip to Nicaragua. This
delegation included representatives from all sectors of the
Nicaraguan Indian organization, Yatama. Yatama had been
established at a general assembly of Nicaraguan Indians in
June, 1987 to replace and unify the Nicaraguan Indian
organizations known as Misurasata, Kisan and Misura.
Brooklyn Rivera is one of the Yatama directors.
On the eve of the talks, the Sandinista Directorate met
in Managua and decided that the Indian commission must
submit to the government's amnesty program before it could
return to Nicaragua. This amnesty precondition was
unacceptable to all the Indian leaders, because it required
an act of surrender and submission by the Indians. The
government, through Miguel D'Escoto, had earlier informed
Rivera and Senator Kennedy that it would not insist on this
amnesty as a precondition to talks in Nicaragua with the
Indians. The government's change of position on this
critical point killed the October talks.
DESPITE NEW OBSTACLES, EFFORTS CONTINUE
TO FIND A FRAMEWORK FOR TALKS
In late October and early November most of the Indian
negotiation commission members returned to Honduras, where
they were subjected to economic and political pressures by
United States and Honduran officials for trying to negotiate
"unilaterally" with the Sandinistas. These officials had
demanded that there be no Sandinista-Indian talks without
prior approval of the contras. Brooklyn Rivera tried to
return to Honduras, but he was singled out for special
treatment because of his key leadership role. He was barred
from entering the country. Despite repeated pleas to the
U.S. State Department and the Honduran government to permit
Rivera's access to his people in Honduras. He has been
barred from that country since October. Rivera's inability
to meet freely with Indian leaders, Indian fighters, and
over 20,000 Indian refugees in Honduras has greatly
complicated the peace process.
Armstrong Wiggins, a Miskito leader who works at the
Indian Law Resource Center in Washington, D.C., learned in
December that he too had been barred from Honduras for the
same reason as Rivera. Upon his arrival at the airport in
Tegucigalpa, he was summarily deported from the country,
without explanation and without permission even to make a
telephone call.
Indirect talks between Brooklyn Rivera and Sandinista
officials continued after the October breakdown. President
Daniel Ortega and other members of the Sandinista
Directorate took a more active role for the Nicaraguan
government, but Tomas Borge continued to be the chief
Sandinista official in these indirect discussions.
PRESIDENT ARIAS GIVES FIRM BACKING TO
THE INDIAN PEACE INITIATIVE
The early January 1988 summit meeting of the Central
American Presidents under the Arias plan was used to
formally bring the Indian peace initiative forward once
again. President Arias met with Rivera during that summit
and personally introduced him to the other presidents.
Daniel Ortega and Rivera met privately in San Jose and made
final plans to begin direct negotiations in late January.
President Ortega assured Rivera and President Arias that the
amnesty precondition had been dropped and that the Yatama
Indian delegation could meet and travel inside Nicaragua
without any precondition. The Costa Rican government agreed
to send its ambassador with the Indian delegation to serve
as an observer and guarantor of the delegation's security.
FORMAL SANDINISTA-INDIAN PEACE TALKS
BEGIN IN MANAGUA
On January 23, a Yatama Indian negotiation commission
of nine members, headed by Brooklyn Rivera, flew from Costa
Rica to Managua. Members of the commission included Marcos
Hopington, Samuel Mercado, Modesto Watson, Walter Ortiz,
Jenelee Hodgson, Herta Downs de Masanto, Julian Smith and
Armstrong Wiggins. They were accompanied by the Costa Rican
ambassador to Nicaragua. Also with them were Jim Anaya, an
attorney with the National Indian Youth Project who was
asked by Senator Edward Kennedy to be his personal
representative, and three other advisors to the Yatama
commission: Dr. Bernard Nietschmann, attorney Glenn Morris,
and attorney Steven Tullberg of the Indian Law Resource
Center.
The talks in Managua began with serious difficulties.
Tomas Borge at first insisted on meeting at his Interior
Ministry office, contrary to an understanding on the part of
the Indian leaders that the meetings would take place in a
neutral setting. After several hours of tense discussions,
during which Borge threatened to summarily expel the entire
commission from the country, an agreed-upon meeting place
was found, and all subsequent talks took place at the
Moravian Church or at the hotel where the delegation stayed.
Borge also objected to the presence of North American
advisors and observers. (Sandinista officials had called
three of them CIA agents when the 1984-85 Indian peace talks
broke down.) The dispute about advisors was not resolved for
more than a day. After first threatening to expel all four
North Americans, Borge agreed that two of them could stay.
Then he completely reversed his initial position and agreed
that all four could stay.
Other points of contention arose during the first few
days of talks. Borge insisted that the Yatama commission
denounce the bill for aid to the contras that was pending in
the U.S. Congress. He said the Yatama commission's planned
trip to visit the Indian communities on the Atlantic Coast
would be canceled unless they first denounced the contras
publicly. Rivera refused to submit to any such
preconditions, and they were eventually withdrawn after
extensive discussions.
The government also tried to downgrade the talks by
presenting Mirna Cunningham, an Atlantic Coast Sandinista
official, as the head of the government negotiating team.
The Indians refused to negotiate if she was head of the
government's delegation, insisting that the government
comply with its agreement to have talks at the highest
level. Rivera told Borge that the Indian conflict had to be
resolved between the Sandinista leadership and the Indian
leadership, that it could not be resolved through talks
among Atlantic Coast peoples. Borge returned to the
negotiating table.
Another dispute involved Borge's declaration that the
Yatama commission would be denied permission to visit the
Atlantic Coast unless it first signed a ceasefire agreement.
The Indians refused, but they agreed that no offensive or
provocative military actions should take place by either
side during the talks. They agreed to promote a truce during
the talks and to put a formal ceasefire on the negotiation
agenda.
By the fourth day in Managua, more calm and productive
talks began. It appeared that the government was finally
willing to discuss the fundamental Indian rights issues that
it had previously avoided. The parties agreed to establish a
Conciliation Commission, comprised primarily of religious
leaders from the Moravian Church and CEPAD, that would
actively participate in the talks. The Yatama delegation
submitted a written proposal for a preliminary accord, and
the government agreed to respond to it after the Indian
commission returned from its trip to the Atlantic Coast.
THE YATAMA NEGOTIATION COMMISSION VISIT
TO THE ATLANTIC COAST
A short trip was planned to the Atlantic Coast Indian
region. By Sandinista military plane the Yatama commission,
advisors and Costa Rican representative flew to Puerto
Cabezas, the main town in the northern coastal region. Today
Puerto Cabezas reportedly is the base for some 2000 MINT
troops. The nearby military base at Kamla holds over 4000
EPS troops. The Sandinista military presence is
overwhelming; uniformed troops and military vehicles are
everywhere, giving this small town the appearance of
military base. The atmosphere was very tense.
The Yatama representatives walked from the airport
through the town and held a meeting at the Moravian church.
Despite the failure of the government to inform the
community of their arrival, the Indian leaders soon were
warmly received by crowds of people in the streets. Meetings
were held through the night with Indian religious and civic
leaders and with family and friends. The Yatama leaders
conspicuously refused to meet with the local Sandinista
officials in their offices. A rally was planned for the
baseball stadium the following morning, before the scheduled
noon departure.
The baseball stadium rally began late the following
morning. Local Sandinista officials had tried to dissuade
the people from coming. They refused to broadcast
information about the rally on the government-controlled
radio, and they set up check points on nearby roads at which
they turned back villagers from outlying communities who
began walking to town once word of Brooklyn Rivera's arrival
reached them.
The Sandinista effort to undercut the demonstration of
local support for Rivera failed. On extremely short notice,
about two thousand people came to the stadium and
enthusiastically showed their support for Rivera. Shortly
after he began speaking to the crowd, a gang of about 20
individuals began to chant pro-Sandinista slogans in
Spanish. (Rivera was speaking in Miskito.) They then moved
out of the bleachers and continued their disruption, almost
provoking a violent confrontation with supporters of Rivera
and Yatama. When it became clear that they were not
effective in their protest and that the people were not
joining with them, they left, and Rivera continued to speak.
With their applause and cheers the crowd demonstrated
overwhelming support. When Rivera condemned local Sandinista
officials for interfering with the peace initiative because
"they feared having their candy taken out of their mouths"
(that is, the loss of their privileges), the crowd erupted
into loud cheers. He repeatedly called for "peace with
justice" for Indians and Creoles of the Atlantic Coast.
The group that tried to disrupt the rally was organized
and led by Sandinista officials, including Interior Ministry
employees, at least one of whom was posing as a news
reporter. The group was a small "turba" (also known as
"turba divina"), an organized mob used frequently against
opponents of the Sandinistas. They became more violent at a
later stage in the talks.
Jose "Chepe" Gonzalez, the FSLN representative and most
powerful Sandinista official in the region, spoke after
Rivera finished. The crowd was unresponsive to his
Sandinista slogans. When Gonzalez asked everyone to stand
for a moment of silence in honor of "the heroes and martyrs"
of Slilma Lila, an Atlantic Coast Indian community where an
armed clash had occurred only days before, the people
remained seated.
After the rally, Rivera and the Yatama delegates were
joined by throngs of supporters who followed them through
the town. As the Yatama delegation prepared to depart for
Bluefields, they were greeted by many friends and family,
some of whom had just arrived after walking many hours to
see them.
The Yatama commission continued its trip to Bluefields
where the atmosphere was very different. Bluefields has not
been militarized like Puerto Cabezas, and the Sandinista
officials there were very cordial to the Yatama delegation.
A public meeting was held at the Moravian Church gymnasium,
with presentations in Miskito and English, and there were no
disruptions. Several local officials went out of their way
to give a warm reception to the Yatama leaders. Private
meetings were held during the night. The Yatama leaders were
relaxed and optimistic when they prepared to travel by boat
to Rama Key, home of the Rama Indians, the following day.
They saw that they had broad popular support in the southern
coastal region, just as in the northern.
The trip to Rama Key was pleasant and positive. Rivera
met with the Ramas in their church and explained the peace
initiative. (This is the same church that was bombed by the
Sandinista air force in the summer of 1984 when Rama
fighters took control of Rama Key for several days.) Then
the Rama leader in the Yatama delegation, Walter Ortiz, met
privately with the Rama community. There was clear Rama
support for the peace initiative. Rama villagers complained
about being "molested" by non-Indian contras operating in
the area and urged the return of the Yatama leaders once
their personal security could be guaranteed.
The Yatama commission returned to Managua after a
friendly private reception at the home of Lumberto Campbell,
the head Sandinista official in Bluefields.
A PRELIMINARY ACCORD BETWEEN THE YATAMA INDIAN
LEADERS AND THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT
Negotiations resumed in Managua on the evening of
February 1, two days before a scheduled contra aid vote in
the U.S. Congress. Talks between Brooklyn Rivera and Tomas
Borge lasted throughout the night and were resumed the
following afternoon, after only a few hours of sleep in the
morning.
The result was a remarkable preliminary accord that is
viewed by the Indian leaders as a breakthrough overcoming
the impasse that had killed the 1984-85 peace talks.
Included in the accord, signed by Rivera and Borge and
released to the public on February 2, is an agreement on
basic principles of Indian autonomy and territorial and
natural resource rights. The parties agreed to refrain from
offensive or provocative military actions during the
pendency of the talks, and they agreed to meet again by
March 1. A formal cease-fire would be on the agenda for that
next round of talks. Yatama would enjoy full civil and
political freedoms inside Nicaragua once a cease-fire was in
operation. Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Finland,
Holland, Norway and Sweden were invited to participate in
the peace process as official witnesses.
The government also agreed to respond to a lengthy
autonomy proposal that was submitted by Yatama in the form
of a draft treaty of peace. The autonomy proposal of Yatama
goes far beyond the autonomy statute enacted by the
government in 1987. Yatama insists that the autonomy
arrangement between the Indians and Managua be based on a
bilateral agreement. The Yatama treaty proposal would
guarantee Indian self-government and control over resources
within a demarcated Indian territory to be known as Yapti
Tasba (Miskito for "Motherland"). Although the parties still
had much to negotiate, there was good feeling on both sides
when the first round of talks ended.
After a joint press conference, the Yatama leaders
returned to San Jose, Costa Rica.
MORE OBSTACLES TO OVERCOME IN HONDURAS
While the Yatama delegation headed by Brooklyn Rivera
was in Nicaragua, the press reported that Wycliffe Diego and
Steadman Fagoth, Yatama leaders in Honduras, had denounced
the Indian peace initiative. It was later learned that
United States and Honduran military officials had demanded
the publication of such a denunciation. They continued to
insist that Yatama unify with and accept direction from the
contras.
In fact, there was continuing broad support for the
peace initiative among the Indian leaders, fighters and
refugees in Honduras. Before undertaking his trip inside
Nicaragua, Rivera had met privately with Diego and Fagoth,
and they had given their quiet support to his negotiation
effort.
Opponents of an independent Indian resistance and
independent Indian peace initiative, particularly CIA and
Honduran military officials, intensified their pressures on
the Nicaraguan Indians in Honduras. They called for a "mini-
assembly" of Indian leaders on the Atlantic Coast of
Honduras. They planned to orchestrate this assembly to
achieve two ends. First, they wanted Brooklyn Rivera and his
associates in the peace effort expelled from Yatama. Second,
they wanted Yatama to unify with the Nicaraguan Resistance.
Needless to say, Rivera and all members of the Yatama
negotiation commission were barred from coming to Honduras
for this assembly.
The mini-assembly was held in the Honduran Atlantic
Coast community of Tapamlaya, February 26-29. Some 300
Indians were present. Wycliffe Diego, under pressure from
U.S. and Honduran officials, demanded that Rivera be
denounced by the assembly, and urged unification with the
Nicaraguan Resistance. (It was rumored that Diego planned to
assume a position on the directorate of the Nicaraguan
Resistance.) But Steadman Fagoth refused to support Diego,
and he publicly reminded Diego of their private meeting at
which they supported Rivera's peace talks inside Nicaragua.
Supporters of Rivera, who carried with them copies of the
preliminary accord, presented a statement to the assembly
that Rivera had prepared. Individuals who had been in
Nicaragua when Rivera and the Yatama commission visited in
late January gave the assembly a full report. Participants
in the assembly demanded that U.S. officials clarify their
objectives in calling the assembly, and insisted they would
not take orders from United States officials.
When Osorno Coleman (Comandante Blas), commander of the
Yatama military forces, under pressure from the U.S. Embassy
threatened to unify the military command with the contras
against the wishes of the Yatama political leaders, the
assembly participants threatened to remove him from the
Yatama leadership.
Azucena Ferrey, a member of the directorate of the
Nicaraguan Resistance, was brought to address the assembly
and urge unification. Participants demanded clarification of
the Nicaraguan Resistance's position on the Yatama autonomy
proposal and on Rivera's peace initiative. To the dismay of
the assembly, she failed to provide answers to their
questions and was quickly taken away by helicopter. (The
Nicaraguan Resistance has not yet addressed the Indian
autonomy issue.)
The end result was that the mini-assembly endorsed
Brooklyn Rivera's peace initiative and refused to unify with
the contras.
This result was infuriating to the United States and
Honduran officials who had organized the assembly. Upon
returning to Tegucigalpa, they demanded that all supporters
of Rivera be denied financial support and be refused
permission even to visit the Yatama office. They threaten to
expel from Honduras those leaders who refuse to comply with
their demands. In early March, they drafted a communique for
publication in the Honduran newspaper EL TIEMPO. They
insisted that Wycliffe Diego and three other Yatama leaders
sign it. That communique announced the expulsion of Rivera
from Yatama, for revealing Indian military positions to the
Sandinistas and for being a "sell out" and "communist." The
same communique also expelled Steadman Fagoth, for human
rights violations. In an accompanying editorial, EL TIEMPO
informed its readers about the obvious political
manipulation by the United States behind this communique.
It is clear to all serious observers that the
expulsions from Yatama were a sham and that Brooklyn
Rivera's leadership and peace initiative is firmly supported
by the vast majority of Nicaraguan Indians in Honduras. By
barring legitimate Indian leaders from Honduras, and by
exerting extreme political and economic pressure on Indian
leaders who are in Honduras, United States and Honduran
military officials have created serious but not
insurmountable obstacles to the Indian peace initiative.
Fortunately, the manipulations and threats are increasingly
transparent and ineffective, and broad Indian support for
the peace initiative continues to be demonstrated in
Honduras as well as in Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
THE SECOND ROUND OF SANDINISTA-INDIAN
PEACE TALKS, MARCH 1988
In compliance with the preliminary accord, a Yatama
delegation returned to Managua for a second round of talks
on March 1. At first there was a dispute about a Canadian
Indian lawyer, Clem Chartier, whom Rivera had invited to
accompany his delegation. Chartier, former head of the World
Council of Indigenous Peoples, had accompanied Rivera in a
clandestine trip deep inside the Atlantic Coast region in
January 1986. He had angered the Sandinistas and had been
called a CIA agent after reporting on the terrible
conditions he had witnessed in Indian villages and the
bombing by the Sandinista air force at the Miskito village
of Layasiksa that almost killed him. Tomas Borge initially
refused to permit Chartier into the country, but he
relented, and Chartier traveled with the Yatama commission
throughout its three-week stay inside Nicaragua.
Several days of talks in Managua were followed by
extensive travel in the Atlantic Coast region. In the talks,
the government raised many objections to the Yatama treaty
proposal, some based on legal and constitutional arguments
and others purely political. The negotiations were serious
and in apparent good faith. The Yatama delegation presented
another brief, written proposal in the hope of making
progress towards a comprehensive agreement. The government
agreed to respond to it after the delegation returned from
the Atlantic Coast.
THE MARCH 1988 YATAMA VISIT TO ATLANTIC
COAST COMMUNITIES
The Yatama commission, the Conciliation Commission and
the advisors had a very remarkable trip to the Atlantic
Coast region. They traveled first to Bluefields, because
Tomas Borge said it was too dangerous to fly immediately to
Puerto Cabezas. He would not explain the nature of that
danger. From Bluefields they traveled north by boat to the
Pearl Lagoon villages and as far as Karawala (Sandy Bay
Sharon) on the Rio Grande. They then returned to Bluefields,
flew to Puerto Cabezas, and went by land to Yulo and to the
Rio Coco border with Honduras, visiting Indian civilians and
fighters in several border villages. Returning to Puerto
Cabezas, they traveled by boat to Haulover and other central
coastal villages, as far as Prinsapolka, the town where the
Sandinista-Indian war began in 1981.
They visited twenty Atlantic Coast communities. At each
stop they received an outpouring of support. There was
virtually unanimous backing for them in the Miskito and
Creole villages, among both civilians and fighters.
EVIDENCE OF SANDINISTA ABUSES IN INDIAN
COMMUNITIES
In two villages, the Yatama delegation found first hand
evidence of serious breaches of the truce that had been
agreed upon in the preliminary accord of February 2. In a
small Miskito community near Karawala (Sandy Bay Sharon),
the villagers told of an incident on February 7 when
Sandinista officials waylaid two young Indian fighters who
were picking coconuts nearby. One of them, "Junior", was
shot and mutilated. His eyes were gouged out and his ears
cut off by a Sandinista official known as "Melward" who was
still stationed at Karawala when the Yatama visitors
arrived. The other Indian fighter had been arrested and
imprisoned in Bluefields. The villagers told Rivera and the
others of this incident in a meeting at their church.
Rivera, the Conciliation Commission members, and Dr.
Nietschmann told the official who was accused of the killing
that they would demand a complete investigation after they
left. Several days after the Yatama delegation left the
area, Melward was reportedly shot and badly injured in an
ambush. This incident was later cited as a reason for
arresting Dr. Nietschmann and removing him from the Atlantic
Coast region. When Rivera returned to Bluefields from
Karawala he was assured by Sandinista prison officials that
the imprisoned fighter would be promptly released.
In the Miskito village of Kum, along the Rio Coco, the
villagers told of another apparent violation of the truce.
Sandinista soldiers had reportedly entered the village,
surrounded the house where an Indian fighter was staying,
and killed him with machine gun fire.
Other complaints included harassment by Sandinista
officials and severe restrictions on subsistence hunting and
fishing. In coastal villages actively patrolled by
Sandinista forces, people complained about a serious
shortage of food. The Sandinista forces had militarily
occupied fishing keys and were prohibiting regular fishing
and lobster gathering. In the villages along the central
coastal area, where the Sandinista military has not been
able to dislodge the Indian fighters, the people have ample
food, but they lack coffee, flour and other staples
previously acquired through commerce. (In the Corn Island
area, the people trade lobsters for dollars and goods
brought in small boats from Colombia and Jamaica. Unable to
stop this trade, Sandinista officials also have begun
purchasing Corn Island lobsters with dollars, and dollars
are now the currency most used in daily commerce on that
island.)
Throughout the region, the people expressed hope that
the Yatama leaders would soon be able to return, that the
war would end, and that justice would be established in the
communities. Even the Kisan Pro Peace group, former members
of the armed Indian resistance who are now in Yulo, gave
full support to the Yatama initiative. Yatama leaders were
told that before they arrived in Yulo, Sandinista officials
had visited and instructed the Kisan Pro Peace people to
throw rocks and sticks at the Yatama leaders when they
arrived. Instead, the Yatama leaders received a warm welcome
and an offer of full support for their peace project.
THE ARREST OF DR. BERNARD NIETSCHMANN
When the Yatama delegation returned to Puerto Cabezas,
near the end of its visit to the Atlantic Coast, armed
Sandinista security officials suddenly appeared at the hotel
where the delegation was staying and sought to arrest Dr.
Bernard Nietschmann, a Yatama commission advisor. At the
time of their arrival at the hotel, Dr. Nietschmann was not
there, so security officials swept through the town looking
for him.
The Yatama leaders immediately began negotiations about
this threatened arrest through the Conciliation Commission
members who were with them. The Sandinista officials said
they wanted to arrest Dr. Nietschmann and hold him in a
"safe house". They accused him of provoking the shooting of
the Sandinista official at Karawala. All available evidence
suggests this was a pretext; the local Sandinista officials
did not want him in town as a witness to coming events in
Puerto Cabezas. Rivera was told that if Dr. Nietschmann did
not leave at once, he and the entire delegation would be
required to return immediately to Managua.
The Yatama leaders agreed that Dr. Nietschmann would
return to Managua, but they insisted that he be accompanied
by a representative of CEPAD, the inter-denominational
protestant relief agency that is part of the Conciliation
Commission, and that he would return to the hotel where the
delegation had stayed in Managua. The Sandinista security
officials then confiscated Dr. Nietschmann's passport and
sent him to Managua. The two highest ranking Sandinista
officials from North Zelaya, Jose Gonzales and Salvador
Perez, accompanied him and the CEPAD representative. After
two days of further negotiations, Dr. Nietschmann's passport
was returned to him. He was reunited with the Yatama
delegation when they returned to Managua on March 14.
THE RALLY OF SUNDAY, MARCH 13, AND
"THE WAR OF ROCKS"
As Brooklyn Rivera travelled through the Coast
communities, he invited the public to a rally at the
baseball stadium on in Puerto Cabezas on Sunday, March 13.
Sandinista officials, including Mirna Cunningham, Cesar
Pais, Hazel Lau, Salvador Perez and Jose Gonzales organized
a week-long campaign to stop people from showing their
support at that rally. On their radio broadcasts they
instructed people not to come. They visited all of the
neighborhoods of Puerto Cabezas in a vehicle with an
attached loudspeaker and warned people that their food and
medicine rations would be jeopardized if they attended the
rally. They set up military checkpoints on roads outside of
town to discourage villagers from coming.
And these same Sandinista officials sent about 40
"turbas", another of their mobs, to throw rocks at the hotel
where Rivera and the others were staying. The turbas chanted
pro-Sandinista slogans as they menaced the delegation.
Military and police officials stood by and offered no
protection, obviously under orders not to intervene. Women
who work in the market in the center of the town immediately
responded by organizing about 1000 people who surrounded the
hotel to protect the Yatama leaders and chased away the
turbas. Rivera then walked to the center of town, surrounded
by about 2000 of his supporters, showing that he was not
intimidated.
The Sunday rally was an historic event for the Miskito
people. Some 8,000 to 10,000 people filled the stadium to
overflowing. They had come to demonstrate their support, and
feelings were very high. Rivera was completely surrounded by
supporters as he spoke. About 20 minutes into his address,
Sandinista military began firing cannon or mortar rounds
nearby, and a Sandinista airplane began circling overhead.
The crowd was not intimidated by this show of force, and the
rally continued, interrupted only by the chants and threats
of a small group of 80-100 turbas. Fearing bloodshed in the
highly charged atmosphere, Rivera urged the crowd to be
calm. He finished his presentation and received resounding
support from the crowd.
Then the turbas started attacking people with rocks,
clubs and chains. The people responded by throwing back the
rocks and by chasing after the turbas and beating them. Some
of the turbas fled into government offices and were dragged
out and beaten. Some of the turbas had guns, and almost all
were from the Interior Ministry and local government
offices. Miraculously, no one was killed in this melee.
(There is an unconfirmed report that one of the turbas
accidentally shot another turba.) Today, that Sunday
disturbance is known on the Atlantic Coast as the "Guerra de
Piedras", the War of Rocks.
Among those injured by the turbas was John Paul
Lederach, the Mennonite mediator, and a CEPAD worker who is
also part of the Conciliation Commission. They had sought
refuge in a CEPAD vehicle when the turbas attacked them.
They were cut and bruised when the turbas smashed in all the
windows, but they managed to escape with wounds requiring a
few stitches. The leader of these attacks was the same "news
reporter" who had been a leader of the turba disruption at
the January stadium rally. A third member of the
Conciliation Commission, Moravian pastor Jorge Fredericks,
was also attacked and beaten by the turbas. An injury to one
of his wrists required a cast. Many Miskitos were injured
before the turbas were routed and order was restored.
Prominent local government officials, including Mirna
Cunningham's chief administrative aide, led the turba
attacks. In all of the turmoil that day, the Sandinista
military and police forces again refused to intervene to
provide any protection against the turbas.
RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN MANAGUA
Brooklyn Rivera and the Yatama leaders returned to
Managua the following day. Their trip had been successful
beyond their hopes. They had found deep support for their
leadership and for their peace initiative in almost every
sector of the Atlantic Coast. Years of efforts by the
Sandinistas to divide and conquer the Atlantic Coast peoples
had obviously failed. The Yatama leaders would be
negotiating from strength.
It was clear that Tomas Borge and the Sandinista
leadership were at a crossroads. On the one hand they could
support the turbas and local Sandinistas who had attacked
the Yatama leaders and violated the truce. They could accuse
Rivera of inciting the people and could close ranks behind
their cadre. This approach would likely result in
termination of the peace talks and would require vigorous
oppressive measures to reassert Sandinista control over the
Atlantic Coast communities.
Fortunately, Tomas Borge did not elect that option.
Instead, he blamed the disturbances and abuses on local
Sandinista officials and offered to accompany Rivera during
his next trip to make sure that there are no more such
troubles. This approach keeps the peace process on track,
whether or not the actions of the local Sandinista officials
had prior approval from Managua.
The final talks in Managua dealt almost exclusively
with Rivera's report and evaluation of the developments and
grievances on the Atlantic Coast. There were no further
negotiations of the substantive Indian rights issues, and
the government apparently needed time to evaluate its next
moves. Accordingly, no additional agreements were made, and
the Yatama negotiation commission returned on March 16 to
San Jose, Costa Rica, promising only to resume talks during
the latter half of April, on a date to be agreed upon.
Although Brooklyn Rivera and others from his delegation
held a press conference and had additional meetings with the
international press in Managua, there was virtually no
coverage of these important events. International attention
on Nicaragua has focused almost exclusively on developments
pertaining to the contra-Sandinista war and the related
East-West issues.
MANIPULATION AND CONFUSION AT SAPOA
The pressures applied against Indian leaders in
Honduras resulted in more problems for the Yatama leadership
after they left Nicaragua. Yatama military commander Osorno
Coleman (Comandante Blas) appeared at the Sapoa cease-fire
talks between the Nicaraguan Resistance and the Nicaraguan
government. He signed the accord and gave the appearance
that the Indian resistance was united with the contras. He
reportedly had been sent to those talks by United States
officials who threatened to cut off humanitarian aid to the
Indian fighters if he refused.
In fact, Colemen had no authority from his people to
participate in those talks. Such authority had been denied
at the Indian "mini-assembly" in late February where a
proposal for unity with the contras was expressly rejected.
This latest effort to manipulate and control the Indian
resistance has created more confusion that will have to be
overcome during the continuing negotiations between Yatama
and the Nicaraguan government.
CONCLUSION
The Indians of Nicaragua, who were the first to go to
war with the Sandinistas, have been quietly demonstrating
that they may be the first to show the way to peace. They
have already made remarkable progress, overcoming many
obstacles. Hopefully, their efforts and their leadership
will soon gain the broader attention and support they
deserve.
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