A Market-Oriented Programming Environment and its Application to Distributed Multicommodity Flow Problems

M. P. Wellman

Volume 1, 1993

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Market price systems constitute a well-understood class of mechanisms that under certain conditions provide effective decentralization of decision making with minimal communication overhead. In a market-oriented programming approach to distributed problem solving, we derive the activities and resource allocations for a set of computational agents by computing the competitive equilibrium of an artificial economy. WALRAS provides basic constructs for defining computational market structures, and protocols for deriving their corresponding price equilibria. In a particular realization of this approach for a form of multicommodity flow problem, we see that careful construction of the decision process according to economic principles can lead to efficient distributed resource allocation, and that the behavior of the system can be meaningfully analyzed in economic terms.

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Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 1 {1993} 1-23 Submitted 5/93;
published 8/93 A Market-Oriented Programming Environment and its
 Application to Distributed Multicommodity Flow Problems
 MichaelP. Wellman wellman@engin.umich.edu
 University of Michigan, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,
 Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
 Market price systems constitute a well-understood class of mechanisms that
under certain conditions provide effective decentralization of decision making
with minimalcom- munication overhead. Ina market-oriented programming approach
to distributed problem solving, we derive the activities and resource allocations
for a set of computational agents by computing the competitive equilibrium
of an artificial economy. Walras provides basic
 constructs for defining computational market structures, and protocols for
deriving their corresponding price equilibria. In a particular realization
of this approach for a form of multicommodity flow problem, we see that careful
construction of the decision process ac- cording to economic principles can
lead to efficient distributed resource allocation, and that the behavior
of the system can be meaningfully analyzed in economic terms.
 1. Distributed Planning and Economics
 In a distributed or multiagent planning system, the plan for the system
as a whole is a com-
 posite of plans produced by its constituent agents. These plans may interact
significantly in both the resources required by each of the agents' activities
{preconditions} and the prod- ucts resulting from these activities {postconditions}.
Despite these interactions, it is often advantageous or necessary to distribute
the planning process because agents are separated geographically, have different
information, possess distinct capabilities or authority, or have
 been designed and implemented separately. In any case, because each agent
has limited competence and awareness of the decisions produced by others,
some sort of coordination is required to maximize the performance of the
overall system. However, allocating resources via central control or extensive
communication is deemed infeasible, as it violates whatever constraints dictated
distribution of the planning task in the first place.
 The task facing the designer of a distributed planning system is to define
a computa-
 tionally efficient coordination mechanism and its realization for a collection
of agents. The
 agent configuration may be given, or may itself be a design parameter. Bythe
term agent,
 I refer to a module that acts within the mechanism according to its own
knowledge and
 interests. The capabilities of the agents and their organization in an overall
decision-making structure determine the behavior of the system as a whole.
Becauseit concerns the collec- tive behavior of self-interested decision
makers, the design of this decentralized structure is fundamentally an exercise
in economics or incentive engineering. The problem of developing architectures
for distributed planning fits within the framework of mechanism design {Hur-
wicz, 1977; Reiter, 1986}, and many ideas and results from economics are
directly applicable. In particular, the class of mechanisms based on price
systems and competition has been deeply investigated by economists, who have
characterized the conditions for its efficiency c
 fl1993 AI Access Foundation and Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. All rights reserved.Wellman
 and compatibility with other features of the economy. When applicable, thecompetitive
 mechanism achieves coordination with minimal communication requirements
{in a precise
 sense related to the dimensionality of messages transmitted among agents
{Reiter, 1986}). The theory of general equilibrium {Hildenbrand & Kirman,
1976} provides the founda- tion for a general approach to the construction
of distributed planning systems based on
 price mechanisms. In this approach, we regard the constituent planning agents
as consumers and producers in an artificial economy, and define their individual
activities in terms of pro- duction and consumption of commodities. Interactions
among agents are cast as exchanges, the terms of which are mediated by the
underlying economic mechanism, or protocol. By
 specifying the universe of commodities, the configuration of agents, and
the interaction protocol, we can achieve a variety of interesting and often
effective decentralized behaviors.
 Furthermore,we can apply economic theory to the analysis of alternative
architectures, and thus exploit a wealth of existing knowledge in the design
of distributed planners.
 I use the phrase market-oriented programming to refer to the general approach
of de-
 riving solutions to distributed resource allocation problems by computing
the competitive equilibrium of an artificial economy. 1
 In the following, I describe this general approach
 and a primitive programming environment supporting the specification of
 markets and derivation of equilibrium prices. An example problem in distributed
trans- portation planning demonstrates the feasibility of decentralizing
a problem with nontrivial interactions, and the applicability of economic
principles todistributed problem solving.
 2. WALRAS: A Market-Oriented Programming Environment
 To explore the use of market mechanisms for the coordination of distributed
planning mod-
 ules, I have developed a prototype environment for specifying and simulating
 markets. Thesystem is called walras, after the 19th-century French economist
Leon Wal-
 ras, who was the first to envision a system of interconnected markets in
price equilibrium.
 Walras provides basic mechanisms implementing various sorts of agents, auctions,
 bidding protocols. To specify a computational economy, one defines a set
of goods and
 instantiates a collection of agents that produce or consume those goods.
Depending on the
 context, some of the goods or agents may be fixed exogenously, for example,
they could cor-
 respond to real-world goods or agents participating in the planning process.
Others might
 be completely artificial ones invented by the designer to decentralize the
 process in a particular way. Given a market configuration, walras then runs
these agents
 to determine an equilibrium allocation of goods and activities. This distribution
of goods
 and activities constitutes the market solution to the planning problem.1.
The name was inspired by Shoham's use of agent-oriented programming to refer
to a specialization of
 object-oriented programming where the entities are described in terms of
agent concepts and interact viaspeech acts {Shoham, 1993}. Market-orientedprogramming
is an analogous specialization, where the
 entities are economic agents that interact according to market concepts
of production and exchange. The
 phrase has also been invoked by Lavoie, Baetjer, and Tulloh {1991} to refer
to real markets in software components.
 2Market-Oriented Programming
 2.1 General Equilibrium
 The walras framework is patterned directly after general-equilibrium theory.
A brief expo- sition, glossing over many fine points, follows; for elaboration
see any text on microeconomic
 theory {e.g., {Varian, 1984}). We start with k goods and n agents. Agentsfall
in two general classes. Consumers can
 buy, sell, and consume goods, and their preferences for consuming various
combinations or
 bundles ofgoods are specified by their utility function. If agent i is a
consumer, then its
 utility function, u
 : <
 k +
 ! <, ranks the various bundles of goods according to preference.
 Consumers may also start with an initial allocation of some goods, termed
their endow-
 ment. Let e
 denote agent i's endowment of good j, and x
 the amount of good j thati
 ultimately consumes. The objective of consumer i is to choose a feasible
bundle ofgoods,
 ; : : : ; x i;k
 } {rendered in vector notation as x
 }, so as to maximize its utility. A bundle
 is feasible for consumer i if its total cost at the going prices does not
exceed the value of
 i's endowment at these prices. The consumer's choice can be expressed as
the following
 constrained optimization problem:
 i u
 } s.t. p 001 x i
 024 p 001 e i
 ; {1}
 where p = {p
 ; : : : ; p
 } is the vector of prices for the k goods. Agents of the second type, producers,
can transform some sorts of goods into some
 others, according to their technology. The technology specifies the feasible
combinations of
 inputs and outputs for the producer. Let us consider the special case where
there is one
 output good, indexed j, and the remaining goods are potential inputs. In
that case, the
 technologyfor producer i can be described by a production function,
 = f i
 i;1 ; : : : ; x
 ; x
 ; : : : ; x
 specifying the maximum output producible from the given inputs. {When a
good is an
 input in its own production, the production function characterizes net output.}
In this
 case, the producer's objective is to choose a production plan that maximizes
profits subject
 to its technology and the going price of its output and input goods. This
involves choosing a
 production level, y
 , along with the levels of inputs that can produce y
 at the minimum cost. Let x
 i;026 -  and p
 026 - 
 denote the consumption and prices, respectively, of the input goods. Then
 thecorresponding constrained optimization problem is to maximize profits,
the difference
 between revenues and costs:
 i 024
 y i
 i;026 -  p
 026  - 
 001 x
 i;026 - 
 s.t. y
 024 f i
 i;026 - 
 or equivalently,
 p 001 x
 s.t. 000 x
 024 f
 i;026 - 
 }: {2}
 An agent acts competitively when it takes prices as given, neglecting any
impact of its own behavior on prices. The above formulation implicitly assumes
perfect competition, in that the prices are parameters of the agents' constrained
optimization problems. Perfect competition realistically reflects individual
rationality when there are numerous agents, each small with respect to the
entire economy. Even when this is not the case, however, we can
 implement competitive behavior in individual agentsif we so choose. The
implications of
 therestriction to perfect competition are discussed further below. A pair
{p; x} of a price vector and vector of demands for each agent constitutes
 competitive equilibrium for the economy if and only if:
 1. For each agent i, x i
 is a solution to its constrained optimization problem|{1} or
 {2}|at prices p, and
 2. the net amount of each good produced and consumed equals the total endowment,
 i=1 x
 n X
 ; for j = 1; : : :; k: {3}
 In other words, the total amount consumed equals the total amount produced
 as negative quantities in the consumption bundles of producers}, plus the
total amount
 the economy started out with {the endowments}.
 Under certain \classical" assumptions {essentially continuity, monotonicity,
and concav- ity of the utility and production functions; see, e.g., {Hildenbrand
& Kirman, 1976; Varian, 1984}), competitive equilibria exist, and are unique
given strictness of these conditions. From the perspective of mechanism design,
competitive equilibria possess several desirable properties, in particular,
the two fundamental welfare theorems of general equilibrium the- ory: {1}
all competitive equilibria are Pareto optimal {no agent can do better without
 other doing worse}, and {2} any feasible Pareto optimum is a competitive
equilibrium for
 some initial allocation of the endowments. These properties seem to offer
exactly what
 we need: a bound on the quality of the solution, plus the prospect that
we can achieve
 the most desired behavior by carefully engineering the configuration of
the computational
 market. Moreover, in equilibrium, theprices reflect exactly the information
required for
 distributed agents to optimally evaluate perturbations in their behavior
without resorting
 to communication or reconsideration of their full set of possibilities {Koopmans,
 2.2 Computing Competitive Equilibria
 Competitive equilibria arealso computable, and algorithms based on fixed-point
meth- ods {Scarf, 1984} and optimization techniques {Nagurney, 1993} have
been developed. Both
 sorts of algorithms in effect operate by collecting and solving the simultaneous
equilib- rium equations {1}, {2}, and {3}). Without an expressly distributed
formulation, however,
 these techniques may violate the decentralization considerations underlying
our distributed problem-solving context. This is quite acceptable for the
purposes these algorithms were originallydesigned, namely to analyze existing
decentralized structures, such as transporta- tion industries or even entire
economies {Shoven & Whalley, 1992}. But because our purpose is to implement
a distributed system, we must obey computational distributivityconstraints
 not relevant to the usual purposes of applied general-equilibrium analysis.
In general, ex- plicitly examining the space of commodity bundle allocations
in the search for equilibrium undercuts our original motive for decomposing
complex activities into consumption and
 production of separate goods.
 4Market-Oriented Programming
 Another important constraint is that internal details of the agents' state
{such as utility or production functions and bidding policy} should be considered
private in order to maxi- mize modularity and permit inclusion of agents
not under the designers' direct control. A
 consequence of this is that computationally exploiting global properties
arising from spe- cial features of agents would not generally be permissible
for our purposes. For example, the constraint that profits be zero is a consequence
of competitive behavior and constant-
 returns production technology. Since information about the form of the technology
and bidding policy is private to producer agents, it could be considered
cheating to embed the zero-profit condition into the equilibrium derivation
 Walras's procedure is a decentralized relaxation method, akin to the mechanism
 tatonnement originally sketched by Leon Walras to explain how prices might
be derived.
 Inthe basic tatonnement method, we begin with an initial vector of prices,
 . Theagents
 determine their demands at those prices {by solving their corresponding
constrained op- timization problems}, and report the quantities demanded
to the \auctioneer". Based on these reports, the auctioneer iteratively
adjusts the prices up or down as there is an excess of demand or supply,
respectively. For instance, an adjustment proportional to the excess
 could be modeled by the difference equation
 = p
 + ff{ n
 n X
 e i
 If the sequence p
 1 ; : : : converges, then the excess demand in each market approaches zero,
 and the result is a competitive equilibrium. It is well known, however,
that tatonnement
 processes do not converge to equilibrium in general {Scarf, 1984}. The class
of economies in
 which tatonnement works are those with so-called stable equilibria {Hicks,
1948}. A sufficient
 condition for stability is gross substitutability {Arrow & Hurwicz, 1977}:
that if the price
 for one good rises, then the net demands for the other goods do not decrease.
 gross substitutability will be violated when there are complementarities
in preferences or
 technologies such that reduced consumption for one good will cause reduced
 in others as well {Samuelson, 1974}.
 2.3 WALRAS Bidding Protocol The method employed by walras successively computes
an equilibrium price in each sep-
 arate market, in a manner detailed below. Like tatonnement, it involves
an iterative ad-
 justment of prices based on reactions of the agents in the market. However,
it differs from
 traditional tatonnement procedures in that {1} agents submit supply and
demand curves
 rather than single point quantities for a particular price, and {2} the
auction adjusts in-
 dividual prices to clear, rather than adjusting the entire price vector
by some increment
 {usually a function of summary statistics such as excess demand}.
 Walras associates an auction with each distinct good. Agents act in the
market by
 submitting bids toauctions. Inwalras, bids specify a correspondence between
prices and2. Thisgeneral approach is called progressiveequilibration by Dafermos
and Nagurney {1989}, who applied
 it to a particular transportation network equilibrium problem. Although
this model of market dynamics
 does not appear to have been investigated very extensively in general-equilibrium
theory, it does seem
 to match the kind of price adjustment process envisioned by Hicks in his
pioneering study of dynamics
 and stability {Hicks, 1948}. 5Wellman
 quantities of the good that the agent offers to demand or supply. The bid
for a particular
 good corresponds to one dimension of the agent's optimal demand, which is
 by the prices for all relevant goods. Let x
 {p} be the solution to equation {1} or {2}, as
 appropriate, for prices p. A walras agent bids for good j under the assumption
that prices
 for the remaining goods are fixed at their current values, p
 026 - 
 . Formally, agent i's bid for good j is a function x i;j
 ! <, from prices to quantities satisfying x
 } = x
 ; p 026 - 
 j ;
 where the subscript j on the right-hand side selects the quantity demanded
of good j from
 the overall demand vector. Theagent computes and sends this function {encoded
in any of
 a variety of formats} to the auction for good j.
 Given bids from all interested agents, the auction derives a market-clearing
price, at which the quantity demanded balances that supplied, within some
prespecified tolerance. This clearing price is simply the zero crossing of
the aggregate demand function, which is the sum of the demands from all agents.
Sucha zero crossing will exist as long as the aggregate demand is sufficiently
well-behaved, in particular, if it is continuous and decreasing in price.
 Gross substitutability, along with the classical conditions for existence
of equilibrium, is sufficientto ensure the existence of a clearing price
at any stage of the bidding protocol. Walras calculates the zero crossing
of the aggregate demand function via binary search. If aggregate demand is
not well-behaved, the result of the auction may be a non-clearing price.
 When the current price is clearing with respect to the current bids, we
say the market
 for that commodity is in equilibrium. We say that an agent is in equilibrium
if its set of
 outstanding bids corresponds to the solution of its optimization problem
at the going prices. If all the agents and commodity markets are in equilibrium,
the allocation of goods dictated by the auction results is a competitive
 Figure 1 presents a schematic view of the walras bidding process. There
is an auction
 for each distinct good, and for each agent, a link to all auctions in which
it has an interest.
 There is also a \tote board" of current prices, kept up-to-date by the
various auctions. In
 the current implementation the tote board is a global data structure, however,
since price
 changenotifications are explicitly transmitted to interested agents, this
central information
 could be easily dispensed with.
 Each agent maintains an agenda of bid tasks, specifying the markets in which
it must update its bid or compute a new one. In Figure 1, agent A
 i has pending tasks to submit
 bids to auctions G
 , G 7
 , and G
 4 . The bidding process is highly distributed, in that each
 agent need communicate directly only with the auctions for the goods of
interest {those in
 the domain of its utility or production function, or for which it has nonzero
 Each of these interactions concerns only a single good; auctions never coordinate
with each
 other. Agentsneed not negotiate directly with other agents, nor even know
of each other's
 As new bids are received at auction, the previously computed clearing price
 obsolete. Periodically, each auction computes a new clearing price {if any
new or updated
 bids have been received} and posts it on the tote board. When a price is
updated, this
 may invalidate some of an agent's outstanding bids, since these were computed
under the
 assumption that prices for remaining goods were fixed at previous values.
On finding out
 6Market-Oriented Programming
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board_Times-Roman}_Times-Roman}Figure 1: Walras's bidding process. G
 j denotesthe auction for the jth good, and A
 ith trading agent. An item [j] on the task agenda denotes a pending task
to compute and submit a bid for good j.
 about a price change, an agent augments its task agenda to include the potentially
 At all times, walras maintains a vector of going prices and quantities that
would be
 exchanged at those prices. While the agents have nonempty bid agendas or
the auctions new bids, some or all goods may be in disequilibrium. When all
auctions clear and all agendas
 are exhausted, however, the economy is in competitive equilibrium {up to
some numeric
 tolerance}. Using a recent result of Milgrom and Roberts {1991, Theorem
12}, it can be shown that the condition sufficient for convergence of tatonnement|gross
substitutability| is also sufficient for convergence of walras's price-adjustment
process. The key observation
 is that in progressive equilibration {synchronous or not} the price at each
time is based on
 some set of previous supply and demand bids.
 Although I have no precise results to this effect, the computational effort
required for
 convergence to a fixed tolerance seems highly sensitive to the number of
goods, and much
 less so to the number of agents. Eydeland and Nagurney {1989} have analyzed
in detail
 the convergence pattern of progressive equilibration algorithms related
to walras for par-
 ticular special cases, and found roughly linear growth in the number of
agents. However,
 general conclusions are difficult to draw as the cost of computing the equilibrium
fora par-
 ticular computational economy may well depend on the interconnectedness
and strength of
 interactions among agents and goods.
 2.4 Market-Oriented Programming As described above, walras provides facilities
for specifying marketconfigurations and
 computing their competitive equilibrium. We can also view walras as a programming
 environment for decentralized resource allocation procedures. The environment
 constructs for specifying various sorts of agents and defining their interactions
via their
 relations to common commodities. After setting up the initial configuration,
the market
 can be run to determine the equilibrium level of activities and distribution
of resources
 throughout the economy. To cast a distributed planning problem as a market,
one needs to identify {1} the goods traded, {2} the agents trading, and {3}
the agents' bidding behavior. These design steps areserially dependent, as
the definition of what constitutes an exchangeable or producible commodity
severely restricts the type of agents that it makes sense to include. And
 mentioned above, sometimes we have to take as fixed some real-world agents
and goods
 presented as part of the problem specification. Once the configuration is
determined, it
 might be advantageous to adjust some general parameters of the bidding protocol.
Below, I
 illustrate the design task with a walras formulation of the multicommodity
flow problem.
 2.5 Implementation Walras is implemented in Common Lisp and the Common Lisp
Object System {CLOS}.
 The current version provides basic infrastructure for running computational
 including the underlying bidding protocol and a library of CLOS classes
implementing a
 varietyof agent types. The object-oriented implementation supports incremental
 ment of market configurations. In particular, new types of agents can often
be defined as
 slight variations on existing types, for example by modifying isolated features
of the demand
 behavior, bidding strategies{e.g., management of task agenda}, or bid format.
Wang and Slagle {1993} present a detailed case for the use of object-oriented
languages to represent general-equilibrium models. Their proposed system
is similar to walras with respect to formulation, although it is designed
as an interface to conventional model-solving packages, rather than to support
a decentralized computation of equilibrium directly.
 Although it models a distributed system, walras runs serially on a single
 Distribution constraints on information and communication are enforced by
 and specification conventions rather than by fundamental mechanisms of the
software en- vironment. Asynchrony is simulated by randomizing the bidding
sequences so that agents are called on unpredictably. Indeed, artificial
synchronization can lead to an undesirable oscillation in the clearing prices,
as agents collectively overcompensate for imbalances in the preceding iteration.
 3 The current experimental system runs transportation models of the sort
described be- low, as well as some abstract exchange and production economies
with parametrized utility and production functions {including the expository
examples of Scarf {1984} and Shoven and Whalley {1984}). Customized tuning
of the basic bidding protocol has not been nec- essary. In the process of
getting walras to run on these examples, I have added some
 generically useful building blocks to the class libraries, but much more
is required to fill out
 a comprehensive taxonomy of agents, bidding strategies, and auction policies.3.
In some formal dynamic models {Huberman, 1988; Kephart, Hogg, & Huberman,
1989}, homogeneous
 agents choose instantaneously optimal policies without accounting for others
that are simultaneously
 makingthe same choice. Since the value of a particular choice varies inversely
with the number of agents choosing it, this delayed feedback about the others'
decisions leads to systematic errors, and hence
 oscillation. I have also observed this phenomenon empirically in a synchronized
version of WALRAS.
 By eliminating the synchronization, agents tend to work on different markets
at any one time, and hence
 do not suffer as much from delayed feedback about prices.
 8Market-Oriented Programming
 3. Example: Multicommodity Flow In a simple version of the multicommodity
flow problem, the task is to allocate a given
 set of cargo movements over a given transportation network. The transportation
 is a collection of locations, with links {directed edges} identifying feasible
 operations. Associated with each link is a specification of the cost of
moving cargo along it.
 We suppose further that the cargo is homogeneous, and that amounts of cargo
are arbitrarily divisible. A movement requirement associates an amount of
cargo with an origin-destination pair. The planning problem is to determine
the amount to transport on each link in order to move all the cargo at the
minimum cost. This simplification ignores salient aspects of real transportation
planning. For instance, this model is completely atemporal, and is hence
more suitable for planning steady-state flows than for planning dynamic movements.
 A distributed version of the problem would decentralize the responsibility
for trans-
 porting separate cargo elements. For example, planning modules corresponding
to geo-
 graphically or organizationally disparate units might arrange the transportation
for cargo within their respective spheres of authority. Or decision-making
activity might be decom- posed along hierarchical levels of abstraction,
gross functional characteristics, or according to any other relevant distinction.
This decentralization might result from real distribution
 of authority within a human organization, from inherent informational asymmetries
and communication barriers, or from modularity imposed to facilitate software
engineering. Consider, for example, the abstract transportation network of
Figure 2, taken from
 Harker {1988}. There are four locations, with directed links as shown. Consider
two move-
 ment requirements. The first is to transport cargo from location 1 to location
4, and the
 second in the reverse direction. Suppose we wish to decentralize authority
so that separate
 agents {called shippers} decide how to allocate the cargo for each movement.
The first ship-
 per decides how to split its cargo units between the paths 1 ! 2 ! 4 and
1 ! 2 ! 3 ! 4,
 while the second figures the split between paths 4 ! 2 ! 1 and 4 ! 2 ! 3
! 1. Note that the latter paths for each shipper share a common resource:
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msave/mrestore stack overflow: Offending command 'msave'_Times-Roman1_Times-Roman2_Times-Roman4_Times-Roman3Figure
2: A simple network {from Harker {1988}).
 Because of their overlapping resource demands, the shippers' decisions appear
to be
 necessarily intertwined. In a congested network, for example, the cost for
transporting a
 unit of cargo over a link is increasing in the overall usage of the link.
A shipper planning
 its cargo movements as if it were the only user on a network would thus
underestimate its
 costs and potentially misallocate transportation resources. 9Wellman
 For the analysis of networks such as this, transportation researchers have
 equilibrium concepts describing the collective behavior of the shippers.
In a system equi-
 librium, the overall transportation of cargo proceeds as if there were an
omniscient central
 planner directing the movement of each shipment so as to minimize the total
 cost of meeting the requirements. In a user equilibrium, the overall allocation
of cargo
 movements is such that each shipper minimizes its own total cost, sharing
 the cost of shared resources. The system equilibrium is thus a global optimum,
while the
 userequilibrium corresponds to a composition of locally optimal solutions
to subproblems.
 There are also some intermediate possibilities, corresponding to game-theoretic
equilibrium concepts such as the Nash equilibrium, where each shipper behaves
optimally given the transportation policies of the remaining shippers {Harker,
 From our perspective as designer of the distributed planner, we seek a decentralization
 mechanism that will reach the system equilibrium, or come as close as possible
given the
 distributed decision-making structure. In general, however, we cannot expect
to derive a
 system equilibrium orglobally optimal solution without central control.
Limits on coordi-
 nation and communication may prevent the distributed resource allocation
from exploiting
 all opportunities and inhibiting agentsfrom acting at cross purposes. But
under certain
 conditionsdecision making can indeed be decentralized effectively via market
 General-equilibrium analysis can help us to recognize and take advantage
of these opportu- nities.
 Note that for the multicommodity flow problem, there is an effective distributed
 due to Gallager {1977}. One of the market structures described below effectively
mimics this
 solution, even though Gallager's algorithm was not formulated expressly
in market terms. The point here is not to crack a hitherto unsolved distributed
optimization problem {though that would be nice}, but rather to illustrate
a general approach on a simply described yet nontrivial task.
 4. WALRAS Transportation Market
 In this section, I present a series of three transportation market structures
implemented in
 walras. The first and simplest model comprises the basic transportation
goods and shipper agents, which are augmented in the succeeding models to
include other agent types. Com-
 parative analysis of the three market structures reveals the qualitatively
distinct economic and computational behaviors realized by alternate walras
 4.1 Basic Shipper Model
 The resource of primary interest in the multicommodity flow problem is movement
of cargo.
 Because the value and cost of a cargo movement depends on location, we designate
as a
 distinct good the capacity on each origin-destination pair in the network
{see Figure 2}. To
 capture the cost or input required to move cargo, we define another good
denoting generic
 transportation resources. In a more concrete model, these might consist
of vehicles, fuel,
 labor,or other factors contributing to transportation.4. In the Nash solution,
shippers correctly anticipate the effect of their own cargo movements on
the average
 cost on each link. The resulting equilibrium converges to the user equilibrium
as the number of shippers increases and the effect of any individual's behavior
on prices diminishes {Haurie & Marcotte, 1985}.
 10Market-Oriented Programming
 To decentralize the decision making, we identify each movement requirement
with a distinct shipper agent. These shippers, or consumers, have an interest
in moving various units of cargo between specified origins and destinations.
 The interconnectedness of agents and goods defines the market configuration.
Figure 3
 depicts the walras configuration for the basic shipper model corresponding
to the example
 network of Figure 2. In this model there are two shippers, S
 and S 4;1
 , where S i;j
 a shipper with a requirement to move goods from origin i to destination
j. Shippers connect
 to goods that might serve their objectives: in this case, movement along
links that belong to
 some simple path from the shipper's origin to its destination. Inthe diagram,
 the good representing an amount of cargo moved over the link i ! j. G
 denotes the special
 transportation resource good. Notice that the only goods of interest to
both shippers are G
 , for which they both have endowments, and G
 , transportation on the link serving
 both origin-destination pairs.
G0G4,2G2,1G3,1S4,1G2,4G1,2S1,4G2,3G3,4Figure 3: Walras basic shipper market
configuration for the example transportation net-
 The model we employ for transportation costs is based on a network with
 thus exhibiting diseconomies of scale. In other words, the marginal and
average costs {in
 terms of transportation resources required} are both increasing in the level
of service on a
 link. Using Harker's data, we take costs to be quadratic. The quadratic
cost model is posed
 simply for concreteness, and does not represent any substantive claim about
 networks. The important qualitative feature of this model {and the only
one necessary
 for the example to work} is that it exhibits decreasing returns, a defining
characteristic of
 congested networks. Note also that Harker's model is in terms of monetary
costs, whereas
 we introduce an abstract input good.
 Let c
 {x} denote the cost in transportation resources {good G
 0 } required to transport
 x units of cargo on the link from i to j. The complete cost functions are:
 {x}= c
 {x} = c
 {x} = c
 {x} = x 2
 + 20x;
 c 3;1
 {x} = c
 {x} = c
 {x} = 2x
 + 5x:
 Finally, each shipper's objective is to transport 10 units of cargo from
its origin to its
 In the basic shipper model, we assume that the shippers pay proportionately
{in units
 of G
 0 } for the total cost on each link. This amounts to a policy of average
cost pricing.
 We take the shipper's objective to be to ship as much as possible {up to
its movement
 requirement} in the least costly manner. Notice that this objective is not
expressible in
 termsof the consumer's optimization problem, equation {1}, and hence this
model is not technically an instance of the general-equilibrium framework.
 Given a network with prices on each link, the cheapest cargo movement corresponds
 the shortest path in the graph, where distances are equated with prices.
Thus, for a given
 link, a shipper would prefer to ship its entire quota on the link if it
is on the shortest path,
 and zero otherwise. In the case of ties, it is indifferent among the possible
allocations. To
 bid on link i; j, the shipper can derive the threshold price that determines
whether the link is on a shortest path by taking the difference in shortest-path
distance between the networks where link i; j's distance is set to zero and
infinity, respectively. In incrementally changing its bids, the shipper should
also consider its outstanding bids
 and the current prices. The value of reserving capacity on a particular
link is zero if it
 cannot get service on the other links on the path. Similarly, if it is already
committed to shipping cargo on a parallel path, it does not gain by obtaining
more capacity {even at a lower price} until it withdraws these other bids.
 Therefore, the actual demand policy of
 ashipper is to spend its uncommitted income on the potential flow increase
{derived from
 maximum-flow calculations} it could obtain by purchasing capacity on the
given link. It is
 willing to spend up to the threshold value of the link, as described above.
This determines
 one point on its demand curve. If it has some unsatisfied requirement and
 income it also indicates a willingness to pay a lower price for a greater
amount of capacity.
 Boundary points such as this serve to bootstrap the economy; from the initial
conditions it
 is typically the case that no individual link contributes to overall flow
between the shipper's
 origin and destination. Finally, the demand curve is completed by a smoothing
 on these points.
 Details of the boundary points and smoothing operation are rather arbitrary,
and I make no claim that this particular bidding policy is ideal or guaranteed
to work for a broad class of problems. This crude approach appears sufficient
for the present example and some similar ones, as long as the shippers' policies
become more accurate as the prices approach equilibrium.
 Walras successfully computes the competitive equilibrium for this example,
 in the case of the basic shipper model corresponds to a user equilibrium
{UE}for the
 transportation network. In the UE for the example network, each shipper
sends 2.86 units
 of cargo over the shared link 2 ! 3, and the remaining cargo over the direct
link from
 location 2 to the destination. This allocation is inefficient, as its total
cost is 1143 resource5. Evenif a shipper could simultaneously update its
bids in all markets, it would not be a good idea to do
 so here. A competitive shipper would send all its cargo on the least costly
path, neglecting the possibility
 that this demand may increase the prices so that it is no longer cheapest.
The outstanding bids provide
 some sensitivity to this effect, as they are functions of price. But they
cannot respond to changes in many prices at once, and thus the policy of
updating all bids simultaneously can lead to perpetual
 oscillation. For example, in the network considered here, the unique competitive
equilibrium has each
 shipper splitting its cargo between two different paths. Policiesallocating
all cargo to one path can never
 lead to this result, and hence convergence to competitive equilibrium depends
on the incrementality of
 bidding behavior.
 12Market-Oriented Programming
 units, which is somewhat greater than the global minimum-cost solution of
1136 units. In economic terms, the cause of the inefficiency is an externality
with respect to usage of the shared link. Because the shippers are effectively
charged average cost|which in the case of decreasing returns is below marginal
cost|the price they face does not reflect the full incremental social cost
of additional usage of the resource. In effect, incremental usage of the
resource by one agent is subsidized by the other. The steeper the decreasing
returns, the more the agents have an incentive to overutilize the resource.
 6 This is a simple example
 of the classic tragedy of the commons.
 The classical remedy to such problems is to internalize the externality
by allocating
 ownership of the shared resource to some decision maker who has the proper
incentives to
 use it efficiently. We can implement such a solution in walras by augmenting
the market structure with another type of agent. 4.2 Carrier Agents
 We extend the basic shipper model by introducing carriers, agents of type
producer who have the capability to transport cargo units over specified
links, given varying amounts of transportation resources. In the model described
here, we associate one carrier with each available link. The production function
for each carrier is simply the inverse of the
 cost function described above. To achieve a global movement of cargo, shippers
 transportation services from carriers in exchange for the necessary transportation
 Let C
 i;j denote the carrier that transports cargo from location i to location
j. Each carrier C
 is connected to the auction for G
 , its output good, along with G 0
 |its input
 in the production process. Shipper agents are also connected to G
 , as they are endowed with transportation resources to exchange for transportation
services. Figure 4 depicts the walras market structure when carriers are
included in the economy.
4: Walras market configuration for the example transportation network in
an econ-
 omy with shippers and carriers.6. Average-cost pricing is perhaps the most
common mechanism for allocating costs of a shared resource.
 Shenker {1991} points out problems with this scheme|with respect to both
efficiency and strategic behavior|in thecontext of allocating access to congested
computer networks, a problem analogous to
 our transportation task.
 In the case of a decreasing returns technology, the producer's {carrier's}
 problem has a unique solution. The optimal level of activity maximizes revenues
minus costs,
 which occurs at the point where the output price equals marginal cost. Using
this result,
 carriers submit supply bids specifying transportationservices as a function
of link prices
 {with resource price fixed}, and demand bids specifying required resources
as a function of
 input prices {for activity level computed with output price fixed}.
 For example, consider carrier C
 . At output price p
 and input price p
 0 , the carrier's
 profit is
 y 000 p
 where y is the level of service it chooses to supply. Given the cost function
above, this
 expression is maximized at y = {p
 000 20p
 . Taking p 0
 as fixed, the carrier submits a supply bid with y a function of p 1;2
 . On the demand side, the carrier takes p
 1;2 as fixed and
 submits a demand bid for enough good G
 to produce y, where y is treated as a function of p
 With the revised configuration and agent behaviors described, walras derives
the sys-
 tem equilibrium {SE}, that is, the cargo allocation minimizing overall transportation
 The derived cargo movements are correct to within 10045 in 36 bidding cycles,
and to 1045
 in 72, where in each cycle every agent submits an average of one bid to
one auction. The
 total cost {in units of G
 }, its division between shippers' expenditures and carriers' profits, and
the equilibrium prices are presented in Table 1. Data for the UE solution
of the ba- sic shipper model are included forcomparison. That the decentralized
process produces a global optimum is perfectly consistent with competitive
behavior|the carriers price their outputs at marginal cost, and the technologies
are convex.
 pricingTC expense profitp
 2;1 p
 p 2;4
 3;4 p
 4;2MC {SE}1136 1514 37840.0 35.7 22.1 35.7 13.6 13.6 40.0
 AC {UE}1143 1143 030.0 27.1 16.3 27.1 10.7 10.7 30.0
 Table 1: Equilibria derived by walras for the transportation example. TC,
MC, and AC
 stand for total, marginal, and average cost, respectively. TC = shipper
expense 000
 carrier profit.
 As a simple check on the prices of Table 1, we can verify that p 2;3
 + p
 = p
 + p
 = p
 . Both these relationships must hold in equilibrium {assuming all links
have nonzero movements}, else a shipper could reduce its cost by rerouting
some cargo. Indeed, for a simple {small and symmetric} example such as this,
it is easy to derive the equilibrium analytically using global equations
such as these. But as argued above, it would be improper
 to exploit these relationships in the implementation of a truly distributed
decision process. The lesson from this exercise is that we can achieve qualitatively
distinct results by sim- ple variations in the market configuration or agent
policies. From our designers' perspective,
 we prefer the configuration that leads to the more transportation-efficient
SE. Examination
 ofTable 1 reveals that we can achieve this result by allowing the carriers
to earn nonzero
 profits {economically speaking, these are really rents on the fixed factor
represented by the
 14Market-Oriented Programming
 congested channel} and redistributing these profits to the shippers to cover
their increased expenditures. {In the model of general equilibrium withproduction,
consumers own shares in the producers' profits. This closes the loop so that
all value is ultimately realized in
 consumption. We can specify these shares as part of the initial configuration,
just like the
 endowment.} In this example, we distribute the profits evenly between the
two shippers.
 4.3 Arbitrageur Agents The preceding results demonstrate that walras can
indeed implement a decentralized solution to the multicommodity flow problem.
Butthe market structure in Figure 4 is not
 as distributed as it might be, in that {1} all agents are connected to G
 , and {2} shippers
 need to know about all links potentially serving their origin-destination
pair. The first of these concerns is easily remedied, as the choice of a
single transportation resource good was completely arbitrary. For example,
it would be straightforward to consider some collection of resources {e.g.,
fuel, labor, vehicles}, and endow each shipper with only subsets of these.
The second concern can also be addressed within walras. To do so, we introduce
 another sort of producer agent. These new agents, called arbitrageurs, act
as specialized
 middlemen, monitoringisolated pieces of the network for inefficiencies.
An arbitrageur
 i;j;k produces transportation from i to k by buying capacity from i to j
and j to k. Its
 production function simply specifies that the amount of its output good,
 i;k , is equal to
 the minimum of its two inputs, G
 and G j;k
 . If p
 + p
 j;k < p
 , then its production
 is profitable. Its bidding policy in walras is to increment its level of
activity at each
 iteration by an amount proportional to its current profitability {or decrement
 to the loss}. Such incremental behavior is necessary for all constant-returns
producers in
 walras, as the profit maximization problem has no interior solution in the
linear case.
 To incorporate arbitrageurs into the transportation market structure, we
first create new
 goods corresponding to the transitive closure of the transportation network.
In the example
 network, this leads to goods for every location pair. Next, we add an arbitrageur
 every triple of locations such that {1} i ! j is in the original network,
and {2} there exists a
 path from j tok that does not traverse location i. These two conditions
ensure that there
 is an arbitrageur A
 for every pair i; k connected by a path with more than one link, and
 eliminate some combinations that are either redundant or clearly unprofitable.
The revised market structure for the running example is depicted in Figure
5, with new
 goods and agents shaded. Some goods and agents that are inactive in the
market solution
 have been omitted from the diagram to avoid clutter.
 Notice that in Figure 5 the connectivity of the shippers has been significantly
decreased, as the shippers now need be aware of only the good directly serving
their origin-destination pair. This dramatically simplifies their bidding
problem, as they can avoid all analysis of the price network. The structure
as a whole seems more distributed, as no agent is concerned with more than
three goods.7. Without such a restriction on its bidding behavior, the competitive
constant-returns producer would
 choose to operate at a level of infinity or zero, depending on whether its
activity were profitable or
 unprofitable at the going prices {at break-even, the producer is indifferent
among all levels}. This would lead to perpetual oscillation, a problem noticed
{and solved} by Paul Samuelson in 1949 when he
 considered the use of market mechanisms to solve linear programming problems
{Samuelson, 1966}.
5: The revised walras market configuration with arbitrageurs. Despite the
simplified shipper behavior, walras still converges to the SE, or optimal
solution, in this configuration. Although the resulting allocation of resources
is identical, a qualitative change in market structure here corresponds to
a qualitative change in the degreeof decentralization.
 In fact, the behavior of walras on the market configuration with arbitrageurs
is vir-
 tually identical to a standard distributed algorithm {Gallager, 1977} for
 flow {minimum delay on communication networks}. In Gallager's algorithm,
 modules expressly differentiate the cost function to derive the marginal
cost of increasing
 flow on a communication link. Flows are adjusted up or down so to equate
the marginal
 costs along competing subpaths. This procedure provably converges to the
optimal solution
 as long as the iterative adjustment parameter is sufficiently small. Similarly,
 in walras for this model requires that the arbitrageurs do not adjust their
activity levels
 too quickly in response to profit opportunities or loss situations. 4.4
 The preceding sections have developed three progressively elaborate market
 for the multicommodity flow problem. Table 2 summarizes the size and shape
of the con-
 figuration for a transportation network with V locations and E links, and
M movement requirements. The basic shipper model results in the user equilibrium,
while both of the augmentedmodels produce the globally optimal system equilibrium.
The carrier model re- quires E new producer agents to produce the superior
result. The arbitrageur model adds O{V E} more producers and potentially
some new goods as well, but reduces the number of
 goods of interest to any individual agent from O{E} to a small constant.
 These market models represent three qualitatively distinct points on the
spectrum of
 potential configurations. Hybrid models are also conceivable, forexample,
where a partial
 set of arbitrageurs are included, perhaps arranged in a hierarchy or some
other regular
 16Market-Oriented Programming
 modelgoods shippers carriers arbitrageursBasic shipperE + 1 M [O{E}]  -
 : : : plus carriersE+ 1 M [O{E}] E [2]  - 
 : : : plus arbitrageursO{V 2
 } M [2] E [2] O{V E} [3] Table 2: Numbers of goods and agents for the three
market configurations. For each type of
 agent, the figure in brackets indicates the number of goods on which each
 structure. I would expect such configurations to exhibit behaviors intermediate
to the specific models studied here, with respect to both equilibrium produced
and degree of decentralization.
 5. Limitations One serious limitation of walras is the assumption that agents
act competitively. As
 mentioned above, this behavior is rational when there are many agents, each
small with
 respect to the overall economy. However, when an individual agent is large
enough to affect
 prices significantly {i.e., possesses market power}, it forfeits utility
or profits by failing to take this into account. There are two approaches
toward alleviating the restriction of perfect
 competition in a computational economy. First, we could simply adopt models
of imperfect
 competition, perhaps based on specific forms of imperfection {e.g., spatial
 competition}or on general game-theoretic models. Second, as architects we
can configure
 the markets to promote competitive behavior. For example, decreasing the
agent's grain size
 and enabling free entry of agents should enhance the degree of competition.
Perhaps most
 interestingly, by controlling the agents' knowledge of the market structure
{via standard
 information-encapsulation techniques}, we can degrade their ability to exploit
 market power they possess. Uncertainty has been shown to increase competitiveness
 risk-averse agents in some formal bidding models {McAfee & McMillan, 1987},
and in a
 computationalenvironment we have substantial control over this uncertainty.
 The existence of competitive equilibria and efficient market allocations
also depends
 critically on the assumption of nonincreasing returns to scale. Although
congestion is a
 real factor in transportation networks, for example, for many modes of transport
there are often other economies of scale and density that may lead to returns
that are increasing overall{Harker, 1987}. Note that strategic interactions,
increasing returns, and other factors
 degrading the effectiveness of market mechanisms also inhibit decentralization
in general, and so would need to be addressed directly in any approach.
 Having cast walras as a general environment for distributed planning, it
is natural to
 askhow universal \market-oriented programming" is as a computational paradigm.
We can
 characterize the computational power of this model easily enough, by correspondence
to the
 class of convex programming problems represented by economies satisfying
the classical con- ditions. However, the more interesting issue is how well
the conceptual framework of market
 equilibrium corresponds to the salient features of distributed planning
problems. Although
 itis too early to make a definitive assertion about this, it seems clear
that many planning
 tasks are fundamentally problems in resource allocation, and that the units
of distribution often correspond well with units of agency. Economics has
been the most prominent {and arguably the most successful} approach to modeling
resource allocation with decentralized
 decision making, and it is reasonable to suppose that the concepts economists
find useful
 in the social context will prove similarly useful in our analogous computational
 Of course, just as economics is not ideal for analyzing all aspects of social
interaction, we
 should expect that many issues in the organization of distributed planning
will not be well
 accounted-for in this framework.
 Finally, the transportation network model presented here is a highly simplified
ver- sion of the actual planning problem for this domain. A more realistic
treatment would
 cover multiple commodity types, discrete movements, temporal extent, hierarchical
net- work structure, and other critical features of the problem. Some of
these may be captured by incremental extensions to the simple model, perhaps
applying elaborations developed by the transportation science community.
For example, many transportation models {in- cluding Harker's more elaborate
formulation {Harker, 1987}) allow for variable supply and demand of the
commodities and more complex shipper-carrier relationships. Concepts of
 spatial price equilibrium, based on markets for commodities in each location,
seem to offer the most direct approach toward extending the transportation
model within walras. 6. Related Work
 6.1 Distributed Optimization
 The techniques and models described here obviously build on much work in
 transportation science, and operations research. The intended research contribution
here is
 not to these fields, but rather in their application to the construction
of a computational
 framework for decentralized decision making in general. Nevertheless, a
few words are in
 order regarding the relation of the approach described here to extant methods
for distributed optimization.
 Although the most elaborate walras model is essentially equivalent to existing
 rithms for distributed multicommodity flow {Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1989;
Gallager, 1977},
 the market framework offers an approach toward extensions beyond the strict
scope of this
 particular optimization problem. For example, we could reduce the number
of arbitrageurs,
 and while this would eliminate the guarantees of optimality, we might still
have a reasonable
 expectation for graceful degradation. Similarly, we could realize conceptual
extensions to
 thestructure of the problem, such as distributed production of goods in
addition to trans-
 portation, by adding new types of agents. For any given extension, there
may very well be
 a customized distributed optimization algorithm that would outperform the
 market, but coming up with this algorithm would likely involve a completely
new analysis.
 Nevertheless, it must be stated that speculations regarding the methodological
advantages of the market-oriented framework are indeed just speculations
at this point, and the relative
 flexibility of applications programming in this paradigm must ultimately
be demonstrated empirically.
 18Market-Oriented Programming
 Finally, there is a large literature on decomposition methods for mathematical
 ming problems, which is perhaps the most common approach to distributed
 Manyof these techniques can themselves be interpreted in economic terms,
using the close
 relationship between prices and Lagrange multipliers. Again, the main distinction
of the
 approach advocated here is conceptual. Rather than taking a global optimization
 lem and decentralizing it, our aim is to provide a framework for formulating
a task in a
 distributed manner in the first place.
 6.2 Market-Based Computation The basic idea of applying economic mechanisms
to coordinate distributed problem solving
 is not new to the AI community. Starting with the contract net {Davis &
Smith, 1983}, many have found the metaphor of markets appealing, and have
built systems organized around markets or market-like mechanisms {Malone,
Fikes, Grant, & Howard, 1988}. The
 original contract net actually did not include anyeconomic notions at all
in its bidding mechanism, however, recent work by Sandholm {1993} has shown
how cost and price can be incorporated in the contract net protocol to make
it more like a true market mecha- nism. Miller and Drexler {Drexler & Miller,
1988; Miller & Drexler, 1988} have examined the market-based approach in
depth, presenting some underlying rationale and addressing
 specific issues salient in a computational environment. Waldspurger, Hogg,
 Kephart, and Stornetta {1992} investigated the concepts further by actually
 market mechanisms to allocate computational resources in a distributed operating
 Researchers in distributed computing {Kurose & Simha, 1989} have also applied
 algorithms based on economic analyses to specific resource-allocation problems
arising in distributed systems. Forfurther remarks on this line of work,
see {Wellman, 1991}.
 Recently, Kuwabaraand Ishida {1992} have experimented with demand adjustment
 methods for a task very similar to the multicommodity flow problem considered
here. One significant difference is that their method would consider each
path in the network as a separate resource, whereas the market structures
here manipulate only links or location
 pairs. Although they do not cast their system in a competitive-equilibrium
 results are congruent with those obtained by walras.
 Walras is distinct from these prior efforts in two primary respects. First,
it is con-
 structed expressly in terms of concepts from general equilibrium theory,
to promote math-
 ematical analysis of the system and facilitate the application of economic
principles to
 architectural design. Second, walras is designed to serve as a general programming
 ronment for implementing computational economies. Although not developed
specifically to allocate computational resources, there is no reason these
could not be included in mar- ket structures configured for particular application
domains. Indeed,the idea of grounding
 measures of the value of computation in real-world values {e.g., cargo movements}
 naturally from the general-equilibrium view of interconnected markets, and
is one of the more exciting prospects for future applications of walras to
distributed problem-solving.
 Organizational theorists have studied markets as mechanisms for coordinating
 and allocating resources within firms. For example, Malone {1987} models
information requirements, flexibility and other performance characteristics
of a variety of market and non-market structures. In his terminology, walras
implements a centralized market, where
 the allocation of each good is mediated by an auction. Using such models,
we can determine
 whether this gross form of organization is advantageous, given information
about the cost
 of communication, the flexibility of individual modules, and other related
features. In this
 paper, we examine in greater detail the coordination process in computational
 elaboratingon the criteria for designing decentralized allocation mechanisms.
We take the
 distributivity constraint as exogenously imposed; when the constraint is
relaxable, both
 organizational and economic analysis illuminate the tradeoffs underlying
the mechanism
 Finally, market-orientedprogramming shares with Shoham's agent-oriented
 ming {Shoham,1993} the view that distributed problem-solving modules are
best designed and understood as rational agents. Thetwo approaches support
different agent operations {transactions versus speech acts}, adopt different
rationality criteria, and emphasize dif- ferent agent descriptors, but are
ultimately aimed at achieving the same goal of specifying complex behavior
in terms of agent concepts {e.g., belief, desire, capability} and social
 nizations. Combining individual rationality with laws of social interaction
provides perhaps
 the most natural approach to generalizing Newell's \knowledge level analysis"
idea {Newell, 1982} to distributed computation.
 7. Conclusion
 In summary, walras represents a general approach to the construction and
analysis of
 distributed planning systems, based on general equilibrium theory and competitive
mech- anisms. The approach works by deriving the competitive equilibrium
corresponding to a particular configuration of agents and commodities, specified
using walras's basic con- structs for defining computational market structures.
In a particular realization of this
 approach for a simplified form of distributed transportation planning, we
see that qualita-
 tive differences in economic structure {e.g., cost-sharing among shippers
versus ownership of shared resources by profit-maximizing carriers} correspond
to qualitatively distinct be- haviors{user versus system equilibrium}. This
exercise demonstrates that careful design of the distributed decision structure
according to economic principles can sometimes lead to
 effective decentralization, and that the behaviors of alternative systems
can be meaningfully
 analyzed in economic terms.
 The contribution of the work reported here lies in the idea of market-oriented
 ming, an algorithm for distributed computation of competitive equilibria
of computational
 economies, and an initial illustration of the approach on a simple problem
in distributed resource allocation. A great deal of additional work will
be required to understand the pre-
 cise capabilities and limitations of the approach, and to establish a broader
methodology for configuration of computational economies. Acknowledgements
 This paper is a revised and extended version of {Wellman, 1992}. I have
benefited from
 discussions of computational economies with many colleagues, and would like
to thank in
 particular Jon Doyle, Ed Durfee, Eli Gafni, Daphne Koller, Tracy Mullen,
Anna Nagurney,
 20Market-Oriented Programming
 Scott Shenker, Yoav Shoham, Hal Varian, Carl Waldspurger, Martin Weitzman,
and the
 anonymousreviewers for helpful comments and suggestions.
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