A personal view

Democracy for its own sake by Abdoulaye Diop

Over the past few years, a growing consensus on the need for official aid to take account of fundamental human rights and the democratisation of political systems has emerged in the international debate on development and cooperation policies. This prompts the question, is democracy essential to development 7

Opinions are divided on this. For some, democracy is a precondition which must be met if development is to be achieved. Others argue in the opposite direction, believing that economic development is essential for the successful establishment of democracy. The latter are apt to cite, in support of their argument, examples such as Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand and Turkey, where development has occurred under non-democratic or authoritarian regimes. Finally, there are those who, despite the apparent dichotomy, think there is merit in both approaches and favour the view that the two should progress side by side.

Recent trends in the European Union's development cooperation policy come close to this last idea. Thus, for example, in its declaration of 25 March 1991, the Council of Ministers spoke of human rights and democracy forming part of a much wider package through which balanced and self-sustaining development could be achieved.

The idea that democracy could serve as an instrument of economic development began to take shape, both on paper and in practice in the EU, in the middle of the 1980s. The development of this new approach was certainly made easier by {he subsequent international upheavals, notably the ending of the Cold War and the emergence of democracy movements in many developing countries.

A decisive step in the EU's development policy was taken on 28 November 1991, with the adoption of the resolution on human rights, democracy and development. With traditional approaches to development cooperation under scrutiny, the belief has grown that internal political factors may play a determining role in the creation of development opportunities, and in a country's wider economic performance.

Within the European Union, more and more people are expressing the view that the era of 'aid without conditions' is now over. These sentiments are accompanied by a tendency to lay down more stringent political or economic 'conditionalities' in accordance with the principles laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. It is clear that the attachment of such demands to aid-giving is related to the fact that Europe has been suffering from an economic recession for some years. But the fact that governments and public opinion are weary of the repeated failures of development aid policies also has something to do with it.

'Democracy' provisions highlighted in Lomé, IV mid-term review

Questions of political conditionality are currently at the centre of the discussions taking place in the mid-term review of the fourth Lomé Convention (which runs for 10 years from 1990 to 2000). It is worth noting, however, that democracy 'clauses' were introduced into a number of important cooperation agreements between the EU and Latin American countries, prior to the signing of Lomé, IV. It is no surprise these should provide a model for EU relations with other developing regions, including the ACPs.

The resolution of November 1991 also provided that the EU should formally take human rights into consideration in its relations with developing countries, and that future cooperation agreements would include human rights clauses. The current trend clearly reflects this approach.

So human rights and democracy have been very much to the fore in the EU's development cooperation policy in recent times and amendments to Article 5 of the fourth Lomé Convention (which refers to human rights but not to democracy) are to be an essential part of the mid-term review. On the ACP side, the debate about national sovereignty and unwarranted interference has lost some of its stridency. A resolution passed by the ACP-EU Joint Assembly at Gaborone, in March 1993, made it clear that the principle of noninterference in a state's internal affairs did not relieve any country of its responsibility to protect and promote human rights. Nor could it be invoked in support of any action likely to halt or impede the process of democratisation.

There are also strong practical reasons in support of the proper management of public affairs (the concept of good governance). The Lomé Convention leaves recipient countries with full freedom to decide their spending priorities, and in these circumstances, the EU believes that it is vital to have 'responsible governments' as their interlocutors in the ACP States. This also underpins the Union's support for structural adjustment in the ACPs. Such support is seen as contributing to the principles of 'good governance by helping to transform the political, economic and social landscape in these countries.

The challenge of achieving democracy and structural adjustment simultaneously

Democracy is not designed per se to bring about economic development but it dearly cannot survive in an environment of poverty and hardline structural adjustment. It is difficult to manage economic and political reform at one and the same time. Yet this is what must be done and it represents one of the biggestt challenges facing the developing countries and their external partners in the dosing years of this century.

What this means is that the ACP States must constantly keep the economic logic of their structural adjustment programmes in line with the political logic of the democratisation process. The donor community cannot ignore the political dimension. it is not possible to insist that the people should participate in the taking of decisions that directly concern them, while, at the same time, excluding them from the debate on economic policy, and particularly on structural adjustment programmes drawn up by outsiders.

Multi-party systems are not, in themselves, a guarantee of democracy

On the EU side, it would be a mistake to see democracy as an instant 'miracle-cure' and to ignore the wider consequences inherent in any call for democratisation. in particular, democracy entails a lot more than simply holding an election involving competing political partim. mere are too many examples of elections that lead to civil wars. One need only cite the cases of Angola and Burundi.

Governments in receipt of extemal aid can also be guilty of windowdressing when it comes to changing their political systems, paying lip service to the new 'conditionalities' without undertaking genuine reforms. Aid organisations tend to be short of information about democratisation processes and this is a frequent cause of concern. Action in this area is sometimes taken without the necessary reflection or research. Things are imposed with only very limited empirical knowledge of what is actually happening in the field. The overall result of this can be demands for reforms that are unrealistic.

In essence, democracy is an internal, gradual and inherently long-term process. The expectations, demands and support of the donors need to take this reality into account. Consequently, the root of the problem lies not so much in whether to tackle human rights and democracy issues as in how to tackle them, in a balanced way.

The EU intends to include an explicit reference to democracy in the Lomé IV revision and to introduce the so-called 'essential element' clause allowing it to take speedy action in the event of human rights violations or serious disruptions to the democratic process. Even if this kind of provision prompts no objections where human rights are concerned, it do" provoke some disquiet in the context of democratisation. It is evident that there are real difficultiesm in defining 'democracy', establishing transparent and objective criteria, and then imposing sanctions. The ACP's fear that the EU may apply double standards, a view which is reflected in their suspicion that the Union is giving favourable treatment to Asia. In the absence of objective criteria, the EU may choose instead to adopt a pragmatic, case-by-case approach by analogy with other similar situations.

Democracy offers a set of reference values for a society as well as providing social cohesion, common institutions and a form of government that makes the best possible job of involving people in decisions that affect them. But these are all imprecise concepts. What democracy cannot do is to attract the kind of consensus enjoyed by notions such as 'the rule of law' (adherence to and application of the rules accepted by society) or 'good governance' (which is actually an approach to public management).

The question, therefore, is whether 'conditionality' as currently applied will lead to the establishment of genuinely democratic regimes in the ACP States. An immediate answer would be premature because the process is fairly new to the European Union. But the success of ongoing schemes will depend to a large extent on how each country responds to its people's call for political reforms. This is because democracy involves more than the simple proclamation of constitutional texts and the creation of institutions. It is also a question of attitude, outlook, social and political behaviour, sharing the same values and so on.

Each country must therefore be able to select a democratic model that is compatible with its own realities, values, history and culture. But what if this model should prove incompatible or inconsistent with the western notion of democracy? Can the donor countries read against it ? It is difficult to see how, given that the international community said virtually nothing when the democratic process in

Algeria was interrupted following the electoral victory of the Islamic fundamentalists.

This question has not yet arisen in sub-Saharan Africa, because almost all the states there have copied the western model. This is doubtless one of the reasons why democracy facing a crisis in the continent. Among the contradictions that are to be seen in the new African states, there are three basic ones that appear to be decisive:

-The nature of the political systems. Whether they are capitalist, socialist or liberal, few of them promote, or have promoted, democratic criticism or self-criticism;

-The relationship between political principles and political practice, in particular, the gap that exists between constitutional norms and the way politics are actually conducted;

-The social, economic and cultural context. As the Ivorian scholar, Daniel Kadja Mianno points out, 'any democracy will be a myth and an illusion unless its exercise is guaranteed by a minimum of viable socioeconomic and socio-cultural conditions'.

By way of example, the still illiterate majority of the population is effectively precluded from taking a hand in the exercise of power. Of what avail are democratic choices, far less elections, to an individual who is confused by the ballot paper? For years to come, the lack of education and training will be major impediments to development in Africa, where history is marked by oral tradition.

Ultimately it does not matter whether the system, be it capitalist or socialist, is a single-party or a multi-party one. The real problem is how and how far to involve the people in the running of their own affairs. So the priority for European aid, in terms of economic or political conditionality, must be to help the African states establish economic and social democracy within the rural communities where the bulk of the people live. This democracy must reflect the reality of local structures and of local social and political forces, with a view to ensuring the basic legitimacy of the designated authorities. In any event, the future of democratisation in

Africa hinges on the success or failure of economic development policies.

Conditionality requires EU cooperation policy to be consistent with the bilateral policies of the Member States

The process of reaching consensus within the EU on the relationship between development aid and democracy has been hindered by what is still the decisive importance of bilateral policies visa-vis Community policy. To put it in another way, the issue is the use of aid, as an instrument of national policy, to influence events.

By necessity, the application of political and economic 'conditionality in such a sensitive area entails establishing a consensus on the criteria to be applied. It follows from this that national political priorities must, to some extent, be subordinated to the priorities that have been established at the supranational level. The Maastricht Treaty opens up new possibilities in this regard and offers the hope of a more effective and balanced EU development policy. More specifically, it makes the stipulation that the efforts of the Union and its Members State in this field should complement each other.

Leaving aside certain national trends in cooperation policy (for the example, the UK's views on the principle of good governance and the implications of the Franco-African summit at La Baule in 1990) there are still doubts about whether all Member States are committed to reform. Some have even been openly accused of holding up the process of transition.

Democracy and the role of the state

Political and economic reforms will not work unless they are implemented by a strong state. But African states are in the throes of serious crisis, exacerbated by democracy movements and economic difficulties.

Nearly all the developing countries which have achieved some degree of political stability and are fairly advanced in their economic and social developments, are strong states, with credible institutions that are able to handle social conflict peacefully. Strong states are exactly what Africa needs if its democratic processes and economic reforms are to succeed. But strong states in this context should certainly not be equated with dictatorships. They are, rather, countries with political leaders who can claim the broadest possible legitimacy and that have the institutional strengths capable of rallying the nation's social and political forces.

It should also be recognised that the current enthusiasm for democracy is not unrelated to economic aspirations and this is something which is both its strength and its weakness. One might well ask whether democracy ought not to be sought for its own sake rather than just as a means of achieving development-in other words, accepting the proposition that, 'basically, democracy does not have to be useful.' But of course, indirectly, it can create the right conditions for economic development and the emergence of individual initiative.

While it may be true that democracy cannot survive without economic development and that economic performance will not be sustainable without political liberalisation, it is also the case that democracy is worth defending for its own sake and for the values that it represents-human rights, political freedom, economic liberalisation and so on. The Africans, who have suffered greatly from the slave-trade, colonisation, dictatorship and the massacre of innocent civilians, must be resolute in their commitment to these values.
A.D.