|Portugal's African Wars (Tanzania Publishing House Dar Es Salam, 1974, 251 p.)|
1. bloc. Trade with South Africa has been categorically banned on Several occasions by the UN because it is so essential to the survival of the apartheid regime which cannot suffer isolation. The countries which systematically defy the UN to trade with South Africa were, in 1969: (i) UK (28.2%); (ii) USA (13.4%); (iii) West Germany (11.1%); (iv) Japan (9.5%); (v) Italy (3.6%); (vi) France (2.1%); (vii) Belgium (2.4%); (viii) Canada (2.3%); (ix) Netherlands (2.1%); (x) Australia (1.5%). Greece has also become a trading partner of Pretoria since the colonels came to power.
2. Lisbon. Of the 360,000 Africans employed in gold mines in 1965, two-thirds were from neighbouring countries. According to The Times of 14 September 1973, out of 500,000 African migrant workers employed in all mining work three-quarters were from neighbouring countries. 100,000 of these according to Marches Tropicaux of 30 March 1973, were from Mozambique. Their salary of 800 escudos - 'less than half that paid to other workers - had not changed since 1964 when South Africa and Portugal signed an agreement to employ this forced labour.
3. Rhodesia. According to the Austrian Military Review Osterr Milit Zeitschrift (heft 2, 1970) 'one-third of the South African Army is serving abroad, in Rhodesia and Mozambique'. The Guardian of 29 October 1970 reported that faced with 'mounting African nationalist guerrilla action' South Africa had 'increased its military and para-military assistance to Rhodesia where there are now some 3,000 to 4,000 South African troops and policemen operating with the Rhodesian army along the Zambezi river valley ... equipped with Saracen armoured personnel carriers, patrol vehicles and Alouette helicopters'.
In March 1971 Pretoria revealed she was selling armaments and spare parts 'in a very big way' to 'a country' presumed to be Rhodesia. The Daily Telegraph of March 1971 disclosed that the value of armament spare parts alone would be £580,000 and that these were destined for the 'Rhodesian armoured cars'.
4. rule. South Africa has a population of 19,000,000 of which less than 4,000,000 are whites. The white settlers are divided into two main groups - the Afrikaners, of Dutch descent, 53% of the white population, and the British settlers who make up for the remaining 47%. These two white racial groups do not see eye to eye in many matters of policy, apartheid included.
5. wars. We shall detail later in this book Portuguese claims of 'multi-racialism'. Here we wish to quote simply from the 'laws' of another minority regime in South Africa - Rhodesia:
'Persuasion must continually be exercised ... to persuade people who are qualified [to remain where they are], and who are not prepared to accept settlement in their homelands, to be settled in their homelands....'
The above excerpts from Rhodesian Ministry General Circular to Local Authorities, No. 25, 1967, were quoted in X-Ray, Vol. I, No. II, June 1971, an Africa Bureau Publication, 48 Grafton Way, London WI.
6. lists. Doc. CM/38o, Part I, OAU, Addis Ababa, June 1971.
7. Gervasi. Published by the UN Unit of Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, Doc. ST/PSCA-Ser.A/10, New York 1970.
8. combined. A detailed and up-to-date study of British investments in South Africa is to be found in South Africa's Stake in Britain by Barbara Rogers, published by The Africa Bureau.
9. Affairs. No. 243 of July 1971.
10. budget. The overall 1971 budget totalled 32,052 million escudos as income and 32,049 million as expenditures, of which 10,755 was earmarked for normal and extraordinary defence expenditures. The normal military budget was 3,732 million escudos - or $130,000,000.
11. UN. Document A/8023 (part II) of 10 December 1970.
12. services. Actual ordinary expenditure for 1968 was 13,887.3 million escudos.
13. £248. Financial Times, 6 December 1971.
14. stated. Doc. CM/38o, Part 2. OAU, Addis Ababa, June 1971.
15. territories. The Economist, 20 November, 1971.
16. Armadas. General Staff of Armed Forces.
17. 1970. General Direction of Security.
18. training. The better trained Grupos Especiais Paraquedistas (parachutists) were to be created at a later date; elements of these units distinguished themselves in the Wiriyamu massacre, in Mozambique.
19. Mozambique. Doc. A/A233/Add. 3 of 5/10/70, UN, New York.
20. Paz Portuguesa. 'Portuguese Peace'.
21. sources. Doc. A/8423/Add. 4 of 28/9/71, UN, New York.
22. Marinha, 30 June 1971.
23. colonies. It consists of F-86F Sabres, F-84G Thunder jets, German-built FIAT G.91R-4s, Italian-built FIAT G.91 fighters and fighter-bombers; Douglas B-26s, PV-2 Harpoon light bombers; Neptune sea reconnaissance units; Boeing 707s, DC-6s, Noratlas, Focker Friendship, C-47 and C-54 transports and a variety of COIN and liaison aeroplanes such as Dornier Do-27, T-6G and T.Mk.3 Harvards. Helicopters were mainly Alouettes II and III and SA. 330 Pumas.
24. Britain. Results of this study undertaken by a group of Portuguese students were published in Anti-Apartheid News, London, October 1971. The Portuguese and Colonial Bulletin (UK) of April 1973 calculated Portuguese 'minimised' losses at 2,538 between 1970 and 1972.
25. 8,600,000. L'Avante, organ of the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party, quoted in the Roman weekly Panorama of 30 December 1971, claimed that '4,000' people were dying on an average every year owing to colonial wars.
26. Staff. Report of the Psychological Section. No. 15 quoted in a report dated September 1971 by PAIGC Secretary-General Amilcar Cabral.
27. Guerrilhero. No. 5, June/July 1971, Bulletin of the Com mittee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea.
28. document. 4/LM/30 of 33 June 1971. Zambia Information and Tourist Bureau for Western Europe, Rome.
29. press. See mainly Le Monde of 9 July 1971, The Guardian of 8 July 1971, L'Unita of 8 July 1971, Standard, Dar es Salaam of 7 July 1971, Morning Star of 8 August 1971. BBC 24 Hours programme also interviewed OAU Assistant Secretary-General Mohamed Sahnoun and this author on the subject of the Portuguese use of chemical warfare - on 6 July 1971. See also the study of chemical and biological warfare published in August 1973 by the SIPRI - Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
30. decency. Swedish Premier Olaf Palme peering across into racialist southern Africa from the Victoria Falls during his visit to Zambia in November 1971.
31. United Nations. Scandinavian governments are the first non-Communist ones in Europe to have officially extended assistance (non-military) to Liberation Movements from Portuguese Colonies.
32. Empire. '... but whether or not it is observed, the Salisbury Agreement of November 1971 must be deemed an ignoble way of closing down the empire'. Sunday Times, 38 November 1971.
33. dormant.'... In order that any insurgency on the African continent should not be a surprise to the American government, the Pentagon is stepping up its intelligence operations in the countries of Africa. All members of American Embassies and representatives of US government agencies have it as their line of duty to watch for all the symptoms of potential insurgencies.
'At the same time the Pentagon is conducting operations called upon to provide for the defeat of the enemy at the initial stage of any military conflict and prevention of insurgencies from developing into African Vietnams. One such operation is the setting up of a network of secret Pentagon forward bases - the secret stockpiles of weapons and ammunition adapted to tropical conditions whose number will be sufficient for large-scale military operations. Small groups of specialists are attached to weapons depots from among the Pentagon anti-insurgency experts. From the summer of 1970 these groups will be headed, as a rule, by the graduates of the new military school at Fort Bragg, who, in the words of the American journalist George Ashworth, "can understand insurgency, recognise symptoms and remedies, and act in a broad spectrum of specialties to prepare host nations and armies to do what is necessary". The American embassies received instructions from Washington to do all they can to encourage the local authorities to build aerodromes and ports which the Pentagon could use for its transport planes and fast supply vessels. US oil companies play an important role in these plans of the Pentagon.' African Statesman, Vol. VI, no. I, 1971, pp. 8-11, Lagos.
Late in 1973, Dr Henry Kissinger was taking a fresh look at US policies in southern Africa (Observer of 12 August 1973) in the conviction that 'Africa will loom larger in American interests as the Vietnam involvement wanes' (Star of South Africa - 15 September 1973).
34. Indian Ocean. See Le Monde of 1 February 1972.
35. press. Ross K. Baker, Chairman of the New Brunswick Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, and a regular contributor of articles on Africa to The Washington Post, wrote in Orbis (US), Spring 1971 (quoted in Facts and Reports, edited by the Angola Comité, Da Costastraat 88, Amsterdam, Holland): '... Yet the vague geopolitical threat posited by Great Britain has received implicit endorsement by the United States. Meanwhile, even accepting the notion that Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean are malevolent does not explain why the compromise solution offered by President Kaunda of Zambia at the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference was summarily dismissed. The Kaunda Compromise suggested that the United States and Great Britain could build a new naval facility in Mauritius to supplant Simonstown; or that, if this solution were deemed threatening by India, Pakistan and Ceylon, the United States could use her influence to call a conference of Indian Ocean nations with a view to declaring the ocean a neutralised zone....'
36. Indian Ocean. Sunday Times of 2 January 1972, in an editorial on the Malta crisis with the Mintoff Government.
37. diehards. In an article, 'South Africa at Arms', The Times of London of 19 November 1971 drew attention to the fact that 'a highly important aspect of the Defence Force's role in the South African political structure is that it is now virtually Afrikanerdom at arms, just as the Dutch Reformed Church is Afrikanerdom at prayer and the ruling Nationalist Party is Afrikanerdom politically enthroned. Nearly all the key men in the Defence Force, starting at the top, are not just Afrikaners but also Nationalists who are not afraid of making political speeches full of echoes of government sentiments on communists and "terrorists", or of installing "Christian National" values in recruits. This takeover, as in other areas of white South African life, has been made easy by the tendency of English-speaking whites to opt out of the public service in any form.'
38. Sunday Times of South Africa, dated 4 July 1971.
39. weapons. See River of Tears, a study of RTZ by Richard West, Earth Island, London 1972.
40. skill. Commenting on the ousting of the Israelites from Uganda, The Times of 4 April 1972 remarked editorially that Israel 'has been quietly building bridges to African states, with the additional balancing trick of keeping close ties with the minority white rulers in South Africa'.
41. 1973 of 29 November 1971.
42. Africa. Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis, Pretoria. Publication 1.
43. The Third Africa. By Eschel Rhoodie, Nasionale Buchhandel, Pretoria.
44. South Africa. Quoted from the African Bureau Publication, X-Ray, Vol. 1, No. 8, February 1971.
45. continent. Not only in the African Continent, but elsewhere too, particularly in London, where in December 1971 The Observer made a series of disclosures concerning the activities of BOSS in the British capital. BOSS -Bureau for State Security, under General Van den Bergh - is the cloak and dagger intelligence and counter-intelligence of apartheid which also controls military intelligence, under General R. C. Hiemstra, the Commandant-General of the Defence Force, and the security branch of the police (headed by Brigadier 'Tiny' Venter) falling under police Commissioner-General J. P. Gous. BOSS was created on 16 May 1968 and is directly under the Prime Minister's office. The Secret Service budget was raised from Rand 1,842,500 in 1968 to Rand 5,320,500 in 1969/70. The BOSS in Britain enjoyed the cooperation of Scotland Yard. South Africa's House of Assembly (Lower House) passed 'one of the most important pieces of legislation' of its 1972 session when on 16 May it approved the 'Security Intelligence and State Security Council Bill' providing for a high-powered State Security Council, with the Prime Minister as Chairman. This new body would, in cooperation with BOSS, advise government on the formation of national policy and strategy as well as on policy 'to combat any particular threat to South Africa'.
46. 'The Third Africa'. The 'white Africa' contained in South Africa's lebensraum.
47. The Standard of 19 March 1971. Article signed Sean A. Browne.
48. Rhodesia. The tactic here was made all the easier since Zambia is a completely landlocked country with all of her six routes to the sea, except one, controlled by her enemies. These routes are:
(a) Beira-Zambia (railway); (b) Beira-Rbodesia (railway) then Rhodesia-Zambia (road); (c) Lobito-Zambia (railway); (d) Tanzania-Zambia (road); (e) Nacala-Malawi (railway) and then Malawi-Zambia (road); (f) South Africa-Zambia (railway) and Malawi-Zambia (road) and then Zambia (railway).
It is interesting to note that, for reasons which raised many speculations in East Africa, the portion of the Lusaka-Dar es Salaam road being constructed by an American firm showed no signs of being well built and finished, while the other portion, being built by Italian firms, was quickly built and well completed.
49. commentator. It was the first time that President Kaunda was interviewed by these newspapers. This had been arranged in an attempt to break through the virtual monopoly the British press has in Zambia.
50. Dumont. See Africa in Eclipse, by Leonard Barnes, Gollancz, London, 1971, and Paysanneries aux abois, René Dumont, De Seuil, Paris, 1972.
51. Paris. One of France's most' effective attempts to divide Africans was her military support of Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. This scheme was devised by M. Jacques Foccart, the head of all French intelligence plots in Africa, because of traditional opposition to the existence of such an 'anglophile' colossus as Nigeria. Keen French interests in Congo-Kinshasa are also motivated by the desire to exploit this only French-speaking territory which had not been colonised by Paris.
52. MPLA. Professor L. Barnes (op. cit.) correctly remarks that if local self-government is in the hands of the local blacks in a country like Zaïre - as against local self-government being run by whites without black participation in white minority regimes - Zaïre is nevertheless to be classified 'as a white supremacy country (without apartheid)' for the enormous influence of Belgians camouflaged as advisers means that local politics are in fact only nominally in the hands of local blacks. This should further explain why the Mobutu government is a de facto ally of colonialist forces.
53. Barnes. Op. cit.
54. inhabitants. In Marvin Harris's Portugal's African 'Wards', New York, 1958, p. 33. Quoted in Basil Davidson's Which Way Africa?, Penguin African Library, 3rd ed., 1971, p. 86.
55. quoted. In a paper presented to the University of California Project 'Brazil - Portuguese Africa', 27 February 1968, and to the Seminar of the Department of Political Service, University College, Dar es Salaam, 7 November 1968.
56. island. During the Nigerian civil war, even Italian aeroplanes trying, with the full cooperation of the Lagos government, to rescue Italian oil workers caught in the Biafra fighting, were operating from São Tome. One of the authors (AH), then a political adviser for Africa and Asia to the Italian State Corporation for Hydrocarbons (ENI), put an end to this anomaly by suggesting to the Lagos authorities - who readily agreed - that these Italian planes should henceforth operate from Lagos 'instead of the Portuguese colony of São Tomé'.
57. violence. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution, Oxford, 1929, p. 82. Quoted in Basil Davidson, Which Way Africa?, p. 24.
58. embarking. Basil Davidson, Which Way Africa?, p. 19.
59. Portuguese. Amilcar Cabral, 'Guinea: The Power of Arms', Tricontinental, English edition. No. 12, Havana, 1969. p. 6.
60. colonies. James Duffy, Portugal in Africa, Penguin African Library, London, 1963.
61. officials. 'The 1950 census in Angola recorded some 30,000 assimilados out of a population of four million people; Mozambique's population of 5,733,000 contained 4,353 assimilados.... Over the last ten years there has been no significant increase in these figures.' J. Duffy (op. cit.)
62. The Times. December 1971.
63. legislation. Portuguese terms quoted are from the official terminology.
64. lait. 'But, monsieur, a black among the whites is like a fly in a glass of milk.' See series of articles entitled 'Angola - Never Ending Revolt' starting in Le Monde of 4 January 1972, Paris.
65. Africa. Amilcar Cabral, Tricontinental, No. 12, 1969, pp. 6-7.
66. civilisation. Basil Davidson, Which Way Africa?, p. 35.
67. organised. Interview with R. Faure, L'Aurore, 9 October 1964.
68. Mota. Amilcar Cabral, United Nations report, 1961.
69. dissolution. In Report of Central African Council (Migrant Labour), Salisbury, 1947. Quoted in Which Way Africa?, p. 43.
70. another. In Basil Davidson, The African. Awakening, London, 1955, p. 304. Quoted in Which Way Africa?, p. 43.
71. juice. Alguns elementos sobre economia portugesa, Secretaria de Estado da Infomacão e Turismo, Lisbon, 1969.
72. per cent. IIIe Plano de Fomento, Vol. 3.
73. Observer. 6 February 1971.
74. progress. Basil Davidson, The Liberation of Guiné, Penguin African Library, London, 1969, p. 35.
75. formula. Robert Davezies, Les Angolais, Edition de Minuit, Paris.
76. bullets. The National Liberation Struggle, MPLA brochure.
77. ALIAZO. PDA: Partido Democratico de Angola. ALIAZO: Alliance des Ressortissants de Zombo.
78. Minh. Agostinho Neto, in a speech in Lusaka, 4 February 1970.
79. responsibilities. Basil Davidson, Le Monde Diplomatique, 18 September 1970.
80. further off. Agostinho Neto, 'Angola, People in Revolution', Tricontinental, English edition. No. 12, Havana, 1969, p. 68.
81. underground. Amilcar Cabral, Tricontinental, No. 12, 1969, p. 8.
82. empirically. Amilcar Cabral, Tricontinental, No. 12, 1969, p. 8.
83. Cabral. Amilcar Cabral, Tricontinental, No. 12, 1969, p. 9.
84. arm. Jim Hoagland, 'A Report on Portuguese Guinea', International Herald Tribune, 1 March 1971.
85. shops, etc. Amilcar Cabral, Tricontinental, No. 12, 1969, p. 10.
86. a car. Amilcar Cabral, Tricontinental, No. 12, 1969, p. 10.
87. aides. International Herald Tribune, 1 March 1971.
88. Portuguese. Amilcar Cabral, in G. Chaliand, Lutte armée en Afrique, François Maspero, Paris, 1967.
89. convoys. Marcelino Dos Santos, L'Expresso, 7 February 1971.
90. in 1949. Eduardo Mondlane, 'FRELIMO, the Real" Challenge', Tricontinental, English edition. No. 12, Havana, 1969. p. 101.
91. a book. The Observer, on 6 February 1972, reported that Interpol had, in cooperation with Tanzania police, established that Mondlane had been the victim of an elaborate plot of the DGS (formerly the PIDE) using two FRELIMO traitors - as was long suspected.
92. people. Marcelino Dos Santos, in Africasia, 25 April 1970.
93. unions. Mario Soares, 'Le Portugal et l'Europe, Le Monde, 3 March 1971.
94. country. Agosthino Neto, Tricontinental, No. 12, 1969, pp. 81-120.
95. Kaunda. In a special supplement on 'Angola and Mozambique', on 19 July 1971, the Financial Times lent credit to the version that President Kaunda had obtained this concession from Rome by making 'thinly veiled threats of reprisals' against the important Italian investments in Zambia. This was the Lisbon version and that it found its way into the columns of the City is not astonishing to anyone who knows that such supplements are in fact paid for, directly or indirectly, by the interested party - in this case the Portuguese government.
The Financial Times should have known better; blackmailing is certainly no part of Dr Kaunda's character. According to the official minutes of the two meetings held by President Kaunda with the Italians in Rome, in April and May 1970, the Zambian leader won the day by his sheer moral arguments which made one of the Italian negotiators state that after having listened to Dr Kaunda 'it was dear that on moral and political grounds Italy could not be part of Cabora Bassa'.
The minutes, respectively numbered 'IFM/PA/1-02 of 25 May 1970' and 'IFM/PA/1-03 of 19 June 1970', were approved by both Zambian and Italian governments and were prepared by one of the authors of this book (AH) who took part in the talks.
In fact President Kaunda told the Italians, 'I ask nothing from Italy and I will ask nothing from France ...' after having stated the facts involved in the Cabora Bassa project, leaving it to the Italians to draw the moral of the argument. France was obviously not to be moved by 'moral' arguments and to this day remains a principal participant in Cabora Bassa.
96. excellent. Portugal Report, published by the Portuguese Embassy in West Germany, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, March 1970.
97. tragedies. Der Europäer, No. 102, p. 27.
98. colonies. This programme of settlement, as well as Portugal's ability to maintain a 'standing army of some 150,000 men in Africa', was questioned by the Financial Times of 14 September 1971. Figures of the preliminary results of the census in Portugal had just been released showing that Portugal had suffered a population decrease of 2 per cent during the last decade, bringing her population to a total of 8.6 million only. The Financial Times attributed this to Portugal's 'war commitment' as well as to the serious drain on manpower caused by 'large-scale emigration'. Portugal's 'main selling point to foreign investors has long been the abundance of low-cost manpower, but this obviously no longer holds good', the London financial paper concluded. Obviously it was with the view of meeting this type of situation that Portugal was now contemplating reversed settlement operations - to bring cheap black labour from Africa to Portugal - which contradicted the settlement programme of taking people from populated areas into unpopulated ones!
In fact this was not a contradiction but a well thought out plan towards establishing white power in Africa.
99. requirements. Financial Times, 15 October 1964.
100. loan. Financial Times, 28 November 1968.
101. Barnes. Op. cit.
102. force. New Statesman, 11 August 1961.
103. States. Die Welt, 3 May 1954.
104. Africa. Jose Shercliff, 'Portugal's Strategic Territories', Foreign Affairs, January 1953.
105. subversion. NATO's Fifteen Nations, October-November 1968.
106. Angola. At the Conference of Foreign Ministers of NATO member-countries, Oslo, 8 May 1961.
107. base. DPA news agency, 21 March 1963.
108. countries. Diario de Lisboa, 31 August 1967.
109. forces. NATO Letter, Paris, September 1967.
110. alterations. Diario de Lisboa, 31 August 1967.
111. Force. John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1969, p. 229.
112. forces. Christian Science Monitor, 12 January 1968.
113. Russia. General Hermes de Araujo Oliveira, Deutsche Tagespost, 14 August 1967.
114. position. Statement by the Portuguese minister for defence, published in Provincia de Angola, 17 June 1969.
115. Guinea. Flying Review International, April 1966.
116. operations. The spokesman of the German Defence Ministry, Mr Armin Halle, in a statement to the Frankfurter Rundschau, of 28 October 1971, admitted that Do-27 planes supplied by Bonn were in Angola equipped with arms. The Federal Government said on this occasion that, while it was against arms going 'to third countries', it would continue to supply military equipment to 'Portugal'.
117. Portugal. Correia de Manha and Tribuno da Imprensa, October 1966.
118. outrageous. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 July 1968.
119. policies. International Herald Tribune, 1 April 1971.
120. people. 'Even in the visual arts there are examples of a conscious protest against Portuguese culture. This can be seen particularly in some pieces of Makonde sculpture. Under the influence of Catholic missionaries madonnas, Christ figures and priests have become common subjects of Makonde art. Mostly these appear reasonably faithful stereotyped imitations of European models, but occasionally you will find a very different treatment of the theme in which the artist has worked out some of his personal doubts or hostile reactions to the new religion; a madonna who appears at first glance to be an ordinary standard madonna but who on closer examination is seen to be holding a wild animal or a demon instead of the Christ Child; a priest who has a serpent crawling out from under his surplice; a religious figure whose hands and feet are turning into the claws of a monster. Sometimes a madonna or a Christ is portrayed as standing on and crushing the people.'
The late Eduardo Mondlane in 'Nationalism and Development' in Portuguese Colonies: Victory or Death, Havana, Cuba.
121. Africa. New York Times, 10 December 1971.
122. Guardian. 17 December 1971.
123. Commons. Hansard, 13 December 1971.
124. Cape Town. Serious doubts that the Portuguese would not be able to make good their claim that FRELIMO would never come near the Cabora Bassa project arose after the failure of 'Operation Gordian Knot' when, in May 1971, General Kaulza de Arriaga launched a massive offensive with 50,000 men in an attempt to seal the Tanzania border. FRELIMO managed to weaken this offensive by launching a series of counter-attacks in the rear of the Portuguese forces and missed, owing to poor communications, entering Porto Amelia whose entire garrison had been hurriedly dispatched to reinforce Portuguese troops taken by surprise by the FRELIMO counter-attacks. At the same time, FRELIMO was able to make attacks in another sector near the Rhodesian border, south of Zambia.
The Marches Tropicaux of 4 December 1971, known for its links with French industrial interests in Southern Africa, was to write: 'At the beginning, Portugal had stated she would need no one to protect this work [Cabora Bassa] costing $294 million ... but the intensification of the activities of the guerilleros in the Tete district seems to have caused her to have changed her position.'
Earlier, on 17 September 1971, the Rhodesian Herald had cast doubts on Portuguese claims of military successes against FRELIMO: 'it becomes apparent that terrorist activities in the Tete, neighbouring the Cabora Bassa region, represent a greater danger than official communiques have disclosed' the Salisbury newspaper said.
The Journal de Genève commented that 'Cabora Bassa could become an entrenched camp' and Le Monde of 20 January 1972 announced that Portuguese forces had managed, with the assistance of heliborne troops, to destroy 'two guerilla camps installed ... near Cabora Bassa'.
125. guerillas. The British were to be replaced by Italians in the air-force too. Italian instructors were so strictly restricted by their government, to their role of training, that they were forbidden to pilot planes transporting even single Zambian military personnel.
126. in 1963-3. Present at the conversation was the well-known Goan militant and journalist, Acquino da Bragança, now a teacher at the University of Algiers.
127. mondo. 'Lands of the end of the world' as the Portuguese define the desolated lands of Eastern Angola.
128. 1970. Quoted in Doc. A/8423/Add. 4 of 28/9/71. UN, New York.
129. Le Monde. 7 January 1972.
130. volunteers. Author's italics. These (white) schoolboys and students who happened to be on holiday were in fact paid 100 rand a month, against 8 rand paid for the same job to the (black) workers.
131. forecast. The Economist of 5 February 1972 reported: 'A year ago the South African government was so confident that it enjoyed the support of the people of South-West Africa, the neighbouring territory which it administers, that it offered to hold a plebiscite there. In an interview published last week the prime minister, Mr Vorster, withdrew the offer.'
132. Africa. Title of the editorial of the Observer of 30 January 1972.
133. propaganda. The sole exceptions were the Observer in April 1973 and the Guardian in August 1972.