(introduction...)
This section looks at the formal provisions regarding
implementation as set out in the conventions from 1899 to 1981, and glances
briefly at aspects of the wider range of pressures and mechanisms which may in
fact be involved in processes of implementation. When in an actual armed
conflict the laws of war do play a part in shaping the decisions made by
belligerents, they may do so for complex reasons. Action in consonance with the
laws of war may owe much to a wide range of political, military, diplomatic and
ethical factors: these may include a fear of military reprisals, and an anxiety
to project a reasonable image with the domestic public and with actual or
potential allies.
The 1992 German tri-service military manual lists thirteen
factors, mainly treaty-based, that "can induce the parties to a conflict to
counteract disobedience of the law applicable in armed conflicts and thus to
enforce observance of international humanitarian law ":
· consideration for public
opinion;
· reciprocal interests of the
parties to the conflict;
· maintenance of
discipline;
· fear of reprisals;
· penal and disciplinary measures;
· fear of payment of compensation;
· activities of protecting powers;
· international fact-finding;
· the activities of the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC);
· diplomatic activities;
· national implementing measures;
· dissemination of humanitarian law; and
· the personal conviction and responsibility of the
individual.
As has been recognized in many treaties and manuals on the
subject, the laws of war are implemented largely through the medium of
individual countries. It is usually through their government decisions, laws,
courts and courts-martial, commissions of inquiry, military manuals, rules of
engagement, and training and educational systems, that the provisions of
international law have a bearing on the conduct of armed forces and individuals.
The overwhelming majority of legal cases in connection with the laws of war have
been in national, not international, courts.
Even where the problem is one of international enforcement
following a violation - to get a foreign state or armed force to comply with the
rules - the actions of individual governments have often been important. For
example, neutral states may influence the conduct of belligerents, through
private or public diplomatic pressure, economic inducements, embargoes, and even
threats of military action. On the other hand, they are sometimes hesitant to do
so, and when they do act their intervention is often rebuffed by belligerents.
One means of enforcing the law is reprisals. A reprisal may be
defined as a retaliatory measure, normally contrary to international law, taken
by one party to a conflict with the specific purpose of making an opponent
desist from particular actions violating international law. It may be intended,
for example, to make the adversary abandon an unlawful practice of warfare. The
use of reprisals is controversial. They can on occasion be little more than a
fig-leaf thinly disguising the resort to unrestrained warfare; and certain types
of reprisal are now prohibited in 1977 Geneva Protocol I. At ratification, a
number of states made declarations which, in interpreting some of the Protocol's
provisions, appeared to keep open the possibility of reprisals. Italy's long
statement of interpretation included the following: "Italy will react to serious
and systematic violations by an enemy of the obligations imposed by Additional
Protocol I and in particular its Articles 51 and 52 with all means admissible
under international law in order to prevent any further violation". On occasion
the threat or actuality of reprisals can be an important means of inducing
restraint.
One other powerful instrument of enforcement is neglected in
most discussions of the subject. Sometimes illegal conduct by a belligerent,
including the commission of atrocities, may contribute to the formation of an
international military coalition against the offending state; and may influence
the coalition's willingness to use force. Such conduct has been a significant
element in the building of many coalitions, including the anti-Axis alliance in
the Second World War, the international coalition against Iraq in 1990-91, the
intervention in Somalia in December 1992, and the decision by NATO and the UN to
initiate "Operation Deliberate Force" in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 30 August 1995.
Even the possibility of such a process is almost entirely neglected in the legal
literature. It constitutes a little-recognized but important link between ius in
bello (the law applicable in armed conflicts) and ius ad bellum (the law
governing resort to armed conflict). It is discussed further at several points
in this study.
The treaty provisions regarding implementation, discussed in
subsequent parts of this section, are of many kinds. They include stipulations
about the trial and punishment of individual offenders, and about reparations by
states. They touch on reciprocity as a basis for observing the laws of war, and
on the controversial issue of threats of reprisals as a means of enforcing the
law. They contain a variety of arrangements, including monitoring, negotiating,
and fact-finding, in order to secure implementation of the conventions. Despite
this wealth of provisions, concentration on the treaty arrangements for securing
compliance can easily mislead. Many of the formal written provisions have proved
less important in practice than was hoped. Arrangements and forms of pressure
that were not envisaged in the laws of war treaties have sometimes had more
impact.