7. The Involvement of the United Nations
Since about 1980, crises over implementation have focused to an
unprecedented extent on the United Nations, and more particularly on the
Security Council. The UN's involvement in issues relating to the international
law of armed conflict goes back a long way. The wartime allies established the
United Nations War Crimes Commission on 20 October 1943, at the same time as
they were working towards the creation of the United Nations Organization. The
1948 Genocide Convention, Article VIII of which made significant reference to
the UN, was negotiated at the UN General Assembly. A further major landmark was
General Assembly Resolution 2444 of 19 December 1968 on "Respect for Human
Rights in Armed Conflicts". Literally hundreds of UN General Assembly
resolutions have used the laws of war as a basis for criticizing the actions of
particular states; Israel's conduct in the occupied territories has been
condemned with particular frequency.
In 1977, two treaties made explicit provision for a major UN
role in implementing the laws of war. The Convention on the Prohibition of
Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (the
ENMOD Convention) envisaged that the UN, especially the Security Council, would
handle investigations of suspected violations. The Geneva Protocol I
foreshadowed the further involvement of the UN in matters relating to the laws
of war when it stated: "In situations of serious violations of the Conventions
or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or
individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with the
United Nations Charter".
Since at least the mid-1980s, the UN's involvements in matters
relating to the laws of war have focused more on the Security Council than the
General Assembly, and more on implementation than on development of the law. The
Security Council's involvement in this area illustrates the wide range of issues
in which the Council can become engaged once it is seen as capable of reaching
agreement. It also illustrates the difficulties of attempts to ensure
implementation.
If the assumption is that the UN is becoming the centre of a
system of collective security, then its concurrent rule as a supervisor and
arbiter of the implementation of the laws of war may well seem a logical
corollary. In the post-Cold War era, many have hoped, and some still hope, that
the UN has the possibility of establishing some kind of general system of
collective security. However, for those who are sceptical as to whether the
traditional difficulties of proposals for collective security have even been
addressed, let alone overcome, the Security Council's role in laws of war issues
looks especially problematic. If the Security Council is not capable of tackling
effectively even a modest proportion of threats to the peace, will it be any
more effective in the lesser task of securing implementation of the laws of war?
One obvious problem with the UN's role in respect of the laws of
war is that the Security Council is necessarily selective as to which issues it
tackles. Due principally to the existence of the veto, the Security Council did
nothing about alleged violations of the laws of war during the Vietnam war in
the 1960s and 1970s, nor during the Afghan war in the 1980s. It was the General
Assembly, not the Security Council, that passed most of the resolutions critical
of Israeli conduct in the occupied territories.
In some conflicts since the mid-1980s, as briefly summarized in
the following sections of this study, the UN Security Council has dealt with
laws of war issues. It has addressed two fundamentally distinct aspects: first,
the investigation and punishment of major violations by belligerents; and
second, the management of UN-authorized forces, whether in peace-keeping or
enforcement actions, in a manner consistent with the laws of war. An opinion on
the effectiveness of these roles will be offered in the conclusions of this
study.