Cover Image
close this bookBlending of New and Traditional Technologies - Case Studies (ILO - WEP, 1984, 312 p.)
close this folderPART 2: CASE STUDIES
View the documentChapter 3. Application of microcomputers to Portugal’s agricultural management*
View the documentChapter 4. Off-line uses of microcomputers in selected developing countries*
View the documentChapter 5. The use of personal computers in Italian biogas plants*
View the documentChapter 6. Microelectronics in textile production: A family firm (United Kingdom) and cottage industry with AVL looms (United States)
View the documentChapter 7. Microelectronics in small/medium enterprises in the United Kingdom*
View the documentChapter 8. Integration of old and new technologies in the Italian (Prato) textile industry*
View the documentChapter 9. The use of numerically controlled machines on traditional lathes: The Brazilian capital goods industry*
View the documentChapter 10. Electronic load-controlled mini-hydroelectric projects: Experiences from Colombia, Sri Lanka and Thailand*
View the documentChapter 11. The application of biotechnology to metal extraction: The case of the Andean countries*
View the documentChapter 12. Cloning of Palm Oil Trees in Malaysia*
View the documentChapter 13. Technological Change in Palm Oil in Costa Rica*
View the documentChapter 14. Biotechnology applications to some African fermented foods*
View the documentChapter 15. Use of satellite remote-sensing techniques in West Africa*
View the documentChapter 16. India’s rural educational television broadcasting via satellites*
View the documentChapter 17. New construction materials for developing countries*
View the documentChapter 18. Photovoltaic solar-powered pump irrigation in Pakistan*
View the documentChapter 19. Photovoltaic power supply to a village in Upper Volta*

Chapter 16. India’s rural educational television broadcasting via satellites*

* Contributed by the ILO.

COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY HAS made major advances in recent years with the development of the microelectronic silicon chip bringing closer the technologies of communication and computing. In the last decade, radical progress has been made in miniaturising computers and in applying the technology particularly to television transmission and telephone systems. The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the scope, effectiveness and limitations of the new technology in benefiting the rural poor in India. In general, agriculture and the rural sector generally can benefit a great deal from the meteorological data, storm and weather forecasts and disaster warnings which the communications satellites make possible. Our main interest in this paper is the use of mass television broadcasting via satellite. We shall consider below India’s effort in the educational uses of satellite television in the rural areas.

India’s history in satellites dates back to May 1974 when the United States satellite ATS-6 launched by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was loaned to India. Following experiments in the United States, this satellite began its one-year operation in August 1975 thus making India the first country in the world to broadcast mass television from space. The history of developments in satellite technology in India is given in Table 16.1. A remote-sensing satellite IRS is also proposed for the mid-1980s.


This is perhaps one of the main experiments whose major objective was to provide rural education and relevant agricultural information to Indian farmers and rural people. A precursor to this experiment were the Rural Radio Forums (RRFS) launched in 1956. Although initially high priority was given to rural broadcasting under this scheme, subsequent assessments showed that with few exceptions (notably a pilot project in Poona), the experiment was not very successful. As a result, the RRFS did not expand on the scale envisaged in the Five Year Plans.1

Name of satellite


Date launched

Launching site



ATS -6

United States

May 1974

United States

Direct broadcast of television programmes

Used in the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE)



April 1975


Mainly a test system

Weighed 360 kg
6 months life


France and Fed. Rep. of Germany

Made available to India in June 1977


Experiments in remote area communications using transportable terminals, radio-networking, emergency communications, digital communications, multiple access, integration of satellite circuits into terrestrial networks and multiple audio-video transmission

Used in the Satellite Telecommunications Experiments Project (STEP)

Bhaskara I


June 1979


Remote sensing to collect information on forestry, hydrology, snow cover, geology and soils.

Weighed 440 Kg



May 1981


Testing purposes

First satellite to be launched from India Weighed 35 Kg

Ariane Passenger Payload Experience

India (ISAC)

June 1981

Kourou in French Guiana

Collection of geo-synchronous data. Experiments aimed at speeding tempo of space communications. Experiments on communication technology, domestic communications, radio networking, data relay, remote area communications, etc.

Bhaskara II


November 1981


Same as Bhaskara but wider scanning range


United States (Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation)

April 1982

United States

Significant telecommunications component: long distance telephony, telecommunications to remote areas & emergency communications. Also meteorological capacity includes 24- hour observation weather system, data collection and relay from remote, un- attended platforms and a disaster warning, remote- sensing operations. The TV capability relates to direct broadcasting from satellite to community TV sets in the rural areas & radio net- working.

First multioperational domestic satellite for television broadcast, communications and meteorology.

Notes: Sources (drawn from information from (a) The Times of India, Directory of Yearbook 1982 ed. G. Jain, Times of India Press, New Delhi 1982. (b) Government of India, India 1982 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi, India, 1982.
ISRO: The Indian Space Research Organisation.
ISAC: ISRO Satellite Centre.

The advent of TV in India shifted the emphasis from radio broadcasting to TV communication system for rural education and other purposes. A TV instructional project was launched in Delhi with the following three stages:

(a) Citizen civic education (Naga Nagarik);
(b) Delhi School Project;
(c) Rural Programme (Krishi Darshan).

The satellite TV programmes superseded the above programmes when satellite technology was developed in the advanced countries. The Indian authorities envisaged that “the satellite technology, facilitating a national programme which would cover 80 per cent of India’s population would be of great significance to national integration: for implementing schemes of economic and social development and for the stimulation and promotion of cultural identity.”2

In 1963, a decision was taken to set up an Experimental Satellite Communications Earth Station (ESCES) at Ahmedabad (Gujarat) with a view to:

(i) serve as a centre for building the necessary technical manpower in the country for a future space research programme;

(ii) provide training in satellite communications technology; and

(iii) carry out some research and development in the fields of earth station and ground segment hardware for satellite communications systems.3

The SITE is basically a hybrid system combining both direct reception from the satellite and reception through terrestrial transmitters linked to the satellite. The SITE experiment undertaken in 1975-76 by the Department of Space in collaboration with NASA covered only 2,400 villages in six clusters. Considerations of economy, limited broadcasting time and logistics of maintenance were responsible for this limited coverage. The village selection was done in two steps, namely, selection of areas in which the clusters were to be located and selection of villages in the clusters. The villages were selected on the basis of such criteria as: backwardness, availability of electricity and distance from maintenance centres. Within the SITE an experiment known as the Kheda project was undertaken in the Pij district of Gujarat and jointly managed by the Space Applications Centre (SAC) and the Indian National Television (Doordarshan).


This pilot project was funded by UNDP and executed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 1975-76, within the framework of SITE, with a particular objective of promoting technological and rural development in Kheda district of Gujarat State.

Kheda district is mainly agricultural and is among the wealthier and more progressive areas of India. It has a large and successful dairy cooperative. Of the 690 villages in the district, 400 were electrified and 307 (practically all the villages in the range of the transmitter) were equipped with television sets for reception from the Pij transmitter.

The System

The Pij TV system consisted of the following:

(a) Ahmedabad TV studio which generated signals for transmission;
(b) A cable link and a line of sight microwave link which carry the signals to Pij;
(c) The Pij TV 1 kW transmitter which radiates TV signals over a radius of more than 30 kilometres around Pij. This transmitter received input signals from both the microwave receiver terminal and the Limited Rebroadcast receiver via the Applications Technology Satellite - (ATS - 6)(Figure 16.1).


The main objective of the project was to bring the new TV technology to the doorsteps of rural areas and villagers for instructional broadcasts of different kinds. The following target groups were intended to be covered: agricultural landless labourers, small land-holders, women and children.

Description of the Project

The television sets, which were purchased with funds from the dairy cooperative, the State Government and villagers’ contributions, were located mainly in the cooperative buildings. A few sets were privately-owned or placed in the panchayat.

Figure 16.1 Block diagram of the PIJ TV system using a combination of terrestrial and satellite transmission

Programmes consisted of half an hour of “national programming” transmitted from the Delhi Earth Station via satellite to all SITE receivers, and another half hour of programmes prepared specially for the Kheda district and transmitted from the Pij transmitter. The “national programming” consisted of news and cultural entertainment in Hindi while the locally prepared programmes (broadcast in Gujarati) consisted of:

- instruction in agricultural practices and cottage industries (20 per cent of broadcasting time),

- children’s programmes (30 per cent),

- drama with social change objectives (25 per cent), and

- news, songs and dance (25 per cent).4


Kheda served as a testing ground for a number of programming approaches. One such approach was used in a local affairs programme (called “Vat Tamari” or “Your View”). A one-half inch video equipment was used to facilitate communication between the villagers and government officials. Villagers’ problems were recorded in the village and later presented to the officials. The reactions of the officials were also taped and played back to the villagers. This programme succeeded in resolving several problems of the villagers. A number of schools were expanded, a post office was installed, a bridge was built and a road was repaired. One indirect benefit from this approach was the creation of self-confidence of the villagers in dealing with Government officials.

Another series of programmes gave instructions on handicraft activities with low capital investment. This programme generated great interest among the villagers who realised that the knowledge alone was not sufficient to embark on the activities. They did not have even the minimal capital required to purchase equipment and material. This led the ISRO officials to arrange a special credit programme through a local bank to enable the villagers to get started. The lesson learnt from these programmes is that support facilities are necessary to ensure the success of instructional programmes.

A multidisciplinary approach was used to produce a children’s programme when feedback studies showed that children were interested in the broadcasts. A team consisting of a producer, an evaluator and a specialist in child development together identified the children’s needs and worked on the development of the programme. The multidisciplinary approach included needs identification, objective definition, empirical development of programmes and pretesting. These stages were repeated until feedback studies showed that the goals were being accomplished. The final programme encouraged children to make things and engage independently in constructive activities, showing them how local materials could be used.

Although the choice of target for the Kheda project suggested an intended priority for animal husbandry programmes, as one author, who was a member of a multidisciplinary team to measure the impact of the programmes, put it, “more emphasis was placed on broadening of outlook, self-reliance, opening a window to the world, etc. and a somewhat less emphasis on animal husbandry and agriculture.”5


Evaluation of the impact of SITE is important since it is likely to provide guidelines for the design and execution of future systems. A special Research and Evaluation Cell (REC) of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) was primarily responsible for evaluation. The cell consisted of about 100 persons including five senior researchers at the REC headquarters at Ahmedabad and a senior researcher in each of the SITE clusters. The overall research design consisted of three components, namely, (i) formative or input research: detailed studies of potential audience and pre-testing of programmes, (ii) process evaluation: feedback study on audience reactions to the programmes, and (iii) summative evaluation: impact surveys covering an assessment of the impact of programmes on adults and children. Apart from these sectoral and subject-specific studies, holistic studies were also undertaken to examine the process of existing rural communication, the role of television as a new medium of communication and the change brought about by the television at the village level.

A number of assessments and evaluations of the SITE experiment have been carried out by the Indian Space Applications Centre and the Indian Planning Commission. There seems to be no unqualified and unanimous conclusion about the success of the SITE experiment. The main conclusions of these assessments are worth quoting below.

SAC Studies6

(i) The size and frequency of viewers increased with time; with more male than female viewers of TV;

(ii) About 24.3 per cent viewers were largely illiterate and poor who switched from conventional media like radio to TV;

(iii) A fairly sizeable proportion of the rural people, between 21 and 28 per cent, did not participate in any media;

(iv) The attendance per set per day was 106 as against 172 average viewer size. This discrepancy is explained by such operational factors as: TV disorders and failure, power failure, climatic factors, and telecast schedule. Other non-operational factors identified were: caste, social class, inappropriate language, and wearing off of the novelty of TV;

(v) There was not much difference between different programmes in respect of farmers/viewers receptivity or awareness. However, positive gains seemed to be noticed regarding new inputs and animal husbandry;

(vi) There was little impact of TV communications on the adoption of family planning;

(vii) There was a greater adoption of health innovations by female viewers than by male viewers;

(viii) Adoption of agricultural innovations was undertaken more by frequent viewers than by infrequent ones.

Planning Commission Study7

The study by the Planning Commission of India contested the above findings of the SAC assessments. It seriously questioned the effectiveness of rural TV in spreading rural education or agricultural innovations. The arguments of the Planning Commission are based on the following points.

(i) The average frequent viewers of SITE programmes are young and educated who are already well-exposed to other communication media;

(ii) A large proportion of the rural population did not watch TV for several reasons, namely, pressure of work, social restriction, etc.;

(iii) TV could only be supplementary to interpersonal communications to become effective;

(iv) The Planning Commission also contested that no significant gains were obtained in knowledge, awareness, and adoption of agricultural innovations among control and experimental groups.

One of the most significant outcomes of the SITE project is the demonstration that the technical and operational aspects of such an advanced technology can be successfully undertaken in a developing country. The electronic circuitry required for reception of satellite pictures were designed and produced in India and the antenna and front-end converter was designed by ISRO and produced by the Electronics Corporation of India (ECIL) - a Government enterprise. Maintenance and repair of the sets were undertaken by a network of local personnel.

Whatever the controversy regarding the effectiveness of the SITE programme, it is generally agreed that much more emphasis has been placed on the hardware in which technical success has been achieved than on software for a TV system as an instrument of rural development.

Notwithstanding some controversy concerning the effectiveness of the system, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting slightly expanded the rural TV system under the Satellite Extension Continuity Project (SCEP) which followed SITE. This suggests that the rural TV system had its strong proponents within the government.

With the termination of SITE, the government continued the earlier programme in the form of SCEP which expanded rural coverage through six TV transmitters in each SITE state thus leading to 40 per cent coverage of SITE villages with a population of 11.5 million.


Several years ago, Vikram Sarabhai, former Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), explained reasons for low priority given to the use of television as a tool for mass communication and as a development agent. The principal among the reasons was the very high cost per unit oa a TV receiver compared to a receiver for sound broadcasting. Accordingly, studies were undertaken to determine the system configuration, cost and significance of a synchronous satellite to “link together isolated rural communities and distant centres of population in India through a powerful national system for mass communication using television.”8 It was intended to cover 80 per cent of the total Indian population.

Some Considerations in the Design of the TV Component of INSAT

The following four systems were studied:

(i) conventional rebroadcast stations with terrestrial microwave interconnections;
(ii) direct broadcast from a synchronous satellite;
(iii) conventional rebroadcast stations with satellite interconnections; an
(iv) a hybrid system involving direct broadcast to some areas and five rebroadcast stations for the densely populated regions. The conclusion of the cost study was that option (iv) was one-third as costly as option (i).

The higher cost of a TV receiver compared to a receiver for sound broadcasting necessitated the use of community TV centres which at any rate were a more feasible technique for the rural areas. (Only 1 to 2 per cent of the total Indian population views privately-owned TV sets.) Therefore, unit costs of providing rural education and agrarian information (innovations, inputs, crop prices, weather, etc.) would be much lower through community TV sets installed in panchayats and cooperatives. It was estimated that all the half million villages in India could be provided for a total cost of about US$ 180 million by using option (iv).

It has been argued that the cost estimate of the study for option (iv) was an underestimate since no account was taken of the cost of repair and maintenance of community TV sets, power sources for community TV sets in unelectrified villages, and software production centres. One author maintained that “appropriate costing techniques would almost double the estimated cost of INSAT”.9

The rationale for the installation of a satellite TV system for rural education and instructional purposes was based on several considerations. First, the satellite system requires shorter time for installation compared to a terrestrial TV system. Second, its cost-effectiveness was demonstrated by pay-off calculations based on satellite and ground segment costs and the projections of revenue earnings from satellite telecommunication channels. According to calculations, revenue earned in this application will amount to US$50 million for one-sixth capacity utilisation and US$72 million for one-fourth capacity utilisation.10 On average, it was expected that the project would yield a revenue of US$ 300 million for the satellite life of five years thus covering the expenditure on the project.” Third, it was argued that the INSAT project would give a fillip to the domestic electronics industry. It was estimated that about 1 to 1.5 million requirements for TV sets (or 500,000 to 750,000 sets per annum) would generate an employment of 4,500 engineers/scientists, 6,500 technicians, 9,000 support staff, 36,000 administrative workers and 5,000 maintenance personnel.12

Technical Capacity versus Socio-Economic Potentials of the TV Component of INSAT

Technical studies for INSAT were initiated in 1966 and in 1970 a study by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) arrived at a design for the satellite, based on the above considerations. According to this design which was tendered for purchase in 1976, INSAT was to broadcast in the UHF band via three TV channels each accompanied by five radio channels, 1,800 two-way telecommunications channels, programme distribution channels for radio and multiple access transponders. The ground segment was to consist of more than 500,000 village receivers.

However, this plan was widely criticised mainly because of its large TV broadcasting component. Scepticism was expressed for a number of reasons. First, it was thought that a centralised programme of such magnitude was far too ambitious. Taking into account the vast regional, cultural, occupational and seasonal differences within the country, it was doubtful whether such a system would be capable of providing differentiated information, adapted in language and content, to the needs of specific groups of the population. Preliminary calculations showed that these groups would have to wait a long time for a programme of interest in their own language to appear.13 In addition, only the major language groups could be catered for due to the limited satellite capacity.

Second, the large investments required for both hardware (manufacture, installation and maintenance of ground system and communal sets) and software (needs assessment, programme production, feedback, etc.) gave rise to a great deal of concern. The fact that the direct benefits of this programme to the economy were not evident did not help the situation.

These and other considerations led to a much smaller TV component of the INSAT programme at launching in April 1982. Instead of the proposed installation of 100,000 direct broadcasting sets per year, only an average of 2,000 sets would be installed annually up to 1987. These would be augmented by a terrestrial system under which a further 6,600 community sets would be installed by that same year. The states covered are: Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Orissa, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh. Four rebroadcast transmitters are to be installed in Gorakhpur, Nagpur, Rajkot and Ranchi. The main emphasis of INSAT was switched from mass rural communication to utility in telecommunications, meteorology, remote sensing, and TV and radio networks. INSAT could thus be seen as a continuation of SITE with little prospect of large-scale expansion.

The satellite started operation in 1983. Therefore, it is too early to expect any meaningful evaluation of its performance. However, some of the shortcomings of the programme have been highlighted.14

In spite of the reduced TV component, preparations for rural broadcasting were surprisingly poor even at launching of the satellite. Needs assessment and studies of population profile of the target villages were not carried out, programme production facilities were not set up and user agencies were not mobilised for software production. In addition, delays were experienced in the supply of equipment at all levels. This would lead to underutilisation of the system and loss of satellite time, given its limited life. It could also affect the effectiveness of the programme.


The rural programmes of the Indian Television System are not reported to be very popular as is shown in Table 16.2:

Table 16.2. The Ratings of Different TV Programmes (Percentages)

Films & Entertainment Programmes


Magazine Programme on Science


English News Programme


Documentary on Development Themes


Programme for Industrial Workers


Rural Programme (Krishi Darshan)


Children’s Saturday Programme


Source: Sumit Mitra and Anita Kaul: Doordarshan. The Tedium is the Message, India Today, New Delhi, May 31, 1982.

Note: Rating is defined as the percentage of TV sets switched on for each programme put out by each station.

The above data, generated by a TV audience survey in December 1981, do not appear to be comparable.15 Yet they clearly indicate the predominance of social entertainment programmes in preference to the rural informational and educational programmes which, at one time, were considered to be of a high priority.

A number of reasons seem to explain the above situation. First, movie films are very popular in a country with a few sources of entertainment: they are also revenue-earning programmes. Added to this, the urban lobby which is very strong in India, makes sure that most of the prime time on TV is reserved to cater to their requirements. Second, the rural educational/informational programmes are poor and unimaginative. According to a TV critic, “the Doordarshan shows are poor not because the subjects are always poorly chosen, because nobody makes any effort to present with imagination.”16 Third, the Government seems to give low priority to the production of suitable rural education programmes. The National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) was commissioned to prepare no more than 50 special school programmes of 20 minutes each.17 This stock of programmes is estimated to last only 25 days at the planned rate of two programmes per day. Fourth, as the SAC (Ahmedabad) noted, little action has been taken “to set up field programming centres, select the target villages, or train personnel for maintaining the community TV sets... “18 Government red tape has been blamed for slow action or inaction. It is reported that programmes are not ready because the Indian Government was too slow in sanctioning the use of Indian National Satellite (INSAT) for special rural TV audiences. Finally, although the government had provided 2,400 direct reception sets for the SITE programme more than seven years ago, manufacturers are being approached only now to produce additional sets. Under the circumstances, the Doordarshan target of reaching 15,300 villages in 18 districts in six states is unlikely to be met.

It is estimated that “the direct TV broadcast by INSAT will be able to reach only Kurnool (Andhra Pradesh), Ranchi (Bihar), and Sambalpur (Orissa) districts when the programmes are formally inaugurated on August 15, 1983.”19

A serious effort to reach the Doordarshan target would require a more effective use of INSAT’s television transponders beaming separate programmes for farmers, rural producers, children and women for at least four hours a day or about 1,500 hours a year.20 At present, such programme capacity simply does not exist: a 50 per cent increase in total studio capacity would be required.21


It seems that the plans for TV satellite telecommunications for rural villages of India have not made much headway. A number of factors, economic, technical, and political, seem to account for this slow process. This situation can be best described by the following quotations:

The effect of the lack of a coordinated long-range strategy in relation to communication as well as adoption of relevant technologies, can be seen at various levels. Not only is the nation-wide instructional TV system using direct broadcast satellite shelved and development of terrestrial system slow, but there are dangerous trends of introducing commercial and foreign programmes in the system, and more importantly, the waning of the whole concept of developmental communication. This seems to be due to the fact that the attention of policy-makers is focused on the introduction of new technologies rather than on the process of communication itself. Therefore, it is not surprising that even before a new technological venture is properly developed and its effectiveness is demonstrated, it is either shelved or its utilisation becomes a lingering formality, thus missing an opportunity to investigate the real problems related to developmental communication.22

... in the absence of democratic participation of the rural population - for whom establishing communication links was the main rationale for TV and satellite TV planners - the new technologies show the inevitable tendency of aligning themselves to the informational entertainment needs of the privileged groups. The introduction of colour TV, the possibility of establishing franchised TV commercial stations, and the widely talked about tie-ups with foreign broadcasting agencies, is a pointer in this direction. This situation is described by many in terms of “cultural dominance” and “technological fetishism”, thus questioning the indiscriminate application of new technologies in developing countries.23

The question which arises from this study is that of the cost-effectiveness of centralised satellite TV systems compared to decentralised systems broadcasting to given areas. The final choice would depend on the specific conditions in a given country. While satellite broadcasting might appear to be the ideal technical solution, socio-economic conditions might dictate that they are replaced or complemented by decentralised systems or by radio broadcasting.


1. Ashok Raj and C. Vishnu Mohan: “INSAT: evolution and prospects”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XVII, No. 33, Bombay, August 14, 1982. Also see National Committee report on five year plan publicity, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, New Delhi, 1965.

2. V. Sarabhai: “Television for development”, Kamla Chowdhry (ed.) in Science policy and national development, Macmillan, New Delhi, 1974.

3. UNESCO: Planning for satellite broadcasting - the Indian instructional television experiment, by Romesh Chander and Kiran Karnik, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication No. 78, Paris, 1976.

4. Clifford Block, Dennis Foote and John Mayo: A case study of India’s satellite instructional television project, USAID, Washington, DC, 1977, (mimeographed).

5. J.K. Doshi: “Kheda impact survey in Space Applications Centre (Indian Space Research Organisation)”, in Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE); Winter School, Ahmedabad, January 16-28, 1976.

6. Binod Agarwal: “SITE evaluation through holistic study, Second Workshop of Space Applications Centre”, Ahmedabad, June 1976.

7. Planning Commission: Satellite instructional television experiment: an evaluation of its social impact, New Delhi, (undated).

8. V. Sarabhai, op.cit. Also printed in K.B. Madhava (ed.), International Development 1969 - Proceedings of the Eleventh World Conference of Society for International Development, New York, 1970.

9. B.D. Dhawan: Economics of Television, S. Chand. New Delhi, 1976.

10. Ashok Raj and C. Vishnu Mohan, “INSAT”, op. cit.

11. Vikram Sarabhai et al.: “INSAT, A national satellite for television and telecommunication, paper presented at the National Conference of Electronics”, Bombay 1970; reprinted in Kamla Choudhry (ed.), Science policy and national development, op. cit.

12. E.V. Chitnis: Development of TV in India via satellite: The context of SITE, paper presented at the National Conference on Electronics, Bombay, 1970.

13. See for example, A. Melzer: “An educational TV satellite for India: a critical assessment”, Research Policy, Volume 5, No. 2, Amsterdam, April, 1976.

14. Ashok Raj and C. Vishnu Mohan, “INSAT”, op. cit.

15. No methodology is given of the Audience Survey. It seems that some ratings relate to the percentage of the TV sets actually switched on under a programme (e.g. programme for industrial workers); the others represent the number of actual viewers as a percentage of the total TV viewers. The latter is clearly a more relevant indicator for measuring the importance and impact of a particular programme on a group of the population. The number of sets and switching on of programmes may have no direct correlation with the number of viewers especially in the case of rural population with community TV rather than private one.

16. Sumit Mitra and Anita Kaul: “Doordarshan, the tedium is the message”, India Today, New Delhi, May 31, 1982, op. cit.

17. T.N. Ninan and Rohini Nilekani: “INSAT, A damp squib”, India Today, New Delhi, May 15, 1982.

18. Ninan and Nilekani, ibid.

19. Amarnath K. Menon: “INSAT, The starry messenger”, India Today, New Delhi, April 15, 1982.

20. Ninan and Nilekani, op. cit.

21. ibid.

22. Raj and Mohan, op. cit., and Ashok Raj: An approach to technology assessment: A case study of Indian broadcasting system, Unpublished M. Phil. Dissertation, Centre for Studies in Science Policy, Jawahar Lal Nehru University, New Delhi, 1980.

23. Raj and Mohan, op. cit.