|Illicit Drugs and the Development Assistance Programme - Strategy paper (DFID, 1999, 18 p.)|
DFID Department for International Development
· DFID's overarching commitment to poverty reduction will make a valuable contribution to the government's effort to combat drugs. Poverty is one of the root causes of the drugs problem in many developing countries. Tackling poverty is key to delivering sustainable, long-term solutions to drugs production and consumption.
· Effective assistance can be provided in support of the control of illicit drugs where this is an integral part of countries' anti-poverty strategies, and where there are sustainable policies and commitments on development. Any assistance will take specific account of the needs of poor people. Partner governments will need to demonstrate a commitment to meet these needs.
· Drugs control activities will be pursued as part of development strategies in countries/regions which are important for drugs production and trade. These are at present: Bolivia and Peru; Pakistan; Eastern and Southern Africa, especially South Africa; the Caribbean region, including Overseas Territories; and Colombia (though DFID has only a small development assistance programme there). The case for providing assistance to Afghanistan will be kept under review; it will depend on the commitment of the Taliban (as well as appraisal of the developmental value of specific proposals).
· DFID's assistance for drugs control is likely to focus on support for alternative development projects; demand reduction programmes; institutional reform and development projects which are likely to have an impact on drugs control e.g. anti-drugs planning and co-ordination, customs and excise reform and community policing. Spending will be determined in the country and regional context, bearing in mind that effective anti-drugs activities often need to take a regional approach.
· In addition, greater attention will be given to drugs-related aspects of current and future DFID programmes, e.g. projects concerning rural livelihoods, environment, infrastructure, urban poverty, health and education. Country strategy papers should, where appropriate, make specific reference to the scope for drugs control activities in the context of poverty reduction, and should, as appropriate, relate any recommendations to regional activities.
· DFID will give increased effort to encouraging multilateral institutions to address drugs issues, in support of developing countries' poverty reduction strategies. Multilateral institutions may also be well placed to help address the regional dimension of the drugs issue. DFID will continue to press for a poverty-focused approach in the United Nations International Drugs Control Programme (UNDCP) as a precondition of working in partnership with them on drugs control projects, and providing financial support. Support for UNDCP will be on a country-by-country basis (i.e. we do not propose to provide core funding). We shall encourage other donors to take a similar approach, insisting on the importance of close monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of UNDCP's approach.
· DFID will work closely with other government departments to ensure that its activities in the field of illicit drugs are consistent with the government's UK drugs strategy. DFID will continue its close collaboration with Drugs and International Crime Department (DICD) in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Other departments accept that DFID's work must be consistent with the 1980 Overseas Development Co-operation Act and with DFID's primary purpose of poverty eradication. DFID will work with them to develop a set of indicators to measure progress with international drugs control, though DFID needs additionally to develop its own means of assessing how far its contribution to drugs control programmes contributes to its poverty-reduction objective.
1 This paper reviews DFID's support for the government's international drugs strategy in the light of the White Paper on International Development (November 1997)1 and subsequent experience in shifting the focus of our development assistance activities to emphasise poverty reduction.
2 The UK government needs to take a consistent approach across Whitehall to drugs issues. Different government departments will, rightly, have some differences of emphasis. Some (such as the Home Office and Customs and Excise) will be strongly focused on interdiction while DFID will be more focused on finding long-term solutions to the drugs problem through tackling poverty in developing countries. DFID will continue to work closely with other Whitehall departments, encouraging them to incorporate developmental objectives into their own drugs policies.
3 The present paper sets out the reasons for DFID's involvement in the drugs strategy, and discusses the range of policy responses available. It does not set spending targets as the appropriate level of spend will depend on the country context, in particular how far a government has successfully integrated drugs control policies into an overall strategy for poverty reduction.
4 The 'primary purpose' test established in the courts in relation to the 1980 Overseas Development Co-operation Act requires that any support provided from the aid budget must be for the benefit of another country. It is clearly not for DFID to finance activities whose prime purpose is to inhibit flows of illicit drugs to the UK. However, cultivation, trafficking and use of illicit drugs are detrimental to sustainable economic and social development. It is therefore permissible under the 1980 Act for DFID to finance activities related to enforcement of laws prohibiting cultivation or trade in illicit drugs; demand reduction; rehabilitation of drug abusers in developing countries; and alternative development in rural areas and urban development projects aimed at providing alternatives to illicit drugs-trade involvement. All these elements have a bearing on the task of dealing with the drugs problem: experience has shown that there are no technical quick fixes.
5 With the publication of its White Paper on International Development, the government adopted a more coherent anti-poverty focus for the development assistance programme: 'We shall refocus our international development efforts on the elimination of poverty and encouragement of economic growth which benefits the poor. We will do this through support for international sustainable development targets and policies which create sustainable livelihoods for poor people, promote human development and conserve the environment.' This provides the policy context for future anti-drugs activities funded from the development assistance budget.
6 Poverty is one of the root causes of the drugs problem in many developing countries. By tackling poverty and helping to develop legitimate livelihoods for poor people we can help to stem the international trade in drugs.
7 At the country level, the short-term financial and employment benefits (or apparent benefits) of the illicit drugs trade have tended to obscure the long-term negative effects on the economy and the adverse social, environmental, governance and health impacts. The illicit drugs trade can crowd out legitimate investment, shifting scarce resources towards high risk short-term investment including the labour and savings of already vulnerable groups. Labour productivity may be lowered, and the risk of AIDS increased. Deforestation and water pollution often occur. Emerging financial markets may be destabilised by money laundering activities, and fragile democracies damaged. In some countries, drugs are a significant source of finance for war lords, and therefore sustain armed conflicts. The security forces of some countries may have links with the drugs industry. All these effects are likely to have an adverse impact on the poor.
8 In general, drug crops are grown in remote, marginal, underdeveloped areas of poor countries, where government institutions are weak or absent. Poor people are attracted into the industry by the lack of alternatives. Drug crop farming often appears a more attractive option than legal alternatives to poor people living in remote areas with poor natural resources. Markets are too far away for farmers to use for the sale of licit crops. Typically, remote areas are neglected by governments, so have little in the way of public services (including education and health services) or infrastructure.
9 Turning to drug crop production does not, however, improve life for poor farmers. Their incomes tend to be unstable and are offset by insecurity, low levels of human development, environmental degradation and often violence. They receive a low proportion of the profits from the production and sale of drug crops. Commercial transactions associated with drug crop farming are increasingly made in kind (drugs), forcing farmers into the circuit of trafficking and consumption. Land often becomes degraded, in some cases because of the adverse environmental effect of the run-off of precursor chemicals used in drug manufacture. When governments try to eradicate drugs crops, (often done forcibly without the offer of alternative livelihoods), a climate of fear and insecurity develops. This can discourage investment in education, health, etc. Alcoholism and prostitution often flourish.
10 Drug crop farmers often suffer from human rights abuses. Government repression may be an explicit strategy, compounded by poor quality policing, crude eradication targets or police corruption. Production and trade in illicit drugs is often coercive and exploitative; drug traffickers, organised groups (such as coca unions) and terrorist groups may also commit human rights abuses. The absence of human rights institutions and accessible justice means that human rights abuses are neither recorded nor punished. Unpaid family and child labour is often used for drug crop farming and processing.
11 The drugs problem is not just a problem of the industrialised countries. Drug trafficking has grown in transit countries (e.g. the Caribbean). Routes are multiplying. Drug abuse is increasing in both producer and transit countries, where it is associated with urban poverty and violence. Poverty has become both a cause and a consequence of the drugs problem. Approaches to drugs control, therefore, must be part of a wider agenda for poverty reduction.
12 The issues discussed above point to a range of possible responses. Common threads will be the focus on the poor, and the need to provide them with new opportunities and alternatives while safeguarding their human rights, providing them with access to justice, and also access to treatment where appropriate. A gender focus is important since poor women may often be pressured into joining the drugs trade, e.g. as "mules" working for trafficking organisations. In general, DFID country programme managers, when drafting country strategy papers, should consider the scope for incorporating anti-drugs activities, where the government is pursuing an anti-poverty strategy which includes elements related to drugs control - and the country is important for drugs production and trade.
13 DFID's present anti-drugs activities include strengthening law enforcement institutions, support for demand reduction programmes, and support for alternative development. Bilateral expenditure in 1997/98 was £7.7 million out of total government funding for the international drugs strategy of £16.4 million.
14 In the context of its poverty reduction and human rights objectives, DFID provides assistance to poor countries to improve personal security through community policing, as well as assistance to strengthen the effectiveness of tax collection on international trade. This involves developing the capacity of police and customs services: this general institutional development enhances the capability of the police and customs to deal with illegal drugs production and trading. Most such projects supported by DFID in drugs-producing and trading countries will have an indirect impact on drugs control.
15 Attempts to improve direct interventions to control drugs will only succeed if the institutional capacity of countries' enforcement services have been developed more generally, including in ways addressed by DFID's programmes. Improved intelligence and enforcement techniques, applied in isolation from wider education programmes, would simply score more highly on detecting and imprisoning offenders, without addressing the underlying problems (though there may also be some deterrent effect). Involving communities themselves in self-help initiatives may be crucial. DFID's support in areas other than law enforcement, such as rural livelihoods, infrastructure development, education, etc., will also have a potential beneficial indirect effect on drugs control.
16 Enforcement activities should include building improved capacity to address the organised criminal's response to the growing value of the drugs trade. This response manifests itself in corruption at all levels in society and government; an upward spiral in violent crime as inter-gang turf wars emerge; large-scale financial fraud and money laundering activities to dispose of large liquid capital reserves generated by the trade; and an undermining of national and international confidence in socio-economic and judicial systems. DFID will look for opportunities to engage in activities which address these issues, working with governments which are themselves committed to addressing them, with an emphasis on eliminating problems and distortions as they affect the poor and vulnerable. Action is required in the UK and other richer countries to ensure that their laws are effective against corruption and the movement of illicit funds.
17 DFID provides assistance to all Caribbean countries, including the Overseas Territories, as part of the Caribbean Drugs Initiative (CDI). This is an initiative co-ordinated by the EU and UN International Drugs Control Programme (UNDCP) and is aimed at combating the drugs trade. European and other governments are working in partnership with governments in the region. The initiative aims to tackle a range of activities that are needed across the region, including improved planning at national level, policing and customs, demand reduction, treatment and rehabilitation. This programme is the most ambitious and comprehensive attempt so far to tackle the drugs problem in the region. DFID has earmarked £7.5 million as a contribution. This will be used to help build local level capacity in police and customs in some of the more vulnerable Caribbean countries, and to provide support for the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police so that they can provide strong regional leadership. DFID is also taking a lead role in co-ordinating a European Commission/UK funded drugs training project for such agencies in the region.
18 UK assistance for demand reduction activities has largely been channelled through the UNDCP. Activities in this area aim to raise awareness of the negative health effects of using illicit drugs; to help consumers stop using harmful drugs; and to help former drug abusers to recover. The broad goal is to help people adopt healthier lifestyles which enable them to develop their own potential and their productive capacity in society. Experience has shown that demand reduction programmes are more successful and potentially more sustainable if they are designed with the participation of all the various groups in an affected community. For example, the UNDCP project in Jamaica is based on an integrated community development model and is designed to help alleviate the conditions that promote use of illicit drugs.
19 DFID plans to continue providing support for this type of activity, especially in the context of community development projects which focus on the poorest. There may be scope for introducing demand reduction activities into community-based urban improvement programmes in relevant areas, where there is a commitment on the part of government or local authority to implement pro-poor policies. DFID's interest in continuing to work with UNDCP will depend on our assessment both of UNDCP's overall stance and capacity on delivering pro-poor assistance (see paragraphs 35-37 below), and on individual proposals.
20 'Alternative development'2 must go much wider than crop substitution, to cover broad-based economic, social and institutional assistance to drug producers, often marginal groups of people living on marginal land. It is acknowledged that in the past narrowly focused alternative development projects have not worked because of poor design, a failure to integrate projects with farmers' livelihood strategies, inappropriate technology and poor market links. In the medium to long term, the best prospect for alternative development is pro-poor macro-economic growth which reaches (in some cases because of affirmative measures on the part of government) remote, poor areas; this should be supported by micro-level interventions (e.g. in education, information, infrastructure).
21 Donor support for alternative development can provide political support to governments trying to develop more effective anti-drugs policies (though it is important that donor support be well co-ordinated, with clear, shared objectives). Governments may be encouraged to address the issues affecting drug-producing communities described in paragraphs 7-10 above. Farmers may be prepared to trade higher incomes for increased stability and security. But alternative development must also be closely linked to a policy of interdiction which increases the risk of drug crops production, disrupts the supply chain and thus reduces the returns to the farmer.
22 Among issues to be considered in assessing alternative
development projects are the following:
· Alternative development projects often have drug eradication conditionality attached to them, i.e. farmers can benefit from development assistance on condition that they reduce or eradicate drug crops. Views differ on the value of such conditionality. Farmers may reject it on the grounds that it will deprive them of a livelihood until alternative development is proven to work. Conditionality can also lead farmers to identify alternative development projects with repression. Eradication only works when it is voluntary, consensual and accompanied by real alternatives for producers.
· Alternative development projects often take place in a highly charged context involving strong political and economic interests (those of central government, farmers' organisations, drug traffickers, international governments and occasionally terrorist organisations). Such interests greatly increase the risks of alternative development projects.
· Some alternative development projects are targeted to the areas of labour supply for drug crop production, to reduce migration into the area. Such projects are often poorly targeted and limited by difficult conditions and the high degree of geographic dispersion of migrants. In order to reduce the 'balloon effect' (illicit drug cultivation being suppressed in one area only to appear in a neighbouring area) better understanding of on and off-farm needs for income generation is called for.
23 Experience has shown that it is best to work with communal institutions and local governments, rather than individual farmers. The participation of women can often be a crucial factor for success. It would be useful to explore the role which might be played by micro-credit schemes in underpinning alternative development.
24 DFID currently supports alternative development projects in Bolivia (a UNDCP/FAO agroforestry project) and Pakistan (a UNDCP rural development project) and has recently approved support for a UNDCP rural development project in Peru. Given the need for a co-ordinated donor effort, it would be sensible to continue to look for opportunities to co-finance alternative development projects through UNDCP (see paragraphs 35 - 37 below), on the basis of concerted objectives and approaches. Opportunities should be considered on a case-by-case basis, in the context of commitment by partner governments to wider pro-poor strategies.
25 An increasingly important element of DFID's anti-drugs strategy should be influencing multilateral programmes, particularly that of the European Community.
26 European Union aid policy recognises the importance of combating drugs. The European Union's Plan to Combat Drugs (1995-1999) and related strategies are founded on a comprehensive and integrated approach to the problem through reducing the supply and demand for drugs. Key elements of a new EU drugs strategy for 2000-2004 were agreed during the UK's EU Presidency in 1998.
27 The European Community is providing support in the
· A Council Regulation (2046/97) on 'North-South co-operation schemes in the context of the campaign against drug abuse' of 13 October 1997 established the legal base for the budget line which provided for commitments totalling 8.9 mecu (8.9 million ecu, about £5.9 million) in 1998 which support the preparation of national drug control master plans as well as specific implementation measures.
· Assistance for countries in Central and Eastern Europe in their efforts to combat drugs and drugs related crime under the PHARE economic restructuring programme. The EC has committed 33 mecu from 1992 to 1998.
· Technical assistance to support Newly Independent States in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the fight against drugs production and trafficking covering areas such as reinforcing institutional and technical capacity, tackling money laundering, etc.
· Proposals for linking additional trade access to the EU market for Andean countries and Venezuela to conditionality concerning the fight against drugs.
· Support for alternative development through regional programmes, e.g. in Bolivia, Peru and Morocco.
A fuller description of EC support is given in the annex.
28 There is scope for encouraging more commitment to drugs control by the World Bank and regional development banks. The UN Special Session on drugs in June 1998 called on the multilateral banks to do more.
29 Work is most advanced in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) which is being called on to take an increasing role in programmes to address the problem of the production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs. The Bank provides support specifically through alternative development, prevention efforts, the strengthening of judicial systems and training in banking supervision to detect and prevent money laundering. However, the IDB has not produced a drugs strategy paper drawing together its approach.
30 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has made some efforts to become more aware of the place of drug control issues in its programmes, and to share information with UNDCP Bangkok, but does not have a coherent proactive policy reflecting the multidimensional nature of the problem and the strategic importance of the subject. The UK has been the most active board member in pushing for drugs issues to be addressed, e.g. in the Bank's long term strategic framework, in selected country operational strategy studies and in country assistance plans. With its heavy involvement in promoting reform, restoring growth and protecting those most affected by the Asian crisis, and its continuing freeze on staff numbers, the ADB may lack the resources to respond adequately at present.
31 The World Bank has consistently failed to produce a statement on its approach to drugs, despite pressure from the UK over the past ten years. In its country assistance strategies, the impact of the drugs industry is not mentioned, even for Latin American countries where the drugs problem may be acute. The Bank does not see itself as having a comparative advantage or expertise in drug reduction, and instead points to the indirect contribution made through its lending for development in many areas (e.g. good governance, health, education and rural investment) that will strengthen the prevention and mitigation of the effects of drug trafficking. Informal contacts suggest, however, that Bank staff working in some areas (notably social development) are beginning to take the issue more seriously. With US support, the UK will now raise the issue as appropriate at board level.
32 Neither the Caribbean Development Bank nor the African Development Bank has attempted to develop a drugs control policy. Both institutions have limited staffing and neither have the skills to make an effective contribution in the drugs area. We are therefore not pressing them to become involved.
33 Against this background and taking into account DFID's priorities and objectives for the multilateral development banks, DFID will encourage the production of drugs strategy papers where appropriate. In addition, DFID will look for opportunities to raise drugs-related issues at the executive boards of the banks in discussion of individual country strategies. As with DFID's bilateral assistance, our objective will be to ensure that drugs control is incorporated as appropriate within anti-poverty programmes to which recipient governments are strongly committed. We shall argue in support of pro-poor approaches which take active account of human rights.
34 As with DFID's own programmes, we should argue for a coherent approach to drugs issues in development programmes financed by the UN. This should be facilitated by the progress being made towards better co-ordination of UN country-level programmes through the UN development assistance frameworks (UNDAFs). Other UN agencies, currently outside the UNDAF process, also have a role, e.g. the World Health Organisation (WHO), which implements a Programme for Substance Abuse to which DFID contributes.
35 UNDCP is, however, likely to remain our principal interlocutor on drugs issues within the UN system. The UN Special Session in June 1998 reaffirmed its role, including as a global centre of expertise, i.e. in research, analysis, monitoring, etc. DFID should work with UNDCP in two parallel strands of activity. First, it should seek to influence UNDCP's approach to ensure that anti-poverty objectives are properly reflected in its core policies. Second, it should continue to look for opportunities to work with UNDCP (including by providing project co-financing or parallel financing, and participation in project steering groups and evaluation missions) in specific countries which are pursuing anti-poverty strategies, with drugs control as an integral element. DFID should favour opportunities for working with UNDCP where there are other donors involved, with UNDCP co-ordinating activities and encouraging a common approach.
36 DFID has no plans at this stage to provide core funding for UNDCP, or to contribute to its (as yet incomplete) 'Global Plan' other than on a country-by-country basis.
37 Donors, including the UK, remain concerned about aspects of UNDCP's management and technical capacity in the field of alternative development. DFID should continue to work, with other interested donors, for improvements. This should include working alongside UNDCP and other donors in the field, in order to improve the focus of activity. UNDCP's capacity merits further scrutiny. A small organisation, it may be stretching its resources over too many countries to be effective at project delivery. Other Whitehall departments which have regular contact with UNDCP and provide funding (FCO and Home Office) should be encouraged to become involved in DFID's efforts in these areas of concern. DFID should also work with other donors to press UNDCP for better co-ordinated evaluation of its own activities, which would be consistent with the role identified for it as a centre of expertise. (The evidence of UNDCP's recent evaluation reports suggest that evaluation methodology is sound.)
38 International NGOs such as the Catholic Institute of International Relations (CIIR), the Transnational Institute and the umbrella group the European NGO Council on Drugs and Development (ENCOD) undertake research and advocacy in the field of drugs and development. Southern NGOs have valuable local experience, especially in demand reduction, alternative development and human rights. DFID will work with these and other organisations of civil society where this is both possible and useful.
39 The main critical success factors for anti-drugs programmes - not unique to those activities - are: strong recipient government commitment to tackling the problems; close attention to institutional factors; coherence of donor efforts, especially in relation to conditionality; and local participation. The limited evaluation material available to DFID suggests that its interventions in the field of drugs can be successful, though the evidence should be treated cautiously. The Bryan/Mansfield Study of Training in Drug Law Enforcement (March 1995) showed that it is possible to run a well-targeted training programme that enhances the capacity of anti-drugs units to do an effective job. It did not, however, show that drugs supply in the countries studied had in any way diminished as a result, much less that poor farmers had become any better off. It is doubtful, therefore, whether running training programmes of this kind, with no clear anti-poverty benefits, would any longer be appropriate for DFID.
40 When DFID does get involved in drugs activities, we need to ensure that our interventions have clearly defined purposes and carefully chosen indicators. This has not always been done in the past, e.g. the Bryan/Mansfield report notes that 'the quality of the available statistics did not enable the hypothesis of a relationship between training and increased success in in-country enforcement to be tested'. This clearly represents design weakness. DFID's new drugs strategy will need to focus unambiguously on wider outcomes (especially poverty reduction) and the means necessary to assess them. We may need to develop better policy indicators. Indicators should distinguish between the impact of any anti-drugs intervention on the poor, and on the drugs economy more generally. But the possible range and the interrelated nature of indicators may lead to an over-complex picture. It would be useful to work with UNDCP (and others) to identify which indicators have been, or may be, worthwhile and effective in measuring performance against DFID objectives.
41 DFID's focus on poverty reduction in developing countries will contribute to the UK's wider strategy of defence against drugs. Tackling poverty is key to delivering sustainable, long-term solutions to drugs production and consumption.
42 It will be important to maintain the close co-ordination between DFID, the Drugs and International Crime Department, FCO, the Home Office and the UK Anti-Drugs Co-ordination Unit about their respective activities, particularly in relation to law enforcement where there is most scope for overlap. DFID will continue to take part in Whitehall co-ordination mechanisms: it has been represented on the International Co-ordinating Committee since its inception and should continue to play a constructive part. DFID will also work with other government departments to develop a set of indicators (see paragraph 40 above) to measure progress with international drugs control: DFID's primary interest will be in measuring the anti-poverty effect of drugs control activities.
1 Drugs are specifically addressed in paras 3.68 - 3.71 of the White Paper (page 76)
2 The term 'alternative development' is used in this paper because it is used and readily understood by partners, including governments and multilateral institutions, engaged in anti-drugs activities. The precise definition of the term is, however, subject to continuous assessment as attempts to implement successful alternative development projects continue. A working definition might be: The creation of an economic and social environment in which rural families can attain an acceptable living standard without the need for drug crop cultivation. The methodology is based on an integration of crop substitution, rural development, strengthening of democratic institutions and law enforcement with respect for human rights.
1. Council Regulation (2046/97) on 'North-South co-operation schemes in the context of the campaign against drug abuse' established the legal basis for the budget line providing for commitments totalling 8.9 mecu (about £5.9 million in 1998).
In the context of its co-operation activities in the field of drugs and drug addiction in developing countries, the European Community will give priority to those which have demonstrated political will at the highest level to solve their drug problem.
The Community will give priority at the request of a partner country to supporting the preparation of a national drug control master plan, in close consultation with the United Nations International Drug Control Programme.
Preferably operating within the strategic framework established by national plans, the Community will also support specific operations capable of a measurable impact in the following areas:
· implementation of national drug control plans by developing countries.
· implementation of agreements between the Community and certain developing countries.
· demand reduction
· promotion of pilot alternative development projects.
· financing of studies, seminars, and fora for the exchange of experience
2. The PHARE Drugs Programme. The EC has committed 33 mecu from 1992-1998 to assist 13 countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their efforts to combat drugs and drug related crime. There are three elements to this programme: demand reduction; supply reduction; and the development of a multidisciplinary and integrated policy based on a balanced approach between the two.
To complement its main drugs programme, PHARE has also supported both police training and customs modernisation. Finally, PHARE has supported civil society in the field of drug demand reduction.
3. TACIS is the European Union's programme of technical assistance promoting economic reform in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The European Council, held in Florence in June 1996, opened up the possibility of drawing on Tacis funding to develop activities in the field of Justice & Home Affairs (JHA). At the European Council in Dublin, the EU agreed ways to assist Newly Independent States in the fight against drug production and trafficking.
Under the 1996 Tacis inter-state programme, 0.5 mecu was committed to undertake high-level experts' missions to assess the situation in the JHA sector, identifying seven projects to be financed under the 1997 programme budget (3 mecu). These initiatives involve:
· law approximation and the reinforcement of the institutional capacity to fight against drug trafficking;
· reinforcing the technical capabilities of police;
·reinforcing controls at border crossings, airports and ports;
· support for a regional centre for the training of sniffer dogs.
In addition, a further allocation of 3 mecu under the 1998
inter-state programme will allow the broadening of the scope of JHA activity to
· the fight against money laundering;
· crime prevention;
· that these countries continue their respective efforts to combat illicit drugs.
· that they meet social and environmental standards. The Community will discuss these proposals with a view to introducing a revised scheme early in 1999.
5. Regional programmes. The EC is also engaged in important initiatives in Peru and Bolivia. In the Mediterranean, the EC has approved a large integrated rural development project in the northern provinces of Morocco (the Rif region).
6. Clauses on the "fight against drugs" are included as a matter of routine in the EC's external co-operation agreements.
7. For the ACP States, drug-related projects can be financed from the Indicative Programmes under LomV. For instance, the Caribbean Regional Indicative Programme envisages support for the fight against illegal drug production, processing, trafficking and consumption, as well as for rehabilitation and money-laundering programmes.
The Department for International Development (DFID) is the British government department responsible for promoting development and the reduction of poverty. The government elected in May 1997 increased its commitment to development by strengthening the department and increasing its budget.
The policy of the government was set out in the White Paper on International Development, published in November 1997. The central focus of the policy is a commitment to the internationally agreed target to halve the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015, together with the associated targets including basic health care provision and universal access to primary education by the same date.
DFID seeks to work in partnership with governments which are committed to the international targets, and seeks to work with business, civil society and the research community to encourage progress which will help reduce poverty. We also work with multilateral institutions including the World Bank, UN agencies and the European Commission. The bulk of our assistance is concentrated on the poorest countries in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
We are also contributing to poverty elimination and sustainable development in middle income countries, and helping the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe to try to ensure that the widest number of people benefit from the process of change.
As well as its headquarters in London and East Kilbride, DFID has offices in New Delhi, Bangkok, Nairobi, Harare, Pretoria, Dhaka, Suva and Bridgetown. In other parts of the world, DFID works through staff based in British embassies and high commissions.
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