|The Global Greenhouse Regime. Who Pays? (UNU, 1993, 382 p.)|
|Part IV Conclusion|
|14 Constructing a global greenhouse regime|
Conditionality and additionality
Regional building blocks
Notes and references
The construction of a resilient, global greenhouse gas regime requires that state elites share a consensus as to common values and norms of behaviour; submit their respective states to observe the rules and procedures of the regime; and participate in the institutional arrangements established under the regime.
The signing of the Climate Change Convention is prima facie evidence that most national leaders agree that the global climate system must be conserved and restored, and that it must be used rationally in ways that are compatible with ecological imperatives. The rest of the interlocking elements of the regime have been left largely unspecified. Some analysts believe that states so hedged their commitments under the Convention that it merely maintains 'polluter sovereignty' and is so vague as to be almost meaningless.
I am less pessimistic, however. I am convinced that a fully fledged regime can be constructed that will achieve the goals of the Climate Change Convention. Achieving this goal will first and foremost mean activating the norms implicit in the Convention as to mutual reciprocity between, and differential responsibilities of, the rich and poor nations. Specifically, the articles on financial assistance and technology transfer (see Chapter 1) must be elaborated in protocols and implemented.
Donors may place conditions on financial transfers to the South to abate greenhouse gases. In this chapter, I outline the contrary positions held by potential parties to a Climate Change Convention on conditionality and additionality of resources for greenhouse projects in developing countries. The biggest likely demand on resources provided by the North to the South will be to fund technology transfer.
The desirability and even the meaning of technology transfer are contentious, however. I outline two important positions that have emerged in debates on this topic before turning to three aspects of multi-pronged technology transfer strategy for greenhouse gas reduction. These are: cost reduction; technical assistance and training; and information dissemination and transnational research collaboration.
For these commitments to be implemented, parties will require confidence that other beneficiaries under the Convention are not cheating. Procedures must be established to monitor and to verify compliance with convention commitments along with mechanisms to resolve disputes and to enforce compliance.
Transferral of financial resources and technologies on a scale envisaged in this study would transform North-South political-economic relations. I conclude by asking whether 'geoecological' issues such as climate change may strengthen the South's bargaining position in its geopolitical and geoeconomic relationships with the North. My answer to this question is only a qualified 'possibly'. Nonetheless a global greenhouse regime may succeed for three reasons:
1 the likelihood of continued technological innovation and associated reduction in the cost of emissions abatement;
2 the contribution of science on comprehension of the greenhouse effect;
3 the influence of social movements on governmental policy.
The language of the Convention implies - although it is nowhere specifically stated - that the commitment of parties to the Convention should encompass the costs of actually reducing greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries. (As developing countries carefully avoided committing themselves to abatement at this stage, they did not obtain a precise matching commitment from the developed world to fund their abatement costs but only vague statements of intention; see Chapter 1.)
A variety of conditions on providing or accepting financial assistance to abate greenhouse emissions or to ameliorate the impacts of climate change have been advanced. These include the possibility that donors will tie the aid to greenhouse abatement activities and/or require that recipients reform their energy prices and institutional structures; and on the part of possible recipients, that acceptance of such aid in no way infringes on the exercise of national sovereignty in determining the best use of development assistance and that its provision in no way reduces existing flows of official development assistance.
Some analysts have argued that transfers to the South ought not to be for any purpose. Michael Grubb, for example, suggests that the transfer should only be convertible into provision of technical assistance and equipment needed to abate greenhouse gas emissions, and not cash. Conversely, the Group of 77 have argued that funds provided for incremental abatement costs 'will be to a great extent of a compensatory nature.'
There are strong arguments that compensatory payments should be linked closely with greenhouse gas reduction activities. Most important, the resource transfer calculated in Chapters 5 and 6 was based on an obligation-topay index applied to marginal carbon abatement cost curves. This estimate did not define marginal benefits of avoiding greenhouse gas induced climate change. Thus, it does not represent an estimate of compensation that the North might owe the South for having pre-empted atmospheric space or for climate change induced damages.
In practical terms, it is also impossible to calculating monetary values for compensation. There are other advantages to providing compensation in the same dimension as the damages imposed by climate change. An in-kind approach makes explicit the nature of the international transaction. It thereby avoids any connotations of a buy-off of recipient elites.
From a pragmatic perspective, technology transfers financed by funds placed at the disposal of developing countries would increase economies of scale in supplier countries, thereby reducing the cost of supplying the aid in the first place. Linking compensation to specific uses may also help to circumvent elite corruption in recipient countries. It could also increase political support in donor countries.
However, linking resource usage reaches its limits when dealing with the most vulnerable states where urgent local development priorities require that resources be applied across a variety of economic and welfare projects, not limited to greenhouse projects. The most advanced expression of this nonlinkage is the proposal for an insurance fund for the most-affected island and coastal states as outlined in Chapter 7. Some mix of compensatory and linkedcompensatory resource transfer therefore seems inevitable.
Other conditions that might be placed on the transfers studied above include sectoral policies aimed at reforming energy prices or institutional arrangements in a recipient country. In China, for example, coal prices bear little relationship to supply and demand. In the Soviet Union, subsidized natural gas prices foster a high rate of leakage of methane out of transmission pipes. Conditions related to project self-financing by the recipient state, to environmental performance, and to expanding the role of the private sector (including permitting foreign investment in abatement activities) might also be included by donors. If financial and resource efficiencies are to improve in developing country energy utilities, many deep-seated causes of poor institutional performance must be rectified, including: overstaffing; inappropriate skill mixes; shortages of middle level and technical staff; low wages; rigid and politicized hiring and firing practices; political interference, graft and corruption in procurement and billing activities; and inadequate training facilities.
As international energy expert Russell deLucia puts it, 'The primary problems are associated with institutional matters and market structure,' not technology or know-how. In short, the energy sector in developing countries is often so irrational and inefficient that donors will be very reluctant to provide substantial technical or financial assistance unless prices are revised upward to reflect cost, and energy utilities are privatized.
Developing countries assert strongly that they will not accept greenhouse-abatement financial assistance unless such transfers add to rather than substitute for current official development assistance (ODA) flows. The ODA recipients are concerned that existing ODA will be diverted from local development priorities to global environmental concerns, to redress problems created by the donor countries in the first place. They also hold that it is impossible to distinguish between development projects that benefit only their own country, and those that damage or restore only the global environmental protection.
'Additionality', however, is a deceptively simple word. ODA flows fluctuate from year to year in most donor budgets; some donor countries have announced a gradual increase in ODA up to about 1 per cent of annual GNP; others are allowing their ODA to slide to even lower levels. There is no simple (or even complicated) way to ascertain what would have happened to ODA if donors do not fund greenhouse projects in recipient countries. Furthermore, many of these projects are justified in traditional developmental terms with or without consideration of global environmental concerns of the donors. The issue is largely symbolic, therefore, with the United States declaring in 1991 that its contribution to one important mechanism for greenhouse funding, the Global Environment Facility, comes from existing ODA flows on the one hand; and Norway creating a new budget line separate from existing ODA to fund the Facility on the other.
Defusing this issue requires two things to happen. First, overall ODA levels (minus identifiable greenhouse-related aid) should not fall but rather should remain constant or increase. Second, greenhouse-related projects in China, India and elsewhere (especially those funded by the GEF) should deliver enough developmental benefits to allay fears that greenhouse-related projects are an environmental diversion that benefit only the donor states.
Countries like China have also insisted that they will only participate in a Climate Change Convention that does not impinge on their national sovereignty. This stipulation presumably includes retaining control over setting of priorities for the use of external assistance in domestic development projects.
Finally, donor countries may insist on using bilateral rather than multilateral aid mechanisms to transfer greenhouse abatement assistance. In part, this preference would arise from the sheer scale of the transfers discussed above that would exceed the total current United Nations budget and fears that a bloated, inefficient international bureaucracy could not hope to meet the challenge in a timely fashion. Again in part, it would follow from the pursuit of narrower national interests in tying the aid to their own suppliers of greenhouse abatement goods and services as in traditional bilateral aid relationships. In so far as greenhouse projects are funded multilaterally, donor countries prefer the World Bank's Global Environment Facility rather than setting up a new mechanism for climate change (as suggested by China). Developing countries have objected strongly to the nonrepresentative and World Bank dominated decision-making system at the Facility. Given the strong statement in the Convention on reforming the GEF (see Chapter 1), it seems inevitable that either the South must be allowed to participate in the decision-making at GEF on an equal basis, or bilateral funding will dominate the global climate change arena.
There is little dispute that technology transfer from the technologically powerful to the technologically deficient countries will require major expenditure by the North. Unless this transfer is achieved, there is little chance that the South can abate to ecologically acceptable levels as defined in Chapter 5. Technology transfer refers to human- and paper-embodied knowledge (such as operating procedures and manuals), known as technique, as well as knowledge embodied in physical equipment and plant.
Although the chorus of consensus is deafening on this score, the terms of the transfer have been a major sticking point in negotiations over climate change. Issues such as intellectual property, the role of transnational corporations, and the investment climate in recipient countries have all been hotly disputed. Before treating these issues, however, this section outlines two qualifications as to the desirability of large-scale technology transfer to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Some influential environmentalists have argued that current patterns of political and economic power between and within states virtually preclude any significant progress toward greenhouse gas reductions via resource and technology transfer. Patrick McCully, for example, argues that a massive influx of new aid would exacerbate the plight of the impoverished majority rather than achieve greenhouse gas reductions. The history of aid, he contends, is one of corruption, failed projects, waste, neocolonial control, and increased debt and dependency. He expects that a climate fund, whether a new entity - as called for by China - or administered by the World Bank's Global Environment Facility - as called for by the OECD countries and so designated in the Convention as an interim measure - will behave no differently to existing aid agencies. He cites Ian Smillie of Intermediate Technology in London to the effect that energy aid in the 1970s left a legacy of 'windmills that didn't turn, solar water heaters that wouldn't heat, and biogas experiments that were full of hot air before they started.
Greenhouse gas abatement projects, in McCully's view, are just one more of a long list of development fads that employ mostly first world, hit-and-run consultants who increase the South's technological dependency on the North. Sinking billions of dollars into greenhouse aid would create a perpetual technological dependency machine.
I will not take issue here with McCully's critique of aid nor whether social relations which block technology adoption in many developing societies must be realigned before much can be achieved by way of aid-supported development. Rather, I will analyse what could happen if nothing is done, as McCully seems to suggest.
In Figure 14.1, I show two IPCC emission curves, and the permitted (postreduction) emission trajectories developed from the efficiency scenario for the world and the South (see Chapter 5) The South's projected emissions would exceed the IPCC case E global permitted total in about 2100 (at 1.6 gigatonnes of carbon) if the status quo in 2030 is simply extrapolated. It already exceeds the global permitted emissions in IPCC case F (at 1.9 gigatonnes of carbon).
Left to itself, therefore, the South eventually exceeds the global permitted total that is defined in relation to putative acceptable rates of ecological damage associated with climate change induced by emission of greenhouse gases (see Chapter 5). In short, the rest of the world can't afford to leave the South to its own devices. 'Do nothing' is not a viable option, however great the obstacles to change in the South or in North-South relations.
Do more but differently
Martin Bell of the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex University has levelled a more penetrating criticism against the notion of massive technology transfer to reduce greenhouse gases in the South. He notes that energy efficiency (and related carbon abatement) is obtained from pervasive, non-energy-saving technical change throughout an economy. 'lt is therefore impossible,' he avers, 'to identify any distinct category of "CO2 emission reducing technology" which might be the focus for new initiatives concerned with international technology transfer.'
Figure 14.1 Projected South emissions vs IPCC and study world totals
Obviously a technology transfer fund could focus on major 'energy saving' technologies, but that approach neglects many technologies and techniques with as much or more carbon-abatement potential. That is, the transfer of 'greenhouse' technologies is not likely to be blocked only by political and economic barriers. Transferring 'greenhouse' technology alone would achieve far less abatement than is desirable and achievable on economic and ecological grounds.
Bell argues that a more broad-ranging approach is needed that accounts for a whole spectrum of technology used by developing countries. Transfer should encompass not merely know-how (the construction and operation of transferred plant and equipment) and know-why (the research, development, design, demonstration and deployment of technology). It should also include the techniques of incremental learning involved in fine-tuning existing plant and equipment, and in managing the organizational changes that foster such learning. The very notion of technology transfer therefore needs to be recast and the content of the phrase expanded and deepened.
This emphasis on the organizational aspects of technology transfer places the onus for realizing the potential benefits primarily on the recipient countries. Nit Chantramonklasri, for example, found that Thai firms differed greatly in their internal technological capabilities, and that technologically innovative firms were both market competitive and more energy efficient.
The incremental learning and managerial capabilities that occur after technology transfer are as or more important to increasing organizational capability than transferral of skills during a discrete project. This on-going learning process, however, requires managerial effort and allocation of scarce skilled staff and time. As Sanjaya Lall states, every new application of a given technology requires adaptive engineering work. In contexts where policies motivate such organizational learning, Bell argues that donors should fund transnational corporations to transfer to developing countries the managerial and engineering techniques required to learn incrementally and continuously. The resultant human assets are expensive, invisible, mobile, enduring, scarce and therefore extremely valuable in most developing countries.
Organizational innovation, however, also requires a favourable macroeconomic structure. Thus, Frances Stewart argues that there is nothing inevitable about the undesirable dependency fostered by current modes of technology transfer. On the contrary - faulty macroeconomic policies and resultant malign decision-making incentives that face organizations in many developing countries explain the South's inability to become technologically self-reliant rather than the problems associated with transfer per se. Pervasive factors that are determined at a macroeconomic level often thwart micro-level technological changes. Such obstacles include distorted energy prices; regulated fuel supplies; capital scarcities; uncompetitive markets; government procurement policies; stagnant scientific and technological infrastructure; protectionism; low investment in education; and lack of information programmes to overcome market failures.
These considerations imply that transferring only the latest energy efficiency technologies in core energy transformation systems used in industry or the energy sector will result in much less abatement than is possible. It is also pointless to transfer state-of-the-art plant if it is operated as poorly as are many productive enterprises in the developing world. Rather, human and organizational resources must be developed first to improve capacity factors and product quality of existing plant in all sectors of the economy. These same human capabilities can ensure that transferred technology is adapted to operate at high efficiency rather than reverting to past practices. Importantly, much of the technology for controlling greenhouse gas emissions is already in the public domain and often already accessible to developing countries. Investing in human resources that enhance technological and managerial capacity is particularly attractive because the required training is often relatively cheap, entails little or no capital expenditure, and often yields economic and resource-saving benefits almost immediately.
This emphasis on building endogenous, self-reliant technological capabilities does not condemn the South always to lag behind the technological frontier of the latest hardware. Instead, it responds to two imperatives that will otherwise overwhelm the ability of any plausible transfer of narrowly defined technology to contribute meaningfully to greenhouse gas reductions in the South.
First, the vast demographic transition of the South's population growth combined with immense urbanization implies a primary reliance on informal, self-help development. Only an enormous proliferation of local technological research and development institutions can generate and deliver sufficient adapted, appropriate technology to end users. Without this local capability, environmentally benign technological alternatives will often not fulfil local needs and will not attract local users. Foreign technology can only supplement and never substitute for local technological capabilities that support the modernization process.
Second, developing countries confront the likelihood of a 'green' technological revolution in North in bioengineering, waste control, recycling, and product and process engineering early in the twenty-first century. This reformation will be as epochal as were steam motive power, electrical and then electro-mechanical technology, and electronics in their time. The green 'techno-economic' paradigm is driven by the need to preserve, conserve and restore ecosystems at local, national, regional and global levels. Consequent technological innovation in the North may devalue many of the traditional commodity exports and current manufacturing strengths of the developing countries (most notably, of the fossil fuel exporters).
Leaders in developing countries must be alert therefore to the opportunities that arise in a greenhouse world to obtain the best terms for technology transfer. To this end, they must nurture a highly receptive local environment to gain the most benefit from this transfer. Vendors of carbon abatement services, for example, could link their services to offsetting transfers of techniques and technology by buyers of abatement.
A judicious and careful blend of technology transfer from abroad combined with policies aimed at stimulating the virtuous circle of local technological development and competitiveness are essential to avoid the vicious circle of technological dependency and stagnation. A multi-faceted greenhouse technology transfer strategy will address at least three priorities, namely, reducing the cost of transferred technology; technical assistance and training; and information dissemination and technological collaboration.
Two major determinants of the cost of transferred technology to developing countries are the rate of local and foreign innovation on the one hand, and whether the importing state is informed so as to enter bargaining on an equal footing with technology suppliers.
Many of the technological needs of developing countries - especially in the rural and urban-informal sectors - are poorly served by foreign technology suppliers. Indigenous centres of scientific and technological research are critical to expand the supply and reduce the cost of generating new technology and adapting imported technology that fulfils local needs. Demonstration programmes are badly needed that address the technical as well as market and non-market barriers to successful technological development in developing countries. Donor support for indigenous research centres and demonstration programmes should be expanded greatly to redress the imbalance in current research foci on technological needs that emanate from the industrial North rather than the modernizing South.
Transnational corporations are very important agents of technology transfer to developing countries. Aid/technology recipients will need to reexamine their traditional technology import policies to stimulate the corporate conduit of technology flows, including reforms of pricing controls, taxes, income repatriation policies, more liberal licensing arrangements, and less stringent ownership limits in joint ventures. Developing countries badly need to increase their flexibility to deal with transnational corporations if they are to 'stay in the loop' of the international technology alliances. Such strategic corporate alliances to develop new technology will likely predominate in the first wave of the greenhouse-driven technological revolution.
The system of creating and protecting intellectual property rights is closely related to the cost of technology generation and imports in developing countries. It is also a vexed issue in the GATT and UNCTAD fore that is unresolved in relation to possible technology transfer protocols in the Climate Change Convention. The jury is still out as to the net costs and benefits of strengthening intellectual property rights in developing countries. In all probability, there will be big winners (some of the technologically developed and technology exporting developing countries might gain substantially) and big losers (countries with absent or weak domestic scientific and technological infrastructure could pay more for technology imports and reap little in return).
A consensus on this issue may prove to be a precondition for implementing the Climate Change Convention. Developing countries have demanded that environmentally sound technology be transferred to them on a concessional and preferential basis and that patents be transferred on a non-commercial basis. But developing countries need not wait until this global standoff ends before obtaining more technology from transnational corporations involved in greenhouse projects. South Korea, for example, had extensive licensing arrangements at the same time concurrently with a loose intellectual property regime. Its electric utility also used 'turn-key' plant contracts to unpackage skills and to train its own engineers initially in know-how skills and later in know-why skills.
Technical assistance and training
Along the lines of the latter 'trick of the trade', Martin Bell has proposed that donors direct new resources to offset the costs of developing human and organizational capabilities to generate and manage technological change. Transnational companies already participate in such transfers provided they recover their costs. Driven by international competition, there appear to be few proprietary barriers to companies transferring such skills, even in 'state ofthe-art 'technologies. To support this skills transfer, donors would need to accept longer time horizons and invest in long running training programmes rather than with traditional, discrete aid projects.
Information dissemination and transnational collaboration
Donors should also support information dissemination programmes that serve energy efficiency programmes of governments and non-governmental agencies. Relatedly, increased scientific work on climate change monitoring and analysis should be supported in the South. Independent scientific and research communities should be strengthened in developing countries if their leaders are to negotiate in an informed fashion on an equal footing with their counterparts from wealthier societies. Such information can rectify the bargaining deficiencies of importing governments as well as facilitate collaboration between autonomous loci of research and development activity within the South. South-South networks of energy utilities and non-governmental networks of scientists and technologists concerned with energy efficiency should be fostered to hasten the pace of technological development and diffusion.
The transport sector exemplifies the need for an expanded role for government as well as South-South collaboration. Travel, car ownership, and freight are growing faster than income in all developing countries. Greenhouse emissions from transport systems are determined by population growth, travel and freight per person, and greenhouse emissions per passenger- and tonne-kilometre. These latter items are largely determined by economic choices which are constrained in the short run by existing settlement patterns, activities, and transportation infrastructure. The ability to design efficient cities and transport infrastructure plus the youthful vintage of vehicular stocks make it possible to combine big increases in transport services with advanced technologies for greenhouse friendly transport systems.
In poor countries, walking and animal powered carts are the main modes of transport for most people. As incomes rise, bicycles, motorcycles, light three-wheeled and various forms of utility and van-based public transport systems emerge. Due to the small number of privately owned light vehicles in developing countries, the combined total of the carbon emissions from fossil fuel used in transport in South and East Asia (excluding Japan), China, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East amounts to about 18 per cent of the world's transport sector carbon emissions.) By 2025, however, one projection shows that their transport emissions will have increased from their current 0.3 gigatonne per year (about 20 per cent of the world total) to about 0.5-0.8 gigatonne of carbon as CO2, or between 30 and 40 per cent of the world's transport emissions. Reducing this emission by 25 per cent by 2025 would save between 10 and 20 per cent of the South's projected permitted emission in that year in this study (see Figure 14.1).
Even in the wealthy countries, mere improvements in new vehicle efficiency will not by themselves significantly reduce overall carbon dioxide emissions from the transport sector if growth in overall use continues on current trends. Changes in modal balance, urban density, and regulation and market policy instruments will all have to be used to curb the transport sector's greenhouse contribution.
In developing countries, the bulk of the passenger and freight transport is on off-road and rural tracks on traditional transport systems. Policy instruments and technologies transferred from the wealthy to the poorest countries may be of some use in cities (as in Singapore and Hong Kong) but have little bearing on the central transport problems. There is an urgent need for these countries to collaborate in research and development of these traditional transport systems. Wealthy societies have little recent experience and existing technological capability relevant to these issues. A bullock cart, for example, has evolved over thousands of years to operate in rough terrain. Local technicians used immediately available materials to make and maintain the carts. Adding pneumatic tyres or creating hard roads without redesigning the whole cart can greatly reduce its resilience and lifetime. Improving a bullock cart and upgrading rural roads is far more complicated than designing a high technology motor vehicle from advanced materials to run in a predictable highway system.
Three priorities for collaboration and information dissemination in the transport sector are:
1 increased technical and financial assistance for producing intermediate means of transport, especially for human and animal-powered freight;)
2 establishing local organizational capabilities to construct, maintain, and rehabilitate roads;
3 creating low-cost, rural-urban transport links.
So far, I have reviewed the critical issues arising from the Convention that pertain to the realization of mutual reciprocity which is at the heart of the implicit North-South contract in the treaty. In the next section, we move from norms of behaviour to procedures relating to implementation and regulation of behaviour of parties to the Convention.
All institutions based on international cooperation face free riding by signatories who obtain the benefits of an international agreement while avoiding the costs by non-compliance. The likelihood that signatories to a Climate Change Convention might try to avoid meeting their commitments poses the question of monitoring, verification and enforcement of compliance.
Monitoring and verification
Analysts concur that a multi-gas agreement will be much harder to monitor and likely impossible to verify. Taxes, traceable permits, and abatement services all require monitoring to ensure that the terms and conditions of the scheme to fulfil commitments under a Climate Change Convention are being met. Monitoring, however, must be scientifically credible. Monitoring of nonCO2 greenhouse gases such as methane from paddy fields or from diverse, mobile point sources such as cattle is not feasible due to the uncertainty as to emission rates. While rice production is relatively well known, methane emissions vary greatly with soil type, nutrients, light, and temperature. Estimates for rice paddy in Spain and Italy vary by more than 100 per cent.
Also, sinks for and terrestrial reservoirs of greenhouse gases must also be monitored, both to ensure that sinks endowed as property rights are maintained, and to verify any claims made as to additional carbon fixation. Yet rates of re- and de-forestation are highly contentious, and satellite-based remote sensing cannot yet provide adequate monitoring and verification of biotic carbon sinks. The deforestation rate in Brazil, for example, is highly controversial (estimates range by a factor of five). Similar arguments apply to other greenhouse gases such as nitrous oxide.
For all these reasons, therefore, I conclude that it is only meaningful to cost monitoring and verification of carbon dioxide released from fossil fuels at the outset of the implementation of the Convention.
In Chapter 5, however, I assumed that property rights are created in proportion to national carbon sinks that are the basis of determining permissible emissions in future years. It is possible to monitor and verify the status of the forest stocks and thus carbon reservoirs in those forests although it is not feasible to track the carbon flows to and from them. A monitoring system is feasible that would use remote sensing and in situ, ground-based validation to determine the fulfilment of commitments made to maintain or to expand these reservoirs. I assume, therefore, that biotic stocks of carbon will be included eventually under a protocol for monitoring and verification, although not the carbon emissions from these sources.
Verification is the international control of compliance with agreed measures and behaviour by means of tools and procedures agreed upon in an instrument of international law - for example, a protocol on compliance to a Climate Change Convention. Verification can be defined as having different densities depending upon the level of distrust between parties to the agreement and the technical difficulty of obtaining information with an adequate level of confidence on the other.
I assume that the verification procedures that are adopted in a verification protocol will be multilateral rather than bilateral in implementation (although they may rely heavily on national/unilateral monitoring and verification capabilities such as satellite systems). Assuming that all parties will be accorded equal treatment in the protocol, it is reasonable to suppose that all parties also will be subject to monitoring and verification by an implementing organization established under the Convention.
Nature of emission sources
Anthropogenic sources of CO2 vary greatly with respect to characteristics that affect greatly their suitability for monitoring and verification. Some are stationary, emit copiously and continuously, and are suitable for direct, quantified monitoring. Power stations and large factories exemplify this type of emitter. Other sources are stationary and numerous but only emit intermittently very small quantities of gas. Fireplaces and open fires are typical. There are also very many mobile point sources that are sporadic emitters such as vehicles and livestock. Finally, there are very diffuse sources such as non-commercial fuels based on animal wastes.
Only the first category is suitable to direct monitoring and verification. There are, for example, well-developed techniques for determining gaseous emissions such as ultrasonic instruments in the off gas stack which measures the effluent density and velocity and thereby volume to within 3-5 per cent accuracy. The other sources all exhibit characteristics that would make information collection enormously onerous due to their number or the lack of observational methods.
Good statistics are available for energy production and consumption balances for most countries. However, to convert these energy data to emissions on an international basis, energy balances must be made more complete and accurate, carbon content and conversion into emissions must be made more precise, and statistics must be collected according to consistent and compatible ground rules. The parties to the Convention must agree on the types of data, required disaggregation and detail, and common reporting rules for national reports. Fortunately, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has already produced a set of guidelines of this nature, which are being refined and updated. In particular, rules are needed to determine whether emissions are based on energy production or consumption. The latter is particularly problematic because of the difficulty of ascertaining conversion losses.
The implementing organization must be able to verify the accuracy of data such as ash content of coal or oxidation rates of conversion in power plants, etc. It cannot hope to collect the requisite data independently but only to analyse the data supplied by parties to the convention by cross-checking the reported fuel cycles and conversion to emissions with 'spot' cheeks including on-site visits to 'cheek the books' of very large, stationary emitters. In most nations, however, the latter checks would only cover 1-5 per cent of a given country's emissions. It is crucial to an effective greenhouse regime that verification be conducted routinely by subjecting national reports to independent, critical scrutiny and assessment, treated as an expert technical rather than political process.
A verification system that combines data analysis with spot checks would likely enable the implementing organization to detect an emission infringement of the Convention by a party that deviates 10 per cent or more from the party's commitments. Similarly, a verification system that uses remote satellite and air-based sensing with local inspections should be able to detect departures from declarations to maintain or to expand biotic carbon pools such as forest reserves, to within a five per cent deviation from commitment. (The verification protocol would have to define the ground resolution at which it requires monitoring, the calibration and interpretational rules to be followed, and the density of selective observation needed for confidence to exist that parties are complying with their commitments.)
The cost of the verification system will consist of the direct costs of the implementing organization engaged in checking the annual national reports of compliance and field inspections, plus the indirect costs of obtaining independent sources of information needed to cross-check national claims about emissions or the status of carbon stocks or sinks.
It is reasonable to assume that the implementing organization will not have to meet the capital or direct operating costs of remote sensing satellites. Rather, these costs will be covered in the budgets of the space agencies in Europe, Japan, and the United States which already pay for the huge cost of earth-observing satellites.
By way of comparison, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards department currently consists of 450 persons including 190 field inspectors. The implementing organization for verifying a Climate Change Convention would probably require about twice as many staff given the much larger number of facilities to be visited and much broader international scope of the verification system compared with that applied in the nuclear field.
In 1987 the IAEA safeguards applied to about 230 tonnes of plutonium, 30,000 tonnes of enriched uranium, and 50,000 tonnes of depleted uranium, thorium or uranium. In 1983, the IAEA safeguards agreements applied to a total of 881 installations such as power reactors and other fuel cycle facilities. A carbon monitoring system will apply to billions of tonnes of fuels, and millions of hectares of forest at hundreds of thousands of sites a much bigger task.
The safeguards surveillance and materials balance inspectorate system for the sensitive nuclear materials run by the IAEA costs about US$30 million per year. The cost of a system that verifies compliance with a Climate Change Convention might therefore approach $100 million per year. It is doubtful that more than three times the IAEA's budget would be provided to the implementing organization at a time when the IAEA already finds it difficult to obtain funds for such a politically sensitive field of concern to great powers.
The source of the funds for the implementing organization and its activities would either be charges that follow the UN scale of payments or a special formula similar to that developed by the IAEA in 1971 (and later revised) that levies states on a per capita income basis (with a ceiling) and a cap on contributions by poor states.
Verification or confidence building?
The previous sections have argued that the greenhouse arena is characterized by complexity due to multiple gases (unless limited to carbon dioxide); an effectively infinite number of point and mobile pollution sources; mostly national information on energy use which is subject to distortion, withholding, and differing reliability, varying analytical methods, and underlying assumptions; reliance on extrapolation from existing energy statistics rather than new monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions; and a long lead time before an effective monitoring system and verification could be created.
In Chapter 5, I analysed three mechanisms to achieve agreed reductions and to fund the South's 'excess' incremental abatement costs: carbon taxes, traceable permits, and trade in abatement services. Each of these mechanisms poses different demands on a verification system. A carbon tax system, for example, requires that a baseline emission be set and updated each year to confirm that states are reducing emissions to agreed targets. A traceable permit system within an overall global emissions target demands that trading be monitored continuously in addition to establishing national emissions relative to an agreed baseline. Trade in abatement services requires that claimed reductions by one country actually have been achieved in another country. Monitoring compliance of such claims could be politically difficult for an international monitoring system.
In all three cases, achieving a high degree of certainty seems to require an extensive monitoring system and bureaucracy. Yet most states do not (yet) perceive the stakes in the greenhouse regime to demand monitoring and verification like that imposed on flows of special nuclear materials. Only a small international bureaucracy based on national reports and data cross-checking seems politically feasible at this time.
The history of international arms control and environmental agreements offers six important lessons for a greenhouse verification system. First, environmental costs and benefits do not accrue as fast as the costs and benefits of abandoning arms control agreements and the stakes are not perceived as central to the immediate security of the state nor (usually) to regime survival in that state. States may therefore be less demanding of a verification system for environmental agreements than in other domains. Moreover, when states coordinate because of self-interest, there is little reason to defect or cheat and little or no verification or enforcement is needed. If the costs of carbon abatement are as low as suggested in the studies reported in this book - at least for the first 20 per cent reduction and therefore the first decade or two of an agreement - then verification measures are needed mostly to build confidence in the regime rather than to raise the question of non-compliance and enforcement.
Second, it is inevitable and proper that enforcement responsibility will be lodged primarily at the same level as implementation responsibility, that is, within nation states. The bulk of the monitoring and verification should be conducted at this level, rather than internationally.
Third, most military control regimes were created in confrontational contexts under conditions of secrecy and with little or no participation. These characteristics led to many problems of implementation for arms control agreements. This experience implies that a greenhouse regime should strive for maximal transparency and openness, including a strong role for non-governmental organizations in monitoring compliance.
Fourth, some states have skillfully used verification issues in the past to block international agreements (most notoriously, the United States with regard to the Complete Test Ban Treaty). If the analysis in previous sections is correct, then this problem should not arise in the greenhouse gas arena.
Fifth, there are important precedents for monitoring and verifying international atmospheric agreements, at the regional level in Europe, and globally in ozone depletion convention. This experience should provide some good signposts for the greenhouse regime, especially for regional (in Europe) and subregional greenhouse gas agreements (in Northeast Asia) that could be developed to supplement a global greenhouse regime.
Sixth, the history of international monitoring and inspection of nuclear power provides some useful lessons. The IAEA's history suggests that an international secretariat should be created to audit national reports and ensure that they are bona fide, consistent and follow internationally recognized procedures. An independent technical committee could be appointed to define the reporting requirements of states to the parties to a Climate Change Convention. The same technical committee could also explore with states qualitative anomalies (such as refusal to allow an on-site inspection of emission rates or a claimed efficiency improvement) and quantitative discrepancies (such as inconsistencies between national reports and international statistics) that might arise from time to time.
Disputes and enforcement
Article 14 of the Convention states that disputes between parties should be settled by negotiation or by any peaceful means that they care to select, including arbitration by the International Court of Justice, and/or in accordance with procedures yet to be adopted by the parties to the treaty. Thus, the Convention provides little guidance as to what methods of dispute resolution should be incorporated into a protocol. It casts no light at all on the appropriate means of enforcing compliance with treaty commitments.
At a meeting in The Hague in 1989, twenty-four national leaders called for a 'new institutional authority' to set and implement environmental standards. Currently, however, only national institutions can implement standards authoritatively. Moreover, there is no compulsory dispute settlement jurisdiction relating to multilateral environmental regimes. Invariably, agreement by disputants is required before it is submitted to third party adjudication. The major stumbling block had been the socialist bloc rejection, and more recently, US rejection of compulsory third party arbitration.
In relation to disputes involving the failure of developing countries to comply with emission reduction targets, it would likely be highly counterproductive to try to enforce agreed targets by economic sanctions. These would worsen the very technological and economic difficulties that cripple many developing countries' ability to comply. It would also impose substantial costs on states that meet their commitments and thereby reduce the benefits to new signatories considering joining the Convention. Moreover, using the trade system to enforce climate change policies would likely prove to be unmanageable because every product and service that is traded internationally results in greenhouse gas emissions.
Consequently, alternatives to supranational regulation have emerged. States recognize each other's licensing rather than ceding licensing powers to an international authority. Such reciprocal recognition schemes operate in many areas including phytosanitary certificates for exports, shipping oil pollution prevention certificates, marine waste disposal permits, hazardous materials trade, and trade in endangered species. States also harmonize standards and standard-setting laws and procedures, often by adopting models from overseas. (For example, the environmental impact assessment, green labelling and pollution taxes).
Many states have also committed themselves, outside treaties, to providing early warning and notification, for example, with respect to banned chemicals, exchange of standards, or adjustments to trade-controlled items (such as endangered species). Regimes also create transnational networks of lower level 'operational' national officials who short-circuit hierarchical communications across boundaries, or who communicate directly with international organizations that may then reintroduce environmental information at much higher political levels in the same nation state. Such structures can defuse and even prevent disputes arising in the first place.
Non-adversarial techniques have also developed to resolve international disputes from escalating to interstate conflicts. Local legal challenges have been mounted across borders thereby achieving settlement without involving the states themselves. (In Europe and North America, this technique requires that legal systems grant status to foreign parties in local judicial or administrative procedures). The filing of complaints and the launching of infringement hearings are two other techniques that have been used (in the Montreal Protocol and in the European Economic Community, respectively).
Reporting requirements are also an important means of imposing national 'discipline' on treaty parties, especially when combined with international expert auditing and public debate in committees or annual conferences. Such procedures are already well developed in the occupational health and safety agreements administered by the International Labour Organisation. Similar procedures are used by the International Monetary Fund, and multilateral funding agencies also conduct national and sectoral audits as preconditions for or requirements of development loan agreements. Environmental auditing, however, has a weak tradition although the Montreal Protocol requires substantial reporting to permit monitoring of compliance and administration of various aspects of the agreement.
As noted earlier, it seems inevitable that the national reporting requirements of a Climate Change Convention will be the heart of a monitoring and verification system, and the key to effective enforcement through self-regulation. National reporting will the core confidence-building measure that will build widespread commitment to the regime. It can be supplemented by international auditing of the kind referred to above, but such reports (as occurs with the International Energy Agency reports) buttress only the normative power of domestic proponents of fulfilling treaty commitments and have no direct legal connotations.
These measures may be supplemented by other measures that increase the incentives of signatories to comply. Large emitters, for example, can offer to match the abatement of new signatories. They can also threaten to punish offenders by reducing their own abatement by as much or more than that of the defector, thereby reducing the benefits of free riding by increasing the costs of climate change. States can also lock in their own commitments so as to reduce the uncertainty facing potential signatories as to whether they will reap the benefits of reduced climate change.
A global greenhouse regime will take a decade or more to construct. Regional efforts will likely be the building blocks on which a global regime will be built.
In this section, I examine the potential of regional approaches for funding the incremental costs of developing countries. I follow this with a review of the hopeful trend toward sub-regional cooperation on climate change scientific research.
Regional greenhouse trade initiatives
Given the limited past experience with transfer schemes based on carbon taxes, traceable permits, or the sale of abatement services, it is unlikely that they will successfully commence quickly. It is more likely that these schemes will be tested first in national and regional experiments. In this section, l examine the potential for such a scheme in the Asian Pacific region.
In many situations, regional cooperation may be more cost-effective than national initiatives in abating greenhouse emissions due to expansion of available resources of technology and information, economies of scale achieved through trade, and reduction in information and administrative costs. There is no doubt that immense scope exists in the Asia Pacific region for improving energy efficiency and reducing greenhouse emissions. One Asian Development Bank survey (based on 160 energy audits in Thailand, the Philippines, and South Korea) found that energy savings were economically justified in most industry groups.
In Thailand, energy savings of 12-13 per cent were found to be justified except for chemicals and non-metallic products where the potential was much higher. In the Philippines, energy savings of 18 per cent in industry were identified plus another 16 per cent potential by substituting natural gas and biomass for oil. And in Korea, energy savings were found to be 5.5 per cent with big potential in kilns and furnaces and additional potential for cogeneration and district heating.
In Table 14.1, I show the cumulative projected emissions, required reductions, and incremental abatement cost (calculated at the high marginal cost schedule) for four major industrial and three major developing countries in Asia Pacific in 1995, 1995-200415, and 1995-2024/5 as calculated in Chapter 5. The industrial countries have about forty per cent more projected cumulative emissions over the scenario's thirty year period, but are responsible for about three times as much required reduction as the developing countries. Because the industrial countries quickly move to the higher echelons of marginal abatement cost, they also spend much more on abatement than the developing countries over the same period. These figures indicate that markets in traceable permits and abatement services could emerge quickly in the Asia Pacific region as the industrial and developing countries appear to have complementary capabilities and needs that could reduce the cost of abatement in the North while transferring substantial resources to the South.
In Indonesia, for example, the institutional capability to sell abatement services sought by overseas firms or utilities already exists. KONEBA, a quasi-private firm established by firms in the fertilizer sector backed by a World Bank loan, is marketing shared energy savings contracts with firms in the large industrial and commercial sector. KONEBA is also seeking energy efficiency contracts in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Malaysia.
Table 14.1 Asia-Pacific regional carbon abatement services trade potential
|A CO2ff projected emissions, efficiency adjusted scenario (MTC)|
|Developing Asia Pacific|
|B Required reduction, efficiency adjusted scenario (MTC)|
|Developing Asia Pacific|
|C Incremental cost, efficiency adjusted scenario (Million $)|
|Developing Asia Pacific|
Millions of current dollars, not present valued
Part C uses incremental cost calculated with the Nordhaus marginal cost curve
In China, key industries such as iron and steel, aluminum, brick-making, glass and ammonia are very energy inefficient, as are buildings and cooking stoves. One analyst estimates that a 30 per cent reduction in projected energy use can be achieved by 2025. Major increases in energy efficiency will require replacement rather than retrofit of existing and obsolete equipment. Yet China lacks foreign exchange, has unreliable supplies of more efficient fuels such as diesel, operates at small scales of production due to poor transport infrastructure and decentralized economic activity, and accords a low priority to maintenance and repair of equipment that are crucial to energy efficient operations. China has an especially irrational energy price structure that, as the World Bank puts it, appears to be used 'primarily to generate and distribute revenues rather than to influence supply and demand.' China also requires externally funded projects to generate foreign exchange to repay the loans. Projects that increase energy efficiency do so indirectly if they reduce oil use allowing increased oil exports, but crediting the energy efficiency project with the foreign exchange earning will require China to adjust its internal procedures.
These practical obstacles imply that emission abatement programmes in China will have to cast a very wide net in order to address the real constraints on improving energy efficiency and shifting from coal to natural gas. Fortunately, China is one developing country that gives a high priority to energy efficiency. The Energy Conservation Company of the State Energy Investment Corporation spends about $300 million per year to provide project matching funds and technical advice through 156 energy management centres with 5,000 employees at the state and regional levels.
Yet China has limited ability to substitute natural gas for coal. Nuclear power and hydroelectricity are both site-constrained. China already invests about 10 per cent of total public investment in the energy sector into efficiency. The Asian Development Bank is preparing a major loan project to follow up its technical assistance project on energy efficiency in China (funded by Japan and matched by the UN Development Programme).
Projects could be undertaken through existing bilateral and multilateral channels to reorient traditional lending practices. China, for example, purchased cast-off Japanese factories to make highly inefficient appliances such as refrigerators in China - equipment that will require many extra power plants that will cost China much more than it would have to buy factories to make efficient appliances. A compact fluorescent lamp factory provides energy at about one tenth the cost of a new power plant - yet donors find it much easier to package and fund gigawatt size power plants than they do energy efficiency projects.
Greenhouse initiatives at a regional level must be sensitive above all to local conditions. The islands of Asia Pacific, for example, have very different energy economies and needs to those of the big Asian states. The islands are greatly dependent on oil for commercial energy although some also use substantial quantities of fuelwood. One cost-effective and culturally appropriate measure in many of the island microstates will be to engage in coastal reforestation and agro-forestry projects based on indigenous plants of high cultural utility to Pacific islanders.
Regional efforts are also needed to enhance the flow of technology transfer. Regional trade liberalization, for example, may stimulate competition that increases the transfer of energy efficient technology. In Thailand, for example, local refrigerator manufacturers have been locked into using inefficient and obsolete compressors made by a Thai-Australian joint venture that licensed technology from a US firm by high duties and bans on imported compressors. When another firm finally received permission to make a decade-old Japanese compressor, the Thai-Australian joint venture introduced a more recent US compressor. Increased competition thereby improved compressor efficiency in Thailand by 15-20 per cent.
Public and private initiatives to explore the potential for firms and utilities to undertake abatement projects in developing countries of Asia and the Pacific are needed urgently to demonstrate the viability of such activities. A state level utility in Australia, for example, could approach a counterpart in Asia, and then propose to part-fund an abatement project which would be credited to Australia's own national abatement in the Climate Change Convention. The project partners could seek third party private financing, and approach the World Bank/UNDP Global Environment Facility for support. Innovative financing mechanisms such as the Australian utility buying discounted private debt owned by a country like the Philippines could be used to finance the domestic costs of the abatement project.
The Asian Development Bank would act as honest broker, identifying the potential projects, preparing the loan documents, arranging for private cofinancing, and monitoring and evaluating performance. The maxim 'first in, first served' will play powerfully in emerging markets for traceable permits and abatement services.
Potential for sub-regional collaboration
Regional approaches may be attractive and productive for reasons other than the minimizing of cost. Because greenhouse gases are universal on the one hand, and because adjoining countries share common features and interests on the other, a regional programme on climate change may both facilitate the implementation of the Convention and foster regional cooperation. In Northeast Asia, for example, a regional environmental consultative forum is likely to be established in 1993. Initial steps to create this forum became possible in mid-1990 when the Cold War began to thaw rapidly. It will likely encompass climate change issues as well as regional oceans management, resource management, environmental technology research and development, standards, and so on.
Of course, the six nations of Northeast Asia already cooperate on some environmental issues, but mostly on a bilateral basis. The South Korean Forestry Research Institute, for example, is establishing formal cooperative arrangements with its Chinese counterpart in the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The North Korean Academy of Sciences has long cooperated with Chinese institutes. And the Mongolian Academy of Sciences has conducted collaborative research with the Chinese Academy on grasslands ecology and desertification. None of these efforts cover the whole sub-region, however.
The UN Development Programme is the only existing sub-regional cooperative framework that includes all the regional states. It has subregional programmes on transboundary acid rain, clean coal technology, new and renewable sources of energy, and the development of the Tumen River area, all of which are salient to the greenhouse gas issue. But these activities are still at an early stage of development and offer little that contributes directly to regional activity on the greenhouse gas issue.
A sub-regional climate change programme could address a variety of greenhouse related issues. Acid rain fallout, for example, affects carbon emissions/sinks. Acid rain from coal burning is transported from Manchuria and North Korea onto Japan and South Korea; and from Russia onto Mongolia. Methane emissions from the production and use of coal is another possible research priority in Mongolia, and North and South Korea. China has substantial experience in methane monitoring from coal mining and from rice paddy fields, and could provide expertise and share surplus equipment with other countries in the region.
Perhaps the most inclusive, urgent, and long term of all the tasks relates to the need to conduct regional climate modelling in Northeast Asia. All the developing countries in the region lack the basic capability to generate scenarios of climate change impact on which to base adaptation studies and national response strategies which parties to the Convention are obliged to produce. At this time, global circulation models offer poor resolution for Northeast Asia, let alone for a single country. Nations in the region are reduced to relying on qualitative scenarios of climate change with consequent uncertainty as to the range of possible costs and benefits of climate change to which they must respond.
A regional effort to develop a regional climate model is therefore an urgent priority. Such project would nest a regional model within existing global circulation models rather than attempting the extremely costly exercise of building a new global model for use within the region from scratch. The choice of regional climate modelling parameters, the data requirements to validate the model, the interpretation of the model's results, etc. are all items that require a regional rather than a national approach.
The United Nations Development Programme could convene a regional scientific collaboration along these lines that would:
1 create a regional scientific advisory board for this activity;
2 identify a regional network of collaborating institutional and scientific participants
3 convene a planning session to identify the appropriate scientific approach to the various tasks;
4 develop a detailed budget for the work for both short and long term work.
Such joint work could lay the groundwork for a regional climate centre, as has been proposed by the Academy of Sciences in Beijing. A regional climate change centre in Latin America, and a regional scientific network on climate change scientific cooperation in Southeast Asia - both of which are in advanced planning stages - provide two models from other regions that could be drawn upon in Northeast Asia.
Thus far, I have analysed the arrangements for building confidence in the greenhouse regime and the major difficulties pertaining to resource and technology transfer for greenhouse-related activities. In the next section, I explore the extent to which the North-South conflict may affect the ability of parties to the Convention to negotiate meaningful protocols. The North-South stand-off has been institutionalized since 1964 when the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established. Is it really possible to erect a global greenhouse regime in spite of North-South antagonism as to the nature of aid, the terms of trade, and technology transfer? To what extent does a global environmental issue such as climate change portend the emergence of a new organizing principle of interstate relations on a par with geopolitical and geoeconomic concerns? Is geoecology on the international agenda?
The archetype of southern politics - UNCTAD - was built on polarized political blocs organized around adversarial and conflict-prone economic relations between the poor and wealthy states. In the 1980s, however, the unity of the South's Group of 77 (G77) had been severely stressed already by the rise of the newly industrialized countries in Asia which heralded the end of the (third world'. The end of the second Cold War combined with the steady decline of the 'South' es a unified entity may make it easier to de-link old debates from new agendas such as climate change.
Thus, even the concepts of 'South' and 'North-South' conflict may be obsolete and irrelevant in the climate change arena. Indeed, since late 1991, negotiations over climate change have resulted in a fractured and pragmatic set of political axes. Completely new alignments of cooperation and conflict emerged that are still fluid but no longer mirror the old North-South cleavage. Thus, in 1991 Anne Kristin Sydnes identified at least five groups from the 'South' in the climate change negotiations. These were:
1 radical, like-minded activist states (eg Bangladesh and Maldives) which view climate change as a major threat to their national existence;
2 potential, like-minded activist states (eg Mexico) which see climate change as a good way to extract additional concessional aid;
3 energy-consuming, hardliner states (eg Brazil, China, and India) which support more research but object to costly commitments and actions;
4 energy-exporting, hardliner states (OPEC states led by Saudi Arabia and supported by Australia) which object to potential market shrinkage and trade impacts;
5 unpredictable 'transition' states (eg Taiwan, South Korea, and some Eastern European states) which are already ambivalent as to the North-South cleavage given their position in the world economy and international hierarchy of states.
By December 1991, the G77's unity had virtually collapsed at the greenhouse negotiations in Geneva. A breakaway Group of 24 (G24) proposed that developing countries consider acting on greenhouse issues while awaiting action by the OECD. Two other southern strains also emerged in addition to the centrist G24, namely, a group of energy exporters which backed the United States in stalling agreement; and the AOSIS island states which joined the European Community, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in calling for a strong convention. The AOSIS states believed that the dilatory and ideological stance of the hardline, big poor states in G24 jeopardized their chance of obtaining any resources from the OECD. A fourth group of still uncommitted countries emerged, including Argentina and Mexico. These divisions continued up to the signing of the Climate Change Convention in June 1992 and are reflected in its text. It is difficult to believe that the state elites of the G77 can reconstruct their solidarity while negotiating protocols to the Convention now that they have discovered that their interests diverge fundamentally in relation to climate change.
The fragmentation of the South places developing countries in a weak bargaining position on the central issues of financing, technology transfer, and compensation payments that are still to be addressed in the Convention. The greenhouse issue exemplifies a general dilemma that developing countries face in global environmental politics. Global and regional environmental predicaments present them with new demands on scarce resources for regime and national survival as well as new bargaining opportunities with the OECD states. It remains to be seen exactly how southern elites will respond to these pitfalls and opportunities in the greenhouse arena.
On the negative or threatening side of their security, environmental problems could shift the priorities of wealthy trade and aid partners away from political and social stability in the South to global dilemmas of less concern to the southern elites. They also confront new and unruly domestic social movements often aligned transnationally with powerful counterparts in OECD states.
Vulnerable states could launch ideological campaigns against environmental issues in an attempt to wrest the political initiative away from the OECD states in the international arena. Polarization around issues such as climate change between the big, poor states and the big rich states block rather than foster international cooperation. Conflicts at a global and regional level on environmental issues could spill over into geoeconomic and geopolitical dimensions of interstate relations salient to climate change, thereby gridlocking ongoing negotiations.
Big, poor states may also use environmental issues to extract concessions from the OECD states in long-standing geoeconomic and geopolitical arenas. The greenhouse issue is unique in that the South influences a global asset that is greatly valued by the North: Earth's climate. Negotiations to date have been stalled by ideologies transposed from prior North-South conflicts into the greenhouse arena. But the elites of big, poor states have also tried to play a climate destruction card in a slow motion game of global climate change poker.
This strategy may fail, however. As Dallas Burtraw and Michael Toman have explained, most negotiations have two phases. The first phase is the bargaining over terms and content of agreement, which was partly completed at Rio. The second phase now underway is concerned with ratifying and implementing the agreement. 'Any proposed outcome that cannot be credibly implemented in the second phase of the game,' they note, 'cannot be credible in the first phase of the game.
Due to weak administrative and market institutions, states such as India, China, or Brazil may be unable to abate in accordance with global commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions - with or without transfers of resources from the wealthy nations. In addition, poor states are more vulnerable to the economic and social impacts of climate change than wealthy states. For these reasons, it is likely that the leaders of the OECD will be unmoved by implicit threats from the developing countries to destroy the earth's climate system unless the rules of international commerce are reformed.
Ironically, demands by big, poor states for massive resource transfers undermines the credibility of such threats for two reasons. First, it suggests to donors that the problems are so large that aid recipients may not be able to deliver the abatement, even if they receive additional support on a large scale. Second, to the extent that large-scale resource transfer achieved abatement and stimulated development, it would increase the dependency of southern elites on this source of external support. Recipients who defected from the regime would be sawing off one of the branches supporting them. It is not surprising therefore that the elites of the big, poor states are not persuaded that cooperating in the climate change arena helps rather than harms their prospects of staying in power.
A new power game
The potential economic impacts of mitigation and adaptation strategies have elevated environmental concerns from low to high politics, on a par with traditional economic and military preoccupations of the great powers. In contrast to the nuclear arms race, for example, no single state or group of states so predominates in emissions or abatement capability that it can impose an international regime on everyone else. The potential candidate the United States - abdicated from its potential hegemonic role in this regard at Rio by refusing to commit itself to reduction targets. Moreover, unlike the geopolitical and geoeconomic domains of interstate relations, there are as yet no widely accepted ideologies that frame geoecological issues such as climate change.
Consequently, ecological alignments in international relations remain fluid and unpredictable. No single state or group of states can lead or coerce other states to join a greenhouse regime or to build an oppositional grouping. It remains an open question whether governments will construct a meaningful greenhouse gas regime. Faced with this agnostic prognosis, there are three reasons to be optimistic about the medium- and long-term future of a greenhouse regime: technological innovation, the contribution of scientists to elite and popular understanding of climate change issues, and social movements.
Rising energy efficiency is closely associated with technological dynamism, in turn an attribute of competitive firms and economies. Domestic and international competition drives technological innovation that will reduce the cost of greenhouse gas reductions, even at high levels of abatement. Governments can impede or encourage this phenomenon, but they can't stop it in the long run.
Nonetheless, an international climate change agreement that sets the ground rules for investors and states would enhance this phenomenon. Relatedly, bilateral and regional initiatives to demonstrate the technological feasibility and economic attractiveness of greenhouse gas reduction will be an important immediate step toward a greenhouse regime. It is crucial to identify the costs of abatement above the 20-30 per cent level of reduction for which data is available today. Only when the true cost of preserving the world's climate is known will political leaders be able to respond meaningfully.
Scientists will continue to develop a common stock of scientific knowledge on greenhouse issues out of which political elites can forge consensus on policy issues over time. Environmental regimes reflect not only interests, including the influence of domestic stakeholders in international affairs, and legal authority flowing from or ceded to international institutions, but also different world views. The smaller the common understanding and commitment to shared values, the weaker the regime. Thus, consensual knowledge is critical to overcoming the divisions of interest, authority, and belief systems that militate against international agreement.
Political scientist Peter Haas calls this influence 'epistemic' because scientists have been able to shape the images held by politicians and diplomats as to what is at stake in negotiations. He notes that scientists have already provided an ecological basis to international agreements in the Mediterranean Action Plan and the Vienna Convention to stop ozone depletion. There is little doubt that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has and will continue to play exactly this role in goading governments to grapple with the problem of global climate change.
The inability of governments to concur in immediate stringent greenhouse gas reductions under the Convention may stimulate even greater efforts by social movements to address the issue of climate change on a global basis. In the developed countries, these organizations prefigure emerging social trends, are paradoxical in that they represent contradictions in the social order, and often transform the status quo. In many developing countries, non-governmental organizations are among the few wellsprings of social activity that are not dominated by government or administrative structures. Non-governmental organizations are able to pioneer creative and innovative solutions to many problems that stymie governments.
Although local citizen groups are the bedrock of social movements aimed at increasing accountability and participation in decision making of governments, they have invented new ways of communicating across cultural and institutional barriers, both within and between countries. Citizen groups provide a unique interface at the intermediate level of society to link national governmental policies and programmes with local realities via a host of social, economic and political organizations at the provincial and district level, including federations of cooperatives, trade unions and businesses, institutes, and churches. In many developing countries, this level of civil society is weak and must be strengthened to complement efforts to decentralize national public bureaucracies onto local, autonomous governmental institutions.
Another hallmark of environmental politics is the role of strong national, regional, and transnational social movements concerned with environment, development and social justice. The Climate Action Network exemplifies this trend. Established first in Western Europe, North America and Australia, the Network now includes vibrant and self-reliant regional networks in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. The Network marshalls scientific information to present policymakers with strong recommendations and backs up these positions with strong political pressure on national governments and in the course of climate change negotiations.
Many citizen groups are starting carbon abatement projects without waiting for governments to reach international agreement. They are the key to reaching the millions of decision makers and billions of people who must change their daily routines if greenhouse gases are to be reduced to ecologically acceptable levels. They can inspire, complement and (when necessary) circumvent governments to initiate shifts in popular and elite world views. Non-governmental networks increasingly cross national boundaries to generate common positions on issues that divide their respective governments, including the old North-South divide. They can also monitor the implementation of the agreement and trumpet loudly when governments fail to meet their commitments. The production of independent inventories of greenhouse gas emissions is an important contribution in this regard which has already had an impact on international negotiations on climate change.
An important component of an international greenhouse strategy in the short- to medium-run is to increase the participation of non-governmental organizations in private and public international financing of energy and environmental investment projects. The participation of non-governmental organizations in the project cycle of the World Bank's Global Environment Facility (GEF) is an important first step in this direction. In Mexico, the EMIR (Eficientacion Mexicana de Iluminacion Residencial) project began in l 991 when the
International Institute for Energy Conservation working with US scientists and the Comision Federal de Electricidad (the Mexican electricity utility) proposed to the GEF that it lend $10 million to Mexico to improve the efficiency of residential lighting by promoting CF (compact fluorescent) lamps. Over its life, each 16 watt CF lamp that costs $10 to install will save about $33 of electricity and $9 of incandescent lamps, and will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by about one fifth of a tonne of carbon.
Citizen groups are also pushing for a direct role in the funding decisions of multilateral banks. At the NGO Global Forum that was held at the same time as the governmental 1992 Earth Summit, they committed themselves to urge the governments of developed countries to provide adequate, new and additional funds on concessional terms to developing countries, and to ensure that they participate in expenditure decisions and implementation of funded projects to ensure that these resources are well spent.
The creation of an NGO consultative committee by the GEF is an important step in this direction, and one that other organizations, especially the regional developments banks, should emulate. Indeed, by December 1992 citizen groups had produced already a positive, even visionary reform agenda for the GEF.
Market-driven technological innovation, increased popular participation in decision-making, non-governmental mobilization for sustainable development, and the role of the scientific community in policy formation may impel governments to overcome all the barriers to agreement. The first steps toward creating a global greenhouse regime are likely to be small rather than large, bilateral rather than multilateral, and regional rather than global. The transfer of resources is likely to be pragmatic, linked closely to abatement activity, and largely additional to existing aid flows.
Initially, therefore, a greenhouse regime must be flexible enough to demonstrate what is possible rather than to strive for final policy commitments that are simply ignored. The low (or possibly negative) net cost of abatement for the next one or two decades will grant the world a breathing space in which to explore the frontiers of social and technological possibility.
As Ralph Buultjens has written, no other issue has the ability to bring together so many people and nations as does climate change. The negotiations to create a global greenhouse regime are a rare opportunity to form a global coalition of interests that transcends national boundaries and historical antagonisms. It is perhaps the first time in history that the poor in the developing countries have a powerful ally among influential citizen groups and even some governments in the developed world. Thus, Greenpeace International's greenhouse gas scenario uses a development scenario that favours the poor countries rather than simply projecting the unequal global status quo into the future, as did the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
It is conceivable, therefore, that humanity will not march over the precipice of climate change, but will stop, look down, and will head instead toward a sustainable future.
1 See J Berreen and A Meyer ,'A Package Marked "Return to Sender," Some Problems with the Climate Convention,' Network '92, Centre for Our Common Future, Geneva, no. 4, June-July, 1992, p 7
2 Michael Grubb, 'The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets,' International Affairs, volume 66, no. 1,1990, pp 82-83
3 Ghana on behalf of the Group of 77, 'Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technology,' informal paper to Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, 4th session, December 1991, p 5
4 Ibid, p 23
5 Ibid, p 21
6 R deLucia, Sustainable development and rural poverty alleviation: evolving perspectives on needed new thinking and approaches, report to International Federation for Agricultural Development, World Rural Poverty Study, deLucia and Associates, Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 1990, p 2-7
7 G Schramm, 'Issues and Problems in the Power Sectors of Developing Countries,' in UN Department of Technical Cooperation, Report on the Stockholm Initiative on Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development (SEED): Strategies for Implementing Power Sector Efficiency, Stockholm, November 1991, p 58
8 R deLucia and M Lesser, Natural Gas and New Power Generation/Cogeneration Technologies: Implications and Opportunities for Some Developing Countries, paper to the International Association for Energy Economists' 11th Annual International Conference, Caracas, deLucia and Associates, Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 1989, p 7
9 UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Energy Policy Implications of the Climatic Effects of Fossil Fuel Use in the Asia-Pacific Region, ESCAP Symposium, Paper NR/SCE/1, September 1990, Tokyo, December 12,1990, p 122
10 G Porter, 'Reaching a Consensus on Financial Resources,' Network '92, Centre for Our Common Future, Geneva, no. 4, June-July, 1992, p 1
11 O Kjorven and A Kristin Sydnes, Funding for the Global Environment: The Issue of Additionality, Report 4, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway, 1992, provide an excellent analysis of this issue
12 O Kjorven, Facing the Challenge of Change: The World Bank and the Global Environment Facility, Report 3, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway, 1992, pp 6366; A Kristin Sydnes, Developing Countries in Global Climate Negotiations, Report 4, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway, 1991, pp 9-11
13 As stated in People's Republic of China, 'China's Principled Position on Global
Environment Issues,' chapter 5, National Report of the People's Republic of China on Environment and Development, August 1991, pp 53-54
14 See UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, Climate Change and Transnational Corporations: Analysis and Trends, ST/CTC/111, United Nations, New York, 1991
15 P Adams and L Solomon, In the Name of Progress, The Underside of Foreign Aid, Earthscan, London, 1991; and P Adams, Odious Debts, Loose Lending, Corruption and the Third World's Environmental Legacy, Earthscan, London, 1991
16 P McCully, 'The Case Against Climate Aid,' The Ecologist, volume 21, no. 6, November-December 1991, pp 244-257
17 ibid, p 248
18 On the latter issue, see P Hayes, 'Social Structure and Rural Energy Technology,' in Nautilus Inc. ed, Southern Perspectives on the Rural Energy Crisis, Conference of NGOs and the Environment Liaison Centre, Nairobi, 1981, pp 37-48
19 M Bell, Continuing Industrialisation, Climate Change and International Technology Transfer, Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex University, December 1990, pp 75-80
20 N Chantramonklasri, 'The Development of Managerial and Technological Capability in the Developing Countries,' in M Chatterji, ed, Technology Transfer in the Developing Countries, MacMillan, London, 1990, pp 38,44
21 S Lall,'Transnationals and the Third World: Changing Perceptions,' in S Lall, Multinationals, Technology and Exports, St Martin's Press, New York, 1985, p 72
22 M Bell, Continuing Industrialisation, op cit. endnote 19, p 84
23 F Stewart, 'Technological Dependence,' in F Stewart, Technology and Under development, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1977, p 123
24 F Stewart, Macro Policies for Appropriate Technology in Developing Countries, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987
25 G Anandalingham, 'Energy Conservation in the Industrial Sector of Developing Countries,' Energy Policy, August 1985, p 338
26 R Kaplinsky, 'Technology Transfer, Adaptation and Generation: A Framework of Evaluation,' in M Chatterji, ed, Technology Transfer, op cit. endnote 20, pp 2223
27 UNCTAD Secretariat, Technology Policy in the Energy Sector: Issues, Scope and Options for Oeveloping Countries, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, June 1989, p 101
28 A Barnett, 'The Diffusion of Energy Technology in the Rural Areas of Developing Countries: A Synthesis of Recent Experience,' World Development, volume 18, no. 4, pp 539-553; and other essays on specific country or technology experiences in the same issue
29 C Freeman, Technology Policy and Economic Performance, Pinter Publishers, London, 1987, pp 64-79
30 J Granger, Technology and International Relations, W H Freeman, New York, 1979, p 62
31 M Grubb, 'Technology Transfer and the Global Environment: Motives and Mechanisms' (mimeo), Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, September 12,1991
32 A Mody, Staying in the Loop, International Alliances for Sharing Technology, World Bank Discussion Paper 61, World Bank, Washington DC, 1989, p 2
33 C Primo Braga, 'The Developing Country Case For and Against Intellectual Property Protection,' in W Siebek, ed, Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries, World Bank Discussion Paper 112, Washington DC, 1990, pp 68-87
34 L Lunde, The North/South Dimension in Global Greenhouse Politics, Conflicts, Dilemmas, Solutions, Report 9, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway, 1990, p 20
35 P Wexler, International Negotiations on Climate Change, Center for Global Change, University of Maryland, February 1992, p 18
36 Lee Jin-Ioo and .1 N Sharan, Technological Impact of the Public Procurement Policy: The Experience of the Power Plant Sector in the Republic of Korea, Geneva, July 1985, p 14
37 M Bell, Continuing Industrialisation, op cit. endnote 19, p viii
38 L Lunde, Science or Politics in the Global Greenhouse, A Study of the Development Towards Scientific consensus on Climate Change, Report 8, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Lysaker, Norway, 1991, p 127
39 E Parson, The Transport Sector and Global Warming, Paper E-90-11, JFK School of Government, Global Environmental Policy Project, Harvard University, Cambridge 1990, pp vii-viii
40 I Mackenzie and M Walsh, Driving Forces: Motor Vehicle Trends and their Implications for Global Warming, Energy Strategies, and Transportation Planning; World Resources Institute, Washington DC, December 1990, p 38
41 UNCTAD, Policies and Mechanisms for Achieving Sustainable Development, UNCTAD TD/B/1304, Geneva, August 15, 1991, p 25 and Figure 2.1
42 S Barrett, 'Free Rider Deterrence in a Global Warming Treaty', First Draft, London Business School report to Environment Directorate OECD, Paris, May 1991
43 For a general treatment of these issues, see C Russell et al, Enforcing Pollution Control Laws, Resources for the Future, Washington DC, 1986
44 W Fischer et al, A Convention on Greenhouse Gases: Towards the Design of a Verification System, Forschungszentrum Julich GmbH, Julich, Germany, October 1990. The following section draws heavily on this study
45 D Victor, 'Limits of market-based strategies for slowing global warming: The case of traceable permits,'Policy Sciences, volume 24, 1991, p 210
46 ibid, p 207
47 Using satellite data, A Setzer and M Pereira, 'Amazonia Biomass Burnings in 1987 and an Estimate of their Tropospheric Emissions,' Ambio, volume 20, no. 1, February 1991, pp 19-22, estimate Brazil's forestry related CO2 fossil fuel emissions at 1.7 gigatonnes in 1987; World Resourches Institute, World Resources, 1991, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, p 346, estimated the emissions at 1.2 gigatonnes that year; A Agarwal and S Narain, Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism; Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi, 1991, p 4, argue that the figure should be based on a decadal average, not 1987, and should be reduced to between 0.38 gigatonnes. Thus, estimates for an important emitter range differ by a factor of five
48 J Lanchberry et al, Verification and the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Verification Technology Information Centre, London, May 1992, p 25
49 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Estimation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, final report to the IPCC from OECD Experts
Meeting, February 1991, Revised August 1991
50 J Lanchberry et al, Verification and the Framework Convention, op cit. endnote 48
51 A Krass, Verification, How Much is Enough?, Taylor and Francis, London, 1985, p 94
52 B Schiff, International Nuclear Technology Transfer, Dilemmas of Dissemination and Control, Rowman and Allenheld, Totowa, New Jersey, p 113
53 See J Wettestad, 'Verification of International Greenhouse Agreements: A Mismatch between Technical and Political Feasibility,' International Challenges, volume 11, no. 1, 1991, pp 41-47
54 J Ausubel and D Victor, 'Verification of International Environmental Agreements' (mimeo), November 13, 1991, forthcoming in Annual Review of Energy and Environment
55 P Lewis, 'Experiences in Verification - What Can Be Learned for a Greenhouse Gas Convention,' in J Primio and G Stein, eds, A Regime to Control Greenhouse Gases, Forschungszentrum Julich GmbH, Julich, Germany, 1992, p 54
56 M Efinger and H Breitmeier, 'Verifying a Convention on Greenhouse Gases: A Game-Theoretic Approach,' in J Primio and G Stein, eds, A Regime to Control, ibid, p 66
57 D Feldman, 'Some Lessons of the IAEA's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime for Confidence-Building Under a Greenhouse Gas Convention,' in l Primio and G Stein, eds, A Regime to Control, op cit. endnote 55, pp 79-84
58 Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, Climate Change Convention, UN Document A/AC.237/18 (Part Il)/Add.1, May 15, 1992, as revised at the June 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development
59 M Grubb, 'The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets', International Affairs, volume 66, no. 1, 1990, p 76
60 K von Moltke, 'International Trade, Technology Transfer and Climate Change,' in I Mintzer, ed, Confronting Climate Change, Risks, Implications and Responses, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p 302
61 P Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, World Resources Institute, Washington DC, June 1990, pp 25-27
62 T Simmons, 'The IEA Energy Data System,,' in J Primio and G Stein, ed, A Regime to Control, op cit. endnote 55, 119-129; and discussions of IEA in annexes to Pledge and Review Processes: Possible Components of a Climate Convention, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Energy and Environment Program report, August 2, 1991, London
63 S Barrett,'Free Rider Deterrence,' op cit. endnote 42, pp 9-14
64 A Markandya, 'Global Warming, The Economics of Tradeable Permits,' in D Pearce, ed, Blueprint 2, Greening the World Economy, Earthscan, London, pp 59-61
65 Asian Development Bank, Environmental Considerations in Energy Development, ADB, Manila, May 1991, p 96
66 Ibid, p 100; see also J Topping, A Qureshi and S Sherer, Implications of Climate Changefor the Asian Pacific Region, Climate Institute, paper for the AsianPacific Seminar on Climate Change, Nagoya, Japan, January 1991
67 V V Desai, K Nyman, Industrial Energy Conservation: Notes on Three Country Studies, Energy Planning Unit, Asian Development Bank, Manila, circa 1986, pp 2-4
68 M Philips, Energy Conservation Activities in Asia, International Institute for Energy Conservation, Washington DC, September 1990, p 12-13
69 M Levine et al., Energy Efficiency, Developing Nations and Eastern Europe, A Report to the US Working Group on Global Energy Efficiency, April 1991, p 20
70 G Doyle, 'Future Coal Use in the Asia Pacific Region,' in T Siddiqi and D Streets, Responding to the Threat of Global Warming, Options for the Pacific and Asia, Argonne National Laboratory and Environment and Policy Institute, East West Center, Workshop Proceedings, ANL/EAIS/TM-17, June 21, 1989, Honolulu, p 3-21
71 World Bank, China: Socialist Economic Development, Annex E, The Energy Sector, Report 3391-CHA, June 1981, p 11
72 M Philips, Energy conservation activities, op cit. endnote 68, p 3
74 International Institute for Energy Conservation, 'Factory Lost Opportunities Project,' International Institute for Energy Conservation, Asia Regional Office, Bangkok, 1990; see also A Gadgil and G Jannuzzi, Conservation Potential of Compact Fluorescent Lamps in India and Brazil, LBL-27210 Rev., Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley California, September 1990
75 R Thaman, 'Coastal Reforestation and Agro Forestry as Immediate Ameliorative Measures to Address Global Warming and to Promote Sustainable Habitation of Low Lying and Coastal Areas,' in T Siddiqi and D Streets, Responding to the Threat of Global Warming, Options for the Pacific and Asia, Argonne National Laboratory and Environment and Policy Institute, East West Center, Workshop Proceedings, ANL/EAIS/TM-17, June 21, 1989, Honolulu, pp 437-45
76 S Myers et al, Energy Efficiency and Household Electric Appliances in Developing and Newly Industrialized Countries, LBL-29678 UC-350, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley California, December 1990, p 44
77 Asian Development Bank, Environmental Considerations in Energy Development, ADB, Manila, May 1991, p 77
78 B Leach, China and Global Change, Opportunities for Collaboration, US National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1992
79 See 'Development of an Inter-American Institute for Global Change Research,' workshop report, San Juan, Puerto Rico, July 15, 1992; and 'Regional Co-Operative Activities to Support Global Change Research in ASEAN Countries as a Component of START,' October 20, 1992, annex B to 'Minutes of Second Meeting of the Southeast Asian Regional Committee for START (SARCS),' Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, October 9, 1992
80 S Krasner, Structural Conflict, The Third World Against Global Liberalism, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, 1985; M Williams, Third World Cooperation, The Group of 77 in UNCTAD, St Martin's Press, New York, 1991
81 N Harris, The End of the Third World, Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an Ideology, Penguin Books, London, 1986
82 A Kristin Sydnes, Developing Countries, op cit. endnote 12, pp 7-8
83 T Hyder, 'Climate Negotiations: The North/South Perspective,' in I Mintzer, ed, Confronting Climate Change, op cit. endnote 60, p 330
84 Ibid, p 8
85 L Lunde, The North/South Dimension, op cit. endnote 34, p 2
86 Ibid, p 16
87 ECO 'Last Change for Climate Treaty, US Intransigence Still Hinders Negotiations' (New York), April 24, 1992, p 1
88 P Haas, Saving the Mediterranean, The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p xxii; and P Haas, 'Ecological Epistemic Communities and the Protection of Stratospheric Ozone' (mimeo), Political Science Department, University of Massachusetts in Amherst, January 1991, forthcoming in International Organization special issue on Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination
89 A Melucci, Nomads of the Present, Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society, Hutchinson Radius, London, 1989; C Jennett and R Stewart, eds, Politics of the Future, The Role of Social Movements, MacMillan, Melbourne, 1989
90 P Ekins, A New World Order, Grassroots Movements for Global Change, Routledge, London, 1992
91 J Holmbert, Making Development Sustainable, Redefining Institutions, Policy, and Economics, Island Press, Washington DC, 1992, pp 56-7
92 See International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Economic Policies for Sustainable Development in Nepal, report to Asian Development Bank, Khatmandu, May 1990, p 373
93 l Clark, Democratising Development, The Role of Voluntary Organisations, Earthscan, London, 1991; and G Leach and R Mearns, Beyond the Fuelwood Crisis, People. Land and Trees in Africa, Earthscan, London, 1988, pp 100-122
94 N Dubash and M Oppenheimer, 'Modifying the Mandate of Existing Institutions: NGOs, 'in I Mintzer, ed, Confronting Climate Change, op cit. endnote 60, p 275; and Climate Change Network, 'A Force for Change' (mimeo), December 1992
95 See 'Atmosphere and Climate,' chapter 24 of World Resources Institute, World Resources, 1992-1993, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp 345-355; and S Subak et al, National Greenhouse Gas Accounts: Current Anthropogenic Sources and Sinks, Stockholm Environment Institute, Boston, 1992
96 Center for Building Science, 'Mexico Large-Scale Compact Fluorescent Lamp Project' (mimeo), Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, undated
97 'Alternative Non-Governmental Agreement on Climate Change,' in Alternative Treaty-Making Process from the International Non-Government Organization Forum, Rio de Janeiro, June 1-14, 1992, p D-3
98 'NGOs: Conventions Must Drive GEF,' ECO, December 1992, Geneva, p 7
99 R Buultjens, 'Years of Waste, Call for Action,' Earth Summit Times, volume 3, no. 2, August 27, 1992, p 14
100 Stockholm Environment Institute, Towards Global Energy Security: The Next Energy Transition, An Energy Scenario for a Fossil Fuel Free Energy Future, draft report to Greenpeace International, Boston, May 1992; J Parikh, 'IPCC strategies unfair to the South,' Nature, volume 260, December 10, 1992, p 507