![]() | The Global Greenhouse Regime. Who Pays? (UNU, 1993, 382 p.) |
![]() | ![]() | List of contributors |
![]() | ![]() | Preface |
![]() | ![]() | Acknowledgements |
![]() | ![]() | Part I Measuring responsibility |
![]() | ![]() | 1 Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | The greenhouse effect |
![]() | ![]() | What was decided at Rio? |
![]() | ![]() | Protocol negotiating difficulties |
![]() | ![]() | Key issues for climate change negotiations |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 2 The basics of greenhouse gas indices |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Apples and oranges |
![]() | ![]() | Implications |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion: indices do matter |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 3 Assessing emissions: five approaches compared |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Comprehensiveness compared |
![]() | ![]() | Accuracy by category |
![]() | ![]() | Regional and national emissions by source |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix A: Estimates of greenhouse gas emissions |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix B: Calculating cumulative and current emissions |
![]() | ![]() | 4 Who pays (to solve the problem and how much)? |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Indices of allocation: a brief review |
![]() | ![]() | Accountability |
![]() | ![]() | Equity and efficiency |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Part II Resource transfers |
![]() | ![]() | 5 North-South carbon abatement costs |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Climate change convention |
![]() | ![]() | Method overview |
![]() | ![]() | Implications for the South |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | 6 North-South transfer |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Obligation to pay indices |
![]() | ![]() | Redistribution of incremental cost |
![]() | ![]() | Benchmarks |
![]() | ![]() | UN scale of payments |
![]() | ![]() | Financing mechanisms |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | 7 Insuring against sea level rise |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Insurability of losses |
![]() | ![]() | Oil pollution |
![]() | ![]() | Nuclear damage |
![]() | ![]() | Implications |
![]() | ![]() | The insurance scheme proposed by AOSIS |
![]() | ![]() | The Climate Change Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix: Scheme proposed by AOSIS for inclusion in the Climate Change Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Part III National greenhouse gas reduction cost curves |
![]() | ![]() | 8 Integrating ecology and economy in India |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Emissions inventory |
![]() | ![]() | Energy efficiency and fuel substitution |
![]() | ![]() | Emissions and sequestration from forest biomass |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 9 Carbon abatement potential in West Africa |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Long-term energy and carbon emissions scenarios |
![]() | ![]() | Options for rational energy use and carbon conservation |
![]() | ![]() | Economic opportunities for implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Policy issues for the region |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 10 Abatement of carbon dioxide emissions in Brazil |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Brazil energy economy |
![]() | ![]() | Energy subsector analyses |
![]() | ![]() | Changing land-use trends |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 11 Thailand's demand side management initiative: a practical response to global warming |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | End-use energy efficiency policies |
![]() | ![]() | Costs and benefits of the DSM master plan |
![]() | ![]() | CO2 reductions from the DSM Plan |
![]() | ![]() | Why should other developing countries adopt DSM? |
![]() | ![]() | The role of the multilateral development banks |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 12 Carbon abatement in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Energy-environment nexus |
![]() | ![]() | Scenarios for the future |
![]() | ![]() | Country results |
![]() | ![]() | Policy implications |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 13 Greenhouse gas emission abatement in Australia |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Abatement of energy sector emissions |
![]() | ![]() | Economic impact of abatement strategies |
![]() | ![]() | Non-energy emission abatement |
![]() | ![]() | Australia's international role |
![]() | ![]() | Carbon taxes, externalities and other policy instruments |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Part IV Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | 14 Constructing a global greenhouse regime |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Conditionality and additionality |
![]() | ![]() | Technology transfer |
![]() | ![]() | Multi-pronged approach |
![]() | ![]() | Implementation procedures |
![]() | ![]() | Regional building blocks |
![]() | ![]() | North-'South' conflicts |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix: The Climate change convention |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Background |
![]() | ![]() | Climate change convention |
![]() | ![]() | Article 1. Definitions |
![]() | ![]() | Article 2. Objective |
![]() | ![]() | Article 3. Principles |
![]() | ![]() | Article 4 Commitments |
![]() | ![]() | Article 5. Research and systematic observation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 6. Education, training and public awareness |
![]() | ![]() | Article 7. Conference of the Parties |
![]() | ![]() | Article 8. Secretariat |
![]() | ![]() | Article 9. Subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice |
![]() | ![]() | Article 10. Subsidiary Body for implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 11. Financial mechanism |
![]() | ![]() | Article 12. Communication of information related to implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 13. Resolution of questions regarding implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 14. Settlement of disputes |
![]() | ![]() | Article 15. Amendments to the Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Article 16. Adoption and amendment of annexes to the Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Article 17. Protocols |
![]() | ![]() | Article 18. Right to vote |
![]() | ![]() | Article 19. Depositary |
![]() | ![]() | Article 20. Signature |
![]() | ![]() | Article 21. Interim arrangements |
![]() | ![]() | Article 22. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession |
![]() | ![]() | Article 23. Entry into force |
![]() | ![]() | Article 24. Reservations |
![]() | ![]() | Article 25. Withdrawal |
![]() | ![]() | Article 26. Authentic texts |
1. The Convention shall be subject to ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States and by regional economic integration organizations. It shall be open for accession from the day after the date on which the Convention is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.
2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to the Convention without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under the Convention. In the case of such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a Party to the Convention, the organization and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under the Convention. In such cases, the organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under the Convention concurrently.
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by the Convention. These organizations shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.