SUMMARY
This paper examines the social consequences of illicit drug
production, trafficking and consumption, as well as the factors contributing to
the global drug problem. In the light of this analysis, it considers the
potential and limitations of the various possible policy responses - both those
strategies already attempted and those that have as yet only been proposed.
People engage in drug production largely in response to economic
incentives, which legal sanctions have been unable to counteract effectively.
Peasant growers of drug crops can make from 10 to 50 times more in supplying the
illegal drug market than they can in any other agricultural pursuit. Even where
intense eradication efforts have managed to suppress drug production regionally,
the shortfall in the drug market is quickly made up by increased production
elsewhere.
Drug traffickers have used the opportunities presented by the
changing global economic environment to enlarge their activities and expand
their markets. They are highly mobile, employ the latest communications
technology and move their money around the world electronically. The
consequences of this type of increasingly organized trafficking are severe:
systemic crime and violence are becoming endemic in the countries worst
affected, while traffickers efforts to corrupt public officials and
attract new generations to the drug trade help to protect them from attack.
Drug users not only suffer physical, social and economic
problems themselves, but they also impose many direct and indirect costs on
society. Of particular concern is the relationship between drug use and crime,
especially the violent crime associated with crack cocaine.
In addressing the question of what is to be done about the
illicit drug problem, this paper argues that the strategies favoured by the
present approach are not working. Efforts to reduce the supply of drugs through
crop eradication or attacks on drug syndicates have failed because the profits
to be made in the industry are so enormous: the economic incentives are such
that producers and traffickers always spring up to fill any gaps in the market
that result from drug control efforts. Attempts to reduce consumption by
imposing legal sanctions fail to curb drug use among the sections of the
population where the problem is most severe: in order to be effective, such
sanctions require that the user have something of value to lose and a future
worth sacrificing for. Marginalized populations in many consuming countries seem
to be resistant to such strategies.
Increased military involvement in drug control operations has
been relatively unsuccessful where it has been tried. In addition, the adverse
social and political impacts of such a strategy are potentially severe. More
promising approaches involve longer term and more indirect strategies, including
education, community organization and treatment programmes in consuming
countries, and significant progress in rural development in producing countries.
Proposals for the regulation, decriminalization or legalization of drug
consumption and/or production have also been advanced - not to reduce
consumption, but rather to reduce the drug-related crime and violence which
affect society as a whole. This crime is driven largely by the high costs of
drugs and the profits to be made in the drug trade, which in turn derive from
illegality itself.
The paper concludes that no one policy option is going to solve
the illicit drug problem. Given the severity of the current drug crisis,
however, it is to be hoped that a balanced and more thorough examination of the
advantages and limitations of all available policy options will lead to more
imaginative and constructive policy
formulations.