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close this bookScience and Technology in the Transformation of the World (UNU, 1982, 496 p.)
View the document(introduction...)
View the documentForeword
Open this folder and view contentsOpening addresses
Open this folder and view contentsThe gear-box of priorities
Open this folder and view contentsLe nécessaire et le possible dans la formation du mondial (Keynote Address)
Open this folder and view contentsSession I: Science and technology as formative factors of contemporary civilization - from domination to liberation
Open this folder and view contentsSession II: Technology generation and transfer - Transformation alternatives
Open this folder and view contentsSession III: Biology, medicine, and the future of mankind
Open this folder and view contentsSession IV: The control of space and power
Open this folder and view contentsSession V: From intellectual dependence to creativity
View the documentGeneral report on the seminar
View the documentAppendix: Position papers
View the documentParticipants
View the documentFrom the charter of the United Nations University


Edited by
Anouar Abdel-Malek
Gregory Blue
Miroslav Pecujlic

First International Seminar on the Transformation of the World
Belgrade, Yugoslavia, October 1979.


Project on Socio-cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing WORLD (SCA)
Sub-project on the Transformation of the World (TW)

General Editor: Anouar Abdel-Malek, Project Co-ordinator

© The United Nations University, 1982
ISBN 92-808-0339-5

This book was prepared within the framework of the Human and Social Development Programme of the United Nations University. The views expressed are those of the writers and not necessarily those of the United Nations University.

The United Nations University
Toho Seimei Building, 15-1 Shibuya 2-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150, Japan
Tel: (03) 499-2811
Telex: J25442

Printed in Japan


The United Nations University's Project on Socio-cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World (SCA) is proud to present to the international intellectual, scientific, and academic community the results of the first international seminar of the SCA sub-project on the Transformation of the World - devoted to "Science and Technology in the Transformation of the World'' - organized jointly with the University of Belgrade and held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 22-26 October 1979.

The sub-project on the Transformation of the World is one of the two sub-projects of the SCA Project itself - parallel with the sub-project on Endogenous Intellectual Creativity - and an accompanying series of convergence areas. It has been designed from the outset as a pioneer inspection of the ongoing major transformations in the world system towards a more equable and humane future for mankind. More than a new international economic order, the transformation of the world has its deep impact on all major dimensions of human and societal existence and evolution - from strategy to spirituality, from economics to patterns of human societies, from science and technology to visions of the world wherefore the sub-project on the Transformation of the World has been designed to deal with the following dimensions:

- science and technology,
- economy and society,
- culture and thought,
- philosophy and religion,
- history and international relations,
- the civilizational prospective.

This SCA sub-project is being implemented through a series of major international seminars, of which the one held in Belgrade was the first, and a wider net of detailed exploration of sub-themes by several of the research units associated with the SCA Project network in the five continents, supported by a select converging set of research reports by individual experts.

The preparation of this volume - bringing together the presentations, official addresses, position papers, and reports of the Belgrade seminar - has been made possible by the convergence and lucid amity of a large group of senior scholars and research staff, involved both in the preparation of the seminar itself and in the elaboration of the several stages leading to the publishing of this volume.

Dr. Miroslav Pecujlic, Rector of the University of Belgrade, has been at the very heart of the whole process: he has assumed with the greatest distinction the key role of orientation, intellectual and scientific, of this international seminar, as witness his key contributions in the volume. We were privileged to have the support of the Yugoslav authorities, as represented by Mr. Zivorad Kovacevic, President of the City Assembly of Belgrade, Professor Pavle Savic, President of the Academy of Sciences of Serbia, Dr. Anton Vratusa, Chairman of the Executive Council of Slovenia, Dr. Milojko Drulovic, Secretary of the Executive Committee of the YCL of Yugoslavia, and other senior colleagues. Professor Henri Lefebvre, in his keynote address, "Le Nssaries et le Possible dans la Formation du Mondial," set the level at which the whole seminar proceeded. Professors Jos. Silva Michelena, Salustiano del Campo Urbano, Osama El-Kholy, Guillermo Bonfil Batalla, and Celso Furtado, as chairmen of the individual sessions, with the painstaking support of the five rapporteurs for these sessions, Professors James A. Maraj, Cuthbert K. Omari, Gregory Blue, Vladimir Stambuk, and Ahmad Yousef Hassan, played a key role in co-ordinating the meeting and giving sense to our convergence through differences and contradictions, in the spirit of the SCA Project: the non-antagonistic dialectical treatment of contradictions leading towards complimentarily. The general rapporteurs of the seminar, Professors Kazuko Tsurumi, Rajko Tomovic, and A.N. Pandeya, undertook a crucial responsibility in giving a sense of the thrust of the seminar in most distinguished terms.

Dr. Kinhide Mushakoji, Vice-Rector of the United Nations University for the Human and Social Development Programme, assisted by Dr. Hossam Issa, Programme Officer of the HSD Programme and secretary to the international seminar, gave their support and help, the warm fraternity, to the seminar, which also has benefited from the presence and the contribution of Dr. Alexander Kwapong, Vice-Rector of the United Nations University for Planning and Development.

We are particularly indebted to Mr. Gregory Blue, Assistant to the Director of the East Asian History of Science Library, Cambridge, for his dedication to his responsibility as co-editor for the seminar, especially in the shorter "Report" volume, where kits crystal-clear analytic mind and editorial remolding of the complete proceedings have played a major role in bringing the gist of our endeavors to the widest possible public. We wish to formally recognize our indebtedness to his work, initiative, devotion, and ability in giving shape and light to a mountain of documents in a most distinguished manner.

Mr. R.N. Malik, Chtef of Conference and General Services of the UN Untversity, Mr. Shigeo Mtnowa, Chtef of Academic Services, Mr. Ray Fleming, Director of Information Services, Mr. D.T. Manson, Director of Administration, and all the administrative staff at the UNU Centre contributed their full share of support and help in amity to the globally of this process.

At the central echelon of the SCA Project in Paris, Mrs. Christine Colpin, our assistant and head of secretariat and technical unit, contributed invaluable help to make feasible the very initiation of this sub-project, facing serious logistical difficulties as well as the work of co-ordination with the University's Cent re in Tokyo, with the greatest accuracy and courtesy throughout, for which she has fully deserved the gratitude of all concerned.

The SCA Project is fully conscious of its responsibilities in contributing its share to the prospection and mediation processes vitally needed if the dangers at work in the present tensions, at this time of transformation of the world, are to be tamed towards rationality and fraternity - to which the TW sub-project is essentially devoted, open for all to join hands.

Anouar Abdel-Malek
Project Co-ordinator

Zivorad Kovacevic

President of the City Assembly of Belgrade

I have the honour to welcome you cordially on behalf of the citizens of Belgrade and in my own name, guests and participants of the International Seminar on Science and Technology in the Transformation of the World, and to wish you successful work.

The place of your meeting - the University of Belgrade in the city of Belgrade - is a place of progressive tradition, openness, free communication, host to a number of international political, professional, scientific meetings dedicated to advancement of mutual co-operation.

However, the fact that this is the first international symposium of the United Nations University and that it is held jointly with our university, as well as the fact that it is dedicated to a topic such as the humanistic role of science, is our special pleasure and honour.

This fact is not accidental. it is rooted in the joint strivings of the United Nations University and our country; in a lively sense of the great dilemmas of our epoch which are troubling the world and especially developing countries; in endeavours for creating a more human, more just community of the new world economic but also social and cultural order.

The United Nations University is a noble example of such endeavours, establishing mutual links between countries, mutual intellectual enrichment. Your project, the theme which is the topic of your research, shows such a richness; a panorama of significant and inspiring themes comprising fundamental dimensions of scientific work from natural to social sciences.

Your seminar is dedicated to a topic that attracts more and more attention, the crucial topic of our epoch - the relations between technique and society, technological growth and human progress. It is dedicated to science and technology, which are parts of a new civilization wave; which are becoming a driving force of development, a strong lever for the humanization of the world, for the liquidation of poverty and hunger, for reducing the gap between rich and poor countries - this volcanic contradiction of our epoch.

But it would be a dangerous illusion to believe that technique by itself will solve existential problems. In spite of its great humanistic potentialities it can be abused, it can become destructive of nature, transformed into a powerful instrument of domination and power over people and whole communities, it can be used in favour of privileged groups and countries.

Technological growth will provide human progress not if it is stopped, but if it is connected with humanistic aims. It is necessary that every country develop its own creativity and not merely adopt foreign patterns of industrial urban development. Without individual creativity and development of all individual scientific potentialities, independent social and cultural identity cannot be achieved. However, it does not mean autarchy. On the contrary, at the same time that we reject any sterile isolation and building of Chinese walls around ourselves, we open up bridges towards the world, towards universal scientific achievements and mutual enrichment. Our times have become an epoch of general interdependence - technological, economic, cultural. But the world shall become a real human community of equal people and nations only provided that each culture enriches it by its authentic, unique creativity, looking for answers to the problems that we all have to face.

This is the great, real role of a university which comes out of its isolation and has a sense for social needs. However, it is not merely a receiver of orders, but is rather one of the pioneers in the discovery of new possibilities of development; a watchtower of the world development of science from the viewpoint of the need for development of all creative potentialities of one's own society.

I know that one group at this meeting shall separately discuss science and technology as causes of change in urban environment. Belgrade as a big urban centre is especially interested in all achievements that can improve conditions of work and life in big urban centres. We are putting great efforts into this aspect and we have, besides a number of research programmes, invested a considerable part of our scientific and financial potentialities in the establishment of the Centre for Urban Technology. The principal task of the Centre is to carry out in practice the theoretical knowledge accumulated in the world and to give answers as to how citizens - producers and consumers - can more effectively participate in making vital decisions in their everyday lives.

Pavle Savic

President, Academy of Sciences of Serbia

It is my privilege to welcome you with the wish that your efforts should provide the greatest possible contribution in solving the problems laid in the basis of our civilization. In other words, I wish you full success in the task that you have undertaken to carry out as men of science, inspired by human goals. Problems which are imposing themselves on every thoughtful creature of our times and on which the destiny of the human race is depending, undoubtedly are those which are the topic of this and other worldwide endeavours in our times.

Let me explain in a few lines why I consider that questions with which the seminar is dealing are not only of vital interest for the further development of our civilization and its role in the humanization of society, but as well of vital importance for its very survival. I have surveyed material prepared for this seminar and studied it as carefully as I could, and I wouldn't like to repeat what is written there for I want to save your precious time.

We all want, and in our vision of the future we strive, that our image of the future should be more human than the total pre-history of contemporary civilization. What premises for this vision do we have?

The main characteristics of the present times are the geometrical progression of the birth rate and the increasing expansion of population of our planet; and the exhaustion of classical energy resources, whereas energy resources are the roots of development of every civilization. That means that we are at a turning point between old and new civilizations, or, as Pecujlic would say in his study, we are on the threshold of "the future which has begun."

In the analysis of the structure of our civilization we must point to the great potential, both useful and destructive possibilities, of nuclear energy, which already substitutes for classic resources and imposes itself by its inexhaustible possibilities as the only possible successor of dying civilization based upon exploitation of classical energy resources.

Our generation, and generations that are coming, have to carry a heavy burden, because this change of civilizations causes revolutionary changes in the structure of human society: in the still-powerful capitalist society with its means of production vested in private property and a hired labour force alienated from surplus labour, as stated by Marx in his scientific analysis, while, on the other hand, socialist relations are accomplished and efforts are being put forward in creating such relations in specific conditions created by the history of each particular nation: when super-developed and extremely underdeveloped human communities simultaneously exist; when millions of men, women, and children are dying of starvation and diseases, and a minority enjoys the benefits of accumulated wealth.

You know all this better than I do, because you are dealing with these problems as specialists. Therefore, from the domain of sociology and political economy, I shall move to the field I am more familiar with.

Besides the nuclear resources of energy which nowadays exist as a reality, but are as well as a monopoly of super-powers, technology is using electronics in different ways: lasers, cybernetic computers as a special application of electronics, etc.

No reasonable man would expect, taking into consideration these conditions of our times, that technological development by itself can remove the increasing potential differences which from day to day threaten ever more to cause a spark.

Furthermore, no reasonable man would expect that the increase of population will stop by itself or that technological development by itself will provide the humanization of human society. We must be well aware that only by the conscious endeavours and active efforts of all progressive forces, by agreements and regulations agreed upon and based on scientific results, may threatening dangers to the survival of the human race be overcome. These dangers are not only in the destructive power of nuclear weapons, in the event of their application, but, although invisible at the first sight, far-reaching consequences for the human race lie hidden in biological discoveries, genetic mutations caused by chemical means, and pollution of the human environment by an unreasonable struggle for profit. Even today the situation in the human environment has been brought to an alarming state in technologically developed countries, and especially in developing countries which are procuring obsolete technology and thus becoming subject to neo-colonialistic dependence on technologically developed countries.

In such a complex situation as the contemporary world is, we come to the conclusion that it is necessary to organize endeavours of all progressive forces in order to provide that scientific achievements serve the majority instead of the minority. It is not a question of whether it should be done in the interests of morality, but whether it should be done in the interests of survival of the human race.

In order to be more explicit, I shall use an example from the history of the Spartan people who, in order to survive, hurled from the Tarpeian cliff all cripples, because they were only a dead weight and endangered the survival of this people. Our civilization is facing the same problem; in the interest of the human race's survival and the further development of productive forces we must find a Tarpeian cliff from which not people but all obstacles on the path to the aims of their more human life shall be hurled. That means, firstly, to be aware that the interests of the people are above the interests of individuals or particular castes; that social responsibility for the application of scientific and technological achievements should be enhanced; that the developed must endeavour to contribute to the development of the economically and technologically underdeveloped in order to accelerate the process of development of productive forces and to avoid the perilous consequences of existing and increasing contradictions. I would like to stress the following contradiction which governs the development of human society: the idea is born individually, but it is put into practice by collective work. This means that a man invents, but society undertakes the use, and responsibility for the use, of discoveries and technological processes in the interest of the community. I point to this in contrast to utopian and totally senseless tendencies to stop the process of development of science and technology, to stop progress because the world is going to perish because of new inventions.

It seems absurd, but it is true, One need only observe mass movements against the erection of nuclear plants, movements that are developing in technologically developed countries. It would be enough to inform people that they are under full and responsible control of science. But they also frequently undertake senseless endeavours to stop progress, to turn the historical course, as at the time of the introduction of the first railway or electricity.

At the end, I would like to express my sincere belief that the efforts which we put forward may make science and technology become the properties of society as a whole, providing for the humanization of human relations and creating the basis for a different, more human morality which conforms more to the conscience and welfare of people than one based upon the right of the stronger. I welcome you once more and wish you success in your work.

Miroslav Pecujlic

Rector, University of Belgrade
Chairman of the Seminar

1. Introduction

This international seminar is dedicated to the investigation of one of the crucial topics of our age: the role of science and technology in the transformation and conquest of a more humane world, of a new international economic and social order. Science and technology are part of a new civilizational wave of new gigantic powers that has conquered and which brings us to the threshold of a new world. But science and technology have found themselves at a great historical crossroads. Scientific and technical forces, which no epoch of previous human history could have dreamed of, have entered life. These are forces which have the wonderful power of making human labour freer, creative, and worthier of man, of liberating mankind from the yoke of poverty, and of narrowing the gap between rich and poor countries.

However, it is a dangerous illusion to believe that technology would automatically, on its own, solve man's existential problems. As if by some fateful magic spell the new sources of productive power - as opposed to their great liberation potentials - can become destructive both for nature and man. They can be misused and they can serve for subordinating people and entire communities, for widening the gap between the rich and the poor - the gap which is turning contemporary society into true volcanic ground.

Science and technology are not neutral. They are developing not in a vacuum but in human space. In order to make technological growth become human progress at the same time, it is necessary not to stop it but to give it a new direction, a connection with the broad cultural horizon of a human society, with the transformation of the world.

The age in which we live, and particularly the gigantic development of science and technology, has opened a glorious but also critical era of universal interdependence. The former isolated and autarchic societies, like oases separated by deserts, have come closer together and have become connected by thousands of links. We are living in a world planetary society; but it is of crucial importance what it will be like. In order to make the world a human community, a society which is not uniform and undistinguishable but rich in its Promethean quest for life, which is becoming worthier of man, it is essential to have a pluralism of cultures, their mutual enrichment. Only full independence, autonomy, equality of rights, freedom, and one's own identity can be the road leading to the universal richness of the world, a world which every culture is contributing to with its endogenous "intellectual creativity - understood as the contribution of the countries or cultures to human civilization; the study of how to give creativity precedence over mere transfer" (UNU project). Deprived of this, interdependence is not a road to mutual enrichment but an impersonalization, a halting of civilizational development.

"The central intent of this seminar is to study the dimension of science and technology in and through the historic period of the transformation of the world we now live in. This transformation is visualized by the SCA project as being the combined output of three major sets of formative influences: (a) the re-emergence of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and specifically the Orient to contemporaneity (the dimension of national liberation); (b) the rise of socialism as a set of new models facing the traditional capitalistic models; and (c) the second phase in the industrial revolution, often labelled the scientific and technological revolution" (A. Abdei Malek). The rise of so-ciocultural alternatives within the developed western countries is connected with the radicalization of the social processes.

The socio-cultural development alternatives in a changing world are connected with national liberation and socialism as the world process.

The aim of this international seminar is the investigation of these characteristics of social practice which enable technological growth to coincide with authentic human progress. As an illustration of this we propose a dialogue based on the following:

(i) The application of science and technology that provides for the effective solution of existential problems of the broad working people such as: hunger (nutrition, housing, employment. A strategy of economic-social and technological development which leads to the narrowing (rather than growth, of such essential social differences that endanger the survival and development of large sections of the population, entire social groups, and countries or regions. A technological development that benefits the working people, and not primarily the privileged position of narrow strata of certain countries.

(ii) The relationship between science, technology, and traditional culture. A way of modernization which is not destructive - destructive in the sense that it destroys the positive cultural and productive heritage of original civilization, not creating new living and working conditions for the population, but creating gigantic masses of pauperized populations that have lost their roots. A mode of technological development which preserves progressive cultural and productive tradition and turns it into a point of departure for the creation of new forms of social organization, for a great mobilization of human energy - a development that suits society's own needs.

(iii) Forms of sociability and modern science and technology. Some fundamental forms of life and mentality - cultural and civilizational values such as solidarity, a tendency towards egalitarianism, and a collective spirit - represent important components of the human community. But traditional forms of sociability had great limitations: firstly, traditional collective communities were confined to a narrow framework - to a village, to a local community - while the pyramid of the ruling elites and groups rose above them like a kind of superstructure. Secondly, the local community and its solidarity was kept in life by using the undeveloped productive forces which had not changed for centuries - by their conservation. The key problem is how to attain greater sociability - more human and more solidary forms of social life - on a larger scale, not within the framework of small local communities, and on the basis of revolutionary productive forces. The problem is how to preserve positive values and unite them with the modern.

2. Human or Repressive Role of Science and Technology - Distinctions

Where do the distinctions lie between a science and technology which serves the authentic progress of individuals and communities and, on the other hand, an application which turns science and technology into new instruments for controlling and manipulating people, for technological subordination?

The discussion should show the differences both in the goals and ways of application of the same technology and in the formation of alterative technologies, which are more suitable to a specific natural and social environment.

This general guiding thought should be materialized in systematic discussions in a few fields of utmost importance.

(i) Science, technology and the control of environment - alternative types of urbanization and industrialization and their social consequences.

Alternative patterns of urbanization, collective conditions of living. The crisis of the megalopolis; the city which is developing according to human needs, rather than according to a profiteer-bureaucratic logic that alienates people, turning the city into a modern anthill.

Various types of industrialization (modernization). Two sides of technology transfer - independent development and progress, or a way of transferring knowledge which maintains subordination and widens the civilizational, economic gap between societies.

The strategy of scientific and technological development which is not limited exclusively to the copying of the patterns of others. Greater reliance on one's own forces and a larger share of endogenous creativity in technological development, development of cities, production of food and raw materials, organization of labour. How to develop endogenous scientific creativity (its autonomy, specificity) and reject autarchy, sterile confinement, simultaneously. How to open bridges to the world, enrich one's own experience with the most valuable heritage of other cultures, with knowledge, and with universal values - to create a new economic and social order in the world.

(ii) Science, technology, and the control of environment - the transformation of agrarian societies and technological revolution.

Connections between social processes and the conception of development, and agrarian relations and science, social agronomy.

The character and mode of application of science and technology which leads to emancipation and to the solution of the existential needs of the population. Possibilities for an alternative technology, for combining traditional methods, knowledge, experience, and contemporary productive forces.

A character and mode of application of science and technology, of modernization, which leads to the ruin of the land, to a decrease in the fertility of the soil, to a decrease in the quality of food and an expansion of hunger, to biological degradation, to mass pauperization of the agrarian population, to a larger dependence on developed world centres.

(iii) Social medicine, biology, and demography in the service of authentic progress.

The relationship between the organization of labour and way of work, working hours, social contradictions, and the human organism. To what extent does the way of using the labour force and working conditions truly influence the human organism, the span of human life, illness.

Does medicine, as a practice and as a science, bring about knowledge about this and critically investigate the social conditions which lead to the mass improvement or deterioration of health as the basic value. The social direction in medical and pharmaceutical research - to what extent are innovations directed towards the fundamental upgrading of the quality of health, and to what extent are they directed solely towards variations which prevent repletion of the market and the reduction of profit.

Biology in the service of the promotion of man's health and life, or the creation of new kinds of control and manipulation of people through genetic engineering.

(iv) Science, technology, and the control of space and power (geopolitics, armaments).

3. The Quest for a Humanistic Science - the Scientist in the Transformation of the World

(i) The character of contemporary science.

The constituent principles - organization, professional ideology and culture, the way of formation of experts (narrow specialization and "parcelization") on which modern science, as a special sphere of human practice, rests. For instance, to what extent are the principles on which the prevailing pattern of scientific knowledge is based those that exclude from their perspective the positive traditions - the results of the experience of people as to how the fertility of the soil is preserved or how one can live better in human settlements, what people feel as good or bad; e.g., why don't the research workers at modern agronomical institutes wonder what will happen to the land, whether it will lose its fertility, what will happen to nutrition, whether food will lose essential nutritive qualities, what will the human organism look like, what social consequences will arise in certain societies and in international relations? Why do they not ask those questions of themselves? Probably not only because of commercial interests but also because of professional ideology, because they have pedagogically been formed to think as narrow specialists, only within the framework of their limited sector, and to exclude the social dimension. Are they being formed as one-dimensional people?

(ii) The scientists as subjects of the historical process of socio-cultural alternatives.

What kind of transformation in its social direction, internal principles, and professional culture should science undergo in order to take part in the transformation of the world, representing an aspect of the transformation towards a more human world.

Universities as the protagonists of such scientific research, pioneers in the discovery of new possibilities for development. The university as the watchhower of the world development of science, but also from the point of view of endogenous, original creativity and the needs of society.

The pedagogical principles of such a formation of young intelligentsia who will be masters of knowledge but with a deep social feeling, who will seek the best technical but also human solution, adapted to the needs of their own society. The formation of research workers whose minds will reach the horizons of world science but whose feet will firmly rest on the foundations of endogenous national culture and needs.

Philosophy and ethics.

(iii) The socio-economic framework and creativity.

Socio-political organization: the state and self-management.

Kinhide Mushakoji

Vice-Rector, United Nations University

I have the pleasant obligation to express the gratitude of the UN University to the University of Belgrade, through its Rector, Prefessor Pecujlic, for having accepted to co-sponsor this seminar.

I want also to express, in the name of all the non-Yugoslav participants, our deep appreciation for the hospitality of our colleagues from this great country. I must not fail to insist on the fact that it is especially fortunate that we could hold this seminar in this country, which is indeed the meeting place between East and West, and North and South, since here we can best acquire a good sense about the transformation of the world.

Nowadays, science and technology are treated with a much more critical mind than before, mainly for the following two reasons.

Firstly, because science and technology tend to be monopolized by the major powers, monopolizing knowledge in view of their nuclear hegemony. This creates a hierarchical world order with the super-powers on the top and the developing countries on the bottom.

Secondly, because the R & D activities in science and technology tend to give a disproportionate advantage to big science and big technology through overly centralized management systems' often losing sight of the diversity of local needs and environmental conditions.

Yugoslavia, through its non-aligned position, takes a position clearly most relevant to the first aspect I have just mentioned. Through its experiment in self-management and decentralization, it provides also an interesting answer to the second problem mentioned above.

This is why the UN University is extremely happy to hold this seminar in this great country. The UN University tries to become an international scientific forum of researchers of different cultural backgrounds and ideologies, and who hold different paradigms. This is a difficult task, especially when it has to deal with problems so controversial as the one to be treated in this seminar.

Many international organizations which seek to produce reports at the end of their expert meetings are stressing the points of agreement, emphasizing consensus. The UN University encourages rather diversifying views and a frank and critical debate aiming at determining clearly the roots of divergence's. This approach, only possible within a university, must make the UN University a place where new alternative perspectives on the world in transformation can be formulated freely by the researchers collaborating with this institution.

This is why I urge all the participants of this meeting to feel free to disagree. We share, I hope, at least a common interest in ascertaining that science and technology serve humanity and guarantee its survival, and not that science and technology serve the cause of the destruction of human life, welfare, and development.

Being sure to agree on this essential point I call upon all the participants of this seminar to contribute, to sharpen this debate which is of special relevance in the UN calendar coming as it does after the UNCSTD Conference in Vienna. Thus it is at this historical moment that I call upon all the participants to put forth their reflections on Science and Technology in the Transformation of the World.

Anouar Abdel-Malek

We are honoured and delighted today to inaugurate the first international seminar of the series devoted to examining the prospects for The Transformation of the World, in the capital city of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, at a time when Belgrade vigorously proceeds along the path of constructive mediation between the different spheres in the worlds of power and culture at work in our times.

This first international seminar of the series on The Transformation of the World, deals with Science and Technology in the Transformation of the World. It is thus the first of a series of six international seminars devoted to implementing a sub-project on The Transformation of the World (TW). TW itself is part of a United Nations University Project on Socio-cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World (SCA). This project is within the framework of the United Nations University's Human and Social Development Programme, directed by Vice-Rector Dr. Kinhide Mushakoji. A parallel series is devoted to the theme of another sub-project on Endogenous Intellectual Creativity. This series began with the First Asian Regional Symposium held at the University of Kyoto (13 to 17 November 1978) and was followed by the Latin American Regional Symposium at the Universidad Nacional Auta de Mexico (23 to 29 April 1979) and other seminars. The seminars dealing with The Transformation of the World, after this first seminar devoted to science and technology, cover: economy and society; culture and thought; philosophy and religion; history and international relations; civilizational prospective.

The first international seminar is organized jointly by the United Nations University and the University of Belgrade, thanks to the perceptive help and deep commitment of Dr. Miroslav Pecujlic, Rector of the University of Belgrade and our host and chairman this week, and Dr. Kinhide Mushakoji, Vice-Rector of the United Nations University's Human and Social Development Programme.

In launching this series, the SCA project members are aware that it thus fulfills an important part of the moral and scientific obligations of the international scientific community, of the United Nations University proper, and of our joint quest for a New International Order, according to fundamental decisions by the United Nations Organization and the charter of the United Nations University. These decisions reflect the aspirations and decisions of the Group of Developing and Non-Aligned Countries. This systematic, comparative, and critical study of the different dimensions of the transformation of the world is conceived as the all-encompassing general frame and mould of the scientific and theoretical workshop now being developed toward providing the international community with a deeper and more genuine understanding of linkages and differences, of our differing priorities, through their complex dialectical paths from contradictions to convergence. As such, our wish is that this series of international seminars devoted to The Transformation of the World implements the aims and ideals of the United Nations University, as defined in its charter:

The University shall devote its work to research into the pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare that are the concern of the United Nations and its agencies, with due attention to the social sciences and the humanities as well as natural sciences, pure and applied (Article 1, point 2, UNU Charter);

The research programme of the institutions of the University shall include, among other subjects, co-existence between peoples having different cultures, languages and social systems; peaceful relations between States and the maintenance of peace and security; human rights; economic and social change and development; the environment and the proper use of resources; basic scientific research and the application of the results of science and technology in the interests of development; and universal human values related to the improvement of the quality of life (Article 1, point 3, UNU Charter).

The central character of our times, of the real world in our times, is in the transformation - not evolution or transition (all historical periods are periods of transition) - of all dimensions of the life of human societies. To be sure, this transformation, acknowledged all over the world, is neither unilinear nor synchronic. At the first level, we see major differences in the quality, quantity, and, especially, the tempo and impact of processes of transformation in different sectors of social life and activity - economic production, patterns of power, societal cohesiveness, cultural identity, civilizational projects, political ideologies, religions, philosophies, myths, and so on - in short, all sectors of what is usually termed the infrastructure and superstructure of society.

At a second, more visible, and forceful level, we do acknowledge distinctions between different types of societies, for example, in the different types of socio-economic formations and the accompanying political ideologies (basically capitalism, liberal capitalism, and monopoly capitalism, and socialism, national progressive socialism, and communism). And even more so, in the hitherto neglected dimension of civilizational, cultural, and national specificity, we encounter major, more resilient, and protracted sets of differences.

This transformation of the world can be recognized in the following three sets of factors, which lend themselves to being recorded according to different conceptions of priorities.

(a) The first is the resurgence of the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to contemporaneity, in both socio-political and civilizational-cultural fields. The historical processes of national liberation and independence, coupled with national and social revolutions, have gathered momentum since their inception in modern times, during the early part of the nineteenth century, until they became the dominant factor of contemporary history beginning in 1917, especially in the period from 1945 to 1973.

Western specialists have seen this vast transformation as a socio-political process within the traditional conception of the world's history (as consisting of one centre - Europe, later Europe and North America: that is, the western world - and its periphery, the Orient, which includes Asia, Africa, and the Arab-Islamic world, later joined by Latin America). The three continents were emerging but what was/is emerging is seen in socio-political terms.

On the other side, especially in the Orient - Asia, Africa, and the Arab-Islamic world - this emergence was seen essentially as a renaissance of either culture or civilization, as in the Arab and Islamic "Nadah," Meiji Japan, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the upsurge of Africanism, while Latin America's quest for identity has brought to light the hitherto hidden Indian and Indian-African elements of the culture.

(b) A parallel, major set of formative factors in this transformation appears to have developed between 1848 and 1973, and especially from October 1917, the date of the first socialist revolution in history. The hitherto equanimous front of the bourgeois in power was suddenly faced with the eruption of the labouring people into power, coupled with a populist Weltanschaunng geared toward a persistently more humane life for the have-nots. Sixty years later, nearly half of mankind lives under socialism - four-fifths of them in Asia and Africa.

(c) More recently, a third set of factors has become more visible, centring upon the immense progress in science and technology. Here again, while certain advanced western countries opted for such denominations or descriptions as the "scientific and technological revolution" or "post-industrial society," on the other side the vision remained paradoxically nearer to more realistic approaches, using the more traditional concepts of "revolution," "development," and "social transformation" within the implacable parameters of geopolitics. Yet none would deny the message and ever-growing influence of the application of modern technology in our world, in the very fabric of our individual life through the complexity of societal processes.

The transformation of the world: how can it be related to the social and human sciences, to political and social theories, to the philosophical quest? And, proceeding from there, how can this lead towards a more comprehensive study of human and social development?

To be sure, the prevailing position of the probltique of transforming the world in our times starts with this third set of factors, around the visible impact and deep penetration of science and technology in all nations in our times - a redoubtable instrument for universalization and reductionism that has compelled analysts, policy makers, and international organizations to devote recent efforts to studying this area. And, while both the priority in the presentation of the three sets of formative factors and the tone of this presentation are widely different according to national-cultural and socio-political groupings in the world, nobody hesitates to acknowledge that perhaps science and technology have both assumed primacy over the more restrictive level of economic production, being deeply at work as determining factors in armaments and geopolitics, culture and societal behaviour. In August 1979, the United Nations Organization Conference on Science and Technology for Development served as a focal point for deepening international discussions in this area. Allow me to quote excerpts from Dr. Kinhide Mushakoji's keynote address on "Sociological Implications of Tradition and Change in Developing Countries":

It is the whole international system of science and technology which is in crisis, and this crisis is not only economic; it is part of a crisis of civilization.

If science and technology have to serve effectively the cause of the survival, development, and welfare of humankind within the outer and inner boundaries limiting the growth of world economy, if science and technology are to be developed in accordance with the basic principles of equity, national autonomy, and interdependence of a New International Economic Order, the present system of science and technology is quite inappropriate. New goals - e.g., meeting human needs and guaranteeing national self-reliance - should replace the present ones - e.g., power and profit. New incentives for innovation and production should be institutionalized. (Should technological invention continue to be an object of property right? lf so, is there no alternative legal approach facilitating a freer flow of technology?) Public and private R & D activities should be effectively controlled and oriented toward the new goals through technological assessment with effective power enforcement. R & D for human and social development, oriented toward the satisfaction of human needs, should be given priority over R & D for profit and power. New labour and research ethics should become the basis of a new scientific and technological awareness of the people who should participate actively in the scientific and technological development process. Scientific and technological planning must adopt a new methodology more decentralized, more location-specific, more sensitive to socio-cultural specificities, and more responsive to the people's demands and expectations...

The specificity of the first joint international seminar of the United Nations University's SCA project and the University of Belgrade lies in its focus. While development was quite rightly at the centre of the UN Vienna Conference, this international seminar is intended to be but a part of a whole series devoted to studying structural modifications, to in-depth remodeling of the world we know today - science and technology being, for reasons of feasibility, the first to be tackled, This concept of science and technology as one, albeit the first, step and stage in the series devoted to exploring the prospects for transforming the world means that the stress and tone of the sub-project is more concerned with the differences, contradictions, and tensions in this, our real world, than with more strictly ethical or developmental variables. The persistent coupling of science and technology, of culture with power, in the belief that the primacy of the political - the prince as philosopher - always at work in the history of men ought to become the meeting point of scholars and policy makers, of science and technology specialists on the one hand with analysts and theoreticians of the human and social sciences on the other hand. This is a step, therefore, in an unfolding process, in interrelation with the parallel series of endogenous intellectual creativity. And what we have in mind is more of an intellectual and theoretical workshop than a meeting of experts.

A long way, verily, from the ethos and tone of 1945 - a long, long way.

Neither atomic clouds above the North Pacific, nor the hideous convulsions of traditional imperialism and colonialism in Asia and Africa, nor the liberation of the largest country in the world in 1949 could bring sense to the massive thrust in western advanced industrial societies toward productivism, consumerism, and hedonism. Finally the golden age of man-as-demiurgos had been reached, the very frontiers of the Promethean concept so persistently at the heart of western civilization, from the age of maritime discoveries and the European Renaissance till Yalta. And the instruments of this historic fulfillment were none other than science and technology as the driving forces in the second stage of the industrial Revolution.

If man was finally the master of nature, the conqueror of the universe, geared to achieve all the pleasures he could dream of, what, if any, would be the use in keeping such "archaic" concepts and moulds as nation and state, the family, working people, and the tools of exploitation, to say nothing of such "distant" objective superstructures as philosophy, religion, the human values of love and fraternity, equity and peace - let alone civilization? Despite powerful waves pushing for the transformation of the world, few, or at best a large minority, were listening to the "voices of silence," to Joseph Needham's favourite Confucian saying, "Behave to Everyman as One Receiving a Great Guest," to Chou En-lai's "don't Forget the Well-Digger When You Drink Water." Or was it because of them?

Yet, in less than ten years, ethos and tone have shifted decisively toward the penumbra of a "Crisis."

Which crisis?

In the North, leaders are busy mending fences. A lack of oil and raw materials, receding markets, non-competitive old industrial plants: such was the appraisal with some lonely exceptions. And this verdict was echoed by a large proportion of audible voices in the South, the good "westernized modernizes," busily engaged in reciprocating, even if now with more strident voices.

That the crisis could be that of civilization itself was now mentioned. But this civilization was conceived of as that of the still hegemonic "centre," as opposed to the underdeveloped or developing non-western "periphery," provoking a mixture of reluctant acceptance and anguished self-interrogation. That the crisis might be, perhaps, that of the path to civilization taken by the hegemonic West itself, much more so than its actual hegemony and precedence in power terms, began to emerge here and there. This was followed by intense reactions of either apocalyptic previsions - if western civilization was in crisis, how on earth could mankind seek alternatives? - or derisive comparisons and strictures facing the incoherence and lagging behind of the non-western world.

For it is true that major parts of the underdeveloped non-western societies are still caught in the mirage of reductionism, busily imitating the advanced industrial societies of the West. It is as if history were indeed repetitive, its formative historical moulds and real concrete processes amenable to copying, precisely, limitless productivism, consumerism and hedonism, progress equated to profit and domination, the ghettos of individualism and the negative mind. It is as if nothing could be different from that combination of factors which completely erode self-assurance, popular and national self-reliance, the feeling of security, the hope for a more fraternal and equable future for the majority of mankind - the taming of the "acquisitive society."

Wherefore the quest for alternatives.

In science and technology, the quest is now toward "alternative technology" or "appropriate technology," with a sprinkle of "radical technology." If a set of scientific applications of technology is to be sought to escape the dilemmas of advanced western industrialized societies, then this set could only be - in the reductionist approach - an "alternative" set of technologies, parallel to the advanced western varieties. And this set could be found in the concept of "appropriate technology." "Appropriate" to what? "Appropriate" to whom? "Appropriate" for which purposes? "Appropriate" according to which, and whose, criteria? To be sure, history has it that the great majority of the nations of the three continents can hardly echo the procedures which enabled the West, in five centuries, through the concentration of historical surplus value, to gradually develop its modes of capital-intensive productivity. The humane uses of human resources, in the advanced nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, like the socio-economic restructuring of the societal fabric, is now seen as more beneficial than previously imagined in bridging the gaps between rationality and fraternity, in giving a more humane vision of social dialectics than hitherto prevalent.

Yet numerous temptations, traditions, and fringe benefits of survival imitation lead to a reluctance to use vision as a tool for our future. For then the question would be: To which technology does vision belong?

The growing criticism of the impact of science and technology on modern societies and human life, through its diversity and different motivations, gives an impression of leading toward a growing ambiguity. For although this impact, through hegemony, has had its negative and destructive effects in underdeveloped areas in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to this day, whether through direct domination by imperial powers or more systematic pillaging by multinationals, the recently mounting criticism has come from developed areas, from the core of the West.

The tone here is alarm, and the contents ethical and normative. Industrialization and urbanization have led to ecologism. Atomic armaments and nuclear energy, to the quest for pacifism. Consumerism and individualism, at the time of the energy crisis, to the pursuit of more humane, low-key participatory patterns of social interaction. And it is from the core of the more advanced industrialized societies of the West that the most ruthless indictments of science and technology are nowadays being launched.

On the other side, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, a mounting wave of national movements, often coupled with social transformation or revolution, has always clearly proclaimed its desire - in all countries, nations, and societies in the so-called "South" - to modernize its variegated national-cultural specificities grounded in the depths of history. The instruments and means to achieve this legitimate global desire have been defined simultaneously, in the inner circle, as the creation and reinforcement, or revival, of a stable centre of national social power, the independent national state of the tri-continental area in our times, to be accompanied in the outer circle by careful examination of the realities of the balance of power and of the evolving patterns of dialectical interrelations between major centres of power and influence in our times.

For here, more than ever before, more than anywhere else, more than in any other field at any other time in the history of mankind, the massive unanimous protracted consensus of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, of the Group of Developing and Non-Aligned Countries, lies in the coupling of national independent decision-making power - only feasible with an advanced level of science and technology in economic production and state organization and a mass onslaught on illiteracy and backwardness - with a meaningful and equable share in policy-making at the world level. Such are the roots, visible for all to see, of U Thant's call for what was then labelled the "New International Economic Order" and what has gradually become the "New International Order" at the time of the transformation of the world. Close scrutiny of the major decisions and the philosophy behind them in the series of major conferences from Bandung to Belgrade, Colombo to Havana, plus examination of the socio-political contents of politics put forth by all national independent states of these areas (four fifths of mankind), through the deep diversity of their socio-economic and political ideological regimes, with exceptions - isolated societies or compradore fringes - bear witness to this reality.

The call has been and remains for a realistic political approach to human society in our times, a deep desire to fully use the contributions of science and technology as means to secure a wider and greater share in world and regional decision-making power. Such an approach is more often than not attuned to civilizational visions, cultural traditions, and national parameters - but never evasive about the deep structural integrated interrelations between power and culture, at the heart of all problems of human and social development.

As a matter of course, both sectors of world societies - the so-called North and South - meet along the more general issues, such as nuclear disarmament and the acknowledgment of the need for more rational relations between the two sectors. But, short of the extreme parameters of annihilation, the rise to contemporaneity of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is seen, by the formative endogenous schools of thought and action in these continents, in terms altogether different from those of the dedicated minority groups in advanced industrialized societies who are justly rebelling against the dangers inherent in their societies and civilizational projects. At the same time, the power structures of modern advanced industrialized societies, with the broad support of the wide masses of the population, including the working people - industry, agriculture, and the services alike - are persistently taking action to reach an ever-growing level of scientific and technological sophistication in all fields of social life, with a view to ensure their continuous hegemony through coming generations and, with hope, centuries.

Here lies the principal contradiction between the two sides, between the hegemonic power centres of advanced industrialized societies on the one hand, and the national independent influence centres of the heretofore marginalized cultures and societies of the world. The secondary contradiction seems to lie at a much lesser degree of intensity, and, perhaps, a higher level of ambiguity, between the humanistic minorities of advanced industrial societies on one hand, and the tricontinental area on the other.

Clearly, this area of contradictions is of crucial importance toward defining the probltique of our joint investigation. It is here, so we feel, that the confrontation of analyses, the uses of meaningful comparisons, the perceptive understanding of different types and scales of priorities can genuinely benefit the international community, leading to deeper understanding of the transformation of the world in our time. It is here, so we feel, that the challenges and difficulties of the dialectics of tradition and modernity, specificity and universality, are calling upon us to search for the deepest roots, the hidden part of the iceberg, as it were.

This is a task of vital importance in our times and an imposing challenge on the international intellectual community. It also is the duty of all concerned citizens to their nations, peoples, and cultures to answer this challenge.

As Socrates, the master of interrogative dialectic, taught us many a century ago, "everyone acts according to his knowledge." And we now know that Louis Aragon is right when asserting that "the future has not already been lived." If knowledge, philosophical knowledge of the inner workings of societies in our time, is indispensable and worthy of continuous attention, could it be confidently stated that a better knowledge, a deeper understanding of the present, as both history and a potential future, could chart the path toward more rational and humane endeavours?

To this task of paramount importance, the historic task of bridge-building, our UNU project on Socio-cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World (SCA) is, above all, dedicated. For ours are the challenges and promises to jointly construct what we would propose to define as the "gear-box of priorities": to bring together in meaningful, complementary interaction the widely different schools of thought and action in this our world - rooted in civilizational, cultural, and national specificities; socio-economic formations, political systems; philosophic, religious, and ideological visions of the world, and scientific, theoretical, and methodological conceptions.

As we approach the practical aspects of our research, the more practical, policy oriented aspects of our endeavours, we are bound to face the basic dialectic between specificity and universality under the guise of what we would propose to call the dialectics of priorities. It is obvious that policy definition, differences in standpoints at theoretical and practical levels alike, relate directly to, and are grounded in, what appears at first sight to be a difference in priorities. Then, how can we come to grips with this contradictory aspect of our probltique?

1. The first level of analysis deals with the definition of categories of priorities:

(a) Some would tend to put the first category in the domain of production, economics, and their accompanying technological and scientific aspects. We would have here, inter alia, productivism and consumerism; low-key development and hedonism; individual patterns of economic organization; collective and state patterns; and so forth.

(b) The political dimension proper is such that priorities take shape through political decisions by concerned bodies and institutions of all societies. Usual distinctions between liberal and autocratic, democratic and dictatorial, populist and despotic, consensus and elitist, and so on are naturally considered and are directly relevant to defining priorities.

(c) A third category lies in the realm of culture, thought, philosophy, ideology, and religion as part of a society's formative historical mould: this is where we find the greatest number of differences, echoing the differentiation of human societies in nations and cultural areas, and the proliferating Weltanschauunge cutting across different levels of this sphere.

2. We would then address ourselves to a second level of differentiation, that is, the different types of priorities:

(a) A first general priority type is the static-conservative type, that is, priorities more concerned with maintaining societal cohesiveness, socio-economic and political ideological systems. This maintenance is performed either facing the mounting wave of new transformational and radical demands, or just as an expression of the necessity to preserve achievements and acquisitions which had been the results of lengthy processes of transformation before crystallizing into a viable new order. The different justifications for this conservative approach clearly mean that the contents of what is sought to be conserved can be, and are, profoundly different - yet appear for a certain time more static than their proclaimed aims and contents.

(b) A second general type in priorities is the radical type, oriented toward the transformation of societal moulds. Here, priorities will often appear in parallel, dual, contradictory patterns, and not just as different stages in the same type of priorities, as is often the case with conservative priorities.

3. Enough has been said, though sketchily at this stage, to give a sense of the immense complexity of defining priorities, let alone making sense of their differences.
Yet, the most disconcerting aspect in priorities appears to be the aspect/dimension of tempt. For while the difference in priorities - through their different categories and types - can be understood, and even accepted, as a rational discourse, the operational position of priorities through the time-dimension, that is the transition from choice to action, from decision to praxis, represents the hour of truth in the dialectics of priorities. And here again, it is important to note that different tempt are not derived only from the subjective moment of decision-making: they are rooted, objectively, in the objectivity of the geo-historical constraints defined in the outer and inner circles of social dialectics in different societies of our world, as well as the different visions obtaining within these societies of the alternatives ahead of them.

4. Thus the quest for a mediation which combines the distinctions in a way that can make them understandable, acceptable to a reasonable extent, or at least properly perceived within their own objective legitimacies. The intent here is not to solve the dialectics of priorities but rather to clarify the hidden part of the iceberg which forcefully makes for contradictions, opposition, and frontal antagonisms. A central task of the SCA project has therefore been seen as the gradual construction of the "gear-box of priorities," a gear-box whose component parts are none other than, precisely, the differentials representing the above-mentioned categories and dimensions of the dialectics of priorities.

As we sit today to initiate the series of international seminars on The Transformation of the World with the study of the domain of science and technology, let us remember the hope and urgency, the reality of our real concrete world, the vision of our converging futures.

In fraternal amity and realistic lucidity, let us join hands!


Cette br communication tentera de saisir pour l'cider un concept qui figure dans la constellation des concepts fondamentaux pour notre que, celui de mondial et de mondialitil y figure sans pour autant briller de l'at souverain qu'il pourrait et devrait avoir. Je l'apprnderai en mettant l'accent sur un aspect particulier et particuliment saisissable: le rapport de la mondialitvec des techniques bien dnies, celles de l'information. La relation de l'informationnel avec le social a d examinbien des fois; celle de l'informationnel et du mondial ne semble pas profondnt explor

L'emploi de ces mots - mondial, mondialitplanire - est devenu courant. Le concept n'est pas pour autant cidLa procre pour l'atteindre n'est m pas bien drmin S'agit-il de philosophie ou de science? Ou d'actions men stratquement? S'agit-il de construire un "objet" ou un "mod"? Mais un tel "objet" ou "mod" ne peut se concevoir comme se convent habituellement les objets et l'objectivitcientifiques: comme rs et vrais. En effet, le mondial - en cours de risation, inachevar hypoth - ne peut se concevoir que comme processus et non pas comme une chose, comme une forme ou comme une substance. Ni l'induction ni la dction classiques ne s'appliquent ui, mais il faut procr selon une drche difficile nommtransduction qui atteint un objet virtuel. Il n'est m pas certain que les catries philosophiquement et modologiquement bor de "sujet" et d'"objet" suffisent et m soient nssaires ici. Quant au terme "processus" il vaut mieux que celui d'objet mais n'apporte pas grande lumi; s'agit-il d'un processus historique? D'un mouvement produisant un rltat selon une finalitQui orienterait ce processus gtique? Qui, c'est-ire quel sujet, darerait cette finalit....

Alors, faut-il se contenter d'une description? Mais dans quelle perspective, dans quel horizon et de quel lieu? Faut-il adopter une procre strictement analytique? Mais par omencer? Mise en perspective ou prospective? Rien de plus dvant et souvent de plus arbitraire. Cependant le mondial est ld lobsnt fascinante prnce-absence. Ne serait-il pas l'enjeu supr d'un jeu plleux? Au cours de ce jeu intable (nssaire) la destruction de la plan et l'nouissement de l'homme planire se prntent comme deux possibilitlement probables, lement improbables. Le nssaire, ce serait qu'il y ait danger, risque, aventure; le jeu mettrait en jeu la totalitdonc tous les possibles. Peut-e; mais qui joue? Selon quelles res? Sans res? Qui a posa mise et l'enjeu?

Pour mon compte, ici, je tenterai seulement de mettre en relation intelligible le double aspect du mondial: le probltique et le pratique. En effet, le mondial a un aspect pratique: le marchondial, les strates mondiales, les firmes mondiales, le rau mondial de communications, etc... Il a aussi un aspect probltique, ce terme ne dgnant pas ici a mani des purs philosophes ce qui caractse et spfie une thie, mais un ensemble de questions et d'incertitudes: "Ola mondialitQu'est ce qui le dnit ou bien la voue 'indnissable?" Je tenterai de mettre en œuvre de multiples questionnements, les uns froidement conceptuels, d'autres quelque peu anxieux, tous visant la mondialitPuis je tenterai de prser le questionnement artir des techniques informationnelles sur lesquelles aujourd'hui on sait beaucoup sans tout connae, de loin.

En exergue ette de, je mettrai ce texte qui se trouve dans les annexes aux exposde Renhom: "De quoi faut-il s'nner?" (ClRCE, N° 8 - 9 Morphogse et Imaginaire, 1979.)

"Tout objet, toute structure, toute morphologie, pour e dgnet dits doivent e structurellement stables, contrairement aux formes informes, assemblages chaotiques et contradictoires, qui sont typiquement instables. Nous souhaitons trouver une forme s'apparentant a signification qui rgeant du r dans son ccontinu identitille de l'identit la diffnce, pour aboutir au r dans son cdiffnciCette forme entrant en contact avec l'organisation conceptuelle de la ritntiment sous l'influence du principe d'identita en se stabilisant subir les assauts du principe de diffnce. Ces assauts se solderont par des bifurcations... ou encore par de vtables conflits o phase se change brusquement en une autre. On traduira ainsi la lutte de ces deux attracteurs que sont identitt diffnce..." (J. Duport).

Commentaire: avec quelques rrves concernant le terme "forme," cette formation appel a fois prnte et absente, possible et s'atteignant en rnt l'impossible et en transversant des catastrophes selon les ths de Renhom, ne serait-ce pas le mondial?

Première Partie: Le Mondial, Esquisse d'une Analyse

1. Que Disent les Philosophes?

C'est ravers la philosophie que le "monde" apparacomme reprntation et comme concept. L'histoire du manden Occident serait longue. Bien que des fragments en aient paru par-ci par-lelle n'est pas encore blie complment. Il suffit ici de rappeler l'origine italiote de la reprntation. Le terme "mundus" s'opposant de fa longtemps impensau "cosmos" grec dgne un ab, un couloir tbreux cheminant souterrainement vers une issue; c'est un trou par lequel les s entrent et sortent, les profondeurs de la Terre-M, communiquant ainsi avec la soci organisa surface. On jette dans ce trou sacres condamnort, les nouveaux ndont on se drrasse. La terrible parole augustinienne, Mandest immundus, doie l'image du couloir tbreux, parcours de vie et de mort, et fonde le christianisme le plus rigoureux. Je puis montrer comment la philosophie occidentale confronte - tantes srant, tantes rejoignant - ces deux grandes reprntations; le cosmos lumineux, le monde tbreux. (Sans oublier la poe: entre autres Dante et la Divins Commedia.)

2. Hegel

Il arrache le concept 'obscurites mphores en exposant le monde comme produit de l'histoire, le sombre parcours approchant de sa fin sublime. Pour lui le Welt-Geschichtlich fait rger la triade airante: savoir - droit - Etat; ce dernier incarnant l'idtermine l'histoire du monde; il en fait surgir le sens et la raison: la finalitLa "Phenomenologie" dit le douloureux cheminement de la conscience, son enfantement dans les tbres du monde. L'histoire (celle de la connaissance, du droit, des institutions politiques) montre comment s'fie cette construction, selon Hegel radieuse, a fois cosmique et humaine et divine: l'Etat.

Si l'on nd jusqu'otre que la perspective hlienne, il faut assigner comme sens et fin du processus historique la constitution d'un Etat mondial. Le monde moderne a-t-il pris cette orientation? Non. Seconde remarque, lia premi. Chez Hegel, le temps historique joue le rprimordial; il engendre ce qui nade lui dans une rationalitui rend intelligible la production et le produit. Or le monde moderne se dnit par un espace, l'espace planire, ainsi que par les modalitd'occupation et de domination de cet espace. Ce qui modifie la conception du temps historique et gtique, en obligeant econsidr les rapports du temps avec l'espace.

Il faut donc pour comprendre le monde actuel remettre en question la perspective hlienne, encore que Hegel ait eu l'immense mte de montrer l'importance croissante de l'at et de l'tique dans tous les domaines du savoir et de la pratique.

3. Marx

Pour lui, la philosophie classique en se risant par l'action rlutionnaire devient monde; elle le dnit donc artir de ses concepts fondamentaux: victoire de la connaissance sur les tbres de l'ignorance, risation du bonheur et de la libert

Inversement, le monde en se transformant devient philosophique. C'est donc artir de la philosophie qu'il faut penser le mondial.

Contre Hegel, Marx pense que l'histoire ne s'ach pas avec l'at, car le devenir emporte tout ce qu'il produit; l'Etat disparaa apravoir dri, en raison de ses contradictions, il laissera place es formes d'organisation plus hautes: moins brutalement oppressives, plus sociales et plus civilis. En attendant cette pode, le mondial prend la forme du marchondial, dont Marx commence et n'ach pas la thie bien qu'il se la fixe comme objectif, en m temps que les thies (elles aussi inachev dans son œuvre) de l'at, de la pensdialectique, etc...

D'aprMarx, indication trimportante, il y a deux moments ou deux phases du marchondial: L'une prpitaliste, plus exactement contemporaine de l'expansion du capitalisme commercial et anteure au capitalisme industriel (le vrai capitalisme) - l'autre posteure 'installation du capitalisme industriel et a prminance de la bourgeoisie. Le capitalisme selon Marx se dloppe, se transforme, s nd. La premi phase du marchondial est didans une grand partie du Capital alors que manque l'de de la seconde phase, seulement indiqu Le capitalisme tend donc avec les conqus techniques et l'accroissement des forces productives ien l'ouvrage colossal de la marchandise, qui a sa logique et son language, qui produit en m temps que d'innombrables choses une mondialitonsolidet gralispar la poursuite du profit (plus-value). Cependant les contradictions de la production marchande et industrielle paralysent la formation de la mondialitOn peut dire que, selon Marx, la bourgeoisie a pour mission historique d'entrevoir ou plut'entrouvrir la mondialit alors que le socialisme a pour mission de l'accomplir. Cependant, Marx ne sort pas complment de l'europentrisme et ne cont le mondial que d'une fa limit comme extension du Logos europ.

4. Nietzsche

Je me contente d'une citation.

"Dieu est une conjecture. Je veux que votre conjecture ne dsse pas votre volontrrice... Ce que vous avez appelonde, il faut que vous commenciez par le cr. Votre raison, votre imagination, votre volontvotre amour, doivent devenir ce monde..." (Zarathoustra II, ''Sur les Iles bienheureuses'').

5. Teilbard de Chardin

Il dit le processus d'hominisation. Pour lui, la noosph enveloppe 'echelle planire la nature (la biosph). La noosph, savoir et communication, semble s'identifier pour lui au mondial. Teilhard attribue une grande importance au rapport conflictuel entre l'entropie et la nentropie. Seul, avec MacLuhan, il tente d'interprr spfiquement les techniques de communication. Cette interprtion optimiste est plus descriptive qu'analytique et critique; est-elle encore acceptable? C'est une question.

6. Heidegger

Formules obscures et profondes. Dans sa premi œuvre, Sein und Seit, il cont en termes anthropologiques le monde; il explicite le "in-der-Welt-Sein" de l'homme, c'est-ire son e en proie au monde. Plus tard, franchissant les limites de cette anthropologie confondue avec une ontologie, Heidegger cherche oncevoir le monde en lui-m. Il dare: "Le monde se modifie." "Die Welt Bellet"... Ce qui pourrait se prendre pour une tautologie mais veut dire que la dispersion cesse des lieux sr que ces lieux se rassemblent, ce qui tend onstituer un (le) monde, unitt totalitCette totaliterait l'issue du cheminement dans les tbres, dans le souci et l'angoisse, dans la banalitt l'inauthentique dont seule nous sort la hantise de la mort. Mais il faut cr cette totalitondiale. Qu'est-ce que penser? La connaissance mte et poursuit cette crion pleine de risques. L'unitssaire ne suffit pas nir le mondial; elle est discerndu mondain (intra-mondain), de la dliction, de la banalituotidienne. Comme Marx, mais autrement, Heidegger mte sur la technique. Elle ravage la nature en la dominant; son importance moderne fait partie de l'histoire de l'Etre; en elle et par elle l'Etre se manifeste mais s'occulte. Le ravage par la technique terminl'Etre apparaa dans le monde ainsi bli au-dele l'errance et de la demeure, du discours et de l'angoisse. Le possible suit le nssaire, mais il n'a pas sa raison d'e dans la nssitL'Etre et son histoire, qui aboutit au mondial, est sans pourquoi. Comme la rose dans le po d'Angs Silus, rappelar Heidegger dans Le principe de Raison. La rose est sans pourquoi. Ainsi la Rose du monde!...

7. Kostes Axalos

Il se veut et se dit expressnt philosophe du monde. Pour Axelos, le jeu est beaucoup pus qu'une activitarmi les autres, plus qu'un symbole du monde (cf. Fink). Il le rle. Axelos dloppe comme Heidegger mais en allant plus loin le cbre aphorisme d'Hclite sur le dieu-enfant qui joue aux davec et dans le monde. Le jeu, c'est-ire le risque (de perdre, de gagner), est l'essence m du monde. Tout est jeu dans le monde, sans que l'homme qui est le joueur connaisse ou puisse fixer res et enjeux. L'homme qui joue est aussi le jouet et son jeu perpellement duMais c'est en lui et par lui que le jeu se reconnacomme acca totalitt que le jeu de monde se reconnacomme totalitLe monde selon Axelos? Une totalitn devenir, fragmentaire et dispers multidimensionnelle et ouverte, en qui s'ttent et dttent les puissances qui relient l'homme e monde - mythes et religions, poe et art, politique et philosophie, sciences et techniques - puissances elles-ms anim par des forces mentaires: langage, pens travail, lutte, amour, et mort. Tout ceci fondamentalement probltique c'est-ire rendant probltique tout projet mais en exigeant toujours un projet.

Sans fin, ni but ni terme. Sans autre sens que le jeu toujours duui fait de chaque joueur son jouet.

Autrement dit en exprimant aussi clairement que possible une penscommune eidegger, ink, xelos dans la lignhclitne: pour qu'il y ait des possibles il y a une condition primordiale; il faut une action, un projet ou des projets, donc des risques encourus et assum des obstacles et des dangers; en deux mots un devenir et une aventure. Il faut qu'il y ait jeu. Dans toutes les conjonctures, tous les possibles rgent; toutes les strates, toutes les formes d'action sont essay. Toutes ouent tu tard, du par un jeu plus puissant, le jeu cachu monde. Toutes ouent plus ou moins, drd plus ou moins, les enjeux changeant laissant gain ou perte. Chaque fois, quelque chose se dile. Trop tard. Nssaire, le jeu ouvre le possible.

8. MacLuhan

Doit-on le considr comme un philosophe ou comme un savant? J'opte pour la philosophie, impliquant chez cet auteur des hypoths aventureuses, en apparence scientifiques, en vtocio-mphysiques. Sa philosophie des media ne tient compte que de la tvision. L'informatique et la tmatique bouleversent les anticipations un peu lres qui l'ont rendu cbre. Rien de moins certain que la nouvelle tribalitAvec les nouvelles techniques de communication, l'atomisation et la totalisation du social sont lement possibles. On a fait remarquer lusieurs reprises que dans les pays industriels avancflit d l'importance de la tvision.

9. La Philosophie et/es Philosophes

Ils ont stimula rexion et la mtation lis ont que monde et le mondial en montrant la complexite sa formation. De la lecture des philosophes il rlte que le mondial n'est plus l'informe, l'horizon inaccessible des horizons, l'indescriptible. Les philosophes l'ont senti mais ils ont aussi suscites fantasmes, des symbolisme tantihilistes tantptimistes. Pour rendre plus concret le concept du mondial ne faut-il pas avoir recours aux diverses sciences dites sciences de l'homme en intant dans une thie globale les rltats partiels?

Mais il n'est pas question ici de tenter la thisation compl du mondial. Par exemple, je laisserai dbment de ccertains aspects importants de la question, entre autres la division du travail 'elle mondiale, les changements dans les forces productives et dans leur rrtition a surface du globe. Cet aspect nomique exige une de particuli. Je m'attacherai 'autres aspects du probl.

10 Critique de l'Europentrisme

Ce vice de mode et de pensn'a pas disparu. Que de gens ne convent le mondial que comme une extension du Logos europ, du mode de production et du mode de consommation nen Europe. Le concept de diffnce reste mal assimilt le pluralisme se rit pour beaucoup a pluralites partis politiques. Or el faut admettre aussi la diversites cultures (mot bien vague) et celle des concepts et catries voire de leur mode d'emploi dans le discours. Aujourd'hui on doit reconnae que Marx lui-m n'a pas app l'europentrisme.

La saisie du mondial comme processus historique si l'on veut - mais sortant de l'historicitlassique dnie par la seule mire - exige que l'on dsse dbment l'europentrisme. Il ne faut pas s'attacher e que les aspects homogs du mondial prminent sur les diffnces. Il ne faut pas s'attendre ne simple extension quantitative du Logos europ mais es transformations qualitatives au cours d'un long et profond mouvement.

11. La Mondialisation de l'at

Au lieu d'un unique Etat mondial l'histoire moderne a donnne multiplicit'Etat-nations et d'Etats plurinationaux (frations et confrations). La rationalitolitique selon Hegel n'a cependant pas disparu de la sc; ces Etats forment un syst et des traits analogues sinon homogs se reconnaissent en chaque Etat particulier. Le syst mondial des Etats n'empe pas la fragmentation extr de la totalitlanire; il n'empe pas davantage la stricte hirchie allant du plus petit et du plus humble Etat aux super-puissances. Je propose que l'on retienne ce concept de la totalithomogit fragmentation - hirchie. Il dent une certaine gralitil s'applique 'autres domaines que le politique.

Pas plus que la fragmentation et la hichie, le syst mondial des Etats n'exclut les contradictions. Conflits et affrontements, tantacifiques tanton, font leur chemin ravers le syst tique. Pour le thicien du mondial la mondialisation prend une double forme, grosse de difficult d'une part la mondialisation de l'at, d'autre part les firmes mondiales (prototype: IBM).

D'o proposition que je pourrais ncer comme un th: le mondial se forme ravers ce qui l'arr, ce qui le fixe, ce qui le dgr (obstacles, conflits, et contradictions multiples).

12. Le Marchondial

Il existe. Il dent une unituisque les pays "socialistes" n'ont pas rsi onstituer un second marchival du premier. Le marchondial n'est pas pour autant le mondial; il ne dnit pas l'homme planire. Il n'en est que le support. Il manque une thie du marchondial. Les spalistes n'en connaissent qu'une composante par exemple le syst monire. Le marchondial s'analyse en terme de flux, de courants, de raux - mais aussi de systs, de p, de points forts et fixes.

Une particularitend difficile l'analyse de cette ritouvante et hyper-complexe: le possible, pr, joue le rd'une cause ou raison. Tel secteur du march'explore, s'occupe selon des procres appropri; les virtualitse prennent en compte et la prsion devient optionnelle, non sans risque.

En tant que tel le marchondial s'analyse en flux divers qui se superposent et s'articulent ou divergent dans l'espace: flux de produits finis, flux de capitaux, flux de main-d'œuvre, flux de techniques, flux de connaissances, voire de symboles et signes, flux d'informations, flux d'œuvres dites culturelles, etc... D'o proposition: le nssaire c'est-ire l'extension mondiale de la marchandise, de la valeur d'ange (de leur langage, de leur logique) laisse place 'exploration du possible et m l'exige.

Sur le marchondial l'nomique et le politique se rejoignent ou s'affrontent: "paradoxalement le succd'lBM et le champ de son nouveau dloppement donnent aux Etats l'occasion de s'affirmer comme interlocuteurs de la compagnie sur un terrain o sont s'ils le veulent moins drm.. Maesse de raux la compagnie prendrait une dimension qui exc la sph proprement industrielle: elle participerait qu'elle le veuille ou non 'empire de la plan... La carence des Etats crait un vide, rapidement comblar le dynamisme spontane la compagnie IBM..." (Rapport Nora-Minc, pp. 65 - 66).

13. L'Espace Mondial et le Temps

Dans la conception habituelle de l'historicitle temps joue un rdrminant. Or un changement quantitatif et qualitatif a lieu: de plus en plus c'est l'espace qui joue le rprimordial. A lui peut maintenant s'attribuer une importance qui reste gmatique si l'on ne tient compte que de la temporalitcausalitu futur, influence de l'absence. Les espaces vacants disponibles pour telle ou telle activitcommerciale, industrielle, financi, voire culturelle ou militaire) entrent dans les suppurations et les strates. Le sous-sol, le sol, le sur-sol, et l'espace aen ne se srent pas. L'espace mondial c'est-ire planire et m sidl rit le nssaire et le possible sans pour autant drminer quel possible se risera. D'o conception de la causalitt de la finalitui modifie et supplante les anciennes catries philosophiques sans pour autant les annuler. Il en va pour le nssaire le possible comme pour le sujet et l'objet.

Il en rlte que le temps doit aujourd'hui se penser autrement que selon des modalittraditionnelles. L'espace-temps de la mondialitequiert des approches et des atteintes intes. Le temps se localise et chaque lieu comprend un temps; mais il n'en existe pas moins un temps mondial. La temporalite peut plus se concevoir selon le cycle des naissances et des dins (Hegel-Marx-Nietzsche) mais selon la relation conflictuelle des strates mondiales. D'oproposition: c'est un espace-temps de catastrophes, au sens de Renhom.

Deuxième Partie: L'Informationnel et sa Problématique a l'Echelle Mondiale

1 Les ProgrTechnologiques

Inutile d'insister ici sur les techniques nouvelles. La presse depuis quelque temps est pleine de descriptions dill sur les nouveaux dispositifs et procres de l'information. J'insisterai seulement sur deux ou trois points. Il y a d'autre part des techniques qui impliquent cette connaissance mathtique mais qui s'en distinguent comme les applications se distinguent de la science fondamentale. Enfin, il y a une pratique sociale de l'information. Une tendance se fait jouer dmettre qu'il n'y a aucune sration entre ces trois domaines et que par consent il y a une sorte de thie unitaire du champ informationnel. Cette prndue science thique qui fait disparae les distinctions dans une globalitel de ce que j'appellerai l'idogie informationnelle et que je critiquerai plus loin. Cette tendance riger toute thie nouvelle en absolu apparabien des fois au cours de l'histoire du savoir. Toutefois il ne peut pas e question de sration absolue entre ces trois secteurs puisque la thie de la dadation de l'rgie informationnelle se retrouve partout et se relie comme on sait aux lois grales de l'rgque et de la thermodynamique. Seconde remarque: il y a d'autres "aventures technologiques" que l'aventure informationnelle, qu'il n'y a pas lieu de priviler en la portant 'absolu ici encore. Parmi ces "aventures technologiques" citons l'exploration et l'exploitation du fond des mers, les manipulations gtiques et les performances de la biologie: les probls rgques et les sources d'rgie, etc... Il n'en est pas moins important de souligner que l'avance technologique renforce mais en m temps diversifie le rau mondial des communications. Il tend onstituer un rau unique par inter-connexions des raux divers et en s'intant des services multiples. La question de l'informationnel, quelque peu banalisde nos jours, n'est pas pour autant is

2. L 'Idogie Informationnelle

C'est une question importante non seulement parce que l'information atteint la totalitu public, modifiant ainsi les reprntations et idogies, modifiant aussi les normes et valeurs, mais parce qu'on observe partout une forte tendance ransfr la fonction idogique, y compris la production et la diffusion du savoir de l'universitt de l'le aux appareils d'information. Or ceux-ci sont administrativement et institutionnellement contr soit par l'Etat, soit par les grandes firmes dites mondiales.

En particulier tout ce qui concerne la (le) politique risque de passer par les canaux de l'information. Ce qui voue la penset l'action politique indndante et nonprogrammoes 'inefficacitt a stlitLa politique elle-m risque d'e remplacpar l'idogie et par le discours des autoritet des "compnts," c'est-ire des techniciens et technocrates capables de programmer l'informationnel.

Cette tendance fait partie de la "crise" actuelle et l'nd non seulement aux valeurs et normes mais a penspolitique et aux institutions. Elle favorise la personnalisation du pouvoir et m l'appel n consensus nouveau autour du pouvoir personnalisDanger primordial: le renforcement sans limite de l'Etat et de ses capacitmultiples, gestionnaires, ressives, idogiques.

L'idogie informationnelle en vient nnoncer la gen d'une autre soci: la soci post-industrielle. La soci prndustrielle serait fondsur la disposition des matis premis. La soci industrielle s'organise autour de l'rgie... La soci post-industrielle se structurerait autour de l'information (cf. The Changing Inform. Environment, Westview, Environmental Studies, Tome IV. 1976).

La critique de l'idogie informationnelle doit ter ce que les auteurs de "l'ordinateur au pouvoir," P. Gremion et H. Jamous, appellent le roman rose et le roman noir de l'informatique. Je veux ter la "fascination" que provoquent ces instruments capables de collecter, d'inter, et de traiter l'information sans moraliser ni politiser arbitrairement les donn. Il s'agit donc de dsser dans cette critique les vieilles questions: "Quels sont les effets de l'informatique sur ceci ou sur cela?... L'informatique est-elle neutre?..."

Les idogues de l'information savent que la soci se transforme et qu'il en rlte une profonde modification sinon un effondrement des normes et des valeurs. Ils pensent que l'information sera nssaire et suffisante pour blir de nouvelles valeurs. Ils proposent ce qui leur parafa fois possible et nssaire: l'image d'une soci transparente. Dans cette soci, tout se rrcuterait aussitans les moindres dils des pphes aux centres, et des centres jusque dans les pphes les plus lointaines. Pas d'ombres ni de coins sombres ni de "niches" dans cette pratique parfaite. Pas de secret ni honteux ni discret. L'information socialisaboutirait ne soci "intalement planifi ocentre recevrait de chaque cellule de base des messages corrects sur son elle de prrence" de sorte que la culture et l'information, rendant chaque individu conscient des contraintes grales et collective, "auraient m structure et m orientation" (cf. Rapport Nora-Minc p. 122). Il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une idogie mais d'une mythologie scientiste et d'une utopie dangereuse, d'autant plus que le dloppement technique de "l'audit" destinu contrinterne des entreprises peut s'ndre jusqu'au contrglobal de toutes [es organisations, jusqu''ensemble des raux de communication. L'audit vise expressnt et rationnellement l'adation des moyens aux buts dans une efficacitui mine toute perturbation.

Les idogues de l'information donnent la somme de leurs techniques pour une science objective: pour une activit'ensemble capable d'atteindre la totalitu r social, de la maiser et de la gr. Ils ne pensent pas qu'ils interprnt des donn mais croient parvenir 'objectivittable dans le domaine social. Ils ne veulent pas reconnae qu'ils prntent ou reprntent eux-ms un projet politique.

Subordonner es facteurs techniques les faits sociaux et politiques, n'est-ce pas une attitude politique? Techniciser le politique et le social au lieu de socialiser et de politiser le technologique, c'est on avis une attitude politique, faussement objective: une idogie qui se donne pour science. Cette affirmation ne rud pas (cf. les recherches d mentionn de Gron et Jamous) le difficile probl des rapports entre changement technique et changement social, mais interdit de prendre pour solution ce qui pose le probl.

La maise de l'informationnel implique une critique approfondie du concept et de la pratique. Ceux-ls qui dloppent le point de vue techniciste laissent lieu et place aux "cellules de base" et aux "micro-socis". Ils se prononcent pour un type dntralise soci tout en faisant une confiance absolue 'informationnel. Leurs bonnes intentions ne font aucun doute; mais ils admettent implicitement l'mination de la penscritique. Ce qui rend plus significatif encore la pratique politique. On poursuit en France au nom d'un monopole d'Etat les tentatives de radios indndantes, alors que l'expence de Radio-Lorraine "Cœur d'acier" montre l'intt d'ssions libres faites et contrs par des travailleurs pour la dnse de leur ron. L'expence de Radio-Alice montre d'autres aspects des ssions libres; ce qui s'exprime en termes que beaucoup ont trouvxcessifs: "le dr se donne une voix".. (cf. "Radio-Alice" laboratoire de sociologie de la connaissance, Universitaris VlII, 1977).

L'informationnel sans limites et sans critique est rcteur de la connaissance comme de la spontanConnae, ce n'est plus employer les concepts borpar une activitpfique, c'est seulement recevoir et retenir de l'information. Le concept de la connaissance s'estompe; ntuellement il dispara

Or l'information se dade. D'oxigence de dispositifs rstant a dadation par l'affirmation de l'identitL'identitroclame qu'elle rste a diffnce comme a dadation.

Reste une interrogation cruciale. L'informationnel est-il producteur ou creur? Se contente-t-il de vculer des aper sur l'existant ou bien lui ajoute-t-il quelque chose qui le modifie et qui introduit du nouveau? Historiquement il est difficile de rter la th de MacLuhan sur le rcrif des communications: l'alphabet phonque, l'imprimerie, etc... Mais l'on peut penser aussi que cette capacitrrice dine peu eu avec le chemin de fer, l'auto, l'avion, les media au XXI sie et enfin l'informationnel. Entropie? Peut-e.

S'il on admet la dissociation de l'activitroductive en matelle (agricole et industrielle) et informationnelle (non pas "spirituelle" ou "superstructurelle") on aboutit ette conclusion que le second secteur croit plus rapidement que le premier; il tend donc 'encombrer et a limite e paralyser. Les thiciens annoncent donc une crise de l'information dans une soci par ailleurs en t critique. Ce serait un cas particulier et particuliment grave de l'entropie. La capacite travail utile (productif) diminuerait lorsque la puissance dissips've a moitie la puissance globalement consomm Il y aurait un seuil (travaux de llya Prigoline, Prix Nobel 1977).

Les linguistes ont dettre l'existence de niveaux: i'infra-linguistique et le supralinguistique. De m ne faut-il pas admettre un en-dede l'informationnel (le spontanet un au-della connaissance bor? Les thiciens technocratiques de l'information en font la forme supeure du savoir destin'absorber 'elle mondiale. Or l'information n'est qu'un ment de la connaissance, ment nssaire mais brut, non boronceptuellement et non passar la penscritique.

Une entreprise de rction et de destruction se doie 'elle mondiale, entreprise menavec des moyens formidables. En m temps elle cherche tendre au monde entier des techniques produites par les pays les plus dloppet elle duit par le fondement le Lagos sans profit pour personne. Elle ne le dsse pas mais l'attaque du dedans, en son propre nom en le dmposant. Cette ntivitui se donne pour positivitarfaite est particuliment nocive. L'idogie et l'idisme informationnels agissent dans le sens de la dislocation a fois pour la probltique politique et pour la quotidiennetechnicis en supprimant prsnt tous les probls. Or c'est 'elle mondiale que la situation se dile et qu'elle doie tous ces risques.

Rire, simplifier pour dominer, tel est le but a fois des terminologies spalis, des logiques particulis, des rationalisations llure scientifique.

Le secret et la transparence? Paradoxalement il faut attaquer le secret contre ceux qui l'utilisent pour rer (secrets politiques, diplomatiques, et financiers) - et le dndre contre ceux qui veulent l'abolir pour rer par d'autres modes plus sophistiqu. Mais ce n'est pas le m secret. Les secrets de la vie personnelle et affective, il faut absolument les protr et les sauver.

3. Globalisme et Pluralisme

Les technologies posent sans le rudre le probl essentiel qui oblige n choix; ne option politique. Autrement dit la nssitici l'unification intable des raux 'elle mondiale) ne s'nd pas jusqu'aux possibilit elle les fait nae; elle suscite une probltique, poset drmindepuis plusieurs ann. Le probl s'nce ainsi: les systs de communication et d'information doivent s'examiner non pas isolnt mais dans un contexte social et politique. Ou bien on exige des formes et des forces sociales qu'elles s'adaptent a technologie, ce qui favorise une structure verticale et centralis Ou bien on mise sur l'intensification du social sans hter devant les "bruits" et les interventions perturbatrices, ce qui favorise les courants horizontaux. Ou bien le message anonyme, produit industriel, irculation verticale a prioritOu bien la circulation entre les activitsociales. Ou bien, autre mani de s'exprimer, l'information statistique - ou bien l'information service, bassur l'usage (notion rser). Ou bien on vise le rau mondial totalement int ou bien on vise l'assouplissement du rau. De toute mani deux types opposde soci se profilent 'horizon. Il y a conflit donc a fois exigence d'une option et mouvement dialectique car il va de soi qu'une soci dntralisdu point de vue de l'information n'exclut pas absolument la centralitles messages verticaux. Elle les relativise.

4 La Maise de l'Information

Elle ne peut venir d'une action centralisatrice, d'une structure unitaire. Une telle action ne peut que miser sur la redondance, sur la rtition. Paradoxalement et du seul point de vue scientifique, maiser l'information veut dire: intensifier les effets de surprise - diminuer la redondance. Or la surprise ne peut venir que d'en bas.

Il y a plus et mieux aire qu'ntraliser techniquement les structures informationnelles en multiples niveaux ou ges ou mailles ou alves. Cette th encore technocratique a le mte de montrer technologiquement les avantages d'une organisation diffntielle de l'espace. Elle ne montre pas le fonctionnement autonome des centres partiels et de la base. C'est ainsi que, dans certains schs politiques, il est question de "contre-pouvoirs" mais ils ne sont lue pour "ilibrer" les pouvoirs politiques rs, c'est-ire les centres de dsion inattaquables comme tels.

La question reste une question politique fondamentale. Pour maiser l'information il faut admettre que la "base," les macro-socis, les cellules ou alves (territoriales ou non attach n terroir) aient une activitt une force propres, une capacite contret d'auto-drmination. La maise de l'information est un probl de dcratie politique.

Nous retrouvons ici la grande probltique de l'autogestion. L'information fournit peut e un crit de la production et du marchComment discerner des simulacres d'autogestion les conditions rles de son efficacitQuelle part ont ou auront les organismes de base (entreprises et communautterritoriales) dans la production, la gestion, et l'usage de l'informationnel? L'autogestion ne peut que se valoriser et prendre un contenu plus concret dans la probltique de l'informationnel.

5. Citoyens et Usagers

Un grand combat idogique et politique se dule autour de ces concepts. Comme l'ont remarques observateurs et analystes objectifs, l'usager tend emplacer le citoyen. Celui-ci n'est gu plus qu'une abstraction politique; ses "droits," depuis longtemps fictifs en grande partie, s'amenuisent, vtable peau de chagrin. L'usager seul aurait une existence pratique. Il emploie tel ou tel "service" public ou privIl les emploie tous tour our et les rit dans l'usage.

Ce concept relativement nouveau a une belle cari. Au dt il a engendruelques illusions et il a pu passer pour restitution de la "valeur d'usage" dominpar la "valeur d'ange." L'usager a des besoins "rs," les plus rs n'nt pas des produits de la publicitIl a sa place nssaire dans toutes les fonctions: transports, achats et ventes, communications et informations.

Or le concept d'usager devient de plus en plus suspect. Non sans raison. Le citoyen? C'est un concept politique. L'usager? Ce n'est qu'un concept fonctionnel ouvertement dlitisIl sert d'instrument idogique pour saper par la base la thie et la pratique de la citoyennett des "droits" de l'homme et du citoyen, fondement de la dcratie.

Pour satisfaire l'usager, il suffirait de faire fonctionner "normalement" tous les services. Au nom de l'usager on pourrait exiger un fonctionnement "normal," ce qui met en question le droit de gr.

Les dangers de la situation sont donc multiples, ils ne sont pas seulement en provenance de l'utilisation tique de l'informationnel. L'emploi commercial de l'information jusque dans l'industrie culturelle est gros d'autres dangers. On va produire industriellement et culturellement en fonction des besoins et drs du public, c'est-ire d'usagers drmin On die d les goes usagers pris dans les classes moyennes; des "groupes-cibles" dmitaracts en tous points moyens et banals fournissent des mods de consommation matelle et culturelle standardis Ces mods servent de crit. Les comportements et mnismes psychosociologiques des usagers deviennent ainsi des moyens de domination. Pourtant, dans l'informationnel l'usage et l'usager "lein-temps" ne regagnentils pas une capacitevendicative qui exc le simple fonctionnement? En effet les usagers exigent le qualitatif.

Par l'usager retrouve le citoyen. L'unite ces deux concepts, dans la pratique sociale et dans la vie politique, pourrait ntuellement les restituer, les consolider, et les enrichir l'un par l'autre.


C'est en France, semble-t-il, que paraissent avec le plus de force les menaces et dangers et par consent les probls de l'informationnel. Ces menaces ne transparaissent gu dans les colloques officiels consacr'informatique et a soci. Par contre elles sont soulign avec beaucoup de clartans des publications officieuses, par exemple le rapport d'activitu CORDES (commissariat au plan) en 1978. On lit (pp. 147 - 148) dans le rm'une recherche poursuivie par un groupe scientifique de Grenoble: "La machinerie des appareils d'information frans reproduit les caracts de l'appareil d'Etat frans. Elle est tiste et centralis elle est dominpar le Minist des finances..." Au lieu d'aller vers la transparence cette machine aggrave la soci du secret. Cette structure explique pour une part l'abandon par les planificateurs d'une perspective axsur l'action sociale. Cet abandon apparaaux enquurs comme un aspect d'un tournant stratque pendant l'boration du Vlli plan: le repli de la planification sociale sur l'appareil d'Etat, c'est-ire sur la rlation macro-nomique, via la simulation auprdes partenaires sociaux que l'on connasous le nom de "concertation." Ce qui a d des consences graves dans certains domaines sociaux comme la santublique. Le caract ponctuel et limite la participation des syndicats, ajoutent ces enquurs, a laisse champ libre aux affrontements entre les administrations.

Il existe donc d en France une structure de l'appareil informationnel. Elle agit invisiblement et profondnt. Sans doute pourrait-elle ater sous la pression nomique, sociale, et politique d'ments nouveaux. Mais pourrait-il s'agir d'une simple rrme?

L'exigence de dntralisation va beaucoup plus loin que ne le pensent ceux qui proposent cette dntralisation avec des arguments technologiques. Elle implique un projet global. Son accomplissement ne suppose pas seulement des dsions d'ordre gouvernemental. Elle implique une action politique rle, c'est-ire des luttes politiques trconcrs. La base ne se fraie sa voie que par des actions efficaces. Il y a beaucoup de chances pour que les sommets (politiques, tiques) n'admettent la dntralisation, les diffnces affirm, le pluralisme, les microsocis, que contraints et forc Comment? Par la dcratie, c'est-ire par la lutte pour la dcratie. En effet la dcratie ne se dnit pas par une statique, par une stabilitu un ilibre, mais comme une dynamique et un mouvement, par une conqu et une reconqu incessantes.

La technique en elle-m a des exigences mais aussi des limites. En elle et par elle se dare le nssaire. Celui-ci ne se ferme pas, ne se constitue pas malgres prntions de certains technocrates en syst achevLoin de lelle ouvre des possibilit elle s'ouvre vers des possibilitdiverses, voire contradictoires. Quant a production par la seule technique d'une sorte d'organisme mondial, ce r ne rste pas 'analyse.

Le combat politique pour les diffnces devient fondamental ous les niveaux - non sans filtrage des prntions a diffnce et sans sre analyse critique. Pas n'importe quoi ni n'importe qui!

La mondialisation qui se forme suscite a fois la rexion sur le nssaire, la mtation sur le possible, et parfois l'imaginaire le plus drant. La mort de la plan Terre et l'horizon merveilleux de l'homme planire vont ensemble. L'homogitu mondial ne doit pas omnubiler mais au contraire susciter la formation de l'hrog ou "hrologique" (terme emprunt Georges Bataille).

Le mondial se dge ainsi comme sc et scrio du possible.


Chairman: Jos. Silva Michelena
Co-chairman: Slobodan Ristic
Rapporteur: James A. Maraj


Gregory BIue

The five position papers presented to this session and the ensuing discussion developed the theme from different points of view, but it seems that each intervention sought to focus attention on the same basic questions, namely: Science and technology for whom? For whose benefit? At whose serviced In addition, special attention was paid to debunking various forms of scientism and technological determinism. It was first of all pointed out that science and technology are the results of historically determined social activity. Dr. Tomovic reviewed the development of modern technology since the Industrial Revolution and considered the implications of a heritage dominated by mass production, profit optimization, hierarchical forms of management, and the abuse of natural resources. Dr. Leite Lopes extended this historical analysis in order to situate the scientific and technological dependence of the Latin American countries; and Dr. Le Thanh Khoi related specific mechanisms of scientific and technical dependence to other aspects of the cultural domination to which Third World countries are subjected. Henri Lefebvre stressed the continuing pre-eminence of the world market in shaping scientific and technological as well as political objectives and, drawing on the example of the informational sciences, considered ways in which the development of new fields of knowledge is a scene of sharp social struggle. Dr. Pandeya (whose paper we have not been able to include in this volume) in turn pointed out that in the Third World both the natural and the social sciences can flourish only if the scientists are bound closely to the people and serve the interests of the people. Dr. Barel developed these problems theoretically, working from a view of the mutual interpenetration of science and society; he distinguished two necessarily complementary types of rationality, namely, the mechanistic and the dialectical, and he spoke of the dangers inherent in pushing along with the first while neglecting the second, since human liberation requires that the dialectical (or structural) method must take the leading role. According to Dr. Lefebvre, on the other hand, scientific truth extends rather than dilates the scope of human responsibility, and it therefore necessitates critical political struggle for differences at all levels. Drs. Pandoya and Leite Lopes emphasized that only political struggles could determine whether science and technology would play a specifically liberating role for the majority of the people in the world; and Dr. Leite Lopes in particular noted that the goal of advancing science itself gives Third World scientists an integral role in participating in such struggles. Finally, Dr. Tomovic spoke concretely about ways and means of breaking out of contemporary technological impasses and of creating better facilities for solving individual and social problems.

One of the points of conflict throughout the conference, especially in the early sessions, concerned the question of "appropriate technology." Starting off the discussion, Dr. Macura argued that the technology necessary to meet the growing needs of the population of the Third World must be appropriate, in the sense of being inexpensive, labour-intensive, energy-saving, and egalitarian in terms of providing employment opportunities and the satisfaction of basic needs. Dr. Holland spoke of the dangers of technological unemployment and noted that technological innovation is often an aspect of heightening international competition. Dr. Pandaya, on the other hand, objected strongly to the notion of appropriate technology on the grounds that what is advertised as "appropriate" for Third World countries is in fact often obsolete for the industrialized nations, and he said that implementation of such technology is in fact a recipe for continual dependence and underdevelopment. Dr. Stambuk agreed with this and felt that problems concerning the development of science and technology as well as those concerning unemployment would properly have to be viewed within the more general context of changes in society as a whole. Finally, Dr. Pecujlic was of the opinion that "alternative" technologies which take into account both productivity and human well-being can be born only from social struggle and not from catchy slogans. Unfortunately, Dr. Leite Lopes was unable to attend the conference, but the last section of his paper should be consulted for his own cogent criticism of the strategy of "appropriate technology."

Stuart Holland, Le Thanh Khoi, Milos Macura, and A.N. Pandeya took part in the discussion.

Report on session I

Jam. A. Maraj

The initial consideration of the sub-theme was facilitated by the presentation of four position papers whose titles give some indication of the particular perspective from which each of the main speakers approached the matter.

Dr. Lefebvre in opening the proceedings concerned himself with what was necessary and what was possible in the transformation being contemplated. In the worldwide struggle taking place, although "knowledge" was only part of the overall problem, it was nevertheless a most significant part. A strategy for coping with knowledge on a world scale was urgently required, for the emergence of information science as a result of technological development now made it impossible for any specialist to grasp the complexity and the amount of information being processed and disseminated. Dr. Lefebvre also noted that by linking information processing to government channels which controlled financial resources, there was a tendency to emphasize consumption rather than production. The technology itself had little to do with how the information was processed and absorbed, and questions related to the production of information by whom and for whom were politically and ideologically determined rather than technologically.

Professor Tomovic argued that we had reached a turning point or the beginning of a new era. He wondered what universities could do. Referring to the definition of technology in his paper, he commented on the mystification of the relationship between science and technology and noted that very few powers could really develop technology from basic knowledge. Professor Tomovic felt that emphasizing technology often diverted attention from social problems. The development of particular technologies was essentially socially conditioned. He referred to destructive effects associated with mass production based on profit motives and claimed that the management of technology often depended on authoritarian attitudes. In his view, if social conditions favoured it, enough of the basic goods could be produced and technology could be used to solve urgent urban problems or improve the delivery of health care for the masses, for example. Professor Tomovic suggested that universities should start research on a critical history of technology and he wanted particular studies made of the interaction between specific technologies and their social consequences. He drew attention to the need for technology forecasting and assessment and the need for greater self-reliance to be promoted. In his view this self-reliance was not facilitated by transfers of techniques or educational systems whose goals required thorough reexamination.

Professor Pandeya reminded us that the focus of our concerns in considering science and technology as factors in transformation had to be seen in the context of a movement from domination to liberation. He accepted the contribution which two sciences could make, and had made, to development. Natural sciences (Sc. 1), which generate technology leading to productivity, and Sc. 2, humanistic and social sciences which were. at the core of a society's ideological apparatus, were taken as given. Professor Pandeya emphasized, however, that there was a third science which had to be utilized for revolutionizing existing structures in order to create the new order or new varieties of order which we seek. It was not reproduction of the order as known which science and technology should be used for; rather they should be revolutionizing agents. Relating this approach to cultural transformation, Professor Pandeya argued that there was a need to link scientific insights to "the physic impulses" of the people and that their cultural perspective should not be limited to a social. memory only, but be enhanced by a forward-looking element which could lead to a capacity for critical reflection. In his view, liberation will only be achieved when, on a large scale, the critical scientific insights of imaginative minds are shared by the people and become an integral part of their consciousness and cultural frame of reference.

Professor Yves Barel, commenting on his paper, "Scientific Paradigms and Human Self-determination," noted the following:

1. Science and technology, contrary to certain well-established beliefs, have certain negative side-effects on human self-determination, i.e. on the right and the power of the individual, the social groups, and, finally, the bulk of the population to decide about their actions, to make sense of them, and to determine their objectives.

2. These negative side-effects are particularly significant in three fields:

- the autonomization of technical systems, which means the autonomy of the machinery vis-is the immediate human operator;

- the displacement of labour know-how, the real qualification of workers, by algorithms which become foreign to these workers;

- the development of new forms of social control founded on the diffusion of "scientific" and rationalizing norms in multidirectional domains: private life sexuality, family life, education of children, nourishment methods, etc.

3. This influence of science and technology is not only a problem of the social misuse of their results, but also a problem of inner methodological and epistemological orientations. These orientations, in turn, are themselves partly a social problem.

4. Reorienting the techno-scientific direction implies a new sort of compromise between the two dominant paradigms - the mechanistic paradigm and the "structural" or "dialectic" paradigm - which does not give priority to the mechanization of structure, particularly human and social structures. The real problem which this raises is the problem of re-examining the present imbalance of power.


Professor Macura noted that while ethical, philosophical factors were important, economic factors were no less so. Quoting figures related to the gap between developed and developing countries, he felt that technology was the instrument to assist in its reduction. Focusing on the employment problem faced by most countries he noted that appropriate technology had to be seriously considered.

The new technology must advance egalitarianism, save energy, and conserve natural resources; it should be inexpensive and labour-intensive, but productive. China had demonstrated its feasibility. The question now was whether China could continue in this way and in what specific dimensions alternatives would be essential.

Dr. Holland reminded us that we were at the end of a long phase of development. He noted the distinction between process and product innovations, the former resulting in the displacement of labour which is no longer absorbed and compensated for by growth in the latter.

It was important to recall how people view the world. For example, work is regarded as a good thing per se. Some of these values may have to be altered and if technology could not produce more jobs, as seemed to be the case, could it be used to assist in coping with new life patterns, e.g., wiser use of leisure.

Looking at S & T on a wider perspective, perhaps biological planning, availability of nuclear energy, etc., could in due course also be major factors in the transformation.

Professor Pandeya observed that the economic gap was not the whole story. The science-knowledge industry had grown to such proportions that it was now over 30:1 in favour of the industrialized nations. The notion that low-level technology is good enough for the Third World was totally unacceptable in his view.

Rector Pecujlic noted that the problem was essentially one of individual norms of behaviour versus the collective conditions of the system. He felt that it was only out of a social struggle that technological innovation could really be born.

Professor Le Thanh Khoi observed that science and technology are a part of culture as envisaged in its largest meaning, and should be examined in this context. Culture could be a liberation as well as a domination. There was no political and economic independence without a cultural independence. In his view culture comprised four main elements: education; science and technology; "culture in its restrictive senses"; and communication.

1. Education. Its development is usually measured by quantitative indicators (rates of enrollment, number of students per 10,000 inhabitants, percentage of GNP devoted to education, etc.). The real question is what is education for and for whom. Is education a reflection of its own culture or of foreign culture(s), does it use national language(s), what are the social origins of those students who arrive at the university and get the diplomas enabling them to obtain the best positions while others are condemned to manual occupations or to unemployment?

2. Science and technology. These, likewise, should be examined not only from the quantitative point of view (number of scientists and engineers per 10,000 inhabitants, budget, etc.), but particularly from the point of view of the policy followed by national authorities, which in turn is composed of three elements:

- The production of knowledge: what kind of knowledge is or is not produced in the country, by whom (expatriate or national scientists)? Does this production take into account the real conditions of the country?

- The diffusion of knowledge: is it restricted to the elite or widely communicated to the population, so that they can apply it to production?

- The application of knowledge: there may be knowledge, but it is not applied for what reasons? These may be political, social, or economic reasons, e.g. pressures from transnational corporations.

3. Culture (in its restricted sense). Colonialism had persuaded the colonized peoples that they had no culture, or a culture vastly inferior to European culture. This situation has not disappeared in many countries, where the leaders are not mentally liberated. Only an authentic culture can give meaning to the development process. It is by being oneself that a people can participate in the dialogue of cultures and civilizations. But this "return to roots" should eliminate the negative aspects of traditional cultures and not be closed to foreign influences.

4. Communication. The mass media have become a powerful instrument of manipulating international opinion and sometimes destabilizing governments. At present, 65 per cent of world information is produced in and diffused from the United States. Many countries content themselves to reproduce messages from the big Western press agencies without analyzing their ideological contents. Information is at the same time conditioning. The message is in fact "massage" of the minds, destined to contribute to the reproduction of the existing international order.

Dr. Stambuk in his intervention asked whether the problem should be viewed as requiring a change in society rather than changes in technology even when consideration had been given to the alternative forms available.

Professor Macura referring both to Pandit Nehru and President Carter asked what the options were to his earlier proposals, if these proposals were not acceptable.

Professor Mushakoji then made the following observations before the session was concluded:

1. Science did not only feed into technology, but also received from technological developments new knowledge and insights.

2. Decentralization, which was desirable, had itself been assisted by technological developments, especially in such areas as micro-processors.

3. The need for collective self-reliance by the Third World countries should be recognized and acted upon as it could lead to changing the bases of power. In this connection the intellectual stimulus would have to come from universities.

In the discussion workshop, participants having satisfied themselves that the summary record of the plenary sessions was fair, then moved to a more detailed consideration of underlying themes. It was agreed that the discussions should lead to a sharpening of the differences which had emerged and the following positions were arrived at:

(a) There was need for a much more vigorous examination of the relationship between the way a technology was applied, the technology itself, and the basic science from which it grew.

(b) In pursuing the examination, attention should be focused on the role of technology as a factor in the social, economic, and cultural aspects taken individually and cumulatively. The interaction between the various aspects should also be closely observed as well as such matters as, Is the problem the technology itself or its management, or the resource base? etc.

(c) It was particularly important to re-examine these relationships as we are entering a new era following the current world crisis.

(d) Technology was not an end in itself. It was preconditioned by social goals and these goals needed to be clearly articulated. In particular, the human factor had to be emphasized, not only from the standpoint of the individual but also from that of the social group as we strive towards egalitarianism in terms of equality of opportunity. The search for a fraternal convivial society should recognize both cultural identity and diversity.

(e) In accepting the proposition that science and technology were socially conditioned, it was thought that it would be useful to study the application of various specific technologies to determine whether the goals being pursued were in fact being achieved or whether the technologies imposed by wrong motivations themselves altered the character and the nature of the technology.

(f) While recognizing that various dilemmas would have to be confronted, it was thought that some of these could be made less difficult to cope with, if clearly defined social criteria could be stated and adequate methods agreed upon for assessing and forecasting technologies.

(g) It was noted that while science had to a large extent been decentralized, this was not so with technological development. The latter was still heavily monopolized by a few powers.

(h) The link between technological development proceeding from a scientific base was seriously questioned and several reasons given for the non-automatic emergence of technological development even where a strong science base existed.

(i) It was concluded that the various parameters of the social field had to be carefully examined before deciding on technology development or adaptation and that the entire social system itself would be the determinant of the extent to which technological development would succeed in effective transformation.

Ralko Tomovic

The term technology has had an interesting evolution. Originally it was used to refer to the processing of raw materials. However, production turned out to be but one small aspect of the resources and activities involved in successfully running an industrial organization. Gradually awareness grew that a combination of scientific knowledge and accumulated experience is necessary to run any large system, no matter what its nature. Thus, with the evolution of modern society, technology's role has increased enormously in depth and in scope.

Technology is not the only factor shaping our future, but there is no doubt that it will play a decisive role in all efforts to change our world. Knowing this, it would be too risky to allow technology to develop without monitoring its trends in terms of social needs. Already a new activity, technology forecasting and assessment, is becoming a prominent part of any national and global planning. The speed of technological progress has increased so much that, without a strategy of technological development, the economic and defensive capabilities of any country could be seriously undermined.

Choosing an adequate strategy for technological development has become a highly delicate issue, especially for developing countries. Traditional approaches, such as giving top priority to heavy industry, have lost much of their value because many other industries, once at the bottom of the priority list, have been promoted to the top (food production, data processing, raw materials, and so forth). On the other hand, many options in the selection of an appropriate strategy for technological development that did not exist 30 or 40 years ago are available today. I do not intend to discuss the whole problem of technology forecasting and assessment, but to emphasize that this important field of research and applied activity must be given an adequate place at the university level.

Technology's new social and political functions can be best understood by reviewing the general conditions under which modern technology emerged. This technology is still young; it is generally agreed that the technological era began with the advent of the steam engine and the first automatic regulator devices in the mid-eighteenth century.

Having been exposed to the tremendous production potential of the modern world, we easily forget the scarcity of goods only 200 years ago. In 1750 most tools used by farmers were made either by the village blacksmith or by the farmer himself. It was only around 1850 that farm equipment started coming in increasing quantities from factories. When speaking of numbers, it should not be forgotten that farming machines were selling at the rate of just a few thousand a year. In other words, the technological era began without an adequate farm equipment industry. The first sugar-beet factory, which had an extraction efficiency of only two to three per cent, was completed in 1802, which means again that the food industry, now of strategic importance, was marginal 150 years ago. At the turn of the eighteenth century, England's pig iron production was about 15,000 tons. The level of development of the most advanced technological countries around this time may be characterized by various statistics: for example, in 1841, 33 per cent of men and 49 per cent of women marrying in England and Wales signed the marriage-register with a mark, while the structure of England's work-force in 1850 was such that the number of blacksmiths exceeded the number of iron workers by nearly 50 per cent, and there were at the same time twice as many tailors as railway employees.

The most powerful factors shaping our technology - union of science, research and technology as well as extensive technological education - were almost non-existent until the middle of the nineteenth century.

The awakening to the need for technological education started in the period from 1851 to 1867. Mathematics and physics had been introduced as separate subjects in schools in Europe in 1840.

The middle of the nineteenth century may also be taken as the beginning of proper engineering education in Europe. A few facts taken from official university documents of that era clearly illustrate the contempt prevailing in academic circles toward engineering. For instance, the first professors in engineering had to give assurances that they would not encroach on other university disciplines. Attitudes such as that which considered that engineering was not "a proper department in which a degree should be conferred" were also indicative of the misunderstanding of the role of applied science.

One could add many other details from the history of technology in order to emphasize the striking differences in the production means of today and yesterday. In fact, a comprehensive study of this phenomenon proper rather than a mere comparison of facts and figures would be highly valuable to the understanding of the new social tasks of modern technology. An international effort in this direction would certainly be welcome.

I have repeatedly referred to the interaction of technology and society. Consequently, a full understanding of the reasons that technology has led to a consumer society, environmental destruction and abuse of natural resources would require studying the socioeconomic conditions under which it evolved.

Let me again mention just the most relevant features of the world situation in the mid-eighteenth century. First, the social structure of the world, in spite of great differences, was homogeneous in one important respect: the land and the production potential in general were, exclusively, privately owned. State ownership and participation, not to mention self-government, were at that time unheard-of principles of socio-economic structures. At the same time, vast areas of our planet, in fact the majority of mankind, were forced to live under colonial rule. Without exaggeration, one can say that never in the history of our planet was global decision power concentrated in so few hands located in such a narrow geographic area. It is under these circumstances that the basic features of our present technology were shaped.

The above remarks should be helpful in understanding the following statements about the interaction of technology and society in the early days of the Industrial Revolution. The basic social goals which globally affected the existing technology were as follows:

a. Mass production. There are very few books which will give full credit to the idea on which all modern technology is based. The founders of our technological civilization were really concerned just with small-scale production. Production tolerances at that time were so large that each machine had to be built as a single unit. The fundamental idea of developing industrial production on the principle of replaceable parts is not more than 130 or 140 years old. It is no wonder that the first experiments in this direction aroused great interest, because the technology of replaceable parts leads immediately to production specialization, assembly lines and services. Without such an approach, many goods such as household appliances, cars, television sets and so on would still be the privileges of very restricted groups. Let us not forget that even shoes and socks were once reserved just for the aristocracy. Creating a more democratic access to goods of all kinds is definitely a historical aspect of modern technology.

b. Profit optimization. Taking into account the historical conditions under which present technology grew, it is easily understood that profit motivation was the single major factor affecting the functioning, organization and management of production processes. How deeply the profit motivation has affected the very nature of our factories still remains to be analysed. In fact, very few studies based on the interaction of profit motivation and technology are available. But there is little doubt that absurd destruction of the human environment is the product of a narrowly oriented technology. Another example of negative interaction of one-sided social goals and technology is human settlements. Reducing the human being to a commuter between the suburbs and the working place deprives him of rich, many-sided interactions with the city, narrowing them down to just traveling and working.

c. Abuse of natural resources. A clear distinction between mass production and the consumer society must be made. Consumer technology, including marketing and advertising, is meant to satisfy not just the average needs of man but his artificially created demands as well. The folly of such an approach has now become evident. After the oil crisis, it requires little imagination to understand how absurd it is to develop megalopolises where, for each family, three to four tonnes of steel and several hundred litres of gasoline per month are needed just for transportation. This is just the minor part of the story. The chemical, drug, food, textile, electronic and many other industries also have been developed without paying due attention to the abuse of renewable and non-renewable natural resources.

d. Management. The term technology in its broader sense applies to the management of resources in general, to the improvement of the organizational aspects of applied activities and to improved decision making processes as well. The dominant management technology of our time is conceived on the basis of hierarchic organization, subordination, and separation of man's intellectual and physical involvement in the production process. That is, the fundamental principle of prevailing practice in management technology means rule by authority based on hierarchy rather than full involvement of all those concerned. This has led to two oppressive principles. First, although the equality of human beings as political decision makers is unconditionally accepted, at least in principle, when the same human being begins to work, in production or elsewhere, he is ruled by "orders and degrees" issued by an elite founded on hierarchy, property or education. Even more oppressive is the fact that such management and organizational principles are practiced not only in societies based on private ownership but also in those with state ownership of factories.

Evidently such undemocratic treatment of human beings cannot be maintained without considerable repression and manipulation. One of the most subtle and dangerous ways of manipulation is deeply rooted in current educational systems. Instead of extensive analysis of this phenomenon, let me just quote the words of Androrz (Proceedings, Fourth International Workshop of Metalworkers, April 1972, Oberhausen, European Publishing House).

From the social point of view, the educational system has essentially a selective role: it provides the cultural background for social inequality. The educational system forces students of all ages to a painful process of acquiring uninteresting knowledge without internal motivation; they are obliged to become part of a competition system within which beforehand the success of one individual depends on the failure of the others so that they are degraded to less ''valuable" positions. Thus the educational system is favouring not the most "talented" ones but the most ambitious ones: those who have the ambition to "improve themselves socially," accepting thus the disciplinary-hierarchical nature of the school which in its educational relations reflects already the patterns of production relations and has the tendency to reproduce them. As seen, the manipulation of human beings by power structures tends to start very early.

Now let us turn to the future. New socio-economic, scientific, educational and cultural conditions affecting the interaction of technology and society can hardly be compared to the old ones. Again, I shall not use numerical data to emphasize the quantitative differences between the past and the present, but instead will attempt to summarize the essential features of the last two radical breakthroughs in the history of technology.

The rate of progress in technology and production potential of the world has been so fast in the last 150 years that, notwithstanding enormous market expansion, mankind's basic needs can be met. This is certainly true if the arts industry is included as a productive factor. For the first time in its history, humankind has at its disposal production facilities which, in principle, do not require discrimination in terms of goods to satisfy basic human needs (clothing, food, housing, public transportation, education, and health care). At least, such a goal is technologically feasible today. But other factors, beyond technology, still prevent faster progress in this direction.

Modern technology possesses yet another fundamental asset. As is well known, the Industrial Revolution was carried out in its early stages without using such powerful resources as science and education. Individual creativity and heuristic approaches were the most frequent tools of technological progress in the eighteenth century. Nowadays the greatest potential for technological progress lies not in "hardware" but in "software." Modern science, industry, and society possess a most powerful tool: we know how to manage, organize, and implement the transfer of new scientific knowledge into all human activities. By mastering this most complicated transfer process, promoting technology becomes an organized social activity rather than one involving only individuals or companies.

In contrast to the extreme national and regional concentration of technological power in the past, know-how, advanced industry, and promotion of new technology are no longer the privileges of a few western nations. Europe as a whole belongs today to technologically developed societies. Nations in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East also possess powerful industries and technological resources. Even more important, education in science and technology has spread all over the world either directly or indirectly. This profound change in the distribution of technological power across the world and the fall of colonial rule have laid down the basis for a global order of equality of nations rather than rule by domination and monopolies.

The once homogeneous socio-political system of governing represents nowadays but a part of the global order. Socialist ideas are not theoretical considerations any more but have become the founding principles and guidelines of many nations, both large and small. In these circumstances it has become inadequate to assess technology just in terms of profit optimization. Its meaning and impact must be evaluated in a much broader context, including urban environment, education, health, and human rights at work.

New living conditions have placed new requirements on technology. It is a matter of complex multidisciplinary studies to propose more precise guidelines for a strategy of technological development in our era. At this point I shall just present a sketch of some of the options which lie before us.

a. Urban technology. So far it has been technology's role to support the functioning of human settlements whose basic profiles and growth have been determined by the needs of consumer society, commerce, banking, industry and administration. Eventually, with increased social consciousness and in the face of an alarming deterioration in the quality of life in metropolitan areas, steps were taken to use technology to improve the worst effects of the urban crisis.

From a long-term point of view, palliative measures cannot resolve the problem; instead, the basic approach must be changed. Social, urban, regional and economic planning must be granted the same status as other factors so that human needs are matched not to patterns imposed by the past but to projects containing completely new value systems. For instance our cities would certainly offer much better opportunities for human contact if urban transportation systems had been built on the principle of pedestrian zones, public transportation and individual motorized displacement. New technology for human settlements must be oriented in a way which will strike a better balance between human needs and economic constraints.

b. Health care systems. The most striking fact about health services is the very idea that "health care," conceived as a nation-wide system, is relatively new. The basic human right to have equal access to the best medical care available is still far from a reality in our world. Technology is certainly one restraint on progress in this area.

Medical instrumentation, hospital management and existing organizational institutions are still unable to accomplish the transition from the centuries-old practice of "small-scale operations" to the full coverage of citizens' demands in health services. Our current knowledge of automation, electronics, computers, telecommunications and so forth is such that with concurrent efforts of science, technology and organized social forces a much better functioning of large-scale health care systems can be assured.

The effect of profit-motivated technology on the drug industry is another deep problem related to health care. How many of the drugs bombarding us are effective, semi-effective or ineffective remains to be analysed, though drug and food safety regulations are certainly a small step in the right direction. Technology's future role in health care presents great challenges and expectations. Neglecting health care problems is a reflection more of misplaced social priorities than of current technology deficiencies.

c. Management technology. I have pointed out that the most adverse effects on human rights in the production sphere occur during decision making processes. Authoritative management was understandable in the early stages of technological development when a large amount of physical labour was a sine qua non for any production system. However, the advent of modern automation and the computer makes any kind of non-creative, degraded human work obsolete, provided there is enough professional and social support. The basic question today is not mass production but the human factor. Quite a change in a rather short historical period: let us not forget that the industrial era relied heavily on child and illiterate labour, as well as pushing workers to the limits of human endurance.

Such practices are marginal in contemporary conditions. But, even so, the most challenging tasks lie ahead. The fundamental goal of social and technological endeavours must become the right of each man to be free not only in terms of civil rights but also in a much deeper sense. "As long as human activity is not shaped freely but by chance, his own product becomes an adverse and estranged power constraining man instead of freeing him" (Karl Marx). "To be free means fulfillment of one's life. That means a great number of freedoms.... If one cannot become himself, does it make sense to become anything?" (Tennessee Williams). "It seems to me that we owe to each human being many other lives" (Arthur Rimbaud). Taking away from a human being the right to self-government at any level of his activity is equivalent to the amputation of his personality.

Quoting poetic visions of human destiny in the context of technological considerations may seem artificial. However, the interaction of society and technology has reached such a level that the strategy of technological development must take into consideration not only economic values but the human factor in its full richness as well.


This piece is by no means an exhaustive study of future technology, for that would require enormous effort and detailed analysis. Most probably it will take another hundred years before the transition from profit-motivated and economic growth-oriented development to human factor-dominated technology is achieved. But the transition has already begun and there is no turning back.

Having to choose between mere generalities and technical considerations, I wanted to present, in the first place, a possible outline for international research activity in the domain of technology and society. History of technology, multidisciplinary studies of the impact of technology, the strategy of technological development and technology forecasting and assessment seem to be pieces of a new, comprehensive field of academic activity. The issues raised are of such fundamental and general importance that the United Nations University seems to be the most appropriate institution to launch such a research programme. As noted, during the Industrial Revolution academic institutions were not anxious to invest their intellectual resources in engineering and technology. This time, the university is given another chance to assume a leading role at a time of transition. We should not remain passively watching the emergence of new relations between society and technology.

Yves Barel

Petits et grands nements du quotidien culturel

Qu'on me permette d'esquisser le tableau un peu impressionniste de quelques faits de notre vie culturelle, un peu a mani d'un chroniqueur de presse.

Voici un de ces pays dont on dit qu'ils ont besoin de "se dlopper". Il est de taille moyenne, sa population est relativement nombreuse, il a quelques ressources naturelles qui lui procurent une relative aisance financi, et une rle volontconcrses par un Projet de soci, d'asseoir son indndance politique et de donner on nomie les moyens d'une croissance autonome. Pour cela il est pronsacrer une partie non nigeable de son pouvoir d'achat international inancer l'importation de science et de technique modernes. Et il s'apert qu'ravers le transfert technologique, la fourniture d'usines "clen mains", voire l'assistance technique destines ormer des spalistes nationaux, se crt les conditions d'une nouvelle dndance. Les difficultqu'il rencontre pour constituer un appareil d'engineering national capable de maiser l'importation de science et de technique et de prrver sa liberte choix sur le marchondial, lui font voir que pour tirer un r parti des connaissances import, il eut fallu ou presque qu'il fpable de les produire lui-m. Si l'on me permet cette comparaison, l'importation de science et de technique agit un peu comme une drogue dont le pays devient dndant, non comme l'un des aliments d'un dloppement autonome.

Voici un diant "tiers-mondiste" dans une universituropne ou nord-amcaine. Le voici pris dans le paradoxe d'avoir pprendre et enser dans des catries mentales qu'il sent inadapt aux probls de son pays, et qu'il ne peut pourtant pas transgresser, parce que sa propre culture ne lui fournit pas les catries adates, faute d'avoir pu librement et de son propre chef affronter les euves de la modernitCet diant connaun conflit interne dont le difficile dssement paralyse ses possibilitd'identification intellectuelle et culturelle, au lieu d'en rythmer la marche. Au mieux il connace que le sociologue, po et homme politique soudanais Mohl-DCuber appelle "l'illusion culturelle" (1).

(1) - Voir Anouar Abdel-MaIek, "La penspolitique crabe contemporaine", Seuil, Paris, 2d., 1975, p. 163 et suiv.

Son ambivalence n'est pas fnde et risque de conduire ne attitude de passivitulturelle qui la rend seule supportable.

Considns, un peu partout dans le monde, ce qu'on appelle la paysannerie "traditionnelle" et les rons rurales oe vit. Les conditions qui lui sont faites, en premier lieu les conditions nomiques, conduisent U>duire le sens du travail et de la vie de cette paysannerie. En Alge, le revenu d'une exploitation agricole de 3,5 hectares dipar Jeanne Favret (2), exigeant 300 journ de travail, ivaut 5 jours de travail a mine de zinc voisine, ou U>l'rgne risable apr40 jours par un travailleur algen immigrn France.

(2) - "Le traditionalisme par excde modernit Archives europnes de sociologie, tome 8, N°1, -1967.

Dans ces conditions, le travail de la terre devient une sorte d'occupation absurde, et ve comme telle par les paysans. Il est significatif, par exemple, que 75% des Algens interroglors du recensement qui s'effectuait au m moment se soient darchrs, alors que le che n'affectait rlement que le tiers environ de la population active masculine. Un reportage rnt sur la "vente" de leurs enfants par des familles paysannes thandaises es entrepreneurs de Bangkok, souligne la double absurdite salaires urbains assez misbles faisant figure de petites fortunes 'elle monire paysanne. Au bout de l'absurditil y a souvent la paralysie, la passivitla mort. C'est l'impression que produit n animateur thral le Limousin frans. Cet animateur, ptien d'origine, connabien la mis noire des campagnes ptiennes. Mais il n'y trouve pas le fatalisme et l'acceptation de la mort qu'il lui semble avoir rencontren Limousin. Encore deux exemples emprunta vie de mon pays. L' dernier, des milliers et des milliers d'hectares de la foret provene ont brLa technologie moderne (avions, "canadair", colonnes motoris...) n'a autre pu ter le dstre. Si l'on En croit l'ivain Rezvani (3) qui est un amoureux de cette for le drame est en partie li l'atonie des pouvoirs locaux qui, a moindre alerte, sollicitent l'intervention de ce pouvoir exteur qu'est la technologie lourde, au lieu de compter sur leurs propres forces.

(3) -'Le Monde" du 15. VIII. 79.

Et si, lncore, on retrouve l'atonie et la passivitc'est parce que la forprovene se vide peu eu de sa population "traditionnelle", le sol nt accaparar les agents immobiliers, les rdences secondaires, ou gelar les splations foncis de banques europnes, et la foret ne pouvant gu faire l'objet d'une exploitation nomique. Or la population traditionnelle avait une technique et un savoir-faire de lutte contre le feu (doussaillage hivernal des sous-bois), qui reposaient sur la connaissance intime du pays, sur la fusion presque charnelle de l'habitant humain et de son terroir, pour drminer oquand exactement il fallait allumer les feux de debrouissaillage, pour garder le contrdes feux ainsi allum etc. La lourde technologie moderne ne parvient pas emplacer ce savoir-faire minutieux des bergers, chasseurs et forestiers de jadis, et cela n'est pas seulement une question de moyens. il existe une sorte de relation subtile entre techniques modernes et passivitociale, que l'on retrouve ropos du "programme Massif Central" annoncn 1975 qui cherche nrayer le din de l'Auvergne, une province franse qui connaun exode rural massif, dont l'agriculture dine et dont le vignoble est malade (1).

(1) - Pierre. PascaIIon, "L'Auvergne face c son avenir", ed. Cr, 63340 Nonette.

Le programme, i-chemin de son extion, ne donne pas de rltats trsatisfaisants, selon Pierre Pascallon. C'est, dit-il, parce que ce projet d'amgement rural reste une affaire de citadins, parce que le plan a organisepuis Paris, autour du progr de l'industrie, de la plus forte rentabilit. La solution ne consiste certes pas dessiner une sorte de r rousseauiste ouvergne refermes sur Quelques valeurs dss deviendrait le bon sauvage de l'Hexagone" (2).

(2) - Ces tentes sont empruntn compte-rendu du livre de Pierre PascalIon pare dans "Le Monde" du 15. VIII. 79.

Mais il faut prendre conscience de ce que signifie ce progrpens l'exteur et apporte l'exteur. Il dloppe dans la population locale une aptitude ttendre passivement Due les crts, les plans et les id viennent d'en haut et, dans les conditions qui lui sont faites, cette attitude est logique ou intable. Ce qui manque c'est "un cadre territorial vraiment v et ressenti par ses habitants" (3).

(3) - "Syst nomique et espace", Universite Montpellier, octobre 1979.

Naturellement, le fatalisme n'est pas fatal. Il peut arriver, dans une conjonction favorable de facteurs, qu'une population locale ou une catrie sociale arrive ntenter le modernisme technique ne strate propre se dnissant comme un activisme de la survie ou du dloppement. C'est ce que montre la th remarquable (non encore publies) de Franck Auriac sur le vignoble du Languedoc et sur les strates des cooptives de vignerons (4).

(4) - "Grandeur et ddence au professeur d'agriculture", CERAT, Universite Sciences Sociales, Grenoble.

C'est ce que montre aussi Pierre Muller ropos de la paysannerie moyenne franse de refonte des structures agraires (4). Mais cette "intorisation" de la science et de la technique parait relativement rare, parce que reposant sur une occurrence d'nements qui a quelque chose du hasard et de imprsible.

Ce n'est pas seulement dans les secteurs "traditionnels" que la science et la technique provoquent une sorte d'exil inteur qui confine parfois a perte d'identitersonnelle, groupage, ou sociale. C'est aussi en plein coeur de la modernitIl y a l'ouvrier d'usine moderne confront la raison technicienne devenue si ange et si ang pour lui qu'il ne peut plus situer son travail, lui donner un sens, et se situer lui-m dans l'appareil de production. Il y a le collaborateur technique d'un grand laboratoire de recherche qui ne peut pas rendre raison de son activitans le montage d'une grande expence. Il y a le malade pris en charge par un syst de santui fait de lui un "objet oigner", quelles que soient les bonnes intentions du corps mcal et du personnel hospitalier : c'est le syst de santui consomme pour lui comme le montre trbien Alain-NoHenri; lui, le malade, ne "consomme" que du travail mcal ou para-mcal et des ipements hospitaliers, dans des conditions souvent pbles d'ignorance de son propre corps, de ce qui l'attend, de ce qu'il devient. Il y a le "consommateur moyen" qu'un consumsme moderniste somme de consommer "scientifiquement" et que se sent aussi exclu d'une "science" dont il n'a nul moyen d'ouver la soliditque manipular une publicitbsidionale, m et surtout lorsqu'elle emprunte au jargon technique ou scientifique. Ce n'est l'ailleurs qu'un exemple parmi d'autres o population devient une sorte d'interlocuteur par force muet et passif, de tin indispensable mais annular sa propre ignorance, de batailles d'experts sur la sritans les centrales nuclres, sur la pilule contraceptive, sur l'analyse de la crise nomique, sur la sexualitsur la pollution et la destruction de l'environnement, sur ce qu'est la santu la maladie mentale, etc.

La nature du probl

Si les notations ci-dessus se voulaient une description approchde l'impact social de la science et de la technique, elles seraient trinsuffisantes. Aussi le but poursuivi n'est-il pas cette description (dont les grandes lignes sont au demeurant bien connues), mais bien plute suggr uel point c'est dans la vie concr, dans la quotidiennetU> de chacun de nous qu'on peut observer la prnce du probl dont on va maintenant essayer de dnir les contours. Les vastes fresques sur le rde la science et de la technique dans la modernitquel que soit par ailleurs leur intt, ont un peu tendance a estomper le fait que cela nous touche personnellement et que ce qui est en cause n'est pas seulement le jeu de catries sociales abstraites.

Les exemples retenus sont extrment diffnts entre eux, ne serait-ce que par l'importance qu'ils revnt, allant du sort de quelques individus au destin de nations et de continents, en passant par celui de rons ou de groupes humains spfiques. Ils n'ont entre eux qu'un point commun justifiant qu'on les que ensemble, c'est d'aboutir n questionnement du rsocial de la science et de la technique et, plus gralement de ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler la modernitSeulement ce rest plus ou moins direct et plus ou moins visible. Si le cas du pays s'engageant dans un cercle vicieux de dndance technico-scientifique ou celui de l'diant "tiers-mondiste" coincntre deux cultures, font directement intervenir la science et la technique, on ne voit pas a priori en quoi celles-ci sont concern par le sort du paysan kabyle. Il est tentant de ne voir dans l'incendie de la foret provene qu'une conjonction malheureuse et accidentelle entre une forte poussde mistral (le vent local), une seresse excessive, et la nigence socio-nomique en mati de doussaillage (1).

(2) - Pour ne pas quer Les bruits qui courent sur certains incendies volontaires, ase de splation fonci et immobili, comme cela a le cas, dit-on, dans certaines zones urbaines de Montr.

Il est facile de ne voir dans la difficultu'a l'ouvrier d'usine ou le collaborateur d'un laboratoire de recherche de donner un sens on travail, "que" des imperfections et des lacunes dans la circulation de l'information. On peut toujours penser qu'un peu plus de chaleur humaine et de convivialitermettrait de faire du malade autre chose qu'un objet de santet au vieillard un objet gntologue, de l'assistn objet du travail social...). On peut dire que le paysan auvergnat ou limousin "n'a qu'faire comme le vigneron languedocien. On peut assimiler les batailles d'experts u folklore social somme toute assez innocent. Pourquoi chercher midi uatorze heures et invoquer e propos les responsabilitde la science et de la technique?

Ici l'anecdote de l'incendie de foret a une valeur "stlogiquement" exemplaire. Car, "en soi", l'efficacitechnique des avions canadair ou des colonnes motoris de lutte contre le feu, ne peut e mise en doute. C'est la "drtification" humaine de la foret qui paralyse en partie cette efficacitet cette drtification est le rltat d'une conjonction habituelle (et non accidentelle) entre des intts socio-nomiques et l'insistance avec laquelle ces intts utilisent la science et la technique pour consolider leur pouvoir. C'est en quelque sorte parce que tout un syst socio-nomique global cherche 'encaciner dans la science et la technique, que des sciences et des techniques particulis se trouvent mises en ec.

Il y a ln paradoxe qu'on n'apert pas si on ne "descend" pas au niveau du concret, avant d'explorer quelques uns des longs cheminements, quelques unes des multiples mations qui structurent le cercle vicieux du social et du scientifique. La "science" dans la foret provene et son embrasement, c'est moins le Canadair ou la moto-pompe que l'amgement 'scientifique" de la "vocation" touristique de la cmterranne, la planification "scientifique" depuis Paris ou depuis des sis sociaux de banques europnes du dloppement urbain et de l'industrialisation du bment; et c'est, finalement, une ambiance culturelle qui pousse iser ce qui n'est pas "scientifique" et qui rel du savoir-faire traditionnel du paysan et du petit peuple. Ce n'est pas qu'on ne l'aime pas, ce savoir-faire, car il est aujourd'hui objet de bien des nostalgies touchantes. On l'aime comme on aime la nature dans les parcs naturels : c'est pourquoi on le donne oir, non ervir. Si la foret provene br'est en partie parce qu'elle devient un parc naturel pour touristes et rdences secondaires" Les marxistes ont coutume de dire que la science devient une force productive "directe". Soit. A condition que l'expression ne fasse pas oublier que cette force se manifeste souvent de fa fort indirecte, parce qu'en ritla" science n'agit pas sur "la" soci, mais la soci dans la science, et la science dans la soci. L'un n'est pas "l'exteur" de l'autre.

Ceci dit, qu'apprend-on sur ce point commun ous les exemples (qui cela va sans dire, pourraient e facilement multipli de notre antillon. Dans tous les cas, nous observons que la science et/ou la technique joue un certain rdans une entreprise qui conduit ssr des individus, des groupes, des nations du pouvoir et de la faculte se drminer eux-ms. Le pouvoir de modeler leur vie, individuelle ou collective, ourt ou ong terme, appe en partie aux sujets humains. La science et la technique contribuent roduire et reproduire un clivage entre "ceux qui savent" et ceux qui ne savent pas, et ce clivage pose d'emblun probl de pouvoir, et un probl de vouloir. Ceux qui ont le pouvoir et la volonte s'en servir n'ont que trop tendance nsister sur la passivitles conduites d'ec, la rgnation, la dndance sociale ou culturelle, la "mentalit'assist de ceux sur qui ils ont le pouvoir et pour qui ils veulent quelque chose, eur place. Ce n'est pas une raison pour nier que ces dssions de l'auto-drmination humaine font aussi partie de la ritbservable, dans une dialectique renouvel(une version douce) du mae et de l'esclave. Comment pourrait-il en Etre autrement, en rd e que l'on pourrait appeler le pouvoir "aporistique", dans certains cas, de la science et de la technique. Comment s'der de la double impossibilit'arrr l'importation de science et de technique, et de la continuer? Comment "choisir" entre une culture inadaptet une culture inadaptable parce que stoppdans sa maturation historique? Que peut faire d'autre une petite municipalitrovene que de demander le secours des canadair, m si elle sait qu'elle ne les obtiendra pas, parce que l'incendie fait rage partout a fois? Comment "choisir", en masse, de ne plus e un paysan "traditionnel", etc.?

Quand j'avance l'id de fa dbment partiale, que la science et la technique constituent une menace pour l'auto-drmination humaine, je ne revendique aucun statut "scientifique" pour cette id surtout si l'on confond ici la scientificitvec un tableau balances "bons" et des "mauvais" c de la science. Il y aurait aussi ire en faveur de la science et de la technique, et si l'histoire ne progresse pas uniquement par ses bons c, elle ne progresse pas non plus uniquement par ses mauvais c. Tout en reconnaissant l'intt qu'il y a oursuivre inlassablement la te de dire "exhaustivement" les implications sociales de la science et de la technique, je revendique le droit d'insister sur l'une de ses implications, parce qu'il me semble qu'elle est relativement nouvelle, qu'elle prend une certaine importance, et qu'il existe une tendance ous-estimer cette importance.

La science et la technique sont impliqu dans la multiplication de systs sociaux qu'on peut dire de nature hronomisante (c'est-ire fondsur la distinction entre un Centre qui dde et une pphe qui est mue de l'exteur) L'hronomie est souvent un bon principe pour la construction de machines. Il est douteux qu'il en soit de m pour les socis ou fractions de soci qui sont des systs vivants, c'est-ire des systs dont le fonctionnement n'est gu concevable au dessous d'un minimum d'auto-drmination. On que quelquefois la crise de la dcratie reprntative non point tellement pour souligner les manquements (nombreux) a re, que pour dire que cette re m est peut-e en train de devenir un facteur de fragilisation sociale. Ce n'est pas la faiblesse du centre qui est cense 'origine de cette fragilisation (comme le prndent les idogies autoritaires traditionnelles), c'est au contraire le fait que le rme reprntatif, pouss son terme, instaure une logique de renforcement du Centre et revient toujours der de ce que veulent les gens eur place. La science et la technique, et par consent les hommes qui reprntent la science et la technique, participent du jeu de ce rme reprntatif. La science et la technique se mettent reprnter" l'activite symbolisation et la crion culturelle de toute la population, exactement comme les s, directement, les administrateurs et les juges, indirectement, sont censreprnter la volontolitique et sociale de la population. En d'autres termes le rme reprntatif se fait hronomisant, avec la complicite la science et de la technique. Et l'hronomie est un danger de rupture sociale.

La th peut parae absurde si l'on songe ous les rmes, passou contemporains, qui ont ou sont infiniment moins "dcratiques" que le rme reprntatif et qui ne s'en portent pas plus mal, et outes les tentations totalitaires qui menacent la dcratie "formelle". Mais la vtst qu'il y a des versions douces et des versions dures de l'autoritarisme, et que l'effet final sur la cohon et sur le dynamisme de la soci n'est que partiellement fonction de cette plus ou moins grande "douceur" ou "duret Il y a eu dans l'histoire toutes sortes de rmes "durs" dont on s'apert aprcoup, et en les confrontant a modernitqu'ils laissaient une large place de fait 'initiative et 'autodrmination d'individus, de petits groupes, de communautlocales, etc... Dans toute une se de domaines, les gens pouvaient dder eux-ms de ce qui it bon pour eux et de ce qu'il fallait faire : ils ient maes jusqu'n certain point de leurs dsions nomiques, construisaient leurs demeures et leurs villes comme ils l'entendaient, gient ensemble un certain nombre d'affaires locales, avaient leurs id sur l'cation des enfants, etc. etc. Les puissants ne pouvaient pas dder eur place faute de moyens d'intervention, et aussi peut-e ne le voulaient pas nssairement parce que la ltimite leur pouvoir se situait ailleurs que dans la "reprntation" de la volontopulaire. Aujourd'hui, 'inverse, le principe reprntatif repose de plus en plus non seulement sur une dimension politique "pure" (par exemple, l'ction), mais aussi sur le droit (fondpar exemple, sur la science et l'expertise technique) de "reprnter" a population ce qui est raisonnable et rationnel pour elle. Il dule de lne dilatation potentielle, et parfois rle, de l'action hronomisante du Centre. Ce qui ne comptait gu se met ompter : tout, y compris des choses "insignifiantes" comme la ditique familiale, la sexualites jeunes ou la conduite automobile, peut devenir "affaire d'Etat". Qu'on demande aux gens de ''se drminer" par des modes brutales ou en pratiquant la "douceur", voire en manipulant la "permissivit n'est certes pas indiffnt quant a vie quotidienne concr de la population. Mais dans les deux cas, c'est le pouvoir et le go l'autodrmination qui est mis en question, et il n'est pas exclu que le domaine d'hronomie s'nde d'autant plus que cette mise en question soit faite en douceur. Et, au niveau de l'efficacitil faudrait aujourd'hui une bonne dose de natour poser que les techniques dures de contrsocial l'emportent toujours, et par principe, sur les techniques douces.

Il serait dommage que ces remarques soient prises comme l'affirmation que les hommes ient plus "libres" dans le passu'ils ne le deviennent, jour aprjour, dans un rme reprntatif allant jusqu'au bout de la logique de la reprntation. Ce serait remplacer une vision simpliste par une autre vision simpliste. Mais la question n'est pas de se livrer a des comparaisons historiques (probablement sans grande signification possible). Il est de drrasser un probl contemporain de fausses comparaisons historiques, pour mieux l'examiner en tant que tel, c'est-ire comme soumis a propre logique. Or, sous cet angle, la science et la technique posent incontestablement un probl du point de vue des chances actuelles et futures de l'auto-drmination humaine.

Trois attitudes mentales

Face e probl, les discussions sur la science et la technique laissent percevoir ce que l'on peut appeler, par commodittrois attitudes mentales.

La premi correspond ne perception courante, non sophistiquen quelque sorte, de la science et de la technique. Nous sommes au niveau du cafu commerce, de la rencontre mondaine, de propos lrs entre gens qui, finalement, ne se sentent pas vraiment concernpar la question; On peut l'exprimer par le proverbe frans : "on ne fait pas d'omelette sans casser les oeufs". La deuxi attitude s'exprime dans les courants de "l'anti-science", de la "science pour tous", etc. Elle a pour caractstique d'ner de la "communautscientifique elle-m, notamment dans ses parties les plus "dures" (c'est-ire lltimitu savoir est la plus solide et la plus dente), et parmi ses ments les plus jeunes et les plus crifs. Elle exprime une volonte "traquer" l'idogie scientifique et l'idogie des scientifiques et, mue par sa propre logique, elle monte en ngle un id qui n'est pas seulement de science pour tous, mais de science (ou toute autre forme transformdu savoir) par tous. La troisi attitude, ancrde longue date dans la discussion, qui revdes formes frustes ou savantes, et sur laquelle se rencontrent aussi bien des marxistes que des libux ou des tenants de la rblique des savants, reprend inlassablement le th de la distinction entre "la'´ science d'une part, "la" soci d'autre part. L'idfondamentale est que la science est "bonne" en soi ("neutre" dans d'autres versions) mais qu'elle peut e pervertie par un msage social. Cet archpe d'une virginitcientifique ne peut que se trouver confortar certains excbien connus de la science "allemande" ou de la science "prolrienne", excqui permettent parfois fort opportunnt de masquer le fait qu'en effet les orientations sociales sont aussi des orientations scientifiques et vice-versa.

Ces trois attitudes mentales laissent insatisfait. La premi ivaut ne drtion a fois sauvet condamnes par le contexte oe rge (l'indiffnce de fait au probl). Insignifiante sur le plan du fond (ne serait-ce que parce que "l'omelette" brille souvent par son absence), elle n'est entionner que parce qu'elle exprime a mani un sentiment d'impuissance devant le probl partagar une partie importante de la population, et ivaut donc a dsion pratique de laisser les choses en l't. La deuxi attitude, par contre, remplit une fonction critique indispensable, m s'il lui arrive d'e "injuste" 'rd de la science, de son rlibteur dans le pass"Galil Bellarmin, m combat" simplifie peut-e un peu la question), voire dans l'avenir (si la science cesse de se confondre avec ses orientations du moment). Sa fonction utopique (la science par tous) a sa pertinence en tant que telle. Mais elle ne prnte pas -et les partisans de la science critique le savent bien-, une solution actuellement praticable. Le mandarinat, le terrorisme de l'expertise, le clivage entrele travail manuel et le travail intellectuel, s'exorcisent plus facilement dans les mots que dans les faits parce qu'aprtout le savoir scientifique et technique, la difficulte l'acqur, l'tisme de fait qui en rlte ne sont pas qu'une illusion, m s'il arrive qu'il soit aussi cela ou, qu'en tout cas, ou en abuse socialement. Quant a troisi attitude, elle aboutit, en s'appuyant parfois sur des petits (ou grands) faits vrais du msage social de la science, ublier que la science et la technique sont des pratiques sociales comme les autres, m s'il s'agit de pratiques prntant bien des traits spfiques. Ce qui est signifiar l'est pas simplement le fait banal que les scientifiques sont aussi des hommes, des citoyens ou des sujets, qu'ils ont comme tout le monde des prrences politiques, des idogies, des faiblesses humaines, leur part d'Ombre et d'irrationnel. C'est si dent et si peu dsif pour l'issue de la discussion qu'il n'est pas un partisan de la "bonne" science et de la "mauvaise" soci qui ne l'admette de bon coeur. Car cela ne change rien au fond du probl, tant qu'il reste entendu qu'il y a quelque part quelque chose qu'on appelle, par exemple, la mode scientifique et, qui reste aussi impermle aux variations sociales, que le gtype aux broderies du phtype et aux fantaisies erratiques du milieu. Les dillances toujours possibles du sujet vis-is de la mode ne font qu'en souligner la splendeur, toujours approch jamais atteinte tout-ait. Il y aura toujours un territoire de non-social du social, se dmitant par son absence de relation avec le social. C'est lne conviction quasi-atavique qui, comme telle, n'est jamais remise en cause par un certain nombre de scientifiques, ne serait-ce que parce que, dans de nombreux cas, elle n'atteint m pas le niveau de la conscience et de l'expression articul Il s'ensuit que le probl posar la science et la technique est toujours, "en derni analyse", un probl consid comme purement social, alors que peut-e il est, du m n, a fois stlogique, stlogique parce que social, social parce qu'stlogique. Bref, "socio-stlogique".

Deux paradigmes de l'activitymbolique (1)

(1) - Les dloppements ci-apr ainsi que ceux qui suivent sur les strates symboliques reprennent de nombreux passages de mes travaux anteurs, notamment de confnces ontr et Boston, et du chapitre introductif ne tion amcaine en cours du "rapport humain a mati".

Evitons d'entrer dans les discussions sur la dnition "exacte" d'un paradigme, telles que ce' les qui ont suscit par le livre de Thomas Kuhn. Le terme servira ici gner quelque chose d'assez vague pour comprendre le "rdu" idogique et, plus gralement, inexplicable que contient toute logique de la rexion humaine, et d'assez prs pour que ces logiques apparaissent comme nettement distinguantes les unes des autres et dgnent bien chaque fois une fa particuli de se reprnter le monde.

Aussi loin que nous puissions remonter dans l'histoire de la penshumaine et jusqu'ujourd'hui, il semble que cette penss'organise dans une oscillation entre deux p : appelons l'un le paradigme mnique et l'autre, faute de mieux, le paradigme "dialectique" ou "structural" (le terme de structure ne coidant pas ici avec le contenu que lui donne le structuralisme contemporain). Ces paradigmes ont probablement quelque chose oir avec les deux grandes familles techniques rssant le rapport humain a mati, dont l'une regroupe les techniques prsnt appelles mniques, et dont l'autre a son point de drt dans la manipulation du feu.

D'ailleurs, plus gralement, on peut avancer la conjecture que l'action humaine sur le milieu (nomique, sociale, politique, technique...) et la reprntation de ce milieu, utilisent des catries du m type, a condition de se situer n niveau d'abstraction suffisamment vSi un isomorphisme de ce type existe bien, il ne provient certainement ni de ce que le monde serait l'incarnation progressivement rises et indniment inachevd'une sorte d'Idhlienne, ni de ce que le monde des id serait le "reflet" des pratiques humaines. Cet isomorphisme hypothque et partiel sugg plut'idd'une communaute processus 'oeuvre dans les deux domaines. On dit quelquefois que le cerveau humain ne pourrait pas interprr le monde, s'il ne prntait pas avec lui un minimum de redondance, s'il n'it pas, en quelque mani, une sorte de monde miniaturisOn n'a besoin ni d'adhr a littlite cette redondance, ni de ressusciter l'antique mphore du macrocosme et du microcosme, pour attribuer une certaine vt cette assertion. Il suffit que nous croyions ne certaine unitondamentale de la mati, dont l'expression pourrait e la suivante : le cerveau humain et son produit d'affects et de concepts est un syst matel et un syst vivant partageant une partie des probls de cet autre syst matel et vivant qu'est, par exemple, la soci. Mphoriquement parlant, on peut se reprnter le cerveau et son produit comme une soci, et la soci comme une sorte de cerveau gt.

La mphore n'est utile que si l'on voit dans le cerveau et la soci deux "lieux" dont la probltique est partiellement commune, la mphore aidant erner cette probltique. Les paradigmes du mnisme et de la structure sont une mani commode d'exprimer d'une part la probltique, d'autre part les amorces de solution, qu'ils offrent l'un et l'autre. Au niveau le plus ve gralitn se situe, les probls communs sont les probls fondamentaux que doit affronter tout syst vivant : la nssite construire et prrver son identitt sa spficitle besoin de se reproduire, la recherche de strates contre-aloires capables de maiser les perturbations qui viennent de l'inteur ou de l'exteur du syst. En forme de boutade, on peut dire que "la vtest le bonheur du syst mental, et que le "bonheur" est la vtu syst social. Aujourd'hui, par exemple, on peut penser qu'il existe une similitude entre : 1) la recherche de formules sociales instaurant plus de dcratie authentique, d'initiative et de crivitumaines, au niveau des individus et des petits groupes, comme de la soci toute enti; 2) la recherche d'une mode ou d'une approche, pour les sciences sociales et humaines, mais aussi peut-e pour les sciences de la mati et de la vie, capables de mieux user les sinuositdu r, de ne pas se laisser surprendre Dar lui, d'ouvrir le syst thique sur l'nement, et l'nement sur le syst thique. En forme de demi-boutade : il y a quelque chose de commun entre la mani dont la physique thique essaie de maiser les mmorphoses de la mati et de se les reprnter d'une part, et la mani dont des groupes de jeunes marginalisessaient de casser des structures sociales et interindividuelles dans lesquelles ils se sentent emprisonn pour leur substituer d'autres structures ayant l'apparence et peut-e la rite "non-structures". On retrouve l'idd'un isomorphisme du monde intellectuel ou affectif et du monde social. C'est de lue vient le caract "socio-stlogique" de nos paradigmes.

S'il fallait absolument donner une formule qui rme la diffnce entre le paradigme mnique et le paradigme structural, je reprendrais volontiers l'antique opposition entre les deux visions du monde : le monde fonctionnant comme une machine, et le monde vivant comme un organisme. Cette reprise ne serait gnte que s'il s'agissait de parcourir ouveau la longue et lassante controverse entre les deux visions, dans le but de donner "raison" 'une ou 'autre. Mais on ne cherche qu'essiner au plus prleurs contours. Schtiquement, on peut dire que le paradigme mnique dit l'ensemble des mouvements de la mati ou sur la mati qui ne se traduisent pas par une modification de sa structure ou de la "substance" dont elle est constitu Les lois de la physique classique (et notamment de sa partie mnique) rendent compte de ces mouvements. Le dacement spatial d'un corps discret intangible en est l'exemple le plus pur : le mouvement d'une plan, la chute d'une pierre, la marche d'un animal, etc. Les techniques humaines font largement appel aux gestes mniques archpaux : pousser, tirer, percer, couper, polir, lancer, mnger ou disjoindre des objets... Mais il y a des cas omouvement de la mati ou sur la mati aboutit ne modification de sa structure, ne transformation interne des substances matelles. Ce sont des mouvements de ce second type qu'expriment la photosynth, une rtion chimique ou nuclre, un phm de croissance ou de ression biologique, l'lution d'un -syst... On a alors affaire n mouvement que, par convention, on peut appeler structural. Oisons pour rmer que la mati se transporte ou se transforme. Naturellement, comme toute dichotomie, celle-ci n'est, pour une part, qu'une commoditIl n'y a pas de mouvement structural qui n'ait sa composante mnique. Et il est rare qu'on puisse observer un mouvement mnique "pur". Il est impossible d'cuer toute ambigu de la distinction entre ce qui est mnique et ce qui est structural, et cette ambigu est peut-e l'un des points de drt de ce qu'il y a de paradoxal dans le monde et dans la reprntation du monde. Mais il y a, malgrout, deux grandes vections de la penshumaine. La premi est a recherche de ce quelque chose qui, lorsque le monde bouge, reste intangible, et dont les dacements expliquent le changement du monde. La seconde croit que ce quelque chose, outre ses dacements, se transforme, devient autre chose que lui-m.

Le tableau suivant prnte quelques unes des formes sous lesquelles les deux paradigmes peuvent s'affronter.



- Substance ou substances inteurement homogs

- hrogitnterne

- Permanence

- changement (mmorphose)

- Sction

- Adaptation

- PassR>

- Futur

- Rtitivitsyst d'nements uniques et singuliers

- Cha (ou juxtaposition)

- Non contradiction (oui ou non)

- Contradiction (oui et non)

- Imitation

- Crion

- Cycle

- Spirale

- RrsibilitR>

- IrrrsibilitR>

- Autorite la loi externe

- Autoritu sujet

- Drmination

- Indrmination

- FermR>

- Ouvert

- Opposition et juxtaposition (mati et mouvement, ritt imaginaire, sujet et objet, choses et mots, inteur et exteur, objectif et subjectif)

- "Confusion", superposition, redondance, contamination

- LinitR>

- Non linitR>

- Causalitlassique

- Causalitstructurale", "systque, "dialectique"

- Simultanonctuelle temporelle

- Simultan isseur

- AdditivitR>

- Effets spfiques de totalitBR>


Les strates symboliques

Peut-e le paradigme mnique et le paradigme structural ne sont-ils que l'avatar intellectuel dernier, l'une des expressions parmi d'autres, y compris otre que scientifique, de deux conduites humaines archpales, deux modes globaux d'e au monde et d'y agir, qui ne sont pas le fruit d'un raisonnement logique prable (m si, comme l'expose Levi-Strauss avec beaucoup de vraisemblance dans "les mythologiques", on ne peut imaginer une pode originelle de la penshumaine faite seulement de sentiments et ne comportant pas d de mise en ordre de type intellectuel), et qui se reproduisent au cours des millires au besoin contre toute "raison", peut-e parce qu'elles expriment une logique de systs vivants dssant toujours ce qu'il est possible d'en rationaliser. Essayons de nous mettre a place de ces es qui, 'aube de l'histoire humaine, sont plongdans un univers hyper-complexe, drdonnincohnt, opart immense de 1' inconnu reste comme une menace suspendue sur la poursuite des rlaritobservables (l'alternance du jour et de la nuit, la succession des saisons...). On peut imaginer que, de cette hyper-complexitnaun sentiment d'effroi permanent. Un effroi qu'il s'agit d'exorciser en maisant l'hyper-complexitar l'une ou l'autre de deux attitudes. Devant l'incohnce apparente ou rle du monde, la premi revient ssumer frontalement cette incohnce, en vivant intimement avec elle, exactement comme certaines cultures affrontent la mort en se la rendant constamment prnte. Le monde est alors une totalitnsble qu'il faut prendre en bloc, avec son incohnce, laquelle devient le mode d'e de l'existant. Elle cesse d'e effrayante parce qu'elle n'est plus impos'homme de l'exteur mais qu'elle est, pour ainsi dire, rjectpar lui dans le monde. De ce fait elle prend une signification et ordonne le monde en un double sens : le monde acquiert un ordre et l'homme lui donne des ordres. Voilpeut-e, le point de drt lointain du paradigme structural. La seconde attitude pose, au contraire, que lorsque quelque chose existe, ce quelque chose est forcnt cohnt: il ne peut e a fois une chose et son contraire, identique ui-m et diffnt de lui-m. Dans ce cas l'incohnce, si incohnce il y a, ne peut venir que du choc de plusieurs choses juxtapos. Le monde se dupe, parce qu'il additionne des existants. Voila, peut-e, le point de drt lointain du paradigme mnique.

Si l'on suit ces conjectures, on est conduit omprendre pourquoi le symbolisme humain prnte un caract totalitaire. Par ln entend le fait que ce symbolisme ne peut pas se laisser arrr par ce que lui-m sent, plus ou moins confusnt, e ses propres limites de reprntation du monde. Il ne peut pas admettre de reprntation partielle d'un monde qu'il sait total. M s'il a des doutes sur sa propre pertinence quant on pouvoir de reprntation, il lui faut dsser ces doutes et reprnter quand m le non-reprntable. Ce totalitarisme symbolique est demment attacher au besoin humain de l'ordre, 'angoisse qui nad'une non-maise symbolique et rle du monde. De ce point de vue, il est aussi vieux que la penshumaine, indndamment des conditions sociales d'exercice de cette pens Ceci dit, dlors qu'apparaissent dans une communautumaine des individus et des groupes dirigeants s'arrogeant le droit de dire a communaute qu'il faut faire et ce qu'il faut penser, le totalitarisme symbolique n'exprime plus seulement le besoin d'ordre de n'importe quel individu ou de n'importe quel groupe, face n environnement menacent. Il prend un contenu ouvertement social, et traduit la volont'une minorite maiser l'ensemble de la communautumaine. Toute classe dirigeante, toute idogie dominante, ou toute classe et idogie aspirant e devenir, doit assumer quelque chose de ce totalitarisme symbolique.

C'est en ce premier sens qu'il y a bien strate symbolique, dans la mesure odulement d'un symbolisme met en cause bien autre chose que ce qui parait e, es propres yeux ou eux d'autrui, sa logique interne de dloppement. Mais cette dimension stratque dule aussi de ce que, du seul fait qu'ils existent c le paradigme mnique et le paradigme structural ne peuvent pas, l'un ou l'autre, l'un et l'autre, incarner chacun le tout du totalitarisme symbolique. DEs lors, la strate symbolique devient une ruse humaine avec le monde et avec la reprntation du monde. Le conflit entre les deux paradigmes est bien r, mais il ne peut jamais aller jusqu'a victoire totale d'un paradigme sur l'autre. Tout se passe comme si la penset la technique humaines avaient ffronter depuis toujours un paradoxe qui peut s'exprimer ainsi : pour donner un sens au monde et 'action humaine, il faut choisir un des deux archpes ou paradigmes, et, en m temps il est impossible de choisir. Il faut choisir, car le choix est la condition nssaire de l'action humaine, en ce double sens que le refus de choisir est aussi un impossible ou insupportable refus d'agir, et que le choix donne son sens 'action. Quand il faut out prix introduire de l'ordre dans l'univers, f l'ordre de la contradiction ou du paradoxe, il faut aussi se dder sur le contenu de cet ordre. S'y refuser, agir en pensant a fois que son action modifie le tout de l'univers et pourtant ne le modifie pas, est une action proprement insens

On peut a rigueur concevoir qu'un homme, pur spectateur de l'univers, ne puisse pas dder s'il est un ou multiple. Mais l'action est en soi une dsion qui ne peut pas s'accommoder de l'inddabilite son symbolisme. Et pourtant, il faut bien qu'elle s'en accommode. Car ce symbolisme reste, jusqu'n certain point, inddable. Quand le choix du paradigme est fait, les hommes s'apervent toujours que ce choix laisse des probls en suspens. Le paradigme nd son ombre sur l'univers, et pourtant ne peut le couvrir tout entier. Pourtant encore, il faut qu'il le couvre. Il faut un imaginaire constamment capable d'aller au-dele l'expence quotidienne des hommes, dans le travail, la technique, et m dans l'exercice de la pens Il faut toujours cr un monde avec des fragments incomplets. Voilourquoi il faut choisir dans des conditions ochoix est impossible, un choix qui s'analyse toujours comme un moment de la gen du choix contraire.

La strate symbolique est donc une strate paradoxale ou strate double a fois bridet dynamispar la prnce obsessionnelle d'une aporie fondamentale. Connivence et conflit des deux archpes symboliques scandent l'histoire de la penshumaine. La "penssauvage" poursuit a fois une entreprise de mise en ordre universel par une classification identifiante s'appuyant sur l'observation des plus menues diffnces, et une entreprise de "dialectique sauvage" qui prend, semble-t-il, le contre-pied de la premi. Le mythe, dit Levi-Strauss, introduit la discontinuitans l'univers, et le rite rblit la continuitssaire. Le Logos grec et la Ms grecque montrent une connivence secr, m lorsqu'ils affectent de s'ignorer ou de se miser. Hclite, Nicolas de Cusa, les alchimistes. Voiles noms qui viennent aux les quand on que la ruse symbolique de l'homme. Et que dire de l'ambivalence d'un Newton, ou de celle de ces crions thiques du XIXie (sie, dit-on, du positivisme et du scientiste), qui tignent de l'extraordinaire prance d'un imaginaire fnd dans la "froide" raison scientifique : Darwin fabulant sur la pangsie, Mendel sur ses "facteurs", Maxwell sur son champ, tout le monde sur l'er...

Mais il faut couper court et se borner voquer un des aspects de la ruse symbolique, dans la science contemporaine. Aujourd'hui, il n'est plus possible de dire que le paradigme mnique est ce qui nige les structures, et le paradigme structural ce qui en tient compte. Le mnicisme est allrloin dans la prise en considtion des structures et ce n'est pas, ou ce n'est plus, sur ce point, qu'il se diffncie du paradigme structural. Le paradigme mnique pose que, si loin qu'on aille dans la comprnsion ou la transformation des choses, il vient toujours un moment on a affaire ne "substance", une entitun ment que l'on ne sait plus ptrer, dmposer, dructurer et restructurer. Il y a quelque part quelque chose qui est, et qui est dans l'invariance ou qui, s'il varie, le fait sans "raison" et sans lois. Le butoir nt admis, dans l'intervalle, le paradigme mnique peut se "structuraliser.' presque 3 l'infini, c'est-ire pousser trloin la prise en compte de la richesse, de la vari et de la variation du monde. Il fonde sa puissance explicative sur le fait drmais bien connu que avec un tout petit nombre d'ments premiers intangibles, et une combinatoire m trsimple (par exemple, une permutation de place ou d'ordre des ments), on peut riser un nombre presque inisable de variantes, construire des mondes d'une richesse infinie. Tout ce que le paradigme mnique demande d'admettre c'est que, au del'un certain point, le monde cesse en fait d'e une structure (un arrangement quelconque d'ments premiers), pour devenir prsnt ces ments intangibles dont vient la structure. Il y a donc action ou pensstructurales, si l'on veut, mais qui reposent sur l'idqu'il subsiste un "rdu" non structural et que, par consent, le mouvement de combinaison, mnge ou articulation des ments premiers, responsables des structures, conserve tout du mouvement mnique. L'essentiel du mnicisme est ainsi conservTout se transforme ou peut se transformer, mais c'est toujours gr au fait que quelque chose d'intransformable se transporte. Structurer c'est toujours, en dnitive, jouer au mno, ou encore, moduler. On peut discuter 'infini sur ce qui est invariant et non structuru structurable, on peut rire comme une peau de chagrin son domaine -et l'on a fait l'un et l'autre pendant des millires-, mais tant que l'on admet que ce domaine existe en fait et en pens on ne sort pas du mnicisme. Appelons, par convention, et pour faire court, ce structuralisme bavard assorti d'un mnicisme discret mais drminant, le structuralisme "mou" ou le mnicisme structural. Le structuralisme "dur" ne fait "que" mettre en doute l'hypoth de l'existence d'ments premiers pospar le mnicisme structural, et admet, au moins itre de conjecture, que puisque beaucoup est structurans le monde, peut-e tout l'est-il, tout nt "donc" susceptible de changer. Si loin qu'on aille dans la comprnsion ou la transformation des choses pour trouver l'invariance ultime, il arrive toujours un moment on ne peut pas se contenter de cette invariance et ofaut aller plus loin, retrouver la structure dans l'ment, et le changement dans l'invariance.

Il me semble que la physique thique, dans certaines de ses parties, incarne bien le structuralisme "dur". Mais bizarrement, la physique thique, malgrout son prestige et l'esp de prinence qui est la sienne dans les hirchies symboliques, ne me parait pas reprntative de ce qui domine la sc symbolique aujourd'hui, avoir la ruse du mnicisme structural, dont la biologie mollaire est une bonne illustration.

Il existe une extraordinaire congruence -comme une sorte de mimsme-, entre la biologie mollaire et la fa dont fonctionne et dont on se reprnte le fonctionnement de l'industrie moderne. Mieux qu'une machine, l'e vivant est vu comme une usine. Une usine moderne, largement automatis avec son programme qui, fondamentalement, reste le m, mais avec des variantes infiniment modulables, une mire d'ordinateur prodigieuse ayant stock peu prtoutes les situations imaginables, capable donc "d'adapter" la production n large aloire en sctionnant la variante requise. C'est une usine complexe dont un des drtements livre des pis standards dont le mod ne change pas, et dont la finition est parfaite. Un autre drtement ajuste, articule, combine ces pis de fa btenir les produits finis les plus varien travaillant ne vitesse folle (l'enzyme bat la mesure du rythme de fabrication), et en surmontant chaque incident gr n jeu complique feed-back. Les pis standards peuvent changer occasionnellement, mais, pour l'usine, le changement intervient au hasard, en fonction de la concurrence, de l'innovation, de l'invention exteures sur lesquelles l'usine n'a pas de prise : elle n'a pas de drtement de recherche qui, aprde de march(l'influence du milieu), et en fonction des donn technico-nomiques de la production, puisse provoquer des modifications planifi de ses pis standards. Les procs de fabrication sont intangibles : ils sont chimiques et mniques, ou, plus exactement, ils sont une combinaison de nano-mnique et de macro-mnique.

Ce mimsme situe moins la biologie mollaire comme un "reflet" idogique de l'nomie moderne (car on pourrait aussi soutenir, et de plus en plus on droit, que c'est l'nomie moderne qui est le "reflet" de la biologie mollaire), qu'il ne signale 1e travail, sur la sc sociale comme sur la sc symbolique, du m modale d'organisations qui en "structurant" le mnisme ouvre aussi le champ, rlement ou symboliquement, ne mnisation, sans prdent dans l'histoire, des structures. De sorte que, d'une certaine mani, on assiste ne dilatation inoudu paradigme mnique. "La" science ne frappe pas a porte de "la" soci pour qu'un nouveau rapport humain a mati puisse entrer, et pour que celle-ci adapte ses structures e nouveau rapport. De m que "la" soci essaie de ruser avec son aloire interne et externe et avec les turbulences et les "catastrophes" qui l'assaillent, de m "la" science ruse avec deux techniques symboliques de matricer de l'aloire (tout en cherchant auvegarder la prinence de la premi sur la seconde) : celle qui est fondes sur la prrogrammation externe du syst ler, et celle qui table sur une rle auto-programmation et auto-finalisation du syst. On retrouve le probl de l'auto-drmination humaine, dans un jeu d'orientations "socio-stlogiques" de la science et de la technique dont le moins qu'on puisse dire est qu'il ne favorise pas cette auto-drmination.

Le csocial du "socio-stlogique".

On quera (de fa bien trop rapide, malheureusement), trois tendances importantes des socis contemporaines constituant un danger r pour l'auto-drmination humaine, et dans lesquelles les orientations dominantes de la science et de la technique jouent un rparfois central.

La premi tendance est ce qu'on peut appeler l'autonomisation des systs techniques. On cherche ultiplier les dispositifs de production (ou de distribution, d'information...) devenant de plus en plus autonomes par rapport eurs opteurs humains. Tout un faisceau bien connu de sciences et de techniques sont attelette te : automatique, informatique, cybernque, intelligence artificielle, robotique... Il s'agit de remplacer le "facteur humain" dans deux activitfondamentales : la perception sensorielle et l'activitentale. En caricaturant les choses, l'industrie moderne ne voit aucun inconvent ssocier des bactes on travail. Par contre, sous couvert d'efficacitde sritde fiabilitde rendement..., elle a tendance, autant que faire se peut, e passer de l'ment humain. Ce qu'on appelle les "systs hommes-machines" n'en sont pas en ritou trpeu : ce sont des systs de machines dont les hommes sont de plus en plus absents en tant qu'hommes, soit que leur prnce devienne rlement inutile, soit que, nssaire encore, elle les confine a pphe du syst, ou es tes machiniques 'inteur du syst. On a souvent observue la cybernque, par exemple, est une cybernque mecaniciste qu'on peut dire "pauvre.' parce qu'elle ne cherche pas aire interagir la "cybernque" humaine et la cybernque machinique, et qu'elle ne permet pas, par consent, d'fier d'authentiques systs hommes-machines. Or cette orientation de la cybernque n'a rien d'obligatoire ou d'imposquelles que soient les difficultet impasses provisoires que rencontreraient d'autres orientations; elle correspond manifestement n choix "socio-stlogique". Les travaux sur l'intelligence artificielle et surtout sur l'heuristique dont certaines orientations serviraient mieux l'effort pour fier d'authentiques systs homme-machines, semblent pour l'instant rencontrer de nombreuses limites stlogiques ou techniques, mais peut-e aussi sociales. Les consences sociales de l'autonomisation des systs techniques sont bien connues, au premier rang desquelles il faut quer le spectre du che, parfois dnti aprcoup, mais toujours renaissant et toujours menat (la pousses de fie technique en cours autour de la micro-informatique et de la tmatique en est un exemple frappant). Mais il n'y a pas que le che. Il y a aussi que l'autonomisation des systs techniques par rapport non pas l'homme" en gral (il existe, bien entendu, des maes humains de ces systs qui sont en m temps les tenants du pouvoir nomique et politique), mais par rapport ette esp sociale particuli d'hommes que sont les travailleurs de la "base" (les extants), il y a que cette autonomisation rit considblement ce que ces travailleurs de base pouvaient garder de pouvoir sur leur propre travail, sur leur vie, et sur eux-ms en dnitive.

Cette ression du pouvoir d'auto-drmination se prolonge ravers ce que l'on peut appeler l'algorithmisation du travail. On dgne par la tendance ubstituer des algorithmes de travail -c'est-ire des procres analytiques d'action devenues en quelque sorte dchables de la personne qui agit et indndants d'elle-, e qu'on appelait autrefois le savoir-faire, artisanal ou ouvrier. Ce savoir-faire non entiment communicable par une dmposition analytique et nssitant un long apprentissage et un intense investissement personnel, rendait l'artisan ou l'ouvrier irremplale, lui confit un incontestable pouvoir sur son travail et sur la production (m s'il it limit et lui mgeait de nombreuses dsions et de nombreux choix aire. Il it (et il est encore, car l'dication du savoir-faire est une oeuvre immense, ecommencer sans cesse), une des opportunitles plus importantes de manifestation de l'autodrmination humaine. On dit que le taylorisme est en recul. C'est probablement vrai pour ce qui est des recettes tayloriennes proprement dites. Mais on peut considr ces recettes comme une forme fruste et primitive de l'algorithmisation qui, si elles ont fait historiquement leur temps, ne doivent pas cacher que l'essence du taylorisme -avoir la recherche d'algorithmes-, non seulement reste intacte, mais encore revdes formes nouvelles qui ouvrent un champ immense 'algorithmisation. Le taylorisme concernait certaines catries ouvris. Aujourd'hui l'algorithmisation atteint l'ensemble du personnel des usines, des services, des bureaux, et pas seulement le personnel d'extion, mais aussi les cadres techniques, administratifs, managaux... L'ironie de l'histoire veut que les algorithmisateurs se font eur tour algorithmiser.

Du point de vue de l'auto-drmination humaine, c'est-ire de l'auto-drmination des individus et des "masses", tout se passe comme s'il se poursuivait depuis deux ou trois sies un formidable anlement, un anlement qui a quelque chose oir avec une mutation de la nature du pouvoir politique, nomique, culturel, dont nous commens seulement tre de saisir l'ampleur, la complexitt les prolongements dangereux encore enir. Je suis frappar le fait que dans ce qu'on appelle les socis prndustrielles ou prapitalistes, le pouvoir sous ses diffntes formes it d'une nature telle qu'il n'impliquait pas, et dans certains cas excluait, l'intervention directe des classes ou des groupes dirigeants dans la production. Cette abstention mgeait des espaces de libertux producteurs directs, m si par ailleurs, des institutions comme le servage ou l'esclavage et bien d'autres (ne serait-ce que le prvement du surplus nomique sur les producteurs directs, c'est-ire sur tout le monde ou presque) n'assuraient qu'un jeu bien modeste ette libertencore une fois, la reconstitution fantasmatique d'un passdyllique n'a rien aire ici). On peut dire que le capitalisme industriel, et le rapport nouveau qu'il crentre la soci civile et l't, inaugurent une novation fondamentale, en ce que, pour la premi fois dans l'histoire du monde, les classes et groupes dirigeants tirent une partie de leur ltimitt de leur pouvoir de leur intervention directe dans la production. On a pu penser un temps que le tout de cette novation et de cette mutation s'it effectuour ainsi dire d'un coup et correspondait aux limites historiques d'une formation sociale spfique, le capitalisme, et de sa principale dimension spfique, la propri privdes moyens de production. Il me semble qu'on s'apert aujourd'hui que la maise de l'accumulation du capital n'it qu'une premi pe de la mutation du pouvoir et de la prise en mains directe de la production, que l'algorithmisation en cours est une deuxi pe au moins aussi importante que la premi et grosse de dloppements futurs, et que cette algorithmisation n'est pas "ontologiquement" line formation sociale parmi d'autres ni ne formule unique d'appropriation de l'appareil productif.

Je n'aime pas trop les raisonnements en termes d'pes qui quent une sorte de mnisme chronologique linre. Mais force est de se poser la question de savoir si la mutation du pouvoir n'entre pas dans une troisi phase, qu'on peut se reprnter comme une transposition des techniques de l'aigorithmisation e qu'on appelle le "hors-travail", c'est-ire out le champ immense de la vie sociale et interindividuelle. Le phm est li une remise en cause du rapport traditionnel entre le ''Centre" (l'Etat, l'appareil productif, les institutions, les diffnts appareils d'encadrement de la population) et sa "pphe" sociale (la masse de la population, prsnt).

Cette remise en cause est profondnt ambivalente. premier lieu, elle part du constat que le rapport traditionnel entre le centre et la pphe donne des signes certains de dillance, parce que l'industrialisation, l'urbanisation, la modernisation ont produit une "foule solitaire" qui s'analyse comme un vtable vide social : un vide, parce que le Centre ne peut plus compter sur la pphe pour s'auto-rler, s'auto-drminer, ravers mille sortes de micro-milieux sociaux, de fa er mille "petits" probls dont chacun d'eux peut parae insignifiant, mais qui, pris ensemble, reprntent une bonne part de ce qu'on appelle la rlation sociale, la cohnce sociale, c'est-ire, finalement, l'auto-reproduction vivante d'une soci. Le "Centre" commence 'effrayer 'idque s'il veut que " marche, il lui faut tout faire, tout dder, tout impulser de lui-m. Il y voit, ou du moins certains au "Centre" y voient, une cause d'ankviose, de paralysie, et finalement d'affaiblissement du pouvoir. Le Welfare State se fait peur ui-m. Il en vient donc 'ides qu'il faudrait refabriquer du tissu social, combler en partie le vide, faire "participer" la population de fa qu'elle assure elle-m une partie de la rlation et du contrsocial. Il souffre 'Ouest un petit vent de "dtellisation" susceptible d'introduire un peu d'auto-drmination. On parle de dntralisation, de participation, de mouvement communautaire, on parle m 'occasion d'auto-gestion, et on fait quelques tentatives (bien timides, il faut le reconnae). Seulement, avec la "dtellisation"´ c'est de division du travail qu'il est question, et non pas fondamentalement de partage du pouvoir. Le Centre peut espr se renforcer en se "daissant et la pphe ne peut ignorer cet espoir, m s'il lui est possible de formuler le contre-espoir d'un dpage de la division du travail vers le partage du pouvoir. Nous sommes ici en pleine zone d'inddabilite l'histoire.

Ce qui est certain, par contre, c'est que la dtatisation", m lorsqu'elle correspond n souhait sinc de voir l'auto-drmination reprendre un peu de vigueur, ne s'analyse pas en un retrait pur et simple de ce qu'il y a de "central" ou d'tique dans ou au-dessus de la soci civile. D'une certaine mani, ce qui est recherchst une socialisation de l't et une tisation du social sous des formes nouvelles facilitant une intorisation plus aises des normes sociales. On veut certes ter d'alourdir la chape du centre, mais en faisant en sorte que la pphe se solidarise mieux du Centre, se fasse elle-m un peu Centre. Ce "recentrage" de la pphe qui, pourtant, ne saurait abolir la barri entre le centre et la pphe, est une oeuvre paradoxale qu'on cherche iser par une strate paradoxale : le Centre se retire ou se fait discret sur le plan de l'action ou des institutions, en espnt que cette absence sera compenspar la prnce traccrue de ses normes.

C'est lu'on retrouve l'algorithmisation transpos La transposition revient enser une normalisation tous azimuths de la vie quotidienne. C'est pourquoi on assiste ne extraordinaire efflorescence de discours et de pratiques portant sur des sujets dont on admettait, "traditionnellement", qu'ils relevaient d'une sorte de domaine prive l'auto-drmination des individus et des groupes. Je ne peux ici que procr par mtion (non exhaustive), sans entrer dans l'analyse nssaire. Il y a la vie priv/U> proprement dite; la communication sociale et interpersonnelle; la sexualitl'action culturelle, dont certains pensent en France qu'elle pourrait obtenir le m effet de cimentation que la III Rblique a obtenu a fin du XIXie, gr n formidable effort scolaire, il y a des choses aussi ''insignifiantes" que le code de bonne conduite au volant d'une voiture, la nourriture "optimale", la lutte contre le tabagisme, le code de bonne conduite "logique", voire m le code de bonne conduite du touriste frans quand il s'en va 'anger "reprnter" son pave; il y a enfin la santavec une sorte de Radicalisation de la vie sociale dont il appert que les "inadapt, "handicap, "dants" sont des gens "3 soigner", et ceci dans leur propre intt. On voit m fleurir des idogies nec ou pseudo-mcales aux termes desquelles personne ne n'ait ou ne reste en bonne santet chacun doit s'efforcer de produire et reproduire cette bonne santvec l'aide d'un appareil d'encadrement dont on ne sait plus s'il est mcal, politique, social, ou s'il ne rel pas, 3 la limite, du service de renseignements. En m temps, tout cet effort de production et d'inculcation de normes, a une difficult affronter qui est ce que l'on appelle la "crise" des valeurs, l'effondrement des systs de valeurs, la "fin des idogies", avec toute la "permissivit rle ou thique, que cette situation impose, au moins dans les circonstances actuelles. A ce probl difficile, on cherche aire face en dloppant ce que l'on pourrait appeler des techniques d'idogie invisible, sorte de symique de techniques de publicitnvisible qu'on a parfois expmentur le public. Les procs de cette idogie invisible restent tout entier nalyser. On peut seulement apercevoir qu'ils s'efforcent d'occulter le message normatif explicite (a diffnce des idogies et morales "classiques") en pratiquant la "neutralit(et ici l'habillement technico-scientifique joue un rde premier plan, notamment dans les idogies mcales), en faisant passer le contenu du message dans sa "syntaxe" ou sa "grammaire" et non dans ce que l'une et l'autre servent xprimer (le sens se concentre sur la forme, la mani de dire, les mas du message), en multipliant les choix et les options possibles, apparents ou rs, c'est-ire en les relativisant les uns par les autres, et en occultant, car le seul lage de cette diversitles choix et options oubli Ici la permissivitst le rem m aux dangers sociaux de la permissivit

Il me semble que l'idogie invisible va de pair avec la transformation en cours perceptible dans l'enracinement socio-culturel de l'intelligentsia. 'intelligentsia "traditionnelle" faite d'individus et de ccles, est en train de succr un syst Production et de diffusion des id dont les acteurs se situent quelque part "entre" l'universitla recherche institutionnelle, les mass media, l'Edition, la techno-bureaucratie de l'nomie et de l'administration. Le sens social de ce glissement parait e le suivant : au lieu que l'idogie dominante soit directement produite par les classes et groupes dominants ou par leurs reprntants "ex officie", elle ne drmais en partie de ce que l'on pourrait appeler les "classes moyennes", c'est-ire ceux qui (par leur profession, leurs fonctions, leur place dans la hirchie sociale) n'ont pas enser les fondements d'une strate sociale ou symbolique, mais 'exter, m lorsque leur criviteut s'exercer sur la mise au point de variantes de la strate. Si cette idogie de classes moyennes peut devenir et rester dominante, ce n'est pas tant en raison de son excellence, que parce que ses fondements (assimilables, pour simplifier, n choix en faveur du productivisme) n'est pas seusement contestDe ce point de vue, la guerre des paradigmes n'a pas encore eu lieu, et nous en sommes es escarmouches d'avant-poste. Mais cette situation prnte des dangers, y compris pour le caract dominant de cette idogie. Cette idogie de classes moyennes est auasi-visclement fascinpar le probl des moyens d'une strate, presque incapable d'aborder le probl de strates alternatives, le probl des fondements "ultimes" de la strate choisie. En d'autres termes, l'idogie dominante a du mal emplir une des fonctions nssaires a reproduction de la domination : l'assomption par un symbolisme quelconque de sa dimension totalitaire, telle que dnie plus haut. Le danger est clairement perpar une partie de la classe politique, des dirigeants syndicaux, de la "nouvelle" intelligentsia. De plusieurs c on voit surgir des avertissements sur la nssite doter les socis industrielles ou post-industrielles d'une sorte de supplnt d' (il y a probablement lne des raisons de l'importance stratque attribupar certains 'action culturelle). A dut d'une rle poussde surplus symbolique, on voit se multiplier les simulacres ou ersatz de surplus. Il y a ce qu'on appelle en France le "nouvelliste" (cela va de la nouvelle cuisine a nouvelle philosophie, au nouveau romantisme...); il y a l'engouement pour la "philosophie orientale", quand ce n'est pas pour nos racines "celtes" ou gr-romaines; il y a le pseudo-archae, le pseudo-organicisme, le phm des sectes; il y a les techniques du corps et de l'esprit se voulant ase de psychanalyse; il y a une exaltation feutres ou ouverte de la dison, de l'irrationnel, de la violence, de la mort, de la consumation, du salut par la destruction. On voit des "valeurs" traditionnellement roite, tomber auche, et osciller vers une nouvelle droite se voulant plus auche que la gauche. Ce sont luelques unes des escarmouches d'avant-poste qu plus haut. On a quelque mal es prendre au seux, voir autre chose que le retournement agit'un vide symbolique sur lui-m. Tout se passe comme si l'on simulait un conflit entre nos deux paradigmes se drquant du conflit r a fois cacht rlar la ruse symbolique du structuralisme mnique, dans des circonstances ote forme de ruse demeure dominante, tout en laissant voir drmais des limites proches.

Le probl des alternatives

Supposons acquis que les socis industrielles ou post-industrielles prennent une certaine conscience d'une limite historique et que surgit donc rlement la question des alternatives, la question de l'auto-transgression d'une soci. Pour nous en tenir au c"stlogique" de ce probl "socio-stlogique", il parait clair que la transgression ou l'alternative passe par une remise en cause fondamentale des orientations de la science et de la technique, si cette transgression ou cette alternative doit rlement aller dans le sens d'un jeu plus ouvert de l´auto-drmination humaine. Le contenu de cette remise en cause est clair lui aussi : il porte sur le type de ruse entre les deux paradigmes reprntar le structuralisme mnique. Car il est illusoire d'escompter une synth finale harmonieuse des deux paradigmes, leur "dssement" dans un paradigme "supeur". Il faut partir du caract durable de leur conflit li leur relative pertinence 'un comme 'autre. Il faut se rgner e que la ruse persiste et e que la strate symbolique reste paradoxale. La remise en cause ne peut porter que sur le point suivant : comme strate paradoxale, le structuralisme mnique prnte la particularit mettre l'ivoque du choix et du non-choix entre les deux paradigmes, au service d'une fin qui n'est pas ivoque, et qui est la mnisation des structures. Cette mnisation est presque l'antith de l'auto-drmination humaine. La "nouvelle" ruse, si nouvelle ruse il y a, ne peut donc consister qu'rganiser un conflit des deux paradigmes donnant le pas 'auto-drmination sur la mnisation. Pour prendre un exemple concret qui nous fasse un peu descendre de ces hauteurs absconses, le renversement de strate se traduirait, dans le domaine cybernque, par une orientation de recherche sur les moyens d'obtenir un couplage r de la "cybernque" humaine et de la cybernque machinique dans d'authentiques systs hommes-machines, lesquels pourraient eux-ms devenir une des bases technico-scientifiques d'un mouvement de retour, en toute modernitdu pouvoir de dsion depuis le Centre jusqu'a pphe, c'est-ire les individus et les groupes de base. Nul doute que ce basculement stratque soul de nombreuses difficult d'ordre scientifique ou technique (au point qu'on n'a pas le droit d'exclure l'ntualite l'ec de la tentative). Nul doute non plus que la dsion de changer ou de ne pas changer de strate est fondamentalement de nature sociale, tant qu'il n'a pas expmentt prouvue le changement est impossible pour des raisons purement techniques ou scientifiques.


What is our physical image of the world today? How was it achieved throughout history?

What was the importance of scientific research, of cultural creation, for the development of the contemporary advanced societies?

What was the effect of the lack of scientific education and practice on underdevelopment

What are the present-day problems, what are the prospects for the application of science and technology to promote adequate development not only in the less-developed countries but also in the advanced industrial nations?

Is the aim of science and technology to liberate man or to contribute to a world ruled by repression of the many poor by the few rich?

These are some of the questions which we all must study and try to answer if we are to formulate meaningful and significant proposals for the harmonization of the development of human societies in accord with their cultural heritage and national identity, in the changing world of today.

I. The physical image of the world

As is well known, speculations about the structure of the universe were always contained in the cosmogonic models and philosophical systems developed by ancient civilizations.

In Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, superb achievements were obtained by ancient societies - in their mythical approach to the study of nature, in their cultural monuments, in their artistic and technological ingenuity, in their astronomical observations, in the philosophies on space, time, matter, and life that they were led to create and which reflected their forms of interaction with the world

It was, as everyone knows, the atomistic philosophers of ancient Greece who exercised perhaps the greatest influence on the modern conception of the universe.

Before the Greeks, the Babylonians and the Egyptians had already made observations, during many centuries, on the motions of the sun and of the moon with respect to the fixed stars, and knew how to predict lunar and solar eclipses. In spite of the fact that the Greeks identified the celestial bodies with gods, Anexagoras stated that the sun was like a red hot stone and that the moon was made like the earth. The Pythagoreans, at the end of the fifth century B. C., stated that the earth is spherical, Aristarchus of Samos, in the third century B. C., discovered the complete Copernican system, and Eratosthenes, in the year 200 B. C., calculated, according to Claudius Ptolemaeus, the maximum distance of the moon from the earth and the minimum distance between the sun and the earth.

Abu 'All al-Husayn ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Sina, known as Avicenna, philosopher, codifier of Aristotle and one of those who preserved and contributed to the transmission of Greek culture, stated: "Time is the measure of motion.''1 In the Rasa'il, a 51-treatise encyclopedia known as the Koran after the Koran, one finds a list of distances to the planets (as a function of Earth radii) and of sizes of planets; it is stated there that space is "a form abstracted from matter existing only in the consciousness.''] But how many documents were lost or destroyed, as happened for instance in the subjugation of the magnificent pre-Columbian civilizations by the invading Spaniards in Mexico, in Central and South America?

After these systems were forgotten during the decay of later antiquity, there came the Christian medieval model of the image of the world. As expressed in Dante's Paradiso, the earth is the cent re of the universe, Satan is at the centre of the earth, the heavens consist of ten concentric spheres. Everything below the moon is subject to corruption and decay; everything above the moon is indestructible. "God, the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover, causes the rotation of the Primum Mobile, which, in turn, communicates its motion to the sphere of the fixed stars and so on downwards to the sphere of the moon."2

The great scientific revolution in astronomy and in physics came long after the Greeks, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with the work of Galileo and Newton, who built up the first scientific image of the universe.3 By discovering the laws of motion of the bodies of our daily experience and by generalizing these laws to all bodies in the universe, and by inventing the infinitesimal calculus needed for this work, Newton achieved the first great synthesis, which is the aim of modern science, in intimately correlating ideas and facts apparently strange to one another: the fall of an apple from the tree, the fall of the moon around the earth, the motion of the celestial bodies under the action of universal gravitation. "In the beginning," wrote Einstein in his Autobiographical Notes, "(if there was such a thing) God created Newton's laws of motion together with the necessary masses and forces. This is all; everything beyond this follows from the development of appropriate mathematical methods by means of deduction. What the nineteenth century achieved on the strength of this basis, especially through the application of the partial differential equations, was bound to arouse the admiration of every receptive person."

After the Newtonian mechanics of action at a distance, the notion of field was introduced in physics, mainly through the work of Faraday and Maxwell on electromagnetism, which culminated with another great synthesis, that which unifies the domains of optics, electricity, and magnetism. What made Maxwell's theory "appear revolutionary," wrote again Einstein (reference 4, page 33), "was the transition from forces at a distance to fields as fundamental variables. In this connection I cannot suppress the remark that the Faraday-Maxwell pair has a most remarkable inner similarity with the Galileo-Newton pair - the former of each pair grasping the relations intuitively, and the second one formulating those relations exactly and applying them quantitatively."4

At the end of the nineteenth century, there were the discovery of the electron and of the proton, and a collection of remarkable questions which led, on the one hand, to the discovery of the quantum of action by Planck in 1900 and, on the other hand, to the development of the theory of relativity by Einstein in 1905.

"When one looks back over the development of physics, one sees that it can be pictured as a rather steady development with many small steps and superposed on that a number of big jumps. Of course it is these big jumps which are the most interesting feature of this development. The background of steady development is largely logical, people are working out the ideas which follow from the previous set-up according to standard methods. But then, when we have a big jump, it means that something entirely new has to be introduced. These big jumps usually consist in overcoming a prejudice."5 The inventive physicist finds that he has to question this prejudice and replaces it by an entirely new image of nature.

In his work on the special theory of relativity, Einstein made one of these big jumps and achieved a great new synthesis of apparently disconnected ideas: the prejudice of absolute simultaneity was questioned, analysed, and replaced by a new conception of physical space, a new entity in which ordinary three-dimensional space and time are amalgamated to constitute a four-dimensional manifold, a consequence of which is that space may generate time, energy may generate momentum, energy is equivalent to mass, electric and magnetic fields are aspects of the same subjacent variables, the electromagnetic field.

Moreover, a new concept, that of a superlaw, was introduced by Einstein in physics with his relativity principle. By postulating that the laws of physics must be independent of the state of (rectilinear and uniform) motion of the observer, of its position in space, and of the time at which his observations are made, Einstein formulated a general requirement to be satisfied by the equations of physics. If an ordinary physical law expresses a relationship between variables associated to phenomena and events, the principle of relativity states how such a relationship must be expressed, how it may not be; mathematically, the principle of relativity states, as is well known, that the physical laws must be invariant under a certain group of transformations, the Poincarroup. This was perhaps a striking and very precise realization of the claim, or desire, that scientific knowledge must be wholly impersonal, independent of the physicist who makes the experimental observations. And also the proclamation of absolute statements - the invariant laws - as well as the relativization of the notion of measure, of the values of length, volume, time interval, energy of a physical system, for example, as numbers which depend on the frame of reference in which the measure is carried out.

It was still Einstein - and we commemorate the centennial of his birth this year 1979 - who after ten years of research discovered the relativistic theory of gravitation, one of the most beautiful, if not the most beautiful, constructions in the theoretical physics of all times. By achieving a new synthesis, which generalized Newton's gravitation theory, Einstein identified the gravitational field with the tensor of the space metric, the physical space as described by laws of Riemannian geometry. The machinery of this geometry led Einstein to invent his equation of the gravitational field - an equation which is based on the notion that matter affects the curvature of space-time and that space-time acts back onto matter and determines the nature of its motion: a revolutionary concept which destroys the old notion of space as a passive stage where events take place, without affecting them, as proclaimed by Leibnitz.6

It was mainly his invention of the relativistic theory of gravitation which led Einstein to formulate his conception of the genesis of scientific knowledge in physics: the concepts and the laws which relate them to one another can be discovered by means of purely mathematical constructions, and give the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. Experience may suggest the appropriate mathematical ideas but these can surely not be deduced from it. Experience, of course, remains as the only valid criterion for judging the physical utility of a mathematical theory. But "the concepts and principles are free inventions of the human intellect, which cannot be justified either by nature of that intellect or in any other fashion a priori."7

This epistemological conception of scientific work, of, so to say, an anti-Baconian character, is indeed to be found from Newton, Lagrange, Hamilton, to Einstein, De Broglie, Heisenberg, and Dirac.

The discovery and the development of the theory which describes atomic phenomena - quantum mechanics - as well as research on the ultimate constituents of matter, the so-called elementary particles, dominated the physics of the last fifty years.

It was only in the beginning of the eighteenth century that the atomic hypothesis, put forward by the Greek philosophers, lost its theological and metaphysical character. Democritus, in the fourth century B. C., stated that "the only existing things are atoms and the vacuum; all else is mere opinion"; and thereby put forward the important notion that the complex variety of bodies and phenomena result from the motions and interactions between invisible and indivisible particles, the atoms, which obey "simple" laws. Newton himself wrote: "It seems probable to me that God in the Beginning formed matter in solid, messy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles of such Sizes and Figures and with such other Properties and in such Proportion to Space as most conduced to the End for which he formed them; and that these primitive Particles being Solids, are incomparably harder than any porous Bodies compounded of them; even so very hard, as never to wear out or break in pieces; no ordinary Power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first Creation."8

You all know that the atoms - or at least the objects we came to call atoms - were found to be rather complex systems. The development of modern science, from the seventeenth century to our days, the extraordinary achievements of experimental techniques and ingenuity' the birth and development of scientific thought, led to the replacement of the metaphysical approach to natural philosophy by the rational approach based on experimental evidence, on mathematical models constructed on the results of observations and on inventive intuition.

The notion of an indivisible atom gave place to the concept of elementary particles and one hoped that these particles would be - in small number - the fundamental constituents of matter. In the last decades, however, a large number of such sub-atomic particles were discovered, a number which is now in competition with the hundred atoms or so which integrate Mendelejev's periodic table. We now know six species of leptons, particles which include - and have properties in common with - the electron and its neutrino. There are the baryons, particles related to protons and neutrons; the mesons, which are. exchanged between baryons; there is the photon, the particle of light, responsible for the propagation of electromagnetic forces. We assume the existence of particles which have not yet been observed such as the graviton, which propagates gravity, the weak mesons, which propagate weak interactions. The mathematical beauty of the present attempts to unify the weak, strong, and electromagnetic forces, such as the Salam-Weinberg model, lead most of the present-day physicists to believe in the existence of the latter particles. This unification, in which are concentrated the efforts of the physicists who specialize in the domain of high-energy physics, will constitute a great new synthesis, comparable to those which were mentioned earlier in this paper.

And this is the present hope: to reduce the different forms of observed forces, the gravitational interactions, the weak interactions, the electromagnetic forces, and the strong forces (responsible for the existence of nuclei and therefore of matter) to different manifestations of certain underlying basic entities called gauge fields.

This unification is an old dream which started with the attempts of Einstein to include the electromagnetic forces in the unification of gravitation and space-time geometry. And it is the method introduced with so much force and elegance by Einstein in theoretical physics, the search for symmetry groups which leave invariant basic physical laws which is at the root of our present-day work.

Matter, on the other hand, the variety of elementary particles mentioned above, seems to be constituted - with the probable exception of the leptons - by certain objects called quarks. The quarks would be the latest elements in the fragmentation scalation of matter, ultimate particles which integrate the heavy elementary particles but which would be, for some reason not yet fully understood, not observed as free particles. Quarks would most probably be confined inside the elementary particles and this notion would perhaps give the key for us to stop in the process of reduction of matter to smaller and smaller constituents

To conclude this picture of our physical image of the world, let me say just a few words on the astrophysicist's conception of the universe.

It was after the discovery of the relativistic theory of gravitation that cosmology started to develop as a science. From 1917 observational data and theoretical studies laid the foundations of this discipline which has not stopped developing since.

As stated by a distinguished cosmologist, "the existence of the universe is clearly its most important characteristic but I am referring here to the stronger idea that it is meaningful to talk of the universe as a whole, as a single well-defined concept. This idea is one of the most important, perhaps the most important, scientific discovery of the twentieth century." That the universe is unique, and that we can apply to its study the physical laws which are locally established, are postulates generally admitted. Observations of stars and galaxies and objects revealed by the emission of invisible radio waves have led the astrophysicists to the conception that the whole universe is in a state of expansion, of continuous change with time. The notion of expansion of the universe was the result of observations of the red shifts of the galaxies, radio source counts, abundance of the elements. The extrapolation into the past of this outward movement of galaxies, the discovery of the background microwave radiation, have led to the conclusion that our world came into existence in a sudden way, out of an explosion, a "big bang." This is the so-called "standard hot big bang model" according to which, at the beginning, about 15 billion years ago, elementary particles were highly concentrated and under thermodynamic equilibrium at extremely high temperature, with the decay of particles and recombination of pairs in the first few seconds. With the motion of these particles the temperature dropped and there occurred the formation of elements, with the production of helium out of protons and neutrons. Later on heavier elements were produced out of nuclear reactions and the stars became intensely hot furnaces in which ordinary matter was forged out of protons.

And thus we are still left with the question of what happened before the initial state of nearly infinite density and temperature and pressure. Other models of the universe are also investigated by cosmologists who attack fascinating questions such as the possible permanent expansion of the universe or its return to contraction, the gravitational collapse, the existence of singularities in nature.

Such is the evolution of our ideas about the universe, from the old civilizations to present days. It is fascinating to learn that the matter of our localized world, "the carbon and nitrogen of our bodies, the oxygen we breathe, the iron in our blood were all generated inside stellar furnaces at remote epochs in the past.''10 And that in any case, as dreamed of by Anaxagoras, in the times of Pericles, the sun is like a red-hot stone and the moon is made of earth.

II. Science and underdevelopment in Latin America

The above is only a sketch of some of the basic lines of our physical image of the world. Others might tell you about the foundations of the biologist's picture of the universe, of the points of view of the chemist, the geophysicist, the mathematician, the social scientist.

We see that modern science had its birth in the seventeenth century and became associated with the emergence of capitalism in West European countries. Little by little, empirical inventions of machines and mechanisms, the study of nature in laboratory, the search for new products, and the understanding of the laws of nature furnished the instruments for the technological and scientific transformation of the world. At the same time, in other civilizations and societies, many of them subjugated by conquest and war, similar processes did not take place.

Immersed in a different historical context, subjected to specific religious, cultural, political, and economic forces, these societies did not develop the search for scientific knowledge - or were not allowed to continue such a development - and thus lacked basic tool, for the transformation of the world and indeed for ensuring their very survival.

Once the inequality among nations was established due to their different forms of interactions with the physical world, economic and political forces were bound to act in order to increase this inequality. 11 And the development of the emerging industrialized societies apparently arose associated with the economic and political domination of other societies, the present underdeveloped nations or, if you wish to change the nomenclature, the less-developed countries.

In Latin America, as you know, the Spaniards and Portugese conquered he native peoples of this continent, and employed efforts to destroy their religious systems and their cultural achievements. The civilizations in the Andes - the Incas - in the Mexico plateau and in Yucatan - Aztecs and Mayas - had reached important levels of material and cultural development before the invasion in the first half of the sixteenth century.

Mathematics, which included the utilization of the number zero, and astronomical knowledge, which included the prediction of eclipses, were achievements of those civilizations, which also developed techniques in agriculture, architecture, and engineering, as well as an artistic culture, which were transmitted from generation to generation.

The replacement of the local cultures by those of Western Europe as brought about by Spain and Portugal did not lead, however, to a scientific development in our part of the world, as was taking place in Europe.

It is true that Spain and Portugal made superb achievements which culminated with the discovery of continents through the development of the art and sciences of navigation. Several factors, however, such as the great influence of religion and the power exercised by religious authorities in those two countries, prevented them from participating in the European creation of science in the seventeenth century.

It is not my purpose to describe the effect of this on the evolution? Or science in Latin America.12 Names and data can be found in books and specialized articles. It will be seen that, in spite of difficult conditions of work, many talented scientists did important work in many countries of our continent, mainly after the second half of the nineteenth century. What is of the greatest interest to us is to see that the state of political and economic dependence of our countries could not allow the flourishing of culture and science. The colonies of Central and South America were regarded as places rich in primary materials to be exported to the expanding capitalist countries of Europe. And these in turn exported to the Latin American colonies their industrial products. "[Latin America], it is not unjust to say, saved the British cotton industry in the first half of the nineteenth century, when it became the biggest market for the English exportations.''13

The proclamation of political independence did not change the nature of the economic system in those countries - it was rather an opening toward their domination by Great Britain. At the same time, an ideology was taking form which stated that the process of economic development was a kind of game, of free competition, where the most intelligent and most dynamic peoples are successful. Political and economic domination in fact prevented other societies, other peoples, from competing in these games.14

And inside our countries, the national ruling classes, partners of those in the dominating foreign powers, developed an ideology according to which our countries have as a vocation the exportation of raw materials necessary to the expansion of the capitalist industrialized countries.

"It was accepted," states Velho, "that we [in Brazil] would never be able to produce industrial goods so well as English and other countries and that if we attempted to do so and became projectionists we would certainly suffer retaliations against our agricultural exportations.''15

Subsequently, the transformation of the economies of Latin American countries by means of the import-substitution industrialization, started in the beginnings of the twentieth century, had as a direct consequence the importation and the imitation of products and of the means of production invented abroad, the purchase of technology developed in the advanced countries.

It is thus important to emphasize that the character of economic dependence was essentially kept untouched, although under another form, when the Latin American countries ceased being formal colonies of Spain and Portugal. The search for manufactured products equal or similar to those which were imported led immediately to a technological dependence from abroad - the scientific and technical knowledge necessary to industrialization in Latin America was incorporated in the machines and plants imported from abroad.

In parallel to this situation of the economy, the medieval Christian image of the world was imposed in education. Universities were founded late in Latin America - and the exceptions do not change the general feature of lack of scientific education and its subsequent effect on the life of our nations. Clearly, the absence of industries implied no need for technological and scientific research institutes. And it is perhaps not exaggerated to say that the universities which were founded early in Latin America, in the seventeenth century, were rather centres dedicated to the study of the medieval-inspired culture developed in Spain and Portugal.

In the last few decades, a great effort has been made towards the development of universities and scientific institutes in many countries of Latin America. Following the industrialization process, many universities and scientific laboratories were founded or further supported and developed.

However, in spite of this expansion of the university system, of science and culture, the fact is that the industries which are owned by Latin American industrialists depend basically on imported machinery and technology.

And these industrialists have never been preoccupied with the technological research necessary to the improvement of the quality of their manufactured goods. Associated to foreign enterprises, from which they buy equipment and technical assistance, the national industries in Latin America almost never called for technical services by the national technological institutes.16 In this way, Latin American universities have generally been dissociated from the studies for economic projects; scientists and technologists have not been called to help make fundamental decisions in the formulation of the economic development programmes of these countries.

In the advanced industrialized countries, on the other hand, the machines and plants which are invented depend on intensive technological research and this, in turn, is based on investigation on fundamental science carried out in their institutes and universities.

III. Science and dependent development

If in our countries, in Latin America, we scientists and research engineers hoped one day to be able to contribute to their development, this hope was seriously harmed by the government decisions which have been taken in the last twenty years to base development on the implantation of affiliates of multinational enterprises. These industrial companies, which have their own research laboratories in the centre of the capitalist system, produce goods in the countries where they establish themselves mainly for exportation as well as for consumption by a small fraction of our populations. in recommending the adoption of these policies, technocrats utilize the myth of technology transfer. The installation of plants of multinational enterprises clearly does not imply any transfer of technical and scientific knowledge; the imported machines are invented, designed and built abroad, and the plans for locally making goods cannot be changed by the local national engineers. Even if we set aside the basic question of whether these industrial products are really those which are needed for our populations, it is clear that the important thing is the capacity of technological innovation and not the fact that workers have to be instructed on which buttons to press for operating the machines. The capacity of technological invention is not transferred by multinational enterprises. Research is, therefore, carried out abroad and technology comes in locked in black boxes.

The integration of most of Latin America into the economic-cultural market of the industrial capitalist nations has thus inevitably led to an aggravation of dependence: science and culture have become luxury imported products - sometimes locally produced by and for a few.

IV. Endogenization of science in which society?

It is thus clear that if we are to discuss plans for the development of science and culture in our countries, if we Presto suggest strategies for what is now called an endogenization of the activities in these domains, we have beforehand to clearly characterize the political, economic, and social forces which have been an obstacle to independent development, to the enrichment of our cultural heritage, to the affirmation of our national identities. For how are we to suggest a strategy for developing endogenous culture and science if the underlying political and economic systems of the society in question deny this endogenization, assume that what has been invented abroad is necessarily what we must imitate and buy?

V. The aims of science

As we follow the marvellous history of the elaboration of our scientific image of the universe, we are tempted to say that science is a unique and universal system of knowledge, politically neutral and standing above ideologies. The scientific laws are of course valid whatever the laboratory of whatever country in which you make experiments to verify them. But science is not only a catalogue of data, names, and statements. Scientific research is a dynamic process which includes interaction of the scientific community with their surroundings, with political and social forces. The motivations for research, its planning and funding, are not politically neutral. For science, in forming an interpreted picture of the world, gives us instruments for changing the world.

How many industries arose from pure fundamental research - from mechanics and thermodynamics, from the branches of chemistry, from Maxwell's equations, from the theory of electrons and quantum mechanics? Is not the whole field of nuclear energy a result of, among other ingredients, the formula of equivalence between mass and energy?

Science, we have been taught - and we like to repeat it - works for mankind, for the benefit of man, for the liberation of man from work. Science and technology are indeed so powerful as to be able to send man into cosmic space. Are they, however, not impeded from improving the living conditions of the poor and exploited masses in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America?

Is science then not a part of the social and political system of the advanced industrial nations? The results of scientific and technological research, are they not primarily and chiefly applied for the promotion of their model of society, for their mankind?

There are, of course, those who do not attach importance to these questions, who elude them.

There are those who, confronted with political changes in developing countries which tend to liberate them from subjugation and dependence, get ready to tell these countries which kind of science they must develop. It is suggested that developing countries must develop only so-called intermediate technologies, leaving the fields of advanced science and technology, the so-called big science, hard science, to the industrialized nations.

This suggestion is clearly unacceptable. Of course, a given country, with its specific resources, cannot always develop an arbitrarily chosen technology. Even the nations of Western Europe had to get together and pool their physicists, technicians, and financial means in order to establish a high-energy physics laboratory - the CERN - so as to produce the advanced and expensive equipment needed for further investigation on the ultimate structure of matter.

This idea of getting together, of pooling human and material resources among nations of a given region of the world, is it not a good idea, worthy of imitating? In this way is not the capacity of developing countries going to be enhanced, multiplied by a significant factor, are then not fields of research in science and technology open to such a group of nations, each of which would not be able to develop them in isolation? Clearly, locally developed techniques, many of which have been replaced by imported and inadequate technologies, must be preserved and studied.

But the principle that developing nations must not have access to certain fields of knowledge is unacceptable - it would be an attempt at freezing the present division of the world into rich and poor nations, at perpetuating the international division of labour.

Of course, appropriate technologies, in the sense that they should be financially, economically, ecologically adequate and serve the ideals of improving the living conditions of the whole community, not the interests of a privileged minority, such appropriate technologies are to be recommended not only to developing nations but also to the rich industrialized countries.

Look at the waste of energy, at the indiscriminate burning of fossil fuels in the rich countries. Look at the indiscriminate exportation of sophisticated equipment by these nations to poorer countries just as a need to make profit, to pay for their investments in the corresponding fields. Look at the indiscriminate automation of industries and services there where labour hands are available in enormous surplus, look at the installation of computers everywhere with the subsequent aggravation of the unemployment problem.

It is as if science and technology, under the capitalist system, had as its aim liberating men from work - and thereby condemning them to "che," to being unable to find work, to having access only to the basic requirements of life.

I believe, therefore, that it is meaningless to urge the formulation of strategies for scientific and technological development in our nations if a corresponding political strategy is not analysed and formulated for changing the economic pattern of these countries.

We certainly cannot succeed in achieving endogenization of culture, science, and technology if we, scientists of the developing nations, do not discuss the basic political and economic forces which have prevented - throughout our history - the development of our potential capacity for creation.

VI. Science for liberation

Before concluding, let me make a few additional remarks. The first remark concerns the relationship between the individual work of creation by scientists and the social and political significance of science and technology. It is quite clear that the motivations for research work on the part of many scientists do not have any explicit political or economic connotation. It is apparently the wish to understand and solve problems in his specialized field, connected with the description, correlation, and, so to say, explanation of events and objects, with the discovery of laws of nature and of new images of the world, that incites many scientists to do their research work. In performing this work they develop special intuitions, a sense of beauty and elegance which only professional scientists know and which are probably not essentially different from the corresponding feelings developed by creative artists, philosophers, and writers.

It is, however, the whole set of the findings which result from the work of individual scientists that constitute science. The ensemble of scientific laws, of theoretical views and experimental techniques, constitutes a body of knowledge of the physical world which has a strong interaction with technology - a transformation of science in the art of creating substances, of inventing machines and building mechanisms, which are the tools for the transformation of the world according to the needs of men, their political and social projects and economic requirements.

To the construction of science contribute, in fact, not only the great innovators, but also the scientists who make lesser contributions but who are also important in their search for details, consequences, and applications of fundamental new theories and experimental discoveries.

There are still those - probably the great majority - who do their research work according to specific programmed and plans, with the idea of making discoveries of interest to a given practical domain, such as those in specific fields of solid state physics, of electronics, nuclear energy, space physics, and so on.

The set of the results arising from all this variety of research work constitutes the various domains of science and it would not be correct to say that this ensemble is free from social, economic, and even political significance. It would clearly be inappropriate to say so of the field of nuclear energy physics only because Einstein's fundamental work on this subject had a purely theoretical motivation.

In this respect, contemporary science nourishes all kinds of technology which are responsible for change in our social, economic, and political world: from the technology of food production to the technology of production of the most dreadful and destructive weapon systems. Scientists are thus naturally incited to think about the social, economic, and political consequences of scientific research, even if their own personal work involves only abstract ideas.

Scientists belonging to countries of the Third World, in particular, are naturally led to meditate on the role which science and technology may have in the making of their societies. They will find that the discoveries made in the research laboratories and universities of the advanced countries will be useful to the great industrial companies of the latter countries which develop and utilize these discoveries, and transform them into manufactured goods and special technologies. These companies then invest a part of their profits in the development of these laboratories and sell the result of their research work.

In a developing country, the economy of which is dominated by multinational enterprises, the research work carried out in national research institutes and universities does not generally have application in the benefit of that country since those enterprises employ their own scientific and technological knowledge.

Scientists of the developing nations can thus hardly escape the conclusion that the development of science and technology in their own countries presupposes the search for a political system, the project of which will be the welfare of the whole population.

The following questions are thus appropriate in a symposium such as the present one: which science and which culture, for which project of society in which world?

Is the aim of science and technology to liberate man or to establish a world ruled by repression of the many poor by the few rich?

To my mind, there can be no other answer: science must liberate man; and by that I do not mean only men and women of the advanced societies we must work for liberation of all men and women everywhere so that science will fulfill its vocation of universality and will become a patrimony of all mankind.


1. Quoted by C. W. Misner, K. S. Thorne, J. A. Wheeler, Gravitation. W. H. Freeman and Co., San Francisco, 1973, p. 73.

2. Cf. B. Russell, Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1948, p. 24.

3. The difference between the reputation of Aristarchus and that of Copernicus and Galileo lies, according to Russell, in the fact that in ancient Greece, astronomy was an amusement of the idle rich and not an activity integrated in the life of the community. In the sixteenth century, however, science had made important inventions, the discovery of the Americas had shown the limitations of the ancient knowledge of geography, Catholic orthodoxy had begun to be an obstacle to material progress and the fury of theologians made scientists appear as heroic champions of a new wisdom (ibid., p. 25).

4. Albert Einstein, Philosopher-Scientist, ed. by P.A. Scilpp. The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, 1949, p. 19.

5. P. A. M. Dirac, "Development of the physicist's conception of nature," in The Physicist's Conception of Nature, ed. by J. Mehra. D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, 1973, p. 1.

6. See J. Leite Lopes, "The Evolution of the Notions of Space and Time," Scientia (Milano) 107, 1972, p. 411.

7. A. Einstein, Ideas and Opinions. Souvenir Press, London, 1973, p. 272.

8. I. Newton, Opticks. Dover Publications, New York, 1952, p. 400.

9. D. W. Sciama, "The Universe as a Whole," in The Physicist's Conception of Nature, op. cit.

10. F. Hoyle, The Ten Faces of the Universe. W. H. Freeman and Co., San Francisco, 1977, p. 78.

11. See J. Leite Lopes, "Science for Development - A View from Latin America," Bull. Atomic Scientists 22, 1966, p. 7.

12. See for instance M. Roche, "Early History of Science in Spanish America," Science 194, 1976, p. 806; Ricardo Ferreira, "As origens da actividade cientifica no Brasil," Ciencia e Culture 30, 1978, p. 1301; M. S. Giambiagi and M. Giambiagi, "Alcune reflessioni suggerite dal tema: piani di studio per il dottorato in chimica teorica," IX Congreso dei Chimici Teorici di Espresione Latina, Stresa, Italy, September 1978.

13. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire. Penguin, London, p. 146, as quoted by O.G. Velho, op. cit.

14. See J. Leite Lopes, "Science and Dependent Development," Interciencia 2, 1977, p. 139.

15. O.G. Velho, Capitalismo autoritario e campesinato. Difel, Sao Paulo, 1976.

16. Cf. F. A. Biato, E.A. de Almeida Gulmaraes, and M.H. Poppe Figueiredo, Potencial de pesquisa tecnologica no Brasil. Ministerio do Planejamento, Instituto de Planejamento Economico e Social, Brasilia, 1971; J. Leite Lopes, "Les transferts de technologie: l'exemple du Bresil, in Plurisciences, Encyclopedia Universal is, Paris, 1978, p. 221.


Chairman: Salustiano del Campo Urbano
Co-chairman: Milos Macura
Rapporteur: Cuthbert K. Omari


Gregory Blue

The dominant motif of this session lay in defining a realistic strategy by which the underdeveloped countries - whose peoples of course comprise the vast majority of the population of the globe - would be able to overcome the present cruelly unequal distribution of power over the material and technological resources of the world. A general theoretical framework for the deliberations of this session was provided by Dr. Stambuk, who maintained in his paper that adequate definitions of "development" and "under development" must necessarily be linked to a critique of existing modes of production as such. Dr. Stambuk went on to consider various strategies for scientific-technological development and concluded that only a form of self-reliance rooted firmly in the capacities and interests of the working people would suffice as a steady foundation for a nation's future.

It was pointed out by Dr. Wallerstein in the discussion, however, that the strategies of the transnational corporations make it much easier to talk about self-reliance than to achieve it. This angle was taken up in Dr. Ristic's key paper on the subject of collective self-reliance among developing countries; Dr. Ristic noted that national and collective self-reliance are necessary complements and should be mutually reinforcing. He argued that concerted action by the developing countries is more and more emerging as a powerful impetus for revolutionizing economic and political relations at the global level, and he maintained that this strategy lends itself to being adapted in several areas crucial to scientific-technological development. One of these areas, namely that of the transfer of technology, was later considered in detail by Dr. Besarovic, who gave a fascinating account of the history of legal mechanisms governing such transfers and then suggested ways in which these mechanisms might be changed to the advantage of the countries of the Third World. Again during the discussion, Dr. Issa accused Dr. Besarovic of having placed unrealistic hopes on the benefits to be gained by a reform of legal institutions, and he stressed the snares inherent in the present system of transfers.

Dr. Despic argued that in building up their scientific and technological capabilities countries of the South must distinguish their own priorities from those which the developed countries might like to see them implement; and Drs. Abdel-Malek and Maraj emphasized the effect of exercise of political sovereignty and the right of self-determination as the top priority to be asserted in the face of the numerous forms of subjugation by which developing countries are threatened.

Emphasis on the historical dimension of scientific-technological development was provided by Dr. Kawano, who reviewed pertinent aspects of Japanese experience since the Meiji Restoration. Dr. Hassan's intervention during the discussion also broadened the historical frame of reference by evoking often overlooked lessons from the history of science and technology in the various non-European civilizations.

Anouar Abdel-Malek, Yves Barel, Alexander Despic, Celso Furtado, Ahmad Yousef Hassan, Hossam Issa, Rasheeduddin Khan, Osama A. El-Kholy, James A. Maraj, Vladimir Stambuk, and Immanuel Wallerstein took part in the discussion.

Report on session II

Cuthbert K. Omari

The report of this section is divided into two main parts. The first highlights the main points of the plenary session and the second gives the main points raised during the workshop discussions. The main theme of this section is rural-urban relationship to technology in the transformation of the world. Five papers were presented.

1. The paper by Ristic dealt with the collective self-reliance of the Third World in the development of science and technology. He stated at the beginning that present socio-economic development shows a growing independence and complexity of dynamic changes. Further he stressed that science and technology have been recognized not only as instruments and catalysts of growth but also as vital factors of progress, power, and prestige in every country. However, since 97 per cent of all resources allocated for research and development are still concentrated today in developed countries, this has created a dependence of scientific and technological potentials in developing countries on developed ones. Since there is no value-free science, this affects very much the socio-economic development of developing countries.

He stressed the need for co-operation among the developing countries in developing national potentials. But before such a step is realized, an intercommunication system must be established as one prerequisite. This will help in building a strong relation especially between North and South in a collective way.

Collective self-reliance was called an important instrument in development for two reasons.

It is an instrument for improving negotiations between developing and developed countries, for example by establishing systems of information.

It is an instrument of complementarily in national development. He pointed out that one of the limiting factors in expanding mutual co-operation in different fields, including science and technology, is the scarcity of financial resources.

The paper concluded by stressing the main areas which, according to the author, are very important in the whole question of collective self-reliance. These are resources, strategies for development, management problems, building intellectual creativity, the bridge between research and practice, and better negotiation between the developed and developing countries.

Kawano's paper stressed the fact that Japanese history shows that science and technology were introduced to Japan from Europe long ago, especially before World War II. Since World War II, Japanese society has been influenced by the United States.

It was noted that since the Meiji Restoration government has predominated in the process of industrialization in Japan. However, recently, a new move called "localization" has been stressed not only by the government, but also by people themselves. The aim is to decentralize power and economic activities for the benefit of local populations. Such a move is combined with the desire for a new type of technology that can be controlled through the direct participation of the population - "small decentralized technology." This will involve also policy-making.

The trend is to introduce small-scale industries rather than the existing large-scale modern industries. It is hoped that by doing so the bad side-effects of large-scale industries will be minimized. Also it is within the new trend of developing industries which harmonize with the natural environment.

The paper by Marton dealt with the problem of science and technology in relation to African experience. The paper stressed the fact that science and technology as em pressed in the writings of people such as Fanon, Senghor, and Laroni is the expression of a privileged few.

Science and technology enable men to dominate and control nature and harness it for human development. But man cannot have total control, for to control nature is not an absolute domination. There are side-effects of science and technology; e.g., a car helps to minimize (shorten) time and space in the service of men, but there is the likelihood of accidents, of pollution, etc.

There are two views of science and technology - optimistic and pesimistic. Both see science and technology as a fetish. The optimistic one considers that technology will solve every social problem. Science and technology will dominate men and nature. There is no consideration given to social organization.

The pessimistic view sees the side-effects of science and technology. It brings about alienation and may dehumanize people.

These views were cited to show the predicament of the African when adopting science and technology. The choice is not an easy one. How can an African, for example, adopt science and technology without losing his African identity? Another problem raised was how can an African adopt science and technology for development according to western models of development.

The legal aspect of the transfer of technology was adequately dealt with in a paper presented by Dr. Besarovic. The paper stressed that in developing countries an average 0.7 per cent of the GNP is spent on research while in developed (industrial! countries it is between 1 and 3 per cent on average. Key technology is controlled by multinational corporations and for the benefit of the developed world. The paper stressed that transfer of technology today is one-way only: that is, from developed countries to developing ones. The developing countries lack adequate infrastructure and history of modern technology. Thus developing countries are forced to conform to the existing technological development due to the existing economic systems prevailing in today's world. Intellectual ownership of science and technology becomes the way of transfer - it helps the flow of foreign capital to the developing countries.

It was suggested that laws affecting the transfer of technology must suit national cultures and aspirations.

Stambuk's paper dealt with concepts and philosophy of science and technology. In his paper he suggested that we cannot look at development and underdevelopment from an evolutionary point of view. There is a need for redefinition of the concepts, taking other elements and variables into account.

Also the idea of "intellectual creativity" has some nuances of "progressiveness" and an individualistic tendency. This has a danger. The author suggested that there is a need to develop different technology rather than to "appropriate" technology. This may help when coupled with the concept of self-reliance.

Science and technology must be applicable to the realities of the societies in which they operate. In this way science and technology will become society-oriented and problem-solving processes. This will be possible if societal problems like production level and development are taken into consideration.

The author defined several concepts and terminologies related to his paper.

At the discussion session Abdel-Malek, el-Kholy, Maraj, Khan, Hassan, and Wallerstein made comments and contributions. Questions and points were raised with regard to the transfer of technology in relation to today's world systems. For example, the relation between transfer of technology and the political power structure. It was pointed out that if political power is left out in the process of transfer of technology, there is a problem in realizing the function of science and technology in the society. The decision-makers must be involved in the process of transfer of science and technology.

Also the prevailing contradictions in economic development in the world were pointed out. The in balance not only between developed and developing countries, but also between rural and urban areas in developing countries were pointed out. Also the globalization of cultures and sub-cultures due to the development of worldwide communication systems which are helping the western-oriented cultures and economies to spread.

2. At the workshop group discussions, some elaboration of some points was made.

In relation to the transfer of technology from developed to developing countries it was observed that there is a problem of language. Usually the technological tool or technique developed in western countries has a functional role. There is meaning attached to it. When it is transferred to the developing countries whose language is not the original language in which the technology was invented, it becomes a problem, for the people using it will have no relation to the original meaning of the name given to the tool or the part of the machine. Always the language of invention has a symbolic meaning. This problem of imitation and appropriation was further elaborated by giving examples of African experiences.

(a) Most countries have different languages within one country but if there is one language, transfer may be easier.

(b) The problem of under-population was also noted; this is a problem in relation to the mobilization of productive forces and the marketing system.

It was noted, however, that a country whose traditional technology had reached a certain level might adopt a foreign technology with fewer problems.

In relation to Africa a question was raised as to what extent an African can become modern without losing his/her identity. How one can remain in the past, tradition, without bringing about stagnation in social development? This point was not discussed fully.

It was also pointed out that we are witnessing universalism in our days. People share the same cultures, but this again has its perils. It may bring about conflicts and endanger the survival of men.

The problem of self-reliance in relation to transfer of technology was discussed. It was pointed out that it is impossible to resist science and technology in developing countries, but how can we adopt them without being dominated by the developed countries?

The suggestion was made that the communication system among developing countries should be strengthened. This will help to control information and it is within the area of collective self-reliance in the Third World. From there, then, information can go to the developed countries. This may further help to prevent the side-effects of imitation of science and technology.

The problem is how to change from the interdependency of domination to mutual interdependency.

I. General considerations

1. A growing interdependence and complex and dynamic changes are the major features of modern economic, scientific and technological progress within a country and within the world community. However, century-long colonization and economic and political domination and dependence have created great disparities between various countries with respect to economic development, industrialization and urbanization, and assurance of social justice and prosperity for men. Consequently, an interdependence has been established among "developed'' countries on one hand, and between "developed" and "underdeveloped" ones on the other. Channels of communication, of goods and services, and of knowledge, cultural values, information, and so forth have been set up. Owing to these disparities in the concentration of power, capacities, knowledge, experience and information, and to the established system of communication, developing countries, in their efforts to overcome the gap and to achieve more equity in the relations between the North and the South, had to develop exchange with developed countries.

Science and technology have been recognized not only as the instruments and catalysts of growth, but also as the vital factors of progress, power, and prestige of every country. However, the fact that approximately 95 per cent of the world's scientific and technological capacities, or 97 per cent of the resources earmarked for research and development, are still concentrated in developed countries has led to the scientific and technological potential of developing countries heavily depending on those of developed nations. This situation merely confirms the well-known fact that interdependence both in science and technology is a part of the relations between the North and the South. In addition, current literature on technological development elaborates the conceptual, substantial, and methodological aspects of the exchange of knowledge between developed and developing countries - technology transfer, choice of technology, appropriate technology, intermediate technology, adaptive technology, and so forth. All these are related to the utilization and adaptation of the achievements offered by the developed world without any alternatives.

2. Since knowledge and technology are not neutral in social terms, the high dependence of developing countries on developed nations in scientific and technological advancement has serious implications for their social and economic, and even technological, development. The following excerpts from documents prepared for the UN Conference on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries vividly illustrate this dependence.

The Report of the Panel of Consultants on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries reads as follows:

"Traditional TC, because it was a part of a wrongly conceived 'development thinking,' has contributed to the transfer of, in most part, inappropriate knowledge from 'developed' to TW countries, without even a minimum effort at adaptation to the specific situation of the recipient society. In this type of one-way transfer of knowledge, technology in particular was considered to be 'neutral' in social terms and 'beneficial' in economic development terms. Negative effects of this critical transfer on employment, structure of production, pattern of consumption, income distribution, culture, balance of payment and foreign indebtedness, dependency and so forth were not taken sufficiently into account by traditional TC. Many cases illustrating this point are now available in the literature on the subject."

One of the studies prepared for the same Conference states:

"Fundamentally, traditional TC was conceived as one channel among others for the transmission of some specific types of knowledge from 'developed' to 'underdeveloped' countries. This complemented the transmission of other types of knowledge and information in the same direction through various other channels: e.g., the transmission of information, ideologies, values, images, etc. through the mass media; technology, administrative techniques, marketing knowledge, etc., through transnational corporations (TC), information, paradigms, theories, achievement motivation, etc., through education systems, including foreign textbooks and training."

Thanks to a wide range of social services and efficient bilateral and multilateral machinery, transfer of technology, knowledge, and experience through technical co-operation in the fields of technology, management, public services, planning, urban development, culture, education, and so on is definitely strongly influencing the social, economic, and cultural development of developing countries. Knowledge and technology are transmitted through established channels of "economic and technical assistance" for specific programmed and projects, and so are the conceptions of "modern" and "consumption" societies. This transfer of patterns from "developed" societies also causes a high degree of social injustice, domination, squandering, and alienation of available national natural resources and the introduction of "imitations," which most often are not suited to the specific socio-economic conditions and strategies of individual developing countries. The introduction of foreign concepts, models, and methods in the process of management and decision-making in different spheres of social life, including technological development, is a highly delicate matter in both social and economic terms. Resources management and assurance of a corresponding efficiency and rationality in the decision-making process are an essential prerequisite for social and economic prosperity in every country. However, management is a social process and not a method or technique. This leads us to the conclusion that a non-critical acceptance of management concepts and practices may have serious consequences on the development of developing countries.

3. The social, economic, and cultural development of a country can not be based on imitations. It has to be conducted in line with social values and strategies, needs, and available resources. Because of their grave economic position in international relations, developing countries are emphasizing the importance of self-reliance, not only as essential to the successful utilization and development of national resources and of liberation from domination and dependence, but also as the basis for a substantial transformation of the present-day world. It is only a natural counterbalance to the theories, concepts and solutions imposed by developed countries in international relations, which place developing countries in the positron of passive observers and dependents on financial resources, knowledge, and information of their more developed partners. This concept is more and more apparent at both the national and international levels. Mr. V. Nayedama defines it thus:

"Self-reliance is the cornerstone of development. Self-reliance is not self-sufficiency or autarchy. Fundamental to self-reliance is the indigenous capacity for autonomous decision-making. Galtung dealt at length with what self-reliance is not, what could be achieved through self reliance and the negative aspects of self-reliance. Self-reliance is an open-ended concept, a strategy, a process that takes different forms in different fields, e.g. food, finance, energy, technology, etc., involving people at all levels to decide on choices and action to be taken, minimizing dependence, maximizing independence and optimizing interdependence."

Nayedama defines self-reliance in science and technology as follows:

"Self-reliant development requires self-reliance in S/T. SR implies an in built preference for developing indigenous technology, competence to generate and use knowledge; [a] mechanism to identify, [and] choose from among a set of options and acquire technology, indigenous or foreign, at best possible terms and blending it with indigenous competence to adapt, assimilate and improve [it] for a continuous increase in productivity."

It is difficult to find a national plan or more significant political or economic document in any country today that does not define self-reliance as a lasting national strategy. More and more UN documents include collective as well as national self-reliance as a factor in the establishment of new relations and a New International Economic Order. The documents and programmes of action adopted at the conferences of the Heads of State and Governments of the Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo in 1976 and in Havana in 1979 decisively illustrate the political determination of developing countries to develop indigenous capacities and resources and promote closer mutual co-operation in all spheres of activity.

A number of institutions and scientists in developing countries and progressive academic circles in developed countries define self-reliance as the essential for a substantial transformation of the present-day world. Within this context, science, as a generator of new knowledge and information's, and technology, as knowledge organized to achieve practical objectives, are actually the decisive factors for progress.

4. In view of the fact that collective self-reliance is a general strategy, in theoretical and social terms, which has been conceptually defined through international research, the UN system, and the joint actions of the non-aligned and other developing countries, there is no need to say any more about general considerations. I shall concern myself instead with a pragmatic analysis of certain factors which ensure practical results for developing countries in attaining collective self-reliance in science and technology. The concept and strategy of collective self-reliance cannot be realized without corresponding efforts by developing countries to attain national self-reliance. This explains the emphasis in this paper on the close interdependence of collective and national self-reliance.

The idea of collective self-reliance does not imply the self-sufficiency of the know-how network system of developing countries with respect to the scientific and technological achievements of developed countries. However, in order to establish more equitable relations it is necessary to strengthen the negotiating position of developing countries. The collective self-reliance of developing countries in resolving major problems of transferring science and technology in the world will therefore also be treated pragmatically in further consideration of this issue.

II. Co-operation among developing countries in developing national potentials

1. No traditions exist in co-operation among developing countries in general, and, in science and technology in particular, numerous restraints, both internal and external, hinder the complex process of fortifying joint interests and extending co-operation. These are, inter alia, an insufficiency in the indigenous development of science attained through education and co-operation with developed countries, a lack of reliable information on the resources and capacities of other developing countries, and a deep-rooted attitude that it is only the developed countries that can offer what is usually referred to as science and "modern technology." Obviously, changes cannot be effected solely by declarations, but by conscious determination and action within developing countries themselves and through joint organized efforts at the international level, so that their activity may gain the support of the international community. Departing from the fact that it is not an end in itself, this co-operation has to be directed and motivated within developing countries so as:

- to promote a policy of goodwill and the creation of a climate whereby common or similar problems may be successfully resolved through using the knowledge and experience of other developing countries and through cross-fertilization;

- to introduce simulative measures to expand this co-operation (national policies, programmed, financial resources, priorities in national undertakings, and so forth);

- to establish and strengthen channels of communication with other developing countries (bilateral agreements, programmes of joint teamwork among interested or similar institutions, active involvement in regional programmes and projects, and so on).

2. The formulation of scientific and technological policies and strategies is a primary need and the responsibility of every country, including developing countries. Such policies and strategies should define the availability of resources and constraints in terms of human, physical, and financial resources in scientific and technological progress, including technology transfer. This strategy should be aimed at achieving national objectives such as economic growth, development of national capacities for innovation and education, management of national resources, a guarantee of national security and balance of payments, improvement of the quality of life and the position of man, and so on. With a few exceptions, developing countries do not tend toward elaborate scientific and technological policies and strategies. On the other hand, it is frequently thought that these are one and the same thing, that is, that merely the setting of objectives in science determines the framework for technological development, thus implying that it is a unified process consisting of the same set of activities. It is a well-established fact that speculative abstract science is increasingly giving way to applied science and that this requires social evaluation. Nevertheless, applied science is directed at research of natural and social phenomena without the possibility of a more exact economic evaluation. Technology, with its "hardware" and "software" components, requires a multi-disciplinary approach and teamwork, as it is directly linked with the decision-making process and changes in production and provision of services, as well as in meeting society's present and potential needs. The need therefore arises, in spite of the existing correlation, to differentiate between scientific and technological policies.

Every developing country needs to define its strategy of technological development, which is not easy. The long list of available technologies in the world is undoubtedly a potential source, but there is a basic need for selecting and developing technologies suited to each country's real needs and resources. The development of methodological bases for scientific and technological development strategies is a significant area of co-operation among developing countries since there are many common features and similarities in conditions and available resources. On the other hand, the availability of technological achievements through transfer and indigenous research in developing countries is highly valuable and very often suitable for other developing countries. An exchange of knowledge and experience in this domain provides opportunities to define alternative strategies.

3. A scholar once said that science is not a magic wand that can turn a poor country "into a rich one overnight." Every country uses its limited resources for endogenous social, economic, scientific, and technological development (financial, physical, research, and educational resources, human potential, indigenous and imported know-how and technologies, and so forth). An efficient system of management and decision-making is therefore needed to enable effective use and further development of re sources.

Consulting services, educational programmed, and assistance in establishing various institutions are offered to developing countries through different bilateral and multilateral channels. There is hardly a country today that is not carrying out a project of some sort on management assistance. This transfer of management know-how and foreign concepts is for the most part mechanical and lacks the necessary adaptations. Considering what has already been said about the social content of management and decision-making processes, the "import" of foreign solutions yields an undeveloped system of management and poor practical results and, frequently, certain negative political and economic implications. There is obviously an urgent need to create an indigenous concept and methodological basis of management in developing countries, along with selective use of developed countries' achievements.

Developing countries' needs are many, and vast possibilities exist for the mutual exchange of management know-how. Many similarities in social and economic strategies, economic status, and limited resources, along with the growing role of the public sector and public enterprises, indicate the value of joint research and exchange of knowledge and experience.

4. World research and development activities are growing rapidly. Total expenditures in research and development of the developed market economies rose from $29,000 million in 1963 to $63,500 million in 1973. However, the developing countries' share in total expenditures (estimated at $96,500 million in 1973) was a mere 2.8 per cent compared to 58 per cent for the activities of the US and the USSR.

A study published by UNESCO sheds light on another perspective on research problems in the world today. It is estimated that only 3 per cent of research and development activities are devoted to the specific problems of developing countries, one third of which are carried out in developed countries. Although conclusions cannot be drawn mechanically from these indicators, primarily because many world scientific achievements may be applied universally, it can nevertheless be noted that the objectives and programmed of scientific and technological research are determined by the needs and interests of developed countries. The following data confirm these findings.

a. The nature of accumulated world knowledge is decreasingly relevant to developing countries as it has not been, historically speaking, adapted to the conditions in developing countries where the distribution of production factors (scarcity of capital, abundance of manpower, manufacture of raw materials, and so on) differs from that in developed countries.

b. The development of research and development activities quite frequently contradicts the interests of developing countries. While a thousand million dollars has been allocated for research and development of synthetics production, little or nothing has been done to advance tropical agriculture and to intensify the use of raw materials.

c. Nearly 45.5 per cent of total expenditures have been allocated for military research and development.

We may partly or fully agree with these findings, but it is nevertheless true that developed countries, by power of their indigenous potential and monopolistic position in international transfers, dictate the trends of research and have subordinated science and technology to their interests. If various political, economic, and personnel constraints and the restrictive practices in the international transfer of knowledge and technology are added to those, then it is obvious that the transformation of present relations is out of the question, unless developing countries exert a more decisive influence on scientific and technological research programmes in the world.

A similar position with regard to the potential, needs and natural and climatic conditions in many developing countries call; for joint research programmes and a wider circulation of knowledge and experience among developing countries. Collective self-reliance is the only way to develop research programmed based on alternative strategies, providing for the interdependence of existing world achievements and local conditions in developing countries. Pooling efforts makes possible a rational use of imported knowledge and technology, which are not lacking in developing countries and for which immense resources are spent. Finally, this cooperation will improve the efficiency of joint research programmed and the exchange of experience through the purchase of industrial property, which are already being carried out through UNESCO and UNIDO.

5. It is estimated that about 15 per cent of research workers and engineers are in developing countries, not to mention the "brain drain," or the reverse transfer of technology and the gains of the developed countries in recruiting specialists from developing countries. A strengthening of scientific and technological infrastructures in developing countries, their closer liaison with production systems, and their capability to meet the demands arising from set objectives and needs present a broad framework for prosperous social and economic development. National efforts are being made in this direction and bilateral and multilateral support given, but the change is slow. The process is a highly complex one and closely related to a series of objective constraints. However, there are certain problems in the developing countries' approach to establishing technological infrastructures:

- The research potential is highly concentrated in industrial, technological and social science institutes, and rarely in the universities. Their essential features are an "academic" approach to research and almost exclusive government financing. Dependence on the state is natural under the conditions of the undeveloped economy and social services and, consequently, there is a small "demand" for research. However, the consequences are serious with respect to the promotion of scientific and technological research in society. The dependence of programmes and financing on governments actually makes them a part of the state bureaucracy. The motivation and stimulation to achieve practical results are actually negligible, and the interest of institutes in long-term co-operation with the economic sector and other users is insufficient.

- Due to a lack of indigenous knowledge, experience, and material resources, the majority of institutes in developing countries resort to developing their endogenous potential and spreading knowledge through bilateral and multilateral assistance. In addition to importing knowledge, the creative activity of the recipient country, solutions, organizational philosophy, and other technical assets are employed. This input is significant and very often indispensable, but it creates a basis for a more lasting dependence on and influence by developed countries in further development of institutions and personnel.

- The research and development potential in developing countries is very rarely located in larger, modern technological companies and other systems. This, objectively speaking, is a limitation from the aspect of monitoring and evaluating powerful technological changes, requiring constant imports of know-how without the capability of selection, adaptation, and fertilization of imported technical skills. And, finally, lack of internal research and a development base in large systems limits the involvement of institutes and universities in applied and technological research.

- Consulting and engineering activities, as a bridge between scientific research and practice, are today very important factors both in the utilization and development of indigenous resources and in international expansions.8 However, consulting and engineering activities have no precedents in developing countries, which are the almost exclusive users of these services. The consulting service approach to research aimed at resolving existing problems is slowly being accepted. The most qualified personnel prefer to be involved in academic research. The small number of existing organizations is spread out and strongly influenced by those in developed countries. The establishment of branches of large multinational consulting and engineering organizations is a frequent phenomenon substantially limiting the creation of an indigenous base. In view of the fact that consulting projects are directly involved in major undertakings in social and economic development, the infiltration of international consulting activities has an immediate influence on national decisions.

We may thus conclude that the establishment of scientific and technological infrastructures cannot, as is often the case, be identified solely with the establishment and financing of scientific and research institutes. The development of consulting and engineering activities is frequently identified with the establishment of new organizations. However, it is necessary to consider the development of professional activities rather than that of institutions. Consulting-oriented research may be undertaken by research institutions that are methodologically and professionally equipped to provide services aimed at resolving these problems. Obviously the establishment of technological infrastructures is a complex undertaking.

Collective self-reliance in the establishment of scientific and technological infrastructures more often means the creation of regional and subregional centres and institutes than that of joint programmes and projects. It can be a bureaucratic act which usually results in the development of "supranational" institutions producing their own programmes and methods of work without taking into account the interests and needs of their founders. The intention here is not to oppose joint institutions, but to draw attention to the delicate nature and responsibility involved in such undertakings. Even in the developed world numerous examples may be found of international research institutions that have been transformed into a special type of "international bureaucracy."

Scientific and technological co-operation among developing countries should depart from joint programmes and projects and determine the institutional framework of their activity. Long-term inter-institutional activities of national research, consulting, and engineering organizations should be the basis and by all means the most popular form of co-operation among developing countries. It should be carried out through joint programmes, projects, exchanges of information, personnel training, and so forth. Such long-term activities may also serve as a basis for the establishment of a network of institutions of developing countries for joint programmed in specific fields at the subregional, regional, and interregional levels. Rudimentary examples already exist, and there is a growing awareness of the need to increase their number. However, the success of this undertaking will depend on a more lasting solution of mutual relations based on the interests of national institution development, on devising programme and project management methods, ensuring stable courses of financing, and so on. This requires an effort by the institutions themselves and their governments, and by the international community as well.

The wide range of common interests of institutions in developing countries includes the promotion of management in research and development, as well as in large research, consulting, and engineering projects. Most frequently, knowledge transfer from developed countries in this domain has either failed to yield corresponding results or created certain forms of dependence. This indicates the need to establish, through an exchange of experience and joint research, new forms of management in research and development tailored to the needs of developing countries and autonomous decision-making in all spheres of creative activity. The close liaison between national and collective self-reliance needs to be emphasized in this respect.

6. A series of international indicators shows an accelerated development of higher education in developing countries. The number of students in universities, colleges, and other institutions of higher learning has increased from less than one million in 1950 to nearly ten million in 1975. The number of students in developing countries caught up the number in developed countries, including countries with centrally planned economies, in 1960. Although it is not the purpose of this paper to make a broader analysis of these indicators, all the more so since it does not dwell on the structure and level of research activities, global indicators show that developing countries possess a far broader educational base than developed countries had at their disposal in the early stage of their industrialization. This is a significant prerequisite for the social, economic, and technological transformation of developing countries. However, without going into detail, mention will be made here of certain major problems in the development of higher education and the utilization of personnel. Some problems are: a high degree of imitation in the programmes and organization of higher education, undeveloped research activities in the universities, and "brain drain."

Higher education's modern development is faced with a categorical demand for a radical reform of the university system and educational process. The growth, structure, and quality of educational activities should be more suited to the dynamic social, economic, and technological changes in each country. Usually conservative, bureaucratic, and insufficiently capable of dynamic changes, the educational systems are not in a position to ensure interdisciplinary activity, continuing innovations in programmes and methods of work in accordance with the development of science and indigenous practices, a system of lifelong education, the use of modern technology in education, and so on. All these changes require the advancement of higher education based on a high interdependence between users and everyday practices instead of on the academic independence of the university.

Under conditions of higher education reform throughout the world, cooperation among developing countries is of special significance. Through joint research, exchange of experience, exchanges of teachers and students, and other forms of co-operation it is possible to promote the concept of a new university adapted to the dynamic development needs of countries striving for the respect of their cultural identity and a more equitable position in international relations. It is not a "universal model" of higher education in developing countries that is sought, for this is determined by each country's special conditions and needs. Rather, what's necessary is co-operation and joint research that will help devise specific solutions for developing countries in present complex conditions of higher education reform in the world.

7. All countries are faced with the responsible task of framing policies and establishing mechanisms to safeguard national interests in the international transfer of technology. These problems cannot, evidently, be resolved only by the adoption of international codes of conduct, on which developing countries insist, but primarily through effective national regulations and mutual co-operation of developing countries in the transfer of technology.

Co-operation among developing countries in this domain may be promoted in three directions:

- exchange of experience and mutual assistance in defining national policies and establishing machinery to achieve favourable conditions and harmonize imports of technology and knowledge with real needs and indigenous research;

- co-operation in the field of related imported technologies in order to adapt them to specific needs and introduce innovations in imported know-how; these activities may lead to joint economic undertakings between corresponding partners;

- exchange of information on imported technologies aimed at undertaking joint programmes and projects.9

Ill. The strengthening of the negotiating position of developing countries in science and technology

1. Present-day international relations in science and technology, and especially the absolute need to ensure changes and new relationships in the distribution of resources and potentials, demand plenty of patience in negotiations to reach satisfying solutions. Developed countries, which are experienced and equipped with their own international machinery (OECD, EC, COMECON, EFTA), will be reluctant to abandon their monopolistic position in development and the transfer of technology and knowledge.

Developing countries also are gradually building their own machinery for mutual co-operation and for strengthening their negotiating position with developed countries as well. These are the Group of 77, a movement of non-aligned countries and organizations such as various regional economic integration groups. Co-operation among developing countries is not bloc oriented, but presents instead a platform for mutual co-operation and joint efforts to change present relationships. This is why the developing countries have not yet decided to establish their official international organization to provide different expertise so as to enhance mutual co-operation and enable more qualitative negotiations with developed countries. Under present conditions developing countries are strengthening their position by using the UN development system and by organizing meetings of experts. A constantly present question is whether the developing countries should establish their own special international machinery. Since it is not possible to dwell on this highly complex and delicate issue here, I will confine myself to identifying certain areas in which the joint position and activity of developing countries within international communities may contribute to the transformation of present day relations in world science and technology.

2. The UN Conference on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries, held in Buenos Aires in 1978, whose Programme of Action was adopted both by developed and developing countries, defined the objectives of this movements: to foster the self-reliance of developing countries, to promote and strengthen self-reliance among developing countries, to increase the quantum and enhance the quality of international co-operation, to strengthen existing technological capacities in developing countries, to increase and improve communications among developing countries, to improve the capacity of developing countries for absorption and adoption of technology and skill, to recognize and respond to the problems and requirements of the least developed, land-locked island and most seriously affected countries, and to enable developing countries to attain a greater degree of participation in international economic activities and to expand international co-operation.

This Programme of Action, which is defined as "neither an end in itself nor a substitute for technical co-operation with developed countries," should introduce new relationships in international technical co-operation and grow into a significant component of collective self-reliance of developing countries. It is estimated that the total scope of international technical co-operation today surpasses $3,000 million, the share of developing countries being 4 per cent. Various assistance programmed and projects valued at approximately $800 million are carried out through the UN development system. Even in these programmes, however, the mutual exchange of experts from developing countries accounts for 27 per cent; subcontracting of consulting organizations is only 6.2 per cent, and equipment accounts for a mere 2.5 per cent.11

The so-called new dimension in technical co-operation was adopted in the UN development system several years ago in order to enhance the component of mutual co-operation of developing countries, but its realization is slow, followed by many difficulties and much opposition. In addition to overcoming traditional habits in their environments, developing countries have to win the battle for implementing programmes and procedures within the UN machinery.

3. For several years now extensive activity has been going on in the United Nations to regulate the transfer of technology through international instruments. However, the long-lasting efforts of developing countries to adopt codes of conduct in the transfer of technology and concerning the attitude of transnational companies on the preferential treatment of developing countries in technology transfer, as well as to revise the Paris Convention, have not been successful.

Further efforts are needed at the international level to reach an agreement with developed countries in this area. However, these international instruments should complement the national legislation of developing countries. Only an interaction of these two components can produce practical results. Finally, changes in the international transfer of technology may be regulated more permanently only as a result of changes in world relations.

4. Scarcity of financial resources in developing countries is the key limiting factor to expanding mutual co-operation in different fields, including science and technology. Various agencies and foundations of developed countries, as well as international development and financing corporations, have not developed the practice of financing joint undertakings of developing countries, and their use of the consulting and engineering potential of developing countries is very low.

Development and financing institutions must change their policies if the financial base of joint development undertakings of developing countries is to expand. However, to achieve actual results, developing countries should present detailed programmes and projects. The establishment and functioning of this mechanism and the preparation of projects depends on the organized efforts of the developing countries themselves.

5. It has been stated that there is a lack of sufficiently reliable information on the needs and potential of developing countries and that this deficit is a major obstacle to promoting the common interests and programmes of developing countries in science and technology. In this respect, the activity of individual organizations in the UN system has produced positive results (e.g., UNDP surveys on research, consulting, and education potential of developing countries and UNIDO's efforts to set up an information network on import of industrial property).

One can hardly expect developing countries to establish a special information system outside the activities of the UN development system and the specialized agencies and regional economic commissions. They are a significant prerequisite to the establishment of a system of communications among developing countries and to their greater involvement in the programmes and projects of the UN system and international development and financing institutions. And they provide a significant base for strengthening the negotiating position of developing countries within the wide scope of international relations.

IV. Instead of a conclusion

Collective self-reliance of developing countries is not a process in itself not is it a closed circle isolated from world and scientific progress. It is a complementary component of the battle waged by developing countries to achieve national self-reliance in creative activity in close relation with endogenous social transformations and the development of indigenous capacities for autonomous decision-making. Collective self-reliance also should contribute to a wider exchange of knowledge, experience, and information among developing countries, that is, to inadequately developed components in overall scientific and technological development. It also presents a basis for the development of alternative technological strategies adapted to the needs and resources of developing countries.

Collective self-reliance should help strengthen the negotiating position of developing countries in changing present inequitable relations in world science and technology. In strengthening the negotiating position of developing countries in the UN system, special significance is accorded to its greater use in augmenting the potential of developing countries and expanding co-operation among them. Mutual co-operation among developing countries should contribute toward marking the International Strategy for the Third International Development Decade as the strategy of endogenous development and interdependence without domination. The following research projects are recommended to promote the principles of collective self-reliance among developing countries:

- a system of communication among developing countries in the field of science and technology;

- relations between scientific and technological policies in light of social transformations of developing countries and the strengthening of mutual co-operation;

- development of alternative technologies in correlation with national and collective self-reliance;

- methodological basis of assessment and forecasting of technological development in developing countries.


1. The Panel of Consultants on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries was held in Kuwait in June 1977 at the request of the Administrator of UNDP, as a part of the preparations for the UN Conference on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries.

2. E. Oteiza, D. Rahman: Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries as a Dimension of the New International Economic Order, UNDP, 1 977.

3. V. Nayedama: Endogenous Development and Science and Technology, Vienna Institute for Development, 1978.

4. It is not possible to enumerate all the UN documents defining collective self-reliance as an integral part of the national prosperity of developing countries and more equitable international relations; some of the most important ones are: Resolution 2626 of the UN General Assembly on the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, dated October 1970; Declaration 3201 on the Establishment of the New international Economic Order and Resolution 3202 on the Programme of Action for the establishment of NIEO, dated May 1974; Resolution 3362 on Development and Economic Co-operation, dated September 1975; a document on economic co-operation among developing countries and programmes of action adopted at the UN Conference on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries in Buenos Aires in September 1978, and the UN Conference on TCDC in Vienna in August 1979.

5. By agreement of 30 developing countries, The International Centre for Management in Public Enterprises in Developing Countries was established in Ljubljana. In recent years the centre has been carrying out joint research and training projects and consultation meetings in different areas of management (planning, financing, transfer and development of technology, participation, and so forth).

6. Jan Annerstedt: On the Present Global Distribution of R and D Resources, Vienna Institute for Development, 1978.

7. Science, Technology and the Developing Countries, UNESCO, 1977.

8. According to published data, more than $150,000 million is invested today through consulting and engineering organizations of developing countries, techno-economic research, pre-investment and feasibility studies, design of complex projects, etc. The close correlation between these services and the marketing of equipment and facilities may be illustrated by the fact that 30 per cent of machine-building and electric machine-building equipment and up to 90 per cent of chemical industries equipment is marketed through complex installations, most often followed by patents, training, joint placement on the market, etc. As is known, consulting and engineering services are the basis of complex institutions.

9. It is worth noting the activity of UNIDO in the exchange of information among developing countries in the course of the import of technology.

10. Report of the United Nations Conference on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries, Buenos Aires, 30 August to 12 September 1978.

11. J. Odero-Jowi: Technical Co-operation Among Developing Countries, New York, 1976.


Japan has attached great importance to science and technology throughout the history of its modern development. "Eastern Morals and Western Arts" was the slogan advocated by Sakume Sh (1811-1864). He was unfortunately assassinated because he tried to introduce Dutch science and technology in the early stage of the modernization or westernization of Japan in spite of the chauvinistic nationalism of the time. Sh advocated the idea not because he wanted to show off Oriental supremacy in morals, but because he wanted to make it clear that eastern morals should not exclude western technology. Sh not only thought that it was his duty as a Confucian and a scholar of western science to achieve the happy combination of both, but he also felt that the future of Japan should be moulded on this new idea.

In fact, after the Meiji Restoration Japan accepted western science and technology without reserve, while she recognized the value of her inherent Oriental tradition in the realms of philosophy, morals, literature, and social science, which are usually excluded from the category of natural science. This was a difficult and delicate choice. Why was the decision possible? What came out of it? What is the situation now? This paper will concern itself with these topics.

I. Japan before the second world war

The most important problem facing a nation like Japan which began to modernize with eminent rivals before her as models was how fast the political unity and independence of the nation could be established. Compared with this urgent problem, other issues such as the political liberty of individual citizens or the freedom of ideas were regarded as far less important. In the process of the modernization of Japan, the circumstances just happened to fall in line. The Meiji government wanted the centralization of administrative power and invulnerable authority. But it took another fifteen years after the Meiji Restoration to achieve the original aim by oppressing the opposition parties and by suppressing agitation without mercy.

The authoritative centralized government decided to establish a government-subsidized national university called the "Imperial University" as an institution through which western science and technology could be introduced and in which government personnel could be groomed. The first Imperial University was established in 1878 in Tokyo. Originally it consisted of a Faculty of Law, a Faculty of Letters, a Faculty of Science, and a Faculty of Medical Science. In 1886, a Faculty of Engineering was added. Kyoto University was the second Imperial University and was established in 1898. It started as a college of science and engineering, and several years later a Faculty of Law, a Faculty of Medical Science, and a Faculty of Letters were added. These examples symbolize the government's policy regarding the aim of higher education in Japan, namely, for the practical purposes of rearing government personnel, for technological training, and for medical science. The humanities were taught at the Faculty of Letters, but they were weighted towards the classics, and were very Oriental in nature, with an emphasis on the philosophy and history of either China or Japan. In short, they inclined to be apolitical, anti-modern, idealistic, and moralistic.

The political implication of the establishment of the national universities for practical purposes was to reveal and support the government's position against the private universities which had been started by intellectuals and leaders of the opposition parties from the early Meiji period. Kelo University and Waseda University were established by such pioneers as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Okuma Shigenobu for the study of the humanities, particularly for the learning of foreign languages and other western-oriented disciplines such as economics and political science. But to the dismay of these private universities, the Meiji government took a hard line against employing any of their graduates, either in government or in teaching posts. This was a typical reaction of the Japanese government, which did nothing to encourage private educational enterprise and the development of the social sciences.

However, the policy of the centralized government of promoting education in science and technology, particularly in applied science, by establishing the national universities inevitably involved a contradiction that was self-defeating. The government had to encourage not only public enterprises but also private industries in order to accommodate all the graduates in applied science. Once private industries were firmly established, the national universities could not keep their privilege of being the sole supplier of graduates to them. The government was finally forced to recognize the rationale and role of private universities. The situation became undeniably apparent in the twentieth century, particularly after the First World War.

One of the most essential contradictions suffered was due to the fact that no one could limit the influence of the West in the realm of natural science. Scholarship claims universality. Even cultural events inherently Asian had to be investigated from a wider frame of reference. Therefore, even the traditional studies of the humanities proved to be no longer satisfactory unless they acquired western ideas and techniques. In particular, once western social science had been introduced into Japan, some courageous national university professors began to criticize openly the status quo of the social establishment. Inevitably there were cases of struggle between the government and universities over the appointment to a particular chair. Japan experienced quite a number of tragic lessons of this sort before the outbreak of the Second World War.

II. The change after the second world war

The defeat in the Second World War ironically brought another round of industrialization to Japan. New research fields and technology originating in the United States were introduced. During the war the Second Faculty of Engineering was established at the University of Tokyo, but after the war the Faculty was reorganized into several research institutes for science and technology. Kyoto University also expanded its own Faculty of Engineering. The number of professors has Increased, from 63 in 1949 to 165 thirty years later in 1979. The number of students of engineering has expanded from 1,640 in 1957 to 5,500, and now the Faculty can boast that one out of every three students at the university is majoring in engineering. Besides these famous universities, the national universities have now expanded in number from 19 before the war to 93 at the present. Unfortunately, the new local universities have Insufficient funds and personnel to promote the study of social science even if they have both a Faculty of Letters and a Faculty of Science.

The significant change In the realm of the humanities is the alleviation of governmental control and interference and the disappearance of taboos affecting research projects. The number of chairs in humanities has not conspicuously increased but each scholar enjoys spiritual freedom, relieved from the burden of censorship. One new development in the research field of humanities has been the establishment of new Institutes for economics and business management. Quantity analysis developed by the US has been adopted in these new institutes. This shows a sign of westernization even in the study of the humanities.

In spite of the great change after the war, an unchangeable factor worth mentioning here is the leadership that the centralized government has shown. Throughout the American occupation, the US tried to Introduce the idea of decentralization into the Japanese administration, but It met direct or Indirect resistance from the bureaucracy. It also failed to decentralize education, the police system, and the financial system. The evolution of science and technology in postwar Japan was carried out under the guidance of the central government authorities such as the Ministry of Education and the Science and Technology Agency.

It Is well known that the leading developments in scientific technology after the war have been In the fields of automation, electronics, atomic energy, and synthetic chemistry, all of which were developed In the US. The sophisticated technology which needs elaborate equipment and a mass-production system can only be developed by the power of huge industrial conglomerates. The rapid growth of the economy in Japan has depended on the development of these huge industries. Therefore, the three decades after the war could be called "the Age of Science and Technology" In the history of Japan.

But one important factor is that science and technology, which have long been through" to represent the most brilliant achievements in the world, have suddenly proved to be incompatible with human beings and their societies. It became clear to us at the end of the 1960s that the development of science and technology could kill us all. Poisoning from agricultural chemicals and medical drugs, air pollution from the petroleum industry, water pollution from synthesized fertilizers, traffic accidents, and atomic plant radiation leaks, all these are damaging our society, although they are the by-products of modern industry, of science and technology.

In the space of a few years, our sense of values has reversed itself. Science and technology suddenly lost their shining status and their impact was regarded as suspect, though people stir clung to the benefits they were providing. It is interesting to see how people began to feel a strong need for decentralization and local autonomy as the negative view of science and technology began to prevail among the general public and as criticism and opposition increased against the centralized policies of the government. In Japan, many historians and economists, together with some of the progressive activists in local community movements, developed new research groups to study the possibility of establishing "regional communities." Besides these specialist groups, popular voices were raised and gained general support for local autonomy, local cultural activities, and the conservation of the environment.

III. The significance of ''the age of local communities''

In spring 1979, the local elections for governors and mayors were held in fifteen prefectures and hundreds of cities and towns around Japan. At this time, all the political parties and the mass media advocated the slogan: "Here comes The Age of Local Communities." What did this vague slogan mean? The result of the election at least showed that all the former governors of large prefectures such as Tokyo and Osaka who had stood for a progressive opposition party were replaced by veteran administrators in charge of local problems in the central government. For citizens, "The Age of Local Communities" simply means that a local governor who has a strong connection with the central government will be able to draw out more from the central funds for his local community.

Therefore, the regionalism implied in the slogan "The Age of Local Communities" is not sufficient to satisfy the real needs of the regional community. It will not bring a radical change in the relation between the central government and regional communities, nor will it foreshadow the coming of a new age. It will guarantee neither the autonomy of the local community nor its inherent creativity. After a hundred years of centralization, the identity and independence of the local community suffer from severe damage in Japan. Therefore, people should claim more ostentatiously their right to a "regional community". Otherwise, "The Age of Local Communities" will end up as nothing but another deceptive slogan.

Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the government, economic circles, and even the mass media are at the moment continually paying lip service to the issues of the "regional community." Prime Minister Ohira conceived a plan of building a number of local cities with populations of 300,000 in many places throughout Japan. He called it the "Garden-City Concept." Also, the Agency for Land Development advocated the building up of ''Regions of Permanent Residence". The Agency for Local Institutions has another plan to transfer the administration of traffic and welfare to the local governments in the cause of decentralization. There are many more examples of local community projects advanced as joint ventures of a regional government and groups of local businessmen.

What effect have these changes had on the present situation of science and technology? It is well known that the introduction of huge industrial units in the American style brought about the economic development of post-war Japan. But it is also well known that the elaborate conglomerates cannot evolve any further, partly because of the lack of new markets and partly because of environmental pollution and inevitable accidents, but chiefly because of the shortage of resources and the new energy crisis. The technology needed at this moment is not that of the huge industrial conglomerates on a national scale and the know-how to operate them, but the development of "intermediate technology!' or "small decentralized technology" which actually meets the needs of the local community and is under the control of the members of the community. There is also a need to reevaluate the techniques for manufacture and livelihood which have been fostered and handed down in traditional communities. From these points of view, a radical change in the philosophy of science has been under way for the relocation of the regions of human life along the water supply routes and the reorientation of human society as an ecological entity. As for the energy crisis, an "Autonomic Energy Plan" will be recommended to each regional community to replace the current energy-consuming technology and way of life.

I am afraid, however, that an extreme "anti-technology" posture could easily lead to a total denial of the value of science and technology, as could the simple slogan "'Return to Nature" after the fashion of J. J. Rousseau. Japan has been so deeply committed to science and technology that it is inconceivable that she should ever give up her large-scale research projects for science and technology, or cast away her elaborate industrial investments.

'What we can hope for in Japan's future is not a vainglorious centralized government, but a productive administrative system which honors the initiative and identity of local or regional communities; not a huge conglomerate for science and technology, but a small-scale flexible system of technology; not devotion only to an analytical and rational science, but encouragement of wide varieties of study in the humanities and social sciences. I think that present-day Japan is already at such an advanced stage of culture and civilization.


The contemporary world has at its disposal, generally speaking, sufficient human and material resources; so for the time being the question of the insufficiency of resources is not raised. But the fact is that those resources are not evenly distributed within the international community, and for that reason some states abound with resources while others do not have a sufficient or sufficiently diversified share of resources (e.g., the mono-cultural type of economy). However, the fundamental cause of the existing differences is the unequal distribution of scientific and technological knowledge in the world, enabling a limited number of countries to make rational use of their natural wealth. The rest of the states, not having the necessary knowledge and experience, are forced to purchase it in order to exploit their natural wealth and engage their human and material potentials.

A large number of the developing countries are in a situation of having to import almost the whole technological basis of their national economies, relying little on their own capacities. Consequently, their dependence on foreign technology is enlarging and intensifying because of the general development trends of the developing countries. That relation can be illustrated by the fact that all developing countries contribute only 7 per cent to the world industrial production. This is due to the world set-up which puts many of these countries in the position of satisfying basic needs for industrial goods by importing them in exchange for raw materials.

The scientific and technological dependence of the developing countries can also be demonstrated in another example. Of the 400,000 inventions applied annually, developing countries take part in 1 per cent (the USA, the USSR, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan participate in 73 per cent). This should not be surprising, considering that only 2 per cent of total expenditures for research and development in the world is spent in developing countries.

Today's expenditures for scientific research in developing countries are 0.7 per cent of the GNP on the average, versus 1.3-3 per cent in the industrial world.

When we observe the differences in development between various countries as far as per capita income is concerned, noting the rate of industrial expansion and other economic indications, we actually only scratch the surface of the basic economic and industrial set-up. The very essence of these relations correlates with the gap between the invention activities and possibilities of one group of countries in applying new forms of technological knowledge and the slow pace of the other group in tarring part in the process. For the latter group of countries, importing technology is the imperative of economic survival. The transfer of technology, considered as a complementary exchange of available technological knowledge, represents by itself no danger for a national economy. Today's reality of that transfer, however, is overwhelmingly based on pure export from developed countries, lacking any kind of exchange of human knowledge.

The dependence of national economies on the import of technology can be a step in bridging the gap in invention activities - as it was, for example, in the case of Japan - provided such a transfer becomes organically implanted in domestic industrial production and stimulates local creative potential. This results in cutting technological imports down to the import only of more sophisticated technology which complements domestic technology and helps achieve further and more significant domestic technological improvements.

The expectations of such progress are not fulfilled in many countries, however. In spite of their best efforts, natural resources, cheap labour, and the existing economic structure remain their sole factors of economic development.

On the other side, no more than a dozen countries or a hundred multinational companies possess and control the key technology. The export and import of technology neglects the real needs of developing countries, leaving them at the mercy of big monopolies that dominate the market. We see old colonial powers as technology exporters who have adapted to the present situation by perpetuating the dependence of the former colonies in a relatively hidden manner. The methods are different, and are correlated with the participant in transfer, the kind of technology, and so on. The most common method is by neglecting to establish a satisfactory relation between the imported technology and the traditional culture in a broader sense. Otherwise the monopoly of transferred technology would be at stake. Technology remains the most subtle means of control and domination of many societies by the owners of the technology. Instead of contributing to the resolution of the vital problems of the third world, technology becomes a power which acts against the basic interests of Third World peoples.

The technology imported into developing countries is often too advanced and automated for the geophysical characteristics of the country, the demands of the market, and the limited output of production. Contrary to some assertions, the main danger for developing countries is not in the ability of the supplier of technology to transform the technology into capital but in the use of technology in a monopolistic manner - by excluding the acquiring country from exploiting the technological knowledge - and in the abuse of the monopolistic position.

The owners of technology, furthermore, carry out the exclusive distribution of technology in the world through the glorification of private ownership and the transformation of historical advantages into their own. In this context, the present position of the developing countries is compared to the situation when today's developed countries were underdeveloped themselves before they managed to overcome that situation and became developed. Such a comparison involves neo-colonialistic implications, because in the times spoken about, today's developed countries were surrounded by countries which were even less developed.

The developing countries are integrated into the world system dominated by the economically developed countries, which, having inherited advantages, provided for themselves the best position in the world interest-economies and converted it into their permanent monopoly. The highly developed technology of the industrial countries is based on two hundred years of industrial tradition, supported by the advancement of appropriate infrastructure. The developing countries have neither the tradition of technological development nor the appropriate infrastructure, so their position is considerably more unfavorable than the one today's developed countries had one or two centuries ago.

The developing countries, after achieving national independence, have to conform to the existing economic relations in the world (until the new economic order becomes universally accepted) and to the "international division of labour,'' as it is generously named by western economists, that exists at the time. The developing countries are compelled to be incorporated into contemporary macro-technology - the macro-organization of the production forces - which is dominated by technical elements. Macro-technology is founded on normalization, unification, efficiency, and stability; it has grown out of the capitalist system, and its bearers want to impose it upon all mankind. In the developing countries, centres for the development of macrotechnology are rare and without significant influence on the aggregate development of macro-technology in the world.

Another danger for the developing countries is the transfer of technology performed in the mode of today. The unequal technological and economic position of the contract parties enables the suppliers of technology to have the decisive control in determining conditions for the transfer of technology. Not only is the type of technology determined by the owners (technology that has not been adequately tested, for instance, so that the receiver has the role of testing polygon, or that is sufficiently amortized or already out of date), but the accompanying elements of so-called "tied purchase" are also decided upon by the owners, in order to enlarge their profit and make the position of the receiver even more subordinate, under the pretext of an efficient transfer of technology.

As the competition in the market of technology is imperfect, the price is decided upon by the owner, having in mind the economic position of the receiver. in most cases, the resources at the disposal of the receiver are limited, so the owner of technology is simultaneously in the position of giving a loan, and that makes the position of the receiver even worse. An enterprise from a developing country, needing foreign technology and not having enough financial resources and information about the available technology in the world, and being restrained by given social and economic conditions (the stage of development of the production forces, infrastructure, the profile of personnel), links itself to the first owner of technology who is willing to make it available to that enterprise by granting a loan. The terms of the transfer of technology are out of the primary concern, as well as the effect of the application of technology on the receiving country. In other words, the transfer of technology performed under restrictive conditions imposed by the developed countries is partly made possible by the developing countries themselves. The lack of interest or wrongly directed interest of the international community also plays a part in this situation.

The relevance of the legal order to the transfer of technological knowledge

The legal protection of technological knowledge and skill, i.e., the law of industrial property, is an accomplishment of the contemporary national and international legal systems, as the object of protection gained its significance only in the circumstances of a relatively developed industrial production.

Industrial property rights were values of accessory nature till the Second World War in the majority of industrial underdeveloped countries. Domestic industry was almost non-existent in many countries in Africa and Asia, while industrialists and merchants from developed countries enjoyed a monopolistic position in the domestic market. On that account, there was no need for the registration of patents and trademarks and, accordingly, no need for domestic law on industrial property. The attainment of national independence, the beginning of the development of national industry, and the pressure exerted by the owners of technology from developed countries that they be granted exclusive rights influenced the adoption of the first national regulations on industrial property.

However, laws on industrial property that were and are still being enacted in economically underdeveloped countries are not adapted to the real stage of development of the production forces but, in most cases, have simply been taken over from the former colonial powers. The developing countries, fascinated by their systematization and legal concepts, adopt them without serious consideration because of the lack of domestic experts. In this process they fail to take into consideration that the laws they are taking as a model have been constructed in such a way as to protect the interests of the exporters of capital and technology and/or are designed for a society with a much more developed base and superstructure than exists in the country which is adopting them.

In this manner the phenomenon of law becoming an object of transfer from developed to developing countries originated. It is a phenomenon because the legal order is, in fact, the framework for the transfer of technology, legalizing it on the national and international levels. Thus we have the situation of developed countries exporting not only industrial equipment, knowledge, and capital but also legal rules enabling the exploitation of the imported equipment, knowledge, and capital in the recipient, developing country in a manner that suits their owner. In the developing countries we come across legal rules representing a more or less unsuccessful combination of the customary national law and the law received from an industrial power, usually the former colonial power.

A former colonial power has continuing economic influence in a developing country, and it tries to preserve such a situation as long as possible because it is in its interest, i.e., in the interest of its citizens who are transferring technology into the developing country under the protection of the industrial property law. In this way, the development of peculiarities in the law of new states is impeded, and positive ideas on the unification of the law on industrial property are compromised because of the neo-colonialistic ambitions of some developed countries. The national law on industrial property, instead of encouraging domestic innovative activities and having a positive effect on the flow of foreign technology (under conditions favourable to the national economy), works against domestic industry in favour of foreign technology owners from the developed countries.

The existing system of international protection of industrial property is based on the principles proclaimed in the Paris Convention at the end of the last century. Accordingly, the system is based on the principle of formal equality of the member countries (and the same conditions are imposed upon unequal members). The granting of legal protection to foreign citizens and adopting the principle of national treatment were important democratic achievements in the domain of law and international relations in general. Although this system has its undeniable historical significance and is a contribution to the legal theory and practice of the nineteenth century, it should be pointed out that, even at the time of its establishment, it did not suit the interests of underdeveloped countries. But at those times in the underdeveloped countries that were already sovereign states, the internal balance of power favoured the infiltration of foreign influence and consequently of foreign law too; so those countries acceded to international conventions, irrespective of the real character of such conventions, and it was taken to be a progressive attitude on the part of domestic governments. Domestic legal rules contributed to such a climate too. As has already been mentioned, they represented - more or less - the reception of foreign law. However, at the time of the adoption of the Paris Convention the majority of the contemporary developing countries were colonies, and the question of their accession to the convention was solved by the application of the "colonial clause.)' So the system of international protection of industrial property was created by the industrially developed countries, and it served as a tool for the institutionalization of existing monopolistic and colonial positions.

Later, in the circumstances of a developed international market, modern industrial production, and the raising of conscience of the most advanced countries in the world, the implementation of the international system of industrial protection revealed the extent of its outdatedness. However, it was and still is difficult to oppose the apologetic claims of an equitable treatment of all the parties to the Paris Convention and its other principles as well, since it is backed up by the most developed countries in the world. On the other hand, it took almost a whole century to make the majority of the parties to the Paris Convention aware of the extent to which the international law of industrial protection is relevant to the transfer of technology, and consequently to national economic development. A large number of the developing countries acceded to the Paris.

Convention automatically, the same way they did to other international conventions, in the ecstasy of the attainment of national independence and without an estimation of the impact of those international conventions on their national needs.

It can be stated that both national and international law, in the present conditions, are components of the institutionalization of the existing relations based on factual inequality in the international community and that they serve as the means for new forms of neo-colonialistic exploitation. This is quite understandable when we consider the very nature of law and legal order, which are always the proponents of the institutionalization of the existing relations in a society, created by the more powerful minority; it is unlikely that they could serve as instruments for changing relations to the disadvantage of those who still occupy stronger positions in the international community.

The developed countries do not base their superiority on their size or the allocation of resources but on the technological and industrial advantages they have achieved and on their more developed social structure. Accordingly, it is in their interest to cement existing relations, and the international protection of industrial property is a really convenient instrument to this end.

Some proposed measures on the national and international levels

With regard to the difficulties and peculiarities of each of the developing countries, and having in mind the impossibility of presenting a thorough recapitulation of the state of affairs and possible solutions, we shall confine ourselves to a few proposals devised to help increase the effect of imported technology in developing countries.

The pre-condition of any "successful" transfer of technology, from the viewpoint of the country importing technology, is an indigenous concept of the economic development of the country and of the role of the transfer of technology in that development. An insight into the capabilities and needs of national industrial production, on one hand, and of the scientific and technological realities (the fund of available technology, the conditions for its distribution in the world, etc.) on the other, is the decisive factor in the creation of such a concept. The data obtained are the basis for national development plans concerning the growth of industrial production and they denote, roughly, the kind and quantity of the technology needed in a forthcoming period.

A further consideration of particular importance is the information possessed by the country importing technology. Who owns the technology needed and whether there are other companies having similar technologies that could be also used are among the most important facts to be determined. It is also necessary to investigate the possibility of complementary purchases, seek information on the conditions for the transfer of technology, etc. All these enable the receiver of technology to achieve a degree of lesser dependence and to obtain technology under more favourable conditions.

As far as legal regulation is concerned, the very existence of this regulation in the receiving country is stimulating by itself, because it offers a sense of security to the foreign partner and makes the process of transfer easier altogether. The legal rules on industrial property and the transfer of technology ought to correspond, to the greatest possible extent, to the needs of the national industrial and economic development, i.e., to be the legal manifestation of the above mentioned concept of national economic development. Furthermore, they should take account of the generally accepted international principles of law on industrial property, striving to conform those principles to the interests of all the members of the international community.

Experience has demonstrated that it would be to the advantage of the developing countries if their internal rules were extended to regulate, inter alia, some questions which have been left aside until now: the limitation of the duration of a contract on the transfer of technology (it seems that five years could be the maximum duration); the granting of license for a trade-mark only in exceptional cases, i.e., when it is in the interest of the country and not solely of the parties to the contract; the trend of introducing provisions on the co-operation of the partners in domains of science and research in every contract for the transfer of technology; and, finally, not registering any contract containing a "grant-back'' clause. The question of compensation for the technology supplied could be solved by legal instruments in such a way as to make it dependent on the efficiency of the technology transferred to the developing country. In such a way both the foreign and the domestic partner would be interested in the effect of the application of technology.

In a large number of contracts on the transfer of technology to the developing countries, there are provisions placed on the loan that is made for the purchase of the technology. This practice is really dangerous for the domestic partner who is making the contract with the particular owner of technology willing to grant him a loan, irrespective of restrictive conditions for the implementation of the transfer.

Concerning the contractual modalities for the transfer of technology, it seems more suitable for the developing countries to acquire technology by complex international business law agreements - such as an agreement on long-term co-operation in production or on a joint investment of the resources of a foreign partner with domestic enterprises - than traditional licensing agreements, agreements on patents, trade-marks, know-how, consulting-engineering, management, etc. In the traditional agreements the relations of the partners are, by the nature of the agreement, based on parity and commercial character, but that is not the case in agreements with enterprises from developing countries. The foreign partner should be induced to become interested in different forms of economic co-operation with domestic enterprises; such co-operation could be useful in many respects for the domestic partner.

The introduction of institutional measures is of particular significance for the transfer of technology to developing countries. Such measures have already been implemented in some countries, but reports would indicate that they are not functioning perfectly. In most developing countries, the import of technology is not subject to control at all. On the contrary, domestic enterprises are given the initiative for concluding and the responsibility for implementing contracts for the transfer of technology. This is one of the most serious mistakes made by developing countries with respect to the transfer of technology, but they seem not to be aware of long-term negative effects of such a policy. Governmental and other public interest organs and institutions should have an important, even decisive, role in some phases of the transfer. In the first phase of negotiations between the future partners, governmental organs would have to play an advisory role and to stimulate the conclusion of agreements that provide for the use of domestically available resources and stimulate the development of existing "accompanying" industries in the country. In the second phase, upon the registration of an agreement, governmental organs should have the decisive words taking into account the interests of a domestic enterprise and those of the whole country. In the phase of the implementation of the agreement, the role of the organs and/or institutions would also have to be significant. They could have the competence of imposing sanctions on those contractual relationships which do not implement the provisions of the registered agreement.

Instead, in a considerable number of developing countries we witness the role of governmental institutions reduced to the registration of agreements on the transfer of technology. During such registration, automatism and bureacratism are strongly evidenced. In contrast, in developed countries, where such a system of protection by governmental and societal institutions does not seem necessary (e.g., Japan, France, the United States), the system of control of concluded agreements is much more strict and consistent.

On the other side, changing the sources of international legal regulation of the transfer of technology is a really difficult task, accompanied by much resistance in the developed countries, which are not ready to exchange their monopolistic positions for relations of equality by granting the developing countries preferential treatment. The developed countries, under the pressure of the climate created in the international community, which was in turn initiated by the United Nations, give small cessions from time to time and/or accede to compromises. The basic tactics of the developed countries is gaining time by the prolongation of any process.

On that account the developing countries should act concertedly. They should analyse the national problems and find a common denominator, establish a concept of the acquisition of foreign technology, and, on the way, achieve appropriate arrangements and conditions for the acquisition of technology. Although it is stated that the developing countries purchase only one-tenth of the technology circulated by industrially developed countries, we deem that the task of such a datum is to minimize the importance attached to the creation of new rules of behaviour in the transfer of technology by developing countries. The developed countries are by all means interested in the market for technology in developing countries, and that is the principal reason for their persistent resistance to changing the existing rules.

The formulation of a common platform among developing countries would ease their acquisition of technology and lead to more equalized and equitable conditions for the transfer of technology. However, the developing countries have not, so far, demonstrated enough understanding for co-operation but act independently or in small regional groupings. This suits the developed countries.

It is certain that the achievement of the first agreements among developing countries is not a simple task that can be accomplished quickly. On the contrary, it is a gradual process of conforming their needs and abilities, and at the same time bridging over differences political, geophysical, economic, social, etc. But it is plausible that co-operation among the developing countries will influence speedier changes in the rules of behaviour in the international transfer of technology, and their changing according to the demands of the developing countries. In other words, the voice of the developing countries on the revision of existing international agreements, primarily of the Paris Convention, and on the drafting of new international conventions would be heard and respected much more.

The developing countries that are non-aligned should intensify their endeavours in that respect and prevail on those developing countries that, by their passive attitude on the question of the transfer of technology, are worsening not only their own position but the position of developing countries as a whole. Furthermore, the existing differences among the developing countries with respect to their stages of economic development should be considered, and various forms of aids should be given to the most underdeveloped countries accordingly. In such a way, the sense of co-operation among developing countries would be demonstrated in practice.

In our opinion, the only possible way to "cure" the relations of inequality existing today is to grant preferential treatment to the developing countries and/or their subjects. However, the proposal to give subjects of the developing countries treatment better than that enjoyed by the subjects of the developed countries encounters considerable resistance from the interested parties in developed countries. The opponents of the proposal are found, to a considerably lesser extent, even in some developing countries which are under strong cultural and economic influence of the super-powers. They represent themselves as the protectors of democratic achievements of the nineteenth century proclaiming universal equality and of the legal tradition in general.

The question of the exchange of information in the field of technology is often neglected in discussions on this subject. The developing countries do not attach enough significance to information, in most cases because of the lack of appropriate national services and experts, and do not demonstrate sufficient interest in that matter on the international level either. It is certain that the solution to the problem of information cannot be an overall solution in the transfer of technology, but it is certain as well that the use and disposal of information bears considerable advantage today. The fact that every year approximately a million new documents, containing descriptions of 200,000 to 300,000 inventions, are published should not be overlooked by the appropriate services in developing countries. For that reason we deem good organization of such services in developing countries, with financial and expert help from international organizations and expert bodies, really important. Furthermore, cooperation among the developing countries in the circulation of information and, finally, free acquisition of all available data in the field of technology transfer from developed countries should be additional steps.

Having the problem of information in mind, the United Nations in its seventh special session, in September 1975, envisaged the establishment of a "bank" of industrial and technological data and, eventually, the creation of regional and sector al banks in order to enable developing countries to keep up with the available and advanced technologies in the developed countries (resolution 3362). In such a manner, the activities of the developing countries in the field of information should be intensified, particularly with respect to information in the field of technology.

A detrimental circumstance for developing countries, although it may not be recognizable at first sight, is the fact that the problem of the transfer of technology is being considered along parallel lines in several international forums, on several different levels. There are separate groups of experts, and, although they are working on the same or similar questions, they co-operate very little or even have no contact at all. Thus, international action for the solution of the problem of the position of the developing countries on the transfer of technology is being watered down, and the links between the developing countries - weak as they are - are being disrupted. Finally, this duplication of effort consumes a lot of energy and resources, which is probably close to the intentions of the developed countries.

The efforts to draft a Code of Conduct for the International Transfer of Technology are one of the most interesting questions for the developing countries at present, not only because of their actuality (a recently held diplomatic conference on the Code) but also because of the scope of questions that are to be solved. The essential point has already been stressed: any code without preferential treatment for the developing countries should be boycotted by developing countries. All the rest of the principles proclaimed in the Code of Conduct such as the granting of a free flow of information, and an effective contribution to the development of a scientific and technological base and infrastructure in the developing countries - are found in other international instruments, the implementation of which has not significantly changed relations between developed and developing countries in the transfer of technology.

A question that has been in the cent re of all discussions for a long time, on which the developing countries have not finally agreed or taken a definite attitude, is the problem of universality in the application of the Code and the binding nature of its provisions. Having in mind, on the one hand, the interest of developing countries in the adoption of an international legal instrument for the regulation of the transfer of technology and, on the other, the existing situation in the sphere of possession and allocation of technology, it seems that the only possible solution is a flexible attitude towards the application of both principles - universality and binding nature. To insist on the binding nature and universality of the application of the Code is not consistent with the situation in the field of the transfer of technology, and it would have two adverse consequences for the developing countries: first, it would increase the slowing down and maneuvering; and, secondly, what is much more important, it would result in the watering down of the principles and rules contained in the Code.

Developing countries are going to be obliged for the years to come to keep on importing technology from developed countries, as well as to strengthen their scientific-technological base. The lack of an international legal mechanism to administer the transfer of technology worldwide enables the developed countries to exercise their monopoly and impose various restrictive clauses dictating conditions that limit the development of a scientific-technological base of developing countries.

In the effort to establish a new economic order, developing countries put the emphasis on the revision of existing international conventions and the promulgation of new international documents in the matter of technology transfer between developed and developing countries.

It is not surprising that developed countries are not prepared for radical changes in these matters, as they show through prolongation tactics, small concessions which usually result in vague declarations, and resolutions avoiding any concrete obligations toward developing countries.

Drawing a conclusion, we have to point out that the question of legal regulation of technology transfer becomes more and more difficult because of new social set-ups in developing countries, such as fast growing urban development, the changing role of education, and other factors that should be considered in determining the role of technology in modern society. In order to benefit from imported technology, the transfer must be adapted to national interests coexisting with national culture. International and national legal regulation has to take these factors into account.


Conceptualization of scientific and technological development is no longer the exclusive sphere of interest of economists and experts with similar professional backgrounds. It is increasingly being studied by sociologists, political scientists and even philosophers. The reason is quite simple: Concepts and tendencies of scientific and technological development are crucially linked to the problems of overall social development. Two visions, two different concepts of development, have been generally predominant until now. The first insisted on growth, that is, on quantitative indicators. Its point of departure was in the notion that it was important to produce things: a man with plenty of goods at his disposal would have his needs satisfied. This approach was based on the view that the existing socio-economic conditions, within which such production was taking place, should not be fundamentally changed.

The second approach focused much more on the problems of development. This approach does not neglect quantitative aspects, but it insists on the change of quality of human relations. It is not important merely how much is produced, but also under what conditions production takes place. Furthermore, the purpose of production is becoming increasingly important, in terms of how it is linked to the aims of the society. This brings up the question of whether production leads to greater welfare of the people, to more democratic social and political relations, and to the development of new contents of cultural life in individual countries and in the world community as a whole. The concept of development includes problems of international relations, international solidarity, and cooperation, in both the economic and socio-political spheres. Within the framework of such a concept, the problem of scientific and technological development is seen in a new light. The search for a philosophy of scientific and technological development in this context becomes a crucial issue facing extremely diversified social communities worldwide. This paper is an attempt to help in this search.

I. Development and underdevelopment

The terms over which different concepts clash are always laden with different meanings, ideological connotations and value judgments. Where such terms as "development" and "underdevelopment" are concerned, the issue is even more complex, since their meanings are linked to different concepts of social development, to different goals. It is therefore fruitless to attempt to give a comprehensive definition of those terms. This is even more obvious if we bear in mind that most scientific studies and research projects which presently come from highly developed capitalist countries do not even use the term "development." This tendency was particularly apparent in the works published before 1975. Early works by Toffler, the Club of Rome, projections by Kahn and the Hudson Institute all of them linked directly or indirectly with the problems of scientific and technological development - do not mention the question of development. At best they talk of growth.

It is not incidental that development was not mentioned, let alone analysed, in the scientific literature which dominated the world scientific community until the mid-1970s. Changes began only after the grave energy crisis shook the West. It became clear that the goals of social progress have to be linked not only to planning, but also to certain long-term projections, which would express the essence of socio-economic changes. Such long-term strategic orientation cannot be expressed through futurologist projections, which were very popular at a certain period in the 1970s. This has to be done through the suppositions, contradictions and possibilities of development, which are contained in the day-to-day life of existing societies (states).

True enough, it should be stated that the notion of development quickly entered daily scientific, political and even colloquial parlance - naturally with diverse and often very vague connotations. The study of development has swiftly led some theorists in the more developed western capitalist countries to the concept of over development. This was supposed to designate the level of development at which the pace of further development should be checked. This concept is closely connected with the zero growth theories. All those studies have failed to define development. They generally measured development in terms of per capita GNP, or they simply talked of the more developed, modern, productive output of goods. The problem of development is thus reduced to quantitative indicators in most theoretical papers or those coming from the more developed capitalist countries. So, for instance, the Second Report of the Club of Rome gave ten categories of development, while Kahn measured development and underdevelopment by the quantity of dollars per capita (the underdeveloped countries are supposed to be those with less than US$ 400, and which import more than they export).

On the other side, an entirely different approach has developed - mainly among scientists from developing countries. The notion of development is their central category, the pivot around which scientific arguments and critiques of the existing set of international economic relations are organized. Samir Amin and other scholars from Asia, Africa, and Latin America want to prove that developing countries also have the right to a more rapid socio-economic development. In this respect they demand depending on their theoretical orientation - more or less radical changes in the mode of production both in highly developed industrialized countries and in developing countries. They generally see the current production system as an addition to the world system of exploitation. Even those views, however, do not elaborate on development to a sufficient degree, nor is it a part of a coherent theoretical concept; it is rather used as the key term. It seems, however, that the term "development" would be more adequately determined through its linkage with a deep, fundamental critique of the existing mode of production. More specifically, this critique should concern the very aims of industrialization, that is, the critique of the existing civilizational strategic orientation.

This becomes even clearer if we look at what is meant by and described as underdevelopment. There is no general agreement here either, which is probably the consequence of different roads suggested as ways to overcome underdevelopment. Apparently, there are seven basic approaches to the problems of underdevelopment, and subsequently to the definition of this term. We should constantly bear in mind that underdevelopment is mainly derived from the notion of development, as its antipode. The first fairly widespread view among some Marxists is that the problem of underdevelopment does not exist at all. Using some of Marx's writings and ideas, such Marxists claim that the developed countries now are, in fact, what the developing countries of today will look like one day. Therefore, an inevitable historical process should be followed, and the developing countries are bound to reach a high level of development. Whole volumes have been written in favour of and against this view. Marx's ideas on the possible role of co-operatives in Slavic nations and on the possibility of socialism without a prior capitalist stage in Asia also are well known. The second group of theorists advocates the same thesis, in a way, though it is negatively determined. This is to say that, in their view, the existing underdeveloped countries remain underdeveloped because they have not been sufficiently exploited. In other words, if such countries were exploited to a higher degree, they would become an integral part of developed capitalism, and thus reach its present (that is, developed) level. This concept of underdevelopment rests on the theory that it is necessary to go through all stages of historical development completely and thoroughly in order to achieve development, or at least what is meant by that term today.

The third group concentrates on the unequal international position of certain countries, and on the subsequent division of countries into those which are developed, and those which are not. According to advocates of this view, such division is an inevitable consequence of inequality. Samir Amin thus talks of the relationship between the "periphery" and its "metropolis," pointing out that the latter "develops auto-centrically" at the former's expense. A similar view is offered by A. Emmanuel, and A. G. Frank also insists that the role of the integrated world market is decisive. Because of such diversity of dependence theories, we may claim that it represents the fourth theoretical approach to the issue of underdevelopment. The term "dependence" is mainly used to describe a country's dependence on some decisions which are made outside its boundaries. This dependence is related to the specialization of production, to imports and exports, to the form and level of foreign investment, to technological dependence on imported technology and know-how, to foreign policy pressures, to introduction of inappropriate cultural values and Weltanschauungen, and so forth. The fifth group of theorists departs from the view that an underdeveloped society is one which is not able to reach a certain level of GNP per capita (this level varies with increases in the wealth of highly developed countries). It should nevertheless be added that, besides the level of income, other characteristics also are mentioned with increasing frequency, such as a liberal capitalism-type democracy. This approach, therefore, includes all those definitions of underdevelopment as the antipode of the welfare state or as the opposite of the consumer society. All the views mentioned so far essentially see the capitalist mode of production as predominant and underdevelopment as the direct product of this dominance.

The sixth group of authors maintains that underdevelopment is the characteristic of certain productive relations. Some Latin American analysts thus blame feudal relations in Latin America's production system for the low level of development of their countries; capitalism is therefore not seen as the sole culprit. West European literature also indirectly blames the socialist mode of production as one of the causes of underdevelopment. This is best reflected in the classifications which can be found in the works of those theorists who emphasize total historical prevalence of the capitalist mode of production over its socialist counterpart (Bell and others). Since such classification is largely descriptive, and thus conditional, it is difficult to determine whether certain views generally fall into one group or another. Let us also mention the seventh group of authors, who maintain that underdevelopment is the essential characteristic of the highly developed capitalist world. They support their claim by pointing out that social differences keep increasing in capitalist countries (creating so-called "pockets of poverty"). In their view, the consequences of capitalism - destructive as they are - inevitably lead to underdevelopment, though the system is not necessarily underdeveloped at this moment in time.

It is obvious that discussions concerning development and underdevelopment are placed within the framework of existing historical practice, mainly within the framework of the capitalist mode of production. Let us return to an earlier remark. It is doubtful whether the problem of development can be solved solely on the basis of the existing historical situation, with the capitalist mode of production still predominant in the world and therefore the framework for solving contradictions of development still not substantially altered. There should be no doubt that it is possible to start looking for a different form of civilization and thus for a new mode of production. This new mode would have its roots in the theory and practice of socialism, in the experience of the developing world, and in the manifest shortcomings and contradictions of capitalism. The direction of theoretical reasoning and practical action should not, therefore, have its base exclusively in the critique of characteristics of contemporary capitalism. The direction which should be taken does not imply merely overcoming the capitalist mode of production.

The new, socialist - and thus different - civilization has to be based on the authentic, specific characteristics of those societies which are in search of an alternative road to development. The dominating values and goals have to be in many respects not only opposite to but also different from existing ones. They should be based not only on the differences in the actual capacities of individuals, but also on the differences in the capacities, needs, and possibilities of individual societies. At the same time, these capacities should not be taken to mean the mere sum-total of individuals and needs. They have to have their framework and their catalyst in the unity of potentials and interests of the broadest stratum of each society: the working class, the stratum which produces new social values. The experience of socialist countries and some developing countries already provides an outline of such possibilities. The diversity, the lack of coherence and the failures do not mean that there are no positive results. On the basis of this statement I shall proceed with my discussion of the philosophy of scientific and technological development.

II. Definition of some basic terms

There can be no doubt that today's science, and even technology (which is the applied form of science), is becoming a direct productive force. This nevertheless does not mean that there is a generally accepted view on what science and technology are.

The differences regarding science and technology, as well as their role in the development of society, depend largely on different theoretical approaches to the subject, on different visions of development, and on the role of individual social groups and classes. I maintain that science is a conscious social activity which has the task of creating a systematized body of knowledge, which is achieved through description and explanation of social and natural phenomena. The task of science, therefore, is to establish regularities (social and natural), or at least to point out the facts which may help explain certain phenomena. The new knowledge thus gained has to be verifiable and in accordance with reality; briefly, it has to help establish objective truths.

Technology is yet another term which can be explained in different ways. In my opinion, the most acceptable definition sees technology as a multitude of techniques and modes which are the outcome of scientific discoveries, which enable people to use nature in an organized manner, and which help them manage social processes.

It was necessary to formally define science and technology since all too often in different scientific, expert, and lay discussions certain properties are attached to technology which it does not have. There is a fairly widespread view which seeks justification in the entire Judaeo-Christian culture: that technology and its development represent a peculiar feature of western civilization. Arguments offered in this connection attempt to prove that this peculiarity of that culture is the reason for its "prevalence." Social and economic "achievements" of the West are mainly linked to the ability of that culture to develop scientific knowledge and technological solutions. Furthermore, this ability is alleged to secure the continued superiority of western culture, and thus its own future progress and that of the rest of the world.

In my view, such arguments are not compatible either with the evidence which history offers, or with the actual creative potential of humanity today. Such insistence on technological "super characteristics" of western civilization tends to overlook real contradictions of the modern world; more important still, it obscures certain solutions and roads to development which do exist. In this respect, the gathering organized by the United Nations University and Belgrade University should indicate the scope and possibilities of the modern world to overcome the inequalities, contradictions, and exploitation which are inherent in the concept of science and technology as developed by the West.

III. Existing philosophies of scientific-technological development

Different concepts of scientific and technological development have to be analysed from two viewpoints. The first is linked to the issue of how much those concepts which exist today actually contribute to the swift social development of the contemporary world, and especially toward its less developed sector. The second issue concerns the search for ways and means of using everything positive and beneficial to the development of humanity which exists already, or which is still in the sphere of imagination or intuition, thus marking the true beginning of the new era we are approaching - an era of true liberty, prosperity and welfare. That is, we should always take into account what is, without neglecting what can be.

It seems that we may conditionally talk of four concepts of scientific technological development which can be met in today's theory and practice. The classification is conditional and probably neglects a wealth of ideas and possibilities. It should only be used as the basis for critical reexamination of the existing roads of social development.

a. The first group of concepts and philosophical frameworks of analysis ultimately regards technology as the key which can solve all social contradictions. This view maintains that whenever some grave, apparently insurmountable social problems and contradictions become acute, new technological discoveries make it possible to maintain and extend the pace and volume of production. Oil price increases represent just one of the many attempts to redistribute wealth on the world scale; but developed capitalist countries were not prompted by the new situation to analyse whether there really was too much exploitation in their favour on the world scale. They seek solutions primarily in some new technological breakthroughs which would help them keep their monopolistic positions.

It seems that the concept of technological optimism is therefore unacceptable. This is not to say that the role of technology in the development of society should be denied or negatively evaluated. It is nevertheless beyond doubt that optimism of this kind is not realistic or historically justified. Furthermore, an optimism which postulates the magic power of scientific and technological solutions in many ways reflects the need of highly developed capitalist countries to use their dominating position in that field for the preservation and further extension of their monopolistic position in international economic, cultural, and even political relations. Insisting on such concepts is unlikely to contribute to solving the social problems facing the developing world.

Technological solutions alone cannot solve the problem of cultural development, the dilemmas which exist when the goals of social and economic development are to be defined, the problem of colonialism and neocolonialism, or the problem of democratic development and creation of political systems with democratic characteristics and the like. It is obvious that knowledge and skill cannot solve such burning issues of today's world by themselves; they have to be solved primarily by including broad masses of producers in the process, which masses should be the true masters of their own fate.

Technological optimism is largely elaborated through certain concepts which emerge within the framework of analysis and development of the consumer society, the welfare state, and the concept of post-industrial society. The most fervent advocates of this vision are most certainly multinational companies. The developing countries which have to fight MNCs in order to preserve their national, economic, and political integrity are well aware of the consequences of such a vision.

It is particularly difficult to talk of technology transfers. Depending on the concrete situation, on the goals of a particular society, and especially on the correct notion that better knowledge is always valuable, technology transfer is an activity which should be encouraged. On the other hand, excessive insistence on it implies viewing technology as the magic wand which can solve all issues. In some cases, the transfer may prove counter-productive and highly damaging to the society, for example when highly sophisticated technology is transferred to a pronouncedly agrarian society. The only party to gain in this case is the developed country - the exporter of technology.

Transfer of technology at all costs - often implying not only the transfer of hardware, but also that of software and even of the organization of production - is not a desirable concept. This is particularly apparent in the case of largely agrarian societies. In such societies, even advanced agricultural technology (which requires investments in energy, large holdings, and so on) is unacceptable if the structure of the society, its pattern of ownership, and its economic structure are not prepared for the new technology. The mode, the scope, and the content of the technology transfer which would have the most positive effect possible have not been devised yet - despite numerous discussions and international research projects. One thing is certain: an inadequate and excessive transfer of technology does not contribute to real progress. It is more likely to aggravate social conflicts within the given society and to extend the scope of domination and exploitation.

b. Another widespread view of the role of science and technology in the development of society is that which perceives technology as the negative factor of social development. This concept has numerous advocates in the developed world. They blame developed technology for many negative aspects of the capitalist world (pollution, stratification, overnourishment and undernourishment, excessive supply of consumer goods, and so forth). This approach, adopted by numerous theorists and public workers, is not a novelty. Its early proponents were humanists such as J. J. Rousseau at a time when capitalism was still young.

This concept is especially significant today, since it advocates abolishing certain technological processes which make large-scale mass production possible; a broad spectrum of social theories is being developed on that basis. Different concepts range from the "assessment of technology" to the notion that "small is beautiful." In other words, there is an element of nostalgic longing for the "good old times," and negative characteristics of technology in the developed world are thus exaggerated. Such negative effects of modern technology as can be found in the developed world, but also in developing countries as a consequence of random and inadequate technology transfers, lead these theorists to claim that technology is generally unacceptable to humanity as a whole.

Believing that the happiness and future of mankind can be realized in small communities, without any technological giants, such theorists try to "sell" their concept to the developing world, too. There are two reasons for this attempt. The first is to be found in a strong element of egoism, which could be found in western theories before, too, and which is now manifested in a different light. Until the crises of the early 1970s, very few of them had claimed that the development of technology could be socially damaging; the egoism of exploitation prevented them from taking such a view. Now, when elements of crisis exist, the majority of these same theorists want to stop the world at its present level of development; their motives are again egoistic. They are not worried that more than 3,000 million people have problems which can be solved only if further development of science and technology is combined with the introduction of appropriate social relations.

The second element motivating such a course is the desire to maintain the existing capitalist mode of production. Such concepts do not solve anything but the traumas of their creators. The tragedy is that the proponents of such theories see technology as the source of all evils, and not the continued existence of capitalist social relations.

c. The third view of science and technology is contained in the concept of intermediate technology. The essence of this concept is that the developed industrial world should continue producing new technology which should be not sophisticated but suited to the needs of the agrarian developing societies. Such societies need labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive technology. This concept is an applied form of the view that technological innovation can solve everything.

Intermediate technology is also called "appropriate technology.', Its salient points are as follows: low in capital costs, relies on local materials whenever possible, creates jobs, employs local skills and labour, small enough to be affordable by a small group of farmers, easily understood, controlled by people without a high level of western-style education, makes production in small metalworking shops possible, rests on the assumption that in most of the world important decisions are made by groups and not individuals, involves decentralized renewable resources, makes technology understandable to the people, flexible under changing circumstances, and does not involve patents, royalties, consulting fees, import duties, and so on.

This concept does not postulate at all that it is necessary to provide developing countries with such technology as would prove suitable to their conditions of socio-economic development. The existing pattern of social-class capital relations is implicitly regarded as universally acceptable, and only technology is regarded as unacceptable. All that is required is to replace the existing technology with its intermediate substitute, and the problem would be solved.

Like the concepts outlined earlier, this one also has some rational elements. The unacceptable element is that this concept does not question its own rationale. It does not ask what is the purpose of creating an alternative technology. Its goal is to correct and reform some elements within the given set of relations, without attempting to alter those relations in any fundamental way.

IV. Self-reliance

a. Definition

Self-reliance is not a concept which attempts to offer alternative solutions; it explores the possibility of finding new, different social solutions, rather than some alternative technological solutions. This is probably the cause of great differences which exist within that approach. The concept of self-reliance should not include those views which actually advocate alternative, intermediate technological solutions under the label of self-reliance (Tinbergen). This concept - although not quite defined comprehensively - embraces attempts to devise certain social solutions which would enable technology and science to become the true agents and participants in different, socialist roads to development.

In this respect, self-reliance should include in its philosophical premises the use of those scientific and technological solutions which already exist. It does not reject the need for scientific and technological development. Nevertheless, it questions social assumptions on which scientific and technological development has been founded until now. This concept also may take advantage of some achievements of intermediate technology. Such achievements may be integrated into the framework of social forces, human needs, and goals of developing countries, taking into account each country's specific features.

This concept also will attempt to develop science and technology on a new basis, making it possible to avoid most negative aspects linked to the developed industrial society's socio-economic relations and its accompanying technology: pollution, irrational production, waste of materials and human resources, and so on.

Briefly, self-reliance implies attempts to enrich human life in all its aspects: moral, material, political, and cultural, but only in accordance with the possibilities, goals, and traditions of the given society, and - even more crucially - in accordance with the needs of the basic social agent: immediate producers, who are the creators of new social values.

Revolutionary changes and aspirations are not the privilege of any single society or region. Such aspirations are manifested and realized under different conditions, forms, and scopes. Revolutionary attitudes are the salient feature of the basic and most numerous social group in each modern society. Wherever the working class can be established in the form of an industrial proletariat, revolutionary efforts will be directed at effecting fundamental socialist changes. Revolutionary changes will have some different features in those developing countries where peasantry is the basic social force - and such countries are far more numerous than others. This can be observed by comparing the experiences of socialist revolutions of self-management with the experiences of pare-state enterprises.

The basic feature is the fact that modes of development different from those in capitalist societies are sought. It is only within the framework of the concept of self-reliance that scientific technological development has a chance to become the real element of social development, rather than a pale, imposed copy of the developed world.

Self-reliance is not tantamount to an attempt at self-isolation within one's own boundaries. Collective self-reliance provides this concept with an element of international validity, turning it into the seed of new cultural patterns. This not only enables but also spurs on the developing countries to devise experiences and solutions which may lead to negating all oppressive, exploitative characteristics of the existing capitalist civilization. Such a tendency should be viewed as an integral part of the general development of socialism.

b. Elements of the Concept

As I have already pointed out, the concept of self-reliance is neither homogeneous nor codified. It is therefore risky to outline its elements as a coherent, organized speculative or theoretical concept. It is nevertheless possible to outline some of its elements.

The basic tasks of scientific-technological parameters within the framework of this concept are as follows: a production increase which would lead to satisfying all basic needs of the people (sufficient food supply, consumer goods production, improved housing, medical services, and a higher level of education and culture in general); constant need to promote the role of the human-producer in the process of decision-making; better provision of information; greater participation of people in the process of determining local and social goals; liberation from the domination and rhythm of machine production; liberation from imposed goals and needs which are alien to a given society and which serve alien interests; abolition of make-believe freedom and creation of conditions where liberty would spring from the creative contribution and work of each individual; and the right to have different views and interests, but also the unification of those interests by those who create the material and spiritual wealth of every society - the producers themselves. There is no doubt that realizing such a concept requires a fundamental change in international relations, too. The struggle to change these relations is an integral element in realizing this concept. It is not easy, but it is not impossible either, to effect such a change. The new economic order and the struggle to establish it are indicative of all the difficulties, traps, and forces resisting change, but they also prove that efforts yield fruit at the end.

At the practical level, this concept requires the following:

1. Technology which is developed should be the result of needs and efforts of those who are using it; technology must be suited to the society which is using it; and technology should be an expression of that society.

2. The dilemma of developed technology versus intermediate technology is an artificial one; the real dilemma is how to create a technology which would be suitable to those who use it, while solving social problems facing the developing world.

3. Science and technology must help solve the contradictions of the developing countries, not those of the developed ones.

4. Technology must rest on the creative abilities of the members of each individual society, while using all existing knowledge; it should not be a spill-over from the developed countries.

5. Science and technology must solve theoretical and practical problems facing people in the developing countries when they manage their material and social resources and their society; they should pay more attention to social and humanitarian sciences, and develop them in accordance with the traditions and needs of each individual society.

6. Technology and science should instigate the development of new forms of labour and promote authentic societal values; if this is possible in music, there is no reason why it should not be so in science and technology.

7. Science and technology should contribute to the creation of a value system which would glorify not profit and material wealth but labour, independence, creativeness, and diversity, as well as unity which is founded on the toil and interests of the producers.

8. Science and technology are today already able to help the development of more democratic relations; they should continue to develop in that direction.

9. Association of society and production are indispensable; science in particular should indicate the possibilities of association which would not lead to centralization or exploitation, slavery, and subjugation.

To put all this in simple terms, if science and technology are to serve the cause of social development of the developing countries, they must not be a mere copy of alien schemes. They must represent a creative effort to overcome social contradictions on the basis of the interests and needs of associated producers. In this way, science and technology stand a chance of becoming true elements capable of helping develop a new, different civilization. This civilization would be free and authentic in so far as its creation is based on authentic national and human needs; on genuine capacities rather than mere transfers; on long-term goals rather than daily objectives; on the feeling of mutuality and international co-operation rather than exploitation and national egoism; on the involvement of all producers and their interests as the dominant factor rather than the interests of minority groups which are concerned with their own welfare only. Such a civilization would secure social progress but also social justice; unity but also diversity; development of science and technology but without any domination over people; international exchange but on the basis of equality. Its social pillar will be the immediate producers; they will be its inspirers and its builders.


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Congdon, R. J., ed. Introduction to Appropriate Technology. Rodale Press, Emmaus, Penn., USA, 1977.

Derian, J., and M. Staropoli. La Technologie Incontr? Paris, 1975.

Fohlen, C. Qu'est-ce que la Rlution Industrielle? R. Laffont, Paris, 1971.

Hetman, F. Society and the Assessment of Technology. OECD, Paris, 1973.

Kahn, H. The Next 200 Years. Associated Business Programmes, London, 1977 -

Kay, G. Development and Underdevelopment. Macmillan, London, 1975.

Markovic, L. Klasna borba i koncepcija razvoja [Class struggle and the concept of development]. Naprijed, Zagreb, 1978.

Marx, K. The Grundrisse. Penguin Books, London, 1973.

Mesarovic, M., and E. Pestel. Strate pour demain. Paris, 1974.

"Multinacionalizacija kapitala i nerazvijenost" [Multinational capital and underdevelopment]. Marksizem u svetu, no. 3 (1978).

"Naucno-tehnoloska revolucija" [The scientific and technological revolution]. Marksizem u sventu, no. 10 (1 975).

"Naucno-tehnoloska revolucija i socijelisticko samoupravljanje" [The scientific and technological revolution and socialist self-management]. Marksisticka misao, no. 5 (1978).

Roelofs, R., J. Crowley, and D. Hardesty, eds. Environment and Society. Prentice-Hall, London, 1974.

Radoman, S., J. Bajec, and V. Stambuk, eds. Zemlje u razvoju i Putevi napretka [Underdeveloped countries and their ways of development]. Komunist, Belgrade, 1979.

Technology Transfer. University of Stirling, UK, 1976.

Tehnoloski uzroci promena u savremenom sventu [Technological causes for change in contemporary society]. ETAN, Dubrovnik, 1971 (Book I), 1974 (Book II).

Toffler, A. Future Shock. Random House, New York, 1970.


Chairman: Osama A. El-Kholy
Co chairman: Ljubisa Rakic
Rapporteur: Gregory Blue


Gregory Blue

In the first paper of this session, Dr. Ribes gave a brief sketch of the state of play in biological research in general and considered a few of the factors pushing this research forward. He then linked present research prospects to underlying theoretical and philosophical themes, demonstrating in turn that questions of social ethics are inherent in the life sciences and suggesting a series of basic guidelines pertinent to the utilization and application of biological knowledge. Questions of evolutionary theory were at the heart of Dr. Ribes' paper, and related ones were likewise crucial to Dr. Mori's presentation of the views of the Japanese ethnologist and anthropologist Imanishi Kinji, who has developed a "big-sociological" approach to evolution in contrast to the approach of Darwin. Dr. Mori began with a quite interesting exposition linking recent developments in biological and behavioral theory with changes in political and social relations; he then went on to attempt an extension of Imanishi's "big-sociological" approach in order to explain the generation of conflicts within contemporary human societies. That his efforts in this last attempt were perhaps less than satisfactory was pointed out sharply by Dr. Pandeya in the discussion. Dr. Pandeya warned of the dangers of obscurantism and insisted on the importance of formulating concrete analyses of specifically social and political problems.

The third position paper, by Dr. Rakic (presented by Dr. Milanovic), spoke of the necessity of redefining the nature and scope of the responsibility of the physician and stated that it is now necessary to conceive of the physician's duties in terms of social rather than merely professional obligations. During the discussion Dr. Pandaya observed that the improvement of health-care systems around the world is being hindered mainly not by physicians' conception of their responsibility but by transnational corporations dealing in pharmaceutics and medical equipment who are motivated by considerations of profit rather than of health. Dr. Tsurumi agreed with this point but suggested that physicians are called upon to make a choice between serving the transnational and serving the people. In the last intervention of the day, Dr. Rakic argued that adequate understanding and treatment of many major diseases nowadays requires the implementation of a multi-disciplinary approach, incorporating knowledge not only from the medical and pharmaceutical but also from the human and social sciences.

In an intervention scheduled originally for the first session, Dr. Furtado made the theoretical point that particular technologies are important not in themselves but as sources of power for changing the world. He also noted that since 1945 scientific-technological progress has been dominated by the arms race but during the same period the overall balance of world power has increasingly been shifting in favour of Third World countries.

Finally, Dr. Holland noted that many new technologies have the capacity to reduce boring work greatly but in certain circumstances they may also bring about widespread unemployment. Dr. Holland also mentioned the pressures for protectionism in certain industrialized countries which are faced with foreign competition based on technological innovation.

Anouar Abdel-Malek, Celso Furtado, Stuart Holland, A. N. Pandaya, Bruno Ribes, and Kazuko Tsurumi took part in the discussion.

Report on session III

Gregory Blue

Three position papers were presented and discussion followed.

Dr. Ribes summarized some major points of his paper, "La Maiise de la Vie: Pour Quoi Faire?" First of all, he treated two aspects of modern biological research: the necessity of advancing current knowledge, and the problems entailed in this advance. Research is necessarily pushed forward by broad demands for the improvement of life, e.g., for improvement of industrial and agricultural production, for health care at individual and national levels, and by problems concerning genetic factors at the international level. Nevertheless, research and the application of research results are often carried out despite fundamental ignorance, on our part, concerning the global effects of our interventions - certain drugs, for example, have immediate side-effects, others can affect genetic structures. The question thus arises: should we do all that we have the power to do, or should we first try to overcome our ignorance?

The second part of the presentation dealt with the question: "What is Life?" It was stressed that life is not simply a totality of regulated chemical elements, but rather an evolving dynamic. This evolution has two aspects: towards individual perfection and towards "depassment" of the individual and liberation from necessity. The principal factor in the second aspect is an openness to other living beings, already evident in sexuality and showing that life itself is relation.

It is now important to reinforce this "depassment," and this can be done according to five requirements which can be summarized as follows:

(a) stressing compatibility;

(b) learning the possibilities for open life, rather than excluding them;

(c) intensifying the relational character of openness to others;

(d) preserving the singularity of the individual; and

(e) accepting the historical character of life, for life has no sense - biological or otherwise - apart from this historical character.

Dr. Mori presented his paper entitled "Restructuring a Framework for the Assessment of Science and Technology as a Driving Power for Social Development: A Biosociological Approach." Dr. Mori extended the anthropological methods of Imanishi Kinji to contemporary power relationships, and he applied Imanishi's non-Darwinian theory of evolution in order to analyse such power relationships at the systems level. After considering the characteristics of animal societies, he maintained that what distinguishes human societies is culture, i.e., conscious control of nature and appropriation of surplus in order to raise living standards. Science and technology were portrayed as cultural phenomena; and modern science and technology were presented as having two distinct components, viz., universal general principles and cultural elements. Because modern science developed in Europe it is natural for problems, due to the specifically European cultural elements, to arise when modern science and technology are transferred to other cultures. It is thus necessary to analyse the needs which modern science/technology are meant to fulfill within another culture, if they are to be successfully rooted into it.

Science and technology at the global level seem today to have lost their power as forces for the constructive transformation of the world, and this is because the global hierarchical structures of political power have reached a level at which they are blocking general human development. Among other things, this has serious repercussions upon social and physiological time-sensitivity.

The third position paper was that of Dr. Rakic entitled "Medical Technology and Its Effects." It was presented by Dr. Milanovic. The paper dealt with human relations in the field of medicine. Emphasis was placed on problems inherent in current specialization in medical research, which tends to preclude an integral approach to health care and which simultaneously leads to lack of specificity in dealing with the problems of any given individual. At the same time, the medical knowledge of most people is left at a fairly low level. And hence impersonal and bureaucratic relations tend to prevail in the doctor-patient relationship. On the one hand, there is the patient, who doesn't know what's happening to him but who often expects more from the physician than can actually be given. On the other hand, the physician becomes a distant agent whose task is seen only as the application of specialist research. To overcome this situation it is necessary to depersonalize the doctor-patient relationship. Re-personalization can be facilitated: (1) by development within medical research of a broad multi-disciplinarily between the various medical-related sciences themselves and also between them and pertinent branches of the social sciences; (2) by keeping in mind the physical and social specificity of each patient; and (3) by promoting general medical education for the general population, and for each patient in regard to his own case.

Furthermore, the medical profession as a whole should become involved in self-regulation and should take a critical attitude to the results of medical practice; and the concept of the physician's ethical responsibility must be broadened, so as to take into account both the needs of scientific progress and the needs of the local, national, and international communities.

In the discussion several themes were developed.

1. It was strongly questioned whether Dr. Mori's attempt to apply a biosociological approach to contemporary human problems is valid. There was divergence about whether such an approach leads to illusions about reconciling irreconcilable forces in the political sphere, or whether it can aid in constructing a non-confrontational model for dealing with problems.

It was pointed out that the distortion of social time-sensibility is an extremely great problem, which is leading to a generation gap on a world scale. Productivism tends to destroy people's collective memories and hence to make impossible a collective present.

2. It was pointed out that transformation of existing medical relations must involve a clear understanding of the role of the transnational pharmaceutical companies. It was also said that physicians must choose between serving these companies or serving the real needs of the people.

3. In regard to medical practice, it is necessary to keep in mind the mutual interaction between the individual human organism and the external environment. Many types of disease are impossible to cure without a previous transformation of external physical or social conditions. In such a situation, it is extremely misleading to think that medical success can be attained at the level of the individual alone.

4. It is incorrect to consider science and technology as panaceas for all problems, as independent and isolated from other factors in the world. It was observed that the majority of technological advances since 1945 have been consequences of the armaments race and that this race now dominates technological advance. It is true, thus, that science and technology are sources of power in the present transformation of the world, but they must be viewed within the full context of global power relations.

5. It was observed that, since 1947, the greatest overall growth in the world has taken place in the underdeveloped countries, and that this growth has for the most part occurred in industrial production, whereas growth in the developed world has mostly occurred in the service sectors.

6. It was said that the negative effects of industrial techniques are only inevitable so long as there is no social control over them. Also, it is necessary to take into account all aspects of transformation planning: e.g., it is absurd to promote schemes for "rural development" which ignore subsequent urban over-crowding, etc.


La maise de la vie: pour Quoi faire? - Pour rndre de mani pertinente areille question, il faudrait faire t de l'ensemble des recherches biologiques et mcales actuelles et des perspectives qu'elles ouvrent ourt et ong terme; montrer l'impact prsible des diverses sciences de la vie sur les structures nomiques, sociales et culturelles, nationales et internationales, en dger les implications d'ordre ique et politique.

C'est ln sujet immense que nous ne saurions traiter dans le cadre de cette communication. D'une part, il y faudrait un volume (nous nous permettons de renvoyer elui que nous avons publiux presses de l'UNESCO, Biologie et ique, dont nous utiliserons ici certains dloppements); d'autre part, n'nt pas biologiste nous-ms, nous n'avons pas la compnce requise pour dominer la question pos Notre propos restera donc forcnt modeste et limitDans une premi partie, nous voudrions rappeler sommairement quelle nssitt quels enjeux nous contraignent aujourd'hui oursuivre intensnt notre effort pour parvenir ne vtable maise de la vie. Puis nous amorcerons une rexion sur ce qu'est la vie elle-m. Enfin, nous formulerons quelques suggestions concernant la derni partie de notre question: pour quoi faire?

I. Necessite et enjeux

Certes, l'humanit toujours cherch percer le myst de la vie, 'organiser, voire a maiser. Mais, de nos jours, la nssite parvenir ne compl maise de la vie se fait sentir impeusement. En effet, d'une part, nous avons aire face es contraintes de plus en plus rigoureuses; d'autre part, les progrms de nos recherches et de nos duvertes, les nouveaux pouvoirs que nous avons acquis, nous obligent pprofondir cette maise, faute de quoi nous risquerions de provoquer des perturbations de grande ampleur.

Je ne m'ndrai gu sur les contraintes qui nous pressent de rechercher une plus profonde maise de la vie. Elles s'imposent ous par suite de l'accroissement considble des besoins de l'humanitu fait de l'explosion dgraphique et des exigences du dloppement. Ainsi devons-nous lutter contre les dangers qu'engendrent les pollutions de toutes sortes et maintenir en ilibre les systs, voire la biosph; nous devons dlopper notre agriculture et notre aquaculture vtales et animales; dans cette perspective, il nous faut non seulement perfectionner nos modes de sction ou d'insnation artificielle, mais aussi les manipulations gtiques, y compris le "clonage", et sans doute demain serons-nous amentiliser tout l'arsenal des bactes recombinantes ou recombin pour amorer les esps, les adapter, pour rnr et fertiliser les sols. En m temps, nous avons arfaire nos techniques de stockage, de conservation des aliments et, d'une mani grale, lopper l'industrie agro-alimentaire.

Par le dessinent d les liens qui unissent la biologie 'industrie. Or, ces liens iront en s'intensifiant, particuliment dans trois domaines: non seulement il faudra surmonter les phms de nuisance et les probls de traitement ou d'mination des dets; non seulement nous aurons ccroe le potentiel de l'industrie biochimique, en particulier de l'industrie pharmaceutique; mais nous allons devoir entrer rlument dans les nouvelles perspectives ouvertes par l'utilisation des bactes recombinantes: on sait, en effet que ces nouvelles techniques offrent des possibilitconsidbles qui laissent espr une transformation de l'industrie pharmaceutique (fabrication on marche produits jusqu'ici tronux - notamment l'insuline ou de vaccins plus fiables) et de l'industrie chimique. D'ores et d on peut attendre de l'activitactenne qu'elle soit utilises fins aussi diverses que la dllution, le recyclage des eaux us, la fourniture de divers types de soie, la production de mane, etc. J'en passe et des meilleurs ou des pires, dans la mesure ormement fait aujourd'hui appel a biologie. Il est manifeste que la recherche biologique se voit stimules par de formidables intts, impatients d'obtenir des rltats permettant de rentabiliser les investissements consentis, intts qui inflissent la dtologie des savants et la finalite leurs recherches.

Encore n'ai-je pas ouvert le chapitre capital de la mcine. Et l'on sait combien, dans ce domaine, les progrsont rapides et cependant combien il nous reste aire tant au plan de la prntion qu'elui de la thpie. C'est toute l'existence humaine qui se trouve drmais prise dans une fantastique course au progr avant m la conception, alors que se multiplient les examens gtiques prptiaux et les possibilitde surmonter la stlitdans la conception m, gr 'insnation artificielle et es dv c = e le choix du sexe de l'enfant; durant la conception, puisque se multiplient les interventions chimiothpies, voire chirurgicales sur l'embryon ou le fœtus. Nul doute que, dans les dnnies enir, les pratiques orchogtiques se dloppent: espns que, dans le m temps, les responsables sauront se garder de la tentation de l'eugsme. Par-dela naissance, c'est toute l'existence humaine qui bficie aujourd'hui d'un arsenal de traitements de plus en plus audacieux, prpposant une connaissance sans cesse approfondie des rtions et rlations les plus secrs de l'organisme humain et l'utilisation de techniques ultrasophistiquees: lncore, les promesses sont fascinantes, mais la tentation ne fera que croe de plier l'homme a mcine et non plus la mcine 'homme. Et cette derni remarque est d'une importance particuli quand on sait les prograccomplis pour lutter contre la mort ou pour prolonger la vie, progrqui ne sont pas toujours exempts d'un acharnement thpeutique suspect.

En ritbon nombre des interventions qui viennent d'e qu sont rendues nssaires par la multiplication de maladies en rapide expansion, tels les cancers et les affections cardio-vasculaires, et qui tiennent d'une part 'accroissement la longtmais aussi aux conditions de vie abusives qui sont aujourd'hui les ns et qui perturbent plus ou moins profondnt notre organisme, risquant d'ailleurs de grever le patrimoine gtique des grations enir. Je ne parle pas seulement des nuisances, mais aussi des abus de nourriture, d'alcool, de tabac, et de l'abus dans la consommation des mcaments, dont on sait qu'il prcupe de plus en plus les biologistes et les mcins, en particulier les gticiens. Se pose et rd le trgrave probl de la conservation du patrimoine gtique de l'humanitdont on sait qu'il se dade rapidement.

Parlant d'abus ou de traumatismes, il faut bien quer lement la nssits sommes de compenser les troubles psychiques de toutes sortes et le "stress" subis par un nombre croissant d'individus, incapables de surmonter les tensions de tous ordres qui s'exercent au sein des mlopoles et les multiples conditionnements nerveusement ouvants qui leurs sont impos Ici se profile tout un autre secteur de l'activitco-biologique: celui de l'intervention sur le syst nerveux et des divers moyens de transformer le comportement humain. Dans ce domaine encore, le meilleur est spr et le pire raindre.

On le voit, c'est tout le destin de l'individu qui est aujourd'hui capable d'e modifiar les progrdes diverses sciences de la vie et, par-deles individus, le sort m des socis et de toute l'humanitSi puissants sont les moyens dont nous disposons que nous ne pouvons agir a lre. Les progrms que nous avons accomplis nous imposent de progresser encore davantage dans la maise de la vie: non seulement parce que, parvenus n certain stade de progr ni les individus ni les groupes sociaux ne tolraient un retour en arri, mais aussi parce que nous sommes drmais engages dans une escalade de l'artifice. Je me bornerai sur ce th lopper trois remarques.

La premi remarque tient e que nous intervenons sur les vivants, vtaux, animaux et humains, en dt d'ignorances fondamentales. Les incitations ou imptifs qui pnt aujourd'hui sur la biologie et la mcine donnent lieu es extrapolations multiples, d'ordre thique ou pratique, qui tendent rnter comme globales ou dnitives des duvertes partielles et prpitent la mise en application des possibilitoffertes. Or, ces extrapolations et cette utilisation sont poursuivies alors que nous restons sur beaucoup de points dans l'ignorance du retentissement erme de ce que nous entreprenons et effectuons. Ainsi, nous connaissons trmal les lois, les composantes et les capacitd'adaptation rles ou potentielles du vivant, consid selon sa structure interne et dans sa relation avec le milieu. Dlors de nombreuses pratiques de la biologie ou de la mcine ont eu ou peuvent avoir (car les effets se font sentir etardement) des rrcussions dommageables. C'est d l'dence en ce qui concerne les systs et la biosph. Mais les interventions que nous nous disposons aire, en particulier celles qui touchent a gtique, sont d'une portbien plus considble encore, notamment si se dloppe l'utilisation des virus comme vecteurs mutagques.

S'agissant de l'homme, ces inconnues se redoublent, car notre ignorance porte a fois sur la physiologie mime du cerveau (uoi servent exactement les lobes frontaux, dont le dloppement est cependant caractstique de l'e humain?), sur son activitsur sa dndance et sur son action par rapport au mbolisme de base, sur l'rgence de l'activitsychique et sur son rdans la rlation interne de l'ensemble de l'organisme. Au mieux nous percevons quelques effets, quelques fonctions. Mais, en ce domaine, la plupart des mnismes et des causes nous appent encore.

Il s'ensuit que nous sommes dans l'incapacitpour une large mesure, de prir ou de maiser les "retomb" physiologiques et psychologiques, individuelles et sociales, de certaines pratiques et cela, au moment m ous l'avons vu, la biologie doit faire face es incitations et des pouvoirs de plus en plus pressants, qui la projettent dans une escalade de l'artifice.

Or, dans cette escalade, et c'est ma deuxi remarque, nous avons affaire ne exigence bien plus essentielle: celle qui surgit de la dimension temporelle. En l't actuel de nos connaissances, nous sommes incapables de la maiser. D'une part, les pouvoirs scientifiques acquint une portconsidble dans l'isseur de la nature et la profondeur du temps. La nature, y compris la nature humaine (nous aurons revenir) subit des modifications somatiques et psychiques qui l'atteignent dans son "programme" m: non plus seulement dans l'immat, mais aussi bien dans le futur. Nagu les effets de nos interventions ient directement et immatement li'agent causal. L'homme pouvait en luer les consences et rer sa conduite conformnt on expence personnelle ou elle de ses confrs. Aujourd'hui, l'agent causal, notamment dlors que nous agissons sur le programme gtique, est srable et sres effets par une ou plusieurs grations de vivants. Et nos interventions prennent un caract irrrsible, puisque, en cas de dommages aucune rration n'est envisageable (et, envisag elle n'atteindrait pas les ms organismes), surtout s'il s'agit de la vie, et plus particuliment de la vie humaine.

D'autre part, la vie est affaire d'ilibre, d'homtase, d'organicistD'odanger des interventions ponctuelles. Les mcins le savent bien, qui sont souvent contraints de compenser tel traitement par un autre, s'engageant ainsi dans un processus d'acharnement thpeutique, ou qui, luttant contre la maladie, sont parfois dans l'impuissance d'en miner les selles. Il serait aise montrer que toutes les possibilitoffertes par la biologie contemporaine induisent des processus de compensation, le plus souvent imprsibles dans l't actuel de nos connaissances, qui ne peuvent aller qu'en s'accentuant. Mais aurons-nous toujours le temps de compenser? Il en va de m au niveau du cosmos ou de la soci. C'est ainsi que sans y prendre garde (pouvait-on le faire) nous avons perturbt polluaint syst, ou que certaines pratiques, peut-e tolbles, sinon recommandables, au niveau des individus, ont modifielle ou telle structure fondamentale de l'humanitTypique et rd est l'abaissement de la mortalitnotamment infantile: c'est demment l'une des principales causes de la fantastique ascension de la courbe dgraphique mondiale, laquelle a induit la nssite graliser la rlation des naissances, mais a aussi accre phm d'urbanisation qui, on tour, modifie profondnt le conditionnement psycho-somatique des individus, sans parler des structures sociales, nomiques, culturelles et politiques.

Bref, la nssit'accroe notre maise de la vie se fait sentir avec d'autant plus d'urgence que, bon gral grnos interventions, m ponctuelles ou partielles, hypothent notre devenir et retentissent sur des ensembles.

J'en arrive ainsi a troisi remarque. Cette escalade de l'artifice, il est illusoire de penser qu'elle puisse cesser un jour. Que nous le voulions ou non, nous sommes engages dans un processus irrrsible tel que l'ensemble des rapports entre l'e humain et le biologique s'en trouve substantiellement modifiAlors que, nagu, nous nous bornions aisser e, parant tant bien que mal 'accidentel, nous sommes entraujourd'hui dans une civilisation du faire-vivre qui, de plus en plus, vise tteindre les caracts essentiels de la vie. Pareille transformation serait pleinement exaltante n'it la prpitation avec laquelle nous sommes contraints de passer du savoir au faire, en dt de nos ignorances; n'it aussi la propension de plus en plus grale e fier exclusivement aux prouesses et promesses scientifiques et techniques, comme si elles ient en mesure d'obvier outes les erreurs ou imprudences et de renverser l'irrrsible.

Culturellement tout au moins, les probls relatifs a santendent e poser en termes de "pouvoir", plus encore qu'en termes de "faire", dans une sorte de dialectique du possible et de l'impossible. Le possible devient ainsi le crit fondamental de l'action et de la pratique. Mais alors se pose la question cruciale qui est tout ensemble d'ordre scientifique, socio-politique et ique: peut-on tout faire, sous prxte que cela devient possible? Quels crits, quelle finalitonner os interventions. Intensifier nos recherches pour parvenir a maise de la vie: pareil objectif fait l'unanimitMais la maise de la vie pour quoi faire? Telle est la question...

II. La 'logique' du vivant

Rndre ette question supposerait que nous sachions ce qu'est la vie. Or qui peut rndre ette interrogation fondamentale? Nous n'avons pas cette prmption. Nous nous en tiendrons donc assembler quelques observations qui nous paraissent essentielles pour notre propos.

Il est un double truisme qu'il importe de rappeler au moment ortifice et la technique tendent rendre le relais du "laisser-e": la vie n'existe pas, il n'existe que des vivants; on ne peut pas dntrer la vie, mais seulement la montrer. Certes, la vie proc de la mati, est mati. Dans l'oc primordial, des polyms se sont constitues, au sein desquels sont apparus des anges mollaires. Ainsi ont surgi des systs qui se sont perp enfl combin Cette mati s'est trouvcod inform structures, rl Ce disant, nous croyons atteindre le principe de la vie. Est-ce tellement souchons-nous aux causes ou seulement aux conditions? A supposer que soient discern dans quelles circonstances les "causes" ont rassembl, des inconnaissables plus radicaux subsisteraient: entre les prndues "causes" et la dynamique instaur Or, la vie est essentiellement ce qui "se passe" au sein des vivants, de vivant ivant, cette dynamique profonde, toujours surprenante, en virtualit en lution.

Et voici que nous touchons e qui divise aujourd'hui encore les savants et qui pourtant demeure fondamental (y compris dans la pratique quotidienne, ainsi que nous le verrons plus loin): quels sont les ressorts de cette lution. Impossible ici d'der ce sujet. Cependant, impossible de le traiter. Je me contente de jeter quelques notations qui commandent les rexions que j'aurais aire par la suite.

Sans doute avons-nous onnae que, 'origine de la vie s'est constitun code, doyn programme; que, durant la demi-heure ovit la bacte avant de se scinder en deux, elle doit procr uelques deux mille rtions chimiques distinctes, pourtant ordonn, fonctionnelles et, pour la plupart, sentielles, sans erreur ni retard, sous peine de dturation, de non-duplication, d'nescente. Les biologistes mettent en dence la rigueur des nssitinhntes out vivant et l'euve de compatibilitue prpposent les mutations: elles doivent e assimil, rl en fonction de la logique interne, mris selon le code et le programme gtiques, sinon l'individu ne pourrait ni survivre ni se reproduire.

Mais aujourd'hui encore la question de l'lution demeure enti. L'expliquer comme la rltante du hasard sctionnelon la nssitaux dires d'un Jacques Monod), ou du hasard entnar hasard (selon les observations de Motoo Kimura), ondition que ce qu'induit le hasard soit compatible avec ce qui existe, c'est ne rien expliquer du tout. Et les tenants du ndarwinisme ouent toujours ndre 'objection classique qui leur est faite: la formation progressive de l'œil suppose des milliards de mutations sentielles, organiques (ne serait-ce qu'en connexion avec le syst nerveux), donc accomplies et sctionn, sinon une ne, du moins en trpetit nombre haque gration, harge pour celle-ci de transmettre la "nouveautainsi acquise (et intdans le patrimoine gtique) es descendants, et es derniers de poursuivre le processus ainsi amorce... au hasard... Si le "projet" de l'œil n'it pas en quelque sorte prtermintiquement et fonctionnellement, mais rise fa totalement aloire, il aurait fallu des milliards de milliards de grations pour qu'il apparaisse (ce qui n'est pas le cas) et une s dans la sction incomprnsible puisque le "bfice" de l'œil pour le vivant ne peut se rler qu'une fois cet organe au moins grossiment constituEt ce qui vient d'e dit de l'œil est relativement "simple" compar l'apparition de la sexualitqui implique une double se concomitante de mutations, appropri et synchrones (au moins au terme) du cm et du cfemelle. On voit mal comment apper e constat: il y a de la finalitans le "phm" de la vie.

Pourtant si "cela" est, artir de quand "cela" est-il? La position des finalistes n'est gu plus confortable que celle de leurs opposants. En effet, si le programme gtique s'av identique depuis les premiers vivants, faut-il dire que le "projet" de l'œil est impliquans le premier rassemblement de mati organique qui s'est mis onctionner, constituant la ou les premis cellules vivantes? Mais alors ces tnnements, gaspillages, "rat, aberrations de l'lution? Pourquoi la pluriformitA supposer qu'il existe une finalittout se passe comme si elle it au moins partiellement bloqu et seul le hasard semble la drrouiller progressivement. Pourquoi et pour quoi?

Bref, 'en tenir au "phm", selon la position que l'on adopte, la vie et l'lution paraissent relever d'une fin sans finalitu d'une finalitans fin...

Sans doute cette embrouille provient-elle de ce que nous nous reprntons spontannt l'lution comme une sorte d'avancsomme toute rectiligne, engendrpar un principe directeur. Mais n'est-elle pas la rltante de dynamiques diverses, y compris celle qu'que un Jacques Monod valorisant le hasard (ondition qu'on ne le tienne pas pour exclusive et systtique!)? En ritl'lution est oncevoir de mani systque: provoqupar un ensemble d'actions, de rtions et de rlations. Au quadruple plan des particules vivantes, des organismes, des populations et des rapports entre le ou les vivants avec le milieu. Dans cette perspective, structures et fonctions sont en oite corrtion, s'engendrant et se renfort mutuellement. Les fonctions introduisent dans la "logique" du vivant des "sous-logiques" (par exemple grossier, le dloppement de la mobiliti la conservation et a reproduction) ou des "nssit sctives qui, d'une part, "trient" les mutations (laissant tomber celles qui ne vont pas dans ce "sens") et qui, d'autre part, provoquent, par leur exercice m, des mutations ou des perfectionnements: on court mieux orce de courir. Mieux vaut parler de fonctionnalitinalisante que de finalitonctionnelle. En effet, "la fonction crl'organe", au moins dans un premier temps. C'est une mani de rir du syst nerveux, une sorte de prsion qui lentement "trie" et "exerce" ce qui suscite l'œil, et non pas l'inverse. Le fait qu'il y ait plusieurs systs visuels n'en est-il pas la preuve? De m il existe plusieurs fas de voler: tre, aile de chauve-souris ou d'oiseau; des morphologies adates ont invent tout au long de l'lution.

Dans cette perspective, ce n'est pas le hasard qui engendre la mutation, mais la "nssitinteure, l'organicitui suscite un autoperfectionnement, un renforcement et un affinement des fonctions, qui, eur tour, intensifient cette nssitt cette organicitTel serait le premier ressort de l'lution: la prnce en tout vivant d'une urgence de mieux-e.

Toutefois, ces considtions ne suffisent pas endre compte de l'lution. Elle est aussi propension "verticale". Le probl est ici qu'il s'agit de vaincre la nssitd'apporter un surcrode "programme" gtique permettant l'apparition de fonctions et de rlations nouvelles, confnt une organicitupeure. D'oa peut-il provenir? A mon sens, principalement (car je n'exclus pas la th d'un Monod, mais je tiens le jeu du hasard pour trexceptionnel et lui refuse la continuit de la conjonction avec un autre vivant.

Je schtise: isol une cellule doit se protr tous azimuts; accol, deux cellules n'ont pas e dndre sur la paroi oes se jouxtent; une partie de l'rgie que chacune consacrait a sauvegarde peut e investie ailleurs, notamment dans des transferts mutuels. Il existe un autre "mod": celui du virus ptrant la bacte, s'y installant ou ne faisant que lui infuser (sous rrve de compatibilittout ou partie de son "patrimoine". Accolade ou ptration: l'important est que le vivant se trouve informe mani renouvelle. Certes, de cette conjonction naont une autre nssitrganique, des fonctions et des rlations nouvelles. Mais un plus-e a pu ainsi apparae, quelque rgence.

Bref, l'lution "verticale" me pararlter d'une dialectique entre nssitt "libtion". Et le principe privilsinon unique) de cette "libtion", c'est, me semble-t-il, la fusion de deux vivants. De lient la surrntion.

J'entends l'objection: la rencontre et la conjonction avec l'autre ne sont-elles pas que fortuitement bfiques? Sans doute. Comment ne pas quer ici ce qui se vit dans le quotidien de nos existences? Rares sont les rencontres qui pour nous sont fndes, plus rares sont les es avec nous pouvons entrer en ile correspondance. Pourtant il me semble impossible de considr comme hasardeuses ces dispositions profondes qui font le vivant en attente de l'autre: d les biologistes connaissent des bactes dites "femelles" ou "ms" selon qu'elles sont plus ou moins capables de recevoir ou de dvrer une information (et nous pourrions reculer l'analyse jusqu'a constitution chimique des cellules: pourquoi la cha mollaire est-elle dissymique chez le vivant?). Autrement dit, l'ouverture 'autre vivant parainscrite comme une loi structurelle et structurante en toute forme de vie, aussi fondamentale que peut l'e, par exemple, la ntion du principe d'entropie.

Ouverture 'autre, attente de l'autre... Immatement l'on songe a reproduction. De fait, elle entre dans la dnition de la vie (par opposition a mati, qui se recombine mais ne se reproduit pas). Mtez ces lignes de Frans Jacob (La Logique du vivant, Gallimard 1970, p. 291): "Quel peut e le but de la bacte? Que cherche-t-elle roduire qui justifie son existence, drmine son organisation et sous-tend son travail? A cette question il n'y a apparemment qu'une rnse et une seule. Ce que cherche roduire sans rele la bacte, ce sont deux bactes (...). Toute la structure de la cellule bactenne, tout son fonctionnement, toute sa chimie sont affinpour ce seul but: produire deux organismes identiques lle-m; le mieux possible, le plus vite possible, dans les conditions les plus vari."

S'agissant d'es non sexu la reproduction s'effectue 'identique. La bacte se scinde en deux: un seul programme gtique se transmet; il y a permanence et quantification du m qui, sauf accident, ne disparapas. Deux de l'un. A perpitla bacte n'a, en quelque sorte, ni passi futur. Survient la sexualisation: une ROLUTION.

Il est vrai, je viens de le rappeler, que chimiquement se produisent des "comptrations" mollaires, que la bacte peut e "fnde" par des agents de type viral; qu'au sein d'un organisme les informations intercellulaires sont multiples. La sexualisation a ses archpes. Nmoins, sous ses formes les plus bor, la reproduction sexu m si elle n'est qu'une sorte d'phm, diff radicalement de la duplication bactenne: parce qu'elle est conjonction, recombinaison de deux programmes gtiques, elle fait de la diversitans l'identique un principle "essentiel": un de deux. Trois donn fondatrices apparaissent ainsi.

La qualitI> de la vie devient prminante sur la quantitl'individu le plus fort, le plus beau, le "meilleur" reproducteur gralement l'emporte; et l'ancien c la place au nouveau.

Le caract "relationnel" 'autre (et non plus seulement au milieu ou entre les parties) devient en quelque sorte polarisateur de l'organicitEntrent dans le programme gtique non seulement le plaisir et le dr, mais une multitude de signaux (olfactifs, auditifs, visuels), sans lesquels la sexualitchouerait: le sexe "appelle" l'autre sexe.

Qualitt relationnalitnduisent un incessant dssement. Ce mot est rendre selon toutes ses connotations. La maintenance est modulpar le plus-e: ne survit, car ne se reproduit que ce qui est qualitativement plus relationnel; ou encore, la survie du m est fonction de son ouverture 'autre partenaire sexuel, mais aussi (et corollairement) 'autre en soi-m, par le doiement des virtualitndividuelles. La vie connaen outre de nouvelles exigences d'organicitt de rlation: il importe drmais de pouvoir "faire corps" dans la diffnce, toute autosuffisance nt principalement abolie. La survie devient ec-sistence. Le vivant apparacomme le lieu ovie se qualifie, s'enrichit et le milieu onnent corps d'autres vivants. Il est passage de vie, bientassdsstrss

Nirabilia vitae... Qu'est-ce qui se passe? Abstraitement, rtons-le, la vie n'existe pas: il n'existe que des vivants. Il paraqu'au regard de maints scientifiques, c'est infantilisme que d'e "vitaliste". Soit. Il y a continuitntre la mati et la vie. Pourtant peut-on rire l'une 'autre. M si un jour les biologistes parvenaient nventorier la totalite l'appareil gtique, nter tous les mnismes cbraux, aiser l'ensemble des rlations qui garantissent l'ilibre de ces milliards de milliards de rtions chimiques qui se produisent au cours d'une existence, ils n'auraient pas atteint l'essentiel. D'une part, il n'est de finalit la vie que de faire l'autre rdument. D'autre part, la sexualisation le rend manifeste: la vie n'est pas seulement ce "syst" qu'est mon corps, elle est a fois tous les vivants possibles et l'entre-deux vivants. Un entre-deux, quelle "ritcela a-t-il? Tout au long de l'lution, les "systs" se sont complexifi affin pour ce faire, il a fallu que les vivants se conjoignent; apparala dialectique nssitibtion/nssitMais voici que la sexualisation en indique une autre: le plus-e rge de la relation entre le m et l'autre. Et l'lution se dessine comme une lente conqu de la relationnalitune progressive ouverture au plus-relationnel, outrepassage.

Non, ddnt, nous ne pouvons comprendre ultimement ce qu'est la vie, toute en virtualiten dssement. Nous ne pouvons que la montrer selon ses nssitprofondes, son ouverture sur l'advenir, sa capacit'rgence. Alors pouvons-nous la maiser? Du moins nous revient-il d'en assumer la logique: e cet en-soi qui ec-siste en l'autre.

Mais assumer cette "logique", oa nous mra-t-il? Il est clair que, au niveau biologique, il n'y a pas de rnse ette question. Il est possible d'entrevoir "comment" la vie prend "du" sens, ou comment elle le perd. Il ne nous est pas possible d'en dnir "le" sens, puisque celui-ci nous dsse par rgence virtuelle et ouverture sur l'alttMais alors, puisque le phm de la vie se doie rdument, et puisque la "logique" du vivant n'en indique pas le sens, ne doit-on pas chercher ce sens dans un autre "ordre", celui de l'intelligence et de la libertAutrement dit, par rapport otre question initiale: "la maise de la vie, pour quoi faire?" - le "pour quoi faire" relrait essentiellement des facultsupeures de l'homme. Soit. Mais encore faut-il que nous saisissions en profondeur ce que doit e et rd le travail de l'intelligence.

Ce n'est pas le lieu de dlopper ici une thie de l'intelligence. Je m'en tiendrai donc uelques observations ou suggestions simples, sinon simplistes et cependant fondamentales pour progresser dans notre rexion.

La vie est mati, l'intelligence est vie. A l'origine, peut-e est-elle la simple rltante de rexes - ractions et propensions, provoqu de l'inteur ou de l'exteur (la fleur qui s'ouvre au soleil) - enregistrpar nos cellules nerveuses, puis systtis organis(et induisant en retour le dloppement et le perfectionnement de notre syst nerveux). Il est difficile de tracer une fronti entre certaines cristallisations et les formes primitives de protozoaires, a fortiori de procariotes. De m les premis lueurs de l'intelligence sont indiscernables. Toutefois, s'agissant d'organismes complexes, il devient dent que la vie tigne d'une "crion" nouvelle, instauratrice d'un autre ordre, d'une dynamique qui la diffncie de la mati, qui informe cela m qui la conditionne. De m encore, les manifestations supeures de l'intelligence en tignent, celle-ci est d'un autre ordre que la vie et se doie selon une dynamique nouvelle. Certains prndent rendre compte de cette dynamique en l'assimilant au phm cybernque. Effectivement chaque neurone parafonctionner comme un ordinateur microscopique, ses constituants nt capables de recevoir des signaux, de les trier ou d'en ttre d'autres en retour, avec une frence et une amplitude modul par celles des signaux re. Sans doute ce "mod" peut-il e adoptitre de comparaison (encore que nul ordinateur ne recombine ses propres "circuits", comme le fait le neurone avec ses dendrites) pour rendre compte de l'activitensorielle, pour contenir ou dencher, en fonction de stimulations appropri, des programmes d'action gtiquement prtermin a rigueur pour "synthser" (a la mani d'un poste de tvision) les impressions sensorielles sous forme de reprntations, elles-ms reconstruites ou transmises en fonction des besoins particuliers (purement physiologiques ou comportementaux, individuels ou spfiques). Toutefois, l'intelligence n'apparaalors que comme une somme de rexes ou d'impressions. Or, l'intelligence est aussi rexion. Celle-ci suppose une dntration de soi, donc une vtable rlutions par rapport au rexe. Comment ne pas quer ici cette autre rlutions que constitue la sexualisation? D'autant plus que, nous l'avons vu, celle-ci "lance" la vie dans l"'entre-deux" vivants, brise l'autosuffisance de l'individu, le destine, m morphologiquement, 'autre, suscite d'incessantes combinaisons et recombinaisons, ouvrant sur du nouveau et sur la possibilit'une ntuelle rgence; bref la sexualisation arrache l'individu a sa particularitIl est possible de reprendre ces rexions une ne pour les appliquer a pensrexive. Indndamment du fait qu'elle semble prpposer une rganisation (ou une rganicitdu cerveau qu'il s'agisse du neo-cortex ou de la double rlation des hsphs cbraux -, qui ne sait qu'elle se doie dans l'entre-deux, qu'elle intensifie le caract relationnel de l'individu ne serait-ce que par le langage), qu'elle est incessante combinaison et recombinaison, qu'elle suscite du nouveau, qu'elle rend ce qui est virtuellement et rlement autre que ce n'est, qu'elle atteste que le statut de l'e humain est un vivre particulier qui ne saurait s'enfermer dans la particularitu vivre. La sexualisation est dans la "logique" de la vie; de m la rexion est dans la "logique" de l'intelligence. Or quelle est cette "logique"? Un e intelligent nous parase dnir tout comme l'e vivant: un "en-soi" qui "ec-siste" en l'autre? "En soi", car pour une part l'intelligence ressaisit les nssitpropres de l'individu; "qui ec-siste en l'autre": que celui-ci soit l'autre humain ou l'autre r sous les apparences, risu risable.

De ces notations succinctes ressortent trois conclusions relatives otre question centrale: la maise de la vie: pour quoi faire? La raison ne peut donner sens - cter le "pour quoi" de la maise de la vie qu'en assumant ce dont elle rge; elle doit donc en poursuivre la "logique"; 'inverse la bio-"logique" ne peut e poursuivie 'encontre des exigences propres de la raison (et d'abord 'encontre des conditions nssaires on exercice).

En deuxi lieu, il est emarquer que, si le phm de la vie n'en indique pas le sens, sinon comme passage et rgence en l'autre, l'intelligence aussi tend dinir" les choses et les es, les arrachant a particularite leur t, pour atteindre ce qu'ils sont a fois virtuellement et rlement; ce faisant elle dile du sens, sans jamais atteindre le sens. Autrement dit, de m que la vie s'exposerait 'antissement si elle se fermait 'lution et 'rgence, de mime l'intelligence deviendrait insenssi elle ne prrait son propre dssement, si elle se drminait elle-m en bloquant ou en uniformisant les conditions (notamment biologiques) de son propre exercice.

Enfin, puisque l'e vivant, ainsi que l'e intelligent se rle comme cet "en-soi" qui "ec-siste" en l'autre, une vtable politique (et une ique) de la vie doit viser ntensifier le caract relationnel, pporter un "supplnt de logique", modulant les conditions d'existence de l'intelligence selon les conditions d'existence biologique et vice versa.

III. Quoi faire?

Les notations qui prdent ont pu parae a fois trop thiques et simplistes du fait de leur concision. Elles nous ont semblndispensables pour fonder les principes fondamentaux qui nous paraissent devoir rr toute "politique" de la vie.

1. La premi proposition que nous formulons et rd s'inspire des brefs rappels que nous avons quconcernant la finalitCertes, nous l'avons vu, il est absolument nssaire que l'humanitrogresse dans la maise de la vie. Elle est pouss pour ce faire, par des imptifs de plus en plus rigoureux. Toutefois, une trgrande prudence s'impose. Car, s'agissant de la vie, nous avons affaire ne ritystque, au triple plan de chaque organisme ou de chaque individu, des socis ou groupes sociaux, du milieu. L'ilibre ou l'homtasie de ces systs est a fois fragile et dndante de nssittrstrictes. L'un des maes mots de la biologie est celui de compatibilitEn chacune de nos interventions la question du comment - comment cela s'inte-t-il? comment cela est-il compatible? - est essentielle. Et c'est elle qui est au coeur de la recherche scientifique. Celle-ci vise pprnder comment cela "se passe", comment cela fonctionne. Sans doute, pour ce faire, les biologistes sont-ils amen'interroger sur les "pourquoi" (ou pour quoi) c'est-ire sur les causes. Mais cette interrogation est inteure au comment et porte sur l'enchament. Nulle prpposition n'est ici de mise; l'important est d'affiner la connaissance de ce qui est.

Tout autre est l'application. Celle-ci se propose l'investigation des origines (par exemple de telle maladie) et la poursuite d'une fin (rem, amoration ou crion); le "comment" ne se pose que sub-semment. On ddera de faire une greffe et, dans cette perspective, on diera les conditions de possibilit Autrement dit, un jugement de valeur investit la ritune finalitst pro-pos Le "pourquoi" devient le principe de dnition de la vie; le "comment" rel du moyen.

Ces observations peuvent parae quelque peu speuses. Elles permettent cependant de saisir 'une de ses racines le malaise que ressentent bon nombre de biologistes. Ceux d'entre eux qui sont plutrientvers la recherche "pure" s'inquint du parti que l'on tire de leurs travaux; attentifs aux "systs", aux enchaments ou encore a "logique" des vivants, ils en appellent a modestie scientifique, a la prudence, ne rigoureuse critique pour relativiser certains projets ou certaines entreprises, qui ne devraient pas e mis xtion sans une suffisante connaissance de leurs tenants et aboutissants, de leurs effets a moyen ou ong terme. De leur c les praticiens et autres personnels voua la recherche appliqu considnt les dangers et les carences qui menacent les individus ou la collectivitsoucieux donc d'amorer les conditions d'existence, de surcromobilispar les fins tteindre d'urgence (et souvent presspar les employeurs ou par le grand public) se trouvent parfois contraints de se lancer dans des expences dont le retentissement, pourtant irrrsible, leur appe. A ceux qui les taxent d'imprudence, ils rrquent, non sans raison, que la vie s'explore elle-m, invente sans cesse de nouvelles formes de vivants et de subsistance, bore les antidotes aux dangers encourus, dloppe ses propres dnses ou s les moyens de sa propre proliftion. Toutefois, cette perpelle invention ne va pas sans drdres ni aberrations; surtout, elle demande du temps, ce temps qui, aujourd'hui, nous est si chichement comptA l'homme de prendre le relais pour accrer les processus qui, si on laissait faire la "nature", nssiteraient plusieurs sies ou millires.

Nous n'avons pas la prntion de trancher ici ce conflit de tendances, qui d'ailleurs s'intensifie du fait que les biologistes eux-ms, chercheurs comme praticiens, appartiennent es aires culturelles vari et se rallient es anthropologies ou es idogies particulis. Leur visse s'en trouve diffmment orient Nmoins, compte tenu de la puissance des moyens dont l'homme s'est dotil apparade plus en plus manifeste que, s'il lui appartient de substituer l'artifice aux al de l'existence ou de l'lution, de faire advenir ce qui demeure virtuel, il ne saurait le faire au mis des lois de la vie. Le point de drt oblige toute "politique" en la mati implique que le "bien" ou la "perfection" visne le soient pas sans un profond souci d'entrer dans la "logique" du vivant. D'ore premi proposition: Le "pourquoi" de nos interventions sur le vivant doit e rln fonction du "comment" du phm de la vie, pris dans toute son ampleur. Enont cet aphorisme, nous mettons l'accent sur l'obligation prudentielle de critiquer les projets de la biologie et la mise en application des possibilitqu'elle offre par rapport eur compatibilitvec les nssit("en-soi") inhntes aux systs vivants. Mais la raison ultime de cette rlation du "pourquoi" par le "comment" nous pararder dans le fait que la vie, uelque niveau qu'on l'envisage (physiologie, intelligence, libertn'a pas de finalitiscernable, si ce n'est d"'ec-sister", de faire advenir l'autre". Par leulement elle se perpe et prend sens, dans la mesure o "autre" rge effectivement ou virtuellement n "plus-e". Or, il ne nous appartient pas de prterminer cette altt

2. Il s'ensuit - et c'est notre deuxi proposition - que les biologistes, quels que soient leur discipline ou leur projet, doivent viser dinir" la vie plutu'a dnir ou a drminer (encore que l'un n'aille pas sans l'autre). Cette proposition, corollaire de la prdente, est omprendre par rapport a double dynamique qui nous a paru sous-jacente 'lution. Celle-ci, disionsnous, s'est poursuivie a fois dans le sens du mieux-e - d'un perfectionnement de l'en-soi du vivant, d'un renforcement des nssitet des rlations internes - et dans le sens du plus-e, de l'rgence es formes qualitativement supeures de vie. Il appartient, certes, a biologie de rechercher le mieux-e: parant aux dciences des individus ou visant atisfaire les besoins essentiels de l'humanitAussi bien la propension est grande dans le monde moderne d'obtenir la perfection en l't. Mais prenons garde d'oublier que, dans le domaine biologique, ce terme signifie la sclse; a limite, l'entitivante "parfaite", c'est la fourmili (du moins telle qu'elle est communnt reprnt, dont tous les membres sont rigoureusement conditionnet spalis de mani purement fonctionnelle. La biologie deviendrait insenssi elle se donnait pour objet l'involution, l'implosion, et non plus l'lution, l'rgence. Or, encore une fois, celle-ci ne peut e prtermin tout au plus pouvons-nous nous efforcer de mger ou de promouvoir les conditions qui nous paraissent avoir rendu possible cette rgence et sont indispensables pour que celle-ci se poursuive.

3. La condition prable et effet est de prrver, ntuellement de restaurer et si possible d'intensifier le caract relationnel des vivants, pour autant qu'en se conjoignant, en sa comptrant, en s'organisant, il leur est donne surpasser leurs nssitparticulis. Seraient ici eprendre tous nos dloppements anteurs concernant la rlutions de la sexualisation et la rlutions de la rexion. En ritil en va dans cette proposition de l'essence de l'e humain comme tel, dans la mesure oui-ci ne peut se riser selon ses attributs propres (son intelligence, sa libertqu'en s'ouvrant 'autre; et sans doute de l'essence m de la vie, dans la mesure oest un fait, celle-ci se doie et progresse dans l'entre-deux.

4. Mais il est clair que cette ouverture 'autre, lors m qu'elle implique pour l'homme l'incorporation dans la soci et, de ce fait, l'acceptation de certaines contraintes et rlations, connote le respect de la singularites individus. On pourrait fonder cette proposition sur bon nombre de considtions: par exemple, montrer comment l'uniformisation des individus conduirait n appauvrissement de l'humanitn abrasement de son potentiel lutif, en m temps qu'elle la mettrait en danger d'inadaptabilitPlus profondnt encore, il faut ajouter que le projet d'rgence, de libertst inscrit, semble-t-il, au trnds m du vivant, en tant qu'il en poursuit excellemment la "logique".

5. Enfin, il importe d'assumer la condition historique du vivant, m si elle postule une intation delort. Faut-il redire que la vie est reproduction ou, mieux, procrion; qu'elle "se passe" d'un vivant 'autre; et que, en fait, elle s'av lutive et capable d'rgence; que si elle devait s'arrr 't prnt de l'individu, elle forme de dloppement de ses virtualit el statut du corps social, elle deviendrait insens Et sans doute l'est-elle de prime abord, progressant aveuglnt et non sans aberrations. C'est l'dence. Mais il n'est pas moins manifeste - il le devient dans l'intelligence et dans le projet de libert que la logique qui la traverse "autorise" un incessant dssement. Si la biologie a pour objet de lutter contre tout ce qui dans la vie est carence (rupture ou dcience) de logique, confortant le vivant "en-soi", elle ne peut cependant la faire, sous peine de devenir elle-m illogique, en grevant d'hypothe l'avenir des individus, des grations futures et de l'humanit

Impossible dans le cadre de cette communication de montrer dans le dil comment chacune de ces propositions s'applique aux diverses interventions que nous sommes et serons amenoursuivre tant pour amorer et accroe les productions agricoles (et industrielles) que pour surmonter les al du destin des individus et de l'humanitQu'il nous soit simplement permis. de souligner que ces propositions, pour mentaires, voire simplistes qu'elles puissent parae, nous paraissent devoir revr une importance majeure dans les deux domaines qui sont sans doute appelonnae les dloppements les plus spectaculaires au cours des dnnies enir: nous voulons parler de la modification du comportement humain et des traitements eugques ou orthogtiques lia domination des processus de conception et de gration. Prenons y garde: trop souvent nous ne savons pas ce que nous faisons et de quelles hypothes nous grevons l'avenir des individus et des grations futures; prenons y garde plus encore: au fur et esure que les moyens nous en serons donn et ils le seront; la tentation grandira de normaliser ou de prterminer les individus: qu'il s'agisse des membres d'un groupe social ou de l'enfant que les parents souhaitent avoir. Ce serait une entreprise insens un formidable contresens par rapport a logique de la vie que de l'enfer mer dans des "mods", quels qu'ils soient.

La biologie devrait nous apparae de plus en plus, a mani, comme science du relationnel, de l'rgence, de l'histoire. Mais il va sans dire que la prnter de la sorte indique qu'elle peut et doit e interpellpar d'autres disciplines qui se donnent la m recherche (psychologie, ologie, sociologie, etc.); la rproque nt d'ailleurs souhaitable. Une approche complexe, inter- ou transdisciplinaire de l'homme comme totalitrganique s'av de plus en plus nssaire. Encore que, en dnitive, rien ne doive ni ne puisse e ici dnitif: il n'y a pas de science de l"'ec-sistence"; tout au plus peut-on en dger quelques conditions. "Ec-sister" en l'autre, historiquement, est un parti pris, une "logique" essaisir individuellement et en corps; mais c'est aussi une aventure. Il est vrai que spontannt (peut-e obscurnt avertis par les errements de la vie), le caract aventureux de l"'ec-sistence" nous rgne et nous angoisse. Partant, nous n'avons que trop tendance r a sction du mieux-e, de l'implosion dans notre ordre propre; ou nous en appelons ne science "exteure" pour prterminer cette "ec-sistence" (et donc la biologie). Tel serait le rque certains voudraient faire jouer a "politique", et d'autres 'ique. Il en est m pour souhaiter qu'il existe une Autorit Raison ou Absolu - capable d'cter des principes universellement et intemporellement valables. C'est oublier que si l'on pouvait exhiber de tels principes, ils ne nous seraient perceptibles qu'ravers une formulation humaine, donc historiquement situ qu'ils ne sauraient s'appliquer qu'ne liberture, alors que nous sommes libertncarn que chaque individu s'av biologiquement singulier, de par la texture m de ses cellules et de leur activit. Bon gral gril revient hacun de nous, personnellement et en corps, de nous constituer comme sujet de et par l'aventure de l"'ecsistence".

Oc nous mrait-elle? Se qualifier soi-m pour "ec-sister" en l'autre n'ouvre que sur une qu indnie, rdue de dssement. Apparemment. Mais en ritelui qui fait sienne cette logique acc au Sens. En effet, par la raison, que peut connae de l'Absolu celui qui a foi en lui, sinon qu'il est (dans la tradition judchrenne) Dieu Vivant principallement cet "en-soi" qui "ec-siste" en l'autre, donnant out e d'exister. Il nous revient de faire n ce Lagos: l'avenir, la fin, l'au-delous dssent.

I. Introduction - The darwinian and ned-darwinian systems

It may appear circuitous to commence a discussion on the problem of social development by reference to biological evolution, particularly as there are academic disciplines involving researching the unique characteristics of human society and social development. Since Darwin few have questioned that the human species and society spread around the globe because of biological evolution. Nevertheless, the historical position of Darwin should not be assessed in relation to his discovery of evolution; rather, it should be assessed, and highly evaluated, in terms of his having firmly established a scientific theory to explain the causes of evolution.

Darwin's theory of evolution was, self-evidently, profoundly influenced by the social ideas prevalent in 19th-century Europe. To put it another way, his theory was profoundly influenced by the entire socio-cultural fabric of a developing society. Hence, Darwinism has not simply been confined within the bounds of a theory of biological evolution; it proved a major challenge to social ideas, too, becoming a philosophy that powerfully shaped the central elements of modern culture.

The quintessence of Darwinism is that: (1) an over productivity of living things occurs beyond the possible bounds for survival, and (2) superior/inferior differences exist between individual organisms so that, as a result of the "struggle for existence" between the organisms, only the "fit" are able to survive. In the process, natural selection operates. In other words, the selection operation is left to nature. Through the developments of biological science, especially genetics, both Darwinism and neo-Darwinism are now manifest; but this fundamental premise remains unaltered. In the differences between individual organisms, only mutation due to variations of genes bears any relationship to evolution in Darwinian theory. In this sense, natural selection has come to be regarded as a major cause of evolution.

One of the unique characteristics of modern culture is the existence of the following phenomenon: on the one hand, there is a high degree of trust in the axiomatic quality of natural laws; on the other, there is an amorphous trend in ideas, an uncertainty regarding social laws, and a lack of laws to explain social phenomena. Darwinism and neo-Darwinism have both been shaped by the influences of a competitive society; however, when evolution or development based on competition i.e. the principle of a competitive society - and the survival of the fittest were established as natural laws, they were in fact accepted by society as laws governing society. Needless to say, nowadays such ideas have so fully penetrated people's lives that they are regarded as common sense. Moreover, that extreme form of Darwinism known as social Darwinism is at present being emphasized, and the ideologies of big powerism, war, and aggression in human society are being put forward. It is no exaggeration to say that people accept as axiomatic the necessity to win domestic and international competition, to become a big power, and to gain advantage over others through war, all under the banner of "social development."

At the beginning of the 1960s, the publication of Konrad Lorenz's Das Sogenannte B Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression (1963) set off a lively debate on aggression. Lorenz details how both animals and humans are equally endowed with an aggressiveness that may manifest itself spontaneously. Insofar as animals are concerned, Lorenz says that aggressive behaviour does not lead to the defeat of the other party, but rather becomes a bond of solidarity between the animals; thus, aggressive behaviour functions to maintain order in the animal world.

In the case of human beings, however, Lorenz posits that the manifestation of aggression leads to the killing of the other party and causes war. He then asks: Hasn't an error occurred in the function of aggression since the time man became man by the use of tools? This theory is behind the modern ideas that connect Darwin to Lorenz. It is aggression that lies behind Freud's development of the idea of aggressive drive, too.

The beginning of the 1960s saw the Cold War reach its extreme and, with the US invasion, Viet Nam became "America's Viet Nam War." The formation of Lorenz's theory of aggression and the debate surrounding the theory could not possibly have occurred in isolation from this historical setting. The debate on aggression which developed involved not only ethnologists, but also biologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists, and other social scientists. Without entering fully into the debate on aggression,1 I will simply make the following points: First, Lorenz formulated and developed his theory focusing on the aggressive behaviour of biological organisms and human beings. In this respect, the core of his theoretical construct is identical to Darwin's. Second, Freud's theory of aggressive behaviour was formulated after the end of World War 1, and, along with the sex drive, aggression was considered to be one of the instinctive drives of our species. Here can be clearly seen the impact of World War I.

At the beginning of World War II, a Japanese entomologist-ecologist, Kinji Imanishi,2 raised serious doubts concerning Darwinism. Imanishi proposed a theory of evolution based on a thorough criticism of Darwinism.

Before he went to the battle front, Imanishi wrote The World of Life (1940). This contains the basic ideas of biosociology in which he succeeds in developing a theory of evolution. Fortunately Imanishi returned safely from the war and in the post-war period has energetically devoted himself to research on animal society, social surveys of villages, and so on. In fact. during this period he organized and widened the scope of his research to encompass fields of study ranging from primatology to anthropology. His research cannot be considered apart from his experiences as a mountaineer and explorer, for they gave consistency to his theoretical work. In my discussion of Imanishi's system of biosociology, I will take all of the above into consideration.

If I were to suggest one phrase for Imanishi's system, it would be "post-Darwinian system." In contrast to Darwin, who bases his theory on the over-productivity of living things and variations between organisms, that is, the construction of a theoretical system based on the organism, Imanishi takes into consideration the historical and social nature of a species to construct a theoretical system based not on an organism belonging to a species (i.e. specion), but on a society of species (i.e. specie). His theoretical system is thus called "biosociology.''

The purpose of my presentation is to push forward the basic ideas of biosociology and investigate science and technology as the driving forces for social development. Within these bounds, I will comment on and examine Imanishi's theory. In doing so, however, I feel it is first necessary to touch upon another theory, one which approaches human nature and society in terms of neo-Darwinism. This is sociobiology, the subject of debate which broke out with the publication of Edward Wilson's Sociobiology: A New Synthesis (1975). As a technical term, sociobiology had already been used independently by John Scott (1946) and Charles Hockett (1948). Sociobiology can be defined as an interdisciplinary science comprising biology (particularly ecology and physiology), psychology, and other social sciences. Research covering such fields also is referred to as biosociology and animal sociology.

The debate that arose with the publication of Wilson's scientific theory again cannot be considered in isolation from the social factors present at that particular time in history, as we moved from the 1970s to the 1980s. Of course, for Wilson, the publication of a comprehensive compilation of research results is probably due to nothing more than pure research activities. In making such a compilation at this particular time, however, it is obvious that even Wilson's choice of a research theme was profoundly influenced by the social and cultural pressures of the age. In fact, if we examine the debate surrounding sociobiology, we find that it has been most actively pursued by those outside the original fields of study, for example, by journalists, intellectuals, social scientists, and others.

What are the present social and cultural conditions that lie behind the debate on human nature and its future development vis-is sociology? As we have already seen, behind the debate on Lorenz's theory of aggression was the manifest display of human aggression in the Viet Nam War. The misgivings, despair, fear, anger. and then opposition to the war can be said to have urged people on to examine not only instinctive human drives, but also the aggression that runs through the animal kingdom. The identical situation does not exist at present; in fact, it might seem as if behaviour directly exhibiting aggression has already been hidden from view. Still, oppression has not disappeared, nor has opposition to oppression vanished; it seems rather as if a complex, powerful, oppressive organization - one that is difficult to come to grips with - is gradually blanketing the world. Isn't this the reason why the path to liberation is no longer clearly visible? Moreover, many of the problems pertaining to natural resources, energy, the population explosion, and environmental destruction are viewed as being difficult, almost impossible to solve, types of natural phenomena. Simply put, these are the political, social, cultural, and natural crises of the modern world. Here, I think, lies the fundamental reason for the attempt of sociobiology to search out a means to solve these problems faced by mankind and society, because sociobiology is a coherent theory ranging in applicability from animals to humans. In the next section I will briefly consider the unique characteristics of sociobiology in comparison with biosociology.

II. Sociobiology or biosociology? how to view humans and their society

I have already mentioned that the basis of sociobiology is the theory of neo-Darwinism. This theory is based on the organism. Human behaviour in sociobiology can be seen to result from any of the followings:3 (1) The human brain, as a result of evolution, has become an "equipotential learning machine" determined by culture. In other words, the human mind is free from genetic influence. (2) Human social behaviour is constrained by genes, although the genetic variability that exists within humans has been fully used. In this sense, human behaviour is to a certain extent influenced by our genes, although each human being possesses the same potential. (3) Humans, as a species, are to a certain extent limited, although genetic differences between individuals are displayed. As a result, humans possess the biological capability for social behaviour and maintain the potential for continued evolution.

The above summary of the points made by Wilson reflects a debate on three levels, that is, mind, action, and genetic structure. However, common to all three is the tendency to equalize human beings. A question to raise is: What are the sources for development in neo-Darwinism which, as we have seen, places emphasis on natural selection, in cases where no genetic relationship or major variation exists?

Kenneth Boulding divides the genetic structure and process into two categories: biogenetic and non-genetic. In the biogenetic structure, both DNA and the gene play a part. This structure is connected to behaviour through the production of nervous systems. It is from here that instinctive behaviour derives; however, at some stage in the evolutionary process, the ability to learn is achieved. There also is the non-genetic structure. It is here that learning comes into play. These non-genetic structures and processes are not simply passed on from generation to generation: they also have the capacity to organize behaviour and make new artifacts. In the human species, such processes are dominant; indeed, it is the non-genetic processes that characterize the human race. And it is learning that creates the non-genetic processes.

Simply combining human beings and their actions does not make a society. This is the problem in the sociobiological approach to human society. Exactly the same problem remains even after the development of Darwinism into neo-Darwinism. Several of the ideas of the authors introduced here are in fact incompatible with neo-Darwinism. We can view this as an attempt to transcend the confines of the Darwinian system, although the ideas are still not fully developed from the perspective of scientific theory.

In scientific theory, we began research at the level of the elements composing the system. Except for physics, however, hardly any success has been achieved in attempts to try and deduce the nature or structure of the system. If the interaction is simple, a theory linking the micro and the macro is possible; however, in the case of social phenomena, because they come into being as a result of extremely complex relationships, the possibility of achieving a theoretical link between the micro element, that is, the individual, and the macro element, that is, society, is at present almost non-existent. Yet this certainly does not mean it is impossible in principle, since one of the unique characteristics of the modern scientific method, namely, methodological progress, might one day bring to light a solution to the problem.

In this respect, it should be pointed out that the biosociology of Imanishi is an example of a neo-Darwinian theory of evolution that approaches things from the system's level as with, for example, thermodynamics. Imanishi adopts a holistic point of view, In this theory, an entire system is simply part of another larger system, and, through the mutual relationships between these systems, each system becomes embedded in a hierarchical structure. The above does not simply pertain to what kind of system to adopt, but also depends on what a system is considered to be. Societies can thus be divided into single and complex-level societies.

In biosociology, which recognizes the existence of a society in any species, society is a universal phenomenon. In this sense, human society is no more than one example from among many. Thus, human society becomes an object of research for biosociology, which has its roots in two types of sociology: (1) sociology of the inter-species, and (2) sociology of the intra-species. The former considers geographical and historical factors; the latter, in contrast, includes the level of the individual organism and a society of species. The higher animals form herds, and the phenomenon of the herd level is related to the cultural phenomenon in human society. In other words, the origin of culture can be sought in the herd.5

Let me give the major conclusion of Imanishi's theory of evolution: "Congeneric organisms, which are the same morphologically and functionally, or systematically and behaviorally, must all undergo change in the same way when the time for change arrives. Moreover, as a result of these changes brought about by mutation occurring in all the organisms of the species, mutation improves the species's fitness to win." The path to human society, too, Imanishi argues, is of this type.

A species society is a society constructed out of the individual species's capacity to lead an independent life. In this sense, a society made up of those leading an independent life is the basic level of a species society. In a species society, for example, birds and wild animals which are taxonomically different form independent, yet parallel, societies. Moreover, among both those leading an independent life and those leading a group life, the necessity for raising offspring makes demands on some of the species. It can be seen, therefore, that the road to human society began with a society which supported those taking care of the offspring in the group.

To our distant ancestors who led a daily nomadic life, a life of constant movement would have been an extreme burden to females with young. If they were bipeds, moreover, the difficulties would have been compounded; indeed, the possibility of abandoning the young or breaking up the group may have had to be faced. The way to avoid such a crisis, Imanishi suggests, is to change from a nomadic to a sedentary life. It is quite likely that with the establishment of this kind of life, a meat diet came into being; that is, a change to a hunting and gathering life took place. Here the division of labour between the man, doing the hunting, and the woman, doing the gathering and child rearing, became the rule. As a result of this division of labour, Imanishi continues, a family type was established that necessitated the running of a joint, co-operative household. A local society held together by neighbourly ties then developed. Work, carried out cooperatively by those of the same sex, maintained the group and also allowed opportunities for new families to be formed.

Even if we consider this to be the first step along the road to becoming human, it was still a life completely dependent on nature and a single-level society based on equal relationships. When it comes to the formation of groups in bird and wild animal society, various adjustments are necessary and new behaviour patterns come into existence in order to maintain the group. If this is true, therefore, there is absolutely no need to consider group instinct.

Imanishi stresses the importance of sister relations as the origin of group life among higher animals. Following this way of thinking, it is possible to trace the origin of culture as far back as the establishment of the herd. It was through farming that human beings came to take a completely different evolutionary path than animals. What is of importance here is that farming allowed the production of a social surplus. In contrast to biological evolution, therefore, which occurred through a metamorphosis in the form of the body in order to adapt to nature, human beings evolved as a result of modifying the environment and achieving independence from nature. To put it another way, human beings evolved through culture. In fact, we can consider that speciation in humans came about through culture and that culture is the same as a species in the animal kingdom.

The most important factor in bringing about this evolution was the use of tools. Tools developed into technology; at present, technology is subsumed under the rubric "science and technology." The production of a social surplus through using this technological power led to unequal possession of the surplus and thus the stratification of human society. Between societies, too, it is creating at present a hierarchical structure" As in the animal kingdom's food chain, groups within societies or societies (states) themselves are appearing as predators. In this sense, human beings today are living in a dual hierarchical structure.

III. Three levels of production and consumption

So far I have outlined a perspective or framework for investigations human beings' production activities. First, we have found that any species, including humans, has a society. in other words, the. existence of all living things is a social existence. Second, in tracing the origin of culture, we have been able to go as far as the animals who lived in herds. Unlike evolving animals, however, human beings took a completely different path of development because of the social surplus which followed the start of agricultural life. In the background were the physical changes that led to man becoming fully biped.

Let me now discuss the production activity which animals and hewn beings share. This is the most basic of production activities, namely reproduction of the species. Behind Imanishi's idea of making species society universal is that of the need to achieve a male-female tat c in order to ensure the continuation of the species. Therefore, the period of leading an independent single life must be limited. In Darwin's theory the over-productivity of living things beyond the survival limit is the cause of the struggle (competition) for- survival and leads to evolution. If we examine the food chain in the animal world, however, a hierarchy exists in which the number of non-predators is greater than predators. This is necessary to stabilize the hierarchical structure of animal society. Needless to say, human beings are outside of the food chain. As I have already seated. however, something similar to the predator in anima; society has already made its appearance in human society. If we examine the population explosion from a global perspective, we can see that it is concentrated in South and South East Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

The countries in these regions are either: (1) countries that have been controlled, exploited, or oppressed by international predators (that is, countries that have conducted imperialism, colonialism, or neo-colonialism) or those countries seriously affected by these predators, although formal liberation has been achieved; or (2) those countries rapidly attempting to accumulate social surplus through an internal ruling class of predators; or (3) those countries under this dual hierarchical structure. I have no intention of distorting my meaning when I say that a phenomenon similar to that in the animal world food chain has now appeared in the human world. For human beings, too, if survival is guaranteed, the population problem will be solved. In this case, the guarantee of human survival is not a physiological nor physical guarantee; rather, human survival is guaranteed through culture. In other words, it is as an element of culture that physiological and physical guarantees exist. Here is a fundamental difference in the type of existence enjoyed by animals and human beings. If we are to attempt to solve the population problem, therefore, we must basically start by guaranteeing the survival of the people who live in the problem areas. Specifically, it is not because of overpopulation that poverty and starvation occur; rather, the population increases because robbery, exploitation, and oppression are carried out to the extent that poverty and starvation result. Irrespective of the type of aid that is given, it will be of absolutely no use in solving the problem so long as the structure of robbery, exploitation, and oppression remains the same; instead. it will merely aggravate the situation.

The productive activity unique to humans is production through the use of tools or, as we think of it at present, production activity through science and technology. It is clear that without production there can be no consumption; likewise, we cannot think of production without at the same time thinking of consumption. However, the problem I am concerned with is not what or how to produce and consume, but rather the role and meaning of production and consumption.

In the discussion which follows, a divide production and consumption into three levels (this is a special problem; that is, a problem of the sociology of intra-species): (1) the organism level (organism production has already been dealt with); (2) the social level; (3) the political level.

Let me first provide a definition of the political and social levels. The difference between these two is that which exists between social authority and political power. Social authority and political power generally overlap in human society; however, the problem is that a gap has arisen between the two. If we examine them in terms of origin, they are different: in animal societies that make a group, a distinct social authority exists; for example, a pecking order or leadership system. In the case of animal societies that depend only on gathering, however, there is no evidence of political power. Thus, the origin of political power can be found in the attempts to solve the problem of possession and distribution of the social surplus that appeared when human beings started an agricultural life. Those societies which maintained order only through social authority were still single-level societies. We can say, therefore, that the stratification of species society was brought about by political power.

Quite obviously, so long as no political power exists in animal societies, neither production nor consumption on the political level exists. In those animal societies exclusively dependent on a life of gathering, however, it is worth investigating whether production and consumption on the social level take place. Among birds and wild animals, for example, there are those who make nests and lairs, raise children, bring food to the young not capable of independent survival, and so forth. In a more primitive form of division of labour, we can see in this the germ of social production and consumption.

What gives production activities in human society their unique characteristic is production based on science and technology. We can call this culture. Such production activities are not simply limited to material production but also include the output of various knowledge industries. Moreover, production activities extending over a large area in terms of both quantity and quality become the force for the development of society through the use of the products (resulting from production) and consumption. The rate of evolution in human society, accelerated by production activity, already seems to be far greater than the rate of evolution in animal society.

Yet there is one example of a gap between production and consumption on the political and social levels. This is the example of the nuclear weapons system. Despite the fact that after World War II nuclear weapons have not been employed, the production of weapons is proceeding at a rapid pace at enormous expense and with an increase in both the quality and quantity of weapons produced. Instead of these weapons helping in the development of the producing country's society, however, they are actually impeding social development; their sole function is political. What must be recognized here is that these enormous nuclear weapons systems are being consumed quite effectively and politically. This is because weapons employment is not merely limited to war. It is in fact these systems that gave credence to the idea of a new kind of global political order at a time when territorial expansion and the acquisition of colonies is no longer possible. The perspective taken in the analysis of the nuclear weapons system is, i would argue, also of utility in considering, for example, economic and technical assistance and the transfer of technology.

IV. Needs

Needs regulate and stimulate the complex relationship between production and consumption; thus, let us consider the relationship between production, consumption, and needs. I will not discuss the distribution and exchange occurring between production and consumption as this is not essential to my argument, because whatever process of distribution and exchange is adopted, production depends on consumption for completion; likewise, production without consumption does not make much sense. Needs, of course, must be fulfilled.

How are needs to be fulfilled? Two processes can be suggested. First, there are needs in relation to consumption. In this case, needs regulate production; as a result, needs are fulfilled through consumption. These are needs in relation to quantity. Second, there are needs in relation to direct production. This means a demand for new, quality production; by consumption, therefore, needs are fulfilled. I would like to emphasize that needs have both a quantitative and qualitative aspect. This is because development is a concept relating to quality. More precisely, and quite apart from the conceptual level, there cannot actually be quality without quantity nor, for that matter, quantity unrelated to quality. In social development, therefore, we must grasp both the aspects of quantity and quality of production as a composite whole.

Another perspective on the analysis of needs is to consider them or, the same three levels as production and consumption. In order to achieve balanced social development, needs have to be met on all three levels. The following figure provides a graphic illustration of the relationship between political, social, and individual needs. The shaded area represents the overlap between needs on these three levels. However, things are not so Ripple - political, social, an,] individual needs have their own respective hierarchical structures.

Political, social, individual needs

As I have already pointed our, moreover, the perspective of this analysis is that of the sociology of intra-species. Hence, Spaceship Earth provides the perspective on human society - since mankind is one species. By the same token, if culture is regarded as the Sam as a species in animal taxonomy, then one cultural area becomes the object of analysis. (Here lies my reason for having stressed biosociology; it is also here that the main point of my discussion lies.) In addition, by taking this perspective, society on various levels, from the state to the community, can become independent objects of analysis.

The purpose of the above discussion was to clarify a framework for analysing the role and meaning of production, consumption, and needs. it is still necessary, however, in analysis of actual problems, that the analysis be carried out with respect to various suitable systems.

V. Science and technology as cultural phenomena

Production activities in modern society are being carried out through science and technology. To the human members of society, this means labour. Imanishi gives a biosociological definition of labour as follows: "The effect that living things make to support themselves is not labour. Speaking from the position of a self-centred organism, no further requirement exists. When effort is made to support others besides oneself, however, this additional effort is what equals labour. In this sense, therefore, until a situation arose in which originally, non-essential items became essential, labour did not exist." Why did such a situation appear? Imanishi continues: "If we hypothesize a danger on the level of preserving the species, i.e., that if the male did not support the female then she would not be able to raise the young, then we can provide an explanation for the origin of labour at the same time as the origin of the family." Hence, Imanishi regards that "the ape changed to man at the time that the herd changed to the family (even if there appeared no morphological and physical difference to distinguish between the two, there was certainly a revolution in the mode of life)," and that this "brought about a revolution in social structure."7

To Imanishi, therefore, more important than the origin of labour is the fact that it played a revolutionary role in changing the life of man. We may add, moreover, that even though tools have been produced and employed, and even though the development of these tools has led to the construction of the enormous system of science and technology that exists today, no change has occurred regarding the social development of labour.

Serious misgivings and disappointments seem to be spreading concerning the environmental destruction brought about by science and technology and the alienation of man from his labour. The increase in the destructiveness of war through high-powered weapons is the result of science and technology, too. Perhaps science and technology are actually working to oppress society and its people.

The Industrial Revolution in Europe led to the perfection of modern science and technology, for it freed production power and brought about social development. I would like to make two points, however. The first pertains to science and technology as the motivating powers for social development for all of mankind and as universal, general principles. The second pertains to modern science and technology, that is, science and technology formed against a European social and cultural background. This could also be called the cultural element in science and technology. It is quite natural that in the European world both of the above have been a co-existent whole, rooted in society. At the same time, however, it is natural for problems to arise when western science and technology are transplanted to a society with a different culture. In order for the universal and general principles of science and technology to become the power to bring about social development, it is necessary to clarify needs from the analytical perspective previously mentioned. This is essential if science and technology are to root themselves in non-western societies as culture.

Yet here, too, two problems arise. When we speak of needs, for example, no matter what level we are referring to, they are not simply those of which we are fully aware or conscious, but rather exist as objectively definable requirements dependent upon the state of the society's culture. Thus, the needs of someone who is ill are not only those of which the patient is aware; even if the patient is not aware of his needs, the doctor, through application of his medical knowledge of illness and disease, appropriately meets the patient's needs, that is, provides treatment. The same rules apply to accepting science and technology as the force to bring about social development.

The second point pertains to what I mentioned earlier about culture as a species. Living things are able to maintain themselves as a species because cross-breeding does not occur. In the case of culture as a species, however, the reverse is true; culture arises through mutual Influence and receptivity. While this is occurring, moreover, culture as a species is blossoming in areas which are maintaining and developing independence. From this perspective, we are reminded that behind the establishment of modern science and technology lies western societies' receptivity to Arabian science. the reason modern science and technology are not carrying out their ordinal role of providing power for social development and are instead operating dysfunctionally is quite simple: in short, it is the liberation of social productive power to an extent previously unwitnessed in human history. The accumulation of an enormous social surplus has resulted from this liberation of productive power. Even today, this process seems to be continuing unabated. I have already explained how the social surplus created a hierarchical structure in human society. This hierarchical structure has continued to operate oppressively in human society from the time of slavery. In fact, such a system is nothing more than a difference in the nature of the problem surrounding the control and possession of social surplus.

Of course, to say that the reason modern science and technology are not carrying out their original roles is simple is not to say that the solution to the problem is equally simple. In order to satisfy needs on various levels, the social surplus must be utilized. From the perspective of this analysis, I would raise two questions: First, is it too much to expect some kind of contribution to be made in order to free social surplus? Second, is it impossible to approach the solution to this problem from the perspective of science and technology as a cultural phenomenon?

VI. The turning point of social development: space and time

Let us start the discussion of the turning point of development from a comparison of neo-Darwinism and biosociology. According to neo-Darwinism, mutation occurs randomly. What provides the direction for notation is natural selection. In Imanishi's biosociology, on the other hand, living things must all change in the same way when the time for change arrives. It is in a sense true that this applies only to animal society, human society being different. What we must remember, however, is that coherence of theory and unity of ideas make demands originating in the nature of theories and ideas themselves.

Modern science and technology have brought into play enormous, high performance production power and have made high-speed transportation of goods and people, along with rapid communication, possible. This has planted the illusion that we can realize our thoughts any time and any place. This phenomenon has come into being, I think, as a result of the failures of huge social experiments. We can here recall the "experiment" of the American Viet Ham War and the huge social reorganization that took place in China during the Cultural Revolution, even if we disagree on an evaluation of the results.

At some time, a turning point in social development arrives. This has both historical and social characteristics, that is, the characteristics of space and time. The analytical perspective taken in regard to production, consumption, and needs pertains to the space characteristics of social development. I will thus now discuss time, then the problem of time and space.

The time that ticks by on a clock proceeds in the direction in which the universe is expanding. Although social time proceeds in the same direction as physical time, its passing is different. Historical time is of course measured by the clock. When we look from the present to the past, however, all of the past is, symbolically speaking, built into the present. The time built into the present-day structure of time is constructed in relation to the future; hence, it is not physical time, but social and physiological time.

In the Japanese language, there are two words which express future time: one expresses the future soon to arrive, the other the future quite a distance off. The subtle difference between the two seems to be suggestive of the kind of thinking about time that exists in Japanese society. Of course, this is merely feeling or emotion, but surely such feelings about the past or the time to come can be built into a theoretical framework. This is because in the hearts of the people who have effectively dealt with and controlled the turning points of social development or change in the past, whether they were aware of it or not, has been the ability to grasp the nature of the crisis. The point I wish to make here is not that we should marvel at the genius of the individual, but that we should question whether this is really something that cannot be the object of scientific inquiry.

As an example of this kind of research, one effective method could be to measure the degree of change in social conditions. We can think of this as resembling changes in material things. Water, for example, changes from a solid to a liquid and then to a gas. In this case, we can understand the change as a change in entropy. Needless to say, the decision on what indicators to use to express the conditions in the society depends on how the social system or change in social conditions are viewed. In this way, it becomes possible to grasp the turning points in social development when the time axis is indicated for changes in social conditions. This not only makes it possible to apply research to the past, but also, by following the passage of time, makes possible predictions of changes likely to take place in the future. In short, social change does not occur suddenly at one stroke; rather, despite the fact that it does not appear on the surface of society, social change shows signs of occurring before the change actually occurs.

We are required to consider two different goals in the case of social development. The first is to strengthen social organization and social order. The second, on the other hand, is to increase the amount of freedom, that is, to expand possibilities. Modern science and technology have brought about an increase in productivity through a high degree of organization of the production system; however, they have also made people no more than cogs in the production machinery. If this is the case, then, modern science and technology are working for the oppression of human beings. So long as an increase in material production and a decrease in work do not tie into the construction of a social system that increases social and human freedom, it is clear that modern science and technology, in their present forms, lack the power for social development.

In the preceding discussion I have done no more than point to a framework for thinking about social development. I will leave for another occasion the discussion of the measurement of changes in actual social conditions based on research. An indication of turning points in social development will also have to be postponed.


1. The author discussed aggression in "A Life Sciences Approach to Peace Science," Heiwa Kenkyu [Peace Studies] vol. 1 (1976), Peace Studies Association of Japan.

2. Imanishi Kinji was born in Kyoto in 1902, graduated from Kyoto University, and was a professor of the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies and Faculty of Science, Kyoto University, a professor at Okayama University, President of Gifu University, and President of the Japan Mountaineering Society. He became a Person of Cultural Merits in 1972, and received the Order of Culture in 1979. He is professor emeritus at Kyoto and Gifu universities. He is the author of Collected Works of Imanishi Kinji (10 volumes) and many other books.

3. Wilson, E. (1978) "Introduction: What is sociobiology?" in Sociobiology and Human Nature, Gregory, Silvers, and Sutch, eds.

4. Boulding, K. (1978) "Sociobiology or Biosociology?" in Gregory et al, eds. (1978).

5. Imanishi's two types of sociology first appeared in Logics of a Society of Living Things (1949) and Prehuman Society (1951) respectively. The former considers geographical problems and the latter historical problems.

6. "Against the Authorized Theory of Evolution" (1964), also in Collected Works, vol. 10.

7. "Prehumans and Humans" (1952), also in Collected Works, vol. 5.

Ljubisa Rakic

The ethical and legal aspects of human behaviour always coincide to some extent but they also always differ. To act in harmony with the law - to do something you are obligated to by the legislative power and to not do what is expressly prohibited by law - is sufficient for securing civil loyalty and civil tranquillity. The ethical dimension, besides this social and institutional dimension internalized by individuals, contains also 8 human dimension, a feeling both social and individual which can make us less worthy both in the eyes of the society and in our own eyes even in those cases when our behaviour is strictly in harmony with generally accepted regulations The physician is not rarely restricted by the regulations of the institution in which he works and whose facilities and capacities he utilizes in the diagnosis and treatment of his patients. If all that he does complies with the accepted norms but he does not do all that he should do, it certainly represents a burden to his individual conscience. Torn between rigorous regulations, the exceptionally great expectations of the society, his own human needs, his other obligations and tasks, and his own conscience, the contemporary physician is in the most complex existential situation, burdened with dilemmas that confront other professions. And what are those specificities without understanding of which one cannot establish the physician's responsibility In the treatment of patients?

It was Talcott Parsons who stated a long time ago that one specific and, let us add, rather neglected form of socialization of modern man is the socialization that implies also training of a healthy man for playing an undesired role, the role of a patient. The basic specificity of this role is that the society has not - at least not always - clearly and precisely defined the obligations and behaviour of the patient either towards the society or, which is in this case the most important point, towards himself. For the problem of the physician's responsibility presupposes his exact and humane performance of a definite role which can bring about a cure only if there is at least a minimum of co-operation from the patient and his surroundings. But that does not make the situation simpler in the least - even when legally the physician bears no responsibility, he is responsible for the state of the whole surroundings, for the existence of the cultures that are in conflict with modern medicine, with health and healthy living of man. for illness, which makes it impossible for man to perform his social roles in the manner in which the society expects him to do, represents not only a physical and physiological handicap but the limitation of man's creative capabilities, his human freedom which is the basis and condition of his human living (Marx).

Another specificity of the physician's role in his diagnosis, treatment, and all other forms of activity derives from the exceptionally high level of social expectations. Truly, such expectations (at least in certain situations) the society places also in other professions whose performance of definite tasks is connected with high risk in the preservation of the life, dignity, and moral integrity of other people or even the whole nation. That is the reason society shows a high degree of tolerance for smaller legal and moral of fences while it reacts very rigorously to any behaviour of the physician that does not accord with the social expectations. Public opinion has become accustomed to the submissiveness and passivity of man regarding his rights, to conformity and apathy, and even to pathological behaviour. But if the public detects the absence of sympathy with man in affliction, bureaucracy and formalism in the medical organization, it reacts very severely. It would certainly be wrong to advise contemporary man to show the same patience in waiting for urgent medical aid as that shown in the slow rhythm of work of today's administrators. The corpus of legal and moral norms regulating behaviours in medical institutions does not express the exceptional importance of medicine itself in man's life. A specific ethical code expresses also a basic social need - in order that the society can function, the behaviour and responsibility of the physician must be exceptional. And yet modern sociology warns us that the contemporary medical organization is nothing else but a functional part of a social totality that has common economic bases, common ideological bases, a complete system of values, a system of stimulation and sanction. In a society in which, to paraphrase Parsons, money represents a means by which messages are transmitted and all values are measured, the medical profession will also be subjected to these influences and measured by the same criteria as other professions, no matter how high its system of values is set. If in the society there is disparity between a humane man's needs and the needs of the given type of society, if there is a split between human essence and human existence, this disparity will inevitably be expressed in the controversial functioning of medical institutions and behaviour of the physician. But independent of the forces that are outside us, in the nature of man and in the humane character of medicine lies the intention of searching for chances to overcome ourselves and the situations that limit us, for higher forms of unity with our own nature and with other people, and this intention corresponds both to the humane and to the exact character of medicine. The sphere of medicine is an area of creation. It is not a passive consequence but an instrument of constant broadening of the sphere of man's power, his sphere of creation, and his freedom.

The specificity of the medical profession is also contained in special skills, knowledge of special techniques whose application in diagnosis and treatment is indispensable. But, as in all other fields, in the field of medicine also an explosive development of new knowledge has occurred, producing such a body of information that what makes up the corpus of modern medicine cannot possibly be encompassed by any individual's knowledge or experience. The constant development of investigations and the application of their results in diagnosis and therapy have brought about continuous specialization and constant narrowing of specialist skills, but it has also brought deeper and deeper penetration into the phenomena that are the subject of investigation and greater and greater exactness and increasingly greater efficiency. The naive mythology of the patriarchal society is gradually replaced by confidence in science, which sometimes does not even rest on positive and rational foundations - we doubt that nowadays there is a physician who has not realized that the expectations of patients very often exceed the actual possibilities of present-day medicine. But what is today beyond our power will tomorrow quite certainly become reality, so in this regard the modern myth contains in itself more realism than all the scepticism of conservatives. However, this situation, ethically and even medico-technologically, makes the role of the physician, especially his share in responsibility, complicated. First of all, In all countries that are in contact with scientific progress, regardless of whether medicine is socialized or based on private practice, in more serious and complicated cases the patient seeks access to first-rate medicine. The foremost medical institutions, university clinics and other renowned institutions, are objectively not in a position to treat all interested patients. Sociological investigations show that patients with more favourable social status, i.e., people with more education, income, and political power and with higher social status and reputation generally seek out medical institutions whose status is also more favourable. It should not particularly be emphasized that most often these are institutions of high reputation, well equipped and with an architectural appearance that inspires confidence. To tell the truth, one should admit that at many institutions whose external appearance, reputation, and even status are in considerably lower esteem, the treatment of patients, from a scientific-medical standpoint, is the same as in those institutions of higher standing. However, among medical institutions there are also those whose reputation is in accord with their discouraging appearance.

The material, technological factor is undoubtedly a limiting factor when speaking about both professional possibilities and the responsibility of the physician. The way out of this situation certainly does not lie in some administrative manipulation of patients but in the scientific, technical, technological, and personnel advancement of all medical institutions to a high level corresponding to the standards of modern science. The initiative which in this regard doctors can and must display will certainly be supported by all democratic forces in society.

Constant specialization, narrowing of the scope of work of specialists, the fact that a precise diagnosis cannot be made only on the basis of personal contact, knowledge, and sympathy, have resulted in a relationship between the physician and the patient which in itself expresses relationships between things to a greater extent than between living people. The present-day patient, if he is in a more complex and better-equipped institution, in many respects reminds us of production material which travels on the assembly line. "Undress," "Get dressed," and "Go to the laboratory" are repeated mechanically, data are heaped up, and the picture becomes more and more complete, but nobody knows what has brought the patient to hospital, what is troubling him, and even what his name is. Let us add that the economic factors demand efficiency from medical institutions, that is, rational expenditure of time, energy, materials, the greatest possible speed at work. The relationship between the patient and the physician has become quite impersonal, and the modern organization attended by powerful bureaucratic trends shows also in medicine a tendency towards "collective irresponsibility" among responsible experts, a phenomenon which Wright Mills revealed in the sphere of political decision-making a long time ago. Who bears direct responsibility for the wrong diagnosis or wrong treatment when in the treatment of the patient twenty, thirty, or fifty experts have participated? This is no literary fable - from medical institutions into judicial institutions are brought cases which even the best legal experts cannot clear up. Obviously, the solution must be found in the medical organization itself which, by using modern techniques and technology without which there is no efficient medicine and by observing the principle of economy of work, has to return the human character to the relationship between the physician and the patient. Not only the biological, chemical, and other techniques but also words, human attitudes, and understanding in the hands of the physician must become again the means by which health is restored.

These several aspects of responsibility seem to us to be sufficient to show that responsibility contains in itself also professional-expert dimensions, that the social dimensions contain in themselves legal, political, ethical, and psychological components, and that what we would call the individual dimensions of this problem have far-reaching consequences for the future not only of the individual but also of the human community. We shall try to define this more precisely.

First of all, what has been established in the medical profession is that there is a tendency towards high professionalism, towards an ideal of the expert who acquires a good reputation through irreproachable work. Although this concept is a remnant from the time when medicine was a trade, it contains in itself very important elements without which one cannot build the internal feeling of responsibility towards the object of one's work, i.e., the patient. This concept implies constant observation, acceptance, and application of the results of science and technology, and any instance of lagging behind modern developments, and thus also of ignorance and inefficiency, it proclaims unethical. Although this ethic takes for its norms the exact principles of science, it represents a very important accelerator not only of scientific progress but also of the humanization of medicine.

However, acceptance of this professional ethic, its intention directed towards innovations and modernization of medicine, does not solve the problem completely. All ethical norms, as a matter of fact, express tendencies in human behaviour around which the actual human behaviour oscillates. Where high professionalism in medicine is concerned, oscillations in the behaviour of the physician can be caused by objective circumstances which restrict or even handicap the physician in his personal development. It is obvious that for certain ways in which medicine lags behind we cannot solely blame the physician. In some environments even with backward technology and relatively obsolete knowledge the physician can play a pioneer and indeed a heroic role in the preservation of man's health. But both he and the social environment should accept neither heroism nor self-sacrifice as compensation for retardation and conservatism. Professionalism implies also criticism towards oneself and others, constantly attaining a higher and higher level. But this attitude sometimes gives rise to pseudocritical forms, becomes an expression of commercialization and rivalry, and leads to the destruction of interpersonal relations within the profession. Instead of constant improvement, security, confidence in oneself and in others, it spreads feelings of fear, distrust, and insecurity, and ultimately deprives the patient himself of his faith in the physician. Colleagueship and understanding which are as important as responsibility do not result only from ethical principles but also from the practical needs of everyday life.

Without underestimating the professional concept of the responsibility of the physician and the role which he has played in the development of medical science and medical organization, and which he will play in the future, it seems to us necessary to emphasize that he alone is not enough to meet the needs of modern society and the needs of progress. In addition to the exact dimensions of professional responsibility ("l've done all I was able to"), the principle of responsibility should also gain dimensions of responsibility to other people, responsibility to the community - not only the local or national community but a universal community in which the physician is responsible for searching for new and higher forms and higher levels of its unity. This conceived principle of responsibility to the community includes, first of all, the responsibility of the physician to himself as a human being who seeks his affirmation and his happiness in bringing about the health and happiness of other people, of the society as a whole. This conceived responsibility does not permit reduction of the physician's responsibility to the professional and routine performance of duties, to the separation of his personal form his social life, but expands it to a creative, critical attitude towards oneself and others, towards the society as a whole. Although these words sound very pretentious, medicine by itself cannot have any destructive pretensions, nor can it become a starting point of deeper social transformation. It has always been part of the given society, a functional part. But in medicine, more than in any other area, as through a prism there are refracted and resolved the problems of the individual, who is to the same degree strangled by the deprivation which time lag brings on and crushed beneath the advancing wheel of modern civilization. With the necessary ability to appreciate the pains, desires, anxieties, needs, and capabilities of modern man, the physician can become an important factor in the solution of his existential problems, which not rarely drive man into illness and death. And this openness and human determinedness of the physician, his critical engagement in the struggle to change the world to which he belongs, that entrance upon the broad social stage, and the increased load of responsibility can be equally useful both to mankind and to medical science.


Chairman: Guillermo Bonfil Batalla
Co-chairman: G. Pavicevic
Rapporteur: Vladimir Stambuk


Gregory Blue

The key theme which underlay this session, placing it at the heart of the entire conference, was that of hegemony - the predominant control exercised by one or more foreign powers over the principle forms of the social life of a nation. The struggle against hegemonism is the struggle of a people to determine its own future within its own boundaries; and, as stated by Dr. Abdel-Malek in the last intervention here, the major problem facing the nations of the Third World today is precisely that of maintaining their political and cultural sovereignty. As noted by Dr. El-Kholy in his opening paper, solutions to this problem hinge on the ability of these nations to generate social and political systems that will ensure the efficient utilization of their human and natural resources. Dr. Pandeya pointed out that success in the fields of science and technology requires the formation of a broad popular scientific culture.

The problem of the roles of science and technology in the contemporary world is far from peripheral to the general problem of hegemonism, and many of the participants in this session stressed what Dr. Vidakovic termed the mystification of their objective social functions. Dr. El-Kholy, for example, noted that innovations imposed by the authority of an external power are more likely to serve as means of increased subjugation and alienation than as tokens of some transhistorical progress. Dr. SiIva Michelena in turn observed that technological optimism is an essential part of the developmentalist advertising being pushed by transnational corporations to assure "developing" countries of their bright prospects within the capitalist system. Examining the significance of nuclear energy for countries of the Third World, Dr. Pinguelli Rosa illustrated some of the typical complications that arise when a heavy technology is treated as an object of prestige rather than as an instrument for meeting popular needs, but he also noted that these countries can ignore such technologies only at the price of perpetuating foreign domination, and he stressed the importance of building up national independence in an all-round way. Dr. Vidakovic himself considered how, despite various forms of scientific-technological optimism, the militarization of the contemporary world economy is dominating the development of science and technology, harnessing them more and more to the purposes of repression and destruction and thus obstructing the realization of their great potential for improving the lot of the peoples of the world.

In the search for alternatives, Dr. El-Kholy spoke of the practical rather than the theoretical importance of the Third World's following complementary paths of national and collective self-reliance. Dr. Silva Michelena called for collective bargaining by Third World countries in regard to technology transfer, but he considered the logistic support by the Soviet Union as the most significant element in transforming global politics today. Dr. Vidakovic, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of uniting people around the world to fight against the repressive and militaristic perversions of contemporary science and technology.

During the discussion an important exchange took place concerning the evaluation of various forms of power. Dr. Furtado stressed that since the end of World War 11 the economic potentials of the Third World have been significantly strengthened when compared with world levels; he thus thought that they are objectively more capable of building up their technological infrastructures. Drs. Issa and Rasheeduddin Khan, among others, emphasized on the other hand that those Third World countries which have not undergone a fundamental political transformation freeing them from foreign domination have typically less power to dispose of their own natural resources as time goes on.

Anouar Abdel-Malek, Celso Furtado, Hossam Issa, Rasheeduddin Khan, Le Thanh Khoi, James A. Maraj, Kinhide Mushakoji, A. N. Pandeya, and Vladimir Stambuk took part in the discussion.

Report on session IV

Vladimir Stambuk

1. In his introductory speech, Professor Osama el-Kholy talked about four basic topics. They were: In what way can we look for bridges to new solutions for solving the problems of science and technology in developing countries? How can developing countries use the knowledge and solutions which exist in developed countries? How should developing countries maintain their cultures and develop them? What are the roles of science and technology? Elaborating these topics, Professor el-Kholy suggested that one should relate oneself to the dominant values in a given society but underline that dominant values are not always those expressed by the government and the top political echelon. Much more often, the dominant values are discrepant to those expressed by the power structure and can be really found among the common people. We can look at the values related to development and make three basic assumptions:

- that this development pattern is desirable in itself and is suitable for our society, now and in the future;

- that its realization is possible to achieve nowadays just as it was possible to achieve in the past;

- that our own experience, so far, in following this path is encouraging.

Elaborating the second subject of his introduction, Professor el-Kholy stated: "Rather than swallow contemporary S&T as practiced outside our societies to dictate our socio-political systems alienating us from cultural roots, rather than let progress be an outside force beyond our control, we seek an order within which alienation disappears, or - at least - decreases, and within which man becomes master of S&T in our societies directing them rationally towards the goals of harmony and equilibrium with environment and resources; satisfaction of essential needs; justice and liberation of man's faculties on the basis of the positive elements in our cultural heritage; and not the dictates of profit maximization that currently prevail in international relations. This is the essence of self-reliance, reliance on liberated creativity and sound traditions." Freedom and democracy cannot be developed if we look upon science as a deterministic approach to knowledge with strict unchangeable laws. This kind of approach reduces human endeavours to oppression. If the term "scientific" is used to determinate people who are not laymen, then science is unable to promote free and englobing research.

Professor el-Kholy expressed his concern at the polarization of science and technology due to the emergence of big science and the R&D multi-disciplinary establishment. He talked also of the use of TNCs as the most efficient form of integrated techno-economic activities and the greatest promoter and investor in innovation.

Professor el-Kholy especially emphasized the importance of taking note of the deterioration of international relations.

The threats of armed interventions which are on the horizon bring the possibility that the 1980s will see a further deterioration in international relations in the world. That will have among other effects a negative impact on the further development of science and technology in developing countries. The fact that developing countries have not enough information about themselves does not help in the process of communication and collaboration among developing countries. This fact is becoming more negative through a situation where we do not have, in developing countries, an articulated theory of change and development,

2. In his presentation Professor J. Agustin Silva Michelena asked for what change is taking place. He stated he believes that man is producing his own history, but also that history influences what kind of men we shall have in the future. He presumed that the future is going to be some kind of socialism, but, in his opinion, the character of the modes of production will influence that future. Some elements of the future mode of production already exist today.

Professor Silva Michelena stressed that he believes we are nearly at the end of an era. The period which is ending now started after the big crisis in 1930, reached its peak in 1960 and now is ending, giving way to a new transnational organization of capital. This new way is characterized by two facts: the first is represented by the further expansion of a new social division of labour and the second in the concentration of means of production in the transnational. Up to now, about five to six countries have been included in the process of transnationalization. But, in the view of Professor Silva Michelena, more of them will be included in the future which will lead to a new proletarianization of the working masses. This will be achieved mainly by further development of the technology of management.

The multinationals are more and more collaborating with the local elite, composed of the new bourgeoisie, army elements, politicians, and so on. This co-operation brings a further deterioration in the fulfillment of the basic needs of the working masses. Professor Silva Michelena elaborated some of his geopolitical views stressing that the geopolitical situation of today has basically changed since the 1950s. At that time clashes between the USSR and the USA might have happened over Europe. The balance of nuclear power changed that dynamic. Political and economic differentiation, the over-exploitation of underdeveloped countries, and the fact that the USSR can increasingly give logistic help to revolutionary movements around the world produce a constant imbalance in international relations. In his opinion, Latin America might become, in the 1980s or 1990s, the Africa of today.

To further their domination, the developed countries' elites are developing a new ideology which is a revitalization of the "modernization" theory of the mid-1950s. The main core of this ideology rests on technology and science, on concepts like appropriate technology, which serve to increase control over the developing countries and not to promote better life conditions. What is really happening is that developing countries are treated as clients and not as partners.

3. Professor Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, in his introductory speech, elaborated the role of nuclear energy in developing countries using the example of Brazil. The starting point was that energy policies must be related to the overall economic policy of the country. in developing nuclear energy, ecological considerations must also be present. Decisions related to nuclear energy are political decisions. They have always to be understood as such. To demonstrate this point Professor Rosa used a number of data concerning existing and future reactor-building in Latin America, especially in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico.

In his view, Brazil should promote its nuclear energy for the sake of its future energy needs. But it is also obvious that Brazil is building today nuclear reactors for prestige. Hydro-energy has not been sufficiently used in Brazil. It seems that Brazil is using about 12 per cent of its hydro-energy. Professor Rosa emphasized that nuclear energy can be a part of the energy policy of developing countries, especially those which are poor in other energy resources.

In the lively discussion which followed, ten speakers took part. Three main topics related to the position papers were discussed. The first was what are the characteristics of existing societies and how can they shape technical and scientific transformation.

The second topic was related to power, its different aspects, and its role in the development of science and technology.

The third topic was geopolitical considerations related to existing international relations.

Part of the discussion related to the characteristics of existing societies was concentrated on the analysis of modern capitalism. Following the idea expressed by Professor Silva Michelena, a number of speakers underlined the fact that the role of the multinational companies was increasing in the cultural, scientific, and technological aspects of life. This points up the need to define what kind of technology and science will be developed by the multinational companies and in which way the developing countries should meet that challenge. One of the ideas expressed was that developing countries possessing a large number of scientifically and technologically trained people have not yet been able to translate these potentials into a force of transformation. The scientific community is not able to transmit new ideas related to development to the population. The existing knowledge today is less understandable to the Indian population, for example, than it was in 1947. There is therefore a constant need of integration between scientific knowledge and mass support, oriented to transformation, in the developing countries.

The largest part of the discussion was concentrated on the question of power and its role in the transformation of society, including technology and science. Five elements were suggested at the beginning as the sources of power: control of international markets; control of international finance; control of non-renewable resources; control of cheap manpower, and control of technology. It was stressed that developing countries can control the four first factors and are yet unable to control the fifth. To these elements, during the discussion, some more were added. Control of knowledge and information was stressed as the most important aspect through which influence is being realized over the developing countries.

Another element was added: political power; and a criticism was expressed concerning the control which the developing countries have over the four elements. Expressed opinion was judged as over-optimistic.

The role of politicians was also discussed and the ambiguity of their position between the pressure of the masses for solving every-day needs and the impossibility of leading political structures in developing countries to solve them accordingly. That is why politicians make deals with multinational companies and develop industrialized societies, in order to maintain their power. The multinationals, using the principle of divide and rule, augment their domination over developing countries by a process in which political structures have often been included. There is a feeling that politicians should be educated too. This education should be concentrated on political strategies, open to developing countries. Scientists and university people are not always welcome as advisers to politicians, because they usually put forward views which are not in accordance with the choices open at the pragmatic political level. In that context, the role of the United Nations University, as an objective international institution, was stressed and a hope was expressed that the activity of the University will be more intensive in that direction.

It seems that there are three possible relations in the promotion of science and technology between highly developed countries and multinationals, on one side, and the developing countries, on the other side. They are:

(a) developing countries becoming client states under the political hegemony of an industrial state, which facilitates the operations of transnational corporations;

(b) such countries becoming dependent on the transnational corporations, under the influence of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; and

(c) such countries developing regional co-operation as emphasized in the document on non-aligned countries, and discussed at the seminar as collective self-reliance.

The third relation is the more acceptable one, but has not produced the expected results. Countries which have opted for the first relation register economic growth without effecting much-needed social-cultural transformation.

In the dichotomy of the hegemony of economism, and the hegemony of ethical normativism, we have to look for a solution which will be related to the parameters of power. The problem is: How to undergo transformation but remain sovereign and creative?

In this aspect, the role of the state is very important. The topic of the seminar was not related to problems of the state, but its role must be emphasized in further discussions. Thinking about "science and technology," and the transformation of societies, we must insist on reality and the possibilities which reality is offering us.

The discussions in the workshop on theme 4 may be summarized as follows.

The disarray of the present world situation seems to offer - in spite of its being fraught with obvious dangers - a wider variety of options for the developing countries to establish better control over their future development. While admitting the existence of possibilities for transformations in social, economic, and political structures, it should also be noted that ensuing conflicts will be more complex and sharp and that the capabilities of the adversaries are much greater, qualitatively and quantitatively.

On one level, we see that in the long run it is the developing countries which have expanding markets, financial resources, non-renewable resources, and manpower reserves. They do not, as yet, command technology as a resource which might make up for deficiency in any of the other resources, and technology has become the main source of power - a fact that highlights the role of science and technology in world transformation.

On a more profound level, it is recognized that no one set of variables can be operationalized without addressing the specificities of each particular situation, of which there is considerable variety in the world today. The potentials amenable to mobilization in a situation where a nation has a long history of consolidated existence are quite different from those where even the concept of nationhood is new or inapplicable.

The specificities should, furthermore, be coupled with other factors in the international situation. There are emerging nowadays in the developed world allies of the developing world, particularly in the area of the production and dissemination of knowledge. The UN University can play an important role here, one that may create a conscience that triggers, later on, significant results. Public opinion in the North is gradually mobilizing against intervention through direct action in Third World affairs.

Attempts at regaining social control of techno-economic activities are thwarted in the name of economic rationality and efficiency and the adoption of consumption patterns that favour the expansion of the activities of TNCs in alliance with local capital and even state enterprises.

The importance of specificity can be seen also in the isolation of scientific technological potentials of nations and states and the fact that political constraints prevent the fusion into critical masses that would render D&T effective in transformation.

Rejecting the options of isolation or becoming a vassal or client state or dependent on TNCs, the option of regional joint action needs exploration within this framework, and complementarities, leading to greater national control and power, within the existing constraints. These aspects have been examined in considerable detail in the many documents proposed by the UNCTAD Conferences, reflecting the genuine concerns and requirements of the newly liberated, socio-economically backward countries of the developing world. The only way out is to generate simultaneously social mobilization for cohesive socio-economic transformation in each specific country, together with linking efforts for joint concerted action based on collective self-reliance - the strategy spelt out in the political and economic documents of the summit conferences of the non-aligned nations from Algeria to Colombo and Havana.

It has been stressed also that a new source of power is assuming an increasing importance: the control of information and knowledge. The international mass media are diffusing a world culture based on the ideology and system of values of the industrialized countries. Now, 65 per cent of information messages are produced in and diffused from the United States. The press, radio, TV are such powerful instruments that they are able not only to manipulate public opinion but also, as has occurred, to destabilize governments. The world information system is now an ideological apparatus which contributes to the continuance of the existing international order.

Special emphasis was given to scientific knowledge and technical information as important tools for the control of power in the world. Such a kind of control has been often used by the rich countries with the goal of maintaining their domination of the underdeveloped countries. In this sense, the role of multinational corporations is just that of control of the productive activities in the underdeveloped countries which have no autonomy to decide on their own future.

The optimistic point of view that multinational corporations play some positive role in broadening modern technology is largely negated by the effect of domination of underdeveloped countries in all aspects: economic, cultural, etc.

Science and technology related to the concept of development are emerging as a new ideology of modernization. It is a part of an ideological attempt to control the development of developing countries and is obscuring the real relations between developed and developing countries. The causal relations between development and underdevelopment are lost, and causes of underdevelopment are hidden to view. It is an attempt to eliminate the values of socialist revolution by the ideological concepts of modernization.


It is gratifying to note that, while the project "Socio-cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World" is fundamentally one of comparative evaluative analyses, it takes this to mean that "we ought to take action, as of now, so as to be able to devote a meaningful part of our scientific activities... to this major aspect of the project.''1 The focusing of our concern on science and technology, within this project which encompasses "all fields and sectors, in all visions, cultures and societal formations of our times," comes after more than two years of intensive and worldwide discussions in many parts of the world and within a considerable variety of organizational frameworks - including academic circles - in preparation for the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD), held in Vienna barely two months ago.

We will recollect that UNCSTD was planned within the framework of ongoing efforts to establish a new international economic order. Since the call for such an order was first sounded in 1974, we have come to realize that what is at stake is not just the "economic" order, for we are now used to talking of a new "scientific and technological" order, a new "information" order... etc.

It is felt that practically all the important issues relevant to our theme have been discussed in preparing for, and during, UNCSTD. Many profound analyses of the current situation of science and technology have been made from a great number of perspectives, points of emphasis, and ideological stands. There is probably not much to add at least for some time to come - to this truly global effort. In fact, what is needed is an exercise in analysis and assimilation of all this effort and a distillation of the essence of wisdom in it. It is natural that this work has been of an analytic and diagnostic nature. We do not ignore here the very detailed plan of action recommended by the conference. Nevertheless, we all realize that implementing this plan might well be considered a dream, or at least that the process of programming for such implementation is far from being clear and that it will be several years before any significant part of this plan becomes a reality of any appreciable impact in contributing to the transformation of the world by means of science and technology.

With such considerations in mind, I decided to give this paper a prescriptive - rather than a diagnostic - slant. I endeavour to propose a course of action, within the scientific and academic domain of the United Nations University, based on work that has been going on in the Arab region for almost two years now2 and which is thought to be of relevance to the global scene. Encouragement to embark on this course stems from guidelines for our seminar which deem it essential - if the world is to become a human community - "to have a pluralism of cultures and their mutual enrichment," so that "interdependence may be a road to mutual enrichment and not an impersonalization, a halting of civilizational development."

The starting point of this research programme was the realization that the role of science and technology in bringing about significant changes in society has been considered - until quite recently - as a "technical" problem that is dealt with mainly by professional scientists and technologists. It is true that social scientists mainly economists and some sociologists - have become increasingly aware, as a result of the disappointing outcome of development effort, of the crucial role of science - and technology in particular - in this serious failure. As a rather drastic oversimplification, we might say, however, that the social scientists are not well-versed in scientific technological practices, while the scientists and technologists are still rather insensitive to the socio-political implications of their activities, and even to the full extent of their economic consequences. There is an obvious need for an interdisciplinary effort that would assimilate past experiences, diagnose the present situation, and look further into the future and the courses of action leading to achieving desirable transformations.

We will not dwell here on the results concerning analysis of past experiences3 since these conform more or less with those that have come to be recognized as typical of Third World experience over the last 30 years or so.

It would, however, be worthwhile to elaborate on certain important elements in the characterization of the present situation as specified in the study, even at the risk of being repetitive.

I. A view of the problem from within

When used to indicate underdeveloped countries with low per capita income and industrial development growth rates as compared to western industrialized countries, the expression "Third World" should not imply that this state of underdevelopment has been reached independently of events in the other "worlds." These are components of the same system and such problems cannot be discussed in isolation from the nature of current problems and developments in other parts of the world.

Despite increased world-wide awareness that the majority of the population of the Third World has reached a state of underdevelopment that renders it impossible to provide for their basic needs to any acceptable extent, no recognized solution or course of action has yet emerged. The bankruptcy of the policy of "importing" development goals, theories, and strategies has been proved, both theoretically and from bitter experience in the last three decades. Although it is now recognized that the problem encompasses the whole complex of the socio-economic - rather than the purely economic - system, our knowledge of the operation and mechanisms of such complex systems is still inadequate.

There is a need for persistent intellectual effort originating from within and leading to a specification of objectives and strategies, as well as for the choice of alternatives. Such an effort should be based on recognizing the specificity of conditions in the Third World as a whole, and within each country, and on emphasizing cooperation between Third World countries, all of this performed within an international framework of the problem.4

In the final analysis, dialogues between "North" and "South," though important and necessary, cannot in themselves lead to solving the world's problems. The crucial factor here is the ability to achieve socio-political systems that would enhance the efficiency of resource utilization. Only effective forms of such systems could provide the driving force needed to start and sustain the changes required to overcome underdevelopment on the national, regional, and international levels. Intellectual effort plays a leading role in reaching such forms of socio-political organization and is the only guarantee of the rationality of national and regional decisions.

If our world - under the impact of the revolution in communication has become very small indeed, this should not mean the obliteration of civilizations incapable of asserting themselves under the present circumstances. On the contrary, this should lead to their liberation and to the creation of a suitable climate in which they could provide humanity with the full richness of their heritage of thought, art, and values. The solution we are seeking for world problems is a solution for the whole of humanity. Thus it can only originate in the experience and heritage of all civilizations and countries. This is no call for chauvinism, nor does it mean that theories "originating from reality" are a rejection of all that is positive in another civilization, or system. Rather, it is realizing that neglecting other civilizations - past or contemporary - or failing to analyse them deeply so as to reveal the positive elements in them, will only lead to more global problems and more underdevelopment and subordination. One of the most important positive elements in western civilization is the development of science and technology and the very close links that have been forged between them, while one of its most serious negative impacts has been the obliteration of other civilizations. I single out two points in this respect.

Cultural Identity and Life Styles

The "Interfutures" report of OECD recalls that Arnold Toynbee repeatedly draws attention to the unjust consequences of the current international division of labour brought about by colonialism and to the fact that the basic negative effect of the spread of western civilization over the last two centuries has been distortion and change in the nature of other societies. This was not the result of military-economic might based on science and technology, so much as the influence of values. Garaudy wonders about the way in which we may build a history that is not monopolized by one civilization and considers this as the only salvation for humanity. The fact is that submission to the pattern of western civilization leads directly to serious consequences, such as an alien elaboration of social goals. The role of S e T will become mainly the responsibility of those who decide for us our patterns of thinking and consumption and - to a very large extent, through inevitable subordination - our socio-economic structures.

On the other hand, the independent view of the future and the search for the positive elements in our cultural heritage raise methodological and philosophical issues concerning our ability to view matters independently. Dr. Awn el-Sherif, a Sudanese politician and thinker, puts the matter succinctly by pointing out that those who brought us the tools of the new civilization did not give us the chance to suffer the bitterness of change nor to effect within our beings and minds the necessary changes conforming with the new phase we moved into, so that what is within us would harmonize with what is happening without. Formal progress on the level of material needs for society was the means for entrenching the destructive dichotomy in the life of the individual and of society, since it concerns itself with the outer appearance of the progress of society and not with its content.6

Through naive acceptance of the superiority of the western cultural model, we have tacitly adopted three basic assumptions:

- that this development pattern is desirable in itself and is suitable for our society, now and in the future.

- that its realization is possible to achieve nowadays as it has been possible to achieve in the past.

- that our own experience, so far, in following this path is encouraging.

The simple fact is that none of these assumptions is true, theoretically or empirically:

- Dissatisfaction with this model is now widespread within the industrialized societies themselves. The signs of its disruption and breakdown, materially and spiritually, are now recognized by those who have adopted it.

- This pattern was based on a level of reckless squandering of resources and disruption of the environment, which is neither possible, nor nowadays acceptable.

- Our experience, so far, is that adoption of this pattern has widened the gap between rich and poor, heightened social tensions, and led to more dependence on and subordination to the developed world, with grave political consequences that threaten world peace.

The nature of scientific-technological activity and the role assigned to science and technology are predetermined by the development pattern and life style we choose. Adopting the western model means that national effort will be restricted to importing foreign technology with its ready-made solutions developed by a far superior technological potential for the satisfaction of the social demand of goods and services that form the material basis of this life style. National S & T effort will be geared to the needs of the elite, and it stands no chance of competing with the developed world in this race. At best, our scientists and technologists will be called upon to participate in some adaptive effort or, in the extreme, to imitate the production techniques that provide these goods. There is only one viable option open to them, viz., to become integrated within the framework of a transnational corporation, at the latter's terms.

Should we, however, decide to search for alternative life styles, S & T's function will fundamentally change and its role will be to provide the technology needed to bring about the alternative styles we may choose, since none of these is available today in the developed world nor are such styles likely to interest the developed world commercially.

Rather than allow contemporary S e T as practiced outside our societies to dictate our socio-political systems and alienate us from our cultural roots, rather than let "progress" be an outside force beyond our control, we seek an order within which alienation disappears, or, at least, decreases, and within which man becomes the master of 5 & T in our societies, directing them rationally toward harmony and equilibrium with environment and resources, satisfaction of essential needs, justice, and liberation of man's faculties on the basis of the positive elements in our cultural heritage and not the dictates of profit maximization that currently prevail in international relations. This is the essence of self-reliance, reliance on liberated creativity and sound traditions. We could then speak of technology exchange as practiced nowadays between the developed countries, rather than unidirectional transfer from the centre to the periphery.

Technological self-reliance has been characterized as the autonomous capacity to:

- formulate policies and draft and implement national plans (ordering national priorities - mobilizing resources - achieving consensus and conviction).

- make appropriate technological choices (exercise well-informed social control over technology).

- change and adapt imported technology (on the basis of systematic analysis of national as well as foreign experiences).

- exploit imported technology effectively (as judged by socio-economic criteria).

- innovate and deal effectively - whether as buyer or seller - in the world technology market to the economic advantage of the country itself.

- maintain a national cultural identity while dealing with the outside world.

Freedom and Democracy

If we agree that an Independent point of view and creative ability are necessary departure points for original patterns of development, then the issue of freedom of thought and of research and development has to be faced squarely and analysed in depth.

We are not seeking the return to a glory that has vanished. Such romantic ideas, usually tinged with sanctification of the past, make our societies museums of culture and lead to extremist and reactionary concepts that ignore the weaknesses and defects that led to the passing away of these golden ages. Creative thinking that is serious, profound, and of a high standard can only thrive in an atmosphere of freedom that encourages exploring the unknown and generating the new which may be a challenge to prevailing values and traditions.

We cannot help admitting here that the prevailing intellectual climate is not conducive to the liberation and free interaction of creative thinking.9 Development that is not a copy of another model, nor a slave to it, is bound to be the conscious effort of an educated and well-informed society, enjoying freedom of thought and expression, unfettered by pseudo-religious obscurantism and intellectual bigotry.

It is interesting to note here that such obscurantism and bigotry are usually veiled by the promotion throughout society of a view of science as a deterministic discovery of ultimate and immutable truths and not as an endeavour to understand better the world we live in. This "magical" view of science, in a stagnant autocratic society, leads to intellectual oppression and manipulation of public opinion. The label "scientific" is used as the means for validating the views and values of the power groups in society. It becomes the justification for suppressing the opinions and views of the "layman" and the "extremist," which are, by definition, "unscientific." Consequently, they are barred from discussion and involvement in the decision-making process. Let it be stated clearly here that what is at stake now is freedom for the whole of society to participate in the decision-making process and not simply a legal or formal definition of the rights of man, commendable and desirable as these may be.

Coupled with this, we meet an adulation and blind faith in technology's achievements, which are presented as great victories of the human mind and man's endeavour to master nature. This masks the hidden forces that have motivated such developments and the physical and social problems and disruption they bring about, and presents technology as a disinterested and disembodied activity worthy of admiration. It renders acquisition of the products of modern technology synonymous with progress. Even in the field of armaments, technology is depicted in euphemistic language and breath-taking glamour that hide the ugly face of death and destruction it brings with it.

Thus, integration of social and physical sciences with technology becomes an urgent need. Technological activity has to be viewed as, essentially, social action involving the whole of society. The issue of scientific freedom now becomes particularly crucial for the social sciences, since they often clash with vested interests in society.

II. The view from without

I now conclude this quick and selective characterization of the view from within by underscoring certain elements of the science and technology scene in the developed world, since we consider "First," "Second," and "Third" Worlds as components of the same system (p. 4) and since problems in one cannot be discussed in isolation from those in other parts of the world. I will now list briefly those elements thought to be of particular relevance to my next discussion.

First are the conflicting views of S e T as a promise and a threat. I cite here two considerations that have a direct impact on the scientists on the periphery, on their attitude to their own societies, and on the general public itself. First, there is the desperate stand - in the face of the devastating onslaught of social scientists - by some natural scientists who still maintain that theirs is a neutral and dispassionate pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and who disclaim any social responsibility for the consequences of their actions. Next comes the crippling distortion of S e T activities particularly in developing countries - under the pressure of so-called "defence" requirements. The proper order of national priorities is no longer reflected in such activities, and a very unhealthy and self defeating stratification is imposed on the S e T system. An elite now enjoys better working and living conditions, and, imprisoned within false security considerations, is now separated from the bulk of its own community. The latter is deprived of the tools of the trade, the satisfaction of active involvement in an effective manner in national development, and, finally, a reasonably good life. This is but a reflection of the astronomical rise in expenditures in the centre on R e D for military and "security" purposes. This, together with the seemingly endless build-up of more arms of continuously increasing complexity and sophistication, has siphoned hundreds of billions of dollars away from "transforming the world" through the application of available scientific knowledge and technological know-how and from financing further effort where it is most needed.

Next comes the emergence of "big science" and the large-scale, multidisciplinary R e D establishment that is very expensive to establish and to run, but also cost-effective within the organizational framework of industrialized societies. This has resulted in extreme polarization of S e T activity and its concentration in the centre, bringing with it a whole string of critical problems for the periphery.

There also is the rise of the transnational corporation as the most efficient form of integrated techno-economic activity and the main investor and promoter of technological innovation. The serious asymmetries in dealings with TNCs have been analysed extensively. However, the latent contradictions between their interests and those of their mother countries are beginning to emerge and are receiving more attention now.

Next is the emergence of global problems that call for world-wide analysis and treatment. Deterioration of the environment, the threat of drastic changes in climatic conditions, scarcity of resources (ranging from water to energy sources), and space exploration are all problems that transcend national and regional organizational frameworks of S e T and will, in all probability, bring about new forms of international co-operative effort. It is important that such forms do not exclude or discriminate against the periphery.

Two more points are to be made. The first concerns a growing feeling that practically all Third World initiatives to transform the prevailing world order have been thwarted and frustrated. One could almost go as far as saying that they have boomeranged and in the near future are most likely to become the means for entrenching dependence and subordination.

This calls for some elaboration. The Group of 77, as the representative of the Third World in the United Nations system, has come to rally around a number of causes in which they see the way out of the present situation of technological dependence and asymmetric relations with the industrialized world. Prominent among these are the efforts to modify the Paris Convention of 1883 governing the patent system, and the call for an international code of conduct for technology transfer pioneered by Pugwash and now actively negotiated in UNCTAD. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that building a base of heavy industry for example, metallurgical and petrochemical - and the development of engineering industries (the so-called industrializing industries) and national constancy services are recommended courses of action for building up indigenous technological capabilities that would eventually break through the tight grip of technological dependence of the centre.

There is growing concern nowadays10 that revision of the patent system would lead to more subtle ways of protection and avoid unnecessary conflicts. An internationally recognized code of conduct for the transfer of technology would considerably help the TNCs in long-term planning of their world-wide activities without some of the high risk levels involved in their operations nowadays in certain parts of the world. Contrary to original expectations, this would weaken the bargaining position of developing countries. Even the building of indigenous technological capabilities along the lines mentioned above might well lead to further qualitative intensification of technological dependence and subordination by increasingly monopolizing the decisive elements of R e D, engineering, finance, maintenance, and so on, leaving developing countries with control over the relatively low levels of the productive system.

The second and last point in this section stems from a strong temptation, if not a conviction, of the necessity of drawing attention to the rather bleak political prospects the eighties seem to bring with them. The dialogue between "North" and "South's is grinding to a halt and is now replaced by confrontation and open threats to use force to settle global problems. While the West seems incapable, or unwilling due to internal conflicts of interest, to grapple effectively with inflation and energy problems, the socialist camp is divided and at war. Dnte has been degraded, and the price for SALT II seems to be more armaments. Local wars have become daily occurrences in the Third World. Any serious attempt at transforming the world and any prescription for action must analyse these symptoms, take full account of them, and look beyond them to future long-term global prospects.

III. Toward a clearer definition of the role of science and technology in transformation

The last decade witnessed an increasing interest in prospective studies under the influence of the threats of global problems such as food and energy shortages, discrepancies in growth and income in different parts of the world, and environmental deterioration. Experience with these studies has emphasized the suitability of the regional approach. Within the Arab region, studies were carried out both on a sectoral basis (population, food, industry, energy, and so on) and for the prospects of economic development. In almost all of these studies a view of the role of S e T in development is tacitly assumed.

Appendix 1 outlines a multidisciplinary and systematic approach for understanding and influencing the processes of transformation and, hence, for a clearer definition of the role science and technology should play in bringing about a basic transformation that would permit realization of the objectives referred to in the previous sections.11

This rests on five basic considerations:

1. The search for complementarities and bridges that are acceptable to the parties concerned.

2. An alertness to the pitfalls of attempting to bridge unbridgeable gaps, that is, an insistence on internal consistency of the options presented - a requirement that is sadly absent now in a good deal of loose thinking and some romantic proposals for directing transformation.

3. An awareness of the realities of the world in which we live and of the political situation.

4. An insistence on maintaining our cultural identity and heritage, which is thought to have positive value in bringing about a desirable transformation.

5. A specific concern with the role of S e T in transformation perhaps with more emphasis on the latter. Another consideration is that in the majority of cases there is an obvious shortage of data and information on many decisive issues. Particularly absent are an accurate assessment of the scientific technological potential (now and in the future), a clear definition of the existing and possible future relations between science, technology, and production, as the three basic elements of the technology sub-system, and the other elements of the overall socioeconomic system, as well as its interactions with the rest of the world (the flow of ideas, values, scientific knowledge, technological know-how, end the influx of foreign capital, goods, and services).12

Apart from this serious lack of specific and reliable information on basic issues and our still inadequate knowledge of the operation and mechanisms of the complex socio-economic political systems (p. 270), there also is the lack of a clear definition of social objectives and development patterns. Under such circumstances, a scientific effort to help map the future must consider more than one alternative (or scenario) and ensure that these are at least internally consistent and possible13 - two conditions that are often lacking in emotional and loose thinking about the future. Specifying a limited number of consistent and probable scenarios, rasher than cumbersome models that call for a multitude of non-existent data, will thus reduce the amount of information called for and leave the choice of a clear stand on the multitude of issues and questions involved, which form a societal policy decision, to a later stage when internal contradictions have been removed.

It is needless to emphasize here that all this hinges on a theory of the sequence of development stages, and the international division of labour, so as to ensure the consistency of social and economic factors as well as of the conditions inherent in the scenarios. Such theories exist and differ appreciably. They generally fall between two opposing views. Stated in very general terms, the first sees the problem as one of backwardness, primitiveness of economic structures, and low return of labour. This leads straight to adoption of technological solutions concerned with the importation of modern technology compatible with cultural development in the West and hence to adoption of the West's consumption patterns. It then concentrates on favourable contractual conditions or optimum adaptation procedures. The other sees the historical development of colonialism, subordination, monopolistic practices, and economic penetration as the cause of the alienation of human labour from the technological environment. The economic structures that were originally dedicated to satisfying the needs of the citizenry have been distorted to comply with production and consumption needs from without and to operate to the advantage of the stronger colonialist power. This prompts the search for technological solutions that would end this alienation through a new economic structure capable of satisfying, first, the basic needs of the whole population.

Once more, we see that the role of S e T in transformation depends on objectives for the future, the definition of which has to be guided by a theory and a concept of development. Three basic scenarios, each representing an integrated and consistent alternative, were chosen as indicators of the overall picture of the socio-economic system and from which, or from combinations of which, a clear definition of the role and content of technological activity can be deduced as society moves from one to the other.

1. The "consumer" society. This adopts a cultural and consumption pattern derived from the "western" model, and in it technology is imported according to the criteria of commercial profitability of certain groups in society. A primitive economic structure would still prevail, as well as the phenomena of the "extended" family and the weak local market. Some improvement in living standards could be achieved by exporting raw materials and primary goods based on production processes involving a rather low level of division of labour.

2. The "productive" society. In this the cultural and consumption pattern is the same as before, but technology imports are based on appropriate choices, efficient operation, and successful adaptation. The economic structure is now more varied and improvements in living standards come from a higher level of division of labour. Dualism of the economy, rapid expansion of the local market, and closer links with "superior" industrialized societies are now common.

3. The "pioneering" society. This is characterized by an independent cultural and consumption pattern. In it, technology is the natural environment for human effort or the production technique necessary for a "productive" society and an economic structure that meets the demands of the people.

I illustrate these ideas through an example of a hypothetical development for the Arab region through these and an intermediate scenario of collective self-reliance. This is graphically represented in Figure 1, and is based on the original premises (p. 281) of complementarily, consistency, political realities, and maintenance of cultural identity. In each one of the phases depicted it should be possible to deduce specific tasks for S e T.

In conclusion, I should address myself to a seemingly glaring contradiction in this presentation. I have characterized the current view of science in society as bigoted and oppressive (p. 275). Obviously none of these seemingly attractive scenarios for transformation would come about in such a social climate. However, hope for the future lies in a rebirth of the original attitude of the culture of the region toward science. After all, the scientific method as we know it today is a product of our cultural heritage, closely intertwined with a religion that clearly recognized the universe around us as a source of knowledge and which exhorted people to seek knowledge even in China.

One might well think that the road to desirable transformation is an assimilation of our cultural heritage on a new - or is it an old level.

FIG. 1. A Hypothetical Example (Arab Region)

Oil-Producing Countries

Non-Oil-Producing Countries


Developed Structure

Primitive Structure

Low Population Density

High Population Density


Avoid falling into more dependence

Concentrate on production of food


Regional co-operation to solve food shortages avoid remaining a consumer, non-productive economy

Curb consumption in favour of production


Avoid dangers of exhaustion of oil reserves- reduce dependence on oil revenues to raise standard of living- create advanced structures in basic industries

Develop human resources


Collective regional action to create consolidated productive societies co-ordinating production factors and developing trade within the region

First steps toward achieving pioneering societies based on indigenous technology under an independent cultural pattern in co-ordination with the outside world on just terms

Appendix I.

A systematic approach to the definition of the role of s e t in transformation

I have chosen to embark on an exercise in prospective analysis which starts by analysing the subsystems in a manner that does not ignore the overall view in attempting to understand the changes in these subsystems and their relations, and which differentiates between the dynamics that are influenced by outside forces or those beyond direct control, and those that are known with certainty. It also will be necessary to identify - even though tentatively - basic projects, leading sectors, and "germs of the future." The next step would be to pull these subsystems together in one consistent overall view.

The proposed sequence of steps (Figure 2)14 includes:

- elaboration, through brain-storming and questionnaires, of all the visions and objectives that society could be striving to achieve.
These are used for guidance on the long-term of transformation.

- survey of available studies in the different fields and evaluation and definition of the basic issues and problems whose treatment will formulate the overall picture of the future. Also included is an investigation of theoretical and statistical relations between these issues and variables, first by specialized analysis of each one separately, and next in a multidisciplinary group effort to define such relations.

- through these studies, a check is made on the consequences of the objectives and visions elaborated in the first step, that is, an assessment of the extent to which the observed policies serve to achieve the objectives.

- linking up of the elements of accumulated knowledge in a reference scenario - once as extrapolation of present policies and courses of action, and a second time through simulation models, for defining those conducive to fulfillment of objectives.

FIG. 2. Procedure for Prospective Analysis

- charting the time paths implied by each of these so far static scenarios and defining the points in time when basic decisions have to be made to implement new policies in technology choices and structural changes. This would be deduced from the simulation models and completed by scenario-writing.

- next would come presentation, before a wider multidisciplinary group, revealing weaknesses and contradictions necessitating return to any of the previous steps, in a process of successive approximation.

- completion of qualitative and quantitative forecasts leads to definition of the prerequisites of technology that permits the structural changes envisaged and that would be sustainable economically, keeping in mind available and forthcoming technology, its problems and development tendencies world-wide, and the specificity of local natural and human resources, and size of productive units.

The outcome of the activities outlined above would be the desirable "model" for transformation which would have specified:

- the material structures to be achieved.

- other non-material aspects of a coherent and integrated system, admittedly in an approximate manner.

- some overall indicators of the technological content of this system.

Elaboration from this leads to the scientific-technological requirements and their time-phasing so that the required structures are achieved, bearing in mind the length of gestation periods and unavoidable delays.

Figure 3 represents a procedure for this elaboration which takes into consideration a number of elements that are decisive in defining the role of science and technology. Some of these are:

1. Linking-up with development objectives and the search for relative advantages and appropriate technology.

2. Rational rates of expenditure on R e D that take account of world tendencies, gaps in basic scientific knowledge, and reduction of the brain drain.

FIG. 3. From Objectives to R e D Plan

3. Mobilization of resources for fulfilling the above two elements and the creation of a regional basis that would provide greater chances for attaining development objectives in the primary stages and permit admission to the world of "big science" later on.15

4. Reasonable awareness of future tendencies in science and technology. This is necessary background for long-term planning, for defining gaps to be compensated by transfer, and for development of educational training systems.

I conclude by attempting to clarify some ideas in Figure 3.

In moving from objectives to technological content (marked (1) on Figure 3), I use models (national, sectoral, or regional) to ensure the maximum possible consistency between the different variables. To define the role of S e T. such models16 should allow considerable personal judgement and non-quantifiable variables, since these are closely related to the long-term and overall view of the future of S e T. Appendix II discusses this matter at some length.

Should I choose, however, not to use models and to resort to exploratory techniques, it will be necessary to use questionnaires for brain-storming and scenarios for definition of the main variables and the important relations without resorting to statistical techniques or mathematical formulations. Appendix III sketches these activities which refer to the step marked (2) on Figure 3. If we rely entirely on such methods, then action would start from "Objectives and Policies" directly and not through "The Model.''

In either case, the end product is a definition of actions, in the scientific-technological domain, called for to bring about desirable transformations. These actions are derived primarily from society's objectives and policies. The end product is based on a proper evaluation of the present state of society which considers the international scene and its implications and possible useful inputs, is dynamic and time-conscious, and is unfettered by the inappropriate rigour of quantifying the unquantifiable. It accounts for this crucial element through human judgement and foresight. It also is coherent and internally consistent, as well as related to other decisive factors outside the domain of S e T.

Appendix II.

Relation between mathematical and non-quantifiable experiences (for achieving consistency between model s e t requirements)

Relation between mathematical and non-quantifiable experiences (for achieving consistency between model S e T requirements)

A Selection of a group of consistent assumptions for one round of calculation (input).

B Choice of model output.

C Channels for consideration of elements (objectives or constraints) ignored in mathematical model-building, either by means of choice of suitable scenarios (C1) or modification of model after discussion of results (C2).

D Flexibility of imposing constraints on model during solution.

E Determination of degree of aggregation of model.

F In choosing a set of consistent assumptions in a scenario, note also their consistency with a selected set of constraints, particularly limitation of resources.

Thus an outline of the proposed methodology would be:

a) For non-quantifiable objectives and constraints in the model, results - as well as other consequences not formulated within it will be discussed so as to modify scenarios (C1) or model structure (C2).

b) For quantifiable objectives and constraints not formulated in model - for various reasons - an overall indicator outside the model will serve to indicate tendencies due to time changes in model (e.g., one for income distribution within a country, or between countries, another for collective security).

c) Methodology permits interaction between man and computer, allowing for personal judgement and a normative element in directing path of results with time.

d) Remaining variables neglected - due to length of forecasting period or other reasons - will still have a place in policy implications.

e) All these are primary features of simulation models.

As applied to S e T sector, we note

1) Rates of technological development - not embodied in value of capital - in production functions are clearly expressed in the model.

2) Cost of utilization of resources - particularly natural resources - in the long term is clearly expressed in objective functions and investment input in industry, agriculture, and education.

3) Social cost of environmental pollution - due to utilization of a natural resource or a prevailing technology - and for which an approximate estimate of negative effects can be made, will be included in a general indicator outside the model.

4) There will remain many other factors related to S e T - mainly sociological - which are difficult to quantify. These are left to personal judgement in discussing model results and lead to modification in scenarios or model formulation.

Appendix III.

Analysis of the relative importance of factors relating to s e t (from questionnaire to scenario-writing)

The questionnaire is seen as a preparatory phase, the results of which would help in:

- brain-storming defining elements of experience of experience and human judgement for unquantifiable elements so as to ensure the normative aspect.

- defining technological options, their economics, and timings for application and points for modifications in the economic structure on the basis of technological options.

- linking with educational system development in the long run.

The questionnaire includes questions on:

- prerequisites and a method (a proposal is presented).

- a method of assessing S e T potential on the basis of available information, as well as its performance, economic and social impact, and future requirements.

- fields of joint Arab R e D action.

- assessment of future technology and its social and environmental impact.

- optimum conditions for "freedom" of scientific research and serving national needs.

- achieving exponential growth of S e T and necessary percentage expenditure of GNP, as well as a means of achieving such expenditure.

The scenario aims at ranking the following factors, distinguishing between those that are directly linked and those that have indirect linkages and Impact on the future of technology (tendencies, relative importance, time lags between change and effect, and so forth):

- Indicators of well-being and satisfaction of basic needs.

- Resources: human (population, education, health, employment), material (energy from various sources, soil, water, minerals, capital).

- Infrastructures and environment: material infrastructures, social considerations, distribution of resources, environmental damage, habitat, and so on.

- Production: agricultural, industrial and service sectors, distribution of product.


1. UN University SCA project paper on "The Transformation of the World," February 1979.

2. ALECSO's "Prospective Study on the Role of Science and Technology in the Arab Region," for which the author is co-ordinator and the research team is headed by Dr. Aly Nassar of the Institute of National Planning in Cairo.

3. A wealth of such studies in various sectors has accumulated in the region, as a result of work of academic institutions and regional organizations.

4. I. S. Abdallah sees this as specifically the reason for establishing the "Third World Forum." See Contemporary Egypt, vol. 66, no. 359, Cairo, 1975.

5. "Towards a New Being," Al-Arabi, 24, November 1978 (in Arabic).

6. Compare with The Bariloche World Model Report, which refers to capitalist experiences that reduce social goals to economic growth measured by the total production of material goods and subordinate all other aspects of social life to it, thus ignoring the specificity of cultures and all qualitative features of life that cannot be expressed in economic terms. At the individual level, personality is manipulated through education, information, and the mass media. The new and more subtle instrument of domination has become scientific-technological superiority.

7. El-Kholy, "Science Policy and Long-term Planning," a paper presented to a seminar organized by the Federation of Arab Research Councils, Baghdad, May 1977.

8. El-Kholy, "The Structure and Functioning of Technology Systems in Developing Countries," UNIDO document ID/WG. 301/2, a paper prepared for the Expert Group Meeting on Technology Development and Self Reliance in Developing Countries, Vienna, June 1979, pp. 19-20.

9. El-Kholy, "Science, Technology and the Future! An Arab Perspective," paper presented to the World Conference on "Faith, Science and the Future," organized by the World Council of Churches, MIT, July 1979.

10. D. Ernest, "International Transfer of Technology, Technological Dependence, and Development Strategies," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 2, Oslo, 1979.

11. ALECSO's "Reference Document on the Requirements for a Prospective Study of Science and Technology in the Arab Region by the Year 2000" (in Arabic).

12. El-Kholy, "The Structure and Functioning of Technology Systems in Developing Countries," figures 1 and 3.

13. I use the adjective "possible" here to mean imaginative thinking coupled with a will to break out of present constraints, rather than mere extrapolation of the present.

14. Reference should be made here to the work of the Swedish Secretariat for Future Studies.

15. El-Kassas and El-Kholy, "Science and Development in the Arab Region" (in Arabic), ALECSO, 1976, pp. 101-110.

16. Reference should be made here to the work of the "Cairo Group," headed by I. H. Abdel-Rahman in the Institute of National Planning, on an Arab development model. This can be considered as representative of movement from the present situation to "The model," marked (3) on Figure 3.

I. What kind of transformation?

Very few people today, among social scientists, will oppose the notion that time and space are both social realities, the meaning of which only can be apprehended in the context of specific social formations. From a long perspective, the process of change that the world is undergoing today can be regarded as another episode, an important one, in the long process of transition from a capitalist to a socialist mode of production. Many will probably raise their eyebrows at reading such a statement, perhaps bewildered by what seems to be a commonplace. However, it is a fact that most analysts of the present world crisis, whether Marxists or not, tend to concentrate on what is happening in the capitalist world, thus leaving aside the unity, although a contradictory one, of world history today. We have argued elsewhere that the basic dynamics of the present transformation of the world are determined by the dialectic between capitalist and socialist camps which, without ignoring the internal contradictions within each, is mainly determined by the specific objectives of the great powers of the capitalist and socialist blocs:

In short, the consideration of the objectives of great powers, both capitalist and socialist, leads to the conclusion that the bourgeoisie, as the hegemonic class of the capitalist system, has a primarily economic interest when it tries to prevent the expansion of the socialist camp, and from that the need to combat it politically, militarily, and ideologically derives. In contrast, as socialist powers try to expand their influence to other countries, their primary objective is a political one.1

Such a process, of course, is not a unilinear one, nor even can it be said that the outcome is inevitable or predetermined. Options are open to the point that it is not possible to say what final form the socialist mode of production will adopt. The so-called socialist societies of today, from a long perspective, can only be regarded as incipient historical experiments from which a more definitive form will gradually emerge. It is as if we were writing in 1450 and trying to guess what would be the specific form of what was only much later called capitalism. We cannot pursue further this argument in the present paper for it will take us far away from its specific objective, which is to highlight the main points of relationships between science, technology, and politics in the present world crisis. However, the preceding remarks were necessary both in putting the problem in a wider context and in laying the groundwork for comments which will be made later in this paper.

II. The nature of the crisis

We share the view of many social scientists who regard the present world crisis as a structural one.2 Basically, the world division of labour, which began early in the present century but accelerated after the crisis of the 1930s, reached its limit - namely, the impossibility of increasing profitability for private enterprises - by the end of the 1960s. History shows that the ways out of such crises have been: (1) technological breakthroughs, which provide both new levels of profitability and new opportunities for capital accumulation, and (2) furthering the proletarianization of the world by means of organizational innovations which facilitate the exploitation of low cost labour.

It is true that after the beginning of the 1950s a new thrust in the international economy was provided by the process of transnationalization of the world economy. This later resulted in (1) expansion of the social division of labour to a transnational scale and (2) further concentration of the means of production in a few gigantic enterprises.

However, the impact of this process was not enough to counteract the structural factors which provoked the world economic crises. It may be that the process of transnationalization is just beginning, if one is to judge by the fact that only seven or eight underdeveloped countries are fully incorporated into it; that is, most of the worlds underdeveloped countries are in yet earlier phases of world capitalist development.

It is necessary to point out some of the main features associated with the process of transnationalization: first of all come technological innovations in the organization of the labour process, particularly the breaking down of complex tasks into simple ones so that new masses of non-qualified cheap labour can be hired. Second, a new partnership is being formed between the state, local bourgeoisie, and transnational corporations in order to further the process of industrial redeployment.

Third, due to the energy crisis, huge -funds are increasingly being invested with the aim of producing technological breakthroughs in that field. A critical evaluation of the probabilities of achieving success within the next decade reveals that they are very low. Nevertheless, new sources of capital accumulation are being created.

The main consequences for the underdeveloped countries of the process of transnationalization are:

1. An increased role for the state in the economy, which is not only performing the traditional functions of the state but also assuming the function of producing material goods in leading sectors of the economy.

2. The reconcentration of income in the privileged strata of the population. This phenomenon is determined by (1) the need to expand the demand for the products of the leading transnationalized sectors of the economy, which usually produce goods which can only be purchased by the capitalistic sectors of the economy, and (2) the need to keep down the real salary of the workers in order to make things more profitable for the transnationals, which otherwise could invest somewhere else.

3. Relative deterioration of the capacity to produce both industrial and agricultural products oriented to the satisfaction of the needs of the impoverished masses of the population.

The last two consequences inevitably lead to the discontent of the masses, which sooner or later may explode in violent reactions, strikes, or even revolutionary movements. Presently, the fact that there is a world crisis obviously determines a deepening of class struggle in the developed countries. This, in turn, functions as a demonstration effect for the underdeveloped countries' labour class.

The Latin American experience reveals two basic sets of policies to control such social movements: (a) establishing or reinforcing a social and political pact among labour organizations, government, parties, the military, and the bourgeoisie. This is the case in Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia, where more or less democratic governments exist and where social democratic or Christian democratic parties have great influence both in government and in labour organization; (b) establishing authoritarian regimes such as those in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil.

III. World political trends

However, neither of those two situations is intrinsically stable; particularly when seen within the context of the basic political dynamics of the worlds:

1. As is well known, since the mid-1950s and the nuclear stalemate or "mutual superiority" between the United States and the USSR, the locus of confrontation between the great powers has shifted from the equilibrium zones to the periphery.

2. From then on, any liberation or revolutionary war emerging in underdeveloped countries of the world was likely to be transformed into an indirect confrontation between the above-mentioned great powers, provided that massive logistic supplies could be provided by both of them. Since the US was able to do so around the world after 1945, the matter was reduced to the increasing capacity of other great powers to give logistic support to popular movements. Apparently, the Soviet Union today is capable of giving logistic support to revolutionary movements in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. These are the "hot zones" of the world today.

3. Simultaneously, multi-polarization of the world, both economic and political, increased, thus making it possible to establish new alliances and pacts in order to take better advantage of the new social division of labour on a world scale.

It is within this context that some recent events can be explained. For instance, the increasing inability of the United States to enforce the applicability of post-war pacts such as CENTO, SEATO, etc., and the emergence of organizations like OPEC, which gives the oil-producing countries the possibility of increasing their share of the world oil surplus - a phenomenon made possible by the strategic nature of oil, the will of OPEC states to back the organization, and, last but not least, the increase in the profits of transnational oil corporations. Moreover, the rift between China and the Soviet Union made possible the formation of cross-ideological alliances such as those that came into being in the Indo-Pakistani war and the Angolan revolution; also, the case of the intervention of Viet Nam in Cambodia revealed that conflicts between underdeveloped socialist countries can also happen. Along these lines it is not surprising that closer links are growing between the US and China. One can not even rule out new and formerly perhaps even more unthinkable ententes. So far, the most significant of these phenomena is the expanding capability of the USSR to give massive logistic support. In the last 30 years the Soviet Union has gone from supporting Korea to backing Angola and Eritrea with the help of the Cubans. Whether it will continue to expand towards Latin America is yet to be seen; so far the compromise reached during the missile crisis in Cuba seems to be still operative; however, one can hypothesize that it may not be so by the end of the century.

These trends lead to the conclusion that underdeveloped countries will continue to suffer political instability and that the probability of revolutionary successes in the hot zones is increasing.

IV. The role of science and technology

It is obvious that, in the face of such trends, dominant capitalist countries need to foster new means of legitimizing the present situation, in order to reinforce the more orthodox method of economic, military, and political domination. We like to advance the hypothesis that one such means is to create a new myth which could both revive and make more credible the idea that underdeveloped countries can in effect develop within the capitalist system. It seems that within this new developmentalist ideology science and technology are to play a key role.

As was suggested by one participant in the International Colloquium of ACAST in Vienna:

... such a myth could be useful to fulfill three functions:

(a) The process of qualitative intensification of technological dependence, which predominates in most developing countries, could be conveniently disguised.

(b) The neutralization and progressive obstruction of the few attempts of underdeveloped countries to control technology imports and direct investments, such as, for instance, the Andean Pact regulations, could be hidden.

c) The strategies of "global planned obsolescence" and "technological domination," developed by a few multinational corporations in some of the main OECD countries, could be efficiently legitimized.4

Furthermore, it is now possible that concepts such as "appropriate technology," "increasing capacity to negotiate," "technology transfer," and so on, which appear profusely in the jargon of development ideologists, are but good ways of obscuring the basic facts, namely:

1. The true obstacle to satisfying the basic needs of the masses lies in the present system of domination.

2. The local bourgeoisie's, allied with transnational corporations, are using technology to increase their control and domination of the population rather than bettering their standard of living.

3. The industrialized countries are, in fact, less inclined to share on an equal basis the fruits of scientific and technological development.

4. Experience shows that industrialized countries treat science and technology as commodities to be exchanged in the markets of underdeveloped countries on an unequal basis.

An analysis of the many conferences supposedly devoted to creating the preconditions for the effective application of science and technology to foster development of Third World countries would probably confirm all four conclusions.

V. A proposition

The great question is, then, what shall the underdeveloped countries do to change these trends?

We wish to end this paper on a rather optimistic although utopian note. We are convinced that, in so far as the problems of science and technology continue to be negotiated only at inter-state forums, such as TCDC, UNCTAD, UNCSTED, the North-South dialogue, UNIDO, etc., we can only expect infinitesimal progress or no progress at all.

Many reasons can be argued in favour of such a conclusion, but one that seems to us to be critical is that perhaps the most important protagonist is being left out of the negotiations. We are speaking of the transnational corporations.

It seems to us that the time is ripe either to create a specific organization or for an existing organization such as the Group of 77 or the Non-Aligned Movement to make its priority objective to deal, in a global way, directly with the transnational corporations. Then and only then can a more substantive context be given to common efforts to increase the capacity to negotiate, to create an information bank, to foster managerial capabilities, to create multinationals of the underdeveloped countries, etc. One reason why we think such an operation may work is that transnational corporations, as in the case of OPEC, may also derive benefits from it. Among others, uncertainty could be reduced and therefore they could plan future ventures and profits in a more reliable way.


1. Jos. Sliva Michelena, Crise No Sistema Mundial: Polca y Blocos de Poder. Paz e Terra, Rde Janeiro, 1977, p. 27 (author's translation).

2. See Samir Amin, "Verve una nuova crisi strutturale del sistema capitalistico" (Terzo Mondo, ano VIII, gruppo IV, nos. 24-25, June-September 1974, pp. 9-14); Andre Gunder Frank, World Crisis and Latin American International Options (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1974, p. 1).

3. See Jos. Silva Michelena, op. cit., passim.

4. See Hebe M. C. Vessuri, "Ciencia, Tecnology Sociedad en Veras de la UNCSTD: El Coloqulo Internacional en Viena" (Interciencia [4] 6, November-December 1979, p. 361).


A great cultural result of our time is the basic perception that the social functions of science and technology have been mystified, refracted through the prism of the ruling ideologies and stated in a fetishized form of productivism, economic growth, promotion of civilization, technological solution of social contradictions, unified technical culture that pretends to be universal, general human culture, and so forth. This basic knowledge results from a collective experience in the economic, broader, crisis and from radicalized social struggles and movements. These began, first of all, with anticolonial movements, or movements for the emancipation of dependent and super exploited countries, and were followed by the radicalized currents of industrial and intellectual workers in the developed countries. Included are radical movements of scientific workers, technicians, agronomists, doctors, architects and urbanists, university students, and so on. We now must give concrete form to this basic perception, to operatively testify to it in relation to all segments of the scientific and technological complex.

Such a testimony is given, first of all, in this paper with respect to the technology of repression, that is, armament and its scientific research and technological potential, as well as parliamentary sectors (nuclear energy, outer-space research, and so forth) and the "reserve potential" of totalitarian control over man and society (big-genetic, psychological, meteorological, with respect to food sources and so on). In this, without a doubt, is the paradigm of the entire repressive tendency of science and technology. I intend to show the following:

a. All of the major aspects of the repressive function of science and technology in our era tend to be directed analogously or substantially close to the functions of the technology of repression in the narrow sense. Together with militarized science and technology in the service of force and violence, science and technology which are geared toward greater exploitation of natural sources and economic, socio-political, and cultural hegemony in international relations comprise a unified, organically linked structure of repressive functions. Within this structure, other sectors of repressive technology may partially substitute for the technology of force in the narrow sense but, in any case, functionally combine with it.

b. The main machinery of exploitation and rule within individual societies and in international relations decisively moves toward combining the monopoly of the technology of repression in the narrow sense with other forms of scientific and technical monopoly geared toward repressive functions. As a socio-political expression of this movement, the ruling social forces - classes, their hegemonistic fractions and socio-political blocks - regroup themselves in a way that expresses and allows for the combination of both forms of repressive technology. Social groups that are the protagonists of the technology of death and violent exploitation - the military hierarchy, the military-industrial technocracy, the managerial nucleus of the transnational corporations, the corresponding political and banking oligarchies - take on increasingly greater importance within the ruling socio-political blocks. There is a strong tendency for these groups to become the hegemonistic nucleus of the ruling classes in metropolitan societies.

c. The bearers of such a type of social hegemony, in which a scientific-technological monopoly and its repressive use is essential, will continue to guide the development of science and its technological application, material resources (the utilization of natural sources and accumulation), and human potential toward the expanded reproduction of the total conditions and factors of such hegemony. The expansion of repressive technology then exerts an ever more intensive effect on the total structure, that is, on the social character of the productive forces of labour. The repressive functions absorb a predominant part of the total material, intellectual, and socio-organizational potential of the existing scientific and technological complexes. These functions leave a decided socio-economic, political, and cultural mark on the majority of scientific work and the technological application of its results.

d. The above-mentioned socio-political restructuring globally conditions decision-making in the direction of scientific and technological development, so that the effectiveness of repression becomes a top priority. The repressive functions, that is, the scientific-technological complexes in industry, agriculture, communications, medicine, urbanism, and so forth, determined by them, thwart the investigation and realization of alternatives urgently needed for the material progress of the conditions of life, the rational regulation and cultivation of natural conditions, the abolition of socio-economic, regional, cultural, and national discrimination and segregation, the autonomous development of individual societies, regions, nations, and cultures in accordance with positive historical premises and primary actual needs, and the international co-operation of autonomous actors. Grandiose, diabolical scientific and technological selection is carried out systematically at the expense of the primary needs and historically formed progressive values of humanity.

e. For such a negative scientific and technological selection, a monopoly of political decision-making in the hands of those interested in repressive technology is alone not enough; a specific socio-cultural articulation of such technology is necessary as well. Under the influence of hegemonistic groups that aspire to the repressive use of a socio-technological monopoly, a specific socio-cultural macrocosm is formed in metropolitan societies: this is the structuring of interests and the articulation of the values and motives of "organized knowledge" in industrial corporations, scientific foundations and universities, scientific and technological intelligentsia, and so on. The immediate social and cultural environment of the bearers of fundamental and developmental research - the selection and formation of scientific "elites" and technical cadres, their social hierarchy, ideology, and mentality; their scale of values and goals; their position and prestige in society; the legitimacy of their motives; and the evaluation of their results - is established in the function of the scientific and technological advancement of effective repression. Parallel with this, ideological, political, and scientific-theoretical forms of the mystification of the repressive functions of science and technology have been worked out. This refers, of course, to the development of economic, demographic, sociological, political, socio-anthropological, and other social theories that would be able to legitimize scientific and technological monopolies and their repressive aims - for example, the functional-structural systems theory of society found in contemporary German sociology; neo-Malthusian crisis theories, "socio-biology" as defined by Wilson and Trivers, and so on.

f. In "developing countries," in as much as the process of their emancipation has not prevailed, technology placed under the guidance of metropolitan monopolies takes on multiple and potent repressive functions; it becomes an essential, and may become a decisive, factor in conditioning their structural dependency. "The transfer of technology" is transformed into the implantation of military-technical, techno-economic, and socio-political and cultural instruments for extending and continuing dependency and underdevelopment. With the help of these instruments, a fundamental technological inhibition is established in the development of those countries: a fundamental and radical frustration of scientific research and technological advancements that would be oriented toward primary needs and development possibilities. The repressive scientific-technological monopoly is constructed in a dependent society as an armature of international and, consequently, internal relations of exploitation - an armature able to overcome strivings and efforts toward economic and political emancipation. This armature, a lever for ensuring continued dependency, is built not only into the material-technical structure of production but also into the class structure in dependent societies. Local oligarchies and ''elites" regroup and form in the function of the military-political and techno-economic transmission, with the tendency to impregnate the "cultural assimilation" of the authorized parts of the dependent society with the mystification of the scientific monopoly and repressive technology.

g. In uncovering and abolishing the repressive functions of science and technology, there indisputably exists a common denominator among the efforts for their progressive transformation in otherwise differing societies and regions with materially unequal and culturally specific possibilities, priorities, and choices. This common denominator is the global, international premise for the emancipated and autonomous, progressive and creative contribution of all parts of the world to their own and general scientific and technological progress.

My argument should indicate that from analytically based, socially motivated, and culturally articulated criticism of the repressive functions of science and technology it is possible to derive a far-reaching strategy for their progressive transformation and development. Such a strategy, that would initiate and enable over a long period of time successive and continually linked research and the embodiment of socio-cultural alternatives that would, at last, give the totality of scientific and technological development a significantly different quality, is necessary. It is superfluous to insist on proof that such a strategy of scientific and technological development is but one of the aspects of the historical projects of emancipated and emancipating social practice, and that such possibilities exist only within specific constellations and orientations of social forces.

I. The vicious circle of repressive technology

One should not harbour the illusion that the radical transformation of science and technology and their complete liberation from the materially objectivized and ideologically impregnated effects of economic, social, and political antagonisms, exploitation, and alienation can be realized without long-term creative and preventive efforts. This requires an entire historical epoch: the extent of this liberating practice is difficult for us to imagine now. Today's strategy must begin with criticism and removal of those negative characteristics of scientific and technological development in which are condensed the extreme, most difficult effects of the antagonistic structures, which are, at the same time, the constitutive obstacles to the investigation and realization of socio-cultural alternatives. In this work, I have linked this condensation of negative characteristics which make up an obstacle to social progress to the notion of the repressive functions of science and technology. True, strict socio-critical analysis would indicate that socio-antagonistic and repressive characteristics are interwoven in all the historically formed features of science and technology. My approach is justified if from this whole I single out those attributes and tendencies of science and technology that are the fundamental, essential bearers and expressions of repressive functions. In this way, I put this notion into a historical relation - covering that which in our period is, in the first place, possible and necessary to subject to criticism and change.

Accordingly, I single out three focuses of the repressive function of science and technology:

1. the orientation of scientific-technological development primarily toward the current or potential goals of military force and totalitarian control of society; and functional inclusion of such development into the internationally transformed system of accumulation and distribution of surplus value;

2. establishment of a scientific-technological monopoly by metropolitan centres of accumulation, and direction of monopolistically controlled research and industrial, agricultural, and other application of results in the function of economic and total social hegemony in international and interregional relations;

3. determination of scientific priorities and technological selection in production (as in transportation, urban development, medicine, and so on) in the function of forced exploitation and repressive control of the behaviour of the labour force.

The historically regressive tendency in contemporary science and technology stems from an interaction and combination of the three above-mentioned sources. In their mutual action and interaction, overlapping and condensation, we recognize the dynamics of the expansion of the repressive, exploitative, and destructive effects of science and technology. Here in short are the main aspects of these dynamics:

a. The priority of scientific research and technical innovations within the framework of a military-scientific-industrial complex enables the super concentration of capital and monopolistic accumulation of knowledge in metropolitan financial and industrial centres that become the supports of immense systems for the international exploitation of labour and natural resources.

The linkage of military and scientific resources creates an exceptional economic advantage: the metropolitan centres that gain this advantage will continue to expand both these resources and to control an ever greater part of world accumulation. The military-repressive orientation of science and technology is transformed into an essential economic factor of hegemonistic expansion and exploitation in international relations.

b. The economic mechanism of international hegemony and exploitation - "unequal exchange," restriction of the economic development of dependent countries in conformity with the strategy of a super monopoly, control of the labour market, direct investments, and so on - is established and functions in the presence of the international machinery of non-economic compulsion that In part ensures the reproduction of the social conditions for monopolistic accumulation. With this, the economic and non-economic causes and motives for the precedence of scientific-technological development in the function of military repression are constantly being renewed.

c. Military force and threat alone are not enough to insure the international social conditions of monopolistic accumulation. Sociopolitical upheavals and movements for the economic emancipation of subordinated countries constantly disturb these conditions and endanger the totality of the relations of exploitation. Parallel to economic restrictions and political force, a specific scientific technological control apparatus becomes increasingly important for the international order of hegemonistic expansion and exploitation. The advantage gained through the aid of the military-scientific-industrial complex and monopolistic control of international accumulation constitutes a strong point for the further development and direction of a scientific-technological monopoly as a relatively independent instrument for international repressive control of agricultural, industrial, economic, and socio-political processes.

Technological force or the threat of such force is applied alternatively or cumulatively with military and financial force or repressive threats. As the military-repressive priority has led to well-known deformities with regard to the orientation of science and the programme for technical innovation, so too monopolistic scientific-technological development subordinated to the goals of repressive technological control of the international labour process, the utilization and reproduction of labour, agricultural and industrial orientation, the economic and social policy of individual countries, their internal and international socio-political orientation, and world exchange and distribution leads to profound inversion and distortion of science and technology with respect to the primary needs and developmental possibilities of societies.

d. The priority of scientific-technological development in the composition of the military-scientific-industrial complex and its effect on the influx and disposition of accumulation contributes to the division of the economy into sectors with essentially different conditions for reproduction. industrial sectors and agricultural branches that do not enjoy the advantages of militarization have economically limited possibilities for significant technical innovations and reduced and endangered accumulative capability. This forces and leads them to increase the exploitation of surplus value by forced utilization of labour and by decreasing its value and price by the massive dequalification of workers. Their structurally limited possibilities for developmental research and technological innovation are to a large extent directed toward the development of the means of labour, the technical organization of the labour process, and technological approaches that enable intensive exploitation of primarily dequalified labour. In this way, the orientation of technology as an instrument of increased exploitation of labour is strengthened. Particular attention should be paid to the practice of decreasing the necessary work time, primarily by the concentration of work efforts (labour efficiency norms, repressive technical organization of work, and so on) and reducing the qualifications of workers (parcelization and technical simplification of work) and not primarily by improving the means of labour and technological efficiency in general.

The hypothesis that, accordingly, in large sectors of production this has led to a change in the main tendencies of technological development is not without its place. Backward and repressive technology in the production of goods (directed toward intensive exploitation of labour and its dequalification) is the other face of the system of production and accumulation that favours rising scientific and technological development in the production of arms and other means of repression.

e. In a uniform chain of regressive tendencies, following the links that make up the just-mentioned repressive technology (the production of arms and the super-exploitation of labour in production outside of militarized sectors) comes a link with new repressive functions: monopolistic technological control of dependent countries in combination with other instruments of restriction and force inaugurates the development and use of science and technology within the framework and for the goal of the super-exploitation of the labour force of dependent countries.

This chain of negative factors closes up in a vicious circle. The economic function of the production of arms constantly stimulates the scientific-technological revolution in the military-industrial sectors, reduces the accumulative capability and possibility of essential technical innovation in other sectors, and orients their technology toward forced exploitation of the labour force. If the possibilities for such exploitation of labour in metropolitan societies are limited, sectors of production whose accumulation capability is endangered move to countries in which they can create the conditions for more intensive exploitation. This moves science and technology controlled by metropolitan centres toward functions of repression in "developing countries," thereby establishing in these countries massive poverty and other conditions that enable the exploitation of cheap labour. Super-exploitation and the impoverishment of dependent countries radicalizes the social resistance of the working masses and the movements for emancipation, and this again stimulates the development of the military-repressive apparatus and its combination with the entire economic and technological system of force (that is, the international division of labour, its technical and social organization, the differentiated technical characteristics of internationally divided labour, and so on), all in the function of economic and technological repression.

The contradictions of the system of accumulation in which science and technology are intertwined cannot be overcome by the division between metropolitan and dependent "developing countries," repressive control and forced exploitation of the latter; rather, their solution is sought in relationships of military, technological, and financial dependence and exploitation of the majority of industrially developed countries by the leading groups of the metropolises that hold the main levers of monopolistic control by means of the advantage of the most developed military-scientific-industrial complex and the other means of linking the scientific-technological monopoly and the international repressive machinery of production (as, for example, the agro-industrial complexes, nuclear energy plants, until recently the petroleum monopoly, control of the market of investment equipment, and so on). Along with this, in the circle of developed countries, in their mutual relations a chain of factors of the negative orientation of science and technology moves as well. In a division of labour among these countries, the leading group tends to maintain the scientific technologically propulsive sectors of production, with greater accumulation capability, while sectors with relatively backward and, with respect to labour, clearly repressive technology tend to be located in another category of industrial countries. This also leads to radicalization of social conflicts in this category of industrial countries (for example, in England, Italy, France, and several other European countries). The bearers of international hegemony react by strengthening all the repressive apparatus and, especially, the mechanisms of scientific-technological dependence that have indisputable advantages in establishing dominance over industrially developed countries.

Further analysis of these networks of factors that condition the growth of repressive functions and the exploitative and destructive effects of science and technology exceeds the framework of this paper. Attention will be further centred on the main social figures that provoked these processes, as representatives and protagonists of repressive technology and the cultural and psycho-social personification of its regressive characteristics.

II. The main social figures of repressive technology

The repressive functions of science and technology are directly based on the monopoly of scientific research, monopolistic private ownership of scientific knowledge, and exclusive control of its technological application. This monopoly is an integral and essential part of the system of international monopolistic accumulation and control of the conditions of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption. Herewith is stated an indispensable part of the truth, but still not the whole truth.

The international scientific-technological monopoly, mystified as a scientific and technological "gap" between developed and developing countries, is not completely explained by this, nor is this sufficient to explain the efficiency of the repressive functions of science and technology in international relations. For more complete knowledge it is necessary to shed some light on the totality of class, socio-political, and cultural phenomena that on both sides of the hegemonistic relationship - in metropolitan centres of monopolistic usurpation and in subordinated social environments - produce and reproduce the total social conditions for the effective repressive effect of the scientific-technological monopoly.

The international scientific-technological monopoly is formed and represses especially by means of two basic social figures that represent a condensation of the international whole of antagonistic social reproduction: the metropolitan monopolistic technocracy and subordinate (satellite) local "oligarchies" and "elites" in dependent societies.

The monopolistic technocracy in a uniform structure links the material, intellectual, socio-political and military, cultural, and psycho-social conditions and factors that create the total social strong point of the metropolitan scientific-technological monopoly. It synthesizes interests and motives, values and goals, forms of social organization, and a hierarchy of functions and positions that move the intellectual production of the scientific-technological substance of this monopoly and, at the same time, directs this production toward investigation and selection of the optimal possibilities for exploitative and repressive action. This social figure in its own practice, ideology, configuration of interests, and mentality interiorizes the repressive functions of science and technology; these functions determine its "maximum consciousness," its social character.

Special attention must be paid to the genesis of the contemporary metropolitan technocracy, as this reveals the global social premises and moving factors of the formation of the metropolitan scientific technological monopoly. It especially reveals the genetic dynamic nucleus of this monopoly in the mutual effects of the militarization of the economy and science and the expansion of large systems for international control of the conditions of production and accumulation. It also is worth nothing the articulation of these social figures that personify the metropolitan scientific-technological monopoly and its exploitative and repressive orientation, with other social and political forces, interests, and ideologies in the metropolitan social environment.

At the other pole of the social axis of the scientific-technological monopoly, international social restructuring has formed dependent groups characterized by a constitutive link or symbiosis of the local "oligarchies" of holders of economic and political power and local "technocratic elites" that tend to expand toward the whole "culturally assimilated" intelligentsia and white collar personnel, and is permeated by colonial derivations of the metropolitan ideology. In this symbiosis, we find the other half of the total social and cultural conditions of the repressive scientific-technological monopoly. As the character of social practice and the cultural image of metropolitan technocracy is an inserted strong point of selective production and repressive use of scientific knowledge and technological models in the material social being, so is the subordination of interests and motives and the incapability for research and knowledge beyond the framework of the hegemonistic interests and the models that are the incarnation of these interests - creative impotency, dependency, caricature-like imitation of metropolitan status and cultural patterns, basic insensitivity to the interests of the working masses in their countries, and scorn for the native culture of these masses and their creative and productive potentials - inscribed in the social and cultural profile of the local "elite" in subordinated societies. Without such a socio-cultural lobotomy of the local "elite" that transforms them into forever dependent premature infants, collective and intellectual weaklings, and social subordinates, effective scientific-technological repression of dependent societies would not be possible.

III. Militarization of the economy and science: the birthplace of the metropolitan technocracy

Militarization particularly includes corporations in technologically leading branches of production - aeronautics, electronics, nuclear technology, industrial computer and information systems, and chemistry. It quickly hastened their technical development and the growth of the organic contents of capital, which within these corporations decisively and directly influenced the birth of a modern technology of power and management and the formation of technocratic "character masks." Galbraith's picture of the concentric circles of the "techno-structure" most closely corresponds to the leading corporations in the militarized economy. For in these corporations, on the basis of a high organic content of capital, the concentration of scientific potential and educated technical personnel, as well as profits that devour a lion's share of the total surplus value, were the greatest possibilities for social integration, "indentification," and "adaptation" of a relatively broad circle of participants under the hegemony of technocratically reorganized leading groups that mediate between financial centres, state military programmed, and the resulting subsidized development of science and universities.

The complex advantage of militarized corporations has far-reaching consequences for technocratic reorganization. Only those corporations that are organized as systems for the exploitation of scientific technological resources can permanently maintain the orders of the military-repressive system and use public funds as their own. This can be carried out only by those corporations that introduce the appropriate technology of power and management and bring their managerial groups into conformity with these demands, and that construct a new symbiosis of class interests and status between owner ship and technocratic management. It is important to note that this category of corporations as well as the direct participants of the global functions of the order were enabled and, in order to carry out these functions, compelled to establish broad control over the activities of science, universities, and the entire system of education. This refers as well to control over total production and communication of scientific and other information, over the movement of intellectual potential. That is, control over broad sectors of the social system, that by this become, in fact, branches of large systems for the production of capital. Encompassing those branches? the large systems perfect and spread out their technocratic organization.

When a monopoly of state orders is permanently established, new forms are developed for accumulation and control, and when power is realized over scientific and research development potentials, the enterprises included in the military-repressive system gradually take over independent functions in this system as well. From executors and profiteers in large businesses they become the direct bearers of the development and realization of military-technically, strategically, intellectually, military-politically, and economically repressive programmes and operations. With other centres of the repressive system they decide on all that is essential for the growth and efficiency of these systems. This extends to all dimensions of the general functions of protecting the regime. Their partnership with the ruling political and military groups entrusted with the central functions of the regime is based as well on the monopoly of power and control gained over the material, scientific and technological, organizational, and personnel policies necessary for carrying out these functions.

Here we are talking about a monopoly of the modern technology of a repressive system. In the sphere of militarized corporations, a network of economic advantages is to be gained with the monopoly of this specific technology. Both instances are established along with the special support of the political system and its repressive organizations. But the creature of this system - the militarized economy - quickly becomes an independent political factor that holds technological levers of global rule and in this inserts its specific interests.

The consequences of the symbiosis between the military-repressive system and the authorized monopoly are well known with respect to the personal union and rotation of leading managerial groups on both sides, their combined influence on fiscal and economic policy in the interest of a militarized economy and global military-political strategy, and the entire political process in the metropolises. In this study, a perhaps less-noticed aspect of this especially interests us: the independent power of technocratically organized monopolies in the area of the military system and the technology of violence and death will become the general pattern for the role that the leading corporations take on with regard to all the other general functions of the order.

Militarized and soon other systematically organized large corporations as well began to utilize all elements of this model - systems analysis and strategy for solving complicated problems; monopolistic control of scientific-technological, organizational, and personnel policies; usurpation of public funds; independent power and a partnership with leading political groups and public officials; specific technocratic organization and ideology; and so on - in coping with various areas of "general social needs" and "social problems."

A monopoly of the technology of death and systematic techniques for absolute destruction should be adapted and applied as a monopoly of technical means for human survival and systematic techniques for global regulation of the social process endangered by the production of capital. We would have a solitary power over death, and to an extent survival, according to the same scheme, with the identical purpose and criterion, in the same hands, with the same ideology! The only difference is that the use of this power in the form of a monopoly of technology for destruction and death is significantly more effective than its use in the form of a monopoly of technical means for survival and relief from the global consequences of production that technocratic ideology disguises under the names of "urban chaos," crises of the megalopolis; "ecological catastrophe," "destructive demographic explosions," crises of feed sources, energy, and industrial raw materials; "collective mental disassociation," and so forth. While managers of these systems can predict with great probability and bring about certain destructive effects and massive death, their pretensions and operations in the direction of controlled survival constantly increase the global entropy of the civilization process.

In this context, the militarized apparatus of production was the first laboratory for the new scientific-systematic and technocratic form of rationality. From it all, large systems for the production of capital inherited the technique and organization, the ideology of systematic analysis, and the strategy for solving the problems of complex wholes with the goal of maximizing efficiency under increasingly more difficult conditions. From it were taken scientific methods of research and projection, the complicated use of computer technology in large management systems, and a totally hierarchically determined structure of scientific institutions under the rule of the protagonists of these goals. The militarized apparatus also yields the basic irresponsibility and superficial "political neutrality" of researchers and technical operators in the large systems with respect to the goals and consequences of their use. In these contexts, the staff of these systems took to solving the complex problems of management in technically attractive ways, regardless of the inhuman or merciless efficiency of the solutions, including psychology, sociology, and other "humanistic sciences" in the system of exploitation and force. The entire informative system, logic, language, and mentality of modern exploitation were taken on.

IV. The genesis of the ''technocratic elite'' in dependent societies

At this pole of the social axis of the scientific-technological monopoly, the genesis of the social figure that personifies scientific technological and total dependence on metropolitan hegemony is particularly indicative. Without going into depth on the historical background of this genesis (colonial rule, cultural repression, and so on), in the immediate past and now we find two main generators of the formation of a "technocratic elite" in dependent societies. The first consists of the formation of a local repressive apparatus, primarily military, that often carries out major police functions as well, under the influence and control of metropolitan military systems. It thus carries out perhaps the most important transfer of military technology and contributes to the formation of a specific authoritarian-technocratic ideology in the hierarchies of repressive services. This ideology postulates total repression as the condition sine qua non for the survival and development of "backward" society, and at the same time insists on taking over the economic, technological, and cultural models - derivatives of the metropolitan hegemony as instruments of survival and development whose application is ensured by total repression.

The second generator of local "technocratic elites" comprises a complex of "technical aid" projects within the framework of the global strategy of metropolitan monopolistic centres, according to their impulses and under their control. Selection, education, and specific indoctrination of technical and administrative cadres are carried out first in metropolitan educational and research factories and their branches in dependent societies, under the wing of the superficially independent foundations which sustain the international projects of "technical aid," and then within the personnel policy of the transnational corporations that raise people from the local environments to responsible managerial and technical functions in their internationally located branches or that in other ways subordinate and direct the "modernized" industrial entrepreneurs, agrarian "reformers," functionaries, and leading intellectuals from the ministries and banks, universities, and public information, cultural, and scientific institutions. The essential effect of this great factory for the almost assembly-line production of dependent and emasculated "technocratic elites" is that the material position, status, and professional success of the members of these groups imperatively depends on their conformity to the ideology of dependence and the interiorization of the intellectual, political, and ideological characteristics of this social type programmed in metropolitan laboratories for the technological, social, and cultural transformation of "developing countries."

The two above-mentioned generators of "industrial local elites" - the military and the "technical aid," personnel policy and public relations of transnational corporations - have had from the beginning similar origins and conceivably co-ordinated effects in metropolitan centres. The similarity of these origins refers to the whole linkage of the militarized economy and science with large systems for international management of the conditions of production and absorption of accumulation. However, the operative effects of these two generators remain on separate tracks up until when, in the society submitting to structural dependency, a fire of destructive economic and sociopolitical crises breaks out, burning the ruling structures. If the metropolitan hegemonies exert a decisive influence on those happenings, there follows a process of restructuring, for which is typical the association of the social and ideological creatures of both generators: a combination or symbiosis of military groups with the ideology of total repression and social groups, that is, ideological models that are the product of techno-economic and socio-cultural penetration of the transnational corporations, "technical aid," and great international projects. Such aid and projects include: "the green revolution," modernization of the exploitation of mineral and agricultural raw materials, placement of light industry and technologically dependent production of machines, co-operation in the production of nuclear energy, and so forth.

These two components - military groups and the social branches of transnational corporations - are the framework of the local social force that becomes the interested, politically and culturally conforming recipient of scientific-technological and total hegemony; between these two components there develops a symbiosis of power and interests, an osmosis of ideas, values, and orientations. The ideology of total repression unites with the ideology of technological and cultural dependency and assimilation; in this union repression gains strength as the condition of the entire dependent economic growth, technological progress, and "modernization of society," as a circle of insurmountable dependency on the import of prefabricated knowledge and technical and consumerist models is closed up by the ambitions of the protagonists of authoritarian rule.

I. The Brazilian nuclear programme and the treaty with the federal Republic of Germany

The Brazilian nuclear programme includes the construction of eight light-water PWR-KWU reactors of 1,300 MW each by 199O, besides the 627 MW Westinghouse reactor in final stage of construction, and the establishment of nuclear industry in Brazil in association with West German companies. The industry includes a heavy equipment factory for reactors, already in the last stage, and the nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing plants, which are still in design stage. With such purposes the Nuclear Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany was signed in 1975.

According to the originally announced conception of the Brazilian programme there would be approximately 60 reactors operating in the year 2000, totaling 75 GW of electric power. This prediction is not officially confirmed any more, and now even the Government admits that this programme was over-dimensioned.

Brazil has a hydroelectric potential of 200 GW, of which only 25 GW is presently utilized, and it is expected that 150 GW will be used by the year 2000. In spite of the great distances between many waterfalls and the big cities, it is possible to transmit the electric energy, with the final cost of the hydroelectric KW less than half that of the nuclear-KW cost. Besides, there is coal in the southern parts of the country. Therefore, nuclear energy is not yet an economic necessity to Brazil.

The question is: Why does Brazil go on with such an ambitious nuclear programme? What reasons lead developing countries to search for nuclear technology at any cost? Certainly there are reasons related to the security of the energy supply of a country in the long term, after the exhaustion of the hydroelectric potential and other sources. It is assumed that the construction of reactors would assure the possession of nuclear technology, which is necessary to a country's autonomy in the electric energy supply in the future. Other reasons are related to the myth of nuclear energy as a magic key to national progress and the allure it exerts on governments as a symbol of influence and national power.

We will try to discuss these two aspects, by analysing the Brazilian case, which is more familiar to us, thereby formulating some general conclusions. We will address ourselves to the following points:

a. Nuclear energy may be necessary to the economy of less developed countries in the future, but it requires a very delicate political appreciation and balance of the risks and benefits.

b. Nowadays the acquisition of sophisticated equipment from developed countries may not be the most appropriate way to assure control of nuclear technology in the future.

c. No matter how remote the military use could be, the prestige of the national power associated with the pacific employment of nuclear energy is undeniable. Indeed, this has been stimulated by the attitudes of the nuclear developed countries.

d. Regional co-operation among less developed countries in the execution of nuclear projects would not only increase the bargaining power of these countries in negotiations with the technology owners, but this might also avoid a foolish nuclear race. It would allow at the same time a reasonable internationalization of some stages of the nuclear industry, and a greater regional technical and economic autonomy.

e. The problem of nuclear proliferation related to armaments cannot be solved by the simple blockade of nuclear technology from less developed countries.

II. Perspectives on nuclear energy in Brazil

From the present perspective, nuclear energy will play an important role in Brazil's energy supply probably within 30 years. No matter how great the Brazilian hydroelectric potential is and no matter how modest the consumption of electricity may be, the day that this consumption will exceed that potential will come inevitably. Brazil cannot neglect nuclear technology, because it will be inevitable in the future. The idea that solar energy can be economically used to generate electricity on a large scale is improbable in the medium term. Other forms of indirect use of solar energy, such as biomass, are not appropriate to produce electricity either. Even if the use of alcohol in thermoelectric plants is possible, we cannot expect a substantial economical contribution from this mode of electricity generation.

The myth that developing countries have to concentrate on intermediate technologies that use intensive labour and little capital and apply rustic technology has its consequence on the energy field. This would imply the absolute priority of renewable sources and of the rustic ways of energy generation - as in the use of biomass, wood in particular, of biogas produced from animal wastes, of solar energy, etc. Although we do not need to stress that such alternatives can really be important in the short term in some specific cases, such as alcohol for vehicles and some applications of solar energy, we have to recognize that an efficient large-scale use of those non-conventional sources still requires time and investments in research and development in the long term.

Nevertheless, to found basically the development of the country on exotic and rustic techniques is a dangerous choice. In the energy case, this choice would imply the abandonment of important sources that could be found in the country's territory - petroleum and nuclear principally - to be used by the rich countries.

Therefore, nuclear energy may become necessary for Brazil in the future and it cannot be ignored. On the other hand, a subject that involves a delicate risk-benefit balance demands a political evaluation that transcends technical aspects. For political evaluation, the instrument is the democratic discussion, and for this political decision to be well-founded, the participation of the technical-scientific community is essential. This was not done in the case of the Nuclear Treaty because of diplomatic decisions that transformed its negotiation into a secret. However diplomatic success can be annulled by technical and economic problems.

The ecological aspect is a very important one. It is undeniable that the risk of accidents on reactors is greater than was believed, based on the Rasmunsen Report. The Three Mile Island accident has shown how important the question of reactor safety can be. The storage of radioactive wastes, on the other hand, stands without a final solution. These safety problems tend to be worse in less developed countries, because of three basic points:

a. the necessity of adapting nuclear standards and requirements from other countries, sometimes from more than one country, as is the case of Brazil, which has bought reactors from both the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany;

b. the weakness of the national licensing authorities, that not only have small budgets but also do not have the necessary independence and authority to fulfill some of their intended functions;

c. the lack of well-established public-opinion groups would could force the government into giving more attention to safety-related matters.

A severe comment on the solution adopted by the government involves the fact that the West German nuclear technology has been bought at a very high price, while there are enough hydroelectric resources and coal in the country to last for some decades. Denied the alleged hypothesis of nuclear energy urgency, there would be the possibility of developing in the country a more autonomous and modest nuclear project. Besides a greater control of the technology, this project could better adapt itself to Brazilian conditions. Also, it would make better use of internal resources, especially the scientific community almost completely forgotten in the West German treaty. Also, the national industry has limitations in the nuclear programme because of the specifications of the West German designs, which fatally require the importation of equipment from that country. Even if this equipment comes to be partially made in Brazil, it will be made by foreign companies or In joint venture with them. This will intensify the dependence of the electrical-generating-equipment industry, which is already dominated by the multi-national companies, despite the fact that the technology has been well known to Brazil for decades. The nuclear industry involves the most advanced, sophisticated technology and demands intensive capital. The importation of equipment for nuclear plants will aggravate the external debt, and the local fabrication of the equipment will have difficulties.

The economic reality of the country will cause the nuclear programme to be adjusted and decelerated, as is already happening.

III. Nuclear energy and the prestige of national power

To the economic arguments that led to the nuclear accord, we can add other speculative arguments of geo-political origin. Since India's explosion of the atomic bomb in 1974, all countries comparable in size to Brazil have the atomic bomb (the USA, the USSR, China, and India) or the technology to make it (Canada), besides other world powers that are smaller in territory (England and France).

Moreover, Argentina has chosen a technological line that has made her more independent in the nuclear field, possessing even the plutonium produced in the natural uranium reactor and stored in the burned fuel.

On the other hand, Brazil, even with the Angra I reactor, will not have unconditional possession of the plutonium from the burned fuel, that being subjected to stricter safeguards.

Plutonium is the material for the bomb, and the country which has it, using the technology that is already satisfactorily known, will be able to make nuclear weapons, although in a precarious way and with very limited or no military application.

The prestige of national power arising from the existence of nuclear installations in a country is undeniable, however remote is its intention of making nuclear weapons.

Brazil will have those means only if it has the full nuclear fuel cycle. As long as the enriched uranium must be imported, the spent fuel will be under severe safeguard.

From this point of view, the country must have both enrichment and reprocessing plants.

The USA is against this. It is still trying to avoid the sale of a reprocessing plant to Brazil, although it is not possible to cancel the immediate aspects of the Brazilian-German treaty. The North Americans know that it is an accord with multiple stages. Their government hopes that it will be possible to establish alternatives, such as a kind of accord that will conform voluntarily to an international co-operation system. They know that the first stage of the treaty will have to be executed.

In case the other stages of the accord are not executed, Brazil may find herself in the position of having bought the reactors and afterwards not having the guarantee of fuel supply. Without such guarantee we will be dependent upon negotiations as arduous as the one we have undergone with "Urenco." The decisive point is not the reprocessing but the fuel enrichment, and there will still be some time to wait until we know if it works. During this time we are building the reactors.

If the project fails, we will not have the prestige of national power like the other countries which have nuclear technology, and we will have the concrete onus of relying upon an imported fuel, enriched uranium, which may become more critical than oil, for a substantial part of our electric energy generation.

IV. The possibility of latin american nuclear co-operation

In Latin America it would be more reasonable if some countries at a comparable industrial and economical stage, such as Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico, united themselves to develop a nuclear programme, progressively including other countries as soon as they need this kind of energy.

A similar proposal of Latin American co-operation was recently made in a report of a study group formed by scientists of several countries, including European and North American, in the "Interciencia" symposium held in 1978. On the practical level, such a proposal will face the difficulties caused by the fact that the more advanced South American countries in the nuclear field - Argentina and Brazil - have adopted different technological lines. Brazil will use enriched uranium, and Argentina uses natural uranium. On the other hand, continental cooperation would bring the enormous advantage of eliminating the possibility of a senseless nuclear race with military implications. Moreover, this co-operation would permit a rational internationalization, at the South American level, of some steps of the nuclear industry, particularly the fuel cycle.

This attitude will also reinforce the Brazilian position of incorporating and dominating the fuel cycle, a point vigorously contested by the United States. The accord with West Germany is yet far from being irreversible, at least as far as the enrichment and reprocessing plants are concerned. It could be reversed, independently of Brazil, because of agreements between the United States and West Germany. Because it will take a long time before the technology can be effectively incorporated, the possibility that this incorporation may not take place is not unthinkable.

The United States, on the other hand, has proposed the internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle to avoid the proliferation of such technology and the dissemination of plutonium. This internationalization, under the hegemony of the countries already possessing nuclear technology, lacks trustworthiness because of the historical tradition of political and economical domination implicit in technological and industrial dependence. However, internationalization at a Latin American level could be feasible and could overcome the objections currently made by the North Americans in relation to the fuel cycle. It would also make valuable joint efforts possible, giving an adequate position to nuclear enterprises and strengthening the Latin American block in negotiations with the proprietors of the nuclear technology.

V. The position of brazil regarding nuclear proliferation

Brazil did not sign the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968, alleging that it intended to legitimate an unacceptable distribution of power, requiring the control of the pacific use of nuclear energy without imposing any obstacle to the growth of nuclear weapons among the world military powers.

On the other hand, Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which forbids the production or possession of nuclear weapons and the storage of nuclear weapons belonging to military nuclear countries in the territory of countries signatory to the treaty.

The official Brazilian position on to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has been endorsed even by some intransigent critics of the nuclear accord at the domestic level, and it is necessary to distinguish these domestic critics from the foreign pressures against the Brazilian nuclear programme.

This distinction of positions is essential not only for a correct understanding of the nuclear problem, but also for any realistic reformulation; from anyone who wishes to give further consideration to the Brazilian nuclear policy.

The objective of the scientists is for the country to follow an energy policy suitable to its real means and leading to greater autonomy. The aim of the international pressures from the London Club is to limit the autonomy of the less developed countries, such as Brazil. This is based on the hypothesis that the political irresponsibility of these countries with respect to international security will lead to a nuclear war, if they happen to dominate nuclear technology.

The foundation of this proposition is that the responsibility of the world military nuclear powers is enough to guarantee that a nuclear war does not occur. The historical tradition of some of these world powers, responsible for the worst wars and devastation the world has suffered, gives examples which deny the truth of this assertion.

The matter is not to defend the nuclear militarization of Latin America, but to put the international question under its true dimension: the question of the nuclear disarmament of the world powers. The right position, from our point of view, is to repudiate the military use of the nuclear technology in all countries of the world, while making clear that the great threat to the security of mankind is from the nuclear arms arsenal of the military world powers.


To complete this work, it is appropriate to add two appendices: The first, "Latin America as a Nuclear Market," is based on a report made by the President and the Executive Director of the American Nuclear Society, after the meeting of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission held in July 1979 in Chile. The second, "Comments on the Brazilian Energy Policy," is based on a report of our Energy Study Group of the Graduate School of Engineering (COPPE) of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.

While in "Latin America as a Nuclear Market" we can see the commercial point of view on nuclear energy and its implications in the international game, in "Comments on the Brazilian Energy Policy" we intend to show the socio-economic side of the most general energy questions and some national issues in Brazil.


Latin America is an emerging market for nuclear power reactors and appears perhaps to be the largest export market for reactor vendors in the next 20 years.

The population in Latin America is now about 340 million and is expected to become 600 million by the year 2000. With 260 million additional people and increasing industrialization, Latin America will need to increase electric energy production.

Existing technology and the shortages of fossil fuels in many areas may lead to nuclear energy. By the year 2000 it may be possible to have about 25,000 MW of nuclear power, although Brazil expects to exceed this capacity. The total electric energy production could reach 50,000 MW or even 150,000 MW. The difference will be mainly made up by conventional energy sources: hydra, coal, oil, and gas. A small part of the electrical energy will be produced by solar, wind, or geothermal energy (2000 MW) and by biomass (5000 MW).

Based on the present conditions, including the attitudes toward nuclear power in Latin America, it is estimated that there will be between 20 and 30 reactors operating in Latin America by the year 2000 and another 30 or 40 under construction. They would be in the following countries: Brazil (10-30), Argentina (2-6), Mexico (2-10), Venezuela (1-3), Chile (1-2), Peru (1-2), and Colombia (1-2).

(Based on a report by U. Du Temple and E. Menelly of the meeting of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) held in July 1979 in Chile, published in Nuclear News, September 1979 (59).)

Argentina is the first country in Latin America which has used nuclear power. The first nuclear plant is Atucha, near Buenos Aires, with a heavy-water reactor (Siemens) of 367 MW, operating since 1974. There is another HWR (CANDU) plant of 600 MW under construction near Cordoba, by a consortium of Canadians, Italians, and Argentinians. This plant will start operation within two years. Argentina has plans to build four additional plants, all of the natural uranium and heavy-water type. It seems that the reactor vendor for the first of these plants will be KWU.

Two of the principal points of the Argentine nuclear programme are:

a. that Argentina would secure integrated self-sufficiency in the field of nuclear energy;

b. that Argentina would establish an integrated industry for developing the fuel cycle at all stages.

According to the report of the IANEC meeting, the two objectives have been followed quite closely. Argentina has an estimated reserve of 25,000 tons of U3O8, and it produced 110 tons of UO2 in 1978. There is a pilot plant for fabricating the fuel element. Future plans call for the production of zirconium tubes for cladding the fuel. Argentinians now have an experimental plant producing three tons of heavy water per year. They plan to produce all of the heavy water for the nuclear programme (hundreds of tons per year).

There is a technology transfer programme between Argentina and Peru, by which Argentina supplies two small reactors to the Peruvian Institute of Nuclear Energy. One of those reactors, for training, is completed and the other one, for isotope production, is being constructed.

Venezuela has stated its intention to have a nuclear plant on line by the early 1990s. However the government attitude toward nuclear energy does not appear enthusiastic. Hydro and coal-fired plants with some oil plants are expected to meet the electricity demands for the next 15 years.

Chile is planning to build a 600 MW electric nuclear plant near Santiago. The studies are being advised by a North American firm. The reactor is expected to be named soon. Chile is believed to have enough uranium to support a domestic nuclear programme, but the extent of these deposits are not well known.

Mexico intends to have two power reactors at the Laguna Verde plant in operation by the 1980s. Equador has made an agreement for the supply of a research reactor by Spain; and Paraguay has a small research reactor.

The report discusses in detail the Brazilian nuclear programme which we have already explained in another part of this work. The general impression from the report is that Brazil, though friendly with all its neighbors, is very competitive with Argentina and appears to be going it alone in nuclear development with the help of West German technology.

The report concludes that Latin America appears to offer the greatest external market for all exporters of nuclear reactors and associated services for the next ten years. However, United States policy may have helped European firms to gain ground in this market. The Latin American countries complain that the United States does not trust them and restrains the transfer of technology to them. In addition, the United States is accused of using its influence with European countries to hinder any nuclear development in South America. As a result, the United States has been virtually excluded from South American nuclear markets. It is still not considered a reliable supplier of fuel, enrichment services, and reactors.

Consequently, the development of a Spanish-speaking, independent consortium to develop nuclear power appears to be in the making. With the uranium resources of Latin America and technical experience and expertise of Spain and Argentina, it can develop nuclear reactors with the help of Canadian and European technology. This kind of cooperation among Spanish-speaking countries to develop nuclear technology shows that it could be possible to realize the Latin American nuclear co-operation we have pointed out in this paper.


The energy policy in all western countries before the petroleum crisis in 1973, had a basic goal of supplying the explicit needs of energy at the lowest price.

This policy has resulted in the problems we know very well in our days. The main lesson of this crisis, from our point of view, is that an effective energy policy cannot be limited to supplying the demand and cannot be only oriented to the search for the minimum price.

An effective energy policy must also orient the energy demand to make it consistent with the global objectives of the country. In case of a country with a non-coherent industrial system - one which does not include the complete production of machines and equipment, and in which the energy sector is almost completely controlled by the government - the energy policy could have an important role in directing the construction of a coherent structure of production. It can lead to the introduction into the country of certain industries which still do not exist but are crucial to the reproduction and expansion of the industrial system. But it can also allow the reduction of the rate of growth of some industries which are not convenient to the country, because they are strongly dependent on developed countries.

The energy policy, if well oriented, can be one of the most important poles directing the industrial policy of the country, as the energy enterprises are responsible for a substantial part of the purchases of equipment. On the other hand they have influence on industrial costs through the energy prices.

This same policy can be used to improve regional development in parts of the country which are not industrialized up to now.

The energy policy can be also responsible for the development of national technology. Thus, the construction of thermoelectric plants in France has allowed the development of their national industry of turbines. In Brazil, the construction of hydroelectric plants has allowed the development of an advanced national technology for dam construction, but the same did not happen with the equipment for these plants.

The energy policy must also take into account several other elements. In a developing country, with a non-coherent industrial system, the need for foreign currency for productive activities is always important. Thus, the reduction of expenses on imports for the energy sector becomes important. This way we improve the degree of coherence of the system, and on the other side, we free foreign currency reserves for the more important need of the country to achieve greater industrial progress. For this purpose, it is necessary that the energy policy shift the consumption towards indigenous energy resources, in both aspects of technology and supply.

This policy would also allow an improvement in the security of the energy supply. This point is not irrelevant, since energy is crucial to sustain productive activities. An interruption in the energy supply of the country - with the threat of uranium embargo by the USA exemplifying this possibility - can generate an economic crisis. We must be protected against it.

Besides, an indigenous energy source allows the pricing policy to be controlled by the country, avoiding the price fluctuations on the international market that could interfere with the energy policy.

It is important to point out that we must not forget the environmental problem. The energy consumption is, in our time, large and concentrated enough to produce serious effects on the ecological equilibrium of some regions. This exacts a social cost which can be large but has been forgotten in most of the cases. It is necessary to take this cost into account; otherwise, sooner or later the country will have to pay for it. An energy policy which does not include this question will bear on future generations the consequences of irresponsibility.

Finally, the energy policy should be strongly related to the social and economic policy. There is no way to separate it from the national planning we have in mind for the future. Either we will maintain a high concentration of revenue, socially and regionally, or we will try to reach a more reasonable distribution of the national revenue. This is neither a rhetorical nor an idealistic question. It would be unrealistic to separate the technical and political discussions on energy from the economic and social context. Institutional changes are to be hoped for in the direction of democratization and decentralization. Second, the workers seem to become more important in the political decisions, independently of formal changes. To forget this fact in the discussions on energy demand is a serious error. We shall remember that (a) the rates of domestic consumption of energy are highly unequal, (b) the sophisticated goods incorporated in the middle-class standard of living demand a high use of energy, (c) public transport is insufficient and its service is very bad, (d) the private car has all the privileges, as we can see by the costly highways in large towns.

To this disparity in the social consumption of energy we have to add the disparity of the industrial system, which produces goods for a relatively small part of the population or for export and neglects almost completely the needs of the majority of the people.

The re-orientation of energy demand is the basic condition for an effective energy policy in Brazil. We have to abandon the idea that the energy demand is a variable on which we cannot have any influence. The social demand is not the direct expression of a fundamental need of people but the result of a contradictory process of confrontation between the wish and the other offer.


1. U. Du Temple and E. Menelly, Nuclear News, Sept. 1979, p. 59.

2. A. Oliveira, C. Sigaud, and L. Pinguelli Rosa, Comments on the Brazilian Energy Policy.

3. N. Gall, Foreign Policy, vol. 23 (1976), p. 155.

4. C. Walske, International Security, vol. 1, no. 3 (1977), p. 94.

5. E. Teller, Science and Public Policy, June 1977, p. 234.

6. C. Lebrun and M. Mezin, Recherche, vol. 71 (Oct. 1976), p. 823.

7. J. M. Haucuz, Interciia, Sep./Oct. 1977, p. 264.

8. Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices, Ford Foundation Report/MITRE Corporation, 1977.

9. H. Feiveson et al., Bull At. Sc., Dec. 1976, p. 10.

10. J. Surrey and C. Hugget, Energy, Dec. 1976, p. 292.

11. B. Laponche, Bull At. Sc., Dec. 1976, p. 45.

12. R. Guard, Energy Interm., May 1977, p. 17.

13. J. A. Sabato, World Development, vol. 1, no. 8 (Aug. 1973), p. 23.

14. WASH 1.400, Reactor Safety Study (Rasmunsen Report), 1975.

15. Report of the American Physical Society, Rev. Modern Physics, vol. 47 suppl., p. 75.


The author is deeply indebted to Professor Luiz Fernando de Oliveira of the Nuclear Engineering Programme (COPPE/UFRJ) for stimulating discussions, and to Professor Adilson de Oliveira of the inter-disciplinary Area of Energy (COPPE/UFRJ) for having made some suggestions in this work.


Chairman: Celso Furtado
Co-chairman: Zvonimir Damjanovic
Rapporteur: Ahmad Yousef Hassan


Gregory Blue

As observed by Dr. Pinguelli Rosa in one of the last interventions in the conference's fifth session, there was to be witnessed throughout almost the entire proceedings a marked ambivalence towards contemporary science and technology. It can be argued this ambivalence was a reflection of the objective but contradictory roles which they are and will be required to fulfill. The contradictory potentials of science and technology were brought home forcefully by Drs. Pecujlic and Vidakovic when they evoked the image of the "two faces" which they exhibit, and implications for the social sciences were raised by Dr. Bonfil Batalla.

Although their functions in the modern world may indeed be variable, science and technology nevertheless constitute organic components of contemporary culture, as pointed out by Dr. Damjanovic: they affect every society vitally through their impact on production. As distinct from other aspects of culture, however, they are necessarily rooted in an international or universal dimension. Historical light was thrown on the differential aspects of scientific and technological universality by Mr. Bluets discussion of Joseph Needham's work on the history of science in China and the West and by Dr. Nakeaka's detailed account of the mastering of metallurgical techniques in Japan in the nineteenth century.

Dependence by Third World countries in the fields of science and technology has been and continues to be an essential but nevertheless distinct part within the general structure of domination to which these countries have been subjected. Unfortunately, because the various non-European civilizations have to one extent or another been subject to European domination in general and also to modern science and technology, whose development has for a relatively long period of time been centred within the European cultural area, there has arisen a now widespread notion that proficiency in science and technology are uniquely European traits. In this fifth session, special attention was paid to refuting this thesis in the presentations by Mr. Blue and Dr. Nakaoka in relation to the natural sciences and technology, in that by Dr. Bonfil Batalla in relation to the social sciences, and during the discussion in the intervention by Dr. Pandeya.

All five of the position papers presented emphasized that for Third World peoples to overcome dependence in the fields of science and technology it is necessary to rely on and strengthen endogenous facilities and potentials while simultaneously drawing on global achievements in all fields. The importance of achieving endogenous creativity was likewise stressed throughout the session.

Anouar AbJel-Malek, Salustiano del Campo Urbano, Celso Furtado, Alexander Kwapong, Imre Marton, A.N. Pandeya, Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, and Immanuel Wallerstein took part in the discussion.


Ahmad Your Harlan

1. Dr. Guillermo Bonfil Batalla presented his paper on "The Recuperation and Appropriation of Social Sciences in the Context of Endogeneous Cultural Projects." The paper discusses the relationship between traditional social knowledge and formal social sciences in the case of the native peasant Indian peoples of Latin America.

In the first and second parts, four main points are made:

(a) All societies need scientific social knowledge in order to invent and build their own futures.

(b) Western social sciences have no universal validity and they cannot cope adequately with problems faced by other peoples with different civilizations.

(c) The knowledge about society, e.g., in the case of Latin American Indian peoples about their own societies, is not institutionalized nor systematically organized.

(d) The social science which is needed to help these peoples in their liberation effort must include the systematic knowledge both of their own societies and of the dominant hegemonic societies.

Next, the paper discusses the problem of a new, emerging Indian intelligentsia, as a product of different factors: expansion of school system, migration, etc.

A new intelligentsia is needed in order to concentrate, develop, and formalize traditional knowledge about society and, at the same time, to introduce in this knowledge adequate information and methodological tools of the formal social sciences. The intelligentsia is a first step in the process of institutionalization of traditional knowledge. Without an institutional knowledge, it is very difficult to have an equalitarian dialogue between western and Indian social thought.

Finally the political perspectives of the new Indian intelligentsia are discussed. All the forces and interests of the established political and economic system play against the independence and progressive role of the Indian intelligentsia. The only chance is to become an organic intelligentsia, deeply rooted in the true interest of their own people.

2. Dr. Miroslav Pecuilic presented his paper entitled "On the Edge of a Razor Blade: The New Historical Blocs and Socio-cultural Alternatives in Europe." The paper dealt with the greatest challenge of all: the creation of knowledge suited to our epoch, its fascinating possibilities, and its cruel dangers. The first part of the paper dealt with the two faces of science and technology. In one face social progress was equated with technological growth. The other face came with the slogan "technology inevitably dehumanizes and enslaves man." Part two of the paper spoke about the pathology of power and science, and part three of the new protagonists - social movements and organic intelligentsia. In part four he spoke about the alternatives striving for a new quality of human existence. At the end of the paper he spoke about self-reliance and solidarity or autonomy and new universality.

In speaking about the other face of science and technology, it is stated that it is of decisive importance to realize that science and technology are not negative factors in themselves; they turn into that when becoming part of an antagonistic social arrangement. What we are seeking is a new type of society, of civilization, which is to be a more favourable framework for the development of the authentic potentials of man.

The new culture or civilization cannot be built without international solidarity. Without mutuality, there is no autonomy.

The coming era has opened a glorious but also a critical period of overall interdependence. We are living in a planetary world society. A pluralism of cultures is necessary in order to have the world become a society which is not uniform and indistinguishable. Only autonomy, independence, and equality can be a path leading towards universal richness. Differences will remain. But the decisive question is whether they will turn into hostility and antagonism. (The full text of the paper is included as section V of this report.)

3. Tetsuro Nakaoka spoke about "Science and Technology in the History of Modern Japan - Imitation or Endogenous Creativity?". He exposed the relation between exogenous and endogenous influences in scientific and technical development exemplified by the particular case of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century. Citing the example of the Kamaishi Iron Works it is concluded that science and technology must have their roots in the culture of society. It is impossible for developing countries to make any progress without any imitation or borrowing of technology. Europe learned from the highly advanced Arabic, Indian, and Chinese cultural areas. Examples are cited from the Japanese experience. New technology is acquired and assimilated in "leaps." Japan's technological development can be understood as passing through a series of leaps. The paper spoke about the dynamics of interaction between exogenous and endogenous forces. It also spoke about the gap between the advanced areas and the backward areas of the economy in Japan. The paper concludes that technological leaps can be regarded as elements of dynamic progress in society. They can work as excellent incitements to endogenous creativity; in other conditions they can become the starting point for serious conflicts.

4. Dr. Zvonimir Damjanovic spoke in his paper about "Science and Technology as Organic Parts of Contemporary Culture." The paper elaborates certain theses: (1) That science cannot be developed primarily through needs of local, divided, practical activities in detail. A broad population should be cultivated in science. (2) Technology has grown out of and over its old frame, which was mere application of basic knowledge. Competence in technology is not a matter of choice, of some local priorities. It appears as a part of basic culture of a broad enough population. (3) Science and technology are not a set of recipes. They are rather a way of thinking. The spirit of science cannot be bottled.(4) As collective intellect science and technology are deeply rooted in the human race. No national culture will survive unless it makes space within itself for the all-human complement of scientific-technological culture. (5) Far from creating unemployment, science and technology liberate man from dull work, from over-work. They render the majority of people competent, not only for technical but also for social and political matters. (6) Developing countries are in great need of the development of science and technology. But the problems are not specific to them. All countries are equally faced with the problems of adaptation to the new developments.

5. Mr. Gregory Blue presented his position paper entitled "Joseph Needham's Contribution to the History of Science and Technology in China," and he dealt with three points concerning the development of the national sciences. First of all, he pointed out that medieval China, like other non-European civilizations, had a relatively high level of medieval science and technology, in relation to Europe. Transmission of technology and knowledge of natural phenomena from China to Europe was large and attests to the international and cumulative nature of techno-scientific advance. Traditional China, like other civilizations, formulated problems and generated techniques which represented key factors both in transforming medieval Europe and in the eventual development of distinctively modern science.

The second point concerned the relation between traditional and modern science. It was noted that traditional science, e.g., in China, did have sophisticated bodies of theory, controlled experimentation, etc.; but it remained fixed in untestable, ethnicbound categories. Modern science, on the other hand, uses universalized, mathematical experimentation in order to test its fundamental categories; it thus tends to become oecumenical. Discussion was given to the temporal lag between development of modern science and the realization of its oecumenical character.

The third point concerned the fact that the written material recording the achievements of traditional Chinese science and technology is only one source of knowledge of the tradition, for much valuable traditional knowledge remains alive among the people. A government policy can facilitate tapping of this knowledge by creating conditions in which both traditional science and modern science are geared to the basic interests of the people.


1. Dr. Immanuel Wallerstein remarked that, until this session, speakers referred to science and technology in the sense of physical and biological science and technology only. In this session speakers included the social sciences. We must emphasize the role of the social sciences when we speak of the endogenous capacity of the developing countries. Mr. Blue said in his paper that current ecumenical sciences can benefit from the regional traditional sciences. This may apply also to the social sciences which can benefit also from the traditional cultures of the East.

2. Dr. Salustiano del Campo made four points. First the type of political power, institutional or democratic and its relation to the institutions and development of science and technology in different societies. Second he called attention to the social structure of Europe at the time science and technology developed in comparison to the social situations of some of the societies where science and technology originated. Third, he put the question of the role social science has played in the spread of science and technology. Fourth he mentioned the particular case of some intermediate societies, modern but traditional, developed and developing at the same time, and invited the interest of participants to get more thorough knowledge of such societies.

3. Dr. Imre Marton commented as follows:

La communication prntpar le professeur Miroslav Pecujlic, recteur de l'Universite Belgrade, m'encourage a partager avec vous des prcupations li a ['impact des distorsions, des tensions nomiques et sociales sur le syst de formation dans le secondaire et le supeur, de m que sur le comportement des diants vis-is du savoir et de leur mission sociale, ceci dans les trots mondes.

11 s'agit selon moi d'une surproduction de dipl et d'une sous-production d'intellectuels visant a la crivitcientifique et a une attitude critique vis-is d'eux-ms et des maux locaux. Je manifeste une exacerbation de la contradiction entre travail manuel et intellectuel. Cette course effre des jeunes en Europe occidentale vers le diplrnd a deux visses contradictoires: d'une part relment du niveau de qualification professionnelle et de la culture grais, d'autre part mis, dation du travail manuel, productif, insertion a tout prix dans la soci de consommation. En raison de la dalification et de la surqualification du travail manuel et intellectuel on observe un secteur traditionnel et moderne dans les sphs des activitde production matelle et intellectuelle. Masse croissants de manoeuvres recrutes avant tout parmi les travail leurs angers dans l es pays capitalistes dloppes et mince couche de spalistes hautement qualifies. Une partie importante des dipl deviennent parasitaires ou des gentleman's dipl. Des phms analogues se man infestent de nos jours dans les pays social sites. En Afrique j'ai lement observe que la lutte contra l'analphabsme, I 'extension du syst scolaire, l'elevation rapide du taux de scolarisation, donc cette dialectique ascendants, it pervertie par une dialectique ntive selon ['expression utilis par le professeur Abdel-Malek. Les scolarises du secondaire fuient le travail manuel, le village, et prrent grossir dans les vines les masses flottantes, deuvr, le sous-prolriat.

Les dipl vent inss dans la fonction publique indndamment des besoins de la soci. Ils visent a cr une client tribale, ethnique ou autre pour satisfaire leurs ambitions personnelles et politiques. L'le en partie est source de che et de la production d'une te parasitaire, bureaucratique, ceci en raison des dntations nomiques, culturelles, sociales, rationnels, reproduisant le sous-dloppement.

L'intt de ce snaire international est d'aborder les grand probls du monde d'aujourd'hui en avant recours a une approche globalisante, analytique, et critique, rejetant les variantes de l'europentrisme et du tiermondisme. Je voudrais conclure en disant que la probltique du rde la science et de la technique dans la transformation du monde doit inclure les probls de la formation, de la dalification massive, et de la surqualification tistes de la force de travail manuel et intellectuel.

4. Dr. Alexander Kwapong raised three points. First, he referred to the UN Conference on S&T for Development (UNCSTD) in Vienna, August 1979, where he noted the dichotomy which existed between scientists and politicians. There was a gap between the two. Second, as an African living in Japan he was interested in the Japanese experience. His great hero is the founder of that dynasty which helped to create modern Japan. History of Japan should be of great interest to all developing countries. Historical dimensions must be underlined again and again in development, which is a long process of gestation. It is a question of interaction between exogenous and endogenous factors. He referred to the observation of Dr. Damjanovic who said that it is cheap to buy computers but it is expensive to create human skills. One should be aware of the importance which should be given to education. An infrastructure of human experience must be built. People must be motivated, mobilized, educated, trained, and naturally disciplined. Third, he referred to this seminar and said that this occasion should not end here. The knowledge conveyed here must be disseminated. It must be applied to realities. We should always move from theory into practice, and our ideas must be brought out.

5. Dr. A. N. Pandeya commented on Dr. Nakaoka's statement about how he was motivated by Dr. Pandeya to write about the Japanese experience. Credit should be given not to him but to vice-rector Dr. Mushakoji and to Dr. Anouar Abdel-Malek. What happened in Kyoto was relevant. Bridges are between the minds of peoples of different cultures. Commenting on the papers he said that they are rich, but he had three comments to make. First, that science and technology become tremendous forces when linked with the culture and tradition of a nation. This fusion is our duty, and the UNU should also attend fully to the problem. Second, the famous question raised by Weber on how it comes that science and technology and capitalism were European creations, is a false question. Science and technology are basic components of knowledge, and necessary ones in any culture. No culture or civilization can claim that it created science by itself. Our aim is to develop the capacity of generating knowledge. All the Third World is confronted with the question of creating the capacity to generate new knowledge. Third, we must seek to generate and disseminate knowledge to benefit the deprived sections of society. In India 28 per cent of the population are still composed of tribal groups. They are economically and politically the most deprived. This question should be given priority. Some disastrous views call for not disrupting these societies. We cannot leave people as museum pieces. Man is the target, and should remain our target all the time.

6. Dr. Luiz Pinguelli Rosa said that in general we put together science and technology, but sometimes it would be better to separate one from another to understand some aspects of the question which concerns the underdeveloped countries. Sometimes there is a large distance between the scientific knowledge and its applications to transform the world. I will take an example from the talk of Gregory Blue in this session. Magnetism was known in old China but it has been applied in large scale only by Western civilization, starting in Spain and Portugal in navigation at the time of the Commercial Revolution. What we can conclude is that we must have objective conditions for the applications of science, otherwise we do not have technology coming from the scientific knowledge. This is important for our discussion because many underdeveloped countries have put a lot of money into developing science - e.g., Brazil and Argentina - without profit to productive activities. The economic and political conditions of these countries lead them to buy everything they need from multinational corporations, even the design of the simplest product we can imagine. So we cannot discuss scientific and technological policy without discussing also the role of multinational corporations in the underdeveloped countries. We have spoken here very much of the internationalization as a boundary condition imposed by the multinational corporations, but if we are interested in the transformation of the world, we have to discuss better this kind of internationalization, instead of taking it as immutable input data.

7. Dr. Anouar Abdel-Malek in a short comment on Dr. Rosa's intervention warned of the dangers of utopianism against vision. He referred to conflicting priorities, and how we cannot speak of bad science and technology.

8. Dr. Celso Furtado ended the session by referring to the relation between science and civilization, the nature of science and ecumenical science.


Science and technology are not the products of modern societies alone. Science and technology in Europe have been influenced and based upon the heritage of other civilizations. Although distinctively modern science has arisen in Europe since the sixteenth century, the birth of modern science owed much to the preceding achievements of Greek, Indian, Chinese, and Islamic/Arabic science. For example, in the first fifteen centuries of our era, a large number of mechanical and other innovations were transmitted from China to Europe, and these were large factors not only in revolutionizing medieval Europe, but also in the constitution of modern science itself. The same can be said of the transmission of techniques and the exact sciences from the Arabic world to the Latin West through commercial and cultural contact and through the movement of translations into Latin between the ninth and fourteenth century. This point shows that science and technology are not creations of any one civilization alone. Science can flourish because of beneficial social and political conditions. When we consider the birth of modern science we see that it was also linked to the particular social evolution that took place in the West.

Science and technology continued to expand and flourish in the West, whereas they developed at a much slower rate in the civilizations of the East. Science and technology as developed in Europe consequently were employed as means for domination and suppression, which tended to hinder similar developments within the other regions of the world.

If favourable conditions can be created for the development of science and technology in any country, whether in the East or in the West, then there will be a flourishing, as can be seen from the Japanese experience. Here we have the example of a "late-coming" Asian country which was underdeveloped in science and technology, yet favourable conditions were created in that country because of the lack of foreign domination, because of the presence of an independent, strong control government, and because of the interaction of endogenous and exogenous factors. The Japanese experience shows that modern technology can be successfully incorporated into local culture, provided that certain prerequisites are met.

It seems beyond doubt that human freedom and national liberty depend on economic independence. Having in mind the role which science and technology play in economic development, attention is much given to the discrepancy in the level of research and education between the "North" and the "South," that is between developed nations leading in science, and the bulk of humanity, still striving in poverty for cultural recognition and freedom from domination. But pleading for more science and technology alone does not seem to affect very much cultural emancipation whose dominant aim is to preserve and revive national roots and culture and so to open the prospective of human civilization as a plurality of national cultures. As was outlined above, science and technology have been throughout their history deeply rooted in the human race, and all attempts to ascribe them to any one nation, or group, as local achievements or characteristics, are false. Whatever the national culture is like, science and technology can fit in, as complements. And though it may seem a paradox, no national culture will survive, unless it makes space within itself for the scientific technological culture.

Science cannot be developed primarily through the needs of local, divided practical activities. It is also impossible to plan scientific application in detail. Therefore, a broad population should be cultivated in science in order to help society to develop in a competent way. Similarly competence in technology is not a matter of choice or some local priorities. It is a part of a basic culture of a broad population.

Science and technology are a way of thinking. They deal with basic things in the human environment and in humans themselves. Therefore it is not possible for a society to benefit from science and technology without being exposed to their influence on human behaviour.

Far from looking upon science and technology as creating unemployment, they must be considered as liberating man from dull work and over-work. Science and technology are thus prerequisites of emancipation and development.

When speaking about science and technology it was usually implied that we were speaking only of physical and biological sciences. The role of social sciences was usually ignored. All societies need scientific social knowledge in order to build their own futures. Western social sciences have not universal validity and they cannot adequately cope with the problems faced by other peoples with different civilizations. The knowledge of the members of certain cultures about their own societies is not institutionalized nor systematically organized. The social science which is needed to help these peoples in their liberation effort must include both the systematic knowledge of their own societies and of the dominant hegemonic societies.

Hegemony is not being maintained only through repression, but also through cultural domination. The ability to conceive new visions is becoming decisive. We are confronted by the greatest challenge of all, the creation of a knowledge that is suited to our epoch. There are two faces of science and technology. There is the vision of social and economic growth, and there is the vision of an uncertain future and the illusory criticism of technology which gave rise to the slogan "protect us from technology." However, it is of decisive importance to realize that science and technology are not negative powers in themselves, they turn into that when becoming part of an antagonistic social arrangement. What we are seeking is a new type of society or civilization which is to be a more favourable framework for the development of the authentic potentials of man.

The new culture or civilization cannot be built without international solidarity. Without mutuality, there is no autonomy.

The coming era opens a glorious but also critical period of overall interdependence. We are living in a planetary world society. A pluralism of cultures is necessary in order to have the world become a society which is not uniform and indistinguishable. Only autonomy, independence, and equality can lead toward universal richness. Differences will remain. But the decisive question is whether they will lead to a mutual complementarity, or whether they will turn into hostility and antagonism.


Pretendo presentar en este documento algunos elemen tos que contribuyen a la discusiobre el problema de quelaciones puede haber entre las ciencias sociales, reconocidas convencionalmente como tales en la tradiciccidental, y la visiociohistca organizada que todo pueblo posee en el contexto de su propia cultura. Se trata, en a instancia, de las relaciones entre dos modos del conocimiento sobre lo social, en vistas al establecimiento de alternativas socioculturales para el desarrollo.

El marco de referencia de las pnas siguientes lo forman los pueblos indios de Amca Latina.

I. El problema de la creatividad endógena en ciencias sociales.

Ya es un lugar comigir, en cualquier proyecto de desarrollo, sea e convencional o alternativo, la realizacie investigaciones sociales. Todo mundo acepta que el conocimiento cientco de la realidad social cuyo desarrollo se busca promover, es un requisito ineludible que debe cumplirse por personal calificado y cuyos resultados aportaran - informaciones indispensables para guiar las diversas modelada des, etapas y aspectos del programa en cuestiLa idea de que la participacie las ciencias sociales es necesaria estan generalizada, que a veces se incluye un equipo de especialistas en estas disciplinas sin que se tenga claridad de cual es la funciue habrde desempeni cuales las - aportaciones que de ellos se deben esperar; se incorporan por que se presupone que debe haber cientcos sociales en todo equipo de este tipo.

La cuestie complica cuando lo que se discute no es ya si participan o no cientcos sociales, sino cual, dentro de las muchas corrientes y escuelas que conforman el universo de las ciencias sociales, resulta la madecuada para los objetivos que se persiguen. En efecto, la diversidad de tendencias teas y metodolas en el camp las ciencias sociales es un hecho palpable que, adem parece acentuarse en ciertas cas. Las ideolog polcas impltas o atribuidas a cada corriente de pensamiento identificable en las ciencias sociales, juega con frecuencia un papel determinante en la selecciinal; esto, u a la preponderancia de cierta corriente en las instituciones y los aparatos que auspician y llevan a cabo los proyectos, va conformando paula finamente la hegemonde cierto "modo de pensar" la ciencia social, con su correspondiente modo de hacerla.

En todo caso, la determinacie cuciencia social habre intervenir en la formulacie un proyecto de desarrollo, queda encuadrada exclusivamente en el marco de in teresas y convicciones de los sectores que toman la decisiNo entraremos aqu discutir cuales son los mecanismos que legitiman a una u otra corriente; participaran en ese proceso de legitimaciseguramente, las instituciones especializadas en producir y reproducir este camp conocimiento convencionalmente acotado; intervendrtambilos especialistas reconocidos que detentan el control de la sabidurigual mente reconocida; quienes no intervienen en ningso, son precisamente los sectores que serobjeto de estudio. Ellos son objeto, nunca sujeto, porque se asume que la ciencias social es un conocimiento que algunos adquieren para sistematizar e interpretar de manera cientca lo que otros son, gureo y pueden.

En efecto, ¿cuo se ha pensado que los indios de una tribu amaza o los campesinos mayas de Yucattengan algo que decir en relacion las ciencias sociales? Se supone, sque ellos deberaportar informacique ellos mismos son datos. Si acaso se admite que sus aspiraciones, sus "necesidades sentidas" deben ser conocidas por el investigador social y habrde tomarse en cuenta en la organizacie los planes de desarrollo. Pero no pasa por la mente la - idea de que puedan aportar algo a la "manera de pensar" la -ciencias social.

Veamos ahora otro aspecto del problema. Un rasgo comtodos los esfuerzos para encontrar alternativas socio culturales para el desarrollo, consiste en la afirmacie que todos los sectores involucrados en el proceso deben participar activamente en Esta participacie quiere consciente y profundamente motivada. No basta con la participaciasiva del informante que simplemente responde cuestiona r de entrevista; tampoco con la pura participacisalariada de los individuos que aportan su mano de obra para la ejecucie los proyectos. Se pretende lograr una participacireativa, que ponga en juego todas las capacidades individuales y sociales, tanto en la concepciomo en la ejecucie las actividades encaminadas al desarrollo. No se trata de que la gente aprenda por imitacisino de que desarrolle, saque de s! y acreciente el enorme caudal de sus potencialidades creativas. Es un proceso interno, endo, en el que se insertaran oportunamente y conforme resulten necesarios los conocimientos y las habilidades desarrollados por so ciudades tecnolamente mavanzadas.

Si esto es valido para la tecnology para la organizacie trabajo, ¿como Puede expresarse en el ito del conocimiento social? ¿Hay una Ciencia social recuperable en todo grupo que posee una cultura distintiva? Si hay tecnolog paralelas o alternativas ¿hay tambiciencias sociales paralelas y alternativas? ¿Se puede insertar en el tronco de las ciencias sociales "nativas" el conocimiento de las ciencias sociales reconocidas y legitimadas, o solo cabe, en este terreno, la traducciel conocimiento? Estamos en un campsbaloso en el que ciencia e ideologno se pueden separar flmente. Pero, a fin de cuentas, no es un problema esencialmente diferente del que se nos presenta cuando discutimos sobre tecnologagrla o pricas mcas.

De hecho la necesidad de rescatar el conocimiento social propio es mucho mas apremiante e indispensable que la de recuperar muchas otras arcas del conocimiento endo. No se conciben alternativas socioculturales al desarrollo que no impliquen el reconocimiento y la legitimidad de un modelo de sociedad propio y tal modelo solo puede formularse a partir de una concepciistematizada y organizada de lo que es la sociedad, de co» se transforma y porqude cuha sido su historia y cuales sus recursos para construir el futuro. Se trata, pues, de una sociologo si se prefiere, de una "etno sociolog.

Apuntemos ahora algunos aspectos relevantes para el problema de como rescatar y desarrollar esa sociologenda y como vincularla fructramente con las ciencias sociales reconocidas por la tradiciominante.

Toda sociedad posee y emplea un determinado conocimiento sobre si misma y sobre las demsociedades con las -que estn relaciEste conocimiento le permite a los miembros del grupo normar y justificar su conducta en el seno de la propia sociedad y ante quienes no pertenecen a ella.

Cada sistema conceptual y explicativo de la realidad social incluye los criterios que permiten clasificar en categor sociales significativas a todos los individuos, -pertenezcan ano al grupo. Al interior del sistema social, el conjunto articulado de categor sociales reconocidas expresa las atribuciones de quienes integran cada una de ellas y presupone el tipo de relaciones posibles en el conjunto del sistema. El sistema de parentesco, por ejemplo, que a voces es muy complejo, debe ser conocido por cada miembro del grupo en muchas sociedades Indias latinoamericanas, porque es el co que le permite actuar en la forma prescrita en situaciones relevantes de la vida social. Es un co de relaciones sociales que implica derechos y deberes, reciprocidad y aseter entre quienes participan de Los mismo puede decir se de los sistemas de poder, de las formas de organizacierritorial, de las instituciones de trabajo colectivo y de los especialistas que tienen a su cargo funciones especificase en cada caso hay un conocimiento social que es indispensable para el funcionamiento de la sociedad.

La relacion otras sociedades tambiesta conceptualizada. En principio, todos los miembros del mismo grupo forman una categordistinta de la que se asigna a los miembros de otras sociedades. Frecuentemente, en grupos indios latinoamericanos, el tino que sirve como autodesignacion significa "los hombres" o "los hombres verdaderos"; los extrason clasificados en diversas categor que a veces revelan una ideologetnacrica, como en el caso del tino "chichimeca", que emplearon los pueblos de habla nahua del centro de Mco para designar a los grupos nas del norte y que tiene una fuerte carga despectiva. Este sistema de cate gorras tambicodifica el tipo de relaciones previsibles y expresa el conocimiento que se tiene de la posiciel grupo en relacion los dem No se trata de un conocimiento abstracto, sino que es el resultado de una historia concreta.

El conocimiento histco reviste una importancia particular para muchos pueblos indios latinoamericanos. La -historia no es solamente una secuencia de acontecimientos: es, ante todo, una explicacie la situaciresente y el fundamento para la imaginaciel futuro. La memoria hista, el conocimiento del devenir en el tiempo, mezcla frecuentemente el mito y la leyenda con el registro escrupuloso de los hechos pasados. Los puntos nodales de la historia, donde se gestaron los problemas que hoy se viven, reciben siempre una atencireferente. La historia, concebida en estos tinos amplios, conforma un sistema implto o explto de casualidades, que da cuenta del origen y las razones de los hechos.

Todo este conocimiento sistemco (sobre el cuno es este el lugar para abundar) es un conocimiento cambiante, dinco; las nuevas realidades son asimiladas dentro del sistema cognoscitivo. Se trata de un conocimiento acumulativo que tiene una funcionalidad permanente. Los miembros del grupo social recurren a constantemente para guiar su conducta y entender la de loa otros. Es un conocimiento vivo que se sume te a prueba cotidianamente.

¿Estnstitucionalizado el conocimiento social entre los pueblos indoamericanos del presente? Al abordar este tema debe recordarse que la dominaciolonial arrasn las instituciones y con los especialistas que existieron, indudablemente, al menos en las sociedades pre-coloniales mavanzadas. El conocimiento social se mantiene hoy en forma di fusa, sin una estructuracixplta y sin que sea fl - identificar instituciones especialmente dedicadas a su cultivo y enriquecimiento. El reciente surgimiento de organizaciones polcas Indias, sin embargo, esta generando condiciones que estimulan la aparicie una nueva intelectualidad India preocupada por recuperar el conocimiento tradicional en todos los campos y actualizarlo de manera sistematice. Este problema lo discutiron mentor atencin paginas siguientes.

Hesta ahora he hablado de conocimiento social y he evitado cuidadosamente emplear el termino "ciencia social.. En la tradiciccidental el concepto de ciencia tiene una connotaciestrictiva y se refiere solamente a un tipo particular de conocimiento que cumple ciertos requisitos (1). El conocimiento cientco aspira, por ejemplo, a tener validez universal; es un conocimiento institucionalizado y presupone ademuna condicispecifica: la ciencia reflexiona sobre a! misma y no solo sobre su objeto de conocimiento. En el camp las ciencias sociales el problema se complica particularmente en lo que se refiere a su validez universal. Es difl imaginar siquiera un acuerdo absoluto entre los especialistas en ciencias sociales acerca de un conjunto significativa y coherente de verdades cientcas en sus respectivos campos de especializaciEn ciencias sociales las ideolog se aproximan muy cercanamente al conocimiento cientco; para algunos, incluso, es imposible establecer una separaciigurosa: la manera de prevernirse contra la subjetividad ideologizante ser precisamente, hacer explta la - ideolog para que la investigaciisma y sus resultados pudieran ser siempre entendidos en relacion ella. Cuando se plantea el problema del conocimiento socia, tradicional, y siempre teniendo como punto de referencia a las sociedades in doamericanas, su relacion la ideologaparece como un - primer problema a resolver. Todo mundo tiene una ideolog pero no todo mundo tiene ni maneja un conocimiento cientco.

Se tienda a pensar que las sociedades a las que nos estamos refiriendo viven una etapa pre-cientca. Se reconoce, obviamente, que poseen conocimientos; que estos conocimientos son s para resolver los problemas inmediatos; - que derivan de la experiencia; que en muchos casos pueden ser vdos, verdaderos; pero que en a instancia no son cientcos, porque no reinen los requisitos que definen a ese tipo particular de conocimiento. Y cuando se habla de conocimiento social, se prefiere catalogarlo como ideolog mas - que como ciencia. Si acaso, se admite que pudiera ser una - "ciencia de lo concreto", por contradictorios que parezcan - los tinos.

Si lo anterior es cierto, la hipis de que es posible y necesario recuperar y desarrollar las ciencias sociales propias cae desde su base por falta de fundamento. En -efecto, si la ciencia es una y universal, no caben ciencias paralelas. Por otra parte, habrque reconocer que el desarrollo de los piases metropolitanos de tradiciccidental les ha permitido avanzar en la construccie la ciencia social y que, en consecuencia, la estrategia posible serla la de acelerar la transmisie este conocimiento a las sociedades que no lo han alcanzado por s! mismas. La di ferencia se daren el uso de tal conocimiento, en su empleo como arma para la liberaci no como recurso cada vez msofisticado al servicio de la dominaci

No parece muy discutir este tema en tinos demasiado abstractos. Hablamos de las ciencias sociales como son hoy y no como deber ser o, en todo caso, como podrser en algmento indeterminado del futuro. Lo cierto es que las ciencias sociales no han alcanzado el rigor y la universalidad de las ciencias fIsico-matemcas. Por ejemplo, la indeterminacie los fenos en muchos niveles de la realidad social es, para algunos, un dato de la realidad misma, en tanto que para otros es un problema de subdesarrollo de las ciencias sociales. La mayor parte del conocimiento que producen las ciencias sociales es casuica y ni siquiera - pretende tener una validez universal. En tales condiciones -¿quonocimiento cientco transferir a las sociedades que no tienen una ciencia social institucionalizada?

Quisiera relatar brevemente una experiencia personal que a mi manera de ver ilustra el problema. Recientemente dictn ciclo de conferencias sobre antropologmexicana ante un auditorio formado exclusivamente por estudiantes de origen indio. Quise presentar un panorama esquemco del desarrollo cientco de la antropologen mi paen lo que va del siglo. Eleg varias de las figuras nacionales mrepresentativas en nuestra disciplina y tomomo tema central y com ansis que cada autor habhecho de la problemca sociocultural de los pueblos indios. En la historia de la antropologmexicana estos autores ocupan un lugar destacado: son los pioneros, los "padres fundadores", los que inicia ron y desarrollaron nuestra propia tradicin ciencias antropolas (la que algunos han llamado escuela mexicana de antropolog. Intentresentar en que forma cada uno de - ellos habcontribuido, en su momento y de acuerdo a lascar constancias, a forjar una tradiciientca. Muy pronto, al iniciar el curso, tome conciencia de que estaba hablando ante estudiantes indios: les estaba refiriendo como los habian estudiado a ellos, como los hab conceptualizado, en base a un conocimiento cientco. Me sentotalmente absurdo. Los estudiantes reaccionaban con incredulidad y finalmen te con buen humor, a carcajada limpia. Alguno de ellos preg91;para quos obligan a estudiar estas tonter?; otro le respondiporqus necesario conocer el pensamiento del enemigo.. El enemigo: estmos hablando de don Manual Gamio, la figura mrespetada de la antropologmexicana, quien in medianamente despude la Revolucie 1910-17, en los aheroicos, participgnificativamente en la construcciacionalista y estudi manera particular la problemca indigenista. La reaccie los estudiantes indios cuestionaba totalmente las conclusiones de Gamio; pero, ¿ssus conclusiones? Porque, a fin de cuentas, as se alcanzaron mediante la aplicacie un mdo cientco. Acaso, entonces, lo que se cuestionaba era toda una disciplina, la manera misma de pensar la antropolog Despude todo, la antropologmexicana ha sido el fundamento cientco, siempre proclamado, de la polco indigenista; una polco orientada a la desindianizacies decir a la incorporacie los pueblos indios a la sociedad nacional. Para un grupo de estudiantes indios, el carer etnocida de los resultados invalidaba necesariamente todo el procedimiento, por rigurosamente cientifico que se reclamara. ¿Es a la ciencia social de la que deben apropiarse los pueblos indios?

Por otra parte es cierto que los pueblos dominados, los que han padecido la colonizacitienen de s! mismos y de la sociedad colonizadora una visiuertemente distorsionada que les ha sido impuesta y que en mayor o menor medida - han interiorizado. Esto, como se sabe, es un requisito del oen colonial, que busca la hegemony no sel poder de la fuerza. En tinos del problema que estamos discutiendo, esta situacimporta en la medida en que mediatiza el conocimiento objetivo de la realidad social. Las ciencias sociales desarrolladas por el colonizador y puestas al servicio del -mantenimientos del orden colonial enmascaran o desconocen sus verdaderos objetivos, su funciltima; pero dan cuenta de manera sistemca de las caractericas significativas de; las sociedades dominadas y dicen mucho tambide la organizaci el funcionamiento de la propia sociedad colonizadora. Particularmente este ultimo conocimiento, el que se refiere a la sociedad dominante, permanece inaccesible para los miembros de los pueblos colonizados. Y e es, sin duda, un cono cimiento il, necesario para orientar acertadamente las luchas de liberaci

No son pocos los intelectuales de pueblos colonizados o dominados que han adquirido un entrenamiento en ciencias sociales dentro de la tradiciccidental. El dominio de las disciplinas sociales, sin embargo, no se traduce necesariamente en un rescate del conocimiento social tradicional, en una sistematizacie las categor que se encuentran en el universo semico propio, ni en el desarrollo meto de un conocimiento de las sociedades dominantes desde la perspectiva de los pueblos sometidos. Con frecuencia se da una adopcicuca de la ciencia social occidental, que se convierte en una ca nueva pero igualmente ajena y mediatizadora para percibir la realidad social.

Un libro clco como Facing Mount Kenya, de Jomo Kenyatta, (2) nos revela como puede sistematizarse la experiencia existencial del investigador y como se logra entonces obtener una visiesde adentro, mucho mrica y precisa - qua que es dable alcanzar por un investigador extrapor acucioso que e sea. Con su lectura uno aprende, por ejemplo, que las categor sociales que emplean los gikuyu para conceptualizar sistemcamente su realidad social, han sido con frecuencia mal traducidas por los investigadores europeos, al emplear conceptos que tienen una connotacirecisa en la tradicie las ciencias sociales occidentales y aplicarlos a realidades parecidas, pero en a instancia diferentes, del universo gikuyu. El instrumental teo y metodolo de Kenyatta, sin embargo, es tambide raigambre occidental; 41 mismo, en algunos momentos, emplea categor que no corresponden al universo conceptual gikuyu para describir su sociedad y compararla, gruesamente, con las sociedades europeas. Pese a esto, Kenyatta nos ofrece una visinterior de la sociedad gikuyu en la que recupera la memoria individual y colectiva, las experiencias cotidianas, sus vivencias y, ante todo, la percepcie un mundo organizado que es muy diferente al que presentan las versiones de los investigadores extra Pero uno no conoce occidente en el libro de Kenyatta: no hay una reflexiistemca sobre el mundo del colonizador, malle las acciones que directamente insiden en el universo gikuyu. Se conocen los efectos, porque se viven; pero no se perciben sus causas, su gsis y las tendencias de las fuerzas que los producen.

Quisiera resumir estas inquietudes desordenadas en los siguientes tinos:

1) El conocimiento social cientco es un requisito necesario para que los diversos pueblos puedan imaginar y gestionar los proyectos de desarrollo que correspondan a su propia naturaleza histca;

2) la ciencia social institucionalizada, generada fundamentalmente en occidente, no tiene validez universal ni ofrece las respuestas alternativas que son indispensables;

3) el conocimiento social tradicional se presenta con frecuencia en forma no sistematizada ni institucionalizada y contiene, si acaso, una dl reflexiobre el proceso mismo de conocimiento;

4) una ciencia social necesaria deberpermitir no solamente el conocimiento de la propia sociedad, sino tambila comprensie las sociedades dominantes.

III. La formación de una intelectualidad India contemporánea.

En Amca Latina el proceso de dominaciobre - los pueblos indios despudel periodo de independencia nacional, ha estado fincado sobre un doble eje de relaciones: por una parte, la gran masa de la poblacindia ha permanecido al margen de los sectores "modernos" de las sociedades nacionales, sujeta a formas arcaicas y brutales de explotacico na, discriminada, sin acceso o con acceso muy restringido a servicios como la salud pa y la educaciscolar, por otra parte, aun en los piases mas rdamente estratificados sobre las icas, ha habido un proceso constante de asumocindividual, de cuantvariable, que desindianiza mediante la educacila urbanizaci el trabajo, a individuos que se desarraigan de sus comunidades nativas y pasan a formar parte de la sociedad no indio. La mayorde quienes forman los sectores desindianizados ocupa una posiciubalterna, en la base de la escala social; pocos, muy pocos, alcanzan posiciones superiores en el seno de la sociedad no india. Debido a las exigencias del mercado de mano de obra, los desindianizados son en su mayorgente joven, predominantemente hombres. El desarraigo comienza frecuentemente con migraciones temporales en busca de trabajo.

La expansiel sistema educativo capta, por otra parte, a un pequeontingente de la juventud India que prosigue su formaciscolar mas alle los primeros aen la instruccilemental y lo conduce a la ensea media y superior en instituciones urbanas localizadas fuera del ito indna. Pocos de los estudiantes formados a nivel medio o superior regresan a trabajar en sus comunidades de origen; esto se debe, por una parte, a la falta de empleos en las regiones indnas y, por otra, a la presiesindianizadora - que de manera sutil o compulsiva se ejerce sobre ellos a travde los mdiversos mecanismos y que los obliga a intentar asimilarse a la sociedad dominante. El proceso de asimilien es doloroso: se oculta el origen, se abandonan las lealtades, se cambia de nombre, se adoptan ostentosamente nuevas costumbres, se deja de ejercer y se desprecia la lengua meterna; pese a ello, casi nunca se alcanza la aceptacilena en el seno de la sociedad dominante.

En el caso de Mco, que conozco mejor, la desindianizacior el camino de la instrucciscolar comenzce ya varias ddas en forma sistemca e institucionalizada. Primero se abrieron internados indnas para que grupos selectos de jes indios se educaran en un contexto radicalmente distinto del suyo y se incorporaran a la cultura y a la sociedad dominantes. Madelante se establecieron programas de entrenamiento para formar promotores y ticos de nivel medio que deber regresar a sus comunidades para llevar a cabo programas de educaciaculturaci cambio tecnolo. En arecientes se ha ampliado considerablemente la formacie maestros indios para ensea primaria: en 1970 habalrededor de 4 mil; hoy suman mde 25 mil, de - los cuales un millar tienen formacin docencia superior.

El proyecto polco al formar a este crecido grupo de maestros promotores en distintos campos consisten cambiar la mentalidad India de los estudiantes, darles la educaciormal indispensable y los conocimientos ticos necesarios para el desempee sus tareas y, al final del proceso, reintroducilos en sus comunidades a fin de que actuaran como agentes de transformacien la confianza de que cumplir esta tarea mejor que los agentes no indios que se hab empleado en la primera etapa con pobres resultados. Se pensaba que ser aceptados sin mayor dificultad debido a que - eran originarios del propio grupo, manejaban la lengua y cono c la cultura local. De hecho una gran parte de los jes indios que han sido entrenados en este tipo de instituciones asimilaron cabalmente las enseas que el Estado les proporcionan sido desindianizados de tal manera que aprovechan la primera oportunidad que se presenta para abandonar definitivamente sus comunidades de origen y trasladarse a las ciuda des mestizas.

En arecientes se observa un nuevo feno. Han surgido varias organizaciones gremiales y polcas que estintegradas y dirigidas por jes profesionales indios y que levantan banderas en defensa de la cultura, la lengua y los derechos polcos basados en la identidad ica. Algunas de estas organizaciones tienen una base restringida y se enmarcan en el cuadro de luchas polcas locales. Otras tienen mayor amplitud, incluyen afiliados de grupos icos muy diversos y plantean su acci escala nacional. Una de las mimportantes estormada casi exclusivamente por maestros bilings decir, precisamente por jes indios que fueron so metidos a un proceso educativo encaminado a su desindianizacion (3).

La lucha polca de este grupo profesional parte del reconocimiento de la especificidad y la diferencia de los grupos indios, sus lenguas y sus culturas, en el contexto de la sociedad nacional. Ellos afirman que esa diferencia es legitima y que los problemas de los pueblos indios y, en general, de la sociedad mexicana, no son atribuibles a la existe cmisma del pluralismo ico, sino a las relaciones de dominaci la que estsometidos estos pueblos desde hace -500 a En consecuencia, plantean un proyecto pluralista - que abandone las tesis de la asimilaci la integraci que, en cambio, abra un espacio polco para los diversos grupos icos indios en el que se respeten y estimulen sus propias caractericas culturales y lingas. Dentro de esta perspectiva, en primer tino luchan por un tipo de educaciiferente al que hasta ahora se ha impuesto a las comunidades Indias del pa Han sedo:

"Con el desarrollo del sistema capitalista en nuestro pa desde la creaciel Servicio, nosotros, los maestros bilingpromotores culturales, hemos sido preparados para desempeel papel de intermediarios entre la sociedad nacional y los grupos icos; entre la cultura occidental y la cultura indna; hemos sido medianamente capacitados para desarrollar programas que responden a las necesidades y exigencias del sistema educativo nacional y no a las necesidades y caractericas sociales, lingas, econas y culturales de la poblacindna; hemos sido preparados para - trabajar en funcie los intereses del Estado y no de la. comunidades indnas."

"Un ansis critico de nuestro trabajo, no. permite hacer conciencia sobre el hecho de que carecemos de una filosofeducativa propia y que los contenidos y mdos de - trabajo aplicados en nuestros centros educativos, no son mque simples repeticiones de lo que la escuela de la ciudad ha ce y son completamente ajenos a nuestra realidad sociolinga, econa, cultural y en general, a nuestro propio concepto del mundo y de la vida".

"La educaciilingcultural que debemos instrumentar, no debe confundirse con las pricas de asimilaciincorporaci supuesta integracique se han venido realizando con nosotros los indnas y que constituyen el - marceolo dentro del cual la clase dominante, heredera del colonizador, pone de relieve la universalidad de su propia cultura y rebaja las aspiraciones de movilidad ascendente del indna a tinos individuales y no colectivos"

"La pedagogque se necesita dise tiene que estar enraizada en nuestro pasado y en el presente, porque aula mente en este retamar reflexivo podremos encontrar los caminos para salir de la situaciolonial; solamente as! encontrmos las ticas pedagas por medio de las cuales - aprenderemos a escribir nuestra vida, como autores y testigos de la historia".(4)

Un lenguaje semejante, con iguales aspiraciones, - con el mismo contenido sustantivo, se escucha cada vez mas no sen Mco sino en todos los piases latinoamericanos que cuentan con poblacindna (5). Maestros, dirigentes campesinos, profesionistas y universitarios de origen indio comienzan a participar en n creciente en diversas acciones reivindicados. La vergde ser indio, que caracterizmuchos de los jes educados escolarmente en ddas pasadas, estiendo sustituida por una afirmacie la identidad ica y por la consecuente demanda de respeto a la especificidad de los Pueblos indios. En el caso de Mco, el propio Estado ha dado recientemente un giro significativo a su polca educativa: la educaciiling durante muchos ase empleo como un mero recurso para facilitar la castellanizaci que fue considerada siempre como una actividad extraescolar, ajena a los programas unificados de ensea, es aceptada hay como una parte integrante del sistema educativo nacional. Maun, se ha reconocido oficialmente que la - educaciara la poblacindna del padebe ser bicultural y biling este momento el contenido preciso de ambos tinos y la manera en que habrde ponerse en prica, no son precisos; de hecho, las escuelas continuncionando en la misma forma en que lo ven haciendo y la mayorde los maestros no ha cambiado en nada sus mdos de ensea, fuertemente impregnados de las ideas integracionistas y orlen Lados a la anulaciefinitiva de las culturas y las lenguas Indias. Sin embargo, el cambio en el discurso de la polca educativa resulta por s! mismo importante porque abre la posibilidad institucional de introducir cambios substanciales en el sistema de instrucciscolar para la poblacindna.

La emergencia de una nueva intelectualidad india -plantea cuestiones sobre las que es importante reflexionar. En primer tino cabe el preguntarse por quurge en este momento una nueva intelectualidad que afirma su identidad india. No pretendo dar una respuesta exhaustiva que demandarla una investigaciigurosa (6). Me limito a apuntar los tacto res principales que parecen estar asociados a la emergencia de esta te intelectual.

En primer lugar, cabe recordar que el Estado creo, dentro del sistema educativo, un espacio institucional reservado exclusivamente a ticos y especialistas de origen indio, aunque sus funciones fueran precisamente las de hacer - viable el proyecto de desindianizacion. Simultamente, dise puso en practica una educacixtraescolar bilingque reconocimpltamente la especificidad de los pueblos indios. Aunque todo el aparato buscaba la aculturaci la asimilacitanto de los escolares como de los maestros y - promotores adiestrados para facilitar el proceso de cambio, la estructura econa y social de la sociedad mexicana, asomo las ideolog anti-indias de muchos sectores, actuaban como factores que restring e imped la asimilacie - los desindianizados. La propia sociedad dominante ofrecresistencias estructurales e ideolas a la incorporacie un n creciente de jes escolarizados de procedencia India. Por ejemplo, cuando eran pocos los maestros bilingn porcentaje relativamente elevado de ellos lograba, al cabo de pocos a su transferencia a escuela urbanas; pero cuando hablamos de mas de 25 mil maestros indios, las posiliares de ve" se reducen dricamente. En estas condiciones es fl que los maestros se planteen una alternativa diferente: la defensa y la ampliacie un sistema educativo exclusivo para la poblacindna que quedara necesariamente bajo su control. Este es el resultado de una practica institucionalizaste que tiende a volver permanente lo que habsido concebido como transitorio, al mismo tiempo que cambia el sentido y la finalidad misma de la practica Pero este proyecto tiene un pro-requisito ideolo y polco ineludible: que los maestros afirmen su indignidad y basen sus demandas en la legitimidad del pluralismo ico tanto en el presente como hacia el futuro. La profundidad de las culturas tradicionales, su capacidad probada de resistencia, su verdad como - formas de vida y pensamiento que han permitido la sobrevivencia de los pueblos indios tras casi cinco siglos de colonizacinutren con un contenido propio las demandas que pudieron originarse por intereses gremiales. Por otra parte, en el plano Internacional, la visibilidad polca de las minor icas y nacionales y la efervescencia de los debates ideolos al respecto, alientan las luchas Indias y llevan a sus filas a gente del mismo origen que estaba ya desarraigada y - permanecindiferente a este tipo de problemas y sumida en los conflictos individuales del desindianizado.(7)

Desde otro ulo, los problemas econos y sociales de las comunidades indnas, no solamente no han sido re sueltos por los proyectos desarrollistas y modernizantes seguidos hasta la fecha, sino que de hecho se agravan continuamente. Esta problemca aguda hace indispensable buscar alternativas, una de las cuales es precisamente la de hallar en las ras Indias, en las formas tradicionales que se consideraban anacras y retornadas, los elementos para cimentar un proyecto autico, fincado en primer tino en las fuerzas y en los recursos endos. Este conjunto de situaciones y procesos vendra constituir el marco causal del surgimiento de una nueva intelectualidad India.

Seria peligroso ignorar que en algunos casos existe una manipulacie la identidad India motivada por intereses individuales de poder polco y beneficio econo. Entre los maestros indnas es frecuente el caso de quienes aprovechan un salario que estuy por encima del promedio de ingresos local para ir capitalizando paulatinamente a troves del comercio, la usura o la compra de tierras. La defensa de la indignidad, en tales circunstancias, estarmorientada a legitimar el poder y la riqueza individuales, que a luchar - por un proyecto de desarrollo auto basado en la cultura india. Esto apunta hacia un problema que actualmente se debate por parte de algunos cientcos sociales y dirigentes polcos latinoamericanos: ¿existe o no una burguesIndia?; en caso afirmativo, ¿que papel juega y cual habre desempeesa burguesen el proceso de transformacie nuestras sociedades? No cabe en los limites de este trabajo ahondar sobre estas cuestiones; pero debe reconocerse que su esclarecimiento es indispensable.(8)

Una caracterica particularmente importante de la nueva intelectualidad India, es que su proceso de formacintelectual y profesional ha ocurrido en las instituciones - educativas de la sociedad dominante. Es gente que viene de re graso. Transit camino de la desindianizacion: asimilo los conocimientos, los valores y las practicas del mundo no indio; pasn algmento, por la etapa de la negaciotal de su ser indio, para despurecuperar su identidad, - afirmary luchar a partir de ella. Este proceso ha permitido a los nuevos intelectuales indios tener un conocimiento de la sociedad dominante y de la suya propia desde una perspectiva distinta a la que se adquiere en el seno mismo de las comunidades. Algunos de ellos tienen formacin ciencias sociales; los demtienen, al menos, la experiencia directa del mundo no indio y el conocimiento que se desprende de ella. Al re superar su identidad, al asumir (como dice Daroy Ribeiro) su propio rostro, habrde intentar tambirescatar su conocimiento social, pero enriquecido con el conocimiento sistematizado de la ciencia social dominante.

Esta nueva intelectualidad esta tomando a su cargo la formulacie una ideologIndia adecuada a los tiempos que corren. Intervienen como articuladores y expositores del pensamiento polco indio contemporo, a veces a troves de organizaciones que ellos mismos contribuyen a crear, a voces como lobos solitarios cuya obra, sin embargo, repercute entre los dirigentes y activistas del movimiento indio.

La tarea de construir una ideologexige un esfuerzo de legitimacies decir, que el proyecto polco - que se expresa en esa ideologdebe estar fundamentado de manera convincente para la clientela India potencial, pero tambipara los sectores desindianizados y aun para los no indios, en la medida en que se trata de un proyecto de transformacie la sociedad en su conjunto y no s610 del sector - constituidos por los pueblos indios. En este esfuerzo de legitimacie recurre constantemente a la argumentacin tinos de las ciencias sociales, pero se adopta un punto de - vista indio; es decir, se procura "indianizar" a las ciencias sociales. En este sentido, la nueva intelectualidad India de Amca Latina (como las intelectualidades nativas de Africa y Asta) enfrenta el problema de apropiarse de la ciencia social desarrollada en Occidente y, simultamente, transformarla crcamente para hacer posible lo que podros llamar su desarrollo endo (9). Este proceso implica, necesariamente, alguna forma de rescate del conocimiento social tradicional, lo que ideolamente resulta indispensable para - afirmar el carer indio del pensamiento que se construye.

IV. Notas para un proyecto de desarrollo endógeno de las ciencias sociales.

Estoy convencido de que hay muchos riesgos al generalizar y simplificar cuestiones tan complejas y diversas como las que he abordado - y sobre todo al hacerlo en la forma en que lo he hecho. Me ha sido imposible presentar aquen detalle, ejemplos variados de situaciones concretas, que hubiesen permitido alcanzar una visirica y matizada de los problemas reales. Creo, sin embargo, que no he traicionado la idea central, esto es: que el conocimiento social de la realidad social esta, en todos los casos, fincado en experiencias particulares; que es histco; que de esa concrecieriva precisamente su capacidad para orientar formas especificas de conducta; y que las ciencias sociales, que pretenden alcanzar validez universal, deben ser incorporadas a ese con cimiento social de la sociedad si han de contribuir eficazmente a la generacie proyectos de desarrollo propios y adecuados.

Estamos en un mundo en el que el contacto y la interaccie han generalizado. La construccie una ciencia propia, enda, no puede concebirse como un proceso insular, ajeno a las formas de conocimiento creadas por otras sociedades y particularmente por las que ejercen el poder y alcanzan la hegemon No es el aislamiento, sino la incorporacie todo lo valido y en una trama de conocimiento propia y dinca, lo que permitirn verdadero desarrollo de las - - ciencias sociales puestas al servicio de un proyecto endo. Por la misma razampoco es posible refugiarse en un co "dejar hacer", con la esperanza de que el juego libre de las circunstancias habre producir, como resultado final - ineludible, la armoniosa sesis del conocimiento propio y la ciencia universal. No es as{, ante todo porque no hay tal chunga libre": por lo menos no lo hay para los pueblos sometos, que padecen formas diversas de colonizaciSe plantea entonces la necesidad de generar y/o apoyar acciones que tiendan a estimular el desarrollo de un conocimiento social que sea, a la vez, propio y cientco.

En este sentido podr proponerse varios objetivos:

a) La institucionalizaciU> del conocimiento social tradicional. La construccie un conocimiento cientco - contemporo exige que e sea institucionalizado. Son necesarias instituciones originales, adecuadas a las formas de organizaci a las condiciones actuales de cada grupo. Una - condicibvia: las nuevas instituciones habrde estar contratadas e integradas por miembros del propio grupo (ser- indias, no indigenistas); hay ya una larga experiencia de casas de la cultura" y "centros de estudios" que, a primera vista, cumplen la funcie dar una base institucional al conocimiento tradicional; pero se trata de proyectos creados para los indios y no por los indios.

El proceso de institucionalizacis un requisito indispensable para construir la base enda de las ciencias sociales propias, porque permitirsistematizar y formalizar el conocimiento tradicional de la realidad socio-hista; legitimarlo hacia el interior y el exterior; acrecentarlo; di fundirlo incorporarle los conocimientos teos, metodolas y factuales de las ciencias sociales convencionales; re producirlo, formando sus propios especialistas.

b) El digo indio entre el conocimiento tradicional y la ciencia social contempora. La puesta en marcha de un proyecto de institucionalizaciel conocimiento social tradicional requiere el reclutamiento de dos tipos de especia listas: los que portan el conocimiento tradicional (los sabios que conocen la historia, las leyendas, los mitos; los dirigentes que han conducido las luchas del pueblo; los especia listas en actividades tradicionales; los testigos de acontecimientos importantes) y los que han adquirido una formacin ciencias sociales en las escuelas de la sociedad dominante, pero que no perdieron, o han recuperado, su indignidad; son los miembros de la nueva intelectualidad India. El trabajo conjunto de unos y otros garantiza el dialogo constante entre el saber tradicional y la reflexiientca contempora, pero en el marco existencial e ideolo del pueblo indio. No se trata de hacer de los sabios tradicionales los "informantes" del cientco social ( papel que les asigna la ciencia dominante), sino de reconocerlos como interlocutores y mentores de los "nuevos indios" que construyen el conocimiento y el pensamiento indio actual.

c) La participacinstitucional en las diversas fases de los proyectos de desarrollo. Se trata de que el cono cimiento social propio generado en formstitucional desempel papel que se le asigna a las ciencias sociales en los programas de desarrollo. No sen los programas oficiales impuestos desde afuera, sino fundamentalmente en la gestacie los proyectos propios. Hay un doble auditorio, un doble - consumidor para los productos del trabajo institucional: las agencias de desarrollo que actualmente recurren a los especia listas ajenos al grupo, y el grupo mismo, que es el mas importante y es el destinatario que debe tener prioridad absoluta.

Tal vez proyectos orientados en esta forma contribuyan efectivamente a consolidar el conocimiento cada vez mas riguroso de la realidad social, de acuerdo con las necesita; des y perspectivas histcas de civilizaciue cada pueblo posee y que orientaran su verdadero desarrollo (10).


(1) En fecha reciente tuve un afortunado encuentro con mis co legas Roberto Cardoso de Oliveira (brasile Julio Cotler (peruano) y Jean Casimir (haitiano); en animada charla informal discutimos sobre la relacintre ciencia social y conocimiento tradicional indio. Aprovecho libremente aqulgunas de las ideas expresadas por ellos, pero asumo totalmente la responsabilidad del texto.

(2) Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, Vintege Books, New -York, 1965.

(3) Me refiero a la Alianza Nacional de Profesionales Indnas BilingNPIDAC, con sede en la Ciudad de Mco.

(4) ANPIBAC, Primer seminario nacional de educaciilinagultural. Fundamentos, instrumentos de investigaci agenda de trabajo, Mco, 1979.

(5) Sobre el discurso polco de las nuevas organizaciones polcas Indias en Amca Latina, ver mi ensayo "La nueva presencia polca de los indios: un reto a la creatividad latinoamericana., presentado en el Simposio sobre cultura y - creatividad intelectual en Amca Latina, celebrado en Mco en abril de 1979 (en prensa).

(6) Desarrollon mayor amplitud este tema en el articulo -"Las nuevas organizaciones indnas. Hipis para la formulacie un modelo analcos, Journal de la Soci des -Amcanistes, tomo LXV, p. 209-219, Par

(7) Es posible que exista una diferencia entre la intelectualidad formada por maestros y promotores bilingue tienen una escolaridad formal de nivel medio, y el grupo de profesionales, cientcos e intelectuales de procedencia universitaria. En algunos casos os os tienden a excluir a los primera y, por su parte, maestros y pro» tares actrecuentemente por la vgremial en la que no pueden participar los dem

(8) El Dr. Carlos GuzmBockler lleva a cabo actualmente una investigaciobre el proceso de consolidaci recuperaciel espacio econo regional por los quichde Guatemala, en la que se analiza con detalle el papel que desempea "burguesIndias. Los resultados serpublicados pra mente por el Centro de Investigaciones Superiores del INAH, en Mco.

(9) Aun en los casos en que se niega todo valor a las ciencias sociales occidentales, se hace algo de ellas en los textos indios. En ocasiones se recurre a cientcos sociales no indios que estmarginados o son excluidos del establishment acadco, pero que finalmente forman parte (la parte heterodoxa) de la tradiciientca occidental.

(10) Menciono una experiencia en curso: el Programa de Formacirofesional en Etnolinga que se inicio recientemente te en Pcuaro, Mich., Mco. Se trata de un proyecto para formar, a nivel profesional universitario pero dentro de un programa especial, a una primera generacie estudiantes de origen indio. El plan de estudios comprende materias de Linga, Historia y AntropologSocial. La orientacica del Programa consiste, precisamente, en estimular el digo entre el conocimiento tradicional y las ciencias sociales. Cf: "Programa de formacirofesional de Etnolinga., Noticias del CIS-INAH, vol. II, n enero-febrero, 1979, Mco.


There are certain moments in life which are milestones, when we are compelled to regard the past and present with an eagle eye in order to become aware of our true position. Even world history is inclined to looking back this way in order to understand itself. The contemporary world is living in such an age. The end of the twentieth century is a period abounding in sharp and crucial turns of events, in which something gigantic is dying and something new, colossal, is being born. Whether this epoch will represent a step towards the liberation of people and communities or a new technical barbarity, whether it will degenerate into lower, give birth to higher, forms of life depends on our ability to offer a vision of a new world, a new civilizational alternative.

The hegemony of the old world is not being maintained only through repression, but also through cultural hegemony, the enslavement of consciousness - through the dominant patterns of production, technological and industrial development, patterns of consumption, types of urbanization. These patterns appear to be the only possible, eternal forms, with the appearance of fate itself; a different world seems inconceivable. The destruction of intellectual creativity thus becomes equal to the destruction of the future.

The ability to conceive new visions or to prevent their genesis is becoming the decisive battlefield. We are confronted by the greatest challenge of all - the creation of a knowledge that would be suited to our epoch, its fascinating possibilities and cruel dangers.

I. The new janus - Two faces of science and technology

Man has conquered new, gigantic powers of production which bring us to the threshold of a new world. Scientific and technical forces that no epoch of previous history could have envisaged have come into life.

During the past 50,000 years of man's existence there have been about 800 generations with an average life span of about 60 years each. Out of these Boo, 650 generations spent their lives in caves; only the past 70 have been able to have a significant inter-generation communication; only the past four have known of the printed word; the electric motor has been in use only during the past two generations and a vast majority of material goods that we are familiar with nowadays have been developed during the lifetime of the last generation only.

Atomic energy, automation, and the revolution in cybernetics provide the opportunities for a change which could completely transform the traditional basis of life and work. The mighty systems of automatic machines have the wonderful power of shortening human labour and making it more fruitful, liberated, and worthier of man. They enable an attack on the fateful division of labour into mental and physical, management and simple execution. Routine tasks can be performed by machines, and man's activities are transferred to the field of research, designing, control, and management - to the field of creativity. Instead of an attachment to a partial function there is a rotation of functions; a collective performance of tasks by an entire group is introduced as team work which supervises the entire automated process. The complexity of new technology makes the old hierarchical order inadequate to move the new productive forces. It is very unbearable for creative work, which engages all of one's intellectual potentials, to endure coercion; its inner characteristic is personal autonomy. Society has come to a turning point when the laws of the growth of productive forces appear in a new light. The classic industrial revolution has created as its basis of education a type of elementary school which satisfies the need for a plain labour force. Society has been developing through the intellectual potentials of a relatively small number of people. The technical transformations coming into existence now are connected with a cultural revolution of unseen proportions, with an education explosion, and with a change in the subject-object relationship. In the first industrial revolution the progress in production did not start from man, but from machines to which man was only attached as a cog. Nowadays progress is becoming increasingly dependent on the active development of man's capabilities, initiatives, motivation, and creative work. A new human subjectivity is being developed.

If industry develops, the creation of true wealth becomes less and less dependent on working hours and the amount of spent labour, and much more on the general state of science and technological progress.... It is not direct work performed by man himself (and in which he has more of a supervisory and regulating relationship towards production), nor the time he spends working the basic pillar of production and wealth. The understanding of nature, the development of human capabilities becomes the real pillar. The theft of the working time of others on which present-day wealth rests appears as a poor foundation compared with this newly developed one.. The free development of individuality and bringing necessary labour down to a minimum suits this development - not in order to exploit the surplus of labour (for another) but because of the scientific and artistic education of man, which becomes possible due to free time and the resources which have been made. [Karl Marx]

It is the first time that people have been enabled to make an ancient dream come true - to liberate man from the yoke of poverty and to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor. At the time of the first industrial revolution the annual gross world income was about four billion dollars, at the beginning of the twentieth century it was about 380 billion, and nowadays it amounts to over 6,000 billion dollars.

However, as if by some fateful magic spell, the new sources of productive power - as opposed to their great liberational potentials are becoming destructive both for nature and for man. Like the ancient god Janus, the development of civilization is showing its other face. Almost 20 per cent of scientists are working on the discovery and application of means of world destruction. Peace is maintained in the world under the constant threat of war. Hunger, that old tormentor of people, is going around the world again and is taking a toll of 20 million human lives each year. In its war against nature exploitative industrialism has robbed a great part of the earth's resources; it made rivers and lakes die, and air turn into a murderer.

The deepest contradictions have come up on the human side of production as well. The manifold development of civilization endows the producer with new capabilities and aspirations. Human creative powers are flourishing. However, this new human and productive power is turned into an instrument for creating and preserving the wealth and power of others. New mechanisms for attachment to the dehumanized society are being built. An enormous apparatus for manipulating, for industrializing the human soul is being created. The masters of the market are making series of artificial needs, while nihilism, violence, and neuroses are taking a toll in human happiness which is almost as large as is physical deprivation in the Third World.

The gap between the rich and the poor, which is a volcanic contradiction in the contemporary world, has been increased from 1:3 to 1:70. It has become as large as the 400 vertical kilometres separating the peasant on the paddy fields from the astronaut orbiting the planet. The greatest absurdity of our age is coming into existence: the development of underdevelopment. In order to preserve its cruel abundance the developed centre tends to dictate the productive, economic, and social structure of the periphery. But it is done in a new way today: the new phase of dependent development is coming into existence. From an external dependence, maintained by political force, it is transformed into an internal, organic dependence. This subordination within is performed by the international production apparatus, the great mechanical Leviathan - the multinational companies - through technological conquest, management patterns, and consumption, which are imposed upon the periphery. The large profits of the companies and the low standard of living of the masses, abundance and poverty, are going together hand in hand, like a cruel couple. The unity of the world is based on a relationship of fundamental inequality, while underdevelopment is the other pole of development. The "centre" is super-developed exactly to the extent to which the "periphery" is underdeveloped. Great material progress has encompassed only the part of the western world which has found its place under the sun. The vast spaces of Asia, Africa, and Latin America have remained in a deep shadow, in stagnation and misery. The world is being divided into zones represented by a few centres developing intellectual creativity on the one hand, and those at the bottom of the pyramid of victims who have to be engaged only in routine work.

In order to understand the roots of this situation we must get rid of one of the oldest prejudices. It is the false picture according to which the stubborn adherence to the archaic, pre-capitalist structure is the main cause due to which underdevelopment is still present. The true relationship is actually the reverse: the same historical process, i.e., the development of capitalism itself, has given birth to underdevelopment in the past just as it does today.

If we go on in the same manner in which we have been going on so far, we know that our world will come to an end. Seas and rivers will become sterile, the soil will lose its natural fertility, and life will become the privilege only of those individuals who will be selected to represent the new human race - adapted, through chemical processes and genetic programming, to a new ecological environment which engineer biologists will synthesize for them.... Therefore, the crisis is gaining new dimensions which, apart from a few exceptions, the Marxists have not foreseen. What came under the meaning of socialism so far did not include answers to these new dimensions. We are speaking of a crisis in the relationship between individuals and the economy itself, the crisis of labour, the crisis in our relationship to nature, our relationship to our bodies, towards persons of the opposite sex, towards society, towards posterity and our ancestry, towards history. We are speaking of a crisis in urban life, in housing, in medicine, in schools.... There is a decline in faith in life. Physical crops and economic viability are decreasing; the quality of life is declining although the level of consumption is growing. [A. Gorz]

The two faces of science and technology are becoming a realistic ground on which there is a change between two visions of the world. The vision of the apocalypse is taking the place of technological utopia. Social progress was equated, identified with technological growth which automatically, by its very nature, resolves all of man's existential problems. The only and most important thing was to give the decision making powers to the technocratic masters of machines, to the headquarters that is able only to arrange society in a rational way on the basis of the technical rules of optimality. They will peacefully and without upheavals lead people to the "state of abundance," the "welfare state," the "post-industrial society of unlimited growth " The horizon of civilization seemed bright and clear, without any clouds in sight. However, the other face of technological growth came as a shock. An eclipse has covered modern society; its horizon is darkened, and its shadows are more visible than its light. Thought had come to another extreme: to the shock of an uncertain future, to the abstract and illusory criticism of technology, to the vision of the apocalypse. It came with the slogans: "Technology inevitably dehumanizes and enslaves man," "Protect us from technology," "Stop the growth." The fear of the future and nostalgia for the past caused us to repeat what Voltaire said of Rousseau: that he would want mankind to walk on its hands and feet again in order to be happy. The alienation of man was depicted as fate, as an unavoidable destiny which is born out of the very nature of modern technology. It was said that technology in itself inevitably destroys all individuality, turning people into modern technological serfs.

II. The pathology of power and science

However, it is of decisive importance to realize that science and technology are not negative powers in themselves - like a genie released out of a lamp, whom people can no longer handle. They turn into that when becoming part of a "vicious circle," an antagonistic social arrangement. It is of vital significance to recognize the main causes of this process: what the structures of social power and the types of social organization are, on which depends whether science and technology will play a humanistic role or whether they will turn into instruments of exploitation and domination. Also, what are the social forces, the great social agents that can be the protagonists of one tendency or the other? Therefore, the point of departure cannot be the criticism of technology in itself, because "know-how" is nothing by itself - it is a means without an end, a mere potentiality, an "unfinished sentence." "Know-how" is culture no more than a piano is music. What we need most of all is to understand why things are as they are and what we are to do with our lives - how to turn this enormous potentiality into a new reality, to the benefit of people. What we are seeking is not a new type of car, but a new type of society, a civilization which is to be a more favourable framework for the development of the authentic potentials of science and for a different mode of production. The points of departure are: what are we producing and how are we doing it - for what human needs, values, and purposes.

The very appearance of this idea is an intellectual coup. It shows that we are breaking out of the encirclement of technological determinism which strips the world of everything that suggests the capacities and actions of men; endows history with stages and laws independent of human desires and intentions. We are challenging the tradition which is the continuation of the great religious and philosophical systems of thought on the predestination of human life. Man's fate does not depend on his own work and his own practice; it has been pre-destined by heaven, by the absolute spirit (Hegel), or by the independent trends in the forces of production (reduced Marxism). People are only puppets on the strings of an anonymous, superhuman director of history - technology, the new deity that has been brought down to Earth. The very criticism of these views signifies a great humanization and desacralization of science: the world has been made by people and they can change it as well. Theory should express these new epochal possibilities and their preconditions - what we are not as yet but what we can become through knowledge and struggle.

Science and technology do not appear in a vacuum but in a social space. The civilization whose godparents are profit-making and bureau cracyrule permeates them deeply. This social milieu brings the productive and destructive side of technology together into a symbiosis. Its humane, potentially liberating powers remain in captivity, whereas the pathological form of development - for which an ever-growing human and material price is being paid - afflicts the entire social body, like cancerous tissue. The double function of production - one which is expressed in the creation of goods, and the other whose sole aim is the reproduction of capital and bureaucratic power - fundamentally deforms the productive forces and scientific research. Out of a wide selection of possibilities and capital and power choose those technologies and put forth those requirements and orientations that are functional from the point of view of the existing system and its reproduction. Such a deformed technology is no longer neutral - it becomes an active factor which determines the attitude of a producer towards his product, of a worker towards his labour, of an individual towards society, of man towards his environment. It becomes one of the foundations of the relationship of power, of the hierarchical division of society, and a tool of domination over people and entire communities.

These growth patterns reappear in a specific manner in the period of early, difficult socialism, in societies where productive forces were not developed. In their breakthrough into the modern world they take over many patterns which were made in developed bourgeois societies, although it only brings about once again the social division between those who are in commanding positions and those who are there merely to execute.

The spirit of the age, the principles of a civilization based on profit, power, and prestige, and the ruling cultural patterns permeate positivistic science, its canons, paradigms, professional mentality, and the mode of expert training - in a word, the scientific subculture.

First of all, there are also the criteria as to what is considered to be scientific knowledge, and what is not. Then there is also the mode of formation of experts of the most specialized kind ("Fachidioten") as "one-dimensional man" ignoring social values and purposes as something alien to their concern. For example, research workers in modern agronomy institutes do not consider what will happen to the land, whether it will lose its fertility; what will happen to food, whether it will lose essential nutritive, qualities; what people's bodies will be like and what kind of social consequences will be brought about.

The ruling culture has separated practice and theory, manual and intellectual work; has created an insurmountable gap between professional knowledge and popular culture, experience, and wisdom. It is believed that modern science, by its very definition, must be "deaf" and "indifferent" to human concerns, needs, and preoccupation's. The ethics and ideology of the puritan ruling class have tried to form a science as insensitive as a capitalist undertaker or powerful bureaucrat. Due to a secrecy which makes it difficult for a layman to understand, this knowledge is not connected to "general culture" and the language of the people. This fragmentation of scientific and technical "sub-cultures" is a consequence of the class division of labour; but it is also, at the same time, the condition for its perennial life. It reduces the knowledge and power of scientific and technical cadres to a strictly limited field, and prevents them from situating their knowledge into broader prospects of the whole. Those who possess such narrowly specialized qualifications are professionally just as helpless and dependent as the workers are (A. Gorz). Established science has become a church with its dogma, hierarchy, and heresies. It has its popes and cardinals, as well as its power of excommunication. Scientists have felt this power, and when they have dared question the ruling scientific orthodoxy, were lashed to the pillar of shame (Toffler).

The technicistic wave of our time has cut like a knife and created a deep rift between the sciences and the human purposes for which science is engaged. This gap brings about an enormous loss of scientific knowledge, personal dramas, and resignation, whose very incarnations are, as in ancient tragedies, the giants of atomic physics when they disowned their own works in resignation. It brings about an enormous loss of powers and talent, impoverishes ideals and motivations which inspire people and give them the strength to persevere on the steep path of the science.

This picture of science shows the ruling pattern of positivist science, but it is incomplete. Although science bears the stamp of the ruling civilization in which it was born, it is never fully integrated into a system. Scientific work which produces knowledge possesses, like every other work, part of its own inalienable autonomy. Science can serve predetermined goals; it can develop in a certain direction to the detriment of other directions. It can be guided towards answering the questions put by the mainstays of power, even to the detriment of other questions. However, it is impossible to prevent scientists from asking themselves certain questions that are different from the ones they are allowed to resolve. They are always able to tackle and resolve the same problems that the authorities present them, even in a different way. However, they encounter these possibilities as things that have been denied. Thereby they also meet an ideological and cultural arbiter. Thus they become aware of the fact that the direction and contents of scientific work could be different, but that one would need a different technology and society in order to make it come true. They realize that, at the same time, they do and do not belong to the forces of social change.

III. The new protagonist - social movements and organic intelligentsia

Thus a similar feeling is developed on both sides - the side of the labour world and the side of the world of science - that the time has come when one could live in a different and more meaningful way, with more dignity and freedom. And targets that provide for a different quality of personal and social existence are being put forth. Alternative technology, a character of work and management which has not been pressed into a bureaucratic mould, social ownership, more humane cities, a more humane medicine and psychiatry, a pedagogical revolution which opens vistas for the development of creative personalities, engagement in the new world economic order - this multitude of new alternatives is bombing the core of the old civilization. The new day gives rise to all those aspirations, while the night wants to destroy even the plausible ones.

However, the great changing of civilization will come about not only as the creation of "technological prophets," as an automatic result of intellectual construction, which is motivated only by its own mysterious imperatives. It is a great social and cultural process in which the potentials of technology and science are put at the service of new goals, purposes, and values, of a different quality of human life. The new technology and sources of energy, great anticipations, and experiments will be born out of this new collective practice of the mass social movement, and the new horizons of civilization. It is by no means a rejection of the great accomplishments of science and technology nor is it a mere take-over of the existing ready-made parts out of which a new edifice is simply erected. It is a great transformation - from within - of all the products of civilization, technology in particular. The points of departure are what is being produced, how, during what working hours, and for what needs. The new technological foundations of this new civilization will be born out of this great experiment.

We must admit that we have not the recipe answers to many questions, that the exploration of this new continent has only opened up before us. However, it is possible to point out at least a few elements - for discussion - which represent the distinction lines between repressive and humanistic technologies.

(a) The application of science and technology that provides for the effective solution of existential problems of the broad masses of the working people, such as: hunger (nutrition), housing, and employment. A strategy of economic-social and technological development which leads to the narrowing of such essential social differences that endanger the survival and development of large sections of the population, entire social groups, and countries or regions. A technological development which is to the benefit of the working people, and not to the privileged position of narrow strata or certain countries.

(b) A way of modernization which is not destructive, which does not destroy the positive cultural and productive heritage of original civilization, but is simultaneously creating new living and working conditions for the population.

Development which preserves progressive cultural and productive tradition and turns it into a point of departure for the creation of new forms of social organization, for a great mobilization of human energy.

(c) Alternative patterns of urbanization, collective conditions of living, a city which develops according to human needs rather than according to a profiteer-bureaucratic logic that alienates people, turning the city into a modern anthill.

(d) Types of industrialization and technology transfer which provide for independent development and progress, which do not maintain subordination and widen the civilizational, economic gap between societies. A strategy of scientific and technological development which is not limited exclusively to the copying of the patterns of others. Greater reliance on one's own forces and endogenous creativity.

(e) The technological revolution in the agrarian regions which leads to the solution of the existential needs of the population, combining traditional methods, knowledge, and experience, with contemporary productive forces. A way of modernization which does not lead to the ruin of the land, to a decline in the fertility of the soil, to a decrease in the quality of food and an expansion of hunger, to a mass pauperization of the agrarian population, and to a larger dependence on developed world centres.

(f) The medicine and biology which explore the relationship between the mode of work, working hours, urban life, the way of using the labour force, and their influence over the human organism, the span of human life, illnesses.

(g) Forms of sociability and modern science and technology. Some fundamental forms of life and mentality, cultural and civilizational values such as solidarity, a tendency towards egalitarianism, and a collective spirit, represent important components of the humane community. But traditional forms of sociability had great limitations: firstly, traditional collective communities were confined to a narrow framework - to a village, to a local community, while the pyramid of the ruling elites and groups rose above them like a kind of superstructure. Secondly, the local community and its solidarity were kept in life by using the undeveloped productive forces which had not changed for centuries - by their conservation, The key problem is how to attain more human and more solidary forms of social life on a larger scale and on the basis of revolutionary productive forces.

The change of technology now becomes an essential precondition for changing society, for the development of voluntary co-operation, for the development and sovereignty of communities and individuals. Such a technology would generate a larger economic independence of local and regional communities. It would coincide with the power that the associated producers and consumers should have over production and products.

The secret formula of the birth of the new alternatives, their point of departure, lies in collective experience of social movements which aim for a different quality of existence. The emancipation of the working people can be their own accomplishment, The changing of the world cannot be the simple affair of the managers, the technical experts who are the only ones "who know the secret code of history" and who transfer society from one combination to another.

However, the decisive role in the formation of the new historical project is played by the organic intelligentsia of the plebeian classes. It starts from the radicalized needs which are generated within the old society, but which cannot be fulfilled within its framework. It performs a great elaboration of the collective aspirations which are already developing within the plebeian masses. It can "hear" and "see" the new practice which is being created, but it constructs a bridge across which it takes the action of denying the old society to the site for building the new one. Deprived of this ability, the aspirations of the masses will drown in general, utopian slogans, just as the intelligentsia, without the independent and lively social movement of the masses, is condemned to exhaust its energy in fictional conflicts and conspiratorial tactics. This is a "new historical power bloc" the unity of the people of labour and knowledge, the alliance of progressive social movements and radicalized science. It is a social force capable of mastering the foundations of modern technology and enriching it with new democratic meanings.

Allow me to quote Einstein who, in his book Why I Am for Socialism, says:

It is not enough to train a man only in his profession. It will make him become some kind of a usable machine, but not a wholesome personality as well. It is important that he should acquire a feeling for what is worth striving for. He must learn to understand what motivates people, their ideals and illusions; their suffering and struggles.

Organic intelligentsia radically differ from traditional, satellite intelligentsia, which are imitative, and have not got the strength to think in a different way, to develop endogenous creativity. They are not capable of touching the horizon of world science while firmly standing on the foundations of their own national culture and needs. Organic intelligentsia are not an elite, which creates "culture for a few by a few." They are called upon to perform a revolutionary innovation of its professions and new orientations in all fields of social life. The understanding that they have to be agents of intellectual, cultural, and moral transformations within their own professions is of crucial importance. Because it is the stimulation of professional narcissism and competition in the great international vanity fair which become the subtle mechanisms of the use of the intelligentsia for anti-social purposes. The realization that they are not the earthly sons of a technological deity but that they truly belong to mankind, being the authentic representatives of their kin, becomes one of the main ways of preventing all possible Hiroshimas.

On the other hand, organic intelligentsia are not of secondary importance, the traveling companions of the social movement, but its equal and key participants. Offering projections and alternatives is an expression of collective aspirations and practice, but not a mere reflex - it is also one of the forms shaping this practice. The transfer of requirements from the social zone to the zone of scientific solutions can only be performed by scientists themselves, in their autonomous and sovereign practice.

IV. Dramatic birth of alternatives

Through the examples of the European social movements' struggle for the transformation of labour and of the models of consumption, for the new city, and for health, we shall demonstrate the idea of the mass social movement as the birthplace of the alternatives which are striving for a new quality of human existence.

1. Robotization and Dequalification or the Transformation of Labour

1.1. In response to the crisis of alienated labour and profiteer consumption (as forms of exploitation both of the producers and consumers) new alternatives arise in respect to how work is performed and what is produced. The transformation of labour becomes the decisive front of the social struggle.

Modern technology has deprived man of creative, useful work with hands and brains, and given him plenty of work of a fragmented kind, most of which is joyless and boring. The way it promises to develop further seems even more inhumane. The scientific and technological revolution has, like a knife, cut into the whole working body and made a sharp division. It has liberated only a small minority from routine work. For a vast majority of workers it has brought forth new forms of monotonous, routine labour which violently attack the nervous system and lead to the psychological exhaustion of labour which, instead of being a source of health and sanity, becomes a punishment and curse.

The motions of the new and technologically improved mega-machine, in which there is no place for human initiative, grab them from morning to night, bring them to an exactly set track, put narrow and rigid boundaries on human initiative, and condemn them to obsolescence. Power, speed, motion, standardization, mass production, quantification, regimentation, precision, uniformity, astronomical regularity, and, above all, control become key passwords.

This human drama would endlessly go on if people did not react (a) by rejecting such work, which is becoming especially common among the younger generation; (b) by resentment, escape, and the conscious withdrawal of efficiency; (c) by bringing an alternative for transforming labour, by putting the technological organization of work under the control of the producers.

Under social pressure, in a small number of companies the employers have consented to give the workers extensive rights as regards the organization of labour. They were given the right to set the time and rhythm of production by themselves, to modify and adapt equipment and the mode of production. The times of arrival at and departure from work were not clocked any longer, nor were there any more supervisors, "officers of production." The previously fragmented tasks were put together again, making both every individual and the group responsible for the complex product. The management had to take into consideration all the innovations suggested by the workers' collective. Finally, wages go up in proportion to the productivity of labour.

In dozens of companies where this system was implemented, after a period of wandering, noticeable increases in production were brought about; workers did not stay away from work, a profusion of new ideas and technical innovations kept flowing in from the plants (Gorz).

It is becoming obvious that the endless fragmentation of job tasks is not a consequence of technology, which would develop according to its own laws, regardless of the social context. This fragmentation is a consequence of a technology which would prevent the worker from "stealing" time from his employer, because the workers cannot be trusted. As long as they control at least a tiny part of their labour, there is the danger that they could use this power against those who are exploiting them. The "scientific" organization of labour is first of all the scientific destruction of all possibilities of workers' control (Letieri). The authoritarian organization which sharply divides manual and mental labour, execution and decision-making, is actually a domination technique as much as it is a technique of production. It is insisted upon that domination is necessary in order to increase production as much as possible. But no - domination is necessary in order to provide for conditions which are to ensure that the largest amount of labour possible should serve goals which are not the goals of the workers, but which are there to serve the reproduction of capital and of bureaucratic (technocratic) power (Letieri, Magdof).

Therefore, the workers' movement is not being utopian when opposing the dequalification of the labour force and coming forth with demands to abolish the authoritarian, hierarchal division of labour. Instead of fragmented work and attachment to a partial operation they demand team work. Alternating and collective performance of tasks, collective preparation of decisions, broader scope for initiatives and for the expression of one's abilities are called for. The broad network of hierarchical functions was not caused by technological needs as much as it was caused by the necessity to mutually divide the strata of workers and technicians, by the system of psychological motivation, prestige, special status, and benefits, and to attach them to the interests of profits and bureaucracy. This is where the origin of one of the great sociological laws of modern society lies: "The prestige carried by people in modern industrial society varies in inverse proportion to their closeness to actual production" (Schumacher).

Experience has shown that there is no technical necessity for the dequalification and robotization of workers. On the contrary, it is possible to adapt the process of work in such a way that it can simultaneously be a process of continuous education, Productive labour and the constant acquisition of knowledge and skills can be melded into a whole. There is no need to condemn anyone to unqualified and stultifying working tasks for his entire working life.

1.2. The deep crisis of the economy and its interrelated technological growth has discouraged all hopes of full employment by causing waves of gigantic unemployment which have spread all over the planet. It has caused great restructuring of economies and the withering away of entire branches of the economy, thereby increasingly affecting European workers as well, and younger educated people in particular.

In response to the strategy of the ruling classes, numerous alternatives growing out of factories and turning into demands for a different global strategy of development, investment, development planning, North-South relations, etc. have appeared. Employment becomes the very precondition of everything else. The output of an idle man is nil whereas the output of even a poorly equipped man can be a positive contribution. The success in terms of output or income, without consideration of the number of jobs, is quite Inappropriate in the conditions here under consideration, for it implies a static approach to the problem of development. The dynamic approach pays heed to the needs of people: their first need is to start work (Schumacher).

However, there are only two things that we should like to point out. Although in different ways, unemployment is becoming a common vital problem and neuralgic point in both developed and underdeveloped countries. Also, it cannot be resolved by the prevailing model of technological growth. It is a road without hope. Profound changes in the mode of production and in the character of labour represent one of the most important fields for socio-cultural alternatives.

There is an idea we should like to point out both for developed and underdeveloped countries: the combination of modern automated production in large series with decentralized production. Quality products made in large series and in an automated process of production would satisfy existential needs and would be followed up by a multitude of decentralized, local, self-initiated productive units. They would provide for the option of freer, less impersonal and routine work. According to their affinities and capabilities workers would give such units their own personal stamp, utilize local resources, and satisfy numerous non-uniform needs. Shorter working hours in the basic production would gradually enable this free activity.

The world model of development, which with its satellite industrialization caused a massive pauperization of the peasant masses and brought about the existing pattern of development, arose in societies rich in capital and short of labour, and therefore it cannot possibly be appropriate for societies short of capital and rich in labour.

As Gandhi said, the poor of the world cannot be helped by mass production, only by production by the masses. The system of mass production, based on sophisticated, highly capital-intensive, high energy input-dependent, and human labour-saving technology, presupposes that you are already rich, for a great deal of capital investment is needed to establish one single workplace. The system of production by the masses mobilizes the priceless resources which are possessed by all human beings, their clever brains and skillful hands, and supports them with first-class tools. The technology of the "dual economy" in the developing countries will remain for the foreseeable future. The modern sector will not be able to absorb the whole.

First then, workplaces have to be created in the areas where the people are living now, and not only in metropolitan areas into which they tend to migrate; second, these workplaces must be, on average, cheap enough so that they can be created in large numbers without this calling for an unattainable level of capital formation and imports. Third, production should be mainly from local materials and mainly for local use.

The "intermediate technology" concept has conflicting meanings, and if taken out of the broader social context it can have dubious features. However, it provides food for thought. The "knowledge can be applied in a great variety of ways, of which the current application in modern industry is only one" (Schumacher).

1.3. All the phenomena we have described are links in a long chain of change. However the potentially deepest civilizational alternative is contained in the demand for essentially shorter working hours. It is becoming one of the central and radical demands of the social movement which embodies an enormous potential of deepest changes to be made in the quality of life. Time is becoming the greatest value - the evaluation of time is the evaluation of human life itself. However, shorter working hours also become the main practical means for an entire chain of changes:

(a) Shorter working hours for workers and longer working hours for machines would contribute to greater employment, particularly of the younger generation.

(b) An orientation towards shorter working hours would be an incentive for the development of technologies which save time - the most valuable raw material of human life.

(c) Shorter working hours enable the overcoming of the division of labour, and provide for the linking of work and education, which enables every worker to constantly enrich his practical and theoretical knowledge. The school and the factory, productive labour and the acquisition of knowledge, become organically connected; from youth to retirement every individual is sometimes a producer, sometimes a student, or even teacher. The development of human capabilities and their cultivation, rather than the acquisition of things, is becoming the primary value. "Conditions will be made for anyone who carries the germ of Raphael to become Raphael" (K. Marx).

2. Alternative Model of Consumption and Growth

If one side of the model is the problematique pertaining to the character and conditions of work, the other side pertains to what should be produced and for what needs. In other words, the second main field is the quest for an alternative to crisis of consumption models.

The dangers are undeniable, but what remains concealed is the causes, the deep, organic relationship between the ecological crisis and the crisis of the mode of production (the character of labour and the working conditions). The fact that the workers' and ecological movements are not connected testifies to this. However, there is a hidden but deep relationship between the character of the working process, the position of the producers, and the attitude towards the biological foundations of life, between that which is happening in the factory and in the city. The way of using the human labour force in production and the way of exploiting nature are subject to the same laws. The same logic reduces man to a commodity, and ruthlessly destroys nature. This is also valid for the period of early, difficult socialism which had many of the characteristics of classic industrial organization, the ideals of quantitative growth. Consumption based on the profit-power-prestige trinity, on artificial needs, becomes one of the main causes of the destruction of nature. The key problem facing the corporations is how to prevent market saturation and keep up a growing demand for those goods which bring maximum profit. This problem can be solved in only one way: by constantly launching new products which "outdate" the old ones, products whose usability for individuals need not be better. If the present-day trends are allowed to remain, a collapse of society and an irremediable destruction of the biological system upon which human life on this planet depends will inevitably be brought about by the end of the century. Blueprint for survival. The dangers are well known: a decrease in food production; the reappearance of hunger; the ruthless exhaustion of natural resources; air, water, and soil pollution, etc.

Integral parts of this consumption model (mode of reproduction) are the cultural patterns and the status-seekers' psychology whose purpose, is to preserve a social hierarchy, as well as competition among individuals all of whom want to be "above the others." Their motto is: "What is good for all is not food; you will be prestigious only if you have more than others have." As soon as the goods that were possessed only by the elite (various types of cars, houses, and school diplomas) become accessible to the other strata as well, they become devalued.

The threshold of poverty is raised higher; new privileges inaccessible to the masses are brought about. This "poverty modernization" (Ivan Illich) is one of the fundamental causes of parasitically super consumption and of the exhaustion of natural resources. A citizen of the USA has an influence over his environment which is 25 times greater than that of a citizen of India. The ecological effect of the energy consumption of the USA, with its population of 250 million, is equal to that which 5 billion Indians living in India would have (A. Davis). The consumption and growth generated by these forces cannot be maintained: the maintenance costs of industry in itself are steadily increasing, while the natural resources are steadily diminishing. The solutions do not lie in putting a stop to growth while preserving the same system, as proposed by the Club of Rome. The demand to stop all industrial growth would mean that the rich part of the world would, in order to preserve its cruel affluence, have to maintain the poverty of the rest of the world. The poorer are requested to abandon all hope for a better life forever.

The roots of the problem do not lie in an insufficient production, but in the nature of the goods that are being produced and for what purposes; in the mode of consumption. An answer to these problems, which is proposed by the ecological movements that are close to the working masses, is the creation of an alternative, a great inversion. It is worth producing the goods that are necessary for all, and the aim is not the creation of privileges and hierarchies. Production would be oriented to the products which are of a higher quality and more durable. The pursuit of quantity would not be the main criterion. There is nothing except power, prestige, and profit to prevent us from producing high-quality clothes, machines, more durable cars; from giving incentives to good and cheap public transport, more collective services, etc.

In conclusion, may we say that the progress of the producer, the protection of his abilities and of the environment in which he lives should be stressed as the main purpose and criterion of progress. Man protects his natural and social being at the same front of the social struggle.

People certainly would not like to take earth back to the stage where it was seven days after the world was created. However, they want to and can eliminate ecological catastrophe. The time has come either to pay one's dues to ecology or to go bankrupt. However, this debt cannot be paid only in the ancient values of greater social justice among nations. New steps towards peace and equality among nations must precede the better harmony between nature and man. This great breakthrough, in which we as a species should find ways of survival and progress in a world of a different quality, can only be made within a world framework.

3. The Crisis of the Urban Dinosaur and the New City

A great social movement demanding a different kind of city is born before our eyes. The modern megalopolis, the urban dinosaur, is facing an acute crisis.

Slums side by side with luxury areas; vestibules of hell - urban destruction of entire districts with tens of thousands of abandoned houses and apartments in New York and Detroit; modern architectural colossus on the ruins of decaying inner cities: the dizzying rise in the cost of community services and the reduction in the quality of collective life-; the accelerated growth of crime and the use of drugs; brutality; ghettos of the poor; the driving out of the working class to the outskirts with, at the same time, the flight of the rich along with the decay of the inner cities, etc. The development of the cities is subject to the logic of profit; city rents which have transformed them into monsters. City life has become a hunting ground, a field for the enrichment of a new bourgeoisie which, having lost power in production, turns to speculation in real estate and building lots, robbery by gigantic rents.

The picture becomes still darker if we look at the Third World, cities encircled with belts of incredible misery, in which by the year 2000 three-fourths of the population of Latin America will live. Satellite industries are the cause of a huge breakdown in agriculture in the Third World countries, resulting in enormous masses of homeless people, the "world of the uprooted" in search of bread and jobs, moving to the big cities where they vegetate.

Day by day new forms of social conflict are born that are directly tied to these collective conditions of life; to conquering the city for the workers, to human aspirations for a renewed take-over of living conditions. In these struggles new alternative city life and dwellings are being born, which go beyond the framework of the capitalist, state bureaucratic system, with different qualities of existence. These are not merely visions, intellectual projects, but living elements already being formed and fighting for life in the lap of the existing conditions. The city - if we now regard its other dimension - was also the birthplace of the new productive and cultural forces; social links are being established, along with the accumulation of centuries of culture, of world horizons.

Let me cite the example of Bologna as an illustration of this desire for a new city and the decision to halt the destructive trend and begin a campaign for more human living conditions with citizens truly deciding their own needs. The progressive movement in Bologna, upon taking over the local authority, began a new renaissance. They started with the most vital point - housing. Block by block they restored the dilapidated and neglected buildings. While one sector was being renovated, its residents were temporarily housed in a new block constructed for the purpose. Thus, bit by bit, the rebirth of the housing and beauties was accomplished. By the abolition of private transportation within the city resources were released that had been required for mammoth parking lots, widening of the streets, overpasses, etc. Apartments remained cheap and public transportation was free. The Mayor of Bologna says:

Urban planning expresses the will of the masses. Men and women of all party affiliations supported it fundamentally, in the local communities, districts, factories. Just try to change one item on the list of goals, and you will have a revolt.... We do not want just to build a city but to create a living organism in which the isolation and alienation of the population of the city will be overcome.

4. Health is Priceless

The link between dehumanized technology and the social milieu is most obvious in the field of medicine. There are two big social processes which generate an attack on human health. Firstly, it is the mode of using labour force in the factory, the megamachine, for squeezing out the surplus of labour. Increased nervous exhaustion is related, as described, to the break-through of technology. The other source is the collective living conditions in the cities whose quality is deteriorating - the ecological crisis. Both social processes are sources of an attack on health because they are guided by the same principle: the tendency directed towards an economic output, as the most important target. Like Shylock, they are trying to save their pound of flesh but to the detriment of the living and working conditions.

The basic orientation of the medical service and research grew out of this social situation. First of all, its emphasis is not on preventive medicine, on the elimination of the causes, but on repairing the human machine and returning it to the same living and working conditions. Secondly, it is the strictly individualistic approach which wants to keep up the appearance of health protection as being related to individual behaviour only - don't smoke; don't eat and drink too much, etc.; it is your own fault that you are ill. The control of collective conditions of living remains out of sight. In opposition to this orientation the workers' movements declared that health is priceless. The essence lies in the demand to control the basic living and working conditions, such as the rhythm and intensity of labour, anti-pollution measures, measures against the poisoning of food, etc. On these foundations a different orientation of the medical sciences has also been brought about, as well as their linking to other fields studying the natural conditions, the process of work, psychological life - the entity of natural and living conditions. A great alliance of sciences for the protection of health is in sight.

The struggle to preserve the psycho-physical integrity of the producers exercises an influence over the character of technology. We can give an illustration to support this statement. The introduction of X-ray quality control in car factories was progressive from a technological standpoint. However, it was hazardous to human health. Due to the workers' demands, a new technology based on remote control eliminated the danger. This possibility was not unknown before the workers' demands, but the other technique was cheaper. It is only out of a social struggle that a technological innovation which both promotes production and preserves health was born.

V. Self-reliance and solidarity (autonomy and new universality)

Intellectual creativity is made possible only if the social ground is autonomous. The sources of new culture, of socio-cultural alternatives, are one's own society, its needs. Without a sufficient degree of autonomy dependent growth becomes inevitable. The social groups which are the executors and co-beneficiaries of the exploitation of natural resources and manpower cannot become the bearers of endogenous creativity. They develop the mentality and ideology of inferiority and dependence. Autonomous practice (or the "concept of specificity" A. Malek) must encompass all dimensions of life. Its point of departure is political philosophy - the desire of people to live their own life, to become the masters and creators of their own destiny. A social setting in which citizens would take part in governing and managing their schools, factories, hospitals, and cultural institutions is also a way of having them develop their own integrity and preserve and develop the identity of their culture. the concept of specificity includes a strategy of technological development which is not restricted to the adoption of the patterns of others ("Self-reliant creativity as against the prevailing fashion of the transfer of knowledge''). The search for alternative ways of modernizing, of industrial development which will not lead to such a dehumanization of people and their environment, which will secure increasingly the flow of the fruit of technological growth to the working people, rather than to privileged social groups and societies, is crucial. But the development of endogenous culture by no means implies confinement to one's boundaries. On the contrary, it is the simultaneous maintenance of one's own cultural creativity (autonomy, specificity) and the resolute rejection of sterile autarchy; it is the opening of bridges towards the world, and enrichment with the most valuable heritage of other cultures, with universal values.

But the new culture (SCA) cannot be built in isolation, without international solidarity. Without mutuality there is no autonomy.

The coming era opens a glorious but also critical period of overall interdependence. We are living in a planetary world society. The formerly isolated and autarchic societies, like oases divided by deserts, have come closer together, interconnected by thousands of links. Also, three continents - Asia, Africa, and Latin America - have re-entered the cent re of world history. Moved by the great forces of national liberation and social revolution they are opening the gigantic, hidden creativity potentials of mankind, bearing the most valuable fruits in the creation of a new world.

However, what the image of the world community will be like is of crucial importance. The forces of hegemony are becoming the protagonists of the negative, antagonistic aspect of the integration of mankind. They are inclined toward a world order in which the great linking of material and cultural forces will be paid for by the annihilation of autonomy, by the loss of cultural identity, by subordination. A pluralism of culture is necessary in order to have the world become a society which is not uniform and indistinguishable, but rich in its Promethean quest for a life which is worthier of man. Only autonomy, independence, and equality can be a path leading towards universal richness - a world which is being enriched by the original and unrepeatable creativity of every civilization. Deprived of this, interdependence is not a way to mutual enrichment but an obstruction to the growth of civilization.

It is a liberation of the potentials of the entire world that is concerned; not their compression into a Could, but a true encounter of progressive tendencies from all parts of the world.

Differences will remain. But the decisive question is whether they will lead to mutual complementariness, or whether they will turn into hostility, antagonism (Abdel-Malek). It is crucial to oppose the logic which disintegrates the working masses of the world, not to enforce partial practice and truth as the only ones, not to present part of the sky as the entire horizon. Eurocentrism is a distinct example of such thought and practice. The greatest challenge has emerged like fate itself. Opposing the disastrous current that would immortalize the division into the sparse world aristocracy and the proletarian village is the crucial question of the epoch. Mankind cannot survive if millions of people are being destroyed or are dying of hunger on one side while others are watching this indifferently. It cannot be sustained if the ruling minorities are preserving the growing misery of the rest of the world in order to increase their own wealth: "We are bringing ourselves closer to the sky in fast rockets, but we are not bringing hands together in human brotherhood" (P. Neruda).


1. Rajko Tomovic, Technology and Society.

2. R. Rihta, Civilization at the Crossroads, shows this tendency in the following way:

Classic mechanization (per cent)

Full automation (per cent)










Secondary education



Higher education



3. The creation of multinational companies is growing two times faster than overall world economic activity. According to present day forecasts, by 1985 three to four hundred multinational companies will control 80 per cent of the total industry of the capitalist world. A small group of companies, often associated in consortiums of joint ventures, already rules the world: seven gigantic companies are controlling the entire petroleum industry; fifteen companies are controlling petrochemicals; electronics are controlled by eight groups, the production of flat glass by five, the production of paper by nine groups, etc.

4. In a recent United Nations report it is emphasized that the branch offices of the Third World are paying half the sum of all the new investment reaching the "underdeveloped countries" only for patents, licenses, and '"services performed."

In 1973 all the countries in the world had about 100 billion dollars for scientific research at their disposal. The developed countries have about 97 per cent of these funds at their disposal, while the developing countries have only 3 per cent. Only six countries (the USA, the USSR, Japan, West Germany, France, and Great Britain) are spending 83 per cent of the total fund for developing research in the world, and only two countries - the USA and the USSR - are spending 60 per cent of all these resources.

5. R. Tomovic, ibid.

6. E. F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful.

7. V. Stambuk, "Position Paper."

8. In autumn 1971 a poll in two big factories of the Renault company (in Billancourt and Le Mans) discovered that 56 per cent and 85 per cent of the workers attach greater importance to the shortening of working hours than to a wage increase. In 1967 only 31 per cent of the workers were of those views. In four years these workers discovered the essential difference between making more money and a better life.

9. M. Ji, R. M S. Schmidt, Red Bologna.

10. Anouar Abdel-Malek.

11. Anouar Abdel-Malek.


The idea for this paper came from a discussion at the Asian Symposium on Intellectual Creativity in Endogenous Culture, which the United Nations University held from 13 to 17 November 1978 in Kyoto, Japan. A sharp discrepancy emerged between the speakers from Japan and those from the other Asian countries in their attitudes toward science and technology, in particular toward science and technology in modern Japan.

Japanese speakers liked to talk about the various shortcomings connected with Japan's rapid industrialization and high economic development: pollution of water and of the atmosphere, disturbance of the ecological system, destruction of traditional culture, and so forth. These same shortcomings also were regarded as the results of big science and big technology. Generally speaking, Japanese speakers tended to focus on the destructive effects of science and technology, regarding them as exogenous borrowed factors in Japanese culture, and to stress the value of endogenous traditional elements.

The attitude of speakers from other Asian countries was different. They regarded science and technology far more positively as instruments of social change. They looked for new models of social change which were not constrained by replication of western experience, but dependent on the diffusion of science and technology among the masses for the eradication of poverty, ignorance, disease, superstition, and the hegemony of oligarchic groups. It was from this angle that they were interested in science and technology in modern Japan. How was Japan able to assimilate so rapidly exogenous western science and technology; how were they utilized for Japanese industry; and how has Japan diffused modern science among the masses? These are the questions they wished to have answered, but none of the Japanese speakers could reply.

However, these two markedly different attitudes shared one view about science and technology in Japan; that is, that science and technology in Japan were exogenous, borrowed, imported elements. Starting from this, one group stressed the destruction of the endogenous cultural elements by the exogenous, and the other stressed the assimilation of the exogenous by the endogenous. My position is a little different from both. I think that we cannot answer the questions through such an approach. In the symposium I said: "It would be more relevant for us to discuss the way - like Japan after the Meiji Restoration - of reacting to the exogenous and developing the endogenous."

For lack of time, I could not go further then. Now I would like to pursue the question of the relation between exogenous and endogenous influences in scientific and technical development, exemplified by the particular case of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century.

On this subject we have an excellent pioneer work, Professor Kazuko Tsurumi's "Some Potential Contributions of the Latecomers to Scientific and Technological Revolution - Comparison of Japan and China.'' This paper discusses a dynamic relationship between traditional culture and modern technology based on the comparison of the industrialization process of Japan and China, and includes stimulating propositions which help one to understand the general relationship between technology and culture as well as the specific problems of early Japanese industrialization in the Meiji Period.

Professor Tsurumi rejects the view which considers science and technology as entities independent of the culture of any particular society. Each culture has its own traditional ways of knowing and of making. Then, in so far as they are the means of knowing and making, science and technology must have their own roots in the culture to which they belong. This means that there will be a conflict between all borrowed technology and the indigenous culture of the borrowing country which cannot be overcome until the technology has become integrated into the culture. On this premise she begins with an investigation of conflicts between the indigenous iron-manufacturing technology and the imported western technology in Meiji Japan. This approach strongly recommends itself as a method in techno-sociology. Comparing the various conflicts brought about by the importation of technology into some countries we can expect to find many keys to understanding the relationship between technology and social culture.

The historical event on which Professor Tsurumi concentrates is the failure of the government-owned Kamaishi Iron Works. She writes:

When the Meiji Government launched into the first modern iron manufacturing factory in the City of Kamaishi in 1875, they set aside the traditional technology, and hired a British engineer to lay out the plan and supervise the whole process strictly according to British technology. Less than one hundred days after two modern blast furnaces were lit, operations had to be stopped due to a shortage of charcoal. In 1882, the British engineer resumed the operation of the blast furnaces, by replacing charcoal with coke, which caused congelation of iron and coke in the furnaces, resulting in the closure of the entire plant. The British engineer was dismissed.2

This description is so compact that it would be better to add a few comments. Before the period described, there had already been ten small, charcoal-fired blast-furnaces at Kamaishi. The oldest one was constructed in 1857 by Takato Oshima, a military engineer who belonged to the Nanbu feudal clan and was well-informed about "Rangaku" (Dutch learning). These small furnaces were again based on a foreign design, but were constructed without any help from foreign engineers. A few of them were owned by the Nanbu clan, but the others were private and managed in a capitalistic way. Management of them was difficult financially, but technically the furnaces worked well until the beginning of the Meiji Period. Thus there were 20 years of experience behind the pig-iron manufacturing technology at Kamaishi when the new Meiji Government bought these factories and established the government-owned Kamaishi Iron Works.

They put a German engineer, Ruisu Bianhli (Japanese pronunciation, the original spelling is unknown), and Takato Oshima in charge of its modernization plan and the selection of a new location. But the opinions of the two differed in many respects. Oshima proposed rather small furnaces (though of course larger than the old ones) and a location different from the adopted one. Finally, the western oriented minds of the government chose Bianhli's plan and Oshima left Kamaishi. Two large new furnaces with steam-powered blowers and 15 miles of railroad on which ran a locomotive made in Manchester were built. All these were of the most advanced design of that age and imported from Britain. Their construction was directed by six foreign engineers, and they were operated by ten foreign engineers, most of whom were British. The domestic technology at Kamaishi was completely neglected. Production by the new furnaces started at the end of 1880, and after two runs stopped in the first half of 1882 as Professor Tsurumi described. The whole plant was abandoned afterwards.

Later technological and historical research points to the following as the causes of failure:

1. There was a large gap between the performance of the new furnace based on the latest technology and the old-fashioned method of charcoal making.

2. Neither the location of the furnaces nor the total transportation system was satisfactory for rapidly supplying raw materials. (In these respects, Oshima's proposals were far more feasible.)

3. The design of the furnace had a fundamental defect and its operation by foreign engineers completely neglected the characteristics of Japanese domestic iron ore and coal.

This third factor was the cause of the congelation of iron and coke, the process of which was investigated afterwards by Kageyashi Noro and his student Koroku Komura. Through their investigation they succeeded in finding a way to continuously operate one of these blast furnaces which had lain idle for 12 years.

This story from the dawn of the modern Japanese iron industry raises many points about the exogenous and the endogenous factors in the industry of developing countries. It warns us of the dangers of importing technology without considering indigenous conditions. It also teaches us that the advantage of domestic technology lies in its homogeneity with indigenous conditions: environments, the characteristics of domestic raw materials, customs of workers, and perhaps indigenous culture. In so far as domestic workers speaking the native language operate the plant and domestic raw materials are used in domestic conditions, technology cannot disregard all these factors. Therefore, we must point to, as the fourth and most essential cause of the failure, the worship of the West by the government which scorned the indigenous technology, rejected Oshima's proposal, and adopted the British design in toto.

It is Professor Tsurumi's important contribution to have noticed this and, based on a further comparison of Japan and China, to have elucidated the meaning of the "self-reliance" policy for the "latecomers to the process of industrialization." Her point about the possible relation between Japan's imitation-oriented attitude and its environmental destruction is especially noteworthy. However, there is still something which worries me about her arguments. That is her evaluation of the process of the imitation. Comparing the "imitation model" of Japan and the "self-reliance model" of China, Professor Tsurumi stresses the importance of self-reliance too heavily while at the same time too strongly denying the importance of the imitation model. She never discounts the imitation in general. She allows for imitation or borrowing of technology in some circumstances. I must approve of this. But in the whole context of her argument, "self reliance" always appears as a symbol of positive value and "imitation" as a symbol of negative value. She will not refer to any positive aspect of imitation. As a result, one cannot but gain the impression that imitation is in general rejected here. At least this rather rigid approach seems to me to be a reason why Professor Tsurumi has failed to grasp a possible dynamic relation between "imitation" and "self-reliance."

Is it possible for the developing countries to make any progress in their industrialization without any imitation or borrowing of technology? Impossible, I believe, and so the most important problem we must solve is the relation between the imitation indispensable for their progress and their indigenous conditions. Imitation is an important procedure in a child's learning process. History teaches us this also is true for nations or cultures. In the early part of this millennium, Europe learned much from the highly advanced science and technology of the Arabic, Indian, and Chinese cultural areas. This process included abundant examples of imitation and borrowing, the most important of which was the adoption of Arabic numerals. But once rooted in European culture these exogenous elements triggered off the energy latent in the European domestic conditions, and Europe rapidly began to develop.

The dynamics of the exogenous elements and domestic conditions through which European medieval technology and society started on its way to the modern industrial stage has been elucidated by the works of Professor Lynn White, Dr. Joseph Needham, and many others. There is no need to repeat or to paraphrase their arguments here. The aim of my argument is only to show that the same sort of dynamics can be seen in the very example discussed by Professor Tsurumi.

The history of modern Japanese iron-manufacturing technology has its starting point in the social disturbance brought about by the "Kurofune" (western warships). Many Japanese feudal lords anxious to strengthen the defences of their coastal regions launched into the western-style casting of cannons. During the 1850s I count six attempts to construct western-style reverbatory furnaces: in Saga, Kagoshima, Mito, Nirayama, Tottori, and Hagi. The extraordinary feature of these attempts was the fact that all the work involved was carried out in strict accordance with the directions found in one book alone: "Het Gietvezen in s'Rijks Ijzer-Geschutgieterij'te Luik'' by Huguenin. This Dutch book contained instructions for casting cannons and balls and boring barrels, plus some engineering drawings. It was the only western manual which Japanese could refer to in the late Edo Period. There was an engineering scale drawing of a reverbatory furnace in this book. They tried to construct the furnaces following this drawing as exactly as possible, and to operate them following the book's instructions word by word. How can we classify this sort of technological endeavour? As the imitation model, or as the self reliance model? It may well be called the "self-reliance imitation model."

It is not surprising that such endeavours should have resulted in many failures. Yosuke Sugitani, the chief engineer in the Saga feudal clan, left a detailed record of construction and operations of their reverbatory furnace. This account can be summarized as follows:

The first run: 12 December 1850, tried to melt about 900 kg of domestic pig iron, half of which did melt but the remaining half would not. Perhaps because the temperature was too low? The second run: 2 February 1851, trying to melt 1,200 kg. Result was the same as above.

The fifth run: 10 April 1851, the first success in casting a cannon with a 3.4-inch bore and 2 feet 8 inches long. The firing tests were held on the 18th of April. The barrel burst at the first shot. The sixth run: 20 April 1851, the second success in casting a cannon with a 3-inch bore and 3 feet 5 inches long. The barrel burst at the first shot. The seventh run: 14 May 1851, the first success in melting almost 100 per cent of the iron. The barrel burst at the first shot.

An endless series of trials and failures. They could not achieve even a modicum of success in the firing tests until the end of that year. The twelfth run on the 12th of January of the next year again resulted in a burst barrel. No historical description can tell us so vividly as these records the difficulty of their enterprise. But it must not be overlooked that in the midst of innumerable failures they made steady progress.

In the first run they could melt scarcely half the iron, but after the seventh run they always managed to melt 100 per cent of the iron. They found that pudding the melted iron helped the melting of the remainder. Further noticing that Japanese domestic pig iron made by the Tatara method was not suitable for melting in a reverbatory furnace, they developed a process for pre-treating the domestic pig iron which not only made the melting process easier but also remarkably improved the quality of cannons so cast. The first cannon was cast using a would with a core corresponding to the required bore. The bore of the fourth cannon was made using a boring machine made in Saga which was again a copy of a design in Huguenin's book. In 1852 they began construction of two water-powered boring machines, based on Huguenin's instructions, which worked well when completed.

All this was done, checking again and again the relevant descriptions in Huguenin's book after each failure, borrowing from their own experiences in casting bronze cannons since 1842, and gathering any useful information they could get from Dutch officers and merchants with whom they came into contact only at Nagasaki. It is truly striking to see that in 1852 they succeeded in casting 14 cannons fit for the purpose they were designed for and by the end of the Edo Period they had made about 200, including three cannons with rifled barrels which were the latest development in contemporary Europe. In spite of the innumerable failures recorded by Sugitani, the speed with which they assimilated new exogenous technology seems to us astonishing. Why was such rapid assimilation possible?

There has been much debate about the cause of this speed. But here I will focus on an opinion proposed by Professor Shuji Ohashi. Professor Ohashi, drawing on his detailed studies on late-Edo iron metallurgy, has shown three distinct stages in the formation process of Saga cannon-casting technology; each of these stages had its own counterpart in the European development.

The first stage was the casting of bronze cannons from 1842 to 1859. Since 1641, the Saga clan had been in charge of the defence of Nagasaki; this defence was of the highest importance, because Nagasaki was the only port opened to the West in Edo Period Japan. The Saga clan was, therefore, comparatively advanced in artillery for contemporary

Japan, and had its own technology for casting bronze cannons. On this basis it proceeded to imitate Dutch bronze cannons in 1842,8 and had successfully produced about 150 before 1850. As we have seen above, this experience in bronze-casting helped the clan much in its iron casting. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, European cannon-casting technology remained at this bronze stage which also constituted the basis for their iron cannon-casting technology. The second stage proposed by Professor Ohashi was the casting of iron cannon from 1851 to 1859 (described above), which corresponded to European development from the middle of the eighteenth century to the 1850s. And the third stage was the attempt from 1863 to make rifled cast-steel barrels; this stage corresponded to European development since the 1840s. It must be noticed that although each stage covered only a brief period of time, Saga had passed through exactly the same stages, and in the same order, as Europe.

This reminds us again of a child's learning process. A child grows through imitating the behaviour of adults. But this requires the maturation of the preceding stage in this learning process. Only when a child has been well-prepared in the preceding stage can imitation help his leap to the next stage. Similarly the engineers in Saga had been prepared for iron-casting by their experiences with the casting of bronze cannons; only because of this did their extraordinary attempt to copy Huguenin's design in toto aid them in making their leap to Western technology. However, we must emphasize that it was not only their experience with bronze which aided them: the engineers in Saga also received much help from the various fields of their indigenous technology.

Firebricks used for the construction of the reverbatory furnace were made in Arita, which is still famous for its traditional ceramics. As to the use of water power, they had no difficulty in finding skilled millwrights. in the late Edo Period the use of water power had been diffused widely in the Japanese food industry as well as in agricultural irrigation systems.

For engineering calculations concerning the curved inner surface of the furnace, Japanese indigenous arithmetic was successfully used. And above all, I must point out the role of domestic Japanese iron manufacturing technology, the core of which was the Tatara method. Tatara furnaces were operated at a temperature comparable to that of blast furnaces and could produce pig iron and steel simultaneously. This pig iron and steel was used for manufacturing a wide variety of products, ranging from arms such as swords and guns to agricultural implements such as hoes and sickles. Therefore, the craftsmen who worked under these engineers were considerably skilled in the art of casting and forging and were well-informed about the behaviour at high temperatures of melted iron and various other materials.

Professor Ohashi estimates that the technical level of iron work in Japan during the late Edo Period was approximating that of Britain just before, or during, the first stage of the Industrial Revolution. He also emphasizes that the most important background factor for their success was their indigenous iron technology. Here again we come to the recognition of the importance of indigenous factors in technological progress. Without solid support from indigenous technology and from their own experiences in the preceding stages, any attempt at imitation could not be expected to succeed.

But, on the other hand, we can ask whether Japanese domestic technology and the Saga engineers could have reached the iron cannon casting stage without the attempt at imitation. Surely they could, but perhaps only very slowly. The attempt to imitate the western reverbatory furnace imposed upon them many new and unencountered problems which Professor Ohashi summarizes as follows:

1. building big heavy structures with bricks;

2. producing firebricks able to withstand a temperature of 1200°C;

3. attaining a temperature of 1200°C uniformly by charcoalfiring, this temperature being necessary for melting pig iron;

4. operating two or four furnaces simultaneously and pouring melted iron successively from them to a mould in order to make a huge homogeneous barrel;

5. constructing a water-powered boring machine and boring with it;

6. casting a barrel which never burst.

Solutions to these problems could not be expected to arise spontaneously from Japanese domestic technology. Exactly because the attempt to cast these cannons was an imitation of exogenous technology, it was accompanied by such new and previously unknown problems. Moreover, there was a considerable gap between the technological level required for solving these problems and the one the engineers had actually attained - this is the reason why I prefer to use the word "leap" to express their attempt to "progress." If this gap had been too large, their endeavour would have resulted in a severe failure such as that of the early Meiji government in Kamaishi. Fortunately the gap was sufficiently small for them, and they could overcome it successfully. Their success was accompanied by an apparently endless series of failures in the early stage of their endeavour; but they were able to learn from every experience of failure, and finally they leaped over the gap by their own efforts.

Thus we can summarize the lessons from this historical process as follows: If they had not been well-prepared in the previous stage, the attempt at imitation would have resulted in failure; but if they had not attempted this audacious imitation, their casting technology would have remained at the bronze stage at least for several decades longer. It seems that Professor Tsurumi has missed noticing this last point.

New technology thus acquired and assimilated begins to evolve on its own. Saga iron-casting technology not only proceeded to the next stage of making rifled barrels but also was diffused to many other feudal clans. All attempts to construct reverbatory furnaces in the 1850s were more or less influenced and aided by Saga's engineering. The lord of the Saga clan presented the Japanese translation of Huguenin's book to the lord of the Satsuma clan and helped him to construct the furnace at Kagoshima. For the construction at Nirayama, Yosuke Sugitani himself went there with skilled craftsmen and successfully directed the operation. Furthermore, these other feudal clans began in their turn to develop this technique on their own. The Satsuma clan tried to construct a small blast furnace, which, after having been successful in several test runs, was destroyed by the bombardment of a British squadron before it had achieved continuous operation. But the feudal lord of Satsuma then sent one of his military engineers to collaborate with Takato Oshima in his attempt to construct western-style reverbatory and blast furnaces. This collaboration led them to the first Japanese success in the construction of a charcoalfired blast furnace at Kamaishi, again based on a design found in Huguenin's book. The date they first fired this blast furnace, 1 December 1857, is now considered as the birthday of the modern Japanese iron industry.11 To be sure, we can specify this date as marking the completion of Japan's first leap in iron technology - a leap which had begun with the work of Saga feudal clan and had been diffused to and assimilated by the whole country.

One characteristic of modern Japan's technological development was the presence of many such leaps; and the early history of modern Japan's iron-manufacturing technology can be roughly understood as passing through a series of three such leaps. The first was of course the one discussed above. The second was the already-mentioned importation of British technology by the new Meiji Government. The third leap was the construction of the government-owned Yawata Iron Works, begun in 1896 and based on a German design. These iron works were the antecedents of Shin Nippon Seitetsu, now one of the world's biggest iron manufacturing companies.

As I have already shown, the second leap was a severe failure in contrast to the first. But it cannot be overlooked that this failure also prepared Japanese engineers for their next leap. We have mentioned that 12 years after the failure Kageyoshi Noro and his student Koroku Komura collaborated and succeeded in operating this British furnace with coke. While they were collaborating on this attempt, Noro, as a member of a governmental committee, was simultaneously preparing the plans for Yawata Iron Works. To him the attempt in Kamaishi served as an experiment for the construction of Yawata Works. In fact, the report which he presented to parliament was based on much data gained from the Kamaishi Iron Works.12

From early- to mid-Meiji we can count a number of attempts to import foreign technology into the iron industry. Some of them succeeded; some of them failed severely, such as the one in Kamaishi. But by this time there had grown up in Japan several engineers trained in modern science and able to analyse matters scientifically so as to draw many useful lessons from the failures. Thus before the year 1901, when the Yawata Iron Works were first fired, Japan had experienced almost all the successes and failures which the western iron industry had experienced in its own development from the bloomers to the Bessemer converter and the open hearth. By these experiences Japanese engineers had been well-prepared for their third leap.

This characteristic (that is, a series of small leaps) in Japanese technological development is, I suggest, extremely important for developing countries now. In so far as developing countries aim to reach the same technological level as developed countries have now in a shorter time than they took, their development plans must necessarily be designed as a series of leaps. One example of this is the Chinese pattern of technological development since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. It has been made up of a series of alternate great leaps and periods of adjustment. China seems to have pursued this pattern far more intentionally than Japan. Whether it has been successful and whether it will prove the best model for developing countries are separate questions. What I am going to suggest here is that this stop-go pattern does offer one possible course of development, and that a study of the technological leaps and their related social problems in the history of modern Japan should be of interest to countries embarking on their own development.

Here I would like to point out briefly three important areas for future investigation and discussion. The first concerns the historical situation around each leap or sudden advance. Though in itself a technological endeavour, each leap was always an inseparable part of some historical agitation. The first leap grew out of the agitation which began with the social shock brought about by the Opium War and the appearance of western warships and ended with the fall of the Edo government. Many cannons cast during this time of advance were fired against the Tokugawa army as well as against western squadrons. The second was of course associated with the great social change after the Meiji Restoration, and the third with the international tension in the period between the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars.

Therefore, it must be said that to gain truly practical lessons from the Japanese experience, we have to consider these technical leaps in their whole social and historical contexts, and not see them in isolation. But, broadly speaking, it is true that Japan always succeeded in harnessing the nationalistic passion aroused by such periods of agitation and using it as the driving force for the technological leap. This is still true now. For instance, the Japanese leaders made full use of the oil crisis of 1973 to build up a feeling of emergency which they were able to turn to the development of energy-economizing technology.

From this viewpoint, the period between the two world wars is an especially interesting period in the history of modern Japanese science and technology. From the above argument we could expect that World War I should have started another leap in Japanese science and technology. In fact, this war marks the beginning of an important movement in science. While bringing general prosperity to the Japanese economy, the war, since it stopped imports from Germany, meant severe difficulties for some areas of Japanese industry. For instance, the textile industry suffered badly because of a shortage of dyestuffs. Medicines, soda, and iron also were in short supply. This threatened people's daily lives as well as industry. This experience gave rise to an inclination toward "self-sustained industry," which characterized the whole of Japanese policy in the period between the two world wars.

The late Professor Hiroshige wrote:

What the First World War impressed strongly on Japanese leaders was the fact that modern war was war of attrition. Victory depended exclusively on the ability of the country as a whole to stand up to attrition, i.e., on the country's general productive power. What impressed them particularly was the fact that Germany could have endured against almost the whole of Europe and America for as long a time as over four years. They concluded that this was due to science; Germany was able to invent substitute materials of every kind because of its scientific excellence.

The German situation was contrasted with their own, in which industry, without resources and without science, suffered badly from only a short interruption of imports. Thus Japan was impressed by the virtues of science.

Professor Hiroshige characterized the trend which began with this war by the words "Science for Resources," which meant science for the insurance of resources and science for the invention of substitutes as well as the science of resource materials. Rapidly developing industry in the extremely small Japanese islands was beginning to suffer from the lack of resources in many areas. This on the one hand spurred Japan's aggressive drive for resources in China and on the other encouraged the promotion of science in this period. Here we should notice that the overwhelming interest was in "self-sustained science and technology." The problem Japan had faced during the war (1914-1918) was the sort of "technological dependence" seen now in the third world. Therefore, independence from western technology was stressed.

It is ironic to see that the dynamic interaction of exogenous and endogenous forces, which had operated quite well when Japan concentrated mainly on imitation of the West, began to operate rather destructively as soon as Japan aimed for independence from the West, perhaps because of too much weight laid on the endogenous side. The familiar Japanese method of stirring up nationalistic feeling also had a strongly negative effect in this period. Calls for self-reliance and for Japan's own science and technology evoked too much chauvinism and too rigid an adherence to the indigenous culture and traditional methods, among the masses as well as the leaders. Moreover, the social pressures arising from rapid industrial development were growing in this period so as to threaten the government. From these sprang two opposing social movements: on the extreme left a radical revolutionary labour movement, and on the extreme right a nationalistic movement which claimed that all social evils were the results of western capitalist industrialization. The government hoped to use the extreme right to repress the extreme left. In doing so, it encouraged the chauvinistic, spiritualistic, and oriental elements of the right wing. All these various elements were aggregated into the movement of so-called "Japanese fascism," which was very effective in mobilizing the masses for war but extremely inhibiting to the development of science and technology.

In spite of these restraining factors, the attempts made in this period to promote science and technology helped considerably to build up latent energy for the subsequent great leap in Japan. Professor Hiroshige has made clear that many advanced techniques developed in Japan after World War II have their origins in basic research of this period, most of which was subsidized by the Japanese Association for the Advancement of Science. Subsidizing basic research, promoting the development of indigenous techniques, improving the system of scientific education, and diffusing scientific knowledge among the masses - these steady, basic efforts resulted in raising the level of popular scientific culture and prepared the way for later development, but the vast popular energy was oppressed and inhibited by the mystical and chauvinistic elements of Japanese fascism. Only when Japan's defeat in World War 1I had brought about the democratization of Japan and eradicated these restraints could Japan begin to develop rapidly. This experience also may be instructive to the third world.

Lastly, I must speak a little about the social structure arising from the national effort in making the technological leap. Japanese historians of technology and science have talked a great deal about the "biased structure" of Japanese technology. This concept has various implications, but, roughly speaking, it means a social structure in which only a few areas of industry have been developed to a high technical level, while others remain at a very backward, or even a pre-industrial level. For example, taking the period between the two wars as a midpoint, Japan might be said to have reached a fairly high technical level in iron-manufacturing, ship-building, some areas of chemical industry, and so on, but was considerably underdeveloped in the most basic machine industry. For machine tools, Japan still depended almost entirely on imports. Japan could not produce automobiles of its own design except for the test production of a few poor-quality cars. It was not until 1935 that Toyota successfully completed its first test car after many set-backs. Furthermore, the important agricultural sector and its related industries remained at an almost pre-industrial stage.

The same structure can be seen in particular areas of industry. For example, in the iron industry, the government-owned Yawata Iron Works might be ranked at the world's highest technical level, but the large private companies had no pig iron-manufacturing technology and were only producing steel from imported scrap and from Yawata pig iron by means of open hearths. Further, we must notice that the vast and varied sector of iron-working was occupied by innumerable small workshops called machi-koba [blacksmith factories].

Japanese scholars always explain this structure as a mirror image of the structure of Japan's "armament-biased capitalist industrialization." But I think that it should be interpreted as a socially transformed mirror image of the technological leap. It would be impossible for any developing country to make the technological leap at the same time in every industrial area. Furthermore, formation of techniques in certain areas, for example in the machine industry, is a very slow process which is difficult to accelerate artificially. Therefore, it is quite natural that a Japanese-type national endeavour to promote rapid industrialization through a series of technological leaps should have produced such a biased social structure.

I think this structure, the gap between the advanced areas and the backward areas of the economy, has an important role in itself. If the gap is not too large, in some circumstances it can itself stimulate progress in backward areas. But if the gap becomes too large, some conflicts can arise. It must be noticed that the gap not only exists between the technological levels in two areas of the economy, but may also affect people's attitudes and the social requirements associated with the two levels, such as a highly advanced synthetic chemical industry and agriculture at a pre-industrial stage.

To illustrate, I take a historical case. Between the two world wars, one target of Japanese industrial development was the chemical industry. New large chemical plants were constructed in combination with hydroelectric power stations. As a result, they were situated in or near high mountain regions, where pre-industrial social conditions had remained unchanged since the Edo Period. From the combination of a new large chemical plant and pre-industrial social elements, there grew up a strange type of industrial town which is now called in Japan the company castle town." In short, it is a town which is governed by a "feudal clan": the company. The town's tax revenue comes almost entirely from the company. The inhabitants of the town are the families of workers in the company and in the associated small companies which grow up around it, with only a handful of people unconnected with the company. These workers are drawn from the surrounding pre-industrial communities with their traditional customs and attitudes, the leitmotiv of which is loyalty to the community to which one belongs. The workers naturally tend to regard the company as a substitute for their native community, and are willing to be integrated into the company. The company is as powerful in the region as a feudal lord would be. It can strongly influence even the prefectural governor, not to mention the city mayor. One typical example of such a "company castle town" is Minamata - the city of the notorious Minamata disease.

Many Japanese argue that there was a strong connection between the way in which Minamata disease was diffused and this regional structure.

Of course, the direct cause of Minamata disease was the organic mercury contained in a factory effluent. No one can deny this. However, we also can see that, had countermeasures been taken as soon as the first symptoms appeared, the number of patients could have been held to a minimum. In fact, events proceeded as follows. In 1956 the first patient appeared. Immediately, many people suspected effluent from the factory, but their opinion was strongly refuted by the company, which denied that the cause of the disease could be found in the factory and refused to take any countermeasures. In this, the company received the tacit support of the Kumamoto prefectural authorities. By 1959 scientists at Kumamoto University and a medical doctor employed by the company had succeeded in finding the cause. The disease was the result of a destruction of nervous tissue by some sort of organic mercury, which was found in the effluent produced by the synthesis of aceto-aldebyde in the factory. Yet, even at this stage, the company continued to deny responsibility. It forbade the doctor to speak publicly about any scientific data he found, and attempted by every means to prevent public recognition of the facts.

This attempt ultimately failed, but it contributed greatly to the delay in carrying out basic countermeasures, resulting in the tragic diffusion of the disease. The company's attitude was largely conditioned by the "company castle town" structure. The history of Minamata disease can be described as a struggle by scientists against this structure. In this structure, the man who criticizes the company is the man who revolts against the community, and therefore one who deserves no protection by the community. The work of the scientists, in discovering the cause and diffusing information about the disease among the inhabitants, was blocked by obstacles at every turn, and the scientists could not proceed unless they overcame these. This resulted in delay and contributed to the fatal spread of the disease.

This is not the place to tell the whole history of Minamata. What I intend here is only to show that this famous tragedy of Japanese industrialization also is connected with the problem of exogenous and endogenous influences and technological leaps. I must stress that

Minamata is not an exceptional example. Japanese efforts to make the series of leaps have been accompanied by many similar social conflicts or disasters. Perhaps this is the reason the observers of these leaps in Japan cannot be so favourable to them as observers from outside. And this also is the background of the attitude of the Japanese speakers at the Asian Symposium.

As to my attitude, I regard the technological leap as an element of dynamic progress in society. In favourable conditions it can work as an excellent incitement to endogenous creativity; in other conditions it can become the starting point for serious conflicts. What these conditions are must be the object of further investigation.


1. Research papers of the Institute of International Relations of Sophia University, Japan, Series A-22, 1974.

2. Ibid., P. 7.

3. For instance, Lynn White, Medieval Technology and Social Change, 1962; Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. 4, part 2, 1965.

4. The original record includes detailed descriptions about the raw materials used, melting and casting processes, and the final products. This is a very brief summarization here.

5. This was the greatest technical difficulty in this attempt. The metallurgical reason for this has been explained recently by Shoji Okumura, Koban Kiito Watetsu [Gold coins, silk, and iron in the Edo Period].

6. Shoji Okumura has suggested that maybe this improvement was owing to the importation of western pig iron through Nagasaki. But criticizing this opinion Professor Shuji Ohashi has explained the existence of the pre-treating process and its meaning. Here I choose Professor Ohashi's opinion.

7. Shuji Ohashi, Bakumatsu-Meiji Seitetsu Shi [A history of iron metallurgy in the late Edo and Meiji periods], 1975, pp. 44-48.

8. It must be noticed that this date was just after the Opium War, which gave some Japanese full recognition of the dreadful military power of the West, while most Japanese were still in a dream of isolated peace. Situated at the western end of Japan and nearest to Nagasaki, which was Japan's only window to the West during the Edo Period, the Saga clan was always well-informed about the international situation. Therefore, it reacted immediately to this external menace.

9. Ohashi, op. cit., p. 213.

10. Ibid., p. 17.

11. The most original study of the early history of the modern Japan iron industry since this date is: Hiroto Saigusa and Ken-ichi lida, Nippon Kindai Seitetsu Gijutsu Hattatsu-shi [A history of modern Japanese iron-manufacturing technology], 1957.

12. Masaski Kobayashi, Yawata Seitetsu-Sho [The Yawata Iron Works], 1977, p. 182.

13. Tetsu Hiroshige, Kagaku no Shakai-shi [A social history of science in Japan], 1917, p. 100.

14. Ibid., pp. 107-128.

Zvonimir Damjanovic

It seems beyond doubt that human freedom and national liberty depend, in the last consequence, on economic independence. That is why having in mind the part science and technology play within production, and economic development in general - many analysts pay attention to the discrepancy in the level of research and education between "North" and "South" - that is, between developed nations "leading in science," and the bulk of humanity, still striving - in poverty - for elementary political rights and cultural recognition. One realizes that knowledge and technological and organizational competence represent the real prospective potential of a nation; liberation from classical, blunt forms of colonial rule, from foreign cultural domination, even from the crafty pressures of neo-colonialism, will bring lasting fruits, stability, only if it leads people into scientific technological competence, i.e., the power to create and develop the economy.

But pleading for more science and for emancipation in technology, both of which are important for industry, does not seem to affect very much the parallel movement of cultural emancipation, whose dominant aim is to preserve and revive national roots in culture, and so open up the prospective of human civilization as a plurality of national cultures. More than that, basic science and technology, having been nestled for a long time in the limited space of metropolitan centres, are too often treated as something local - "western science," "European thought,'" etc. Being local, they should be "foreign" in other localities!

The theses I shall try to elaborate here are:

1. Basic knowledge or science maps onto everyday life - including production - in very complicated and mostly unpredictable ways. The classification of sciences does not and cannot fit the division of practical aims. Being the "motive force" of production in toto, science in detail acts as criticism of practical activities. Therefore, science cannot be developed primarily through the needs of local, divided, practical activities, and it is impossible to plan scientific applications in detail; one cannot know in advance which people, and in which combination, are most likely to solve a new problem on a scientific basis. A broad population should be cultivated in science so that their society will be able to develop.

2. Technology has grown out of and over its old frame - which was mere application of basic knowledge. With the development of new techniques and equipment (let us mention contemporary computing media) it ranks high with the basic sciences, generating new knowledge. Technology does not deal only with tools anymore; it deals with robots, too. Man creates systems whose character one cannot predict - they should be basically investigated. Therefore, competence in technology is not a matter of choice of some local priorities; it appears together with natural science and mathematics - as a part of the basic culture of a broad enough population.

3. Science and technology do not represent a set of recipes, or static data. They are rather a way of thinking, the heirs of classical philosophy. By necessity, this way of thinking deals with basic things in human environments, and in humans themselves. It is not possible for a society to benefit from science and technology without being exposed - and this includes the society's spiritual tradition, creeds, and national prejudices - to their revolutionary influence on human behaviour. The spirit of science cannot be bottled.

4. As "collective intellect," science and technology are - through their history - deeply rooted in the human race, and all attempts to ascribe them to any nation, or group, as local achievements or characteristics can be proven false. More than that, by "being judge to herself" science has persisted as a universal element of human culture, "all-human," but it has been able to impose itself on rather different spiritual media, as soon as propulsive socio-economic formations took place. It is important to note that scientific culture is able to co-exist (though not act together) with different creeds and religions that are otherwise foreign to its structures. Whatever the national culture is like, science and technology can fit in as a complement. Though it may sound like a paradox, no national culture will survive unless it makes space within itself for the "all human" complement of scientific/technological culture.

5. Far from "creating unemployment," science and technology liberate man from dull work, from overwork.

The basic, ultimate problem brought about through scientific revolutions is not unemployment (which can be solved by corresponding social rearrangements), but the "menace" of leisure timer What will people do when there is no objective need for them to stay too long around the traditional work place?

Of course, apart from the chance, for some people at least, to indulge in scientific research and fine arts, there is - in those societies that identify progress with the development of true democracy - a chance for many to take part in social and political activities. In the old time scheme, a few "wise leaders" think for the badly educated masses of people; knowledge of society, man, and nature is communicated to them through "teaching"; doctrines serve in the place of science. In order to be able to govern themselves, people should be a full step nearer to science, and to govern material things, they should be a step nearer to technology. Science and technology are a prerequisite of emancipation and development, not only through their impact on production, but also because of the decisive democratic factor involved; their proliferation will render the majority of people competent, not only on technical but also on social and political matters.

6. It is true that the developing countries, the "South," etc., are generally speaking, in great need of the development of science and technology, education and research. This is a consequence of ages of exploitation and suppression. But it would be utterly wrong to imagine that the problems we are speaking about are specific to them! Nations which are developed or which have long scientific and industrial traditions are equally faced with the problem of adaptation to the new developments. Neglecting the need for science, for new education, will not only slow down the rise and emancipation of the first; it can also hold back the second! The second scientific/industrial revolution of our time shifts human activities a gigantic step further - leaving little out of creativity; those that do not adopt modern knowledge, who render it non-creative, will have it worse than those who missed out on the steam engine in the first place.

Comments on the Theses

1. The technological and industrial use of basic scientific knowledge appears as a dominant motive within the movement for the advancement of science in many "new' countries, while other motives - first of all, cultural ascent - remain in the shade. Yugoslavia's experience is interesting in this respect. It comprises many attempts and "schools of thought" in the fields of research and education, striving to shift public opinion, funds, and organization towards those trends in scientific and technological development which would bring the fastest and most useful results.

Traditionally, industry is weak (i.e., it has meagre developmental research), and many efforts and discussions related to this problem have appeared within the circle of academic and public organizations land, of course, during the period when government dealt with these sectors directly, in the corresponding governmental departments). One should particularly mention (a) organizational measures, and (b) financing priorities.

Enormous energy has been applied to move academic institutions dealing with basic sciences nearer to production. This covers the whole spectrum, from reorganization of some universities - moving mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology departments from science faculties to engineering, chemical technology, and agronomy - to organization of some new universities and research Institutes which bound them to dominant local industries.

On the other side, the planning of research and corresponding priorities have contributed maximally to associating research with some projects having practical importance.

Still, two decades of experience ha-ye shown that (1) successful application Ts possible only if one starts with concrete, definite projects, reflecting real needs in the praxis, while "en bloc" combinations of disciplines lead nowhere, and (2) successful projects, as a rule, comprise multidisciplinary teams in various combinations. So, very successful developments in agronomy (maize, wheat), in biomedical engineering (prostheses, outhouses, etc.), and in some other fields are based on the association of researchers from different disciplines, and particularly on a balanced blend of theoretical and practical work.

The history of newer technological development in the world shows the same rule in a much brighter light; but I mention our experience in order to suggest that the experience Ts likely to repeat itself if the same Ts tried again, and also to suggest that the practical lesson Ts much better In the society where the association of science and praxis Ts tried anew than lecturing. Those few instances where application of science develops naturally, based on the needs of praxis, are about to demonstrate that (a) an appropriate combination of different scientists is - as a rule - needed to perform some useful research, and (b) not narrowly specialized experts, but an Involved structure of a broader scientific medium Ts a necessity. One could speak of the "critical structure and mass" of a research medium, without which there is little hope for social and industrial needs that demand the attention of science.

It is never superfluous to mention that a good scientific contribution to praxis is usually negation of a technique, its removal or exchange; if the interest of local factors in industry is invited, it will work for routine improvements, not for science. Only integrated, broader interests in industry tend towards science. But the integration of industry lies in a plane quite different from the one of integration of scientific disciplines, and this dialectic should be kept in mind if one wants to integrate concrete efforts around praxis.

2. One still often treats technology as a simple application of basic knowledge to industry. But contemporary technology is much more than that.

In this context, let us consider the character of industrialization; it seems that this phenomenon is treated sometimes rather superficially.

Very often the so-called first industrial revolution is described basically - as involving the introduction of power machines (steam engines). Here one should go back to Marx and Das Kapital to see another view: not the exchange of human (and animal) power, but the exchange of human skill in textile industries is emphasized; not the labour of muscles, but the work of neural nets; not energy, but the programme of weaving is what is taken over by machines! By the way, Marx praised the English language for discriminating between "labour" and "work"; as is well known, what he wrote about was the work.

This is important, for in fact automation (multiplication of human like work) was the characteristic of the first industrial revolution. And automation is often ascribed to our times, to the second big leap in industrial development.

The dominating change in today's industry goes a step further. One could call it the introduction of adaptive machinery, in order to avoid some popular but not quite clear concepts like "cybernation," or "intelligent machines." Altogether, we have the sequence: tool automation (programmed) - adaptive (programming) machine.

Such machines run not just processes; they govern organization of processes, and not only in industry but in many subtle services, such as health services. Of course, the dominating machinery consists of computers, of networks of computers (processor networks), of computing media with flexible organization, reminding one (and not superficially) of neural networks.

So the object of technology has grown in front of our eyes into a complex, only partly defined system, whose potentials, behaviour and characteristics must be investigated as if the system were a "natural" living creature. That is why technology cannot be treated as a step f _ science to application, but rather as a basic scientific activity. This is particularly true if one takes into account such abstract objects of investigation as mathematical models, i.e., experimental mathematics. The field of basic research is broadened, as mathematical systems, otherwise untreatable, are made subject to experimental treatment, and as these same systems are added to natural objects and laboratory preparations in simulation research.

All this Ts emphasized for two reasons: (a) in order to stress modern technology as a basic element of scientific culture, and (b) to remind one of the stubborn fact that there will be no more easy-going engineering; only "critical mass and structure" of modern technologists, deeply rooted in theory, can guarantee complete cultural, industrial, and scientific advance.

3. Scientific and technological work is still considered, in many places, as the occupation of an elite, who are narrow and in a way isolated in their special "sub-culture." This is nowadays less true. In fact, the scientific/industrial revolution both pushes many workers in all fields out of their old jobs, and makes it possible to educate great numbers of youth to the highest level. It makes not only the society richer, but the education cheaper and technically easier.

It is supposed that the new intellectual power (embracing the bulk of coming generations in developed countries, and being not so distant a possibility for the developing ones) will be engaged in numerous places. So, simply by mass action, this brave new youth will not permit themselves to be bottled up in a ghetto of a specific academic sub-culture. They will spontaneously represent the general new trend.

It should be remembered that the objects of modern science and technology tend to cover most of the problems of our life, directly and explicitly - psychology, language, and brain theory are some examples. Here the scientific approach comes instead, or is integrated with classical philosophy. It inevitably (as inevitably as it will enter the life of all nations) poses the problem of adaptation of local mentalities, or the national culture, not just to the new physical life, but to new outlooks. This aspect of the cultural shock which is coming might be the most dramatic of all.

It would be of particular interest to investigate the prospects in some developing countries, where economic expansion and richness coincide with a heavy leaning towards cultural - especially religious tradition.

4. I cannot resist the wish to cite the Marxian opinion of science particularly because there are Marxists (or would-be Marxists) professing quite different beliefs. Describing science as "collective intellect," Marx adds an important line to his basic anthropological concept. Man is seen as a programme (a focus of social relations), and he is also seen as a population, through generations, and science is reproduced, corrected, and adapted to experience in relative autonomy (being a "judge over herself"). Science is the most objective and most critical activity of man. Of course, in its real appearance it can be deformed by some carriers (scientists), but its lasting, collective spirit traverses the individual and local. It can be said that science is an all-human, cosmopolitan language.

In this respect, it is important to note that contributions of scientists from Asia and Africa - those that have been identified and probably many others that have been absorbed - have remained the basic part of science even during the ages when it was maximally "westernized," and when other products of the cultures of other nations suffered destruction and neglect.

Let us mention two aspects of the theme:

a. National liberation and emancipation make it necessary to emphasize the "cultural possessions" and contributions of all, and to respect the differences.

b. Science cannot stand division; it will remain international, though practicing science must be chandelled In accordance with the international division of work, and - unfortunately - political and ideological divisions.

But science and technology remain common denominators of all national cultures. Accordingly, every specific cultural complex must adapt to this fact. Particularly, international communication, exchange, and cooperation in science and education should be preserved and developed against even the strongest challenge of any kind. Here, the United Nations University will make a substantial, and hopeful, contribution together with other international scientific and educational organizations.

5. As already stated, we usually build our theories of the role of science In development upon the basic belief that it is an important factor of industrial development. But what one actually means is: people in industry.

Are the people we are concerned with, who will be citizens of our countries in the following ten or twenty years, really expected to work In Industry in a way similar to our style today, and are they to spend as much time as we do in routine productive work? No matter how great our doubts about predictions are, we must accept the negative answer to these questions. Routine work will be progressively mechanized, and people will be challenged to do something better; and there will be nothing better without additional education, without acceptance of a more scientific culture. It is going to be a boring world for too simple souls. The old truth that man is something that has been built gradually turns into a new demand that he be rebuilt and re-educated, that he readapt perhaps more than once during his working age. He must act at that very level where the changes in the environment are generated, for that is the level of science and technology. And he will have plenty of his time to offer to others, to society.

So the real problem is not how to make people effective in the changing world of production, but what they are to do, apart from production.

It is not possible to combine the effectiveness in changing production with passivity in a non-democratic order. One could hardly imagine a man, driven by scientific progress, keen and able to follow the changes around him, that would accept bureaucratic, doctrinaire leadership. The integrity of the social system in an age of advanced technology, and when there is a corresponding education of people, will be preserved only on the condition that there is some type of genuine democracy and self-government.

Therefore, it would be difficult to see a chance of using new science and technology for those that are not determined to integrate national emancipation with democracy, and economic progress with mass education in the spirit of modern science and technology.

6. In reality, the gap between the developed (rich) and underdeveloped (poor) grows. A few exceptions (rich but underdeveloped) will soon be disappointed if their education is not speeded up.

Still, this does not mean that "Those that have will be given more" Many facts suggest that it is objectively possible to bridge the gap.

For example, communication and computer technologies are becoming so cheap that the poorest nations Will be able to adopt most effective networks. The only thing which is not growing cheaper is human competence. We face, in the near future, a time when everything necessary for education will be easier to obtain. I have in mind also the improbability that scientific achievements, even those of military importance, could be "protected," i.e., banned. The real "currency" will not be the mass of goods produced, not even the momentary possession of the best technology, but the ability of people to move further, to change production and services.

It is, therefore, equally possible for a developed community to drop down low if it neglects science education and technological culture, and for an underdeveloped community to jump high if it puts the highest priority on science and education.

I am afraid that objective hindrances to progress in this sense, for some - maybe many - countries, will be inferior to the subjective resistance of the bureaucracy, minor groups with leadership ambitions, etc. Here again, only democratic trends of participation by the majority in the shaping of the future promise to break the passivity, pessimism, and resistance that belong to the inheritance - or, rather, to that part of the inheritance which belongs to the past.


The roles of science and technology in the changing world, particularly in the development of nations with inherited poverty, cannot be derived from the trends of daily policy, in either the economic or any other "practical" sphere. These roles are basic to fast progress, to the ability to develop at all; they amount to the ability to survive as a nation, and as a culture.

Science, technology, and education should be given the highest priority in national life, and also high priority and support in international co-operation. Everyone should be given the chance to share them, and - what is most important, in order to make that really possible should have equal rights to contribute to them.


One of the greatest needs of the world in our time is the growth and widespread dissemination of a true historical perspective, for without it whole peoples can make the gravest misjudgements about each other. Since science and its application dominate so much our present world, since men of every race and culture take so great a pride in man's understanding and control over her, it matters vitally to know how this modern science came into being. Was it purely a product of the genius of Europe, or did all civilizations bring their contributions to the common pool A right historical perspective here is one of the most urgent necessities of our time.1

For more than 30 years, Joseph Needham's work on the history of Chinese science and technology has been carried out as a contribution toward the detailed elaboration of just such a historical perspective. In elucidating the achievements and development of the pre-modern science, technology, and medicine indigenous to the East Asian cultural area, this contribution opened up a major field, unsuspected and untapped by most previous "orientalists" and historians of science alike. In tracing the pathways of transmission of many of these East Asian techno-scientific achievements, it has become clear that the emergence of modern science owed major debts to many influences and innovations other than those of the ancient Greek tradition. Without in any sense denigrating the decisive achievements of European scientists in the establishment of distinctively modern science, a correct historical perspective on the long-range development of science and technology might also serve as a cogent critique of positions which still portray all scientific thought as an eternal and exclusive possession of western civilization.

At a time when certain authors can continue to theorize about the "penssans-science" characteristic of "such civilizations as the Chinese,"2 it may be worthwhile to enumerate the published results of Needham's studies.

It can be recalled that the first volume of his collaborative magnum opus, Science and Civilisation in China,3 appeared in 1954. Since then, a total of eight volumes have been published; two more are in press now, and a number of others are in various stages of preparation. Certain studies have been considered too detailed to be incorporated into the SCC series proper, and these have appeared either as individual articles4 or as self contained monographs dealing with such subjects as iron and steel technology5, astronomical clockwork,6 and acupuncture and moxibustion.7 Finally, various essays and addresses concerned with the general features and implications of Chinese scientific and technological history have been collected and published in a number of separate volumes.8 In short, to use Needham's own words, "experience has shown that it is comparatively easy to produce a whole series of bulky volumes about the scientific and technological achievements which the Chinese are supposed not to have had."9

The extent to which the strength and importance of science and technology in Chinese culture surpassed even Needham's expectations can be seen when one consults the list of volumes projected for SCC in Volume 1. The plan there is for seven volumes, four of them concerned exclusively with scientific and technical subjects. The amount of material pertinent to these subjects, however, has necessitated repeated revision and expansion of the original plan. The third volume nearly reached the limit of manageable size, so that it has been necessary to split the fourth and subsequent volumes into separate parts. At present six such tomes (comprising more than 3,000 pages of text) have already been published, and approximately eight more will appear, to make up the fifth and sixth volumes.

It would clearly be impossible to summarize here the contents of such a massive study,10 but perhaps an outline of the topics considered in the various volumes of SCC will not be out of place.

Volume I provides the introductory orientations for the subject. After setting forth the technical conventions used in the series as a whole and discussing some of the most important bibliographical sources, it covers the fundamental geographic characteristics of China and the basic data of her history in the pre-imperial and Imperial eras (i.e., until 1911) The final section concerns the conditions for scientific and technical interchange between China and the European, Indian, and Islamic worlds.

Volume 1I begins with a treatment of the main philosophical trends in the Chinese culture area. Of particular importance, although still quite controversial, is the section on the Taoists, whom Needham consistently portrays as proponents both of primitive democracy and of scientific and technological innovation. There follows in turn a treatment of the fundamental categories of natural philosophy (Yin and Yang; the Five Elements/ Phases) which so permeated ancient and medieval scientific thought in China. The final section of this volume, again perhaps controversial, focuses on the important question of whether the idea of "laws of nature" was to be found in traditional Chinese scientific thought; Needham answers in the negative, maintaining that the tradition recognized "order" within nature, but not "laws" governing it.

With Volume III one departs from the realm of controversial reconstruction of general intellectual trends and enters the field of documentable evidence for concrete scientific and technological achievement. The volume begins with an account of developments in mathematics. Demonstration is given of the antiquity and diffusion from China of the decimal system. It is shown that both algebra and geometry were considerably developed; and while the latter did not reach the level of systematic proof attained by the ancient Greeks, the Chinese algebrists, like their Indian peers, achieved a level of sophistication remarkable for their time. There then follow two long sections entitled, respectively, "The Sciences of the Heavens" and "The Sciences of the Earth." The first details the long traditions of thoroughgoing astronomical and meteorological investigations, which, for example, were oftentimes more than a millennium in advance of comparable studies in Europe. The second section concerns developments not only in geology, mineralogy, and seismology, but also in geography and cartography - of particular importance for world history is the fact that the Chinese tradition of grid cartography was continuous.

Physics and physical technology are dealt with in Volume IV, which has been published in three parts. Part One focuses on "pure" physics; after pointing out that Chinese physical thinking was dominated by the concept of waves rather than that of atoms, the author delves into the traditional material on hydrostatics, dynamics, optics, acoustics, electrostatics, and, finally, magnetism, perhaps the single most important legacy which the traditional Chinese scientists have passed down to the science of the modern world. Mechanical engineering is the subject of Part Two, which enumerates a myriad of "ingenious devices." After preliminary subsections on the role of the artisan and on the various simple machines used in traditional China, there follows a series of sections on complex machines, including water-raising mechanisms and early feats of aeronautical engineering. A summary of the Chinese role in the development of mechanical clockwork (long considered a strictly European phenomenon) is also provided here. The subsections on the employment of power sources cover such topics as windmills and water-mills, the development of the breaststrap harness and the later collar harness (utilization of both eventually spread across the Old World), metallurgical bellows, and lastly that element in the "prenatal history of the steam-engine," the eccentric connecting-rod and pistonrod system, first used with metallurgical bellows. Both civil and nautical engineering are treated in Part Three. Given the importance of water control in China, the section on civil engineering necessarily contains a long survey concerned with the control, construction, and maintenance of waterways; subsections on road construction, wall construction, bridge construction, and general building technology also are included. The section on nautical technology deals with vessel construction, navigation and steering techniques, and means of propulsion. The subsection on the natural history of Chinese ships culminates with a provocative disquisition on the exploits of the Ming fleet (in the fifteenth century), which sailed as far as the Straits of Madagascar in ships (burthen about 2,500 tons, displacement about 3,100 tons) equalled in Europe only several centuries later.

From Volume V, which is concerned with chemistry and chemical technology, only Parts Two and Three have been published; Parts Four and Five are now in proof. All of these deal with aspects of the alchemical tradition. This is a subject in which clear terminology is of particular importance; this is elaborated in Part Two, where the authors have coined the terms aurifiction, aurifaction, and macrobiotics: in other words, gold faking, gold making, and the preparation of elixirs for physical immortality, all three of which are necessary for a genuine alchemical tradition. Part Two goes on to elucidate the metallurgical-chemical background and to identify the many alloys which actually resulted from the alchemical processes. Part Three is a straightforward historical survey of the development of Chinese alchemy from its origin in the First Millennium and through its decline in the period after the fourteenth century. Part Four provides an analysis of the laboratory apparatus and equipment used by the alchemists, presents evidence for the position that the production of distilled liquor was first accomplished in China (although literary evidence now suggests that this distinction may fall to India), describes the successful execution of various reactions in an aqueous medium, and investigates the theoretical background of elixir alchemy. Part Four culminates in a subsection which evokes the influence of Chinese alchemy on the Hellenistic world and which demonstrates the fertility, for this field, of cultural interaction between the Islamic and Chinese worlds. Part Five explores the development of techniques utilized to induce longevity: these techniques are sorted into two categories, namely, "inner" and "outer" (corresponding roughly to the manipulation of "organic" and "inorganic" processes). The latter is described as a forerunner of modern chemistry; the former, which led to preparations of urinary steroid and protein hormones by the seventeenth century, is described as proto-biochemistry.

The remaining parts of Volume V, together with Volumes VI and VII, have not yet been completed. Since much of the material to be included is, however, in the advanced stages of preparation, it will be useful to take note of It in this outline.

The remaining parts of Volume V will, first of all, focus on mining and extraction techniques, not only of the various metals but also of salt and natural gas. There will then follow a section on ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, Including an account of the early production of cast iron in China. Related to this will be a study of martial lore and military technology, including shock weapons, projectile weaponry, types of armour, cavalry techniques, and techniques of fortification. Here, of course, the story of the invention of gunpowder and firearms will be told. A detailed section on textiles will analyse the means of preparing various fibres, the techniques of dyeing, and the different sorts of spinning and weaving machinery; evidence will be provided for Chinese priority in the invention of the drawloom. Last, the authors will recount the important story of the invention and westward diffusion of paper and printing.

Part One of Volume Vl will deal with the wealth of traditional material on botany; among other things, it will cover the developing of classification systems, the knowledge of plant physiology, and the use of horticultural techniques such as grafting. This volume will then thoroughly examine the important zoological literature; after again beginning with an account of the development of classification systems, it will examine materials on general and comparative physiology, ideas on genetics, and the significant tradition of evolutionary thought, which was praised by Charles Darwin. The authors will then go on to a survey of the systematic traditional science of nutrition, ranging from the empirical discovery of deficiency diseases to the various techniques of preservation and preparation of foodstuffs; this section will include a comparative study of the various fermenting organisms and techniques used in China and the West. Agriculture, of course, had a tremendous significance as the economic base of traditional Chinese society, and Volume Vl will contain two long sections on agricultural industries and arts. The first of these will present the principal characteristics of Chinese agriculture, examine the cultivation of the chief food crops, and analyse traditional soil science; it also will trace the history in China of various sorts of agricultural implements, such as the plough, and will investigate the traditional use of irrigation techniques, fertilizers, and systems of crop rotation. Animal husbandry, pisciculture, and forestry also will be dealt with here. Techniques for plant protection (such as ancient insecticides and the use of biological agents) will be detailed in the section on agricultural arts, together with techniques for the production of oils, waxes, lacquers, leather, and tea.

The final sections of Volume Vl will be concerned with the traditional medical sciences and pharmacology, two areas of extraordinary achievement.

The first section will deal with anatomy, the development of techniques of dissection, and the early rise of forensic medicine, as well as with physiological and embryological conceptions. The second section will examine the traditional systems of pathology and therapy, and the principal methods of diagnosis; it will continue with an investigation of the multi-faceted accomplishments in internal and external medical treatment (for example, treatment of infectious diseases, or the early discovery by Chinese physicians of the technique of smallpox inoculation, the forerunner of the vaccination technique, which later won William Jenner such acclaim in the West). The authors will then recount the history of the theory and practice of acupuncture and moxibustion, and appraise these traditional techniques in light of the findings of present-day neuro-physiology. After showing the importance of preventive medicine in the traditional medical system, the section will end with the story of the development of medical institutions and or social medicine in general; among other things, one will find here how the state medical qualifying-examination system came westward from China. The section on pharmaceutics will then describe the use of the more important types of drugs in the great pharmacopoeias of the Imperial Era, and divergences from the materia medica of other culture areas will also be noted.

After a general summary of the chief features of Chinese science in the ancient and Imperial eras, Volume Vll will then examine the social background within which this science developed. The social importance of geographical and demographic conditions, of trade routes, and of urban concentrations will be considered first. In turn, there will be a historical survey of the evolution of social and economic relations (with a particular eye to the fiscal difficulties endemic in a large-scale agrarian empire); an analysis of the traditional class structure, with a relatively undistinguished merchant class and with the mandarinate as the normal executor of political power during the Imperial Era; and critical surveys of the views of modern commentators, Chinese and western, on the nature of traditional Chinese society. Last, there will be a relatively long evaluation of the dominant ideological tendencies and their distinct attitudes to nature and natural phenomena; conceptions of time, aspects of logic, and the significance of the ideographic script will be included here.

It should be clear from the above that what Joseph Needham and his collaborators are giving us is actually a compendium of the whole spectrum of traditional sciences and technologies in one of the world's major cultural areas.

This is undoubtedly a monumental feat in itself, but it is not intended merely to be the object of ethnographic and antiquarian interest. Needham uses the results of his research as the basis for a challenge to that particular type of chauvinism which would have us believe that scientific rationality and technical innovation can only be the prerogatives of "western civilization." In his own words,

If, as is demonstrably the case, (the Chinese) were recording sunspot cycles a millennium and a half before Europeans noted the existence of such blemishes on the solar orb, if every component of the parhelic system received a technical name a thousand years before Europeans began to study them, and if that key instrument of scientific revolution, the mechanical clock, began its career in early +8th-century China rather than (as is usually supposed) in +14th-century Europe, there must be something wrong with conventional ideas about the uniquely scientific genius of Western civilization.11

Yet the point here is not just a condescending recognition of the fact that "Chinamen too" were capable of rational thought. One of Needham's key working hypotheses, repeatedly corroborated by his results, is that progress in science and technology is, in the main, continuous. In other words, while particular techniques and inventions may indeed be lost, while particular theories and types of technical development will certainly be superseded, the major advances in mankind's knowledge and control of nature tend to be incorporated as stages within one cumulative line of development. Although such incorporation will necessarily be problematic at any given moment, it nevertheless seems clear from the long-range historical point of view that there is only one unitary science of nature. In this sense Needham is consciously doing more than documenting the history of Chinese science and technology, and this has been one of his major accomplishments. In the words of one recent commentator:

In the course of broadening and deepening our integral understanding of traditional Chinese culture, practically every paragraph that Needham has written has been designed to be world history, and to urge upon his readers a more humane perception of the future.13

Serious and widespread comparative study of the history of science would have been almost impracticable before the appearance of his work, but it is now inevitable.

Needham has concretely illustrated his point about the continuity of scientific advance with frequent examples of technical transmissions between distinct cultural regions - perhaps the medieval equivalent of what we nowadays refer to as "technology transfer." While scholars such as Lynn White have shown the important debt which modern science owed to the advances in medieval European science and technology, Needham has equally demonstrated that the development of European science, and production in general, was repeatedly pushed forward by incorporation of techniques generated within the civilizations of Asia and Africa in general, and within Chinese civilization in particular. A glance at Table I will give some impression of the scale and importance of the techniques which travelled westward from China to Europe in the first 17 centuries of our era. Transmission was in certain cases by direct diffusion, in other cases by stimulus diffusion; we see here 24 types of technical innovation which, to varying degrees, succeeded in revolutionizing aspects of European life. And it might be added that Table I was admittedly incomplete at the time of its publication in 1954 - since then, many more examples of westward diffusion have been adduced. On the other hand, it is interesting to consider the mechanical elements which the West was able to contribute to Chinese civilization at the time of the Jesuits (+seventeenth century): these numbered only two: the Archimedean screw and the crankshaft. In general, the results of Needham's work clearly show that from the first to the fifteenth centuries of our era the scientific and technical level of Chinese civilization was far higher than that of Europe. The technological transmissions then were heavily one-sided, toward Europe, and while mankind's mastery over nature in the long run exhibited a synthetic continuity, its progress was international and by no means confined to that region of the world in which modern science eventually emerged. Somewhat paradoxically, however, the many techniques which had been invented and developed within other, more advanced civilizations often proved to have (to employ an apt phrase) much more explosive effects in the relatively backward regions of northern and western Europe than in their countries of origin.14

TABLE 1. Transmission of mechanical and other techniques from China to the West

Approximate lag in centuries

(a) Square-pallet chain-pump


(b) Edge-runner mill


Edge-runner mill with application of water-power


(c) Metallurgical blowing-engines, water-power


(d) Rotary fan and rotary winnowing machine


(e) Piston-bellows.


(f) Draw-loom


(g) Silk-handling machinery (a form of flyer for laying thread evenly on reels appears in the +11th century, and water-power is applied to spinning mills in the +14th)


(h) Wheelbarrow


(i) Sailing-carriage


(j) Wagon-mill


(k) Efficient harness for draught animals:

Breast-strap (postilion)




(1) Cross-bow (as an individual arm)


(m) Kite


(n) Helicopter top (spun by cord)


Zoetrope (moved by ascending hot-air current)


(o) Deep drilling


(p) Cast iron


(q) "Cardan" suspension

8- 9

(r) Segmental arch bridge


(s) Iron-chain suspension bridge


(t) Canal lock gates


(u) Nautical construction principles


(v) Stern-post rudder

c. 4

(w) Gunpowder

5- 6

Gunpowder used as a war technique


(x) Magnetic compass (lodestone spoon)


Magnetic compass with needle


Magnetic compass used for navigation


(y) Paper


Printing (block)


Printing (movable type)


Printing (metal movable type)


(z) Porcelain


Source: SCC, Vol. 1, p. 242.

Generally speaking, theory was much less susceptible to diffusion than were technical innovations. Perhaps it is this fact that has at times led to the mistaken notion that the traditional non-European sciences had no body of theory (and hence were not really scientific), but were simply the accumulation of empirical techniques for dealing with nature. In fact, there were very sophisticated theoretical systems for almost all fields, ranging from astronomy to medicine, within the Islamic, Indian, and Chinese traditions. A field such as alchemy, the historical forerunner of chemistry, is particularly instructive, for its theoretical underpinnings were not only quite refined but also to an important extent diffusable: before the introduction of the idea of preparing an "elixir of life" from the Islamic world (and ultimately from China), Europe had no genuine alchemical (as distinct from aurifactive) tradition. Also, research has shown that the invention of gunpowder was the result not of any directly productive activity, but rather of systematically controlled experimentation under the guidance of traditional alchemical theory. Theory there was - but it was medieval theory, and not that characteristic of modern science. In this sense there was no qualitative difference between the traditional sciences of China or India and that of Europe before the Renaissance.

What distinguished modern science from all of the traditional sciences was its new methodology, that is, the practice of systematic experimentation to test mathematized hypotheses. In Needham's opinion, traditional science typically framed its experimentation and analyses in a system of untestable categories which were essentially regional or ethnic-bound. Modern science, on the other hand, used experimentation precisely for the purpose of axiomizing mathematically and of proving the validity of mankind's fundamental notions of reality; because of the introduction of mathematized propositions (which are universal, in the sense that they can be understood, tested, and developed by men and women of all nationalities), Needham calls modern science ecumenical.

Despite the qualitative superiority of modern science over traditional sciences, it would nevertheless seem quite incorrect to isolate this modern methodology from the specific techniques it employed and the concrete problematic it set forth. When this is recognized, it becomes clear that many of these techniques and questions were developed within the structure of traditional science. Conventionally, this is admitted when, in explaining the rise of modern science, authors refer to elements of the ancient Greek tradition which were transmitted to western Europe via the Islamic world: for example, the Euclidian model of strict geometric proof or the conflict between Ptolemaic and Aristarchian analyses of planetary motion. If we accept this line of reasoning, however, it is apparent that the qualitative leap which marked the synthesis of modern science involved much more than a "renaissance" of indigenous "European" elements. The Indian numerals, for example, represented a technical innovation without which the work of Galileo would be difficult to imagine. From India also came the conviction of the theoretical possibility of perpetual motion, transformed but evident in Newton's first law. Within mathematics itself, Descartes' synthesis of two formerly distinct disciplines, algebra and geometry, was certainly based on important contributions by medieval Islamic algebrists. In medicine, a circulation-mindedness which was ultimately Chinese can be seen in William Harvey's holistic approach to anatomy and physiology, in which the organs "might be called 'irrigation fields,' provided with a circulation which keeps every part in communication with the rest in a nutritive and chemical way.''15 Also from China came the crucial knowledge of magnetism,16 the problematics of which suffused and to a large extent inspired the early modern scientists. Here it will be instructive to let Needham make his own point:

Magnetical science was indeed an essential component of modern science. All the preparation for Peter of Maricourt, the greatest medieval student of the compass, and hence for the ideas of Gilbert and Kepler on the cosmic role of magnetism, had been Chinese. Gilbert thought that all the heavenly motions were due to the magnetic powers of the heavenly bodies, and Kepler had the idea that gravitation must be something like magnetic attraction. The tendency of bodies to fall to the ground was explained by the idea that the earth was like an enormous magnet drawing things unto itself. The conception of a parallelism between magnetism and gravity was a vitally important part of the preparation for Isaac Newton. In the Newtonian synthesis gravitation was axiomatic, one might almost say, and spread throughout space just as a magnetic force would act across space with no obvious intermediation. Thus the ancient Chinese ideas of action at a distance were a very important part of the preparation for Newton through Gilbert and Kepler.17

We can sum up what has been said so far about the results of Needham's research in the following four propositions: First, a vast body of documentable evidence confirms the importance and sophistication of traditional science and technology in pre-modern China. Second, a comparative approach to the history of science demonstrates that for the first 15 centuries of our era science and technology stood at a significantly higher level in China than in Europe; this point is borne out both by dating of inventions and by study of inter-regional diffusion. Third, transmission of technology and knowledge of natural phenomena from China to Europe attests to the cumulative nature of techno-scientific advance. Fourth, traditional China (like other pre-capitalist civilizations) formulated problems and generated techniques which represented key factors not only in the development of medieval Europe but also in the constitution of distinctively modern science.

In light of these points it is perhaps not surprising that two of the major problems to which Needham and his collaborators continue to address themselves concern differential rates of scientific and technological development: Why had China been more successful than Europe in gaining scientific knowledge and applying it for human benefit for 14 centuries? And, given this lead, why did modern science originate only in Europe?18

In response to the second question, it is useful to distinguish two orders of historical causation. The first might be termed "internal" and would be limited to scientific and technical factors alone; the second might be termed "external" and would include economic and social factors in general. An explanation in terms of internal causation would argue, for example, that modern science arose only in Europe (and failed to arise in China) because in the fifteenth century Europe developed and synthesized key advances made in all the traditional Old World civilizations, whereas China lacked a strong tradition of strict geometric proof. An explanation in terms of external causation, on the other hand, such as that of Professor B. Hessen,19 would argue that modern science arose in Europe within the context of specific economic and technical tasks which were determined by a newly emerging capitalist order of society; it was such a society that allowed the growth of modern scientific mentality. Such an externalist explanation would hence imply that modern science did not arise in China because the forces of the national bourgeoisie were too weak in relation to the feudal order. Both of these explanations indubitably are valid the problem lies in integrating them.20 For if one limits oneself to an internist explanation alone, then of course one fails to take into consideration a multitude of factors which condition the development and application of any given scientific achievement; scientific advance in turn appears as a rather arbitrary affair. On the other hand, if too much emphasis is placed on externalist causality alone, one risks forgetting that science and technology have an objectivity of their own and being blind to contradictions and continuities within the structure of science itself.

In the face of this problem, the approach embodied in Needham's work has been to investigate thoroughly the Chinese technico-scientific tradition, while consistently granting ultimate determinacy to social and economic conditions. It would seem to be the relative strength of China's bureaucratic feudalism which ultimately, despite a long period of scientific superiority and technical innovation, hindered the emergence of modern science in China. In Needham's words,

Interest in Nature was not enough, controlled experimentation was not enough, empirical induction was not enough, eclipse-prediction and calendar calculation were not enough - all of these the Chinese had. Apparently only a mercantile culture alone was able to do what agrarian bureaucratic civilization could not - bring to fusion-point the formerly separated disciplines of mathematics and nature-knowledge.21

Since China nevertheless does seem to have lacked certain elements of the ancient Greek tradition, it could conceivably be argued that Needham's option for the final determinacy of "external" factors is not entirely justified. In this respect, it might be suggested that a crucial control case might be provided by scholars working specifically on the history of science and technology of the Islamic world, a civilization which absorbed the advances of both ancient Greece and medieval China, but which generated neither a capitalist order nor modern science.

Returning to the question of the causes of China's long superiority over Europe, it is relevant first of all to note that for several centuries before our era the scientific and technical level of the Graeco-Roman world stood appreciably higher than that of China. This lead had already begun to diminish, however, by the end of the Hellenistic period, and by the beginning of our era Chinese achievements in understanding and controlling natural processes had generally begun to surpass the Graeco-Roman level. From that point, some 12 centuries passed before the gap between the Chinese and European levels again started to narrow, and it was only in the sixteenth century that European achievement in certain key sciences started to outstrip that of China.

It should be mentioned that, in approaching the two medieval traditions, a difficulty arises: the respective theoretical systems were ethnic-bound and, to a large extent, cannot be directly compared. Mediated comparison is nevertheless possible by studying the relative successes in discovering and mastering natural processes, and by appraising traditional theories in light of concepts employed at the present stage of modern science (although here it is necessary to keep in mind both that present concepts of modern science are not an absolute yardstick of truth and also that major features distinguish modern from traditional theories). At any rate, it appears from using these two types of comparison that, at the level of internal causation, the fundamental categories of traditional Chinese science were much broader and more flexible than those of Roman or medieval Europe.

This situation would seem in turn to be largely determined by social and economic conditions. In Needham's view, the Chinese form of centralized, bureaucratic feudalism was much more conducive to innovation than either the loosely knit system of the Roman Empire or the fragmented system of European baronial feudalism. For one thing, the position of the direct producers was not so precarious in China as in Europe; consequently, on the level of ideology, disdain for manual labour (and hence for technical ability) was not so all-pervasive as under the Roman Empire.

Having briefly considered a few of the questions involved in explaining the relative fecundity of traditional Chinese science and the subsequent failure to generate modern science, let us now pass on to another question which has arisen in connection with Needham's work, namely, the rate at which the various indigenous sciences were finally integrated into the scope of modern science. In approaching this problem, it will be important to keep in mind the distinction made above between the framework of traditional science and that of modern science. Needham considers the various traditional sciences as regional because their results are framed in terms of ethnically determined categories which remain vague and essentially untestable. Modern science, on the other hand, frames its experimental results in terms of quantified hypotheses which are intended to validate or invalidate theories employed at any given moment. It should perhaps be pointed out here that Needham agrees with those who maintain that the birth of modern science marked "the discovery of the process of discovery itself," that is, the conscious and systematic appropriation of the method pursued, blindly yet steadily, by the regional scientific traditions. But in contrast to the various regional traditions, modern science exhibits a tendency to become increasingly ecumenical insofar as (1) its quantified methodology of controlled experimentation upon nature can be understood, practiced, and developed by all peoples, and (2) the processes of nature encountered by all peoples can be analysed and harnessed for human benefit by means of this methodology.

Now the essence of the problem that we are considering lies in the temporal disparity between the emergence of modern scientific methodology and the realization of its ecumenical potential. At successive points in time different fields of study in Europe lost their traditional character as they were successfully subjected to modern methodology. For some time thereafter, however, the traditional sciences of non-European civilizations would continue to develop at their own pace and would preserve an important body of knowledge and technique not yet incorporated into modern science. To the extent that such a situation prevailed, any given modern science had successfully examined only those problems which had already been incorporated into European experience, and to such an extent modern science retained a regional character.

In theorizing this problem,22 Needham has pointed out the importance of distinguishing two moments: transcurrent and fusion. The "transcurrent point" designates that moment at which the European scientific and technical level surpassed that of a particular non-European civilization. In general, this moment would apparently occur simultaneously with or slightly after the successful investigation of any given field of study by means of modern methodology. The "fusion point" designates that moment at which the body of knowledge and technique belonging to a particular non-European traditional science is successfully incorporated into the modern scientific system.

Needham's attempt at specifying these moments has been restricted to the Chinese case. In mathematics, astronomy, and physics, the fusion point (1640) followed rather quickly upon the transcurrent point (1610), for there was little real difference between the material already contained in the European and Chinese traditions. When we consider botany, however, it is apparent that the lag between the two points was much longer. It is also more difficult to precisely define the transcurrent point, but this would seem to have occurred sometime between the work of Camerarius (1695) and that of Adanson (1780), probably closer to the latter. The fusion point apparently was attained around 1880, with the work of Emil Bretschneider of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission and with that of a number of Chinese scientists trained in modern methodology. When we turn to the medical sciences in general, it is clear that the fusion point has not yet occurred, and while traditional Chinese medical remedies and techniques have already begun to be analysed by and integrated into the modern system, it will apparently take some time before neuro-physiologists thoroughly understand the processes effective in acupuncture treatment or before pharmacologists have exhausted the wealth of knowledge contained in the traditional pharmacopoeias. For the medical sciences, as for botany, there is some difficulty in pin-pointing the transcurrent point; but, if we take therapeutic success as the criterion, it should apparently be situated in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In other words, the lag between the transcurrent point and the fusion point will probably be greater than for botany. The results of this calculation are presented in Table 2.

TABLE 2. Time lags between the transcurrent point and the fusion point

Transcurrent point

Fusion point












or 1780




1800, 1870,

not yet


or 1900

Source: Needham (1970b), p. 415.

Working from the premise that the complexity of a science is directly proportional to the metabolic content of its object (that is, that complexity increases as one proceeds from mathematics and astronomy toward biology and medicine), Needham has attempted to formulate a general principle covering the integration of the various traditional sciences into the structure of modern science.

From this one might be tempted to deduce quite tentatively a "law of oecumenogenesis" which would state that the more organic the subject matter, the higher the integrative level with which it deals, the longer will be the interval elapsing between the transcurrent point and the fusion point, as between Europe and an Asian civilization.23

The case which Needham tentatively employed to test this general principle is that of chemistry, a field which on his scale of complexity would lie between the physical sciences and botany. Here the transcurrent point and the fusion point can be calculated at approximately 1800 and 1880, respectively; the lag between the two points is greater than that for the physical sciences, but less than that for botany. And although the approach and many of the calculations remain highly problematical, it would seem that there is a prima facie case for the principle formulated. Figure I presents a graph on which the relevant data are plotted.

FIG. 1 Schematic diagram to show the roles of Europe and China in the development of ecumenical science

Source: Needham (1970b), p. 414.

It can of course be justifiably argued that the Chinese revolution (an "external" factor in the sense described above) has exerted a powerful positive influence upon those traditional fields which remain outside the scope of modern ecumenical science. But, at this point in time, it is perhaps impossible to ascertain whether the lag expected for the integration of these fields (on the basis of the lags calculated for the fields in which fusion has already occurred) will actually be shortened, or whether, by preserving from partial or complete destruction the traditional sciences which still remain regional, the revolution has broken down. those barriers that would have hindered achieving a thorough fusion.

The present seminar is of course dedicated to examining the role of science and technology in the transformation of the contemporary world, and we are especially concerned with some of the pressing problems which today face the rapidly changing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. One such problem concerns the relationship to be established between modern science and the traditional sciences of these nations. If we formulate this problem in Needham's terms, several scenarios might theoretically be distinguished, for the short term, in regard to those living regional traditions not yet incorporated into modern ecumenical science. One is a situation in which the dissemination of modern science would be obstructed (for any of a number of reasons), while the regional science of the locality continued in its purely traditional form. A second is a situation in which a modern science, still to some extent western-regional, is successfully disseminated, while the regional scientific tradition is ignored or perhaps suppressed. A third is a situation in which conditions allow modern science to be successfully disseminated, while the regional science is fostered, thoroughly collated (techniques and theory), and analysed by modern methodology. A variant of the third case is the situation in which both modern science and the regional science of a different locality are successfully introduced, while development of indigenous regional science is fostered.

In the first case, many of the ecumenical advances already made by modern science would remain unavailable to the population in question, and time and energy would be wasted as the regional science attempted to deal with problems at its own pace alone. In the second case, modern scientific methodology would face problems without the benefit of useful insights available in the regional science, and time and energy would likewise be wasted in dealing with problems for which such insights would be valid. The third case would be the optimal one for ecumenization as well as for heightening the nation's ability to deal with the natural environment efficiently.

If we examine practical attempts at the implementation of the third, optimal scenario, it seems that living regional traditions can contribute in three major ways to ecumenization and, in general, to the advancement of mankind's mastery over nature. First of all, the regional traditions include a large number of useful concrete techniques for dealing with natural processes. Many traditional herbal and mineral remedies, for example, can be uniquely effective, usually without the many side-effects induced by chemically manufactured drugs; we can refer here to the impressive work of Hakim Mohammed Said for his dedicated elucidation of this point.24 Another case can be seen in contemporary China where traditional knowledge of the signs of an imminent earthquake has been systematized and effectively used for earthquake prediction. Second, the regional traditions may preserve an important body of data upon which modern scientific research can be based, even in fields already ecumenized. If I may confine myself to the Chinese case, several examples can be cited. In fields such as astronomy and meteorology, in which prediction is based on long range trends, the traditional records can be of immense utility. And in the medical sciences, which have not yet been fully ecumenized, the traditional pharmacopoeiae again provide a wealth of material upon which modern experimentation can be based. Third, the regional traditions can open new horizons for modern scientific research by demonstrating practical success in mastering processes which modern science has not yet or not sufficiently subjected to analysis. A striking case here is the extent to which successful treatment with acupuncture has stimulated international neuro-physiological research, for example, on the nervous structure of the outer ear and on the mechanisms of pain inhibition.25

I would suggest that these three aspects of the current ecumenization of science demonstrate on a practical level that which Joseph Needham and many other historians of science have been illustrating on the long-range historical scale: namely, that there is a temporal and qualitative distinction, but not an absolute one, between modern ecumenical science and the various regional-traditional sciences. If I may paraphrase a famous maxim, i should say that there is no "Chinese wall" separating the new science from the old. Between the two, it might be said, there lies a new, more productive approach to nature, a more thoroughgoing methodology. If we consider the relationship in a correct historical perspective, it can be shown that modern science arose upon the basis of a synthesis of the various traditional sciences. But, like them, it continued - and to a constantly diminishing extent continues - to retain a regional character. This is a point watch Is being demonstrated in practice, irrespective of whether or not Needham's tentative formulation about the rate of ecumenization proves valid. To the extent that a living regional tradition is ignored or perhaps destroyed, this regional character of modern science is not overcome; it is only perpetuated. Personally, I agree that Needham is correct in speaking of the long-term continuity of scientific advance. In the short term, however, it is important to understand the validity of "walking on two legs" by integrating modern and regional science.

It was a usual observation of Boyle, the English chemist, "That if every artist would but discover what new observations occurred to him in the exercise of his trade, philosophy would thence gain innumerable improvements." It may be observed, with still greater justice, that if the useful information of every country was gleaned by a judicious observer, the advantages would be inestimable....

To send out a traveller properly qualified for these purposes might be an object of national concern; it would in some measure repair the breaches made by ambition; and might show that there were still some who boasted a greater name than that of patriots, who professed themselves lovers of men.

Oliver Goldsmith, The Citizen of the World./Letter CVIII.


1. Needham (1973), p.1.

2. Lardreau (1976), p.70; from the pen of one of the widely publicized Parisian "nouveaux philosopher."

3. Needham et al. (1954-). Hereafter abbreviated as SCC.

4. A bibliography of Needham's publications until 1973 (but excluding articles on biochemistry, experimental embryology, and morphology) can be found in Teich e Young (1973), pp. 472-478. A list of works published since 1973 is included as an appendix to this paper.

5. Needham (1958).

6. Needham et al. (1960).

7. Lu and Needham (1980).

8. Needham (1969, 1970a, and 1970b).

9. Needham (1967).

10. In fact, an abridgement of SCC, to be published in five volumes, has been undertaken by Colin Ronan, in consultation with J. Needham. The first volume, which summarizes vols. I and II of SCC, appeared in 1978; see Ronan and Needham (1978).

11. Needham (1967), p.83.

12. On this point see, for instance, the remarks in Needham (1967), pp. 110-112.

13. From N. Sivin's introduction to Nakayama and Sivin (1973), p. xxxi.

14. This point is brought out clearly in Needham (1964).

15. Bernal (1954), pp. 302-303.

16. See SCC Vol. IV, Pt. 1, pp. 229-334; for example, p.333, "The Chinese were theorising about the declination before Europe even knew of the polarity (end of the +12th century)."

17. Needham (1964), p.255.

18. Needham (1976), p.2.

19. Hessen (1931).

20. Geymonat (1977) provides a tightly argued, lucid analysis of various questions related to this problem.

21. SCC, Vol. III, p. 168.

22. See especially Needham (1967).

23. Needham (1967), p. 93.

24. See, for example, Said (1978).

25. For a survey of the relevant literature, see Lu and Needham (1980).


Bernal, J. D. (1954), Science in History. C.A. Watts e Co., Ltd. 1,039 pages. (Paperback in four-volume set: Penguin Books, 1969.) A classic of systematic scholarship written by a man who was both an outstanding natural scientist and a dedicated Marxist. This work analyses the development of the various sciences from neolithic times until the middle of the present century; for the most part attention is focused upon Europe. Useful as a general introduction to the problems involved in the history of science, but more precisely concerned with investigating the close bonds linking science and society.

Geymonat, L. (1977), Scienza e Realismo. Feltrinelli Editore, Milano, 180 pages. A concise but powerful work on key problems of the history and philosophy of science, also within the Marxist-Leninist tradition. Deals especially with the relationships between modern, axiomized science and a dialectical vision of reality and history.

Hessen, B. (1931), "The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's Principia," in: N. I. Bukharin, et al., Science at the Crossroads: Papers from the Second International Congress of the History of Science and Technology, 1931. Frank Cass e Co., Ltd., 1971 (reprint), pp. 147-203. This book as a whole consists of the papers presented by the impressive Soviet delegation to the 1931 Congress; these papers strongly influenced men like Bernal and Needham. That of Hessen showed the great extent to which Newton's achievements and limitations must be seen in the context of his times.

Lardreau, G. (1976), Le Singe d'Or. Mercure de France. Cited solely as an example of present-day Eurocentrism.

Lu and Needham (1980, in press), Celestial Lancets: A History and Rationale of Acupuncture and Moxibustion. CUP, 3 1 pages. Examines the development of techniques and theoretical systems since their origins in the first millennium B. C., and then proceeds to analyse in modern terms the physiological processes now thought to be involved in therapeutic success, e.g., of acupuncture analgesia. Chinese characters included.

Nakayama and Sivin, editors (1973), Chinese Science: Explorations of an Ancient Tradition. MIT Press, 334 pages. A collection of readable specialist papers by leading Japanese and western historians of Chinese science. The first three essays are especially dedicated to offering basic insights into Joseph Needham's contribution to the field. The final entry is an informative introductory bibliography designed for those who want to investigate the history of Chinese science without knowing the language.

Needham, 3. et al. (1954 -), Science and Civilization in China. CUP, in seven volumes. Vol. 1, 1954. Vol. II, 1956. Vol. III, 1959. Vol. IV, Part 1, 1962. Vol. IV, Part 2, 1965. Vol. IV, Part 3, 1971. Vol. V, Part 2, 1974. Vol. V, Part 3, 1976. A summary of the subjects treated is included in the body of the paper; see infra. Each published book includes an index and three extensive bibliographies which list works relevant to the subject treated in the book: Bibliography A, Chinese and Japanese works published before 1800; Bibliography B. Chinese and Japanese works published since 1800; Bibliography C, works in other languages. All volumes include Chinese and Japanese characters.

_______ (1958), The Development of Iron and Steel Technology in China. (The Second Biennial Dickinson Memorial Lecture to the Newcomen Society, 1956) (revised edition, 1964) Newcomen Society, 76 pages. Considers the comparatively high Chinese level in the production of wrought iron, cast iron, and steel between the fifth century B. C. and the eighteenth century A. D. Also deals with traditional blast furnaces, and examines transmissions of techniques. Includes Chinese characters.

________ (et al.) (1960), Heavenly Clockwork: The Great Astronomical Clocks of Medieval China - A Missing Link in Horological History. CUP, 254 pages. Deals especially with Su Sung's treatise of 1090, which is placed in the context of the tradition of astronomical clock making in China between the seventh and fourteenth centuries. Examines relations with the Islamic world, India, and Europe. Includes Chinese characters.

_________ (1964), "Science and China's Influence on the World,'. in: R. Dawson, The Legacy of China. Oxford Univ. press, pp. 234-308. Demonstrates the importance of Chinese discoveries and innovations in seven major fields, e.g., gunpowder, magnetic compass, stirrup, chain-drive, deep-drilling and stern-post rudder. For Dutch translation, see appendix.

__________ (1967), "The Roles of Europe and China in the Evolution of Oecumenical Science," in: Advancement of Science, Sept. 1967, pp. 83-98. The major arguments are summarized in the last section of the above paper. Provides a crucial insight into Needham's understanding of the significance of his own work in general.

___________ (1969), The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West. Allen e Unwin Ltd., 350 pages. Contains eight readable and typical essays on the topic indicated in the title. The first sums up the strengths and weaknesses of Chinese traditional science. The second is a reprint of Needham (1964). The seventh, on conceptions of time, will be included in SCC Vol. Vll; the last is reprinted from Vol. II, and deals with human law and laws of nature. For translations, see appendix.

___________ (1970a), Within the Four Seas: The Dialogue of East and West. Allen s Unwin Ltd., 22 pages. A collection of essays, addresses, and poetry. Useful for providing insight into Needham's eclectic personality and general views on science, history, religion, and philosophy.

____________ (1970b), Clerks and Craftsmen in China and the West: Lectures and Addresses on the History of Science and Technology. CUP, 470 pages. Consists of 19 specialist papers, each of which deals with a specific example of traditional Chinese scientific or technological innovation. Most of these papers sum up the arguments in the relevant sections of SCC. Papers 2 through 5 concern transmissions. Paper 10 is a revised version of Needham (1958). Paper 18 examines the diffusion of state qualifying examinations in medicine. Paper 19 is a reprint of Needham (1967). For Spanish translation, see appendix.

____________ (1973), "The Historian of Science as Ecumenical Man: A Meditation in the Shingon Temple of Kongosammai-in on Koyasan," in: Nakayama 6 Sivin (1973), pp. 18. A non-technical illustration of Needham's general views on the relationship between modern science, the traditional sciences, philosophy, and religion.

____________ (1976), "History and Human Values; A Chinese Perspective for World Science and Technology," in: Centennial Review, 20, pp. 1-35. Provides typical critiques both of "scientism'' and of contemporary counter-cultural trends which negate the importance of scientific advance; argues that the indigenous Asian philosophies and religions can play a great role today in overcoming such trends. For German translation, see appendix.

Ronan and Need ham (1978-), The Shorter Science and Civilization in China. Vol. I, 1978, 326 pages. Projected for five volumes. An abridgement by C.A. Ronan of Needham's original. Useful for following the main lines of argumentation, without having to attend to the scholarly detail. Vol. I covers vols. I and II of SCC. Includes a selective bibliography; the footnotes and Chinese characters of the original have been deleted.

Said, H. M. (1978), "Eastern Medicine in a Changing World," in: Hamdard Medicus. Vol. XXI, nos. 7-12, pp. 58-74. An example of the work of an eminent scholar exploring and up-dating the Graeco-Arab (Tibb) medical tradition. Includes an impressive list of traditional remedies, their characteristics, and their advantages.

Teich and Young, editors (1973), Changing Perspectives in the History of Science: Essays in Honour of Joseph Needham. Heinemann, 90 pages. A collection of specialist essays by a group of distinguished scholars now working on the history of science and technology. The first paper is an autobiographical piece by Needham (under the pseudonym of H. Holorenshaw). Pages 472-478 list works published by Needham until 1973 (excluding papers on biochemistry and experimental embryology and morphology). See the appendix for works since 1973.


A list of J. Needham's works published before 1973 can be found in Teich and Young (1973), pp. 472-478.

1. Books

Science and Civilization in China

Vol. V, Part 2, 1974.
Vol. V, Part 3, 1976.

Japanese translation: Shisakusha, Tokyo.

Chinese translations:

1. Kho Hsueh Chhu Pan She (Kexue Chubanshe) (Science Press, Beijing)

2. Thai-Wan Shangwu Yin-Shu Kuan (Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan) (Commercial Press, Taiwan)

La Science Chinoise et l'Occident. Seuil, Paris, 1973.
Translation of Needham (1969) by E. Simion.

Scienza e Societn Cina. Il Mulino, 1973.
Translation of Needham (1969) by M. Baccianini.

La Tradition Scientifique Chinoise. Hermann (Collection Savoir), 1974.
Collected essays by J. Needham.

Bunmei no Tekitei. Hosei University Press, Tokyo 1974.
Translation of Needham (1969) by Hashimoto Keizo.

La Cina e la Storia. Feltrinelli, Milano, 1975.
Translation of Needham (1970a) by G. Ascenso and M. Baccianini.

Dentro de los Cuatro Mares. Siglo XXI, Madrid, 1975.
Translation of Needham (1970a) by P. LopMz.

Moulds of Understanding: A Pattern of Natural Philosophy.
Allen and Unwin, 1976.
Collected essays by J. Needham.

Translation: Ciencia, Reliqion y Socialismo. Editorial Crca S. A., Barcelona, 1976, by D. Bergad

La Gran TitulaciCienzia y Sociedad en Oriente y Occidente.
Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1977. Translation by R. Martz Silvestre, M. T. de la Torre Casas, and L. GarcBallester.

Joseph Needham: Wissenschaftlicher Universalismus, Uber Bedeutung und Besonderheit der Chinesischen Wissenschaft. Suhrkamp, 1977.
Collected essays by J. Needham, translated, edited, and with an introduction by T. Spengler.

Higashi to Nishi no Kurakusha to Kosh> (2 vols.). Kawagochi Shobo
Shinsha, Tokyo, 1977.
Translation of Needham (1970b) by Yamada Keiji.

Da la Cienza y la TecnologChinas. Siglo XXI, Mexico City, 1978.
Translation of Needham (1970b) by J. Almela.

The Shorter Science and Civilization in China.
CUP, 1978.
Vol. I, 1978.
An abridgement of SCC, by C. Ronan with the collaboration of
J. Needham.

Seikagaku no Rekishi. Nisuzu Shobo, Tokyo, 1978.
Translation of Needham (1973) by Kihara Hirojl.

Celestial Lancets: A History and Rationale of Acupuncture and Moxibustion. CUP, 1980, to be released.
Lu G.-D. and J. Needham.

2. Articles, Papers, Reviews, and Interviews

"The Historian of Science as Oecumenical Man." In: Nakayama e Sivin (1973).

"The Making of an Honorary Taoist" (under pseudonym of Henry Holorenshaw). In: Teich s Young, Changinq Perspective in the History of Science. Heinemann, 1973, pp. 1-20.

"De Natuurwetenschappen en de Invloed van China op de wereld."
Translation of Needham (1964).
In: De Chinese Traditie. Arbeiderspers, Amsterdam, 1973, pp. 258-334.

Address of acceptance of degree of D. Letters from the University of Hong Kong. In: University of Hong Kong Gazette, Vol. XXI, No. 5, Part 1, pp. 69-74.

"Astronomy in Ancient and Medieval China." In: Phil. Trans. R. Soc. London, 276: 67-82, 1974.

"Chu K'o-chen" (biography). In: Nature, Vol. CCL, 16 August 1974, p.614.

"The Elixir Concept and Chemical Medicine East and West." In: Journal of the Chinese University of Honq Kong, Vol. II, 1, 1974.
(Reprint in: Urganon, lI, 1975;
Italian translation in: Acta Medicae Historiae Patavina, Vol. XIX.)

"The Jesuits in China" (book review of N. Sivin: Copernicus in China). In: J. H. A., V, 1974, pp. 204-205.

The Nature of Chinese Society - A Technical Interpretation" (with R. Huang). In: Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. Xll, Nos. 1 e 2, 1974, pp. 1-16.

"L'Alchimie en Chine, Pratique et Thie." In: Annales, No. 5, 1975.

Foreword to R. A. Salaman, Dictionary of Tools, Allen e Unwin, 1975, pp. 9-10.

"Dilemmes de la Science et de la Mcine Modernes - le rem est-il chinois?" In: Impact: Science et Soc, Vol. XXV, No. 1, 1975, pp. 49-54.

Interview in Oriente y Occidente, Salvat Editores, S.A., Barcelona, 1975, pp. 8-17, 62-71.

"Problems of Translation and Modernization of Ancient Chinese Technical Terms: Manfred Porkerts' interpretations of terms in ancient and medieval Chinese natural and medical philosophy" (with Lu Gwei-Djen). In: Annals of Science, Vol. 32, No. 5, September 1975, pp. 491-502.

"China's Trebuchets, Manned and Counterweighted." In: Humana Civilitas, 1976 (Lynn White Festschrift No. 1).

"Review of Ho Ping-ti: The Cradle of the East (with F. Bray). In: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 4, 1976-1977 - Winter.

"History and Human Values; A Chinese Perspective for World Science and Technology." In: Centennial Review, 20, 1976. German translation in: Heft 1 der Schriftenrethe der Deutschen China-Gesellschaft, K

"Metals and Alchemists in Ancient China." In: To Illustrate the Monuments (J. V. S. Megaco, editor) (Pigott Festschrift), 1976, Thames e Hudson, pp. 284-294.

"Oecumenical Science." Reprint in: Interdisciplinary Science Review.

''On the Death of Mao: A Personal Reflection." In: New Scientist, Vol. 71, 16 September 1976, No. 1,018, p.584.

"Contributions of China, India and the Hellenistic World to Arabic Alchemy." In: Prismata: Naturwissenschaftsueschichtliche Studien (Festschrift fHartner), Franz Steiner Verlag, Gmb H. Wiesbaden, 1977, pp. 246-266.

"Love Sacred and Profane." In: Theology, No. 80, 1977.

"Science: East and West; Kurt Mendelsohn's Secret of Western Domination explored." In: The Sciences, March/April 1977, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 20-21.

Foreword and Postscript to: J. Chang, The Tao of Love and Sex, Wildwood House, London, 1977, pp. 9-10, 121-130.

"Address to the Opening Conference of the Fifteenth International Congress of the History of Science, Edinburgh, August 1978." In: British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. II, No. 38, 1978, pp. 103- 113.

"Alchemy and Early Chemistry in China." In: Frontiers of Knowledge, Uppsala, 1978.

"Entretien avec Joseph Needham." Interview in Le Monde, 6 and 7 June 1978.

"Science Reborn in China." In: Nature, Vol. 274, No. 5674, pp. 832-834, 31 August 1978.

"A Scientific Basis for Acupuncture." In: The Sciences, 19, 5, 1979, pp. 6 ff.

"Wetenschap en Beschaving in China." Interview by F. Boenders, in: Streven, March 1979.

"Why Didn't China Develop Modern Science?" Interview in: The International Harold Tribune, 24 October 1979.

General report on the seminar

Kazuko Tsurumi, Rajko Tomovic, and A.N. Pandeya
General Rapporteurs

1. The first international seminar, dedicated to the investigation of one of the crucial items on the agenda of our age - the role of science and technology in the transformation of the world - met. in a context of expectations, clearly articulated by the Project Co-ordinator, Dr. Anouar Abdel-Malek, and the Conference Chairman, Dr. Miroslav Pecujlic, Rector of the University of Belgrade, in the capital city of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, which vigorously proceeds along the paths of constructive mediation between the different spheres in the world of power and culture at work in our times. The central character of our times, of the real world in our times, is implicit in the transformation of all the dimensions of the life of human societies - a transformation which is neither unilinear nor synchronic, but involves the different sectors of social life and activity - economic production, patterns of power, social cohesiveness, cultural identity, civilizational projects, political ideologies, religious formations, philosophies, myths, etc., covering the entire span of the infrastructure and superstructure of society. The question arises: how can this transformation of the world be related to the social and human sciences, political and social theories, the philosophical quest for humane vision - in short, the cultural and civilizational dimensions of our life tomorrow - through structural modifications, through remodeling in depth of the world as we know it today? And the general focus, within which such interrogations and deliberations as are relevant to the problematique could unfold themselves, yielding significant, converging insights, must inevitably couple science and technology with culture, culture/civilization with power, in the belief that such confluence should become the meeting point of scholars and policy-makers; of specialists in the natural, mathematical, material, engineering, and life sciences with analysts and theoreticians of the sciences of man and society, of humanistic cultures and civilizational totalities. And the problematique, in all its complex ramifications, must continuously remain grounded in the firm territory of the crisis confronting us all - in the monstrous asymmetries of economic, political, scientific-technological, cultural/civilizational, informational/communicational resources, characterizing the present distribution across the globe.

2. This complex problematique was explored in its major facets, comprising constellations of specific questions and issues, through five plenary sessions, focusing successively on Science and Technology as Formative Factors of Contemporary Civilization; Technology Generation and Transfer - Transformation Alternatives; Biology, Medicine, and the Future of Mankind; The Control of Space and Power; and From Intellectual Dependence to Creativity. The expositions, discussions, debates, interrogations, illustrative concretizations, insightful suggestions, reflections and observations - all the diverse forms of cognitive, exploratory activities that were triggered off by the earnest engagement of leading minds from the major cultural, socio-political zones of the globe - eventually took identifiable flow-patterns: mutually complementary, occasionally converging, often ranged in debate-prone tendencies, sometimes in polar opposition, reflecting the real contradictions and divisions of our real-life situations. But, on balance, as the dialogue built up, gathered material and dynamism in its movement from the plenary session to the dialectical stage of in-depth reflections in the working sessions, it was impossible to escape the feeling of a general focusing slowly taking shape, of a broad convergence gradually unfolding as insights and thoughts started falling into place; of an overall deepening, extending, of our understanding; of the centrality of certain issues; and of the awareness that what had actually happened was a cognitive transformation that had overtaken us all!

3. As concluding reflections on the problematique, it must be advisable to take note of those areas where, relatively speaking, the shared insights and cognitive convergence appeared to be pronounced. Science, in its totality of domains - natural, human-social, cultural/civilizational - and technology were everywhere firmly and deeply embodied in the socio-political structures which determined their dominating/ liberating functions. Their hidden social relations and hidden power-base, therefore, needed total transformation, if these resources were to be converted into a massive cultural/civilizational force for re-forming the greater part of the human societies into a more humane, democratic, just, and egalitarian future. The cultural question, then, was how to disseminate scientific insights to the people at large; how to integrate the dissociated sectors of science/technology with the foundational sectors of political social policy formation and decision making; how to strengthen complementarities across differentiated orientations; how to identify and strengthen solidarity among humane, transforming, progressive sectors of humanity distributed across the existing divisions of socio-political boundaries; how to sharpen focus on the gearbox of changing, challenging priorities; how to cope with the ever-increasing pressures which hegemonistic, dominating centres were busy releasing at an exponential pace; how to mobilize and organize the vast, latent reserves of endogenous creativity of the vast majority of mankind for initiating, sustaining, and completing the transformations that are overdue, that admit of no procrastination, divergence, or masking. In this realm of confluence, where reflective activity suggested urgent action, we note the final thrust of the seminar deliberations.

Appendix: Position papers

Section 1: Science and Technology as Formative Factors of Contemporary Civilization - from Domination to Liberation

Henri Lefebvre: "Le nssaire et le possible dans la formation du mondial."
Rajko Tomovic: "Technology and Society."
A.N. Pandeya: "Imagination, insight, and understanding: reflections on the culture of science in a changing world."
Yves Barel: "Paradigmes scientifiques et Autodrmination humaine."

Section 2: Technology Generation and Transfer - Transformation Alternatives

Slobodan Ristic: "Collective self-reliance of developing countries in the fields of science and technology."
Kenji Kawano: "Science and technology in Japanese history."
Imre Marton: "Les mythes technicistes et antitechnicistes en Afrique (conflits entre traditionalitt modernit"
Vesna Besarovic: "Legal aspects of the transfer of technology in modern society."
Vladimir Stambuk: "Philosophy (concepts) of scientific and technological development. "
Joseite Lopes: "Science and the making of contemporary civilization."

Section 3: Biology, Medicine, and the Future of Mankind

Bruno Ribes: "La marise de la vie: Pour quoi faire?"
Yuji Mori: "Restructuring a framework for assessment of science and technology as a driving power for social development: a biosociological approach."
Ljubisa Rakic: "Human aspects of medical sciences: medical technology and the responsibility of the physician."

Section 4: The Control of Space and Power

Osama el-Kholy: "Towards a clearer definition of the role of science and technology in transformation."
Jose Agustin Silva Michelena: "Science and politics in a changing world."
Zoran Vidakovic: "The technology of repression and repressive technology: the social bearers and cultural consequences."
Luiz Pinguelli Rosa: "Nuclear energy in Latin America: the Brazilian case."

Section 5: From Intellectual Dependence to Creativity

Guillermo Bonfil Batalla: "La apropiaci la recuperacie las ciencias sociales en el contexto de los proyectos culturales endos."
Miroslav Pecujlic: "On the edge of a razor blade (the new historical blocs and socio-cultural alternatives in Europe)."
Tetsuro Nakaoka: "Science and technology in the history of modern Japan - imitation or endogenous creativity?"
Zvonimir Damjanovic: "Science and technology as organic parts of contemporary culture."
Gregory Blue: "Joseph Needham's contribution to the history of science and technology in China."


Board of Honour

Prof. Dr. Pavle Savic, President of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art

Prof. Dr. Anton Vratusa, President of the Excutive Council of SR Slovenia

Dr. Milolko Drulovic, Executive Secretary of the Presidency of CK SKJ

Dr. Krsto Bulajic, Director of Federal Administration for Educational, Scientific, Cultural, and Technical Cooperation

Organization Committee

Chairman: Dr. Miroslav Pecujlic, Rector of the University of Belgrade

Secretary: Dragisa Stijovic, Director of the Department of International Relations, University of Belgrade

Dr. Rajko Tomovic, Professor, Faculty of Electrical Engineering

Dr. Zvonimir Damjanovic, Professor and Manager of the Centre for Multidisciplined Sciences

Dr. Jordan Pop-Jordanov, Professor, Faculty of Electrical Engineering

Dr. Ljubisa Rakic, Professor, Faculty of Medicine

Dr. Vlastimir Novakovic, Dean of the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering

Dr. Ines Wesley Tanaskovic, Chairman of the Council of the UN University

Dr. Slobodan Ristic, Director of the Administration for International Scientific, Educational, and Technical Co-operation of the SR of Serbia

Dr. Zoran Vidakovic, Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, and Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade

Dr. Milos Nikolic, Member of the Centre for Social Investigations of the Central Committee Board of Yugoslav League of Communists

Dr. Vladimir Stambuk, Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences Spasoje Grdinic, Chairman of the Culture Centre of the University of Belgrade

Jelka Brajovic, Collaborator from the Federal Council of the SFR of Yugoslavia

Dr. Radoslav Andjus
Member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and Professor, Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of Belgrade

Dr. Yves Barel
Director, Centre d'des des pratiques et representations des changements socio-nomiques (CEPRES), Institut de prospective et de la politique de la science, Universite de Grenoble, France

Dr. Guillermo Bonfil Batalla
Director, Centro de Investigationes Superior, Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, Cordoba, Mexico 7, D. F.

Dr. Vesna Besarovic
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade

Mr. Gregory Blue
Assistant to Dr. Joseph Needham
East Asian History of Science Library, Cambridge, England

Dr. Krsto Bulalic
Member of the Honorary Board of the Seminar
Director, Federal Administration for International Scientific, Educational, Cultural, and Technical Co-operation, Belgrade

Dr. Salustiano del Campo Urbano
Decano, Facultad de Ciencias Politicas y Sociolog Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain

Dr. Zvonimir Damjanovic
Manager, Centre for Multidisciplined Sciences, Belgrade

Dr. Aleksandar Despic
Member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Professor, Faculty of Technology and Metallurgy, University of Belgrade

Dr. Aleksandar Djokic
Vice-Rector, University of Belgrade

Dr. Milojko Drulovic
Member of the Honorary Board of the Seminar
Executive Secretary of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Belgrade

Dr. Osama A. el-Kholy
Faculty of Engineering, University of Cairo, Egypt

Dr. Celso Furtado
Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Paris 1, Paris, France

Dr. Ahmad Yousef Hassan
Rector, University of Aleppo, Syria

Dr. Takeshi Hayashi
Councillor, Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo, Japan Dr. Stuart Holland, M. P.
London, England

Dr. Dusan Jaksic
Rector, University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Yugoslavia

Mr. Ilija Jankovic
Head of the Centre for Transfer of Technology Federal Administration for International Scientific, Cultural, Educational, and Technical Co-operation, Belgrade

Dr. Kenji Kawano
Director, Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University, Japan

Mr. Miroslav Kis
Student Vice-Rector, University of Belgrade

Dr. Everett Kleinjans
Chancellor, East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA

Dr. Henri Lefebvre
Paris, France

Dr. Le Th KhR>Professor of Sciences of Education, University of Paris 1, Paris, France

Dr. Milos Macura
Professor, University of Belgrade

Prof. James A. Maraj
Vice-Chancellor, The University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji

Dr. Imre Marton
Professor of Philosophy, Karl Marx University, Budapest, Hungary

Dr. Jos. Silva Michelena
Director, CENDES, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, Venezuela

Dr. Vaso Milincevic
Secretary of the University Committee of the League of Communists of Belgrade, and Professor, Faculty of Philology

Dr. Yuri Mori
Associate Professor, Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University, Hiroshima, Japan

Dr. Tetsuro Nakaoka
(Professor, Osaka Metropolitan University) Cambridge, England

Dr. Vlastimir Novakovic
Dean, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, University of Belgrade

Dr. Cuthbert K. Omari
Associate Professor and Head, Dept. of Sociology, University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Dr. A. N. Pandeya
Professor of Sociology, Dept. of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, New Delhi, India

Dr. Vukasin Paviovic
Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade

Dr. Mirosiav Pecujlic
Rector, University of Belgrade
Chairman of the International Seminar

Dr. Zlatibor Petrovic
Member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
Professor, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, University of Belgrade

Mr. Dragoman Radojcic
Secretary for National Self-Defence of SR of Serbia

Dr. Rasheeduddin Khan, M. P.
Chairman, Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal
Nehru University, New Delhi, India

Dr. Bruno Ribes
Paris, France

Dr. Ing. Slobodan Ristic
Director, Administration for International Scientific, Educational, Cultural, and Technical Co-operation of SR of Serbia, and Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade

Dr. Luiz Pinguelli Rosa
Co-ordinator of Post-graduate Engineering Programmes, University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Dr. Pavle Savic
Member of the Honorary Board of the Seminar, Chairman of the Serbian
Academy of Science and Arts, Belgrade, Yugoslavia

Dr. Vladimir Stambuk
Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade

Dr. Maksim Todorovic
Vice-Rector, University of Belgrade

Dr. Rajko Tomovic
Professor, Faculty of Electromechanical Engineering, University of Belgrade

Dr. Kazuko Tsurumi
Professor of Sociology, Institute of International Relations for Advanced Studies on Peace and Development in Asia, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan

Dr. Slobodan Unkovic
Vice-Rector, University of Belgrade

Dr. Zoran Vidakovic
Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo, Sarajevo, Yogoslavia

Dr. Anton Vratusa
Member of the Honorary Board of the Seminar
Professor, University of Ljubljana, Chairman of the Executive Council of SR of Slovenia, Ljubliana, Yugoslavia

Dr. Immanuel Wallerstein
Director, Fernand Braudel Centre for the Study of Economies,
Historical Systems, and Civilizations, Dept. of Sociology, S. U. N. Y., Binghamton, NY 13901, USA

Dr. Ines Wesley-Tanaskovic
Chairman, UN University Council
Professor of the Military Academy of Medicine, Member of the Committee of the National UNESCO Commission

Dr. Gazmend Zajmi
Rector of the University of Pristina, Pristine, Yugoslavia

The United Nations University

Dr. Kinhide Mushakoji
Vice-Rector, Human and Social Development Programme

Dr. Alexander Kwapong
Vice-Rector, Planning and Development

Dr. Anouar Abdel-Malek
Project Co-ordinator, Socio-cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World (SCA) Project, Co-chairman of the International Seminar
Paris, France

Dr. Hossam Issa
Programme Officer, Human and Social Development Programme, Secretary of the
International Seminar

Mr. R. N. Malik
Chief, Conference and General Services, Co-secretary of the International Seminar

Mrs. Christine Colpin
Assistant to SCA Project Co-ordinator

From the charter of the United Nations University


Purpose and structure

1. The United Nations University shall be an international community of scholars. engaged in research, post-graduate training and dissemination of knowledge in furtherance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In achieving its stated objectives, it shall function under the joint sponsorship of the United Nations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (hereinafter referred to as UNESCO}. through a central programming and coordinating body and a network of research and post-graduate training centres and programmes located in the developed and developing countries.

2. The University shall devote its work to research into the pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare that are the concern of the United Nations and its agencies, with due attention to the social sciences and the humanities as well as natural sciences, pure and applied.

3. The research programmes of the institutions of the University shall include, among other subjects, coexistence between peoples having different cultures, languages and social systems; peaceful relations between States and the maintenance of peace and security; human rights; economic and social change and development; the environment and the proper use of resources; basic scientific research and the application of the results of science and technology in the interests of development; and universal human values related to the improvement of the quality of life.

4. The University shall disseminate the knowledge gained in its activities to the United Nations and its agencies, to scholars and to the public, in order to increase dynamic interaction in the world-wide community of learning and research.

5. The University and all those who work in it shall act in accordance with the spirit of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of UNESCO and with the fundamental principles of contemporary international law.

6. The University shall have as a central objective of its research and training centres and programmes the continuing growth of vigorous academic and scientific communities everywhere and particularly in the developing countries, devoted to their vital needs in the fields of learning and research within the framework of the aims assigned to those centres and programmes in the present Charter. It shall endeavour to alleviate the intellectual isolation of persons in such communities in the developing countries which might otherwise become a reason for their moving to developed countries.

7. In its post-graduate training the University shall assist scholars, especially young scholars, to participate in research in order to increase their capability to contribute to the extension, application and diffusion of knowledge. The University may also undertake the training of persons who will serve in international or national technical assistance programmes, particularly in regard to an interdisciplinary approach to the problems with which they will be called upon to deal.


Academic freedom and autonomy

1. The University shall enjoy autonomy within the framework of the United Nations. It shall also enjoy the academic freedom required for the achievement of its objectives, with particular reference to the choice of subjects and methods of research and training, the selection of persons and institutions to share in its tasks, and freedom of expression. The University shall decide freely on the use of the financial resources allocated for the execution of its functions.