Les notations qui prdent ont pu parae a fois trop thiques et simplistes du fait de leur concision. Elles nous ont semblndispensables pour fonder les principes fondamentaux qui nous paraissent devoir rr toute "politique" de la vie.

1. La premi proposition que nous formulons et rd s'inspire des brefs rappels que nous avons quconcernant la finalitCertes, nous l'avons vu, il est absolument nssaire que l'humanitrogresse dans la maise de la vie. Elle est pouss pour ce faire, par des imptifs de plus en plus rigoureux. Toutefois, une trgrande prudence s'impose. Car, s'agissant de la vie, nous avons affaire ne ritystque, au triple plan de chaque organisme ou de chaque individu, des socis ou groupes sociaux, du milieu. L'ilibre ou l'homtasie de ces systs est a fois fragile et dndante de nssittrstrictes. L'un des maes mots de la biologie est celui de compatibilitEn chacune de nos interventions la question du comment - comment cela s'inte-t-il? comment cela est-il compatible? - est essentielle. Et c'est elle qui est au coeur de la recherche scientifique. Celle-ci vise pprnder comment cela "se passe", comment cela fonctionne. Sans doute, pour ce faire, les biologistes sont-ils amen'interroger sur les "pourquoi" (ou pour quoi) c'est-ire sur les causes. Mais cette interrogation est inteure au comment et porte sur l'enchament. Nulle prpposition n'est ici de mise; l'important est d'affiner la connaissance de ce qui est.

Tout autre est l'application. Celle-ci se propose l'investigation des origines (par exemple de telle maladie) et la poursuite d'une fin (rem, amoration ou crion); le "comment" ne se pose que sub-semment. On ddera de faire une greffe et, dans cette perspective, on diera les conditions de possibilit Autrement dit, un jugement de valeur investit la ritune finalitst pro-pos Le "pourquoi" devient le principe de dnition de la vie; le "comment" rel du moyen.

Ces observations peuvent parae quelque peu speuses. Elles permettent cependant de saisir 'une de ses racines le malaise que ressentent bon nombre de biologistes. Ceux d'entre eux qui sont plutrientvers la recherche "pure" s'inquint du parti que l'on tire de leurs travaux; attentifs aux "systs", aux enchaments ou encore a "logique" des vivants, ils en appellent a modestie scientifique, a la prudence, ne rigoureuse critique pour relativiser certains projets ou certaines entreprises, qui ne devraient pas e mis xtion sans une suffisante connaissance de leurs tenants et aboutissants, de leurs effets a moyen ou ong terme. De leur c les praticiens et autres personnels voua la recherche appliqu considnt les dangers et les carences qui menacent les individus ou la collectivitsoucieux donc d'amorer les conditions d'existence, de surcromobilispar les fins tteindre d'urgence (et souvent presspar les employeurs ou par le grand public) se trouvent parfois contraints de se lancer dans des expences dont le retentissement, pourtant irrrsible, leur appe. A ceux qui les taxent d'imprudence, ils rrquent, non sans raison, que la vie s'explore elle-m, invente sans cesse de nouvelles formes de vivants et de subsistance, bore les antidotes aux dangers encourus, dloppe ses propres dnses ou s les moyens de sa propre proliftion. Toutefois, cette perpelle invention ne va pas sans drdres ni aberrations; surtout, elle demande du temps, ce temps qui, aujourd'hui, nous est si chichement comptA l'homme de prendre le relais pour accrer les processus qui, si on laissait faire la "nature", nssiteraient plusieurs sies ou millires.

Nous n'avons pas la prntion de trancher ici ce conflit de tendances, qui d'ailleurs s'intensifie du fait que les biologistes eux-ms, chercheurs comme praticiens, appartiennent es aires culturelles vari et se rallient es anthropologies ou es idogies particulis. Leur visse s'en trouve diffmment orient Nmoins, compte tenu de la puissance des moyens dont l'homme s'est dotil apparade plus en plus manifeste que, s'il lui appartient de substituer l'artifice aux al de l'existence ou de l'lution, de faire advenir ce qui demeure virtuel, il ne saurait le faire au mis des lois de la vie. Le point de drt oblige toute "politique" en la mati implique que le "bien" ou la "perfection" visne le soient pas sans un profond souci d'entrer dans la "logique" du vivant. D'ore premi proposition: Le "pourquoi" de nos interventions sur le vivant doit e rln fonction du "comment" du phm de la vie, pris dans toute son ampleur. Enont cet aphorisme, nous mettons l'accent sur l'obligation prudentielle de critiquer les projets de la biologie et la mise en application des possibilitqu'elle offre par rapport eur compatibilitvec les nssit("en-soi") inhntes aux systs vivants. Mais la raison ultime de cette rlation du "pourquoi" par le "comment" nous pararder dans le fait que la vie, uelque niveau qu'on l'envisage (physiologie, intelligence, libertn'a pas de finalitiscernable, si ce n'est d"'ec-sister", de faire advenir l'autre". Par leulement elle se perpe et prend sens, dans la mesure o "autre" rge effectivement ou virtuellement n "plus-e". Or, il ne nous appartient pas de prterminer cette altt

2. Il s'ensuit - et c'est notre deuxi proposition - que les biologistes, quels que soient leur discipline ou leur projet, doivent viser dinir" la vie plutu'a dnir ou a drminer (encore que l'un n'aille pas sans l'autre). Cette proposition, corollaire de la prdente, est omprendre par rapport a double dynamique qui nous a paru sous-jacente 'lution. Celle-ci, disionsnous, s'est poursuivie a fois dans le sens du mieux-e - d'un perfectionnement de l'en-soi du vivant, d'un renforcement des nssitet des rlations internes - et dans le sens du plus-e, de l'rgence es formes qualitativement supeures de vie. Il appartient, certes, a biologie de rechercher le mieux-e: parant aux dciences des individus ou visant atisfaire les besoins essentiels de l'humanitAussi bien la propension est grande dans le monde moderne d'obtenir la perfection en l't. Mais prenons garde d'oublier que, dans le domaine biologique, ce terme signifie la sclse; a limite, l'entitivante "parfaite", c'est la fourmili (du moins telle qu'elle est communnt reprnt, dont tous les membres sont rigoureusement conditionnet spalis de mani purement fonctionnelle. La biologie deviendrait insenssi elle se donnait pour objet l'involution, l'implosion, et non plus l'lution, l'rgence. Or, encore une fois, celle-ci ne peut e prtermin tout au plus pouvons-nous nous efforcer de mger ou de promouvoir les conditions qui nous paraissent avoir rendu possible cette rgence et sont indispensables pour que celle-ci se poursuive.

3. La condition prable et effet est de prrver, ntuellement de restaurer et si possible d'intensifier le caract relationnel des vivants, pour autant qu'en se conjoignant, en sa comptrant, en s'organisant, il leur est donne surpasser leurs nssitparticulis. Seraient ici eprendre tous nos dloppements anteurs concernant la rlutions de la sexualisation et la rlutions de la rexion. En ritil en va dans cette proposition de l'essence de l'e humain comme tel, dans la mesure oui-ci ne peut se riser selon ses attributs propres (son intelligence, sa libertqu'en s'ouvrant 'autre; et sans doute de l'essence m de la vie, dans la mesure oest un fait, celle-ci se doie et progresse dans l'entre-deux.

4. Mais il est clair que cette ouverture 'autre, lors m qu'elle implique pour l'homme l'incorporation dans la soci et, de ce fait, l'acceptation de certaines contraintes et rlations, connote le respect de la singularites individus. On pourrait fonder cette proposition sur bon nombre de considtions: par exemple, montrer comment l'uniformisation des individus conduirait n appauvrissement de l'humanitn abrasement de son potentiel lutif, en m temps qu'elle la mettrait en danger d'inadaptabilitPlus profondnt encore, il faut ajouter que le projet d'rgence, de libertst inscrit, semble-t-il, au trnds m du vivant, en tant qu'il en poursuit excellemment la "logique".

5. Enfin, il importe d'assumer la condition historique du vivant, m si elle postule une intation delort. Faut-il redire que la vie est reproduction ou, mieux, procrion; qu'elle "se passe" d'un vivant 'autre; et que, en fait, elle s'av lutive et capable d'rgence; que si elle devait s'arrr 't prnt de l'individu, elle forme de dloppement de ses virtualit el statut du corps social, elle deviendrait insens Et sans doute l'est-elle de prime abord, progressant aveuglnt et non sans aberrations. C'est l'dence. Mais il n'est pas moins manifeste - il le devient dans l'intelligence et dans le projet de libert que la logique qui la traverse "autorise" un incessant dssement. Si la biologie a pour objet de lutter contre tout ce qui dans la vie est carence (rupture ou dcience) de logique, confortant le vivant "en-soi", elle ne peut cependant la faire, sous peine de devenir elle-m illogique, en grevant d'hypothe l'avenir des individus, des grations futures et de l'humanit

Impossible dans le cadre de cette communication de montrer dans le dil comment chacune de ces propositions s'applique aux diverses interventions que nous sommes et serons amenoursuivre tant pour amorer et accroe les productions agricoles (et industrielles) que pour surmonter les al du destin des individus et de l'humanitQu'il nous soit simplement permis. de souligner que ces propositions, pour mentaires, voire simplistes qu'elles puissent parae, nous paraissent devoir revr une importance majeure dans les deux domaines qui sont sans doute appelonnae les dloppements les plus spectaculaires au cours des dnnies enir: nous voulons parler de la modification du comportement humain et des traitements eugques ou orthogtiques lia domination des processus de conception et de gration. Prenons y garde: trop souvent nous ne savons pas ce que nous faisons et de quelles hypothes nous grevons l'avenir des individus et des grations futures; prenons y garde plus encore: au fur et esure que les moyens nous en serons donn et ils le seront; la tentation grandira de normaliser ou de prterminer les individus: qu'il s'agisse des membres d'un groupe social ou de l'enfant que les parents souhaitent avoir. Ce serait une entreprise insens un formidable contresens par rapport a logique de la vie que de l'enfer mer dans des "mods", quels qu'ils soient.

La biologie devrait nous apparae de plus en plus, a mani, comme science du relationnel, de l'rgence, de l'histoire. Mais il va sans dire que la prnter de la sorte indique qu'elle peut et doit e interpellpar d'autres disciplines qui se donnent la m recherche (psychologie, ologie, sociologie, etc.); la rproque nt d'ailleurs souhaitable. Une approche complexe, inter- ou transdisciplinaire de l'homme comme totalitrganique s'av de plus en plus nssaire. Encore que, en dnitive, rien ne doive ni ne puisse e ici dnitif: il n'y a pas de science de l"'ec-sistence"; tout au plus peut-on en dger quelques conditions. "Ec-sister" en l'autre, historiquement, est un parti pris, une "logique" essaisir individuellement et en corps; mais c'est aussi une aventure. Il est vrai que spontannt (peut-e obscurnt avertis par les errements de la vie), le caract aventureux de l"'ec-sistence" nous rgne et nous angoisse. Partant, nous n'avons que trop tendance r a sction du mieux-e, de l'implosion dans notre ordre propre; ou nous en appelons ne science "exteure" pour prterminer cette "ec-sistence" (et donc la biologie). Tel serait le rque certains voudraient faire jouer a "politique", et d'autres 'ique. Il en est m pour souhaiter qu'il existe une Autorit Raison ou Absolu - capable d'cter des principes universellement et intemporellement valables. C'est oublier que si l'on pouvait exhiber de tels principes, ils ne nous seraient perceptibles qu'ravers une formulation humaine, donc historiquement situ qu'ils ne sauraient s'appliquer qu'ne liberture, alors que nous sommes libertncarn que chaque individu s'av biologiquement singulier, de par la texture m de ses cellules et de leur activit. Bon gral gril revient hacun de nous, personnellement et en corps, de nous constituer comme sujet de et par l'aventure de l"'ecsistence".

Oc nous mrait-elle? Se qualifier soi-m pour "ec-sister" en l'autre n'ouvre que sur une qu indnie, rdue de dssement. Apparemment. Mais en ritelui qui fait sienne cette logique acc au Sens. En effet, par la raison, que peut connae de l'Absolu celui qui a foi en lui, sinon qu'il est (dans la tradition judchrenne) Dieu Vivant principallement cet "en-soi" qui "ec-siste" en l'autre, donnant out e d'exister. Il nous revient de faire n ce Lagos: l'avenir, la fin, l'au-delous dssent.

I. Introduction - The darwinian and ned-darwinian systems

It may appear circuitous to commence a discussion on the problem of social development by reference to biological evolution, particularly as there are academic disciplines involving researching the unique characteristics of human society and social development. Since Darwin few have questioned that the human species and society spread around the globe because of biological evolution. Nevertheless, the historical position of Darwin should not be assessed in relation to his discovery of evolution; rather, it should be assessed, and highly evaluated, in terms of his having firmly established a scientific theory to explain the causes of evolution.

Darwin's theory of evolution was, self-evidently, profoundly influenced by the social ideas prevalent in 19th-century Europe. To put it another way, his theory was profoundly influenced by the entire socio-cultural fabric of a developing society. Hence, Darwinism has not simply been confined within the bounds of a theory of biological evolution; it proved a major challenge to social ideas, too, becoming a philosophy that powerfully shaped the central elements of modern culture.

The quintessence of Darwinism is that: (1) an over productivity of living things occurs beyond the possible bounds for survival, and (2) superior/inferior differences exist between individual organisms so that, as a result of the "struggle for existence" between the organisms, only the "fit" are able to survive. In the process, natural selection operates. In other words, the selection operation is left to nature. Through the developments of biological science, especially genetics, both Darwinism and neo-Darwinism are now manifest; but this fundamental premise remains unaltered. In the differences between individual organisms, only mutation due to variations of genes bears any relationship to evolution in Darwinian theory. In this sense, natural selection has come to be regarded as a major cause of evolution.

One of the unique characteristics of modern culture is the existence of the following phenomenon: on the one hand, there is a high degree of trust in the axiomatic quality of natural laws; on the other, there is an amorphous trend in ideas, an uncertainty regarding social laws, and a lack of laws to explain social phenomena. Darwinism and neo-Darwinism have both been shaped by the influences of a competitive society; however, when evolution or development based on competition i.e. the principle of a competitive society - and the survival of the fittest were established as natural laws, they were in fact accepted by society as laws governing society. Needless to say, nowadays such ideas have so fully penetrated people's lives that they are regarded as common sense. Moreover, that extreme form of Darwinism known as social Darwinism is at present being emphasized, and the ideologies of big powerism, war, and aggression in human society are being put forward. It is no exaggeration to say that people accept as axiomatic the necessity to win domestic and international competition, to become a big power, and to gain advantage over others through war, all under the banner of "social development."

At the beginning of the 1960s, the publication of Konrad Lorenz's Das Sogenannte B Zur Naturgeschichte der Aggression (1963) set off a lively debate on aggression. Lorenz details how both animals and humans are equally endowed with an aggressiveness that may manifest itself spontaneously. Insofar as animals are concerned, Lorenz says that aggressive behaviour does not lead to the defeat of the other party, but rather becomes a bond of solidarity between the animals; thus, aggressive behaviour functions to maintain order in the animal world.

In the case of human beings, however, Lorenz posits that the manifestation of aggression leads to the killing of the other party and causes war. He then asks: Hasn't an error occurred in the function of aggression since the time man became man by the use of tools? This theory is behind the modern ideas that connect Darwin to Lorenz. It is aggression that lies behind Freud's development of the idea of aggressive drive, too.

The beginning of the 1960s saw the Cold War reach its extreme and, with the US invasion, Viet Nam became "America's Viet Nam War." The formation of Lorenz's theory of aggression and the debate surrounding the theory could not possibly have occurred in isolation from this historical setting. The debate on aggression which developed involved not only ethnologists, but also biologists, psychiatrists, anthropologists, and other social scientists. Without entering fully into the debate on aggression,¹ I will simply make the following points: First, Lorenz formulated and developed his theory focusing on the aggressive behaviour of biological organisms and human beings. In this respect, the core of his theoretical construct is identical to Darwin's. Second, Freud's theory of aggressive behaviour was formulated after the end of World War 1, and, along with the sex drive, aggression was considered to be one of the instinctive drives of our species. Here can be clearly seen the impact of World War I.

At the beginning of World War II, a Japanese entomologist-ecologist, Kinji Imanishi,² raised serious doubts concerning Darwinism. Imanishi proposed a theory of evolution based on a thorough criticism of Darwinism.

Before he went to the battle front, Imanishi wrote The World of Life (1940). This contains the basic ideas of biosociology in which he succeeds in developing a theory of evolution. Fortunately Imanishi returned safely from the war and in the post-war period has energetically devoted himself to research on animal society, social surveys of villages, and so on. In fact. during this period he organized and widened the scope of his research to encompass fields of study ranging from primatology to anthropology. His research cannot be considered apart from his experiences as a mountaineer and explorer, for they gave consistency to his theoretical work. In my discussion of Imanishi's system of biosociology, I will take all of the above into consideration.

If I were to suggest one phrase for Imanishi's system, it would be "post-Darwinian system." In contrast to Darwin, who bases his theory on the over-productivity of living things and variations between organisms, that is, the construction of a theoretical system based on the organism, Imanishi takes into consideration the historical and social nature of a species to construct a theoretical system based not on an organism belonging to a species (i.e. specion), but on a society of species (i.e. specie). His theoretical system is thus called "biosociology.''

The purpose of my presentation is to push forward the basic ideas of biosociology and investigate science and technology as the driving forces for social development. Within these bounds, I will comment on and examine Imanishi's theory. In doing so, however, I feel it is first necessary to touch upon another theory, one which approaches human nature and society in terms of neo-Darwinism. This is sociobiology, the subject of debate which broke out with the publication of Edward Wilson's Sociobiology: A New Synthesis (1975). As a technical term, sociobiology had already been used independently by John Scott (1946) and Charles Hockett (1948). Sociobiology can be defined as an interdisciplinary science comprising biology (particularly ecology and physiology), psychology, and other social sciences. Research covering such fields also is referred to as biosociology and animal sociology.

The debate that arose with the publication of Wilson's scientific theory again cannot be considered in isolation from the social factors present at that particular time in history, as we moved from the 1970s to the 1980s. Of course, for Wilson, the publication of a comprehensive compilation of research results is probably due to nothing more than pure research activities. In making such a compilation at this particular time, however, it is obvious that even Wilson's choice of a research theme was profoundly influenced by the social and cultural pressures of the age. In fact, if we examine the debate surrounding sociobiology, we find that it has been most actively pursued by those outside the original fields of study, for example, by journalists, intellectuals, social scientists, and others.

What are the present social and cultural conditions that lie behind the debate on human nature and its future development vis-is sociology? As we have already seen, behind the debate on Lorenz's theory of aggression was the manifest display of human aggression in the Viet Nam War. The misgivings, despair, fear, anger. and then opposition to the war can be said to have urged people on to examine not only instinctive human drives, but also the aggression that runs through the animal kingdom. The identical situation does not exist at present; in fact, it might seem as if behaviour directly exhibiting aggression has already been hidden from view. Still, oppression has not disappeared, nor has opposition to oppression vanished; it seems rather as if a complex, powerful, oppressive organization - one that is difficult to come to grips with - is gradually blanketing the world. Isn't this the reason why the path to liberation is no longer clearly visible? Moreover, many of the problems pertaining to natural resources, energy, the population explosion, and environmental destruction are viewed as being difficult, almost impossible to solve, types of natural phenomena. Simply put, these are the political, social, cultural, and natural crises of the modern world. Here, I think, lies the fundamental reason for the attempt of sociobiology to search out a means to solve these problems faced by mankind and society, because sociobiology is a coherent theory ranging in applicability from animals to humans. In the next section I will briefly consider the unique characteristics of sociobiology in comparison with biosociology.

II. Sociobiology or biosociology? how to view humans and their society

I have already mentioned that the basis of sociobiology is the theory of neo-Darwinism. This theory is based on the organism. Human behaviour in sociobiology can be seen to result from any of the followings:³ (1) The human brain, as a result of evolution, has become an "equipotential learning machine" determined by culture. In other words, the human mind is free from genetic influence. (2) Human social behaviour is constrained by genes, although the genetic variability that exists within humans has been fully used. In this sense, human behaviour is to a certain extent influenced by our genes, although each human being possesses the same potential. (3) Humans, as a species, are to a certain extent limited, although genetic differences between individuals are displayed. As a result, humans possess the biological capability for social behaviour and maintain the potential for continued evolution.

The above summary of the points made by Wilson reflects a debate on three levels, that is, mind, action, and genetic structure. However, common to all three is the tendency to equalize human beings. A question to raise is: What are the sources for development in neo-Darwinism which, as we have seen, places emphasis on natural selection, in cases where no genetic relationship or major variation exists?

Kenneth Boulding divides the genetic structure and process into two categories: biogenetic and non-genetic. In the biogenetic structure, both DNA and the gene play a part. This structure is connected to behaviour through the production of nervous systems. It is from here that instinctive behaviour derives; however, at some stage in the evolutionary process, the ability to learn is achieved. There also is the non-genetic structure. It is here that learning comes into play. These non-genetic structures and processes are not simply passed on from generation to generation: they also have the capacity to organize behaviour and make new artifacts. In the human species, such processes are dominant; indeed, it is the non-genetic processes that characterize the human race. And it is learning that creates the non-genetic processes.

Simply combining human beings and their actions does not make a society. This is the problem in the sociobiological approach to human society. Exactly the same problem remains even after the development of Darwinism into neo-Darwinism. Several of the ideas of the authors introduced here are in fact incompatible with neo-Darwinism. We can view this as an attempt to transcend the confines of the Darwinian system, although the ideas are still not fully developed from the perspective of scientific theory.

In scientific theory, we began research at the level of the elements composing the system. Except for physics, however, hardly any success has been achieved in attempts to try and deduce the nature or structure of the system. If the interaction is simple, a theory linking the micro and the macro is possible; however, in the case of social phenomena, because they come into being as a result of extremely complex relationships, the possibility of achieving a theoretical link between the micro element, that is, the individual, and the macro element, that is, society, is at present almost non-existent. Yet this certainly does not mean it is impossible in principle, since one of the unique characteristics of the modern scientific method, namely, methodological progress, might one day bring to light a solution to the problem.

In this respect, it should be pointed out that the biosociology of Imanishi is an example of a neo-Darwinian theory of evolution that approaches things from the system's level as with, for example, thermodynamics. Imanishi adopts a holistic point of view, In this theory, an entire system is simply part of another larger system, and, through the mutual relationships between these systems, each system becomes embedded in a hierarchical structure. The above does not simply pertain to what kind of system to adopt, but also depends on what a system is considered to be. Societies can thus be divided into single and complex-level societies.

In biosociology, which recognizes the existence of a society in any species, society is a universal phenomenon. In this sense, human society is no more than one example from among many. Thus, human society becomes an object of research for biosociology, which has its roots in two types of sociology: (1) sociology of the inter-species, and (2) sociology of the intra-species. The former considers geographical and historical factors; the latter, in contrast, includes the level of the individual organism and a society of species. The higher animals form herds, and the phenomenon of the herd level is related to the cultural phenomenon in human society. In other words, the origin of culture can be sought in the herd.⁵

Let me give the major conclusion of Imanishi's theory of evolution: "Congeneric organisms, which are the same morphologically and functionally, or systematically and behaviorally, must all undergo change in the same way when the time for change arrives. Moreover, as a result of these changes brought about by mutation occurring in all the organisms of the species, mutation improves the species's fitness to win." The path to human society, too, Imanishi argues, is of this type.

A species society is a society constructed out of the individual species's capacity to lead an independent life. In this sense, a society made up of those leading an independent life is the basic level of a species society. In a species society, for example, birds and wild animals which are taxonomically different form independent, yet parallel, societies. Moreover, among both those leading an independent life and those leading a group life, the necessity for raising offspring makes demands on some of the species. It can be seen, therefore, that the road to human society began with a society which supported those taking care of the offspring in the group.

To our distant ancestors who led a daily nomadic life, a life of constant movement would have been an extreme burden to females with young. If they were bipeds, moreover, the difficulties would have been compounded; indeed, the possibility of abandoning the young or breaking up the group may have had to be faced. The way to avoid such a crisis, Imanishi suggests, is to change from a nomadic to a sedentary life. It is quite likely that with the establishment of this kind of life, a meat diet came into being; that is, a change to a hunting and gathering life took place. Here the division of labour between the man, doing the hunting, and the woman, doing the gathering and child rearing, became the rule. As a result of this division of labour, Imanishi continues, a family type was established that necessitated the running of a joint, co-operative household. A local society held together by neighbourly ties then developed. Work, carried out cooperatively by those of the same sex, maintained the group and also allowed opportunities for new families to be formed.

Even if we consider this to be the first step along the road to becoming human, it was still a life completely dependent on nature and a single-level society based on equal relationships. When it comes to the formation of groups in bird and wild animal society, various adjustments are necessary and new behaviour patterns come into existence in order to maintain the group. If this is true, therefore, there is absolutely no need to consider group instinct.

Imanishi stresses the importance of sister relations as the origin of group life among higher animals. Following this way of thinking, it is possible to trace the origin of culture as far back as the establishment of the herd. It was through farming that human beings came to take a completely different evolutionary path than animals. What is of importance here is that farming allowed the production of a social surplus. In contrast to biological evolution, therefore, which occurred through a metamorphosis in the form of the body in order to adapt to nature, human beings evolved as a result of modifying the environment and achieving independence from nature. To put it another way, human beings evolved through culture. In fact, we can consider that speciation in humans came about through culture and that culture is the same as a species in the animal kingdom.

The most important factor in bringing about this evolution was the use of tools. Tools developed into technology; at present, technology is subsumed under the rubric "science and technology." The production of a social surplus through using this technological power led to unequal possession of the surplus and thus the stratification of human society. Between societies, too, it is creating at present a hierarchical structure" As in the animal kingdom's food chain, groups within societies or societies (states) themselves are appearing as predators. In this sense, human beings today are living in a dual hierarchical structure.

III. Three levels of production and consumption

So far I have outlined a perspective or framework for investigations human beings' production activities. First, we have found that any species, including humans, has a society. in other words, the. existence of all living things is a social existence. Second, in tracing the origin of culture, we have been able to go as far as the animals who lived in herds. Unlike evolving animals, however, human beings took a completely different path of development because of the social surplus which followed the start of agricultural life. In the background were the physical changes that led to man becoming fully biped.

Let me now discuss the production activity which animals and hewn beings share. This is the most basic of production activities, namely reproduction of the species. Behind Imanishi's idea of making species society universal is that of the need to achieve a male-female tat c in order to ensure the continuation of the species. Therefore, the period of leading an independent single life must be limited. In Darwin's theory the over-productivity of living things beyond the survival limit is the cause of the struggle (competition) for- survival and leads to evolution. If we examine the food chain in the animal world, however, a hierarchy exists in which the number of non-predators is greater than predators. This is necessary to stabilize the hierarchical structure of animal society. Needless to say, human beings are outside of the food chain. As I have already seated. however, something similar to the predator in anima; society has already made its appearance in human society. If we examine the population explosion from a global perspective, we can see that it is concentrated in South and South East Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

The countries in these regions are either: (1) countries that have been controlled, exploited, or oppressed by international predators (that is, countries that have conducted imperialism, colonialism, or neo-colonialism) or those countries seriously affected by these predators, although formal liberation has been achieved; or (2) those countries rapidly attempting to accumulate social surplus through an internal ruling class of predators; or (3) those countries under this dual hierarchical structure. I have no intention of distorting my meaning when I say that a phenomenon similar to that in the animal world food chain has now appeared in the human world. For human beings, too, if survival is guaranteed, the population problem will be solved. In this case, the guarantee of human survival is not a physiological nor physical guarantee; rather, human survival is guaranteed through culture. In other words, it is as an element of culture that physiological and physical guarantees exist. Here is a fundamental difference in the type of existence enjoyed by animals and human beings. If we are to attempt to solve the population problem, therefore, we must basically start by guaranteeing the survival of the people who live in the problem areas. Specifically, it is not because of overpopulation that poverty and starvation occur; rather, the population increases because robbery, exploitation, and oppression are carried out to the extent that poverty and starvation result. Irrespective of the type of aid that is given, it will be of absolutely no use in solving the problem so long as the structure of robbery, exploitation, and oppression remains the same; instead. it will merely aggravate the situation.

The productive activity unique to humans is production through the use of tools or, as we think of it at present, production activity through science and technology. It is clear that without production there can be no consumption; likewise, we cannot think of production without at the same time thinking of consumption. However, the problem I am concerned with is not what or how to produce and consume, but rather the role and meaning of production and consumption.

In the discussion which follows, a divide production and consumption into three levels (this is a special problem; that is, a problem of the sociology of intra-species): (1) the organism level (organism production has already been dealt with); (2) the social level; (3) the political level.

Let me first provide a definition of the political and social levels. The difference between these two is that which exists between social authority and political power. Social authority and political power generally overlap in human society; however, the problem is that a gap has arisen between the two. If we examine them in terms of origin, they are different: in animal societies that make a group, a distinct social authority exists; for example, a pecking order or leadership system. In the case of animal societies that depend only on gathering, however, there is no evidence of political power. Thus, the origin of political power can be found in the attempts to solve the problem of possession and distribution of the social surplus that appeared when human beings started an agricultural life. Those societies which maintained order only through social authority were still single-level societies. We can say, therefore, that the stratification of species society was brought about by political power.

Quite obviously, so long as no political power exists in animal societies, neither production nor consumption on the political level exists. In those animal societies exclusively dependent on a life of gathering, however, it is worth investigating whether production and consumption on the social level take place. Among birds and wild animals, for example, there are those who make nests and lairs, raise children, bring food to the young not capable of independent survival, and so forth. In a more primitive form of division of labour, we can see in this the germ of social production and consumption.

What gives production activities in human society their unique characteristic is production based on science and technology. We can call this culture. Such production activities are not simply limited to material production but also include the output of various knowledge industries. Moreover, production activities extending over a large area in terms of both quantity and quality become the force for the development of society through the use of the products (resulting from production) and consumption. The rate of evolution in human society, accelerated by production activity, already seems to be far greater than the rate of evolution in animal society.

Yet there is one example of a gap between production and consumption on the political and social levels. This is the example of the nuclear weapons system. Despite the fact that after World War II nuclear weapons have not been employed, the production of weapons is proceeding at a rapid pace at enormous expense and with an increase in both the quality and quantity of weapons produced. Instead of these weapons helping in the development of the producing country's society, however, they are actually impeding social development; their sole function is political. What must be recognized here is that these enormous nuclear weapons systems are being consumed quite effectively and politically. This is because weapons employment is not merely limited to war. It is in fact these systems that gave credence to the idea of a new kind of global political order at a time when territorial expansion and the acquisition of colonies is no longer possible. The perspective taken in the analysis of the nuclear weapons system is, i would argue, also of utility in considering, for example, economic and technical assistance and the transfer of technology.

IV. Needs

Needs regulate and stimulate the complex relationship between production and consumption; thus, let us consider the relationship between production, consumption, and needs. I will not discuss the distribution and exchange occurring between production and consumption as this is not essential to my argument, because whatever process of distribution and exchange is adopted, production depends on consumption for completion; likewise, production without consumption does not make much sense. Needs, of course, must be fulfilled.

How are needs to be fulfilled? Two processes can be suggested. First, there are needs in relation to consumption. In this case, needs regulate production; as a result, needs are fulfilled through consumption. These are needs in relation to quantity. Second, there are needs in relation to direct production. This means a demand for new, quality production; by consumption, therefore, needs are fulfilled. I would like to emphasize that needs have both a quantitative and qualitative aspect. This is because development is a concept relating to quality. More precisely, and quite apart from the conceptual level, there cannot actually be quality without quantity nor, for that matter, quantity unrelated to quality. In social development, therefore, we must grasp both the aspects of quantity and quality of production as a composite whole.

Another perspective on the analysis of needs is to consider them or, the same three levels as production and consumption. In order to achieve balanced social development, needs have to be met on all three levels. The following figure provides a graphic illustration of the relationship between political, social, and individual needs. The shaded area represents the overlap between needs on these three levels. However, things are not so Ripple - political, social, an,] individual needs have their own respective hierarchical structures.

Political, social, individual needs

As I have already pointed our, moreover, the perspective of this analysis is that of the sociology of intra-species. Hence, Spaceship Earth provides the perspective on human society - since mankind is one species. By the same token, if culture is regarded as the Sam as a species in animal taxonomy, then one cultural area becomes the object of analysis. (Here lies my reason for having stressed biosociology; it is also here that the main point of my discussion lies.) In addition, by taking this perspective, society on various levels, from the state to the community, can become independent objects of analysis.

The purpose of the above discussion was to clarify a framework for analysing the role and meaning of production, consumption, and needs. it is still necessary, however, in analysis of actual problems, that the analysis be carried out with respect to various suitable systems.

V. Science and technology as cultural phenomena

Production activities in modern society are being carried out through science and technology. To the human members of society, this means labour. Imanishi gives a biosociological definition of labour as follows: "The effect that living things make to support themselves is not labour. Speaking from the position of a self-centred organism, no further requirement exists. When effort is made to support others besides oneself, however, this additional effort is what equals labour. In this sense, therefore, until a situation arose in which originally, non-essential items became essential, labour did not exist." Why did such a situation appear? Imanishi continues: "If we hypothesize a danger on the level of preserving the species, i.e., that if the male did not support the female then she would not be able to raise the young, then we can provide an explanation for the origin of labour at the same time as the origin of the family." Hence, Imanishi regards that "the ape changed to man at the time that the herd changed to the family (even if there appeared no morphological and physical difference to distinguish between the two, there was certainly a revolution in the mode of life)," and that this "brought about a revolution in social structure."⁷

To Imanishi, therefore, more important than the origin of labour is the fact that it played a revolutionary role in changing the life of man. We may add, moreover, that even though tools have been produced and employed, and even though the development of these tools has led to the construction of the enormous system of science and technology that exists today, no change has occurred regarding the social development of labour.

Serious misgivings and disappointments seem to be spreading concerning the environmental destruction brought about by science and technology and the alienation of man from his labour. The increase in the destructiveness of war through high-powered weapons is the result of science and technology, too. Perhaps science and technology are actually working to oppress society and its people.

The Industrial Revolution in Europe led to the perfection of modern science and technology, for it freed production power and brought about social development. I would like to make two points, however. The first pertains to science and technology as the motivating powers for social development for all of mankind and as universal, general principles. The second pertains to modern science and technology, that is, science and technology formed against a European social and cultural background. This could also be called the cultural element in science and technology. It is quite natural that in the European world both of the above have been a co-existent whole, rooted in society. At the same time, however, it is natural for problems to arise when western science and technology are transplanted to a society with a different culture. In order for the universal and general principles of science and technology to become the power to bring about social development, it is necessary to clarify needs from the analytical perspective previously mentioned. This is essential if science and technology are to root themselves in non-western societies as culture.

Yet here, too, two problems arise. When we speak of needs, for example, no matter what level we are referring to, they are not simply those of which we are fully aware or conscious, but rather exist as objectively definable requirements dependent upon the state of the society's culture. Thus, the needs of someone who is ill are not only those of which the patient is aware; even if the patient is not aware of his needs, the doctor, through application of his medical knowledge of illness and disease, appropriately meets the patient's needs, that is, provides treatment. The same rules apply to accepting science and technology as the force to bring about social development.

The second point pertains to what I mentioned earlier about culture as a species. Living things are able to maintain themselves as a species because cross-breeding does not occur. In the case of culture as a species, however, the reverse is true; culture arises through mutual Influence and receptivity. While this is occurring, moreover, culture as a species is blossoming in areas which are maintaining and developing independence. From this perspective, we are reminded that behind the establishment of modern science and technology lies western societies' receptivity to Arabian science. the reason modern science and technology are not carrying out their ordinal role of providing power for social development and are instead operating dysfunctionally is quite simple: in short, it is the liberation of social productive power to an extent previously unwitnessed in human history. The accumulation of an enormous social surplus has resulted from this liberation of productive power. Even today, this process seems to be continuing unabated. I have already explained how the social surplus created a hierarchical structure in human society. This hierarchical structure has continued to operate oppressively in human society from the time of slavery. In fact, such a system is nothing more than a difference in the nature of the problem surrounding the control and possession of social surplus.

Of course, to say that the reason modern science and technology are not carrying out their original roles is simple is not to say that the solution to the problem is equally simple. In order to satisfy needs on various levels, the social surplus must be utilized. From the perspective of this analysis, I would raise two questions: First, is it too much to expect some kind of contribution to be made in order to free social surplus? Second, is it impossible to approach the solution to this problem from the perspective of science and technology as a cultural phenomenon?

VI. The turning point of social development: space and time

Let us start the discussion of the turning point of development from a comparison of neo-Darwinism and biosociology. According to neo-Darwinism, mutation occurs randomly. What provides the direction for notation is natural selection. In Imanishi's biosociology, on the other hand, living things must all change in the same way when the time for change arrives. It is in a sense true that this applies only to animal society, human society being different. What we must remember, however, is that coherence of theory and unity of ideas make demands originating in the nature of theories and ideas themselves.

Modern science and technology have brought into play enormous, high performance production power and have made high-speed transportation of goods and people, along with rapid communication, possible. This has planted the illusion that we can realize our thoughts any time and any place. This phenomenon has come into being, I think, as a result of the failures of huge social experiments. We can here recall the "experiment" of the American Viet Ham War and the huge social reorganization that took place in China during the Cultural Revolution, even if we disagree on an evaluation of the results.

At some time, a turning point in social development arrives. This has both historical and social characteristics, that is, the characteristics of space and time. The analytical perspective taken in regard to production, consumption, and needs pertains to the space characteristics of social development. I will thus now discuss time, then the problem of time and space.

The time that ticks by on a clock proceeds in the direction in which the universe is expanding. Although social time proceeds in the same direction as physical time, its passing is different. Historical time is of course measured by the clock. When we look from the present to the past, however, all of the past is, symbolically speaking, built into the present. The time built into the present-day structure of time is constructed in relation to the future; hence, it is not physical time, but social and physiological time.

In the Japanese language, there are two words which express future time: one expresses the future soon to arrive, the other the future quite a distance off. The subtle difference between the two seems to be suggestive of the kind of thinking about time that exists in Japanese society. Of course, this is merely feeling or emotion, but surely such feelings about the past or the time to come can be built into a theoretical framework. This is because in the hearts of the people who have effectively dealt with and controlled the turning points of social development or change in the past, whether they were aware of it or not, has been the ability to grasp the nature of the crisis. The point I wish to make here is not that we should marvel at the genius of the individual, but that we should question whether this is really something that cannot be the object of scientific inquiry.

As an example of this kind of research, one effective method could be to measure the degree of change in social conditions. We can think of this as resembling changes in material things. Water, for example, changes from a solid to a liquid and then to a gas. In this case, we can understand the change as a change in entropy. Needless to say, the decision on what indicators to use to express the conditions in the society depends on how the social system or change in social conditions are viewed. In this way, it becomes possible to grasp the turning points in social development when the time axis is indicated for changes in social conditions. This not only makes it possible to apply research to the past, but also, by following the passage of time, makes possible predictions of changes likely to take place in the future. In short, social change does not occur suddenly at one stroke; rather, despite the fact that it does not appear on the surface of society, social change shows signs of occurring before the change actually occurs.

We are required to consider two different goals in the case of social development. The first is to strengthen social organization and social order. The second, on the other hand, is to increase the amount of freedom, that is, to expand possibilities. Modern science and technology have brought about an increase in productivity through a high degree of organization of the production system; however, they have also made people no more than cogs in the production machinery. If this is the case, then, modern science and technology are working for the oppression of human beings. So long as an increase in material production and a decrease in work do not tie into the construction of a social system that increases social and human freedom, it is clear that modern science and technology, in their present forms, lack the power for social development.

In the preceding discussion I have done no more than point to a framework for thinking about social development. I will leave for another occasion the discussion of the measurement of changes in actual social conditions based on research. An indication of turning points in social development will also have to be postponed.

Notes

1. The author discussed aggression in "A Life Sciences Approach to Peace Science," Heiwa Kenkyu [Peace Studies] vol. 1 (1976), Peace Studies Association of Japan.

2. Imanishi Kinji was born in Kyoto in 1902, graduated from Kyoto University, and was a professor of the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies and Faculty of Science, Kyoto University, a professor at Okayama University, President of Gifu University, and President of the Japan Mountaineering Society. He became a Person of Cultural Merits in 1972, and received the Order of Culture in 1979. He is professor emeritus at Kyoto and Gifu universities. He is the author of Collected Works of Imanishi Kinji (10 volumes) and many other books.

3. Wilson, E. (1978) "Introduction: What is sociobiology?" in Sociobiology and Human Nature, Gregory, Silvers, and Sutch, eds.

4. Boulding, K. (1978) "Sociobiology or Biosociology?" in Gregory et al, eds. (1978).

5. Imanishi's two types of sociology first appeared in Logics of a Society of Living Things (1949) and Prehuman Society (1951) respectively. The former considers geographical problems and the latter historical problems.

6. "Against the Authorized Theory of Evolution" (1964), also in Collected Works, vol. 10.

7. "Prehumans and Humans" (1952), also in Collected Works, vol. 5.

Ljubisa Rakic

The ethical and legal aspects of human behaviour always coincide to some extent but they also always differ. To act in harmony with the law - to do something you are obligated to by the legislative power and to not do what is expressly prohibited by law - is sufficient for securing civil loyalty and civil tranquillity. The ethical dimension, besides this social and institutional dimension internalized by individuals, contains also 8 human dimension, a feeling both social and individual which can make us less worthy both in the eyes of the society and in our own eyes even in those cases when our behaviour is strictly in harmony with generally accepted regulations The physician is not rarely restricted by the regulations of the institution in which he works and whose facilities and capacities he utilizes in the diagnosis and treatment of his patients. If all that he does complies with the accepted norms but he does not do all that he should do, it certainly represents a burden to his individual conscience. Torn between rigorous regulations, the exceptionally great expectations of the society, his own human needs, his other obligations and tasks, and his own conscience, the contemporary physician is in the most complex existential situation, burdened with dilemmas that confront other professions. And what are those specificities without understanding of which one cannot establish the physician's responsibility In the treatment of patients?

It was Talcott Parsons who stated a long time ago that one specific and, let us add, rather neglected form of socialization of modern man is the socialization that implies also training of a healthy man for playing an undesired role, the role of a patient. The basic specificity of this role is that the society has not - at least not always - clearly and precisely defined the obligations and behaviour of the patient either towards the society or, which is in this case the most important point, towards himself. For the problem of the physician's responsibility presupposes his exact and humane performance of a definite role which can bring about a cure only if there is at least a minimum of co-operation from the patient and his surroundings. But that does not make the situation simpler in the least - even when legally the physician bears no responsibility, he is responsible for the state of the whole surroundings, for the existence of the cultures that are in conflict with modern medicine, with health and healthy living of man. for illness, which makes it impossible for man to perform his social roles in the manner in which the society expects him to do, represents not only a physical and physiological handicap but the limitation of man's creative capabilities, his human freedom which is the basis and condition of his human living (Marx).

Another specificity of the physician's role in his diagnosis, treatment, and all other forms of activity derives from the exceptionally high level of social expectations. Truly, such expectations (at least in certain situations) the society places also in other professions whose performance of definite tasks is connected with high risk in the preservation of the life, dignity, and moral integrity of other people or even the whole nation. That is the reason society shows a high degree of tolerance for smaller legal and moral of fences while it reacts very rigorously to any behaviour of the physician that does not accord with the social expectations. Public opinion has become accustomed to the submissiveness and passivity of man regarding his rights, to conformity and apathy, and even to pathological behaviour. But if the public detects the absence of sympathy with man in affliction, bureaucracy and formalism in the medical organization, it reacts very severely. It would certainly be wrong to advise contemporary man to show the same patience in waiting for urgent medical aid as that shown in the slow rhythm of work of today's administrators. The corpus of legal and moral norms regulating behaviours in medical institutions does not express the exceptional importance of medicine itself in man's life. A specific ethical code expresses also a basic social need - in order that the society can function, the behaviour and responsibility of the physician must be exceptional. And yet modern sociology warns us that the contemporary medical organization is nothing else but a functional part of a social totality that has common economic bases, common ideological bases, a complete system of values, a system of stimulation and sanction. In a society in which, to paraphrase Parsons, money represents a means by which messages are transmitted and all values are measured, the medical profession will also be subjected to these influences and measured by the same criteria as other professions, no matter how high its system of values is set. If in the society there is disparity between a humane man's needs and the needs of the given type of society, if there is a split between human essence and human existence, this disparity will inevitably be expressed in the controversial functioning of medical institutions and behaviour of the physician. But independent of the forces that are outside us, in the nature of man and in the humane character of medicine lies the intention of searching for chances to overcome ourselves and the situations that limit us, for higher forms of unity with our own nature and with other people, and this intention corresponds both to the humane and to the exact character of medicine. The sphere of medicine is an area of creation. It is not a passive consequence but an instrument of constant broadening of the sphere of man's power, his sphere of creation, and his freedom.

The specificity of the medical profession is also contained in special skills, knowledge of special techniques whose application in diagnosis and treatment is indispensable. But, as in all other fields, in the field of medicine also an explosive development of new knowledge has occurred, producing such a body of information that what makes up the corpus of modern medicine cannot possibly be encompassed by any individual's knowledge or experience. The constant development of investigations and the application of their results in diagnosis and therapy have brought about continuous specialization and constant narrowing of specialist skills, but it has also brought deeper and deeper penetration into the phenomena that are the subject of investigation and greater and greater exactness and increasingly greater efficiency. The naive mythology of the patriarchal society is gradually replaced by confidence in science, which sometimes does not even rest on positive and rational foundations - we doubt that nowadays there is a physician who has not realized that the expectations of patients very often exceed the actual possibilities of present-day medicine. But what is today beyond our power will tomorrow quite certainly become reality, so in this regard the modern myth contains in itself more realism than all the scepticism of conservatives. However, this situation, ethically and even medico-technologically, makes the role of the physician, especially his share in responsibility, complicated. First of all, In all countries that are in contact with scientific progress, regardless of whether medicine is socialized or based on private practice, in more serious and complicated cases the patient seeks access to first-rate medicine. The foremost medical institutions, university clinics and other renowned institutions, are objectively not in a position to treat all interested patients. Sociological investigations show that patients with more favourable social status, i.e., people with more education, income, and political power and with higher social status and reputation generally seek out medical institutions whose status is also more favourable. It should not particularly be emphasized that most often these are institutions of high reputation, well equipped and with an architectural appearance that inspires confidence. To tell the truth, one should admit that at many institutions whose external appearance, reputation, and even status are in considerably lower esteem, the treatment of patients, from a scientific-medical standpoint, is the same as in those institutions of higher standing. However, among medical institutions there are also those whose reputation is in accord with their discouraging appearance.

The material, technological factor is undoubtedly a limiting factor when speaking about both professional possibilities and the responsibility of the physician. The way out of this situation certainly does not lie in some administrative manipulation of patients but in the scientific, technical, technological, and personnel advancement of all medical institutions to a high level corresponding to the standards of modern science. The initiative which in this regard doctors can and must display will certainly be supported by all democratic forces in society.

Constant specialization, narrowing of the scope of work of specialists, the fact that a precise diagnosis cannot be made only on the basis of personal contact, knowledge, and sympathy, have resulted in a relationship between the physician and the patient which in itself expresses relationships between things to a greater extent than between living people. The present-day patient, if he is in a more complex and better-equipped institution, in many respects reminds us of production material which travels on the assembly line. "Undress," "Get dressed," and "Go to the laboratory" are repeated mechanically, data are heaped up, and the picture becomes more and more complete, but nobody knows what has brought the patient to hospital, what is troubling him, and even what his name is. Let us add that the economic factors demand efficiency from medical institutions, that is, rational expenditure of time, energy, materials, the greatest possible speed at work. The relationship between the patient and the physician has become quite impersonal, and the modern organization attended by powerful bureaucratic trends shows also in medicine a tendency towards "collective irresponsibility" among responsible experts, a phenomenon which Wright Mills revealed in the sphere of political decision-making a long time ago. Who bears direct responsibility for the wrong diagnosis or wrong treatment when in the treatment of the patient twenty, thirty, or fifty experts have participated? This is no literary fable - from medical institutions into judicial institutions are brought cases which even the best legal experts cannot clear up. Obviously, the solution must be found in the medical organization itself which, by using modern techniques and technology without which there is no efficient medicine and by observing the principle of economy of work, has to return the human character to the relationship between the physician and the patient. Not only the biological, chemical, and other techniques but also words, human attitudes, and understanding in the hands of the physician must become again the means by which health is restored.

These several aspects of responsibility seem to us to be sufficient to show that responsibility contains in itself also professional-expert dimensions, that the social dimensions contain in themselves legal, political, ethical, and psychological components, and that what we would call the individual dimensions of this problem have far-reaching consequences for the future not only of the individual but also of the human community. We shall try to define this more precisely.

First of all, what has been established in the medical profession is that there is a tendency towards high professionalism, towards an ideal of the expert who acquires a good reputation through irreproachable work. Although this concept is a remnant from the time when medicine was a trade, it contains in itself very important elements without which one cannot build the internal feeling of responsibility towards the object of one's work, i.e., the patient. This concept implies constant observation, acceptance, and application of the results of science and technology, and any instance of lagging behind modern developments, and thus also of ignorance and inefficiency, it proclaims unethical. Although this ethic takes for its norms the exact principles of science, it represents a very important accelerator not only of scientific progress but also of the humanization of medicine.

However, acceptance of this professional ethic, its intention directed towards innovations and modernization of medicine, does not solve the problem completely. All ethical norms, as a matter of fact, express tendencies in human behaviour around which the actual human behaviour oscillates. Where high professionalism in medicine is concerned, oscillations in the behaviour of the physician can be caused by objective circumstances which restrict or even handicap the physician in his personal development. It is obvious that for certain ways in which medicine lags behind we cannot solely blame the physician. In some environments even with backward technology and relatively obsolete knowledge the physician can play a pioneer and indeed a heroic role in the preservation of man's health. But both he and the social environment should accept neither heroism nor self-sacrifice as compensation for retardation and conservatism. Professionalism implies also criticism towards oneself and others, constantly attaining a higher and higher level. But this attitude sometimes gives rise to pseudocritical forms, becomes an expression of commercialization and rivalry, and leads to the destruction of interpersonal relations within the profession. Instead of constant improvement, security, confidence in oneself and in others, it spreads feelings of fear, distrust, and insecurity, and ultimately deprives the patient himself of his faith in the physician. Colleagueship and understanding which are as important as responsibility do not result only from ethical principles but also from the practical needs of everyday life.

Without underestimating the professional concept of the responsibility of the physician and the role which he has played in the development of medical science and medical organization, and which he will play in the future, it seems to us necessary to emphasize that he alone is not enough to meet the needs of modern society and the needs of progress. In addition to the exact dimensions of professional responsibility ("l've done all I was able to"), the principle of responsibility should also gain dimensions of responsibility to other people, responsibility to the community - not only the local or national community but a universal community in which the physician is responsible for searching for new and higher forms and higher levels of its unity. This conceived principle of responsibility to the community includes, first of all, the responsibility of the physician to himself as a human being who seeks his affirmation and his happiness in bringing about the health and happiness of other people, of the society as a whole. This conceived responsibility does not permit reduction of the physician's responsibility to the professional and routine performance of duties, to the separation of his personal form his social life, but expands it to a creative, critical attitude towards oneself and others, towards the society as a whole. Although these words sound very pretentious, medicine by itself cannot have any destructive pretensions, nor can it become a starting point of deeper social transformation. It has always been part of the given society, a functional part. But in medicine, more than in any other area, as through a prism there are refracted and resolved the problems of the individual, who is to the same degree strangled by the deprivation which time lag brings on and crushed beneath the advancing wheel of modern civilization. With the necessary ability to appreciate the pains, desires, anxieties, needs, and capabilities of modern man, the physician can become an important factor in the solution of his existential problems, which not rarely drive man into illness and death. And this openness and human determinedness of the physician, his critical engagement in the struggle to change the world to which he belongs, that entrance upon the broad social stage, and the increased load of responsibility can be equally useful both to mankind and to medical science.

(introduction...)

Chairman: Guillermo Bonfil Batalla
Co-chairman: G. Pavicevic
Rapporteur: Vladimir Stambuk

Introduction

Gregory Blue

The key theme which underlay this session, placing it at the heart of the entire conference, was that of hegemony - the predominant control exercised by one or more foreign powers over the principle forms of the social life of a nation. The struggle against hegemonism is the struggle of a people to determine its own future within its own boundaries; and, as stated by Dr. Abdel-Malek in the last intervention here, the major problem facing the nations of the Third World today is precisely that of maintaining their political and cultural sovereignty. As noted by Dr. El-Kholy in his opening paper, solutions to this problem hinge on the ability of these nations to generate social and political systems that will ensure the efficient utilization of their human and natural resources. Dr. Pandeya pointed out that success in the fields of science and technology requires the formation of a broad popular scientific culture.

The problem of the roles of science and technology in the contemporary world is far from peripheral to the general problem of hegemonism, and many of the participants in this session stressed what Dr. Vidakovic termed the mystification of their objective social functions. Dr. El-Kholy, for example, noted that innovations imposed by the authority of an external power are more likely to serve as means of increased subjugation and alienation than as tokens of some transhistorical progress. Dr. SiIva Michelena in turn observed that technological optimism is an essential part of the developmentalist advertising being pushed by transnational corporations to assure "developing" countries of their bright prospects within the capitalist system. Examining the significance of nuclear energy for countries of the Third World, Dr. Pinguelli Rosa illustrated some of the typical complications that arise when a heavy technology is treated as an object of prestige rather than as an instrument for meeting popular needs, but he also noted that these countries can ignore such technologies only at the price of perpetuating foreign domination, and he stressed the importance of building up national independence in an all-round way. Dr. Vidakovic himself considered how, despite various forms of scientific-technological optimism, the militarization of the contemporary world economy is dominating the development of science and technology, harnessing them more and more to the purposes of repression and destruction and thus obstructing the realization of their great potential for improving the lot of the peoples of the world.

In the search for alternatives, Dr. El-Kholy spoke of the practical rather than the theoretical importance of the Third World's following complementary paths of national and collective self-reliance. Dr. Silva Michelena called for collective bargaining by Third World countries in regard to technology transfer, but he considered the logistic support by the Soviet Union as the most significant element in transforming global politics today. Dr. Vidakovic, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of uniting people around the world to fight against the repressive and militaristic perversions of contemporary science and technology.

During the discussion an important exchange took place concerning the evaluation of various forms of power. Dr. Furtado stressed that since the end of World War 11 the economic potentials of the Third World have been significantly strengthened when compared with world levels; he thus thought that they are objectively more capable of building up their technological infrastructures. Drs. Issa and Rasheeduddin Khan, among others, emphasized on the other hand that those Third World countries which have not undergone a fundamental political transformation freeing them from foreign domination have typically less power to dispose of their own natural resources as time goes on.

Anouar Abdel-Malek, Celso Furtado, Hossam Issa, Rasheeduddin Khan, Le Thanh Khoi, James A. Maraj, Kinhide Mushakoji, A. N. Pandeya, and Vladimir Stambuk took part in the discussion.

Report on session IV

Vladimir Stambuk

1. In his introductory speech, Professor Osama el-Kholy talked about four basic topics. They were: In what way can we look for bridges to new solutions for solving the problems of science and technology in developing countries? How can developing countries use the knowledge and solutions which exist in developed countries? How should developing countries maintain their cultures and develop them? What are the roles of science and technology? Elaborating these topics, Professor el-Kholy suggested that one should relate oneself to the dominant values in a given society but underline that dominant values are not always those expressed by the government and the top political echelon. Much more often, the dominant values are discrepant to those expressed by the power structure and can be really found among the common people. We can look at the values related to development and make three basic assumptions:

- that this development pattern is desirable in itself and is suitable for our society, now and in the future;

- that its realization is possible to achieve nowadays just as it was possible to achieve in the past;

- that our own experience, so far, in following this path is encouraging.

Elaborating the second subject of his introduction, Professor el-Kholy stated: "Rather than swallow contemporary S&T as practiced outside our societies to dictate our socio-political systems alienating us from cultural roots, rather than let progress be an outside force beyond our control, we seek an order within which alienation disappears, or - at least - decreases, and within which man becomes master of S&T in our societies directing them rationally towards the goals of harmony and equilibrium with environment and resources; satisfaction of essential needs; justice and liberation of man's faculties on the basis of the positive elements in our cultural heritage; and not the dictates of profit maximization that currently prevail in international relations. This is the essence of self-reliance, reliance on liberated creativity and sound traditions." Freedom and democracy cannot be developed if we look upon science as a deterministic approach to knowledge with strict unchangeable laws. This kind of approach reduces human endeavours to oppression. If the term "scientific" is used to determinate people who are not laymen, then science is unable to promote free and englobing research.

Professor el-Kholy expressed his concern at the polarization of science and technology due to the emergence of big science and the R&D multi-disciplinary establishment. He talked also of the use of TNCs as the most efficient form of integrated techno-economic activities and the greatest promoter and investor in innovation.

Professor el-Kholy especially emphasized the importance of taking note of the deterioration of international relations.

The threats of armed interventions which are on the horizon bring the possibility that the 1980s will see a further deterioration in international relations in the world. That will have among other effects a negative impact on the further development of science and technology in developing countries. The fact that developing countries have not enough information about themselves does not help in the process of communication and collaboration among developing countries. This fact is becoming more negative through a situation where we do not have, in developing countries, an articulated theory of change and development,

2. In his presentation Professor J. Agustin Silva Michelena asked for what change is taking place. He stated he believes that man is producing his own history, but also that history influences what kind of men we shall have in the future. He presumed that the future is going to be some kind of socialism, but, in his opinion, the character of the modes of production will influence that future. Some elements of the future mode of production already exist today.

Professor Silva Michelena stressed that he believes we are nearly at the end of an era. The period which is ending now started after the big crisis in 1930, reached its peak in 1960 and now is ending, giving way to a new transnational organization of capital. This new way is characterized by two facts: the first is represented by the further expansion of a new social division of labour and the second in the concentration of means of production in the transnational. Up to now, about five to six countries have been included in the process of transnationalization. But, in the view of Professor Silva Michelena, more of them will be included in the future which will lead to a new proletarianization of the working masses. This will be achieved mainly by further development of the technology of management.

The multinationals are more and more collaborating with the local elite, composed of the new bourgeoisie, army elements, politicians, and so on. This co-operation brings a further deterioration in the fulfillment of the basic needs of the working masses. Professor Silva Michelena elaborated some of his geopolitical views stressing that the geopolitical situation of today has basically changed since the 1950s. At that time clashes between the USSR and the USA might have happened over Europe. The balance of nuclear power changed that dynamic. Political and economic differentiation, the over-exploitation of underdeveloped countries, and the fact that the USSR can increasingly give logistic help to revolutionary movements around the world produce a constant imbalance in international relations. In his opinion, Latin America might become, in the 1980s or 1990s, the Africa of today.

To further their domination, the developed countries' elites are developing a new ideology which is a revitalization of the "modernization" theory of the mid-1950s. The main core of this ideology rests on technology and science, on concepts like appropriate technology, which serve to increase control over the developing countries and not to promote better life conditions. What is really happening is that developing countries are treated as clients and not as partners.

3. Professor Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, in his introductory speech, elaborated the role of nuclear energy in developing countries using the example of Brazil. The starting point was that energy policies must be related to the overall economic policy of the country. in developing nuclear energy, ecological considerations must also be present. Decisions related to nuclear energy are political decisions. They have always to be understood as such. To demonstrate this point Professor Rosa used a number of data concerning existing and future reactor-building in Latin America, especially in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico.

In his view, Brazil should promote its nuclear energy for the sake of its future energy needs. But it is also obvious that Brazil is building today nuclear reactors for prestige. Hydro-energy has not been sufficiently used in Brazil. It seems that Brazil is using about 12 per cent of its hydro-energy. Professor Rosa emphasized that nuclear energy can be a part of the energy policy of developing countries, especially those which are poor in other energy resources.

In the lively discussion which followed, ten speakers took part. Three main topics related to the position papers were discussed. The first was what are the characteristics of existing societies and how can they shape technical and scientific transformation.

The second topic was related to power, its different aspects, and its role in the development of science and technology.

The third topic was geopolitical considerations related to existing international relations.

Part of the discussion related to the characteristics of existing societies was concentrated on the analysis of modern capitalism. Following the idea expressed by Professor Silva Michelena, a number of speakers underlined the fact that the role of the multinational companies was increasing in the cultural, scientific, and technological aspects of life. This points up the need to define what kind of technology and science will be developed by the multinational companies and in which way the developing countries should meet that challenge. One of the ideas expressed was that developing countries possessing a large number of scientifically and technologically trained people have not yet been able to translate these potentials into a force of transformation. The scientific community is not able to transmit new ideas related to development to the population. The existing knowledge today is less understandable to the Indian population, for example, than it was in 1947. There is therefore a constant need of integration between scientific knowledge and mass support, oriented to transformation, in the developing countries.

The largest part of the discussion was concentrated on the question of power and its role in the transformation of society, including technology and science. Five elements were suggested at the beginning as the sources of power: control of international markets; control of international finance; control of non-renewable resources; control of cheap manpower, and control of technology. It was stressed that developing countries can control the four first factors and are yet unable to control the fifth. To these elements, during the discussion, some more were added. Control of knowledge and information was stressed as the most important aspect through which influence is being realized over the developing countries.

Another element was added: political power; and a criticism was expressed concerning the control which the developing countries have over the four elements. Expressed opinion was judged as over-optimistic.

The role of politicians was also discussed and the ambiguity of their position between the pressure of the masses for solving every-day needs and the impossibility of leading political structures in developing countries to solve them accordingly. That is why politicians make deals with multinational companies and develop industrialized societies, in order to maintain their power. The multinationals, using the principle of divide and rule, augment their domination over developing countries by a process in which political structures have often been included. There is a feeling that politicians should be educated too. This education should be concentrated on political strategies, open to developing countries. Scientists and university people are not always welcome as advisers to politicians, because they usually put forward views which are not in accordance with the choices open at the pragmatic political level. In that context, the role of the United Nations University, as an objective international institution, was stressed and a hope was expressed that the activity of the University will be more intensive in that direction.

It seems that there are three possible relations in the promotion of science and technology between highly developed countries and multinationals, on one side, and the developing countries, on the other side. They are:

(a) developing countries becoming client states under the political hegemony of an industrial state, which facilitates the operations of transnational corporations;

(b) such countries becoming dependent on the transnational corporations, under the influence of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund; and

(c) such countries developing regional co-operation as emphasized in the document on non-aligned countries, and discussed at the seminar as collective self-reliance.

The third relation is the more acceptable one, but has not produced the expected results. Countries which have opted for the first relation register economic growth without effecting much-needed social-cultural transformation.

In the dichotomy of the hegemony of economism, and the hegemony of ethical normativism, we have to look for a solution which will be related to the parameters of power. The problem is: How to undergo transformation but remain sovereign and creative?

In this aspect, the role of the state is very important. The topic of the seminar was not related to problems of the state, but its role must be emphasized in further discussions. Thinking about "science and technology," and the transformation of societies, we must insist on reality and the possibilities which reality is offering us.

The discussions in the workshop on theme 4 may be summarized as follows.

The disarray of the present world situation seems to offer - in spite of its being fraught with obvious dangers - a wider variety of options for the developing countries to establish better control over their future development. While admitting the existence of possibilities for transformations in social, economic, and political structures, it should also be noted that ensuing conflicts will be more complex and sharp and that the capabilities of the adversaries are much greater, qualitatively and quantitatively.

On one level, we see that in the long run it is the developing countries which have expanding markets, financial resources, non-renewable resources, and manpower reserves. They do not, as yet, command technology as a resource which might make up for deficiency in any of the other resources, and technology has become the main source of power - a fact that highlights the role of science and technology in world transformation.

On a more profound level, it is recognized that no one set of variables can be operationalized without addressing the specificities of each particular situation, of which there is considerable variety in the world today. The potentials amenable to mobilization in a situation where a nation has a long history of consolidated existence are quite different from those where even the concept of nationhood is new or inapplicable.

The specificities should, furthermore, be coupled with other factors in the international situation. There are emerging nowadays in the developed world allies of the developing world, particularly in the area of the production and dissemination of knowledge. The UN University can play an important role here, one that may create a conscience that triggers, later on, significant results. Public opinion in the North is gradually mobilizing against intervention through direct action in Third World affairs.

Attempts at regaining social control of techno-economic activities are thwarted in the name of economic rationality and efficiency and the adoption of consumption patterns that favour the expansion of the activities of TNCs in alliance with local capital and even state enterprises.

The importance of specificity can be seen also in the isolation of scientific technological potentials of nations and states and the fact that political constraints prevent the fusion into critical masses that would render D&T effective in transformation.

Rejecting the options of isolation or becoming a vassal or client state or dependent on TNCs, the option of regional joint action needs exploration within this framework, and complementarities, leading to greater national control and power, within the existing constraints. These aspects have been examined in considerable detail in the many documents proposed by the UNCTAD Conferences, reflecting the genuine concerns and requirements of the newly liberated, socio-economically backward countries of the developing world. The only way out is to generate simultaneously social mobilization for cohesive socio-economic transformation in each specific country, together with linking efforts for joint concerted action based on collective self-reliance - the strategy spelt out in the political and economic documents of the summit conferences of the non-aligned nations from Algeria to Colombo and Havana.

It has been stressed also that a new source of power is assuming an increasing importance: the control of information and knowledge. The international mass media are diffusing a world culture based on the ideology and system of values of the industrialized countries. Now, 65 per cent of information messages are produced in and diffused from the United States. The press, radio, TV are such powerful instruments that they are able not only to manipulate public opinion but also, as has occurred, to destabilize governments. The world information system is now an ideological apparatus which contributes to the continuance of the existing international order.

Special emphasis was given to scientific knowledge and technical information as important tools for the control of power in the world. Such a kind of control has been often used by the rich countries with the goal of maintaining their domination of the underdeveloped countries. In this sense, the role of multinational corporations is just that of control of the productive activities in the underdeveloped countries which have no autonomy to decide on their own future.

The optimistic point of view that multinational corporations play some positive role in broadening modern technology is largely negated by the effect of domination of underdeveloped countries in all aspects: economic, cultural, etc.

Science and technology related to the concept of development are emerging as a new ideology of modernization. It is a part of an ideological attempt to control the development of developing countries and is obscuring the real relations between developed and developing countries. The causal relations between development and underdevelopment are lost, and causes of underdevelopment are hidden to view. It is an attempt to eliminate the values of socialist revolution by the ideological concepts of modernization.

Introduction

It is gratifying to note that, while the project "Socio-cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World" is fundamentally one of comparative evaluative analyses, it takes this to mean that "we ought to take action, as of now, so as to be able to devote a meaningful part of our scientific activities... to this major aspect of the project.''¹ The focusing of our concern on science and technology, within this project which encompasses "all fields and sectors, in all visions, cultures and societal formations of our times," comes after more than two years of intensive and worldwide discussions in many parts of the world and within a considerable variety of organizational frameworks - including academic circles - in preparation for the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD), held in Vienna barely two months ago.

We will recollect that UNCSTD was planned within the framework of ongoing efforts to establish a new international economic order. Since the call for such an order was first sounded in 1974, we have come to realize that what is at stake is not just the "economic" order, for we are now used to talking of a new "scientific and technological" order, a new "information" order... etc.

It is felt that practically all the important issues relevant to our theme have been discussed in preparing for, and during, UNCSTD. Many profound analyses of the current situation of science and technology have been made from a great number of perspectives, points of emphasis, and ideological stands. There is probably not much to add at least for some time to come - to this truly global effort. In fact, what is needed is an exercise in analysis and assimilation of all this effort and a distillation of the essence of wisdom in it. It is natural that this work has been of an analytic and diagnostic nature. We do not ignore here the very detailed plan of action recommended by the conference. Nevertheless, we all realize that implementing this plan might well be considered a dream, or at least that the process of programming for such implementation is far from being clear and that it will be several years before any significant part of this plan becomes a reality of any appreciable impact in contributing to the transformation of the world by means of science and technology.

With such considerations in mind, I decided to give this paper a prescriptive - rather than a diagnostic - slant. I endeavour to propose a course of action, within the scientific and academic domain of the United Nations University, based on work that has been going on in the Arab region for almost two years now² and which is thought to be of relevance to the global scene. Encouragement to embark on this course stems from guidelines for our seminar which deem it essential - if the world is to become a human community - "to have a pluralism of cultures and their mutual enrichment," so that "interdependence may be a road to mutual enrichment and not an impersonalization, a halting of civilizational development."

The starting point of this research programme was the realization that the role of science and technology in bringing about significant changes in society has been considered - until quite recently - as a "technical" problem that is dealt with mainly by professional scientists and technologists. It is true that social scientists mainly economists and some sociologists - have become increasingly aware, as a result of the disappointing outcome of development effort, of the crucial role of science - and technology in particular - in this serious failure. As a rather drastic oversimplification, we might say, however, that the social scientists are not well-versed in scientific technological practices, while the scientists and technologists are still rather insensitive to the socio-political implications of their activities, and even to the full extent of their economic consequences. There is an obvious need for an interdisciplinary effort that would assimilate past experiences, diagnose the present situation, and look further into the future and the courses of action leading to achieving desirable transformations.

We will not dwell here on the results concerning analysis of past experiences³ since these conform more or less with those that have come to be recognized as typical of Third World experience over the last 30 years or so.

It would, however, be worthwhile to elaborate on certain important elements in the characterization of the present situation as specified in the study, even at the risk of being repetitive.

I. A view of the problem from within

When used to indicate underdeveloped countries with low per capita income and industrial development growth rates as compared to western industrialized countries, the expression "Third World" should not imply that this state of underdevelopment has been reached independently of events in the other "worlds." These are components of the same system and such problems cannot be discussed in isolation from the nature of current problems and developments in other parts of the world.

Despite increased world-wide awareness that the majority of the population of the Third World has reached a state of underdevelopment that renders it impossible to provide for their basic needs to any acceptable extent, no recognized solution or course of action has yet emerged. The bankruptcy of the policy of "importing" development goals, theories, and strategies has been proved, both theoretically and from bitter experience in the last three decades. Although it is now recognized that the problem encompasses the whole complex of the socio-economic - rather than the purely economic - system, our knowledge of the operation and mechanisms of such complex systems is still inadequate.

There is a need for persistent intellectual effort originating from within and leading to a specification of objectives and strategies, as well as for the choice of alternatives. Such an effort should be based on recognizing the specificity of conditions in the Third World as a whole, and within each country, and on emphasizing cooperation between Third World countries, all of this performed within an international framework of the problem.⁴

In the final analysis, dialogues between "North" and "South," though important and necessary, cannot in themselves lead to solving the world's problems. The crucial factor here is the ability to achieve socio-political systems that would enhance the efficiency of resource utilization. Only effective forms of such systems could provide the driving force needed to start and sustain the changes required to overcome underdevelopment on the national, regional, and international levels. Intellectual effort plays a leading role in reaching such forms of socio-political organization and is the only guarantee of the rationality of national and regional decisions.

If our world - under the impact of the revolution in communication has become very small indeed, this should not mean the obliteration of civilizations incapable of asserting themselves under the present circumstances. On the contrary, this should lead to their liberation and to the creation of a suitable climate in which they could provide humanity with the full richness of their heritage of thought, art, and values. The solution we are seeking for world problems is a solution for the whole of humanity. Thus it can only originate in the experience and heritage of all civilizations and countries. This is no call for chauvinism, nor does it mean that theories "originating from reality" are a rejection of all that is positive in another civilization, or system. Rather, it is realizing that neglecting other civilizations - past or contemporary - or failing to analyse them deeply so as to reveal the positive elements in them, will only lead to more global problems and more underdevelopment and subordination. One of the most important positive elements in western civilization is the development of science and technology and the very close links that have been forged between them, while one of its most serious negative impacts has been the obliteration of other civilizations. I single out two points in this respect.

Cultural Identity and Life Styles

The "Interfutures" report of OECD recalls that Arnold Toynbee repeatedly draws attention to the unjust consequences of the current international division of labour brought about by colonialism and to the fact that the basic negative effect of the spread of western civilization over the last two centuries has been distortion and change in the nature of other societies. This was not the result of military-economic might based on science and technology, so much as the influence of values. Garaudy wonders about the way in which we may build a history that is not monopolized by one civilization and considers this as the only salvation for humanity. The fact is that submission to the pattern of western civilization leads directly to serious consequences, such as an alien elaboration of social goals. The role of S e T will become mainly the responsibility of those who decide for us our patterns of thinking and consumption and - to a very large extent, through inevitable subordination - our socio-economic structures.

On the other hand, the independent view of the future and the search for the positive elements in our cultural heritage raise methodological and philosophical issues concerning our ability to view matters independently. Dr. Awn el-Sherif, a Sudanese politician and thinker, puts the matter succinctly by pointing out that those who brought us the tools of the new civilization did not give us the chance to suffer the bitterness of change nor to effect within our beings and minds the necessary changes conforming with the new phase we moved into, so that what is within us would harmonize with what is happening without. Formal progress on the level of material needs for society was the means for entrenching the destructive dichotomy in the life of the individual and of society, since it concerns itself with the outer appearance of the progress of society and not with its content.⁶

Through naive acceptance of the superiority of the western cultural model, we have tacitly adopted three basic assumptions:

- that this development pattern is desirable in itself and is suitable for our society, now and in the future.

- that its realization is possible to achieve nowadays as it has been possible to achieve in the past.

- that our own experience, so far, in following this path is encouraging.

The simple fact is that none of these assumptions is true, theoretically or empirically:

- Dissatisfaction with this model is now widespread within the industrialized societies themselves. The signs of its disruption and breakdown, materially and spiritually, are now recognized by those who have adopted it.

- This pattern was based on a level of reckless squandering of resources and disruption of the environment, which is neither possible, nor nowadays acceptable.

- Our experience, so far, is that adoption of this pattern has widened the gap between rich and poor, heightened social tensions, and led to more dependence on and subordination to the developed world, with grave political consequences that threaten world peace.

The nature of scientific-technological activity and the role assigned to science and technology are predetermined by the development pattern and life style we choose. Adopting the western model means that national effort will be restricted to importing foreign technology with its ready-made solutions developed by a far superior technological potential for the satisfaction of the social demand of goods and services that form the material basis of this life style. National S & T effort will be geared to the needs of the elite, and it stands no chance of competing with the developed world in this race. At best, our scientists and technologists will be called upon to participate in some adaptive effort or, in the extreme, to imitate the production techniques that provide these goods. There is only one viable option open to them, viz., to become integrated within the framework of a transnational corporation, at the latter's terms.

Should we, however, decide to search for alternative life styles, S & T's function will fundamentally change and its role will be to provide the technology needed to bring about the alternative styles we may choose, since none of these is available today in the developed world nor are such styles likely to interest the developed world commercially.

Rather than allow contemporary S e T as practiced outside our societies to dictate our socio-political systems and alienate us from our cultural roots, rather than let "progress" be an outside force beyond our control, we seek an order within which alienation disappears, or, at least, decreases, and within which man becomes the master of 5 & T in our societies, directing them rationally toward harmony and equilibrium with environment and resources, satisfaction of essential needs, justice, and liberation of man's faculties on the basis of the positive elements in our cultural heritage and not the dictates of profit maximization that currently prevail in international relations. This is the essence of self-reliance, reliance on liberated creativity and sound traditions. We could then speak of technology exchange as practiced nowadays between the developed countries, rather than unidirectional transfer from the centre to the periphery.

Technological self-reliance has been characterized as the autonomous capacity to:

- formulate policies and draft and implement national plans (ordering national priorities - mobilizing resources - achieving consensus and conviction).

- make appropriate technological choices (exercise well-informed social control over technology).

- change and adapt imported technology (on the basis of systematic analysis of national as well as foreign experiences).

- exploit imported technology effectively (as judged by socio-economic criteria).

- innovate and deal effectively - whether as buyer or seller - in the world technology market to the economic advantage of the country itself.

- maintain a national cultural identity while dealing with the outside world.

Freedom and Democracy

If we agree that an Independent point of view and creative ability are necessary departure points for original patterns of development, then the issue of freedom of thought and of research and development has to be faced squarely and analysed in depth.

We are not seeking the return to a glory that has vanished. Such romantic ideas, usually tinged with sanctification of the past, make our societies museums of culture and lead to extremist and reactionary concepts that ignore the weaknesses and defects that led to the passing away of these golden ages. Creative thinking that is serious, profound, and of a high standard can only thrive in an atmosphere of freedom that encourages exploring the unknown and generating the new which may be a challenge to prevailing values and traditions.

We cannot help admitting here that the prevailing intellectual climate is not conducive to the liberation and free interaction of creative thinking.⁹ Development that is not a copy of another model, nor a slave to it, is bound to be the conscious effort of an educated and well-informed society, enjoying freedom of thought and expression, unfettered by pseudo-religious obscurantism and intellectual bigotry.

It is interesting to note here that such obscurantism and bigotry are usually veiled by the promotion throughout society of a view of science as a deterministic discovery of ultimate and immutable truths and not as an endeavour to understand better the world we live in. This "magical" view of science, in a stagnant autocratic society, leads to intellectual oppression and manipulation of public opinion. The label "scientific" is used as the means for validating the views and values of the power groups in society. It becomes the justification for suppressing the opinions and views of the "layman" and the "extremist," which are, by definition, "unscientific." Consequently, they are barred from discussion and involvement in the decision-making process. Let it be stated clearly here that what is at stake now is freedom for the whole of society to participate in the decision-making process and not simply a legal or formal definition of the rights of man, commendable and desirable as these may be.

Coupled with this, we meet an adulation and blind faith in technology's achievements, which are presented as great victories of the human mind and man's endeavour to master nature. This masks the hidden forces that have motivated such developments and the physical and social problems and disruption they bring about, and presents technology as a disinterested and disembodied activity worthy of admiration. It renders acquisition of the products of modern technology synonymous with progress. Even in the field of armaments, technology is depicted in euphemistic language and breath-taking glamour that hide the ugly face of death and destruction it brings with it.

Thus, integration of social and physical sciences with technology becomes an urgent need. Technological activity has to be viewed as, essentially, social action involving the whole of society. The issue of scientific freedom now becomes particularly crucial for the social sciences, since they often clash with vested interests in society.

II. The view from without

I now conclude this quick and selective characterization of the view from within by underscoring certain elements of the science and technology scene in the developed world, since we consider "First," "Second," and "Third" Worlds as components of the same system (p. 4) and since problems in one cannot be discussed in isolation from those in other parts of the world. I will now list briefly those elements thought to be of particular relevance to my next discussion.

First are the conflicting views of S e T as a promise and a threat. I cite here two considerations that have a direct impact on the scientists on the periphery, on their attitude to their own societies, and on the general public itself. First, there is the desperate stand - in the face of the devastating onslaught of social scientists - by some natural scientists who still maintain that theirs is a neutral and dispassionate pursuit of knowledge for its own sake and who disclaim any social responsibility for the consequences of their actions. Next comes the crippling distortion of S e T activities particularly in developing countries - under the pressure of so-called "defence" requirements. The proper order of national priorities is no longer reflected in such activities, and a very unhealthy and self defeating stratification is imposed on the S e T system. An elite now enjoys better working and living conditions, and, imprisoned within false security considerations, is now separated from the bulk of its own community. The latter is deprived of the tools of the trade, the satisfaction of active involvement in an effective manner in national development, and, finally, a reasonably good life. This is but a reflection of the astronomical rise in expenditures in the centre on R e D for military and "security" purposes. This, together with the seemingly endless build-up of more arms of continuously increasing complexity and sophistication, has siphoned hundreds of billions of dollars away from "transforming the world" through the application of available scientific knowledge and technological know-how and from financing further effort where it is most needed.

Next comes the emergence of "big science" and the large-scale, multidisciplinary R e D establishment that is very expensive to establish and to run, but also cost-effective within the organizational framework of industrialized societies. This has resulted in extreme polarization of S e T activity and its concentration in the centre, bringing with it a whole string of critical problems for the periphery.

There also is the rise of the transnational corporation as the most efficient form of integrated techno-economic activity and the main investor and promoter of technological innovation. The serious asymmetries in dealings with TNCs have been analysed extensively. However, the latent contradictions between their interests and those of their mother countries are beginning to emerge and are receiving more attention now.

Next is the emergence of global problems that call for world-wide analysis and treatment. Deterioration of the environment, the threat of drastic changes in climatic conditions, scarcity of resources (ranging from water to energy sources), and space exploration are all problems that transcend national and regional organizational frameworks of S e T and will, in all probability, bring about new forms of international co-operative effort. It is important that such forms do not exclude or discriminate against the periphery.

Two more points are to be made. The first concerns a growing feeling that practically all Third World initiatives to transform the prevailing world order have been thwarted and frustrated. One could almost go as far as saying that they have boomeranged and in the near future are most likely to become the means for entrenching dependence and subordination.

This calls for some elaboration. The Group of 77, as the representative of the Third World in the United Nations system, has come to rally around a number of causes in which they see the way out of the present situation of technological dependence and asymmetric relations with the industrialized world. Prominent among these are the efforts to modify the Paris Convention of 1883 governing the patent system, and the call for an international code of conduct for technology transfer pioneered by Pugwash and now actively negotiated in UNCTAD. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that building a base of heavy industry for example, metallurgical and petrochemical - and the development of engineering industries (the so-called industrializing industries) and national constancy services are recommended courses of action for building up indigenous technological capabilities that would eventually break through the tight grip of technological dependence of the centre.

There is growing concern nowadays¹⁰ that revision of the patent system would lead to more subtle ways of protection and avoid unnecessary conflicts. An internationally recognized code of conduct for the transfer of technology would considerably help the TNCs in long-term planning of their world-wide activities without some of the high risk levels involved in their operations nowadays in certain parts of the world. Contrary to original expectations, this would weaken the bargaining position of developing countries. Even the building of indigenous technological capabilities along the lines mentioned above might well lead to further qualitative intensification of technological dependence and subordination by increasingly monopolizing the decisive elements of R e D, engineering, finance, maintenance, and so on, leaving developing countries with control over the relatively low levels of the productive system.

The second and last point in this section stems from a strong temptation, if not a conviction, of the necessity of drawing attention to the rather bleak political prospects the eighties seem to bring with them. The dialogue between "North" and "South's is grinding to a halt and is now replaced by confrontation and open threats to use force to settle global problems. While the West seems incapable, or unwilling due to internal conflicts of interest, to grapple effectively with inflation and energy problems, the socialist camp is divided and at war. Dnte has been degraded, and the price for SALT II seems to be more armaments. Local wars have become daily occurrences in the Third World. Any serious attempt at transforming the world and any prescription for action must analyse these symptoms, take full account of them, and look beyond them to future long-term global prospects.

III. Toward a clearer definition of the role of science and technology in transformation

The last decade witnessed an increasing interest in prospective studies under the influence of the threats of global problems such as food and energy shortages, discrepancies in growth and income in different parts of the world, and environmental deterioration. Experience with these studies has emphasized the suitability of the regional approach. Within the Arab region, studies were carried out both on a sectoral basis (population, food, industry, energy, and so on) and for the prospects of economic development. In almost all of these studies a view of the role of S e T in development is tacitly assumed.

Appendix 1 outlines a multidisciplinary and systematic approach for understanding and influencing the processes of transformation and, hence, for a clearer definition of the role science and technology should play in bringing about a basic transformation that would permit realization of the objectives referred to in the previous sections.¹¹

This rests on five basic considerations:

1. The search for complementarities and bridges that are acceptable to the parties concerned.

2. An alertness to the pitfalls of attempting to bridge unbridgeable gaps, that is, an insistence on internal consistency of the options presented - a requirement that is sadly absent now in a good deal of loose thinking and some romantic proposals for directing transformation.

3. An awareness of the realities of the world in which we live and of the political situation.

4. An insistence on maintaining our cultural identity and heritage, which is thought to have positive value in bringing about a desirable transformation.

5. A specific concern with the role of S e T in transformation perhaps with more emphasis on the latter. Another consideration is that in the majority of cases there is an obvious shortage of data and information on many decisive issues. Particularly absent are an accurate assessment of the scientific technological potential (now and in the future), a clear definition of the existing and possible future relations between science, technology, and production, as the three basic elements of the technology sub-system, and the other elements of the overall socioeconomic system, as well as its interactions with the rest of the world (the flow of ideas, values, scientific knowledge, technological know-how, end the influx of foreign capital, goods, and services).¹²

Apart from this serious lack of specific and reliable information on basic issues and our still inadequate knowledge of the operation and mechanisms of the complex socio-economic political systems (p. 270), there also is the lack of a clear definition of social objectives and development patterns. Under such circumstances, a scientific effort to help map the future must consider more than one alternative (or scenario) and ensure that these are at least internally consistent and possible¹³ - two conditions that are often lacking in emotional and loose thinking about the future. Specifying a limited number of consistent and probable scenarios, rasher than cumbersome models that call for a multitude of non-existent data, will thus reduce the amount of information called for and leave the choice of a clear stand on the multitude of issues and questions involved, which form a societal policy decision, to a later stage when internal contradictions have been removed.

It is needless to emphasize here that all this hinges on a theory of the sequence of development stages, and the international division of labour, so as to ensure the consistency of social and economic factors as well as of the conditions inherent in the scenarios. Such theories exist and differ appreciably. They generally fall between two opposing views. Stated in very general terms, the first sees the problem as one of backwardness, primitiveness of economic structures, and low return of labour. This leads straight to adoption of technological solutions concerned with the importation of modern technology compatible with cultural development in the West and hence to adoption of the West's consumption patterns. It then concentrates on favourable contractual conditions or optimum adaptation procedures. The other sees the historical development of colonialism, subordination, monopolistic practices, and economic penetration as the cause of the alienation of human labour from the technological environment. The economic structures that were originally dedicated to satisfying the needs of the citizenry have been distorted to comply with production and consumption needs from without and to operate to the advantage of the stronger colonialist power. This prompts the search for technological solutions that would end this alienation through a new economic structure capable of satisfying, first, the basic needs of the whole population.

Once more, we see that the role of S e T in transformation depends on objectives for the future, the definition of which has to be guided by a theory and a concept of development. Three basic scenarios, each representing an integrated and consistent alternative, were chosen as indicators of the overall picture of the socio-economic system and from which, or from combinations of which, a clear definition of the role and content of technological activity can be deduced as society moves from one to the other.

1. The "consumer" society. This adopts a cultural and consumption pattern derived from the "western" model, and in it technology is imported according to the criteria of commercial profitability of certain groups in society. A primitive economic structure would still prevail, as well as the phenomena of the "extended" family and the weak local market. Some improvement in living standards could be achieved by exporting raw materials and primary goods based on production processes involving a rather low level of division of labour.

2. The "productive" society. In this the cultural and consumption pattern is the same as before, but technology imports are based on appropriate choices, efficient operation, and successful adaptation. The economic structure is now more varied and improvements in living standards come from a higher level of division of labour. Dualism of the economy, rapid expansion of the local market, and closer links with "superior" industrialized societies are now common.

3. The "pioneering" society. This is characterized by an independent cultural and consumption pattern. In it, technology is the natural environment for human effort or the production technique necessary for a "productive" society and an economic structure that meets the demands of the people.

I illustrate these ideas through an example of a hypothetical development for the Arab region through these and an intermediate scenario of collective self-reliance. This is graphically represented in Figure 1, and is based on the original premises (p. 281) of complementarily, consistency, political realities, and maintenance of cultural identity. In each one of the phases depicted it should be possible to deduce specific tasks for S e T.

In conclusion, I should address myself to a seemingly glaring contradiction in this presentation. I have characterized the current view of science in society as bigoted and oppressive (p. 275). Obviously none of these seemingly attractive scenarios for transformation would come about in such a social climate. However, hope for the future lies in a rebirth of the original attitude of the culture of the region toward science. After all, the scientific method as we know it today is a product of our cultural heritage, closely intertwined with a religion that clearly recognized the universe around us as a source of knowledge and which exhorted people to seek knowledge even in China.

One might well think that the road to desirable transformation is an assimilation of our cultural heritage on a new - or is it an old level.

Appendix I.

A systematic approach to the definition of the role of s e t in transformation

I have chosen to embark on an exercise in prospective analysis which starts by analysing the subsystems in a manner that does not ignore the overall view in attempting to understand the changes in these subsystems and their relations, and which differentiates between the dynamics that are influenced by outside forces or those beyond direct control, and those that are known with certainty. It also will be necessary to identify - even though tentatively - basic projects, leading sectors, and "germs of the future." The next step would be to pull these subsystems together in one consistent overall view.

The proposed sequence of steps (Figure 2)¹⁴ includes:

- elaboration, through brain-storming and questionnaires, of all the visions and objectives that society could be striving to achieve.
These are used for guidance on the long-term of transformation.

- survey of available studies in the different fields and evaluation and definition of the basic issues and problems whose treatment will formulate the overall picture of the future. Also included is an investigation of theoretical and statistical relations between these issues and variables, first by specialized analysis of each one separately, and next in a multidisciplinary group effort to define such relations.

- through these studies, a check is made on the consequences of the objectives and visions elaborated in the first step, that is, an assessment of the extent to which the observed policies serve to achieve the objectives.

- linking up of the elements of accumulated knowledge in a reference scenario - once as extrapolation of present policies and courses of action, and a second time through simulation models, for defining those conducive to fulfillment of objectives.

FIG. 2. Procedure for Prospective Analysis

- charting the time paths implied by each of these so far static scenarios and defining the points in time when basic decisions have to be made to implement new policies in technology choices and structural changes. This would be deduced from the simulation models and completed by scenario-writing.

- next would come presentation, before a wider multidisciplinary group, revealing weaknesses and contradictions necessitating return to any of the previous steps, in a process of successive approximation.

- completion of qualitative and quantitative forecasts leads to definition of the prerequisites of technology that permits the structural changes envisaged and that would be sustainable economically, keeping in mind available and forthcoming technology, its problems and development tendencies world-wide, and the specificity of local natural and human resources, and size of productive units.

The outcome of the activities outlined above would be the desirable "model" for transformation which would have specified:

- the material structures to be achieved.

- other non-material aspects of a coherent and integrated system, admittedly in an approximate manner.

- some overall indicators of the technological content of this system.

Elaboration from this leads to the scientific-technological requirements and their time-phasing so that the required structures are achieved, bearing in mind the length of gestation periods and unavoidable delays.

Figure 3 represents a procedure for this elaboration which takes into consideration a number of elements that are decisive in defining the role of science and technology. Some of these are:

1. Linking-up with development objectives and the search for relative advantages and appropriate technology.

2. Rational rates of expenditure on R e D that take account of world tendencies, gaps in basic scientific knowledge, and reduction of the brain drain.

FIG. 3. From Objectives to R e D Plan

3. Mobilization of resources for fulfilling the above two elements and the creation of a regional basis that would provide greater chances for attaining development objectives in the primary stages and permit admission to the world of "big science" later on.¹⁵

4. Reasonable awareness of future tendencies in science and technology. This is necessary background for long-term planning, for defining gaps to be compensated by transfer, and for development of educational training systems.

I conclude by attempting to clarify some ideas in Figure 3.

In moving from objectives to technological content (marked (1) on Figure 3), I use models (national, sectoral, or regional) to ensure the maximum possible consistency between the different variables. To define the role of S e T. such models¹⁶ should allow considerable personal judgement and non-quantifiable variables, since these are closely related to the long-term and overall view of the future of S e T. Appendix II discusses this matter at some length.

Should I choose, however, not to use models and to resort to exploratory techniques, it will be necessary to use questionnaires for brain-storming and scenarios for definition of the main variables and the important relations without resorting to statistical techniques or mathematical formulations. Appendix III sketches these activities which refer to the step marked (2) on Figure 3. If we rely entirely on such methods, then action would start from "Objectives and Policies" directly and not through "The Model.''

In either case, the end product is a definition of actions, in the scientific-technological domain, called for to bring about desirable transformations. These actions are derived primarily from society's objectives and policies. The end product is based on a proper evaluation of the present state of society which considers the international scene and its implications and possible useful inputs, is dynamic and time-conscious, and is unfettered by the inappropriate rigour of quantifying the unquantifiable. It accounts for this crucial element through human judgement and foresight. It also is coherent and internally consistent, as well as related to other decisive factors outside the domain of S e T.

Appendix II.

Relation between mathematical and non-quantifiable experiences (for achieving consistency between model s e t requirements)

Relation between mathematical and non-quantifiable experiences (for achieving consistency between model S e T requirements)

A Selection of a group of consistent assumptions for one round of calculation (input).

B Choice of model output.

C Channels for consideration of elements (objectives or constraints) ignored in mathematical model-building, either by means of choice of suitable scenarios (C¹) or modification of model after discussion of results (C²).

D Flexibility of imposing constraints on model during solution.

E Determination of degree of aggregation of model.

F In choosing a set of consistent assumptions in a scenario, note also their consistency with a selected set of constraints, particularly limitation of resources.

Thus an outline of the proposed methodology would be:

a) For non-quantifiable objectives and constraints in the model, results - as well as other consequences not formulated within it will be discussed so as to modify scenarios (C¹) or model structure (C²).

b) For quantifiable objectives and constraints not formulated in model - for various reasons - an overall indicator outside the model will serve to indicate tendencies due to time changes in model (e.g., one for income distribution within a country, or between countries, another for collective security).

c) Methodology permits interaction between man and computer, allowing for personal judgement and a normative element in directing path of results with time.

d) Remaining variables neglected - due to length of forecasting period or other reasons - will still have a place in policy implications.

e) All these are primary features of simulation models.

As applied to S e T sector, we note

1) Rates of technological development - not embodied in value of capital - in production functions are clearly expressed in the model.

2) Cost of utilization of resources - particularly natural resources - in the long term is clearly expressed in objective functions and investment input in industry, agriculture, and education.

3) Social cost of environmental pollution - due to utilization of a natural resource or a prevailing technology - and for which an approximate estimate of negative effects can be made, will be included in a general indicator outside the model.

4) There will remain many other factors related to S e T - mainly sociological - which are difficult to quantify. These are left to personal judgement in discussing model results and lead to modification in scenarios or model formulation.

Appendix III.

Analysis of the relative importance of factors relating to s e t (from questionnaire to scenario-writing)

The questionnaire is seen as a preparatory phase, the results of which would help in:

- brain-storming defining elements of experience of experience and human judgement for unquantifiable elements so as to ensure the normative aspect.

- defining technological options, their economics, and timings for application and points for modifications in the economic structure on the basis of technological options.

- linking with educational system development in the long run.

The questionnaire includes questions on:

- prerequisites and a method (a proposal is presented).

- a method of assessing S e T potential on the basis of available information, as well as its performance, economic and social impact, and future requirements.

- fields of joint Arab R e D action.

- assessment of future technology and its social and environmental impact.

- optimum conditions for "freedom" of scientific research and serving national needs.

- achieving exponential growth of S e T and necessary percentage expenditure of GNP, as well as a means of achieving such expenditure.

The scenario aims at ranking the following factors, distinguishing between those that are directly linked and those that have indirect linkages and Impact on the future of technology (tendencies, relative importance, time lags between change and effect, and so forth):

- Indicators of well-being and satisfaction of basic needs.

- Resources: human (population, education, health, employment), material (energy from various sources, soil, water, minerals, capital).

- Infrastructures and environment: material infrastructures, social considerations, distribution of resources, environmental damage, habitat, and so on.

- Production: agricultural, industrial and service sectors, distribution of product.

Notes

1. UN University SCA project paper on "The Transformation of the World," February 1979.

2. ALECSO's "Prospective Study on the Role of Science and Technology in the Arab Region," for which the author is co-ordinator and the research team is headed by Dr. Aly Nassar of the Institute of National Planning in Cairo.

3. A wealth of such studies in various sectors has accumulated in the region, as a result of work of academic institutions and regional organizations.

4. I. S. Abdallah sees this as specifically the reason for establishing the "Third World Forum." See Contemporary Egypt, vol. 66, no. 359, Cairo, 1975.

5. "Towards a New Being," Al-Arabi, 24, November 1978 (in Arabic).

6. Compare with The Bariloche World Model Report, which refers to capitalist experiences that reduce social goals to economic growth measured by the total production of material goods and subordinate all other aspects of social life to it, thus ignoring the specificity of cultures and all qualitative features of life that cannot be expressed in economic terms. At the individual level, personality is manipulated through education, information, and the mass media. The new and more subtle instrument of domination has become scientific-technological superiority.

7. El-Kholy, "Science Policy and Long-term Planning," a paper presented to a seminar organized by the Federation of Arab Research Councils, Baghdad, May 1977.

8. El-Kholy, "The Structure and Functioning of Technology Systems in Developing Countries," UNIDO document ID/WG. 301/2, a paper prepared for the Expert Group Meeting on Technology Development and Self Reliance in Developing Countries, Vienna, June 1979, pp. 19-20.

9. El-Kholy, "Science, Technology and the Future! An Arab Perspective," paper presented to the World Conference on "Faith, Science and the Future," organized by the World Council of Churches, MIT, July 1979.

10. D. Ernest, "International Transfer of Technology, Technological Dependence, and Development Strategies," Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 2, Oslo, 1979.

11. ALECSO's "Reference Document on the Requirements for a Prospective Study of Science and Technology in the Arab Region by the Year 2000" (in Arabic).

12. El-Kholy, "The Structure and Functioning of Technology Systems in Developing Countries," figures 1 and 3.

13. I use the adjective "possible" here to mean imaginative thinking coupled with a will to break out of present constraints, rather than mere extrapolation of the present.

14. Reference should be made here to the work of the Swedish Secretariat for Future Studies.

15. El-Kassas and El-Kholy, "Science and Development in the Arab Region" (in Arabic), ALECSO, 1976, pp. 101-110.

16. Reference should be made here to the work of the "Cairo Group," headed by I. H. Abdel-Rahman in the Institute of National Planning, on an Arab development model. This can be considered as representative of movement from the present situation to "The model," marked (3) on Figure 3.

I. What kind of transformation?

Very few people today, among social scientists, will oppose the notion that time and space are both social realities, the meaning of which only can be apprehended in the context of specific social formations. From a long perspective, the process of change that the world is undergoing today can be regarded as another episode, an important one, in the long process of transition from a capitalist to a socialist mode of production. Many will probably raise their eyebrows at reading such a statement, perhaps bewildered by what seems to be a commonplace. However, it is a fact that most analysts of the present world crisis, whether Marxists or not, tend to concentrate on what is happening in the capitalist world, thus leaving aside the unity, although a contradictory one, of world history today. We have argued elsewhere that the basic dynamics of the present transformation of the world are determined by the dialectic between capitalist and socialist camps which, without ignoring the internal contradictions within each, is mainly determined by the specific objectives of the great powers of the capitalist and socialist blocs:

In short, the consideration of the objectives of great powers, both capitalist and socialist, leads to the conclusion that the bourgeoisie, as the hegemonic class of the capitalist system, has a primarily economic interest when it tries to prevent the expansion of the socialist camp, and from that the need to combat it politically, militarily, and ideologically derives. In contrast, as socialist powers try to expand their influence to other countries, their primary objective is a political one.¹

Such a process, of course, is not a unilinear one, nor even can it be said that the outcome is inevitable or predetermined. Options are open to the point that it is not possible to say what final form the socialist mode of production will adopt. The so-called socialist societies of today, from a long perspective, can only be regarded as incipient historical experiments from which a more definitive form will gradually emerge. It is as if we were writing in 1450 and trying to guess what would be the specific form of what was only much later called capitalism. We cannot pursue further this argument in the present paper for it will take us far away from its specific objective, which is to highlight the main points of relationships between science, technology, and politics in the present world crisis. However, the preceding remarks were necessary both in putting the problem in a wider context and in laying the groundwork for comments which will be made later in this paper.

II. The nature of the crisis

We share the view of many social scientists who regard the present world crisis as a structural one.² Basically, the world division of labour, which began early in the present century but accelerated after the crisis of the 1930s, reached its limit - namely, the impossibility of increasing profitability for private enterprises - by the end of the 1960s. History shows that the ways out of such crises have been: (1) technological breakthroughs, which provide both new levels of profitability and new opportunities for capital accumulation, and (2) furthering the proletarianization of the world by means of organizational innovations which facilitate the exploitation of low cost labour.

It is true that after the beginning of the 1950s a new thrust in the international economy was provided by the process of transnationalization of the world economy. This later resulted in (1) expansion of the social division of labour to a transnational scale and (2) further concentration of the means of production in a few gigantic enterprises.

However, the impact of this process was not enough to counteract the structural factors which provoked the world economic crises. It may be that the process of transnationalization is just beginning, if one is to judge by the fact that only seven or eight underdeveloped countries are fully incorporated into it; that is, most of the worlds underdeveloped countries are in yet earlier phases of world capitalist development.

It is necessary to point out some of the main features associated with the process of transnationalization: first of all come technological innovations in the organization of the labour process, particularly the breaking down of complex tasks into simple ones so that new masses of non-qualified cheap labour can be hired. Second, a new partnership is being formed between the state, local bourgeoisie, and transnational corporations in order to further the process of industrial redeployment.

Third, due to the energy crisis, huge -funds are increasingly being invested with the aim of producing technological breakthroughs in that field. A critical evaluation of the probabilities of achieving success within the next decade reveals that they are very low. Nevertheless, new sources of capital accumulation are being created.

The main consequences for the underdeveloped countries of the process of transnationalization are:

1. An increased role for the state in the economy, which is not only performing the traditional functions of the state but also assuming the function of producing material goods in leading sectors of the economy.

2. The reconcentration of income in the privileged strata of the population. This phenomenon is determined by (1) the need to expand the demand for the products of the leading transnationalized sectors of the economy, which usually produce goods which can only be purchased by the capitalistic sectors of the economy, and (2) the need to keep down the real salary of the workers in order to make things more profitable for the transnationals, which otherwise could invest somewhere else.

3. Relative deterioration of the capacity to produce both industrial and agricultural products oriented to the satisfaction of the needs of the impoverished masses of the population.

The last two consequences inevitably lead to the discontent of the masses, which sooner or later may explode in violent reactions, strikes, or even revolutionary movements. Presently, the fact that there is a world crisis obviously determines a deepening of class struggle in the developed countries. This, in turn, functions as a demonstration effect for the underdeveloped countries' labour class.

The Latin American experience reveals two basic sets of policies to control such social movements: (a) establishing or reinforcing a social and political pact among labour organizations, government, parties, the military, and the bourgeoisie. This is the case in Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia, where more or less democratic governments exist and where social democratic or Christian democratic parties have great influence both in government and in labour organization; (b) establishing authoritarian regimes such as those in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil.

III. World political trends

However, neither of those two situations is intrinsically stable; particularly when seen within the context of the basic political dynamics of the worlds:

1. As is well known, since the mid-1950s and the nuclear stalemate or "mutual superiority" between the United States and the USSR, the locus of confrontation between the great powers has shifted from the equilibrium zones to the periphery.

2. From then on, any liberation or revolutionary war emerging in underdeveloped countries of the world was likely to be transformed into an indirect confrontation between the above-mentioned great powers, provided that massive logistic supplies could be provided by both of them. Since the US was able to do so around the world after 1945, the matter was reduced to the increasing capacity of other great powers to give logistic support to popular movements. Apparently, the Soviet Union today is capable of giving logistic support to revolutionary movements in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. These are the "hot zones" of the world today.

3. Simultaneously, multi-polarization of the world, both economic and political, increased, thus making it possible to establish new alliances and pacts in order to take better advantage of the new social division of labour on a world scale.

It is within this context that some recent events can be explained. For instance, the increasing inability of the United States to enforce the applicability of post-war pacts such as CENTO, SEATO, etc., and the emergence of organizations like OPEC, which gives the oil-producing countries the possibility of increasing their share of the world oil surplus - a phenomenon made possible by the strategic nature of oil, the will of OPEC states to back the organization, and, last but not least, the increase in the profits of transnational oil corporations. Moreover, the rift between China and the Soviet Union made possible the formation of cross-ideological alliances such as those that came into being in the Indo-Pakistani war and the Angolan revolution; also, the case of the intervention of Viet Nam in Cambodia revealed that conflicts between underdeveloped socialist countries can also happen. Along these lines it is not surprising that closer links are growing between the US and China. One can not even rule out new and formerly perhaps even more unthinkable ententes. So far, the most significant of these phenomena is the expanding capability of the USSR to give massive logistic support. In the last 30 years the Soviet Union has gone from supporting Korea to backing Angola and Eritrea with the help of the Cubans. Whether it will continue to expand towards Latin America is yet to be seen; so far the compromise reached during the missile crisis in Cuba seems to be still operative; however, one can hypothesize that it may not be so by the end of the century.

These trends lead to the conclusion that underdeveloped countries will continue to suffer political instability and that the probability of revolutionary successes in the hot zones is increasing.

IV. The role of science and technology

It is obvious that, in the face of such trends, dominant capitalist countries need to foster new means of legitimizing the present situation, in order to reinforce the more orthodox method of economic, military, and political domination. We like to advance the hypothesis that one such means is to create a new myth which could both revive and make more credible the idea that underdeveloped countries can in effect develop within the capitalist system. It seems that within this new developmentalist ideology science and technology are to play a key role.

As was suggested by one participant in the International Colloquium of ACAST in Vienna:

... such a myth could be useful to fulfill three functions:

(a) The process of qualitative intensification of technological dependence, which predominates in most developing countries, could be conveniently disguised.

(b) The neutralization and progressive obstruction of the few attempts of underdeveloped countries to control technology imports and direct investments, such as, for instance, the Andean Pact regulations, could be hidden.

c) The strategies of "global planned obsolescence" and "technological domination," developed by a few multinational corporations in some of the main OECD countries, could be efficiently legitimized.⁴

Furthermore, it is now possible that concepts such as "appropriate technology," "increasing capacity to negotiate," "technology transfer," and so on, which appear profusely in the jargon of development ideologists, are but good ways of obscuring the basic facts, namely:

1. The true obstacle to satisfying the basic needs of the masses lies in the present system of domination.

2. The local bourgeoisie's, allied with transnational corporations, are using technology to increase their control and domination of the population rather than bettering their standard of living.

3. The industrialized countries are, in fact, less inclined to share on an equal basis the fruits of scientific and technological development.

4. Experience shows that industrialized countries treat science and technology as commodities to be exchanged in the markets of underdeveloped countries on an unequal basis.

An analysis of the many conferences supposedly devoted to creating the preconditions for the effective application of science and technology to foster development of Third World countries would probably confirm all four conclusions.

V. A proposition

The great question is, then, what shall the underdeveloped countries do to change these trends?

We wish to end this paper on a rather optimistic although utopian note. We are convinced that, in so far as the problems of science and technology continue to be negotiated only at inter-state forums, such as TCDC, UNCTAD, UNCSTED, the North-South dialogue, UNIDO, etc., we can only expect infinitesimal progress or no progress at all.

Many reasons can be argued in favour of such a conclusion, but one that seems to us to be critical is that perhaps the most important protagonist is being left out of the negotiations. We are speaking of the transnational corporations.

It seems to us that the time is ripe either to create a specific organization or for an existing organization such as the Group of 77 or the Non-Aligned Movement to make its priority objective to deal, in a global way, directly with the transnational corporations. Then and only then can a more substantive context be given to common efforts to increase the capacity to negotiate, to create an information bank, to foster managerial capabilities, to create multinationals of the underdeveloped countries, etc. One reason why we think such an operation may work is that transnational corporations, as in the case of OPEC, may also derive benefits from it. Among others, uncertainty could be reduced and therefore they could plan future ventures and profits in a more reliable way.

Notes

1. Jos. Sliva Michelena, Crise No Sistema Mundial: Polca y Blocos de Poder. Paz e Terra, Rde Janeiro, 1977, p. 27 (author's translation).

2. See Samir Amin, "Verve una nuova crisi strutturale del sistema capitalistico" (Terzo Mondo, ano VIII, gruppo IV, nos. 24-25, June-September 1974, pp. 9-14); Andre Gunder Frank, World Crisis and Latin American International Options (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1974, p. 1).

3. See Jos. Silva Michelena, op. cit., passim.

4. See Hebe M. C. Vessuri, "Ciencia, Tecnology Sociedad en Veras de la UNCSTD: El Coloqulo Internacional en Viena" (Interciencia [4] 6, November-December 1979, p. 361).

Introduction

A great cultural result of our time is the basic perception that the social functions of science and technology have been mystified, refracted through the prism of the ruling ideologies and stated in a fetishized form of productivism, economic growth, promotion of civilization, technological solution of social contradictions, unified technical culture that pretends to be universal, general human culture, and so forth. This basic knowledge results from a collective experience in the economic, broader, crisis and from radicalized social struggles and movements. These began, first of all, with anticolonial movements, or movements for the emancipation of dependent and super exploited countries, and were followed by the radicalized currents of industrial and intellectual workers in the developed countries. Included are radical movements of scientific workers, technicians, agronomists, doctors, architects and urbanists, university students, and so on. We now must give concrete form to this basic perception, to operatively testify to it in relation to all segments of the scientific and technological complex.

Such a testimony is given, first of all, in this paper with respect to the technology of repression, that is, armament and its scientific research and technological potential, as well as parliamentary sectors (nuclear energy, outer-space research, and so forth) and the "reserve potential" of totalitarian control over man and society (big-genetic, psychological, meteorological, with respect to food sources and so on). In this, without a doubt, is the paradigm of the entire repressive tendency of science and technology. I intend to show the following:

a. All of the major aspects of the repressive function of science and technology in our era tend to be directed analogously or substantially close to the functions of the technology of repression in the narrow sense. Together with militarized science and technology in the service of force and violence, science and technology which are geared toward greater exploitation of natural sources and economic, socio-political, and cultural hegemony in international relations comprise a unified, organically linked structure of repressive functions. Within this structure, other sectors of repressive technology may partially substitute for the technology of force in the narrow sense but, in any case, functionally combine with it.

b. The main machinery of exploitation and rule within individual societies and in international relations decisively moves toward combining the monopoly of the technology of repression in the narrow sense with other forms of scientific and technical monopoly geared toward repressive functions. As a socio-political expression of this movement, the ruling social forces - classes, their hegemonistic fractions and socio-political blocks - regroup themselves in a way that expresses and allows for the combination of both forms of repressive technology. Social groups that are the protagonists of the technology of death and violent exploitation - the military hierarchy, the military-industrial technocracy, the managerial nucleus of the transnational corporations, the corresponding political and banking oligarchies - take on increasingly greater importance within the ruling socio-political blocks. There is a strong tendency for these groups to become the hegemonistic nucleus of the ruling classes in metropolitan societies.

c. The bearers of such a type of social hegemony, in which a scientific-technological monopoly and its repressive use is essential, will continue to guide the development of science and its technological application, material resources (the utilization of natural sources and accumulation), and human potential toward the expanded reproduction of the total conditions and factors of such hegemony. The expansion of repressive technology then exerts an ever more intensive effect on the total structure, that is, on the social character of the productive forces of labour. The repressive functions absorb a predominant part of the total material, intellectual, and socio-organizational potential of the existing scientific and technological complexes. These functions leave a decided socio-economic, political, and cultural mark on the majority of scientific work and the technological application of its results.

d. The above-mentioned socio-political restructuring globally conditions decision-making in the direction of scientific and technological development, so that the effectiveness of repression becomes a top priority. The repressive functions, that is, the scientific-technological complexes in industry, agriculture, communications, medicine, urbanism, and so forth, determined by them, thwart the investigation and realization of alternatives urgently needed for the material progress of the conditions of life, the rational regulation and cultivation of natural conditions, the abolition of socio-economic, regional, cultural, and national discrimination and segregation, the autonomous development of individual societies, regions, nations, and cultures in accordance with positive historical premises and primary actual needs, and the international co-operation of autonomous actors. Grandiose, diabolical scientific and technological selection is carried out systematically at the expense of the primary needs and historically formed progressive values of humanity.

e. For such a negative scientific and technological selection, a monopoly of political decision-making in the hands of those interested in repressive technology is alone not enough; a specific socio-cultural articulation of such technology is necessary as well. Under the influence of hegemonistic groups that aspire to the repressive use of a socio-technological monopoly, a specific socio-cultural macrocosm is formed in metropolitan societies: this is the structuring of interests and the articulation of the values and motives of "organized knowledge" in industrial corporations, scientific foundations and universities, scientific and technological intelligentsia, and so on. The immediate social and cultural environment of the bearers of fundamental and developmental research - the selection and formation of scientific "elites" and technical cadres, their social hierarchy, ideology, and mentality; their scale of values and goals; their position and prestige in society; the legitimacy of their motives; and the evaluation of their results - is established in the function of the scientific and technological advancement of effective repression. Parallel with this, ideological, political, and scientific-theoretical forms of the mystification of the repressive functions of science and technology have been worked out. This refers, of course, to the development of economic, demographic, sociological, political, socio-anthropological, and other social theories that would be able to legitimize scientific and technological monopolies and their repressive aims - for example, the functional-structural systems theory of society found in contemporary German sociology; neo-Malthusian crisis theories, "socio-biology" as defined by Wilson and Trivers, and so on.

f. In "developing countries," in as much as the process of their emancipation has not prevailed, technology placed under the guidance of metropolitan monopolies takes on multiple and potent repressive functions; it becomes an essential, and may become a decisive, factor in conditioning their structural dependency. "The transfer of technology" is transformed into the implantation of military-technical, techno-economic, and socio-political and cultural instruments for extending and continuing dependency and underdevelopment. With the help of these instruments, a fundamental technological inhibition is established in the development of those countries: a fundamental and radical frustration of scientific research and technological advancements that would be oriented toward primary needs and development possibilities. The repressive scientific-technological monopoly is constructed in a dependent society as an armature of international and, consequently, internal relations of exploitation - an armature able to overcome strivings and efforts toward economic and political emancipation. This armature, a lever for ensuring continued dependency, is built not only into the material-technical structure of production but also into the class structure in dependent societies. Local oligarchies and ''elites" regroup and form in the function of the military-political and techno-economic transmission, with the tendency to impregnate the "cultural assimilation" of the authorized parts of the dependent society with the mystification of the scientific monopoly and repressive technology.

g. In uncovering and abolishing the repressive functions of science and technology, there indisputably exists a common denominator among the efforts for their progressive transformation in otherwise differing societies and regions with materially unequal and culturally specific possibilities, priorities, and choices. This common denominator is the global, international premise for the emancipated and autonomous, progressive and creative contribution of all parts of the world to their own and general scientific and technological progress.

My argument should indicate that from analytically based, socially motivated, and culturally articulated criticism of the repressive functions of science and technology it is possible to derive a far-reaching strategy for their progressive transformation and development. Such a strategy, that would initiate and enable over a long period of time successive and continually linked research and the embodiment of socio-cultural alternatives that would, at last, give the totality of scientific and technological development a significantly different quality, is necessary. It is superfluous to insist on proof that such a strategy of scientific and technological development is but one of the aspects of the historical projects of emancipated and emancipating social practice, and that such possibilities exist only within specific constellations and orientations of social forces.

I. The vicious circle of repressive technology

One should not harbour the illusion that the radical transformation of science and technology and their complete liberation from the materially objectivized and ideologically impregnated effects of economic, social, and political antagonisms, exploitation, and alienation can be realized without long-term creative and preventive efforts. This requires an entire historical epoch: the extent of this liberating practice is difficult for us to imagine now. Today's strategy must begin with criticism and removal of those negative characteristics of scientific and technological development in which are condensed the extreme, most difficult effects of the antagonistic structures, which are, at the same time, the constitutive obstacles to the investigation and realization of socio-cultural alternatives. In this work, I have linked this condensation of negative characteristics which make up an obstacle to social progress to the notion of the repressive functions of science and technology. True, strict socio-critical analysis would indicate that socio-antagonistic and repressive characteristics are interwoven in all the historically formed features of science and technology. My approach is justified if from this whole I single out those attributes and tendencies of science and technology that are the fundamental, essential bearers and expressions of repressive functions. In this way, I put this notion into a historical relation - covering that which in our period is, in the first place, possible and necessary to subject to criticism and change.

Accordingly, I single out three focuses of the repressive function of science and technology:

1. the orientation of scientific-technological development primarily toward the current or potential goals of military force and totalitarian control of society; and functional inclusion of such development into the internationally transformed system of accumulation and distribution of surplus value;

2. establishment of a scientific-technological monopoly by metropolitan centres of accumulation, and direction of monopolistically controlled research and industrial, agricultural, and other application of results in the function of economic and total social hegemony in international and interregional relations;

3. determination of scientific priorities and technological selection in production (as in transportation, urban development, medicine, and so on) in the function of forced exploitation and repressive control of the behaviour of the labour force.

The historically regressive tendency in contemporary science and technology stems from an interaction and combination of the three above-mentioned sources. In their mutual action and interaction, overlapping and condensation, we recognize the dynamics of the expansion of the repressive, exploitative, and destructive effects of science and technology. Here in short are the main aspects of these dynamics:

a. The priority of scientific research and technical innovations within the framework of a military-scientific-industrial complex enables the super concentration of capital and monopolistic accumulation of knowledge in metropolitan financial and industrial centres that become the supports of immense systems for the international exploitation of labour and natural resources.

The linkage of military and scientific resources creates an exceptional economic advantage: the metropolitan centres that gain this advantage will continue to expand both these resources and to control an ever greater part of world accumulation. The military-repressive orientation of science and technology is transformed into an essential economic factor of hegemonistic expansion and exploitation in international relations.

b. The economic mechanism of international hegemony and exploitation - "unequal exchange," restriction of the economic development of dependent countries in conformity with the strategy of a super monopoly, control of the labour market, direct investments, and so on - is established and functions in the presence of the international machinery of non-economic compulsion that In part ensures the reproduction of the social conditions for monopolistic accumulation. With this, the economic and non-economic causes and motives for the precedence of scientific-technological development in the function of military repression are constantly being renewed.

c. Military force and threat alone are not enough to insure the international social conditions of monopolistic accumulation. Sociopolitical upheavals and movements for the economic emancipation of subordinated countries constantly disturb these conditions and endanger the totality of the relations of exploitation. Parallel to economic restrictions and political force, a specific scientific technological control apparatus becomes increasingly important for the international order of hegemonistic expansion and exploitation. The advantage gained through the aid of the military-scientific-industrial complex and monopolistic control of international accumulation constitutes a strong point for the further development and direction of a scientific-technological monopoly as a relatively independent instrument for international repressive control of agricultural, industrial, economic, and socio-political processes.

Technological force or the threat of such force is applied alternatively or cumulatively with military and financial force or repressive threats. As the military-repressive priority has led to well-known deformities with regard to the orientation of science and the programme for technical innovation, so too monopolistic scientific-technological development subordinated to the goals of repressive technological control of the international labour process, the utilization and reproduction of labour, agricultural and industrial orientation, the economic and social policy of individual countries, their internal and international socio-political orientation, and world exchange and distribution leads to profound inversion and distortion of science and technology with respect to the primary needs and developmental possibilities of societies.

d. The priority of scientific-technological development in the composition of the military-scientific-industrial complex and its effect on the influx and disposition of accumulation contributes to the division of the economy into sectors with essentially different conditions for reproduction. industrial sectors and agricultural branches that do not enjoy the advantages of militarization have economically limited possibilities for significant technical innovations and reduced and endangered accumulative capability. This forces and leads them to increase the exploitation of surplus value by forced utilization of labour and by decreasing its value and price by the massive dequalification of workers. Their structurally limited possibilities for developmental research and technological innovation are to a large extent directed toward the development of the means of labour, the technical organization of the labour process, and technological approaches that enable intensive exploitation of primarily dequalified labour. In this way, the orientation of technology as an instrument of increased exploitation of labour is strengthened. Particular attention should be paid to the practice of decreasing the necessary work time, primarily by the concentration of work efforts (labour efficiency norms, repressive technical organization of work, and so on) and reducing the qualifications of workers (parcelization and technical simplification of work) and not primarily by improving the means of labour and technological efficiency in general.

The hypothesis that, accordingly, in large sectors of production this has led to a change in the main tendencies of technological development is not without its place. Backward and repressive technology in the production of goods (directed toward intensive exploitation of labour and its dequalification) is the other face of the system of production and accumulation that favours rising scientific and technological development in the production of arms and other means of repression.

e. In a uniform chain of regressive tendencies, following the links that make up the just-mentioned repressive technology (the production of arms and the super-exploitation of labour in production outside of militarized sectors) comes a link with new repressive functions: monopolistic technological control of dependent countries in combination with other instruments of restriction and force inaugurates the development and use of science and technology within the framework and for the goal of the super-exploitation of the labour force of dependent countries.

This chain of negative factors closes up in a vicious circle. The economic function of the production of arms constantly stimulates the scientific-technological revolution in the military-industrial sectors, reduces the accumulative capability and possibility of essential technical innovation in other sectors, and orients their technology toward forced exploitation of the labour force. If the possibilities for such exploitation of labour in metropolitan societies are limited, sectors of production whose accumulation capability is endangered move to countries in which they can create the conditions for more intensive exploitation. This moves science and technology controlled by metropolitan centres toward functions of repression in "developing countries," thereby establishing in these countries massive poverty and other conditions that enable the exploitation of cheap labour. Super-exploitation and the impoverishment of dependent countries radicalizes the social resistance of the working masses and the movements for emancipation, and this again stimulates the development of the military-repressive apparatus and its combination with the entire economic and technological system of force (that is, the international division of labour, its technical and social organization, the differentiated technical characteristics of internationally divided labour, and so on), all in the function of economic and technological repression.

The contradictions of the system of accumulation in which science and technology are intertwined cannot be overcome by the division between metropolitan and dependent "developing countries," repressive control and forced exploitation of the latter; rather, their solution is sought in relationships of military, technological, and financial dependence and exploitation of the majority of industrially developed countries by the leading groups of the metropolises that hold the main levers of monopolistic control by means of the advantage of the most developed military-scientific-industrial complex and the other means of linking the scientific-technological monopoly and the international repressive machinery of production (as, for example, the agro-industrial complexes, nuclear energy plants, until recently the petroleum monopoly, control of the market of investment equipment, and so on). Along with this, in the circle of developed countries, in their mutual relations a chain of factors of the negative orientation of science and technology moves as well. In a division of labour among these countries, the leading group tends to maintain the scientific technologically propulsive sectors of production, with greater accumulation capability, while sectors with relatively backward and, with respect to labour, clearly repressive technology tend to be located in another category of industrial countries. This also leads to radicalization of social conflicts in this category of industrial countries (for example, in England, Italy, France, and several other European countries). The bearers of international hegemony react by strengthening all the repressive apparatus and, especially, the mechanisms of scientific-technological dependence that have indisputable advantages in establishing dominance over industrially developed countries.

Further analysis of these networks of factors that condition the growth of repressive functions and the exploitative and destructive effects of science and technology exceeds the framework of this paper. Attention will be further centred on the main social figures that provoked these processes, as representatives and protagonists of repressive technology and the cultural and psycho-social personification of its regressive characteristics.

II. The main social figures of repressive technology

The repressive functions of science and technology are directly based on the monopoly of scientific research, monopolistic private ownership of scientific knowledge, and exclusive control of its technological application. This monopoly is an integral and essential part of the system of international monopolistic accumulation and control of the conditions of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption. Herewith is stated an indispensable part of the truth, but still not the whole truth.

The international scientific-technological monopoly, mystified as a scientific and technological "gap" between developed and developing countries, is not completely explained by this, nor is this sufficient to explain the efficiency of the repressive functions of science and technology in international relations. For more complete knowledge it is necessary to shed some light on the totality of class, socio-political, and cultural phenomena that on both sides of the hegemonistic relationship - in metropolitan centres of monopolistic usurpation and in subordinated social environments - produce and reproduce the total social conditions for the effective repressive effect of the scientific-technological monopoly.

The international scientific-technological monopoly is formed and represses especially by means of two basic social figures that represent a condensation of the international whole of antagonistic social reproduction: the metropolitan monopolistic technocracy and subordinate (satellite) local "oligarchies" and "elites" in dependent societies.

The monopolistic technocracy in a uniform structure links the material, intellectual, socio-political and military, cultural, and psycho-social conditions and factors that create the total social strong point of the metropolitan scientific-technological monopoly. It synthesizes interests and motives, values and goals, forms of social organization, and a hierarchy of functions and positions that move the intellectual production of the scientific-technological substance of this monopoly and, at the same time, directs this production toward investigation and selection of the optimal possibilities for exploitative and repressive action. This social figure in its own practice, ideology, configuration of interests, and mentality interiorizes the repressive functions of science and technology; these functions determine its "maximum consciousness," its social character.

Special attention must be paid to the genesis of the contemporary metropolitan technocracy, as this reveals the global social premises and moving factors of the formation of the metropolitan scientific technological monopoly. It especially reveals the genetic dynamic nucleus of this monopoly in the mutual effects of the militarization of the economy and science and the expansion of large systems for international control of the conditions of production and accumulation. It also is worth nothing the articulation of these social figures that personify the metropolitan scientific-technological monopoly and its exploitative and repressive orientation, with other social and political forces, interests, and ideologies in the metropolitan social environment.

At the other pole of the social axis of the scientific-technological monopoly, international social restructuring has formed dependent groups characterized by a constitutive link or symbiosis of the local "oligarchies" of holders of economic and political power and local "technocratic elites" that tend to expand toward the whole "culturally assimilated" intelligentsia and white collar personnel, and is permeated by colonial derivations of the metropolitan ideology. In this symbiosis, we find the other half of the total social and cultural conditions of the repressive scientific-technological monopoly. As the character of social practice and the cultural image of metropolitan technocracy is an inserted strong point of selective production and repressive use of scientific knowledge and technological models in the material social being, so is the subordination of interests and motives and the incapability for research and knowledge beyond the framework of the hegemonistic interests and the models that are the incarnation of these interests - creative impotency, dependency, caricature-like imitation of metropolitan status and cultural patterns, basic insensitivity to the interests of the working masses in their countries, and scorn for the native culture of these masses and their creative and productive potentials - inscribed in the social and cultural profile of the local "elite" in subordinated societies. Without such a socio-cultural lobotomy of the local "elite" that transforms them into forever dependent premature infants, collective and intellectual weaklings, and social subordinates, effective scientific-technological repression of dependent societies would not be possible.

III. Militarization of the economy and science: the birthplace of the metropolitan technocracy

Militarization particularly includes corporations in technologically leading branches of production - aeronautics, electronics, nuclear technology, industrial computer and information systems, and chemistry. It quickly hastened their technical development and the growth of the organic contents of capital, which within these corporations decisively and directly influenced the birth of a modern technology of power and management and the formation of technocratic "character masks." Galbraith's picture of the concentric circles of the "techno-structure" most closely corresponds to the leading corporations in the militarized economy. For in these corporations, on the basis of a high organic content of capital, the concentration of scientific potential and educated technical personnel, as well as profits that devour a lion's share of the total surplus value, were the greatest possibilities for social integration, "indentification," and "adaptation" of a relatively broad circle of participants under the hegemony of technocratically reorganized leading groups that mediate between financial centres, state military programmed, and the resulting subsidized development of science and universities.

The complex advantage of militarized corporations has far-reaching consequences for technocratic reorganization. Only those corporations that are organized as systems for the exploitation of scientific technological resources can permanently maintain the orders of the military-repressive system and use public funds as their own. This can be carried out only by those corporations that introduce the appropriate technology of power and management and bring their managerial groups into conformity with these demands, and that construct a new symbiosis of class interests and status between owner ship and technocratic management. It is important to note that this category of corporations as well as the direct participants of the global functions of the order were enabled and, in order to carry out these functions, compelled to establish broad control over the activities of science, universities, and the entire system of education. This refers as well to control over total production and communication of scientific and other information, over the movement of intellectual potential. That is, control over broad sectors of the social system, that by this become, in fact, branches of large systems for the production of capital. Encompassing those branches? the large systems perfect and spread out their technocratic organization.

When a monopoly of state orders is permanently established, new forms are developed for accumulation and control, and when power is realized over scientific and research development potentials, the enterprises included in the military-repressive system gradually take over independent functions in this system as well. From executors and profiteers in large businesses they become the direct bearers of the development and realization of military-technically, strategically, intellectually, military-politically, and economically repressive programmes and operations. With other centres of the repressive system they decide on all that is essential for the growth and efficiency of these systems. This extends to all dimensions of the general functions of protecting the regime. Their partnership with the ruling political and military groups entrusted with the central functions of the regime is based as well on the monopoly of power and control gained over the material, scientific and technological, organizational, and personnel policies necessary for carrying out these functions.

Here we are talking about a monopoly of the modern technology of a repressive system. In the sphere of militarized corporations, a network of economic advantages is to be gained with the monopoly of this specific technology. Both instances are established along with the special support of the political system and its repressive organizations. But the creature of this system - the militarized economy - quickly becomes an independent political factor that holds technological levers of global rule and in this inserts its specific interests.

The consequences of the symbiosis between the military-repressive system and the authorized monopoly are well known with respect to the personal union and rotation of leading managerial groups on both sides, their combined influence on fiscal and economic policy in the interest of a militarized economy and global military-political strategy, and the entire political process in the metropolises. In this study, a perhaps less-noticed aspect of this especially interests us: the independent power of technocratically organized monopolies in the area of the military system and the technology of violence and death will become the general pattern for the role that the leading corporations take on with regard to all the other general functions of the order.

Militarized and soon other systematically organized large corporations as well began to utilize all elements of this model - systems analysis and strategy for solving complicated problems; monopolistic control of scientific-technological, organizational, and personnel policies; usurpation of public funds; independent power and a partnership with leading political groups and public officials; specific technocratic organization and ideology; and so on - in coping with various areas of "general social needs" and "social problems."

A monopoly of the technology of death and systematic techniques for absolute destruction should be adapted and applied as a monopoly of technical means for human survival and systematic techniques for global regulation of the social process endangered by the production of capital. We would have a solitary power over death, and to an extent survival, according to the same scheme, with the identical purpose and criterion, in the same hands, with the same ideology! The only difference is that the use of this power in the form of a monopoly of technology for destruction and death is significantly more effective than its use in the form of a monopoly of technical means for survival and relief from the global consequences of production that technocratic ideology disguises under the names of "urban chaos," crises of the megalopolis; "ecological catastrophe," "destructive demographic explosions," crises of feed sources, energy, and industrial raw materials; "collective mental disassociation," and so forth. While managers of these systems can predict with great probability and bring about certain destructive effects and massive death, their pretensions and operations in the direction of controlled survival constantly increase the global entropy of the civilization process.

In this context, the militarized apparatus of production was the first laboratory for the new scientific-systematic and technocratic form of rationality. From it all, large systems for the production of capital inherited the technique and organization, the ideology of systematic analysis, and the strategy for solving the problems of complex wholes with the goal of maximizing efficiency under increasingly more difficult conditions. From it were taken scientific methods of research and projection, the complicated use of computer technology in large management systems, and a totally hierarchically determined structure of scientific institutions under the rule of the protagonists of these goals. The militarized apparatus also yields the basic irresponsibility and superficial "political neutrality" of researchers and technical operators in the large systems with respect to the goals and consequences of their use. In these contexts, the staff of these systems took to solving the complex problems of management in technically attractive ways, regardless of the inhuman or merciless efficiency of the solutions, including psychology, sociology, and other "humanistic sciences" in the system of exploitation and force. The entire informative system, logic, language, and mentality of modern exploitation were taken on.

IV. The genesis of the ''technocratic elite'' in dependent societies

At this pole of the social axis of the scientific-technological monopoly, the genesis of the social figure that personifies scientific technological and total dependence on metropolitan hegemony is particularly indicative. Without going into depth on the historical background of this genesis (colonial rule, cultural repression, and so on), in the immediate past and now we find two main generators of the formation of a "technocratic elite" in dependent societies. The first consists of the formation of a local repressive apparatus, primarily military, that often carries out major police functions as well, under the influence and control of metropolitan military systems. It thus carries out perhaps the most important transfer of military technology and contributes to the formation of a specific authoritarian-technocratic ideology in the hierarchies of repressive services. This ideology postulates total repression as the condition sine qua non for the survival and development of "backward" society, and at the same time insists on taking over the economic, technological, and cultural models - derivatives of the metropolitan hegemony as instruments of survival and development whose application is ensured by total repression.

The second generator of local "technocratic elites" comprises a complex of "technical aid" projects within the framework of the global strategy of metropolitan monopolistic centres, according to their impulses and under their control. Selection, education, and specific indoctrination of technical and administrative cadres are carried out first in metropolitan educational and research factories and their branches in dependent societies, under the wing of the superficially independent foundations which sustain the international projects of "technical aid," and then within the personnel policy of the transnational corporations that raise people from the local environments to responsible managerial and technical functions in their internationally located branches or that in other ways subordinate and direct the "modernized" industrial entrepreneurs, agrarian "reformers," functionaries, and leading intellectuals from the ministries and banks, universities, and public information, cultural, and scientific institutions. The essential effect of this great factory for the almost assembly-line production of dependent and emasculated "technocratic elites" is that the material position, status, and professional success of the members of these groups imperatively depends on their conformity to the ideology of dependence and the interiorization of the intellectual, political, and ideological characteristics of this social type programmed in metropolitan laboratories for the technological, social, and cultural transformation of "developing countries."

The two above-mentioned generators of "industrial local elites" - the military and the "technical aid," personnel policy and public relations of transnational corporations - have had from the beginning similar origins and conceivably co-ordinated effects in metropolitan centres. The similarity of these origins refers to the whole linkage of the militarized economy and science with large systems for international management of the conditions of production and absorption of accumulation. However, the operative effects of these two generators remain on separate tracks up until when, in the society submitting to structural dependency, a fire of destructive economic and sociopolitical crises breaks out, burning the ruling structures. If the metropolitan hegemonies exert a decisive influence on those happenings, there follows a process of restructuring, for which is typical the association of the social and ideological creatures of both generators: a combination or symbiosis of military groups with the ideology of total repression and social groups, that is, ideological models that are the product of techno-economic and socio-cultural penetration of the transnational corporations, "technical aid," and great international projects. Such aid and projects include: "the green revolution," modernization of the exploitation of mineral and agricultural raw materials, placement of light industry and technologically dependent production of machines, co-operation in the production of nuclear energy, and so forth.

These two components - military groups and the social branches of transnational corporations - are the framework of the local social force that becomes the interested, politically and culturally conforming recipient of scientific-technological and total hegemony; between these two components there develops a symbiosis of power and interests, an osmosis of ideas, values, and orientations. The ideology of total repression unites with the ideology of technological and cultural dependency and assimilation; in this union repression gains strength as the condition of the entire dependent economic growth, technological progress, and "modernization of society," as a circle of insurmountable dependency on the import of prefabricated knowledge and technical and consumerist models is closed up by the ambitions of the protagonists of authoritarian rule.

I. The Brazilian nuclear programme and the treaty with the federal Republic of Germany

The Brazilian nuclear programme includes the construction of eight light-water PWR-KWU reactors of 1,300 MW each by 199O, besides the 627 MW Westinghouse reactor in final stage of construction, and the establishment of nuclear industry in Brazil in association with West German companies. The industry includes a heavy equipment factory for reactors, already in the last stage, and the nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing plants, which are still in design stage. With such purposes the Nuclear Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany was signed in 1975.

According to the originally announced conception of the Brazilian programme there would be approximately 60 reactors operating in the year 2000, totaling 75 GW of electric power. This prediction is not officially confirmed any more, and now even the Government admits that this programme was over-dimensioned.

Brazil has a hydroelectric potential of 200 GW, of which only 25 GW is presently utilized, and it is expected that 150 GW will be used by the year 2000. In spite of the great distances between many waterfalls and the big cities, it is possible to transmit the electric energy, with the final cost of the hydroelectric KW less than half that of the nuclear-KW cost. Besides, there is coal in the southern parts of the country. Therefore, nuclear energy is not yet an economic necessity to Brazil.

The question is: Why does Brazil go on with such an ambitious nuclear programme? What reasons lead developing countries to search for nuclear technology at any cost? Certainly there are reasons related to the security of the energy supply of a country in the long term, after the exhaustion of the hydroelectric potential and other sources. It is assumed that the construction of reactors would assure the possession of nuclear technology, which is necessary to a country's autonomy in the electric energy supply in the future. Other reasons are related to the myth of nuclear energy as a magic key to national progress and the allure it exerts on governments as a symbol of influence and national power.

We will try to discuss these two aspects, by analysing the Brazilian case, which is more familiar to us, thereby formulating some general conclusions. We will address ourselves to the following points:

a. Nuclear energy may be necessary to the economy of less developed countries in the future, but it requires a very delicate political appreciation and balance of the risks and benefits.

b. Nowadays the acquisition of sophisticated equipment from developed countries may not be the most appropriate way to assure control of nuclear technology in the future.

c. No matter how remote the military use could be, the prestige of the national power associated with the pacific employment of nuclear energy is undeniable. Indeed, this has been stimulated by the attitudes of the nuclear developed countries.

d. Regional co-operation among less developed countries in the execution of nuclear projects would not only increase the bargaining power of these countries in negotiations with the technology owners, but this might also avoid a foolish nuclear race. It would allow at the same time a reasonable internationalization of some stages of the nuclear industry, and a greater regional technical and economic autonomy.

e. The problem of nuclear proliferation related to armaments cannot be solved by the simple blockade of nuclear technology from less developed countries.

II. Perspectives on nuclear energy in Brazil

From the present perspective, nuclear energy will play an important role in Brazil's energy supply probably within 30 years. No matter how great the Brazilian hydroelectric potential is and no matter how modest the consumption of electricity may be, the day that this consumption will exceed that potential will come inevitably. Brazil cannot neglect nuclear technology, because it will be inevitable in the future. The idea that solar energy can be economically used to generate electricity on a large scale is improbable in the medium term. Other forms of indirect use of solar energy, such as biomass, are not appropriate to produce electricity either. Even if the use of alcohol in thermoelectric plants is possible, we cannot expect a substantial economical contribution from this mode of electricity generation.

The myth that developing countries have to concentrate on intermediate technologies that use intensive labour and little capital and apply rustic technology has its consequence on the energy field. This would imply the absolute priority of renewable sources and of the rustic ways of energy generation - as in the use of biomass, wood in particular, of biogas produced from animal wastes, of solar energy, etc. Although we do not need to stress that such alternatives can really be important in the short term in some specific cases, such as alcohol for vehicles and some applications of solar energy, we have to recognize that an efficient large-scale use of those non-conventional sources still requires time and investments in research and development in the long term.

Nevertheless, to found basically the development of the country on exotic and rustic techniques is a dangerous choice. In the energy case, this choice would imply the abandonment of important sources that could be found in the country's territory - petroleum and nuclear principally - to be used by the rich countries.

Therefore, nuclear energy may become necessary for Brazil in the future and it cannot be ignored. On the other hand, a subject that involves a delicate risk-benefit balance demands a political evaluation that transcends technical aspects. For political evaluation, the instrument is the democratic discussion, and for this political decision to be well-founded, the participation of the technical-scientific community is essential. This was not done in the case of the Nuclear Treaty because of diplomatic decisions that transformed its negotiation into a secret. However diplomatic success can be annulled by technical and economic problems.

The ecological aspect is a very important one. It is undeniable that the risk of accidents on reactors is greater than was believed, based on the Rasmunsen Report. The Three Mile Island accident has shown how important the question of reactor safety can be. The storage of radioactive wastes, on the other hand, stands without a final solution. These safety problems tend to be worse in less developed countries, because of three basic points:

a. the necessity of adapting nuclear standards and requirements from other countries, sometimes from more than one country, as is the case of Brazil, which has bought reactors from both the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany;

b. the weakness of the national licensing authorities, that not only have small budgets but also do not have the necessary independence and authority to fulfill some of their intended functions;

c. the lack of well-established public-opinion groups would could force the government into giving more attention to safety-related matters.

A severe comment on the solution adopted by the government involves the fact that the West German nuclear technology has been bought at a very high price, while there are enough hydroelectric resources and coal in the country to last for some decades. Denied the alleged hypothesis of nuclear energy urgency, there would be the possibility of developing in the country a more autonomous and modest nuclear project. Besides a greater control of the technology, this project could better adapt itself to Brazilian conditions. Also, it would make better use of internal resources, especially the scientific community almost completely forgotten in the West German treaty. Also, the national industry has limitations in the nuclear programme because of the specifications of the West German designs, which fatally require the importation of equipment from that country. Even if this equipment comes to be partially made in Brazil, it will be made by foreign companies or In joint venture with them. This will intensify the dependence of the electrical-generating-equipment industry, which is already dominated by the multi-national companies, despite the fact that the technology has been well known to Brazil for decades. The nuclear industry involves the most advanced, sophisticated technology and demands intensive capital. The importation of equipment for nuclear plants will aggravate the external debt, and the local fabrication of the equipment will have difficulties.

The economic reality of the country will cause the nuclear programme to be adjusted and decelerated, as is already happening.

III. Nuclear energy and the prestige of national power

To the economic arguments that led to the nuclear accord, we can add other speculative arguments of geo-political origin. Since India's explosion of the atomic bomb in 1974, all countries comparable in size to Brazil have the atomic bomb (the USA, the USSR, China, and India) or the technology to make it (Canada), besides other world powers that are smaller in territory (England and France).

Moreover, Argentina has chosen a technological line that has made her more independent in the nuclear field, possessing even the plutonium produced in the natural uranium reactor and stored in the burned fuel.

On the other hand, Brazil, even with the Angra I reactor, will not have unconditional possession of the plutonium from the burned fuel, that being subjected to stricter safeguards.

Plutonium is the material for the bomb, and the country which has it, using the technology that is already satisfactorily known, will be able to make nuclear weapons, although in a precarious way and with very limited or no military application.

The prestige of national power arising from the existence of nuclear installations in a country is undeniable, however remote is its intention of making nuclear weapons.

Brazil will have those means only if it has the full nuclear fuel cycle. As long as the enriched uranium must be imported, the spent fuel will be under severe safeguard.

From this point of view, the country must have both enrichment and reprocessing plants.

The USA is against this. It is still trying to avoid the sale of a reprocessing plant to Brazil, although it is not possible to cancel the immediate aspects of the Brazilian-German treaty. The North Americans know that it is an accord with multiple stages. Their government hopes that it will be possible to establish alternatives, such as a kind of accord that will conform voluntarily to an international co-operation system. They know that the first stage of the treaty will have to be executed.

In case the other stages of the accord are not executed, Brazil may find herself in the position of having bought the reactors and afterwards not having the guarantee of fuel supply. Without such guarantee we will be dependent upon negotiations as arduous as the one we have undergone with "Urenco." The decisive point is not the reprocessing but the fuel enrichment, and there will still be some time to wait until we know if it works. During this time we are building the reactors.

If the project fails, we will not have the prestige of national power like the other countries which have nuclear technology, and we will have the concrete onus of relying upon an imported fuel, enriched uranium, which may become more critical than oil, for a substantial part of our electric energy generation.

IV. The possibility of latin american nuclear co-operation

In Latin America it would be more reasonable if some countries at a comparable industrial and economical stage, such as Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico, united themselves to develop a nuclear programme, progressively including other countries as soon as they need this kind of energy.

A similar proposal of Latin American co-operation was recently made in a report of a study group formed by scientists of several countries, including European and North American, in the "Interciencia" symposium held in 1978. On the practical level, such a proposal will face the difficulties caused by the fact that the more advanced South American countries in the nuclear field - Argentina and Brazil - have adopted different technological lines. Brazil will use enriched uranium, and Argentina uses natural uranium. On the other hand, continental cooperation would bring the enormous advantage of eliminating the possibility of a senseless nuclear race with military implications. Moreover, this co-operation would permit a rational internationalization, at the South American level, of some steps of the nuclear industry, particularly the fuel cycle.

This attitude will also reinforce the Brazilian position of incorporating and dominating the fuel cycle, a point vigorously contested by the United States. The accord with West Germany is yet far from being irreversible, at least as far as the enrichment and reprocessing plants are concerned. It could be reversed, independently of Brazil, because of agreements between the United States and West Germany. Because it will take a long time before the technology can be effectively incorporated, the possibility that this incorporation may not take place is not unthinkable.

The United States, on the other hand, has proposed the internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle to avoid the proliferation of such technology and the dissemination of plutonium. This internationalization, under the hegemony of the countries already possessing nuclear technology, lacks trustworthiness because of the historical tradition of political and economical domination implicit in technological and industrial dependence. However, internationalization at a Latin American level could be feasible and could overcome the objections currently made by the North Americans in relation to the fuel cycle. It would also make valuable joint efforts possible, giving an adequate position to nuclear enterprises and strengthening the Latin American block in negotiations with the proprietors of the nuclear technology.

V. The position of brazil regarding nuclear proliferation

Brazil did not sign the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968, alleging that it intended to legitimate an unacceptable distribution of power, requiring the control of the pacific use of nuclear energy without imposing any obstacle to the growth of nuclear weapons among the world military powers.

On the other hand, Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which forbids the production or possession of nuclear weapons and the storage of nuclear weapons belonging to military nuclear countries in the territory of countries signatory to the treaty.

The official Brazilian position on to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has been endorsed even by some intransigent critics of the nuclear accord at the domestic level, and it is necessary to distinguish these domestic critics from the foreign pressures against the Brazilian nuclear programme.

This distinction of positions is essential not only for a correct understanding of the nuclear problem, but also for any realistic reformulation; from anyone who wishes to give further consideration to the Brazilian nuclear policy.

The objective of the scientists is for the country to follow an energy policy suitable to its real means and leading to greater autonomy. The aim of the international pressures from the London Club is to limit the autonomy of the less developed countries, such as Brazil. This is based on the hypothesis that the political irresponsibility of these countries with respect to international security will lead to a nuclear war, if they happen to dominate nuclear technology.

The foundation of this proposition is that the responsibility of the world military nuclear powers is enough to guarantee that a nuclear war does not occur. The historical tradition of some of these world powers, responsible for the worst wars and devastation the world has suffered, gives examples which deny the truth of this assertion.

The matter is not to defend the nuclear militarization of Latin America, but to put the international question under its true dimension: the question of the nuclear disarmament of the world powers. The right position, from our point of view, is to repudiate the military use of the nuclear technology in all countries of the world, while making clear that the great threat to the security of mankind is from the nuclear arms arsenal of the military world powers.

Appendices

To complete this work, it is appropriate to add two appendices: The first, "Latin America as a Nuclear Market," is based on a report made by the President and the Executive Director of the American Nuclear Society, after the meeting of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission held in July 1979 in Chile. The second, "Comments on the Brazilian Energy Policy," is based on a report of our Energy Study Group of the Graduate School of Engineering (COPPE) of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.

While in "Latin America as a Nuclear Market" we can see the commercial point of view on nuclear energy and its implications in the international game, in "Comments on the Brazilian Energy Policy" we intend to show the socio-economic side of the most general energy questions and some national issues in Brazil.

A. LATIN AMERICA AS A NUCLEAR MARKET

Latin America is an emerging market for nuclear power reactors and appears perhaps to be the largest export market for reactor vendors in the next 20 years.

The population in Latin America is now about 340 million and is expected to become 600 million by the year 2000. With 260 million additional people and increasing industrialization, Latin America will need to increase electric energy production.

Existing technology and the shortages of fossil fuels in many areas may lead to nuclear energy. By the year 2000 it may be possible to have about 25,000 MW of nuclear power, although Brazil expects to exceed this capacity. The total electric energy production could reach 50,000 MW or even 150,000 MW. The difference will be mainly made up by conventional energy sources: hydra, coal, oil, and gas. A small part of the electrical energy will be produced by solar, wind, or geothermal energy (2000 MW) and by biomass (5000 MW).

Based on the present conditions, including the attitudes toward nuclear power in Latin America, it is estimated that there will be between 20 and 30 reactors operating in Latin America by the year 2000 and another 30 or 40 under construction. They would be in the following countries: Brazil (10-30), Argentina (2-6), Mexico (2-10), Venezuela (1-3), Chile (1-2), Peru (1-2), and Colombia (1-2).

(Based on a report by U. Du Temple and E. Menelly of the meeting of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission (IANEC) held in July 1979 in Chile, published in Nuclear News, September 1979 (59).)

Argentina is the first country in Latin America which has used nuclear power. The first nuclear plant is Atucha, near Buenos Aires, with a heavy-water reactor (Siemens) of 367 MW, operating since 1974. There is another HWR (CANDU) plant of 600 MW under construction near Cordoba, by a consortium of Canadians, Italians, and Argentinians. This plant will start operation within two years. Argentina has plans to build four additional plants, all of the natural uranium and heavy-water type. It seems that the reactor vendor for the first of these plants will be KWU.

Two of the principal points of the Argentine nuclear programme are:

a. that Argentina would secure integrated self-sufficiency in the field of nuclear energy;

b. that Argentina would establish an integrated industry for developing the fuel cycle at all stages.

According to the report of the IANEC meeting, the two objectives have been followed quite closely. Argentina has an estimated reserve of 25,000 tons of U₃O₈, and it produced 110 tons of UO₂ in 1978. There is a pilot plant for fabricating the fuel element. Future plans call for the production of zirconium tubes for cladding the fuel. Argentinians now have an experimental plant producing three tons of heavy water per year. They plan to produce all of the heavy water for the nuclear programme (hundreds of tons per year).

There is a technology transfer programme between Argentina and Peru, by which Argentina supplies two small reactors to the Peruvian Institute of Nuclear Energy. One of those reactors, for training, is completed and the other one, for isotope production, is being constructed.

Venezuela has stated its intention to have a nuclear plant on line by the early 1990s. However the government attitude toward nuclear energy does not appear enthusiastic. Hydro and coal-fired plants with some oil plants are expected to meet the electricity demands for the next 15 years.

Chile is planning to build a 600 MW electric nuclear plant near Santiago. The studies are being advised by a North American firm. The reactor is expected to be named soon. Chile is believed to have enough uranium to support a domestic nuclear programme, but the extent of these deposits are not well known.

Mexico intends to have two power reactors at the Laguna Verde plant in operation by the 1980s. Equador has made an agreement for the supply of a research reactor by Spain; and Paraguay has a small research reactor.

The report discusses in detail the Brazilian nuclear programme which we have already explained in another part of this work. The general impression from the report is that Brazil, though friendly with all its neighbors, is very competitive with Argentina and appears to be going it alone in nuclear development with the help of West German technology.

The report concludes that Latin America appears to offer the greatest external market for all exporters of nuclear reactors and associated services for the next ten years. However, United States policy may have helped European firms to gain ground in this market. The Latin American countries complain that the United States does not trust them and restrains the transfer of technology to them. In addition, the United States is accused of using its influence with European countries to hinder any nuclear development in South America. As a result, the United States has been virtually excluded from South American nuclear markets. It is still not considered a reliable supplier of fuel, enrichment services, and reactors.

Consequently, the development of a Spanish-speaking, independent consortium to develop nuclear power appears to be in the making. With the uranium resources of Latin America and technical experience and expertise of Spain and Argentina, it can develop nuclear reactors with the help of Canadian and European technology. This kind of cooperation among Spanish-speaking countries to develop nuclear technology shows that it could be possible to realize the Latin American nuclear co-operation we have pointed out in this paper.

B. COMMENTS ON THE BRAZILIAN ENERGY POLICY

The energy policy in all western countries before the petroleum crisis in 1973, had a basic goal of supplying the explicit needs of energy at the lowest price.

This policy has resulted in the problems we know very well in our days. The main lesson of this crisis, from our point of view, is that an effective energy policy cannot be limited to supplying the demand and cannot be only oriented to the search for the minimum price.

An effective energy policy must also orient the energy demand to make it consistent with the global objectives of the country. In case of a country with a non-coherent industrial system - one which does not include the complete production of machines and equipment, and in which the energy sector is almost completely controlled by the government - the energy policy could have an important role in directing the construction of a coherent structure of production. It can lead to the introduction into the country of certain industries which still do not exist but are crucial to the reproduction and expansion of the industrial system. But it can also allow the reduction of the rate of growth of some industries which are not convenient to the country, because they are strongly dependent on developed countries.

The energy policy, if well oriented, can be one of the most important poles directing the industrial policy of the country, as the energy enterprises are responsible for a substantial part of the purchases of equipment. On the other hand they have influence on industrial costs through the energy prices.

This same policy can be used to improve regional development in parts of the country which are not industrialized up to now.

The energy policy can be also responsible for the development of national technology. Thus, the construction of thermoelectric plants in France has allowed the development of their national industry of turbines. In Brazil, the construction of hydroelectric plants has allowed the development of an advanced national technology for dam construction, but the same did not happen with the equipment for these plants.

The energy policy must also take into account several other elements. In a developing country, with a non-coherent industrial system, the need for foreign currency for productive activities is always important. Thus, the reduction of expenses on imports for the energy sector becomes important. This way we improve the degree of coherence of the system, and on the other side, we free foreign currency reserves for the more important need of the country to achieve greater industrial progress. For this purpose, it is necessary that the energy policy shift the consumption towards indigenous energy resources, in both aspects of technology and supply.

This policy would also allow an improvement in the security of the energy supply. This point is not irrelevant, since energy is crucial to sustain productive activities. An interruption in the energy supply of the country - with the threat of uranium embargo by the USA exemplifying this possibility - can generate an economic crisis. We must be protected against it.

Besides, an indigenous energy source allows the pricing policy to be controlled by the country, avoiding the price fluctuations on the international market that could interfere with the energy policy.

It is important to point out that we must not forget the environmental problem. The energy consumption is, in our time, large and concentrated enough to produce serious effects on the ecological equilibrium of some regions. This exacts a social cost which can be large but has been forgotten in most of the cases. It is necessary to take this cost into account; otherwise, sooner or later the country will have to pay for it. An energy policy which does not include this question will bear on future generations the consequences of irresponsibility.

Finally, the energy policy should be strongly related to the social and economic policy. There is no way to separate it from the national planning we have in mind for the future. Either we will maintain a high concentration of revenue, socially and regionally, or we will try to reach a more reasonable distribution of the national revenue. This is neither a rhetorical nor an idealistic question. It would be unrealistic to separate the technical and political discussions on energy from the economic and social context. Institutional changes are to be hoped for in the direction of democratization and decentralization. Second, the workers seem to become more important in the political decisions, independently of formal changes. To forget this fact in the discussions on energy demand is a serious error. We shall remember that (a) the rates of domestic consumption of energy are highly unequal, (b) the sophisticated goods incorporated in the middle-class standard of living demand a high use of energy, (c) public transport is insufficient and its service is very bad, (d) the private car has all the privileges, as we can see by the costly highways in large towns.

To this disparity in the social consumption of energy we have to add the disparity of the industrial system, which produces goods for a relatively small part of the population or for export and neglects almost completely the needs of the majority of the people.

The re-orientation of energy demand is the basic condition for an effective energy policy in Brazil. We have to abandon the idea that the energy demand is a variable on which we cannot have any influence. The social demand is not the direct expression of a fundamental need of people but the result of a contradictory process of confrontation between the wish and the other offer.

References

1. U. Du Temple and E. Menelly, Nuclear News, Sept. 1979, p. 59.

2. A. Oliveira, C. Sigaud, and L. Pinguelli Rosa, Comments on the Brazilian Energy Policy.

3. N. Gall, Foreign Policy, vol. 23 (1976), p. 155.

4. C. Walske, International Security, vol. 1, no. 3 (1977), p. 94.

5. E. Teller, Science and Public Policy, June 1977, p. 234.

6. C. Lebrun and M. Mezin, Recherche, vol. 71 (Oct. 1976), p. 823.

7. J. M. Haucuz, Interciia, Sep./Oct. 1977, p. 264.

8. Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices, Ford Foundation Report/MITRE Corporation, 1977.

9. H. Feiveson et al., Bull At. Sc., Dec. 1976, p. 10.

10. J. Surrey and C. Hugget, Energy, Dec. 1976, p. 292.

11. B. Laponche, Bull At. Sc., Dec. 1976, p. 45.

12. R. Guard, Energy Interm., May 1977, p. 17.

13. J. A. Sabato, World Development, vol. 1, no. 8 (Aug. 1973), p. 23.

14. WASH 1.400, Reactor Safety Study (Rasmunsen Report), 1975.

15. Report of the American Physical Society, Rev. Modern Physics, vol. 47 suppl., p. 75.

Acknowledgments

The author is deeply indebted to Professor Luiz Fernando de Oliveira of the Nuclear Engineering Programme (COPPE/UFRJ) for stimulating discussions, and to Professor Adilson de Oliveira of the inter-disciplinary Area of Energy (COPPE/UFRJ) for having made some suggestions in this work.

(introduction...)

Chairman: Celso Furtado
Co-chairman: Zvonimir Damjanovic
Rapporteur: Ahmad Yousef Hassan

Introduction

Gregory Blue

As observed by Dr. Pinguelli Rosa in one of the last interventions in the conference's fifth session, there was to be witnessed throughout almost the entire proceedings a marked ambivalence towards contemporary science and technology. It can be argued this ambivalence was a reflection of the objective but contradictory roles which they are and will be required to fulfill. The contradictory potentials of science and technology were brought home forcefully by Drs. Pecujlic and Vidakovic when they evoked the image of the "two faces" which they exhibit, and implications for the social sciences were raised by Dr. Bonfil Batalla.

Although their functions in the modern world may indeed be variable, science and technology nevertheless constitute organic components of contemporary culture, as pointed out by Dr. Damjanovic: they affect every society vitally through their impact on production. As distinct from other aspects of culture, however, they are necessarily rooted in an international or universal dimension. Historical light was thrown on the differential aspects of scientific and technological universality by Mr. Bluets discussion of Joseph Needham's work on the history of science in China and the West and by Dr. Nakeaka's detailed account of the mastering of metallurgical techniques in Japan in the nineteenth century.

Dependence by Third World countries in the fields of science and technology has been and continues to be an essential but nevertheless distinct part within the general structure of domination to which these countries have been subjected. Unfortunately, because the various non-European civilizations have to one extent or another been subject to European domination in general and also to modern science and technology, whose development has for a relatively long period of time been centred within the European cultural area, there has arisen a now widespread notion that proficiency in science and technology are uniquely European traits. In this fifth session, special attention was paid to refuting this thesis in the presentations by Mr. Blue and Dr. Nakaoka in relation to the natural sciences and technology, in that by Dr. Bonfil Batalla in relation to the social sciences, and during the discussion in the intervention by Dr. Pandeya.

All five of the position papers presented emphasized that for Third World peoples to overcome dependence in the fields of science and technology it is necessary to rely on and strengthen endogenous facilities and potentials while simultaneously drawing on global achievements in all fields. The importance of achieving endogenous creativity was likewise stressed throughout the session.

Anouar AbJel-Malek, Salustiano del Campo Urbano, Celso Furtado, Alexander Kwapong, Imre Marton, A.N. Pandeya, Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, and Immanuel Wallerstein took part in the discussion.

(introduction...)

Ahmad Your Harlan

1. Dr. Guillermo Bonfil Batalla presented his paper on "The Recuperation and Appropriation of Social Sciences in the Context of Endogeneous Cultural Projects." The paper discusses the relationship between traditional social knowledge and formal social sciences in the case of the native peasant Indian peoples of Latin America.

In the first and second parts, four main points are made:

(a) All societies need scientific social knowledge in order to invent and build their own futures.

(b) Western social sciences have no universal validity and they cannot cope adequately with problems faced by other peoples with different civilizations.

(c) The knowledge about society, e.g., in the case of Latin American Indian peoples about their own societies, is not institutionalized nor systematically organized.

(d) The social science which is needed to help these peoples in their liberation effort must include the systematic knowledge both of their own societies and of the dominant hegemonic societies.

Next, the paper discusses the problem of a new, emerging Indian intelligentsia, as a product of different factors: expansion of school system, migration, etc.

A new intelligentsia is needed in order to concentrate, develop, and formalize traditional knowledge about society and, at the same time, to introduce in this knowledge adequate information and methodological tools of the formal social sciences. The intelligentsia is a first step in the process of institutionalization of traditional knowledge. Without an institutional knowledge, it is very difficult to have an equalitarian dialogue between western and Indian social thought.

Finally the political perspectives of the new Indian intelligentsia are discussed. All the forces and interests of the established political and economic system play against the independence and progressive role of the Indian intelligentsia. The only chance is to become an organic intelligentsia, deeply rooted in the true interest of their own people.

2. Dr. Miroslav Pecuilic presented his paper entitled "On the Edge of a Razor Blade: The New Historical Blocs and Socio-cultural Alternatives in Europe." The paper dealt with the greatest challenge of all: the creation of knowledge suited to our epoch, its fascinating possibilities, and its cruel dangers. The first part of the paper dealt with the two faces of science and technology. In one face social progress was equated with technological growth. The other face came with the slogan "technology inevitably dehumanizes and enslaves man." Part two of the paper spoke about the pathology of power and science, and part three of the new protagonists - social movements and organic intelligentsia. In part four he spoke about the alternatives striving for a new quality of human existence. At the end of the paper he spoke about self-reliance and solidarity or autonomy and new universality.

In speaking about the other face of science and technology, it is stated that it is of decisive importance to realize that science and technology are not negative factors in themselves; they turn into that when becoming part of an antagonistic social arrangement. What we are seeking is a new type of society, of civilization, which is to be a more favourable framework for the development of the authentic potentials of man.

The new culture or civilization cannot be built without international solidarity. Without mutuality, there is no autonomy.

The coming era has opened a glorious but also a critical period of overall interdependence. We are living in a planetary world society. A pluralism of cultures is necessary in order to have the world become a society which is not uniform and indistinguishable. Only autonomy, independence, and equality can be a path leading towards universal richness. Differences will remain. But the decisive question is whether they will turn into hostility and antagonism. (The full text of the paper is included as section V of this report.)

3. Tetsuro Nakaoka spoke about "Science and Technology in the History of Modern Japan - Imitation or Endogenous Creativity?". He exposed the relation between exogenous and endogenous influences in scientific and technical development exemplified by the particular case of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century. Citing the example of the Kamaishi Iron Works it is concluded that science and technology must have their roots in the culture of society. It is impossible for developing countries to make any progress without any imitation or borrowing of technology. Europe learned from the highly advanced Arabic, Indian, and Chinese cultural areas. Examples are cited from the Japanese experience. New technology is acquired and assimilated in "leaps." Japan's technological development can be understood as passing through a series of leaps. The paper spoke about the dynamics of interaction between exogenous and endogenous forces. It also spoke about the gap between the advanced areas and the backward areas of the economy in Japan. The paper concludes that technological leaps can be regarded as elements of dynamic progress in society. They can work as excellent incitements to endogenous creativity; in other conditions they can become the starting point for serious conflicts.

4. Dr. Zvonimir Damjanovic spoke in his paper about "Science and Technology as Organic Parts of Contemporary Culture." The paper elaborates certain theses: (1) That science cannot be developed primarily through needs of local, divided, practical activities in detail. A broad population should be cultivated in science. (2) Technology has grown out of and over its old frame, which was mere application of basic knowledge. Competence in technology is not a matter of choice, of some local priorities. It appears as a part of basic culture of a broad enough population. (3) Science and technology are not a set of recipes. They are rather a way of thinking. The spirit of science cannot be bottled.(4) As collective intellect science and technology are deeply rooted in the human race. No national culture will survive unless it makes space within itself for the all-human complement of scientific-technological culture. (5) Far from creating unemployment, science and technology liberate man from dull work, from over-work. They render the majority of people competent, not only for technical but also for social and political matters. (6) Developing countries are in great need of the development of science and technology. But the problems are not specific to them. All countries are equally faced with the problems of adaptation to the new developments.

5. Mr. Gregory Blue presented his position paper entitled "Joseph Needham's Contribution to the History of Science and Technology in China," and he dealt with three points concerning the development of the national sciences. First of all, he pointed out that medieval China, like other non-European civilizations, had a relatively high level of medieval science and technology, in relation to Europe. Transmission of technology and knowledge of natural phenomena from China to Europe was large and attests to the international and cumulative nature of techno-scientific advance. Traditional China, like other civilizations, formulated problems and generated techniques which represented key factors both in transforming medieval Europe and in the eventual development of distinctively modern science.

The second point concerned the relation between traditional and modern science. It was noted that traditional science, e.g., in China, did have sophisticated bodies of theory, controlled experimentation, etc.; but it remained fixed in untestable, ethnicbound categories. Modern science, on the other hand, uses universalized, mathematical experimentation in order to test its fundamental categories; it thus tends to become oecumenical. Discussion was given to the temporal lag between development of modern science and the realization of its oecumenical character.

The third point concerned the fact that the written material recording the achievements of traditional Chinese science and technology is only one source of knowledge of the tradition, for much valuable traditional knowledge remains alive among the people. A government policy can facilitate tapping of this knowledge by creating conditions in which both traditional science and modern science are geared to the basic interests of the people.

Discussion

1. Dr. Immanuel Wallerstein remarked that, until this session, speakers referred to science and technology in the sense of physical and biological science and technology only. In this session speakers included the social sciences. We must emphasize the role of the social sciences when we speak of the endogenous capacity of the developing countries. Mr. Blue said in his paper that current ecumenical sciences can benefit from the regional traditional sciences. This may apply also to the social sciences which can benefit also from the traditional cultures of the East.

2. Dr. Salustiano del Campo made four points. First the type of political power, institutional or democratic and its relation to the institutions and development of science and technology in different societies. Second he called attention to the social structure of Europe at the time science and technology developed in comparison to the social situations of some of the societies where science and technology originated. Third, he put the question of the role social science has played in the spread of science and technology. Fourth he mentioned the particular case of some intermediate societies, modern but traditional, developed and developing at the same time, and invited the interest of participants to get more thorough knowledge of such societies.

3. Dr. Imre Marton commented as follows:

La communication prntpar le professeur Miroslav Pecujlic, recteur de l'Universite Belgrade, m'encourage a partager avec vous des prcupations li a ['impact des distorsions, des tensions nomiques et sociales sur le syst de formation dans le secondaire et le supeur, de m que sur le comportement des diants vis-is du savoir et de leur mission sociale, ceci dans les trots mondes.

11 s'agit selon moi d'une surproduction de dipl et d'une sous-production d'intellectuels visant a la crivitcientifique et a une attitude critique vis-is d'eux-ms et des maux locaux. Je manifeste une exacerbation de la contradiction entre travail manuel et intellectuel. Cette course effre des jeunes en Europe occidentale vers le diplrnd a deux visses contradictoires: d'une part relment du niveau de qualification professionnelle et de la culture grais, d'autre part mis, dation du travail manuel, productif, insertion a tout prix dans la soci de consommation. En raison de la dalification et de la surqualification du travail manuel et intellectuel on observe un secteur traditionnel et moderne dans les sphs des activitde production matelle et intellectuelle. Masse croissants de manoeuvres recrutes avant tout parmi les travail leurs angers dans l es pays capitalistes dloppes et mince couche de spalistes hautement qualifies. Une partie importante des dipl deviennent parasitaires ou des gentleman's dipl. Des phms analogues se man infestent de nos jours dans les pays social sites. En Afrique j'ai lement observe que la lutte contra l'analphabsme, I 'extension du syst scolaire, l'elevation rapide du taux de scolarisation, donc cette dialectique ascendants, it pervertie par une dialectique ntive selon ['expression utilis par le professeur Abdel-Malek. Les scolarises du secondaire fuient le travail manuel, le village, et prrent grossir dans les vines les masses flottantes, deuvr, le sous-prolriat.

Les dipl vent inss dans la fonction publique indndamment des besoins de la soci. Ils visent a cr une client tribale, ethnique ou autre pour satisfaire leurs ambitions personnelles et politiques. L'le en partie est source de che et de la production d'une te parasitaire, bureaucratique, ceci en raison des dntations nomiques, culturelles, sociales, rationnels, reproduisant le sous-dloppement.

L'intt de ce snaire international est d'aborder les grand probls du monde d'aujourd'hui en avant recours a une approche globalisante, analytique, et critique, rejetant les variantes de l'europentrisme et du tiermondisme. Je voudrais conclure en disant que la probltique du rde la science et de la technique dans la transformation du monde doit inclure les probls de la formation, de la dalification massive, et de la surqualification tistes de la force de travail manuel et intellectuel.

4. Dr. Alexander Kwapong raised three points. First, he referred to the UN Conference on S&T for Development (UNCSTD) in Vienna, August 1979, where he noted the dichotomy which existed between scientists and politicians. There was a gap between the two. Second, as an African living in Japan he was interested in the Japanese experience. His great hero is the founder of that dynasty which helped to create modern Japan. History of Japan should be of great interest to all developing countries. Historical dimensions must be underlined again and again in development, which is a long process of gestation. It is a question of interaction between exogenous and endogenous factors. He referred to the observation of Dr. Damjanovic who said that it is cheap to buy computers but it is expensive to create human skills. One should be aware of the importance which should be given to education. An infrastructure of human experience must be built. People must be motivated, mobilized, educated, trained, and naturally disciplined. Third, he referred to this seminar and said that this occasion should not end here. The knowledge conveyed here must be disseminated. It must be applied to realities. We should always move from theory into practice, and our ideas must be brought out.

5. Dr. A. N. Pandeya commented on Dr. Nakaoka's statement about how he was motivated by Dr. Pandeya to write about the Japanese experience. Credit should be given not to him but to vice-rector Dr. Mushakoji and to Dr. Anouar Abdel-Malek. What happened in Kyoto was relevant. Bridges are between the minds of peoples of different cultures. Commenting on the papers he said that they are rich, but he had three comments to make. First, that science and technology become tremendous forces when linked with the culture and tradition of a nation. This fusion is our duty, and the UNU should also attend fully to the problem. Second, the famous question raised by Weber on how it comes that science and technology and capitalism were European creations, is a false question. Science and technology are basic components of knowledge, and necessary ones in any culture. No culture or civilization can claim that it created science by itself. Our aim is to develop the capacity of generating knowledge. All the Third World is confronted with the question of creating the capacity to generate new knowledge. Third, we must seek to generate and disseminate knowledge to benefit the deprived sections of society. In India 28 per cent of the population are still composed of tribal groups. They are economically and politically the most deprived. This question should be given priority. Some disastrous views call for not disrupting these societies. We cannot leave people as museum pieces. Man is the target, and should remain our target all the time.

6. Dr. Luiz Pinguelli Rosa said that in general we put together science and technology, but sometimes it would be better to separate one from another to understand some aspects of the question which concerns the underdeveloped countries. Sometimes there is a large distance between the scientific knowledge and its applications to transform the world. I will take an example from the talk of Gregory Blue in this session. Magnetism was known in old China but it has been applied in large scale only by Western civilization, starting in Spain and Portugal in navigation at the time of the Commercial Revolution. What we can conclude is that we must have objective conditions for the applications of science, otherwise we do not have technology coming from the scientific knowledge. This is important for our discussion because many underdeveloped countries have put a lot of money into developing science - e.g., Brazil and Argentina - without profit to productive activities. The economic and political conditions of these countries lead them to buy everything they need from multinational corporations, even the design of the simplest product we can imagine. So we cannot discuss scientific and technological policy without discussing also the role of multinational corporations in the underdeveloped countries. We have spoken here very much of the internationalization as a boundary condition imposed by the multinational corporations, but if we are interested in the transformation of the world, we have to discuss better this kind of internationalization, instead of taking it as immutable input data.

7. Dr. Anouar Abdel-Malek in a short comment on Dr. Rosa's intervention warned of the dangers of utopianism against vision. He referred to conflicting priorities, and how we cannot speak of bad science and technology.

8. Dr. Celso Furtado ended the session by referring to the relation between science and civilization, the nature of science and ecumenical science.

Summary

Science and technology are not the products of modern societies alone. Science and technology in Europe have been influenced and based upon the heritage of other civilizations. Although distinctively modern science has arisen in Europe since the sixteenth century, the birth of modern science owed much to the preceding achievements of Greek, Indian, Chinese, and Islamic/Arabic science. For example, in the first fifteen centuries of our era, a large number of mechanical and other innovations were transmitted from China to Europe, and these were large factors not only in revolutionizing medieval Europe, but also in the constitution of modern science itself. The same can be said of the transmission of techniques and the exact sciences from the Arabic world to the Latin West through commercial and cultural contact and through the movement of translations into Latin between the ninth and fourteenth century. This point shows that science and technology are not creations of any one civilization alone. Science can flourish because of beneficial social and political conditions. When we consider the birth of modern science we see that it was also linked to the particular social evolution that took place in the West.

Science and technology continued to expand and flourish in the West, whereas they developed at a much slower rate in the civilizations of the East. Science and technology as developed in Europe consequently were employed as means for domination and suppression, which tended to hinder similar developments within the other regions of the world.

If favourable conditions can be created for the development of science and technology in any country, whether in the East or in the West, then there will be a flourishing, as can be seen from the Japanese experience. Here we have the example of a "late-coming" Asian country which was underdeveloped in science and technology, yet favourable conditions were created in that country because of the lack of foreign domination, because of the presence of an independent, strong control government, and because of the interaction of endogenous and exogenous factors. The Japanese experience shows that modern technology can be successfully incorporated into local culture, provided that certain prerequisites are met.

It seems beyond doubt that human freedom and national liberty depend on economic independence. Having in mind the role which science and technology play in economic development, attention is much given to the discrepancy in the level of research and education between the "North" and the "South," that is between developed nations leading in science, and the bulk of humanity, still striving in poverty for cultural recognition and freedom from domination. But pleading for more science and technology alone does not seem to affect very much cultural emancipation whose dominant aim is to preserve and revive national roots and culture and so to open the prospective of human civilization as a plurality of national cultures. As was outlined above, science and technology have been throughout their history deeply rooted in the human race, and all attempts to ascribe them to any one nation, or group, as local achievements or characteristics, are false. Whatever the national culture is like, science and technology can fit in, as complements. And though it may seem a paradox, no national culture will survive, unless it makes space within itself for the scientific technological culture.

Science cannot be developed primarily through the needs of local, divided practical activities. It is also impossible to plan scientific application in detail. Therefore, a broad population should be cultivated in science in order to help society to develop in a competent way. Similarly competence in technology is not a matter of choice or some local priorities. It is a part of a basic culture of a broad population.

Science and technology are a way of thinking. They deal with basic things in the human environment and in humans themselves. Therefore it is not possible for a society to benefit from science and technology without being exposed to their influence on human behaviour.

Far from looking upon science and technology as creating unemployment, they must be considered as liberating man from dull work and over-work. Science and technology are thus prerequisites of emancipation and development.

When speaking about science and technology it was usually implied that we were speaking only of physical and biological sciences. The role of social sciences was usually ignored. All societies need scientific social knowledge in order to build their own futures. Western social sciences have not universal validity and they cannot adequately cope with the problems faced by other peoples with different civilizations. The knowledge of the members of certain cultures about their own societies is not institutionalized nor systematically organized. The social science which is needed to help these peoples in their liberation effort must include both the systematic knowledge of their own societies and of the dominant hegemonic societies.

Hegemony is not being maintained only through repression, but also through cultural domination. The ability to conceive new visions is becoming decisive. We are confronted by the greatest challenge of all, the creation of a knowledge that is suited to our epoch. There are two faces of science and technology. There is the vision of social and economic growth, and there is the vision of an uncertain future and the illusory criticism of technology which gave rise to the slogan "protect us from technology." However, it is of decisive importance to realize that science and technology are not negative powers in themselves, they turn into that when becoming part of an antagonistic social arrangement. What we are seeking is a new type of society or civilization which is to be a more favourable framework for the development of the authentic potentials of man.

The new culture or civilization cannot be built without international solidarity. Without mutuality, there is no autonomy.

The coming era opens a glorious but also critical period of overall interdependence. We are living in a planetary world society. A pluralism of cultures is necessary in order to have the world become a society which is not uniform and indistinguishable. Only autonomy, independence, and equality can lead toward universal richness. Differences will remain. But the decisive question is whether they will lead to a mutual complementarity, or whether they will turn into hostility and antagonism.

Introducción

Pretendo presentar en este documento algunos elemen tos que contribuyen a la discusiobre el problema de quelaciones puede haber entre las ciencias sociales, reconocidas convencionalmente como tales en la tradiciccidental, y la visiociohistca organizada que todo pueblo posee en el contexto de su propia cultura. Se trata, en a instancia, de las relaciones entre dos modos del conocimiento sobre lo social, en vistas al establecimiento de alternativas socioculturales para el desarrollo.

El marco de referencia de las pnas siguientes lo forman los pueblos indios de Amca Latina.

I. El problema de la creatividad endógena en ciencias sociales.

Ya es un lugar comigir, en cualquier proyecto de desarrollo, sea e convencional o alternativo, la realizacie investigaciones sociales. Todo mundo acepta que el conocimiento cientco de la realidad social cuyo desarrollo se busca promover, es un requisito ineludible que debe cumplirse por personal calificado y cuyos resultados aportaran - informaciones indispensables para guiar las diversas modelada des, etapas y aspectos del programa en cuestiLa idea de que la participacie las ciencias sociales es necesaria estan generalizada, que a veces se incluye un equipo de especialistas en estas disciplinas sin que se tenga claridad de cual es la funciue habrde desempeni cuales las - aportaciones que de ellos se deben esperar; se incorporan por que se presupone que debe haber cientcos sociales en todo equipo de este tipo.

La cuestie complica cuando lo que se discute no es ya si participan o no cientcos sociales, sino cual, dentro de las muchas corrientes y escuelas que conforman el universo de las ciencias sociales, resulta la madecuada para los objetivos que se persiguen. En efecto, la diversidad de tendencias teas y metodolas en el camp las ciencias sociales es un hecho palpable que, adem parece acentuarse en ciertas cas. Las ideolog polcas impltas o atribuidas a cada corriente de pensamiento identificable en las ciencias sociales, juega con frecuencia un papel determinante en la selecciinal; esto, u a la preponderancia de cierta corriente en las instituciones y los aparatos que auspician y llevan a cabo los proyectos, va conformando paula finamente la hegemonde cierto "modo de pensar" la ciencia social, con su correspondiente modo de hacerla.

En todo caso, la determinacie cuciencia social habre intervenir en la formulacie un proyecto de desarrollo, queda encuadrada exclusivamente en el marco de in teresas y convicciones de los sectores que toman la decisiNo entraremos aqu discutir cuales son los mecanismos que legitiman a una u otra corriente; participaran en ese proceso de legitimaciseguramente, las instituciones especializadas en producir y reproducir este camp conocimiento convencionalmente acotado; intervendrtambilos especialistas reconocidos que detentan el control de la sabidurigual mente reconocida; quienes no intervienen en ningso, son precisamente los sectores que serobjeto de estudio. Ellos son objeto, nunca sujeto, porque se asume que la ciencias social es un conocimiento que algunos adquieren para sistematizar e interpretar de manera cientca lo que otros son, gureo y pueden.

En efecto, ¿cuo se ha pensado que los indios de una tribu amaza o los campesinos mayas de Yucattengan algo que decir en relacion las ciencias sociales? Se supone, sque ellos deberaportar informacique ellos mismos son datos. Si acaso se admite que sus aspiraciones, sus "necesidades sentidas" deben ser conocidas por el investigador social y habrde tomarse en cuenta en la organizacie los planes de desarrollo. Pero no pasa por la mente la - idea de que puedan aportar algo a la "manera de pensar" la -ciencias social.

Veamos ahora otro aspecto del problema. Un rasgo comtodos los esfuerzos para encontrar alternativas socio culturales para el desarrollo, consiste en la afirmacie que todos los sectores involucrados en el proceso deben participar activamente en Esta participacie quiere consciente y profundamente motivada. No basta con la participaciasiva del informante que simplemente responde cuestiona r de entrevista; tampoco con la pura participacisalariada de los individuos que aportan su mano de obra para la ejecucie los proyectos. Se pretende lograr una participacireativa, que ponga en juego todas las capacidades individuales y sociales, tanto en la concepciomo en la ejecucie las actividades encaminadas al desarrollo. No se trata de que la gente aprenda por imitacisino de que desarrolle, saque de s! y acreciente el enorme caudal de sus potencialidades creativas. Es un proceso interno, endo, en el que se insertaran oportunamente y conforme resulten necesarios los conocimientos y las habilidades desarrollados por so ciudades tecnolamente mavanzadas.

Si esto es valido para la tecnology para la organizacie trabajo, ¿como Puede expresarse en el ito del conocimiento social? ¿Hay una Ciencia social recuperable en todo grupo que posee una cultura distintiva? Si hay tecnolog paralelas o alternativas ¿hay tambiciencias sociales paralelas y alternativas? ¿Se puede insertar en el tronco de las ciencias sociales "nativas" el conocimiento de las ciencias sociales reconocidas y legitimadas, o solo cabe, en este terreno, la traducciel conocimiento? Estamos en un campsbaloso en el que ciencia e ideologno se pueden separar flmente. Pero, a fin de cuentas, no es un problema esencialmente diferente del que se nos presenta cuando discutimos sobre tecnologagrla o pricas mcas.

De hecho la necesidad de rescatar el conocimiento social propio es mucho mas apremiante e indispensable que la de recuperar muchas otras arcas del conocimiento endo. No se conciben alternativas socioculturales al desarrollo que no impliquen el reconocimiento y la legitimidad de un modelo de sociedad propio y tal modelo solo puede formularse a partir de una concepciistematizada y organizada de lo que es la sociedad, de co» se transforma y porqude cuha sido su historia y cuales sus recursos para construir el futuro. Se trata, pues, de una sociologo si se prefiere, de una "etno sociolog.

Apuntemos ahora algunos aspectos relevantes para el problema de como rescatar y desarrollar esa sociologenda y como vincularla fructramente con las ciencias sociales reconocidas por la tradiciominante.

Toda sociedad posee y emplea un determinado conocimiento sobre si misma y sobre las demsociedades con las -que estn relaciEste conocimiento le permite a los miembros del grupo normar y justificar su conducta en el seno de la propia sociedad y ante quienes no pertenecen a ella.

Cada sistema conceptual y explicativo de la realidad social incluye los criterios que permiten clasificar en categor sociales significativas a todos los individuos, -pertenezcan ano al grupo. Al interior del sistema social, el conjunto articulado de categor sociales reconocidas expresa las atribuciones de quienes integran cada una de ellas y presupone el tipo de relaciones posibles en el conjunto del sistema. El sistema de parentesco, por ejemplo, que a voces es muy complejo, debe ser conocido por cada miembro del grupo en muchas sociedades Indias latinoamericanas, porque es el co que le permite actuar en la forma prescrita en situaciones relevantes de la vida social. Es un co de relaciones sociales que implica derechos y deberes, reciprocidad y aseter entre quienes participan de Los mismo puede decir se de los sistemas de poder, de las formas de organizacierritorial, de las instituciones de trabajo colectivo y de los especialistas que tienen a su cargo funciones especificase en cada caso hay un conocimiento social que es indispensable para el funcionamiento de la sociedad.

La relacion otras sociedades tambiesta conceptualizada. En principio, todos los miembros del mismo grupo forman una categordistinta de la que se asigna a los miembros de otras sociedades. Frecuentemente, en grupos indios latinoamericanos, el tino que sirve como autodesignacion significa "los hombres" o "los hombres verdaderos"; los extrason clasificados en diversas categor que a veces revelan una ideologetnacrica, como en el caso del tino "chichimeca", que emplearon los pueblos de habla nahua del centro de Mco para designar a los grupos nas del norte y que tiene una fuerte carga despectiva. Este sistema de cate gorras tambicodifica el tipo de relaciones previsibles y expresa el conocimiento que se tiene de la posiciel grupo en relacion los dem No se trata de un conocimiento abstracto, sino que es el resultado de una historia concreta.

El conocimiento histco reviste una importancia particular para muchos pueblos indios latinoamericanos. La -historia no es solamente una secuencia de acontecimientos: es, ante todo, una explicacie la situaciresente y el fundamento para la imaginaciel futuro. La memoria hista, el conocimiento del devenir en el tiempo, mezcla frecuentemente el mito y la leyenda con el registro escrupuloso de los hechos pasados. Los puntos nodales de la historia, donde se gestaron los problemas que hoy se viven, reciben siempre una atencireferente. La historia, concebida en estos tinos amplios, conforma un sistema implto o explto de casualidades, que da cuenta del origen y las razones de los hechos.

Todo este conocimiento sistemco (sobre el cuno es este el lugar para abundar) es un conocimiento cambiante, dinco; las nuevas realidades son asimiladas dentro del sistema cognoscitivo. Se trata de un conocimiento acumulativo que tiene una funcionalidad permanente. Los miembros del grupo social recurren a constantemente para guiar su conducta y entender la de loa otros. Es un conocimiento vivo que se sume te a prueba cotidianamente.

¿Estnstitucionalizado el conocimiento social entre los pueblos indoamericanos del presente? Al abordar este tema debe recordarse que la dominaciolonial arrasn las instituciones y con los especialistas que existieron, indudablemente, al menos en las sociedades pre-coloniales mavanzadas. El conocimiento social se mantiene hoy en forma di fusa, sin una estructuracixplta y sin que sea fl - identificar instituciones especialmente dedicadas a su cultivo y enriquecimiento. El reciente surgimiento de organizaciones polcas Indias, sin embargo, esta generando condiciones que estimulan la aparicie una nueva intelectualidad India preocupada por recuperar el conocimiento tradicional en todos los campos y actualizarlo de manera sistematice. Este problema lo discutiron mentor atencin paginas siguientes.

Hesta ahora he hablado de conocimiento social y he evitado cuidadosamente emplear el termino "ciencia social.. En la tradiciccidental el concepto de ciencia tiene una connotaciestrictiva y se refiere solamente a un tipo particular de conocimiento que cumple ciertos requisitos (1). El conocimiento cientco aspira, por ejemplo, a tener validez universal; es un conocimiento institucionalizado y presupone ademuna condicispecifica: la ciencia reflexiona sobre a! misma y no solo sobre su objeto de conocimiento. En el camp las ciencias sociales el problema se complica particularmente en lo que se refiere a su validez universal. Es difl imaginar siquiera un acuerdo absoluto entre los especialistas en ciencias sociales acerca de un conjunto significativa y coherente de verdades cientcas en sus respectivos campos de especializaciEn ciencias sociales las ideolog se aproximan muy cercanamente al conocimiento cientco; para algunos, incluso, es imposible establecer una separaciigurosa: la manera de prevernirse contra la subjetividad ideologizante ser precisamente, hacer explta la - ideolog para que la investigaciisma y sus resultados pudieran ser siempre entendidos en relacion ella. Cuando se plantea el problema del conocimiento socia, tradicional, y siempre teniendo como punto de referencia a las sociedades in doamericanas, su relacion la ideologaparece como un - primer problema a resolver. Todo mundo tiene una ideolog pero no todo mundo tiene ni maneja un conocimiento cientco.

Se tienda a pensar que las sociedades a las que nos estamos refiriendo viven una etapa pre-cientca. Se reconoce, obviamente, que poseen conocimientos; que estos conocimientos son s para resolver los problemas inmediatos; - que derivan de la experiencia; que en muchos casos pueden ser vdos, verdaderos; pero que en a instancia no son cientcos, porque no reinen los requisitos que definen a ese tipo particular de conocimiento. Y cuando se habla de conocimiento social, se prefiere catalogarlo como ideolog mas - que como ciencia. Si acaso, se admite que pudiera ser una - "ciencia de lo concreto", por contradictorios que parezcan - los tinos.

Si lo anterior es cierto, la hipis de que es posible y necesario recuperar y desarrollar las ciencias sociales propias cae desde su base por falta de fundamento. En -efecto, si la ciencia es una y universal, no caben ciencias paralelas. Por otra parte, habrque reconocer que el desarrollo de los piases metropolitanos de tradiciccidental les ha permitido avanzar en la construccie la ciencia social y que, en consecuencia, la estrategia posible serla la de acelerar la transmisie este conocimiento a las sociedades que no lo han alcanzado por s! mismas. La di ferencia se daren el uso de tal conocimiento, en su empleo como arma para la liberaci no como recurso cada vez msofisticado al servicio de la dominaci

No parece muy discutir este tema en tinos demasiado abstractos. Hablamos de las ciencias sociales como son hoy y no como deber ser o, en todo caso, como podrser en algmento indeterminado del futuro. Lo cierto es que las ciencias sociales no han alcanzado el rigor y la universalidad de las ciencias fIsico-matemcas. Por ejemplo, la indeterminacie los fenos en muchos niveles de la realidad social es, para algunos, un dato de la realidad misma, en tanto que para otros es un problema de subdesarrollo de las ciencias sociales. La mayor parte del conocimiento que producen las ciencias sociales es casuica y ni siquiera - pretende tener una validez universal. En tales condiciones -¿quonocimiento cientco transferir a las sociedades que no tienen una ciencia social institucionalizada?

Quisiera relatar brevemente una experiencia personal que a mi manera de ver ilustra el problema. Recientemente dictn ciclo de conferencias sobre antropologmexicana ante un auditorio formado exclusivamente por estudiantes de origen indio. Quise presentar un panorama esquemco del desarrollo cientco de la antropologen mi paen lo que va del siglo. Eleg varias de las figuras nacionales mrepresentativas en nuestra disciplina y tomomo tema central y com ansis que cada autor habhecho de la problemca sociocultural de los pueblos indios. En la historia de la antropologmexicana estos autores ocupan un lugar destacado: son los pioneros, los "padres fundadores", los que inicia ron y desarrollaron nuestra propia tradicin ciencias antropolas (la que algunos han llamado escuela mexicana de antropolog. Intentresentar en que forma cada uno de - ellos habcontribuido, en su momento y de acuerdo a lascar constancias, a forjar una tradiciientca. Muy pronto, al iniciar el curso, tome conciencia de que estaba hablando ante estudiantes indios: les estaba refiriendo como los habian estudiado a ellos, como los hab conceptualizado, en base a un conocimiento cientco. Me sentotalmente absurdo. Los estudiantes reaccionaban con incredulidad y finalmen te con buen humor, a carcajada limpia. Alguno de ellos preg91;para quos obligan a estudiar estas tonter?; otro le respondiporqus necesario conocer el pensamiento del enemigo.. El enemigo: estmos hablando de don Manual Gamio, la figura mrespetada de la antropologmexicana, quien in medianamente despude la Revolucie 1910-17, en los aheroicos, participgnificativamente en la construcciacionalista y estudi manera particular la problemca indigenista. La reaccie los estudiantes indios cuestionaba totalmente las conclusiones de Gamio; pero, ¿ssus conclusiones? Porque, a fin de cuentas, as se alcanzaron mediante la aplicacie un mdo cientco. Acaso, entonces, lo que se cuestionaba era toda una disciplina, la manera misma de pensar la antropolog Despude todo, la antropologmexicana ha sido el fundamento cientco, siempre proclamado, de la polco indigenista; una polco orientada a la desindianizacies decir a la incorporacie los pueblos indios a la sociedad nacional. Para un grupo de estudiantes indios, el carer etnocida de los resultados invalidaba necesariamente todo el procedimiento, por rigurosamente cientifico que se reclamara. ¿Es a la ciencia social de la que deben apropiarse los pueblos indios?

Por otra parte es cierto que los pueblos dominados, los que han padecido la colonizacitienen de s! mismos y de la sociedad colonizadora una visiuertemente distorsionada que les ha sido impuesta y que en mayor o menor medida - han interiorizado. Esto, como se sabe, es un requisito del oen colonial, que busca la hegemony no sel poder de la fuerza. En tinos del problema que estamos discutiendo, esta situacimporta en la medida en que mediatiza el conocimiento objetivo de la realidad social. Las ciencias sociales desarrolladas por el colonizador y puestas al servicio del -mantenimientos del orden colonial enmascaran o desconocen sus verdaderos objetivos, su funciltima; pero dan cuenta de manera sistemca de las caractericas significativas de; las sociedades dominadas y dicen mucho tambide la organizaci el funcionamiento de la propia sociedad colonizadora. Particularmente este ultimo conocimiento, el que se refiere a la sociedad dominante, permanece inaccesible para los miembros de los pueblos colonizados. Y e es, sin duda, un cono cimiento il, necesario para orientar acertadamente las luchas de liberaci

No son pocos los intelectuales de pueblos colonizados o dominados que han adquirido un entrenamiento en ciencias sociales dentro de la tradiciccidental. El dominio de las disciplinas sociales, sin embargo, no se traduce necesariamente en un rescate del conocimiento social tradicional, en una sistematizacie las categor que se encuentran en el universo semico propio, ni en el desarrollo meto de un conocimiento de las sociedades dominantes desde la perspectiva de los pueblos sometidos. Con frecuencia se da una adopcicuca de la ciencia social occidental, que se convierte en una ca nueva pero igualmente ajena y mediatizadora para percibir la realidad social.

Un libro clco como Facing Mount Kenya, de Jomo Kenyatta, (2) nos revela como puede sistematizarse la experiencia existencial del investigador y como se logra entonces obtener una visiesde adentro, mucho mrica y precisa - qua que es dable alcanzar por un investigador extrapor acucioso que e sea. Con su lectura uno aprende, por ejemplo, que las categor sociales que emplean los gikuyu para conceptualizar sistemcamente su realidad social, han sido con frecuencia mal traducidas por los investigadores europeos, al emplear conceptos que tienen una connotacirecisa en la tradicie las ciencias sociales occidentales y aplicarlos a realidades parecidas, pero en a instancia diferentes, del universo gikuyu. El instrumental teo y metodolo de Kenyatta, sin embargo, es tambide raigambre occidental; 41 mismo, en algunos momentos, emplea categor que no corresponden al universo conceptual gikuyu para describir su sociedad y compararla, gruesamente, con las sociedades europeas. Pese a esto, Kenyatta nos ofrece una visinterior de la sociedad gikuyu en la que recupera la memoria individual y colectiva, las experiencias cotidianas, sus vivencias y, ante todo, la percepcie un mundo organizado que es muy diferente al que presentan las versiones de los investigadores extra Pero uno no conoce occidente en el libro de Kenyatta: no hay una reflexiistemca sobre el mundo del colonizador, malle las acciones que directamente insiden en el universo gikuyu. Se conocen los efectos, porque se viven; pero no se perciben sus causas, su gsis y las tendencias de las fuerzas que los producen.

Quisiera resumir estas inquietudes desordenadas en los siguientes tinos:

1) El conocimiento social cientco es un requisito necesario para que los diversos pueblos puedan imaginar y gestionar los proyectos de desarrollo que correspondan a su propia naturaleza histca;

2) la ciencia social institucionalizada, generada fundamentalmente en occidente, no tiene validez universal ni ofrece las respuestas alternativas que son indispensables;

3) el conocimiento social tradicional se presenta con frecuencia en forma no sistematizada ni institucionalizada y contiene, si acaso, una dl reflexiobre el proceso mismo de conocimiento;

4) una ciencia social necesaria deberpermitir no solamente el conocimiento de la propia sociedad, sino tambila comprensie las sociedades dominantes.

III. La formación de una intelectualidad India contemporánea.

En Amca Latina el proceso de dominaciobre - los pueblos indios despudel periodo de independencia nacional, ha estado fincado sobre un doble eje de relaciones: por una parte, la gran masa de la poblacindia ha permanecido al margen de los sectores "modernos" de las sociedades nacionales, sujeta a formas arcaicas y brutales de explotacico na, discriminada, sin acceso o con acceso muy restringido a servicios como la salud pa y la educaciscolar, por otra parte, aun en los piases mas rdamente estratificados sobre las icas, ha habido un proceso constante de asumocindividual, de cuantvariable, que desindianiza mediante la educacila urbanizaci el trabajo, a individuos que se desarraigan de sus comunidades nativas y pasan a formar parte de la sociedad no indio. La mayorde quienes forman los sectores desindianizados ocupa una posiciubalterna, en la base de la escala social; pocos, muy pocos, alcanzan posiciones superiores en el seno de la sociedad no india. Debido a las exigencias del mercado de mano de obra, los desindianizados son en su mayorgente joven, predominantemente hombres. El desarraigo comienza frecuentemente con migraciones temporales en busca de trabajo.

La expansiel sistema educativo capta, por otra parte, a un pequeontingente de la juventud India que prosigue su formaciscolar mas alle los primeros aen la instruccilemental y lo conduce a la ensea media y superior en instituciones urbanas localizadas fuera del ito indna. Pocos de los estudiantes formados a nivel medio o superior regresan a trabajar en sus comunidades de origen; esto se debe, por una parte, a la falta de empleos en las regiones indnas y, por otra, a la presiesindianizadora - que de manera sutil o compulsiva se ejerce sobre ellos a travde los mdiversos mecanismos y que los obliga a intentar asimilarse a la sociedad dominante. El proceso de asimilien es doloroso: se oculta el origen, se abandonan las lealtades, se cambia de nombre, se adoptan ostentosamente nuevas costumbres, se deja de ejercer y se desprecia la lengua meterna; pese a ello, casi nunca se alcanza la aceptacilena en el seno de la sociedad dominante.

En el caso de Mco, que conozco mejor, la desindianizacior el camino de la instrucciscolar comenzce ya varias ddas en forma sistemca e institucionalizada. Primero se abrieron internados indnas para que grupos selectos de jes indios se educaran en un contexto radicalmente distinto del suyo y se incorporaran a la cultura y a la sociedad dominantes. Madelante se establecieron programas de entrenamiento para formar promotores y ticos de nivel medio que deber regresar a sus comunidades para llevar a cabo programas de educaciaculturaci cambio tecnolo. En arecientes se ha ampliado considerablemente la formacie maestros indios para ensea primaria: en 1970 habalrededor de 4 mil; hoy suman mde 25 mil, de - los cuales un millar tienen formacin docencia superior.

El proyecto polco al formar a este crecido grupo de maestros promotores en distintos campos consisten cambiar la mentalidad India de los estudiantes, darles la educaciormal indispensable y los conocimientos ticos necesarios para el desempee sus tareas y, al final del proceso, reintroducilos en sus comunidades a fin de que actuaran como agentes de transformacien la confianza de que cumplir esta tarea mejor que los agentes no indios que se hab empleado en la primera etapa con pobres resultados. Se pensaba que ser aceptados sin mayor dificultad debido a que - eran originarios del propio grupo, manejaban la lengua y cono c la cultura local. De hecho una gran parte de los jes indios que han sido entrenados en este tipo de instituciones asimilaron cabalmente las enseas que el Estado les proporcionan sido desindianizados de tal manera que aprovechan la primera oportunidad que se presenta para abandonar definitivamente sus comunidades de origen y trasladarse a las ciuda des mestizas.

En arecientes se observa un nuevo feno. Han surgido varias organizaciones gremiales y polcas que estintegradas y dirigidas por jes profesionales indios y que levantan banderas en defensa de la cultura, la lengua y los derechos polcos basados en la identidad ica. Algunas de estas organizaciones tienen una base restringida y se enmarcan en el cuadro de luchas polcas locales. Otras tienen mayor amplitud, incluyen afiliados de grupos icos muy diversos y plantean su acci escala nacional. Una de las mimportantes estormada casi exclusivamente por maestros bilings decir, precisamente por jes indios que fueron so metidos a un proceso educativo encaminado a su desindianizacion (3).

La lucha polca de este grupo profesional parte del reconocimiento de la especificidad y la diferencia de los grupos indios, sus lenguas y sus culturas, en el contexto de la sociedad nacional. Ellos afirman que esa diferencia es legitima y que los problemas de los pueblos indios y, en general, de la sociedad mexicana, no son atribuibles a la existe cmisma del pluralismo ico, sino a las relaciones de dominaci la que estsometidos estos pueblos desde hace -500 a En consecuencia, plantean un proyecto pluralista - que abandone las tesis de la asimilaci la integraci que, en cambio, abra un espacio polco para los diversos grupos icos indios en el que se respeten y estimulen sus propias caractericas culturales y lingas. Dentro de esta perspectiva, en primer tino luchan por un tipo de educaciiferente al que hasta ahora se ha impuesto a las comunidades Indias del pa Han sedo:

"Con el desarrollo del sistema capitalista en nuestro pa desde la creaciel Servicio, nosotros, los maestros bilingpromotores culturales, hemos sido preparados para desempeel papel de intermediarios entre la sociedad nacional y los grupos icos; entre la cultura occidental y la cultura indna; hemos sido medianamente capacitados para desarrollar programas que responden a las necesidades y exigencias del sistema educativo nacional y no a las necesidades y caractericas sociales, lingas, econas y culturales de la poblacindna; hemos sido preparados para - trabajar en funcie los intereses del Estado y no de la. comunidades indnas."

"Un ansis critico de nuestro trabajo, no. permite hacer conciencia sobre el hecho de que carecemos de una filosofeducativa propia y que los contenidos y mdos de - trabajo aplicados en nuestros centros educativos, no son mque simples repeticiones de lo que la escuela de la ciudad ha ce y son completamente ajenos a nuestra realidad sociolinga, econa, cultural y en general, a nuestro propio concepto del mundo y de la vida".

"La educaciilingcultural que debemos instrumentar, no debe confundirse con las pricas de asimilaciincorporaci supuesta integracique se han venido realizando con nosotros los indnas y que constituyen el - marceolo dentro del cual la clase dominante, heredera del colonizador, pone de relieve la universalidad de su propia cultura y rebaja las aspiraciones de movilidad ascendente del indna a tinos individuales y no colectivos"

"La pedagogque se necesita dise tiene que estar enraizada en nuestro pasado y en el presente, porque aula mente en este retamar reflexivo podremos encontrar los caminos para salir de la situaciolonial; solamente as! encontrmos las ticas pedagas por medio de las cuales - aprenderemos a escribir nuestra vida, como autores y testigos de la historia".(4)

Un lenguaje semejante, con iguales aspiraciones, - con el mismo contenido sustantivo, se escucha cada vez mas no sen Mco sino en todos los piases latinoamericanos que cuentan con poblacindna (5). Maestros, dirigentes campesinos, profesionistas y universitarios de origen indio comienzan a participar en n creciente en diversas acciones reivindicados. La vergde ser indio, que caracterizmuchos de los jes educados escolarmente en ddas pasadas, estiendo sustituida por una afirmacie la identidad ica y por la consecuente demanda de respeto a la especificidad de los Pueblos indios. En el caso de Mco, el propio Estado ha dado recientemente un giro significativo a su polca educativa: la educaciiling durante muchos ase empleo como un mero recurso para facilitar la castellanizaci que fue considerada siempre como una actividad extraescolar, ajena a los programas unificados de ensea, es aceptada hay como una parte integrante del sistema educativo nacional. Maun, se ha reconocido oficialmente que la - educaciara la poblacindna del padebe ser bicultural y biling este momento el contenido preciso de ambos tinos y la manera en que habrde ponerse en prica, no son precisos; de hecho, las escuelas continuncionando en la misma forma en que lo ven haciendo y la mayorde los maestros no ha cambiado en nada sus mdos de ensea, fuertemente impregnados de las ideas integracionistas y orlen Lados a la anulaciefinitiva de las culturas y las lenguas Indias. Sin embargo, el cambio en el discurso de la polca educativa resulta por s! mismo importante porque abre la posibilidad institucional de introducir cambios substanciales en el sistema de instrucciscolar para la poblacindna.

La emergencia de una nueva intelectualidad india -plantea cuestiones sobre las que es importante reflexionar. En primer tino cabe el preguntarse por quurge en este momento una nueva intelectualidad que afirma su identidad india. No pretendo dar una respuesta exhaustiva que demandarla una investigaciigurosa (6). Me limito a apuntar los tacto res principales que parecen estar asociados a la emergencia de esta te intelectual.

En primer lugar, cabe recordar que el Estado creo, dentro del sistema educativo, un espacio institucional reservado exclusivamente a ticos y especialistas de origen indio, aunque sus funciones fueran precisamente las de hacer - viable el proyecto de desindianizacion. Simultamente, dise puso en practica una educacixtraescolar bilingque reconocimpltamente la especificidad de los pueblos indios. Aunque todo el aparato buscaba la aculturaci la asimilacitanto de los escolares como de los maestros y - promotores adiestrados para facilitar el proceso de cambio, la estructura econa y social de la sociedad mexicana, asomo las ideolog anti-indias de muchos sectores, actuaban como factores que restring e imped la asimilacie - los desindianizados. La propia sociedad dominante ofrecresistencias estructurales e ideolas a la incorporacie un n creciente de jes escolarizados de procedencia India. Por ejemplo, cuando eran pocos los maestros bilingn porcentaje relativamente elevado de ellos lograba, al cabo de pocos a su transferencia a escuela urbanas; pero cuando hablamos de mas de 25 mil maestros indios, las posiliares de ve" se reducen dricamente. En estas condiciones es fl que los maestros se planteen una alternativa diferente: la defensa y la ampliacie un sistema educativo exclusivo para la poblacindna que quedara necesariamente bajo su control. Este es el resultado de una practica institucionalizaste que tiende a volver permanente lo que habsido concebido como transitorio, al mismo tiempo que cambia el sentido y la finalidad misma de la practica Pero este proyecto tiene un pro-requisito ideolo y polco ineludible: que los maestros afirmen su indignidad y basen sus demandas en la legitimidad del pluralismo ico tanto en el presente como hacia el futuro. La profundidad de las culturas tradicionales, su capacidad probada de resistencia, su verdad como - formas de vida y pensamiento que han permitido la sobrevivencia de los pueblos indios tras casi cinco siglos de colonizacinutren con un contenido propio las demandas que pudieron originarse por intereses gremiales. Por otra parte, en el plano Internacional, la visibilidad polca de las minor icas y nacionales y la efervescencia de los debates ideolos al respecto, alientan las luchas Indias y llevan a sus filas a gente del mismo origen que estaba ya desarraigada y - permanecindiferente a este tipo de problemas y sumida en los conflictos individuales del desindianizado.(7)

Desde otro ulo, los problemas econos y sociales de las comunidades indnas, no solamente no han sido re sueltos por los proyectos desarrollistas y modernizantes seguidos hasta la fecha, sino que de hecho se agravan continuamente. Esta problemca aguda hace indispensable buscar alternativas, una de las cuales es precisamente la de hallar en las ras Indias, en las formas tradicionales que se consideraban anacras y retornadas, los elementos para cimentar un proyecto autico, fincado en primer tino en las fuerzas y en los recursos endos. Este conjunto de situaciones y procesos vendra constituir el marco causal del surgimiento de una nueva intelectualidad India.

Seria peligroso ignorar que en algunos casos existe una manipulacie la identidad India motivada por intereses individuales de poder polco y beneficio econo. Entre los maestros indnas es frecuente el caso de quienes aprovechan un salario que estuy por encima del promedio de ingresos local para ir capitalizando paulatinamente a troves del comercio, la usura o la compra de tierras. La defensa de la indignidad, en tales circunstancias, estarmorientada a legitimar el poder y la riqueza individuales, que a luchar - por un proyecto de desarrollo auto basado en la cultura india. Esto apunta hacia un problema que actualmente se debate por parte de algunos cientcos sociales y dirigentes polcos latinoamericanos: ¿existe o no una burguesIndia?; en caso afirmativo, ¿que papel juega y cual habre desempeesa burguesen el proceso de transformacie nuestras sociedades? No cabe en los limites de este trabajo ahondar sobre estas cuestiones; pero debe reconocerse que su esclarecimiento es indispensable.(8)

Una caracterica particularmente importante de la nueva intelectualidad India, es que su proceso de formacintelectual y profesional ha ocurrido en las instituciones - educativas de la sociedad dominante. Es gente que viene de re graso. Transit camino de la desindianizacion: asimilo los conocimientos, los valores y las practicas del mundo no indio; pasn algmento, por la etapa de la negaciotal de su ser indio, para despurecuperar su identidad, - afirmary luchar a partir de ella. Este proceso ha permitido a los nuevos intelectuales indios tener un conocimiento de la sociedad dominante y de la suya propia desde una perspectiva distinta a la que se adquiere en el seno mismo de las comunidades. Algunos de ellos tienen formacin ciencias sociales; los demtienen, al menos, la experiencia directa del mundo no indio y el conocimiento que se desprende de ella. Al re superar su identidad, al asumir (como dice Daroy Ribeiro) su propio rostro, habrde intentar tambirescatar su conocimiento social, pero enriquecido con el conocimiento sistematizado de la ciencia social dominante.

Esta nueva intelectualidad esta tomando a su cargo la formulacie una ideologIndia adecuada a los tiempos que corren. Intervienen como articuladores y expositores del pensamiento polco indio contemporo, a veces a troves de organizaciones que ellos mismos contribuyen a crear, a voces como lobos solitarios cuya obra, sin embargo, repercute entre los dirigentes y activistas del movimiento indio.

La tarea de construir una ideologexige un esfuerzo de legitimacies decir, que el proyecto polco - que se expresa en esa ideologdebe estar fundamentado de manera convincente para la clientela India potencial, pero tambipara los sectores desindianizados y aun para los no indios, en la medida en que se trata de un proyecto de transformacie la sociedad en su conjunto y no s610 del sector - constituidos por los pueblos indios. En este esfuerzo de legitimacie recurre constantemente a la argumentacin tinos de las ciencias sociales, pero se adopta un punto de - vista indio; es decir, se procura "indianizar" a las ciencias sociales. En este sentido, la nueva intelectualidad India de Amca Latina (como las intelectualidades nativas de Africa y Asta) enfrenta el problema de apropiarse de la ciencia social desarrollada en Occidente y, simultamente, transformarla crcamente para hacer posible lo que podros llamar su desarrollo endo (9). Este proceso implica, necesariamente, alguna forma de rescate del conocimiento social tradicional, lo que ideolamente resulta indispensable para - afirmar el carer indio del pensamiento que se construye.

IV. Notas para un proyecto de desarrollo endógeno de las ciencias sociales.

Estoy convencido de que hay muchos riesgos al generalizar y simplificar cuestiones tan complejas y diversas como las que he abordado - y sobre todo al hacerlo en la forma en que lo he hecho. Me ha sido imposible presentar aquen detalle, ejemplos variados de situaciones concretas, que hubiesen permitido alcanzar una visirica y matizada de los problemas reales. Creo, sin embargo, que no he traicionado la idea central, esto es: que el conocimiento social de la realidad social esta, en todos los casos, fincado en experiencias particulares; que es histco; que de esa concrecieriva precisamente su capacidad para orientar formas especificas de conducta; y que las ciencias sociales, que pretenden alcanzar validez universal, deben ser incorporadas a ese con cimiento social de la sociedad si han de contribuir eficazmente a la generacie proyectos de desarrollo propios y adecuados.

Estamos en un mundo en el que el contacto y la interaccie han generalizado. La construccie una ciencia propia, enda, no puede concebirse como un proceso insular, ajeno a las formas de conocimiento creadas por otras sociedades y particularmente por las que ejercen el poder y alcanzan la hegemon No es el aislamiento, sino la incorporacie todo lo valido y en una trama de conocimiento propia y dinca, lo que permitirn verdadero desarrollo de las - - ciencias sociales puestas al servicio de un proyecto endo. Por la misma razampoco es posible refugiarse en un co "dejar hacer", con la esperanza de que el juego libre de las circunstancias habre producir, como resultado final - ineludible, la armoniosa sesis del conocimiento propio y la ciencia universal. No es as{, ante todo porque no hay tal chunga libre": por lo menos no lo hay para los pueblos sometos, que padecen formas diversas de colonizaciSe plantea entonces la necesidad de generar y/o apoyar acciones que tiendan a estimular el desarrollo de un conocimiento social que sea, a la vez, propio y cientco.

En este sentido podr proponerse varios objetivos:

a) La institucionalizaciU> del conocimiento social tradicional. La construccie un conocimiento cientco - contemporo exige que e sea institucionalizado. Son necesarias instituciones originales, adecuadas a las formas de organizaci a las condiciones actuales de cada grupo. Una - condicibvia: las nuevas instituciones habrde estar contratadas e integradas por miembros del propio grupo (ser- indias, no indigenistas); hay ya una larga experiencia de casas de la cultura" y "centros de estudios" que, a primera vista, cumplen la funcie dar una base institucional al conocimiento tradicional; pero se trata de proyectos creados para los indios y no por los indios.

El proceso de institucionalizacis un requisito indispensable para construir la base enda de las ciencias sociales propias, porque permitirsistematizar y formalizar el conocimiento tradicional de la realidad socio-hista; legitimarlo hacia el interior y el exterior; acrecentarlo; di fundirlo incorporarle los conocimientos teos, metodolas y factuales de las ciencias sociales convencionales; re producirlo, formando sus propios especialistas.

b) El digo indio entre el conocimiento tradicional y la ciencia social contempora. La puesta en marcha de un proyecto de institucionalizaciel conocimiento social tradicional requiere el reclutamiento de dos tipos de especia listas: los que portan el conocimiento tradicional (los sabios que conocen la historia, las leyendas, los mitos; los dirigentes que han conducido las luchas del pueblo; los especia listas en actividades tradicionales; los testigos de acontecimientos importantes) y los que han adquirido una formacin ciencias sociales en las escuelas de la sociedad dominante, pero que no perdieron, o han recuperado, su indignidad; son los miembros de la nueva intelectualidad India. El trabajo conjunto de unos y otros garantiza el dialogo constante entre el saber tradicional y la reflexiientca contempora, pero en el marco existencial e ideolo del pueblo indio. No se trata de hacer de los sabios tradicionales los "informantes" del cientco social ( papel que les asigna la ciencia dominante), sino de reconocerlos como interlocutores y mentores de los "nuevos indios" que construyen el conocimiento y el pensamiento indio actual.

c) La participacinstitucional en las diversas fases de los proyectos de desarrollo. Se trata de que el cono cimiento social propio generado en formstitucional desempel papel que se le asigna a las ciencias sociales en los programas de desarrollo. No sen los programas oficiales impuestos desde afuera, sino fundamentalmente en la gestacie los proyectos propios. Hay un doble auditorio, un doble - consumidor para los productos del trabajo institucional: las agencias de desarrollo que actualmente recurren a los especia listas ajenos al grupo, y el grupo mismo, que es el mas importante y es el destinatario que debe tener prioridad absoluta.

Tal vez proyectos orientados en esta forma contribuyan efectivamente a consolidar el conocimiento cada vez mas riguroso de la realidad social, de acuerdo con las necesita; des y perspectivas histcas de civilizaciue cada pueblo posee y que orientaran su verdadero desarrollo (10).