The Potential of Civil Regulation for the South
Much of the evidence provided for the emergence of civil
regulation as a driver of corporate responsibility for environmental protection
in the South involves Northern NGOs and transnational business. Although many of
the corporate responses to environmental issues have occurred as a result of
protest by groups and communities in the South, the role of Northern NGOs in
facilitating civil regulation has been key. We have argued that in most cases it
is consumer politics in Northern industrialized markets that compels companies
to take action. Therefore one must question the potential for civil regulation
to be replicated in different countries, particularly for businesses involved in
domestic or international trade where the market does not feature well-developed
consumer politics.
There are some signs that consumer politics is beginning to
penetrate parts of the non-Western world. A joint Chile/Japan project to educate
Japanese consumers on the problems with the woodchip trade is one example.
Another is the growth of national eco-labelling schemes in Taiwan, Japan and
South Korea. These examples suggest that some progress is being made in building
consumer and corporate awareness in these key markets.
However, there is much evidence to the contrary. In the case of
forestry, Northern business support for the FSC has not stopped Asian companies
with poor management practices from increasing their logging activities in
tropical forests. The growing demand for timber in the emerging economies does
not appear to be matched by growing consumer politics. Even as Northern-based
companies in other sectors develop higher social and environmental standards for
their operations in the South, their Asian or Latin American competitors are
likely to continue to cut corners when supplying Southern markets. This means
that civil regulation, as expressed through certification and labelling schemes,
may merely serve to shift international trading patterns and have little affect
on environmental protection or sustainable development in the South.
Despite the limited extent of consumer politics, Southern NGOs
are beginning to become involved directly in civil regulation schemes (rather
than contributing to Northern NGO-administered civil regulation through protest
and conflict). The case of Shell approaching the Peruvian NGO RAP to monitor its
operations in the Camisea region suggests that the civil regulation model is
beginning to emerge in the South. At the same time, however, many other NGOs,
activist groups and indigenous peoples organizations continue to challenge
Shells activities in Nigeria and Peru. More research is needed on the
capacity and desire of Southern NGOs to take on such monitoring roles.
More research on the business response to citizen action in
South is also necessary. Charles Reillys review of Latin American NGOs
notes complex sets of national and international relationships but
offers no examples of formal business-NGO collaboration (1995:248). However,
Brian Loveman suggests that environmentally-focused NGOs in Chile
are more likely to make demands upon government and nongovernmental actors
(e.g. business) as a lobby... or interest group (1995:126).
Throughout much of the South, many differences still remain
between the commitment and capacity of national versus global business on
environmental matters. A 1995 survey on public perceptions of economic reforms
conducted by the Consumer Unity and Trust Society in India and Nepal came
across a universal opinion, not withstanding Bhopal, that TNCs are better at
environmental management than domestic entrepreneurs, because of their track
record and circumstances at home (Mehta, 1997, personal communication).
This seems logical, given our argument that much of the impetus
for corporate environmentalism comes from the growing strength of civil society
and consumer politics in the North. Where there is limited demand for
environmental responsibility in the home nation, companies are more likely to
continue to behave irresponsibly. It could be said that the forest communities
of Papua New Guinea and other South Pacific countries are suffering the
consequences of limited environmental awareness and consumer politics in
Malaysia, Indonesia and Japan.
Meanwhile, most Southern NGOs continue to have little or no
experience of co-operative relations with big business, either national or
global. There is also little evidence in the literature of Southern business
embracing civil society as allies. Mutual prejudices will take time to overcome.
Co-Chair for civil society on the Philippine Council for Sustainable
Development, Nicanor Perlas, explains that:
The thawing of the lines between business and civil
society is fairly recent. Bridges are still being built. Trust is still being
developed. Common policy agendas are still being nurtured. It may be some time
before actual partnerships emerge (Perlas, 1997, personal
communication).
In a similar vein, Miguel D. de Oliveira and Rajesh Tandon
believe that: in the countries of the South, NGOs... have so far had
little contact with the emerging initiatives of corporate philanthropy
(1994:3). As and when Southern businesses expand their efforts in the areas of
corporate community involvement and environmental protection, Southern NGOs and
base groups may find themselves in the company of new partners.
In addition to developing collaborative relations with industry,
to be effective, civil society needs to perform a watchdog role competently.
However, the ability to organize, take direct action and speak loudly and freely
is often not protected by government. In many countries, governments actively
undermine NGO efforts to take on these roles:
The recent murders of green activists in Honduras,
Columbia and even Costa Rica (a country which prides itself on its environmental
awareness) are reminders that environmental campaigns can strike at the heart of
political and corporate power (Collinson, 1996:1).
Without the ability to wield the stick, Southern
NGOs and communities will not be able to realize the benefits of civil
regulation. Helen Collinson argues that the main failure here is government
inability or unwillingness to exercise responsible force:
One reason why Latin American environmental
campaigners are more vulnerable than their fellow activists in Europe or North
America is that Latin Americas democratic and judicial institutions are
still weak and protesters often have limited recourse to the law
(1996:1).
This reminds us that NGOs do not have the same power as
governments, as they do not have a universal monopoly on the use of force. They
do not have the ability to impose fines or other penalties. The power of NGOs
lies in the use of the marketplace to boycott a companys products, or
affect its staff morale or investor confidence. This market power is usually
limited to societies with well-organized consumer politics. It also depends on
the ability of NGOs to communicate their message effectively to consumers, and
this usually requires substantial resources. Where NGOs do not have sufficient
financial and communications resources, they may be constrained in their
capacity to use the stick of consumer boycotts or mobilizing
dissent. This may not be only a matter of limited access to information
technology. Unlike many large Northern NGOs, most Southern NGOs do not have the
in-house public relations capacity to challenge slick corporate PR campaigns -
such as Burson-Marstellers recent efforts to undermine the indigenous
peoples campaign against Aracruz Cellulose.
It appears, then, that for Southern NGOs to become active in
civil regulation they need to be linked with supportive NGOs in countries with
developed consumer politics. The Shell Nigeria example also reminds us that
Southern campaigning on its own is not always effective in changing corporate
practices. Protests by local Delta communities against the operations of Shell
began in the late 1980s. Shells responsibility for the plight of the Ogoni
became an issue for consumer politics in the North much later. Global civil
society alliances backed up by activist companies and an attentive media are
also key determinants of effective NGO campaigning and civil regulation.
The need for North-South alliances between NGOs is an indication
of the democratic deficit Southern civil society currently faces with civil
regulation mechanisms. The cases examined in part 1 demonstrate that the power
to regulate corporate activity in the South resides in the North. To influence
the behaviour of global corporations or their subsidiaries, Southern civil
society must make contact with Northern civil society and then persuade them of
their grievances and their alternatives. Many Southern NGO campaigners argue
that Northern NGOs impose solutions on them, demonstrating an approach which
could be described as ethical imperialism. In order to overcome this problem,
Southern NGO participation in policy development must be facilitated. This poses
a logistical and financial challenge that many Northern NGOs appear reluctant to
meet. However, as the civil regulation agenda develops, more questions will be
asked of Northern NGOs relating to their legitimacy in negotiating on behalf of
developing country communities: unlike pandas and whales, people can speak for
themselves. Therefore NGOs seeking greater legitimacy for collaborative business
campaigns will require greater Southern civil society input in the future.
Despite the many concerns about the limits of civil regulation
outlined above, this new policy instrument holds some promise for reducing the
social and ecological footprint of Northern economies on the rest of the world.
Other complementary measures will no doubt be needed to regulate companies in
the future, particularly those based in the South. Although many political
battles may lie ahead, particularly in multilateral bodies such as the WTO, the
ILO and the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, there is
growing recognition of the need for a wider range of regulatory tools to monitor
corporate performance on social and environmental
matters.