![]() | The Long Road to Recovery: Community Responses to Industrial Disasters (UNU, 1996, 307 p.) |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Note to the reader from the UNU |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | 1 Improving community responses to industrial disasters |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | The nature of industrial disaster |
![]() | ![]() | Industrial disaster burdens |
![]() | ![]() | The evolution of responses |
![]() | ![]() | Routine disasters |
![]() | ![]() | Surprises |
![]() | ![]() | Coping with surprise |
![]() | ![]() | Reducing the impact of industrial disaster surprises: The range of choice |
![]() | ![]() | Recovering from surprise |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 2 Responses to Minamata disease |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Who are the victims of Minamata disease? |
![]() | ![]() | Official recognition of Minamata disease and the initial response |
![]() | ![]() | Chisso's grip on the local community |
![]() | ![]() | The making of Minamata |
![]() | ![]() | Environmental destruction before Minamata disease |
![]() | ![]() | Neglect in preventing the spread of disease |
![]() | ![]() | Manoeuvres to avoid a ban on fishing |
![]() | ![]() | Obstacles to identifying the cause of Minamata disease |
![]() | ![]() | Efforts to halt the dumping of contaminated wastes |
![]() | ![]() | Problems associated with relief and reparations |
![]() | ![]() | Relief |
![]() | ![]() | Reparations |
![]() | ![]() | Measures to aid the fisheries |
![]() | ![]() | How the local community suppressed the victims |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | Editor's postscript |
![]() | ![]() | Chronology |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 3 Environmental contamination, community transformation, and the Centralia mine fire |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Centralia: A dependent town |
![]() | ![]() | The Centralia mine fire |
![]() | ![]() | A stage model of industrial contamination |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | Implications |
![]() | ![]() | Recommendations |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 4 Seveso: A paradoxical classic disaster |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Overview |
![]() | ![]() | The chemical release |
![]() | ![]() | Dioxin |
![]() | ![]() | The Seveso Directive |
![]() | ![]() | The European Community's institutional response to Seveso |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | The Directive and its annexes |
![]() | ![]() | Other institutional effects of the Seveso Directive |
![]() | ![]() | The lessons of Seveso |
![]() | ![]() | A model for managing uncertainty |
![]() | ![]() | Modelling the Seveso disaster |
![]() | ![]() | Modelling the Seveso Directive |
![]() | ![]() | Modelling the Karin B incident |
![]() | ![]() | A moral paradox |
![]() | ![]() | A scientific paradox |
![]() | ![]() | Industrial accidents, industrial society, and recovery |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion: ''Seveso'' - A paradoxical symbol |
![]() | ![]() | Acknowledgements |
![]() | ![]() | Chronology |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 5 Long-term recovery from the Bhopal crisis |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | The Bhopal toxic gas leak crisis |
![]() | ![]() | Antecedents and failures |
![]() | ![]() | Inside the plant |
![]() | ![]() | Outside the plant |
![]() | ![]() | A multiple-perspectives understanding of crises |
![]() | ![]() | Recovery of the victims and their community |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Medical recovery |
![]() | ![]() | Economic recovery |
![]() | ![]() | Struggle for compensation |
![]() | ![]() | Victims remain victims |
![]() | ![]() | Recovery of Union Carbide |
![]() | ![]() | Financial restructuring |
![]() | ![]() | Legal battles and the ''sabotage'' defence |
![]() | ![]() | Recovery of the government |
![]() | ![]() | Political management of the crisis |
![]() | ![]() | Learning by government institutions |
![]() | ![]() | Implications for long-term disaster recovery |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Crisis morphology |
![]() | ![]() | The permanence of victims |
![]() | ![]() | Revising stage models of disasters |
![]() | ![]() | Policy implications |
![]() | ![]() | Note |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 6 Iranian recovery from industrial devastation during war with Iraq |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Military and strategic context |
![]() | ![]() | Impacts of the war on human health and long-term habitability of the region |
![]() | ![]() | Human losses |
![]() | ![]() | Environmental damage |
![]() | ![]() | Damage to human settlements and the economy |
![]() | ![]() | Recovery from war |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | National reconstruction plans |
![]() | ![]() | Support from international organizations and local communities |
![]() | ![]() | Urban reconstruction |
![]() | ![]() | Housing reconstruction |
![]() | ![]() | Industrial reconstruction |
![]() | ![]() | Conceptual framework for a model of post-war reconstruction and industrial hazard recovery |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | A reconstruction strategy |
![]() | ![]() | The reconstruction process |
![]() | ![]() | Improving recovery and policy implications |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 7 The Chernobyl disasters Its effect on Belarus and Ukraine |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | The accident and its immediate aftermath |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | The accident is ''under control'' |
![]() | ![]() | Focus on the West |
![]() | ![]() | International cooperation |
![]() | ![]() | The affected community |
![]() | ![]() | Regeneration and recovery |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Victim action groups |
![]() | ![]() | International aid |
![]() | ![]() | Towards a model for nuclear and industrial accidents |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Stages of crisis management |
![]() | ![]() | Three Mile Island, 1979 |
![]() | ![]() | The international nuclear energy industry's response to Chernobyl |
![]() | ![]() | Summary |
![]() | ![]() | Suggestions for a general model of recovery from industrial accidents |
![]() | ![]() | Acknowledgement |
![]() | ![]() | Chronology |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Media sources |
![]() | ![]() | 8 The Exxon Valdez oil spill, Alaska |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | The oil industry and the spill |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | The accident |
![]() | ![]() | Historical and cultural contexts |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | The Katmai eruption |
![]() | ![]() | The great Alaskan earthquake |
![]() | ![]() | The oil spill: Community impact |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Psychological, social, and cultural impacts |
![]() | ![]() | The villages |
![]() | ![]() | Town responses |
![]() | ![]() | Recovery |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Litigation initiatives |
![]() | ![]() | The communities |
![]() | ![]() | Organizational responses |
![]() | ![]() | New risks |
![]() | ![]() | Other kinds of recovery activities |
![]() | ![]() | But, what is recovery? |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | Chronology of the first 10 days |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 9 Signposts on the road to recovery |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Surprising events and disquieting outcomes |
![]() | ![]() | Responding effectively to industrial disaster surprises |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Awareness |
![]() | ![]() | Information |
![]() | ![]() | Action |
![]() | ![]() | Recommendations |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Contributors |
Directives are one type of legislation issued by the European Community. Others include regulations, decisions, recommendations, and opinions. Some of these are binding on the 12 European states that make up the Community,4 while others are not. Several different units of the Community are involved in the process of legislating a directive (table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Units of the European Community involved in legislating a directive
European Community Unit |
Characteristics |
Commission |
Seventeen members appointed by 12 Member State governments for
four years. |
Council |
Twelve representatives, one from each Member State government;
presidency rotates among countries every six months. |
European Parliament |
Elected by peoples of the EC for five-year term according to each
Member State's electoral system (518 members in 1992). |
European Court of Justice |
Thirteen judges appointed by agreement among Member State
governments for six-year terms. Assisted by six
advocates-general. |
Economic and Social Committee |
Assists the Council and the Commission with European Economic
Community and European Atomic Energy Community matters; 189 members from various
economic and social sectors. |
The path for adopting a directive is as follows.5 The Commission presents a proposal to the Council. After consultation with the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee (whose opinions must be heard even if they are not strictly binding), the Council may formally adopt the proposal. After adoption, an EC directive is not immediately applicable to a Member State. Individual states must incorporate the directive into national legislation and take all the necessary measures for compliance within a specified period. Such a procedure allows for effective implementation, while respecting different juridical and administrative traditions. If a Member State fails to comply, the Commission may bring a case before the European Court of Justice.
In practice, the process of arriving at the directive on major accident hazards was long and complex. Technical and political problems required extended consultations among different parties and institutions. A proposal was finally presented by the Commission to the Council in July 1979. The required opinions of the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee were expressed in 1980 and it took two more years of further consulting and discussion before a directive was finally adopted, on 24 June 1982, 8 January 1984 being the anticipated deadline for implementation by the 10 EC Member States of that time. Directive 82/501/EEC soon became known as the Seveso Directive, despite opposition from Seveso residents, who formally complained to EC authorities in Brussels about what they perceived as an implied insult.
Before the Seveso Directive, manufacturers in different Member States were subject to obligations of varying stringency. For example, the submission of a safety report by the manufacturer responsible for a hazardous installation was not mandatory in all countries. Therefore, the Directive's main purpose was to ensure harmonization of regulations among different countries. This was achieved by establishing minimal EC requirements and permitting Member States to enforce stricter regulations. Such a general purpose is consistent with the overall EC policy on environmental health and safety matters. It is instructive to review the Directive's major components.