![]() | The Long Road to Recovery: Community Responses to Industrial Disasters (UNU, 1996, 307 p.) |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Note to the reader from the UNU |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | 1 Improving community responses to industrial disasters |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | The nature of industrial disaster |
![]() | ![]() | Industrial disaster burdens |
![]() | ![]() | The evolution of responses |
![]() | ![]() | Routine disasters |
![]() | ![]() | Surprises |
![]() | ![]() | Coping with surprise |
![]() | ![]() | Reducing the impact of industrial disaster surprises: The range of choice |
![]() | ![]() | Recovering from surprise |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 2 Responses to Minamata disease |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Who are the victims of Minamata disease? |
![]() | ![]() | Official recognition of Minamata disease and the initial response |
![]() | ![]() | Chisso's grip on the local community |
![]() | ![]() | The making of Minamata |
![]() | ![]() | Environmental destruction before Minamata disease |
![]() | ![]() | Neglect in preventing the spread of disease |
![]() | ![]() | Manoeuvres to avoid a ban on fishing |
![]() | ![]() | Obstacles to identifying the cause of Minamata disease |
![]() | ![]() | Efforts to halt the dumping of contaminated wastes |
![]() | ![]() | Problems associated with relief and reparations |
![]() | ![]() | Relief |
![]() | ![]() | Reparations |
![]() | ![]() | Measures to aid the fisheries |
![]() | ![]() | How the local community suppressed the victims |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | Editor's postscript |
![]() | ![]() | Chronology |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 3 Environmental contamination, community transformation, and the Centralia mine fire |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Centralia: A dependent town |
![]() | ![]() | The Centralia mine fire |
![]() | ![]() | A stage model of industrial contamination |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | Implications |
![]() | ![]() | Recommendations |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 4 Seveso: A paradoxical classic disaster |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Overview |
![]() | ![]() | The chemical release |
![]() | ![]() | Dioxin |
![]() | ![]() | The Seveso Directive |
![]() | ![]() | The European Community's institutional response to Seveso |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | The Directive and its annexes |
![]() | ![]() | Other institutional effects of the Seveso Directive |
![]() | ![]() | The lessons of Seveso |
![]() | ![]() | A model for managing uncertainty |
![]() | ![]() | Modelling the Seveso disaster |
![]() | ![]() | Modelling the Seveso Directive |
![]() | ![]() | Modelling the Karin B incident |
![]() | ![]() | A moral paradox |
![]() | ![]() | A scientific paradox |
![]() | ![]() | Industrial accidents, industrial society, and recovery |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion: ''Seveso'' - A paradoxical symbol |
![]() | ![]() | Acknowledgements |
![]() | ![]() | Chronology |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 5 Long-term recovery from the Bhopal crisis |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | The Bhopal toxic gas leak crisis |
![]() | ![]() | Antecedents and failures |
![]() | ![]() | Inside the plant |
![]() | ![]() | Outside the plant |
![]() | ![]() | A multiple-perspectives understanding of crises |
![]() | ![]() | Recovery of the victims and their community |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Medical recovery |
![]() | ![]() | Economic recovery |
![]() | ![]() | Struggle for compensation |
![]() | ![]() | Victims remain victims |
![]() | ![]() | Recovery of Union Carbide |
![]() | ![]() | Financial restructuring |
![]() | ![]() | Legal battles and the ''sabotage'' defence |
![]() | ![]() | Recovery of the government |
![]() | ![]() | Political management of the crisis |
![]() | ![]() | Learning by government institutions |
![]() | ![]() | Implications for long-term disaster recovery |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Crisis morphology |
![]() | ![]() | The permanence of victims |
![]() | ![]() | Revising stage models of disasters |
![]() | ![]() | Policy implications |
![]() | ![]() | Note |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 6 Iranian recovery from industrial devastation during war with Iraq |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Military and strategic context |
![]() | ![]() | Impacts of the war on human health and long-term habitability of the region |
![]() | ![]() | Human losses |
![]() | ![]() | Environmental damage |
![]() | ![]() | Damage to human settlements and the economy |
![]() | ![]() | Recovery from war |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | National reconstruction plans |
![]() | ![]() | Support from international organizations and local communities |
![]() | ![]() | Urban reconstruction |
![]() | ![]() | Housing reconstruction |
![]() | ![]() | Industrial reconstruction |
![]() | ![]() | Conceptual framework for a model of post-war reconstruction and industrial hazard recovery |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | A reconstruction strategy |
![]() | ![]() | The reconstruction process |
![]() | ![]() | Improving recovery and policy implications |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 7 The Chernobyl disasters Its effect on Belarus and Ukraine |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | The accident and its immediate aftermath |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | The accident is ''under control'' |
![]() | ![]() | Focus on the West |
![]() | ![]() | International cooperation |
![]() | ![]() | The affected community |
![]() | ![]() | Regeneration and recovery |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Victim action groups |
![]() | ![]() | International aid |
![]() | ![]() | Towards a model for nuclear and industrial accidents |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Stages of crisis management |
![]() | ![]() | Three Mile Island, 1979 |
![]() | ![]() | The international nuclear energy industry's response to Chernobyl |
![]() | ![]() | Summary |
![]() | ![]() | Suggestions for a general model of recovery from industrial accidents |
![]() | ![]() | Acknowledgement |
![]() | ![]() | Chronology |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Media sources |
![]() | ![]() | 8 The Exxon Valdez oil spill, Alaska |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | The oil industry and the spill |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | The accident |
![]() | ![]() | Historical and cultural contexts |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | The Katmai eruption |
![]() | ![]() | The great Alaskan earthquake |
![]() | ![]() | The oil spill: Community impact |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Psychological, social, and cultural impacts |
![]() | ![]() | The villages |
![]() | ![]() | Town responses |
![]() | ![]() | Recovery |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Litigation initiatives |
![]() | ![]() | The communities |
![]() | ![]() | Organizational responses |
![]() | ![]() | New risks |
![]() | ![]() | Other kinds of recovery activities |
![]() | ![]() | But, what is recovery? |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | Chronology of the first 10 days |
![]() | ![]() | Notes |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 9 Signposts on the road to recovery |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Surprising events and disquieting outcomes |
![]() | ![]() | Responding effectively to industrial disaster surprises |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Awareness |
![]() | ![]() | Information |
![]() | ![]() | Action |
![]() | ![]() | Recommendations |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Contributors |
Our model of uncertainty management is also reflected in the regulations of the Seveso Directive. The main concern here is with communication:
Member States shall ensure that information on
safety measures and on the correct behaviour to adopt in the case of an accident
is supplied in an appropriate manner, and without their having to request it, to
persons liable to be affected by the major accident originating in a notified
industrial activity within the meaning of Article 5. The information should be
repeated and updated at appropriate intervals. It shall also be made publicly
available. Such information shall contain that laid down in Annex VII. (Article
8 of Directive 88/610/EEC, amending Directive 82/501/EEC)
This portion of the Directive reflects concerns about several sorts of uncertainty. First, there is an attempt to institute progressive reduction of scientific uncertainty via updating requirements. Second, the various phrases that call for effective implementation of the public's right to know show clear awareness of the need to confront problems of institutional uncertainty and proprietary uncertainty. Moreover, the very existence of the Directive, particularly Article 8, underscores heightened awareness of legal/moral uncertainty, for the Seveso event showed that simple "accidents," or "acts of God," are not the most important problems affecting the safety of industrial installations and surrounding communities.
When we consider the implementation of the hazard communication requirements of Article 8, we find that the model illuminates practice. First, actual EC regulations seem to assume that societal and institutional uncertainties are not salient or severe. Nor do they deal with the possibility of situational uncertainty (i.e. less than complete competence of available official expertise for prediction, prevention, or control). The contrast between European and American practice is noteworthy. In the United States, provision is often made for the inclusion of alternative expertise via environmental legislation that permits the use of public funds for the incorporation of local citizens' knowledge into the policy discourse on the grounds of due process or fairness.