II. The failure of the UN in Constituting Enforcement Instruments and the Practice of the Security Council of Authorizing Enforcement Action by States
The management by the United Nations of situations of crisis
involving the maintenance of international peace, has been characterized - as
already mentioned - by the fact that the enforcement device considered in Art.
42 ff. of the Charter remained unachieved as a consequence of the Cold War era
confrontation. The great powers, in mistrust of each other, were unable to
conclude the special agreements which, according to Art. 43 of the Charter, were
to make armed forces permanently available to the Security Council. And now too,
notwithstanding the changing reality in the world's political balance, the
fulfilment of the conditions permitting the United Nations, with forces under
its command and control, to take prominent enforcement action against those
responsible for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of
aggression is not foreseeable. As the Secretary-General has recognized in the
Supplement to the Agenda for Peace "neither the Security Council nor the
Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and
control operations for this purpose (enforcement action), except perhaps on a
very limited scale it 8
The consequence of this set of circumstances consists in the
fact that the United Nations, not being in the condition to intervene
effectively in many international and internal conflicts flaring throughout the
world, have in fact left the management of these crisis to the individual
enforcement action of States operating extra organization, in the framework -
you may say - of their traditional and reciprocal interpower relations to which
international humanitarian law of armed conflicts naturally applies.
However, in some cases, the United Nations has divested itself
explicitly of its competence in leading enforcement actions, and has instead
"authorized" member States to undertake enforcement actions by use of force.
Such was the case in Korea, in 1950, when the Security Council, by Resolution
82, recommended that Member States furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea
as may have been necessary to repel the armed attack coming from North Korea and
to restore international peace and security in the area. Such was again the
case, in 1990, when the Security Council, by Resolution 678, acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized a group of member States to undertake an
enforcement action making use of "all necessary means" in response to the
aggression perpetrated against Kuwait, in case Iraq should refuse implementation
of Resolution 660 (1990) ordering its withdrawal from the Kuwaiti territory.
More recently, the Security Council, in situations characterized
by some sort of current, but inadequate presence of United Nations Forces, has
authorized groups of Member States to undertake enforcement action aimed at
certain more specific goals. This is what happened in Somalia, when the Security
Council, referring to Chapter VII, by Resolution 794 (1992) welcomed and
authorized the offer by members States of an action to be taken, by use of all
necessary means, in order to establish as soon as possible a secure environment
for humanitarian relief operations.
Insofar as the case of Rwanda is concerned, the Security
Council, by Resolution 929 (1994), welcomed the offer of member States to
cooperate with the Secretary-General in order to achieve the humanitarian
objectives of the United Nations in that devastated country through the
establishment of a temporary operation under national command and control.
Consequently the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authorized
member States to conduct such operation resorting to all necessary means until
the United Nations Force (UNAMIR) was brought up to the necessary strength.
Again, in the case of Haiti, the Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter, by Resolution 940 (1994), authorized member States
to form a multinational force under unified command and control and to use all
necessary means to facilitate the departure of the military leadership and the
restoration of democracy in Haiti.
Insofar as the situation in former Yugoslavia and especially in
Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, the Security Council, by various - you may say
a burst of - Resolutions once again based on Chapter VII (I may recall numbers
770 (1992),781 (1992),787 (1992),816 (1993),824 (1993), 836 (1993), 844 (1993),
908 (1994) etc.), has authorized Member States, acting nationally or through
regional agreements, to use force in order to ensure compliance with its
measures of embargo and with its ban on military flights m that country's air
space, to support the United Nations Forces in the performance of their mandate,
including defence of personnel who may be under attack, and to deter attacks
against the so called six "safe areas" created in order to guarantee protection
to the civilian population endangered by the ethnic cleansing policy. The Member
States concerned decided to take on those tasks acting under the cover of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover, recently, the Security
Council welcomed the deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina of a British-Dutch-French
rapid reaction force - which includes heavy artillery - fit to undertake an
enforcement action of a military strength which it would have been impossible
for UNPROFOR to express.
It seems obvious and it is generally acknowledged that the
enforcement military actions carried out by States in the aforementioned cases,
outside their national borders and in the territory of a foreign country, while
being "authorized" by the United Nations (and therefore not qualifying as
aggression or illegal use of force), do not differ in any way from traditional
interpower intercourse involving use of armies, which naturally falls in the
field of application - such as widely indicated in the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols - of international humanitarian law and of international law of armed
conflicts as a whole. Furthermore it is a most stable principle that
international law of armed conflicts (ius in bello) applies in equal manner to
all parties involved irrespective of any other consideration, including those
considerations (even if coming from the United Nations) relating to the legality
of the use of force and the objective of the use of force (ius ad bellum). The
acting States are therefore under the duty to strictly implement international
customary rules and those sets of conventional rules which are usually referred
to as "Hague Law" and "Geneva Law" no additional problems seem to arise with
regard to ordinary implementation of international humanitarian law.
I may stress that such a rational solution appears to be
perfectly in tune with the provision now embodied in Art. 2, par. 2 of the
recent 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.
This norm, in defining the Convention's scope of application, establishes that
it "shall not apply to a United Nations operation authorized by Security Council
as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against organized armed
forces and to which the law of international armed conflicts applies".
There is no doubt about the fact that the rule in question -
perhaps somewhat ambiguous in its wording if read in conjunction with the
definitions contained in Art. 1 of the Convention - refers to the already
mentioned enforcement operations conducted directly by third States, whose
action, authorized by the Security Council under the coverage of Chapter VII, is
intended to fill the gap left open by the failure to implement Art. 43. Such
action is clearly carried out not by mutual consent, but against some of the
Parties which have given rise to a situation qualified as a threat to the peace,
a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, in order to force such Parties
and subordinate their political will to the political will of intervening States
and, after all, to the political will of the United
Nations.