![]() | The Global Greenhouse Regime. Who Pays? (UNU, 1993, 382 p.) |
![]() | ![]() | List of contributors |
![]() | ![]() | Preface |
![]() | ![]() | Acknowledgements |
![]() | ![]() | Part I Measuring responsibility |
![]() | ![]() | 1 Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | The greenhouse effect |
![]() | ![]() | What was decided at Rio? |
![]() | ![]() | Protocol negotiating difficulties |
![]() | ![]() | Key issues for climate change negotiations |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 2 The basics of greenhouse gas indices |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Apples and oranges |
![]() | ![]() | Implications |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion: indices do matter |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 3 Assessing emissions: five approaches compared |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Comprehensiveness compared |
![]() | ![]() | Accuracy by category |
![]() | ![]() | Regional and national emissions by source |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix A: Estimates of greenhouse gas emissions |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix B: Calculating cumulative and current emissions |
![]() | ![]() | 4 Who pays (to solve the problem and how much)? |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Indices of allocation: a brief review |
![]() | ![]() | Accountability |
![]() | ![]() | Equity and efficiency |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Part II Resource transfers |
![]() | ![]() | 5 North-South carbon abatement costs |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Climate change convention |
![]() | ![]() | Method overview |
![]() | ![]() | Implications for the South |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | 6 North-South transfer |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Obligation to pay indices |
![]() | ![]() | Redistribution of incremental cost |
![]() | ![]() | Benchmarks |
![]() | ![]() | UN scale of payments |
![]() | ![]() | Financing mechanisms |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | 7 Insuring against sea level rise |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Insurability of losses |
![]() | ![]() | Oil pollution |
![]() | ![]() | Nuclear damage |
![]() | ![]() | Implications |
![]() | ![]() | The insurance scheme proposed by AOSIS |
![]() | ![]() | The Climate Change Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix: Scheme proposed by AOSIS for inclusion in the Climate Change Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Part III National greenhouse gas reduction cost curves |
![]() | ![]() | 8 Integrating ecology and economy in India |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Emissions inventory |
![]() | ![]() | Energy efficiency and fuel substitution |
![]() | ![]() | Emissions and sequestration from forest biomass |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 9 Carbon abatement potential in West Africa |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Long-term energy and carbon emissions scenarios |
![]() | ![]() | Options for rational energy use and carbon conservation |
![]() | ![]() | Economic opportunities for implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Policy issues for the region |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 10 Abatement of carbon dioxide emissions in Brazil |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Brazil energy economy |
![]() | ![]() | Energy subsector analyses |
![]() | ![]() | Changing land-use trends |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 11 Thailand's demand side management initiative: a practical response to global warming |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | End-use energy efficiency policies |
![]() | ![]() | Costs and benefits of the DSM master plan |
![]() | ![]() | CO2 reductions from the DSM Plan |
![]() | ![]() | Why should other developing countries adopt DSM? |
![]() | ![]() | The role of the multilateral development banks |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 12 Carbon abatement in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Energy-environment nexus |
![]() | ![]() | Scenarios for the future |
![]() | ![]() | Country results |
![]() | ![]() | Policy implications |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 13 Greenhouse gas emission abatement in Australia |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Abatement of energy sector emissions |
![]() | ![]() | Economic impact of abatement strategies |
![]() | ![]() | Non-energy emission abatement |
![]() | ![]() | Australia's international role |
![]() | ![]() | Carbon taxes, externalities and other policy instruments |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Part IV Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | 14 Constructing a global greenhouse regime |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Conditionality and additionality |
![]() | ![]() | Technology transfer |
![]() | ![]() | Multi-pronged approach |
![]() | ![]() | Implementation procedures |
![]() | ![]() | Regional building blocks |
![]() | ![]() | North-'South' conflicts |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix: The Climate change convention |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Background |
![]() | ![]() | Climate change convention |
![]() | ![]() | Article 1. Definitions |
![]() | ![]() | Article 2. Objective |
![]() | ![]() | Article 3. Principles |
![]() | ![]() | Article 4 Commitments |
![]() | ![]() | Article 5. Research and systematic observation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 6. Education, training and public awareness |
![]() | ![]() | Article 7. Conference of the Parties |
![]() | ![]() | Article 8. Secretariat |
![]() | ![]() | Article 9. Subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice |
![]() | ![]() | Article 10. Subsidiary Body for implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 11. Financial mechanism |
![]() | ![]() | Article 12. Communication of information related to implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 13. Resolution of questions regarding implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 14. Settlement of disputes |
![]() | ![]() | Article 15. Amendments to the Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Article 16. Adoption and amendment of annexes to the Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Article 17. Protocols |
![]() | ![]() | Article 18. Right to vote |
![]() | ![]() | Article 19. Depositary |
![]() | ![]() | Article 20. Signature |
![]() | ![]() | Article 21. Interim arrangements |
![]() | ![]() | Article 22. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession |
![]() | ![]() | Article 23. Entry into force |
![]() | ![]() | Article 24. Reservations |
![]() | ![]() | Article 25. Withdrawal |
![]() | ![]() | Article 26. Authentic texts |
I conclude that the preceding analysis poses at least seven implications for the ongoing negotiations under the rubric of the Climate Change Convention.
First, it is clear that the consequences of inevitable gradual sea level rise due to climate change induced by global warming will not be insurable on the world's insurance markets. Second, even in the case of the 'abnormal' catastrophic consequences of climate change and sea level rise - floods, inundation, storms, windstorms, hurricanes, tropical cyclones, typhoons insurers already acknowledge that there will be a substantial shortfall in their coverage of losses in the future. Insurers are already forced to decline to insure certain risks in particular areas and increasingly they will be forced to refuse to insure risks in the geographical regions most prone to catastrophic loss. As a result they will have to impose deductibles, limit the total amounts of their liability on individual risks and limit their liabilities in the aggregate.
If as predicted the incidence of catastrophes resulting from the combination of sea level rise, severe storms and storm surges increases substantially, a large proportion of catastrophic losses will be uninsured and indeed uninsurable on the world's insurance markets. The insurance industry recognises that even in the case of catastrophe insurance, government intervention will be necessary.
Third, losses of such magnitude cannot be carried by the governments of those countries most vulnerable to these hazards - the small island and lowlying coastal developing countries. There is a need for an internationally funded insurance pool.
Fourth, the oil pollution and nuclear damage Conventions referred to in this paper provide examples of international insurance pools that have been set up in other contexts. One is funded by the oil industry, the other by States on a basis which takes account of gross national product and nuclear energy capacity.
Fifth, the basis for contribution to an internationally funded insurance pool in the present context, and the criteria to be satisfied in claiming from such a fund, should form part of the negotiations leading to the Climate Change Convention.
Sixth, such an international insurance pool might be funded by the developed countries on a contribution basis related to gross national product and/or greenhouse gas emission levels and/or by the industries of such countries responsible for such emissions.
Finally, the Ministerial Declaration at the Second World Climate Conference recommended, inter alia, that stepped-up financial contributions be provided by developed countries to address the particular problems and needs, including funding, of low-lying coastal and small vulnerable island countries. Such countries must be the principal beneficiaries of an internationally funded insurance pool set up to cover losses resulting from sea level rise and related catastrophic events stemming from climate change.