![]() | The Global Greenhouse Regime. Who Pays? (UNU, 1993, 382 p.) |
![]() | ![]() | List of contributors |
![]() | ![]() | Preface |
![]() | ![]() | Acknowledgements |
![]() | ![]() | Part I Measuring responsibility |
![]() | ![]() | 1 Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | The greenhouse effect |
![]() | ![]() | What was decided at Rio? |
![]() | ![]() | Protocol negotiating difficulties |
![]() | ![]() | Key issues for climate change negotiations |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 2 The basics of greenhouse gas indices |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Apples and oranges |
![]() | ![]() | Implications |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion: indices do matter |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 3 Assessing emissions: five approaches compared |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Comprehensiveness compared |
![]() | ![]() | Accuracy by category |
![]() | ![]() | Regional and national emissions by source |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix A: Estimates of greenhouse gas emissions |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix B: Calculating cumulative and current emissions |
![]() | ![]() | 4 Who pays (to solve the problem and how much)? |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Indices of allocation: a brief review |
![]() | ![]() | Accountability |
![]() | ![]() | Equity and efficiency |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Part II Resource transfers |
![]() | ![]() | 5 North-South carbon abatement costs |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Climate change convention |
![]() | ![]() | Method overview |
![]() | ![]() | Implications for the South |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | 6 North-South transfer |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Obligation to pay indices |
![]() | ![]() | Redistribution of incremental cost |
![]() | ![]() | Benchmarks |
![]() | ![]() | UN scale of payments |
![]() | ![]() | Financing mechanisms |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | 7 Insuring against sea level rise |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Insurability of losses |
![]() | ![]() | Oil pollution |
![]() | ![]() | Nuclear damage |
![]() | ![]() | Implications |
![]() | ![]() | The insurance scheme proposed by AOSIS |
![]() | ![]() | The Climate Change Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix: Scheme proposed by AOSIS for inclusion in the Climate Change Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Part III National greenhouse gas reduction cost curves |
![]() | ![]() | 8 Integrating ecology and economy in India |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Emissions inventory |
![]() | ![]() | Energy efficiency and fuel substitution |
![]() | ![]() | Emissions and sequestration from forest biomass |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 9 Carbon abatement potential in West Africa |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Long-term energy and carbon emissions scenarios |
![]() | ![]() | Options for rational energy use and carbon conservation |
![]() | ![]() | Economic opportunities for implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Policy issues for the region |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 10 Abatement of carbon dioxide emissions in Brazil |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Brazil energy economy |
![]() | ![]() | Energy subsector analyses |
![]() | ![]() | Changing land-use trends |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 11 Thailand's demand side management initiative: a practical response to global warming |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | End-use energy efficiency policies |
![]() | ![]() | Costs and benefits of the DSM master plan |
![]() | ![]() | CO2 reductions from the DSM Plan |
![]() | ![]() | Why should other developing countries adopt DSM? |
![]() | ![]() | The role of the multilateral development banks |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusions |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 12 Carbon abatement in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Energy-environment nexus |
![]() | ![]() | Scenarios for the future |
![]() | ![]() | Country results |
![]() | ![]() | Policy implications |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | 13 Greenhouse gas emission abatement in Australia |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Abatement of energy sector emissions |
![]() | ![]() | Economic impact of abatement strategies |
![]() | ![]() | Non-energy emission abatement |
![]() | ![]() | Australia's international role |
![]() | ![]() | Carbon taxes, externalities and other policy instruments |
![]() | ![]() | References |
![]() | ![]() | Part IV Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | 14 Constructing a global greenhouse regime |
![]() | ![]() | (introduction...) |
![]() | ![]() | Conditionality and additionality |
![]() | ![]() | Technology transfer |
![]() | ![]() | Multi-pronged approach |
![]() | ![]() | Implementation procedures |
![]() | ![]() | Regional building blocks |
![]() | ![]() | North-'South' conflicts |
![]() | ![]() | Conclusion |
![]() | ![]() | Notes and references |
![]() | ![]() | Appendix: The Climate change convention |
![]() | ![]() | Introduction |
![]() | ![]() | Background |
![]() | ![]() | Climate change convention |
![]() | ![]() | Article 1. Definitions |
![]() | ![]() | Article 2. Objective |
![]() | ![]() | Article 3. Principles |
![]() | ![]() | Article 4 Commitments |
![]() | ![]() | Article 5. Research and systematic observation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 6. Education, training and public awareness |
![]() | ![]() | Article 7. Conference of the Parties |
![]() | ![]() | Article 8. Secretariat |
![]() | ![]() | Article 9. Subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice |
![]() | ![]() | Article 10. Subsidiary Body for implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 11. Financial mechanism |
![]() | ![]() | Article 12. Communication of information related to implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 13. Resolution of questions regarding implementation |
![]() | ![]() | Article 14. Settlement of disputes |
![]() | ![]() | Article 15. Amendments to the Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Article 16. Adoption and amendment of annexes to the Convention |
![]() | ![]() | Article 17. Protocols |
![]() | ![]() | Article 18. Right to vote |
![]() | ![]() | Article 19. Depositary |
![]() | ![]() | Article 20. Signature |
![]() | ![]() | Article 21. Interim arrangements |
![]() | ![]() | Article 22. Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession |
![]() | ![]() | Article 23. Entry into force |
![]() | ![]() | Article 24. Reservations |
![]() | ![]() | Article 25. Withdrawal |
![]() | ![]() | Article 26. Authentic texts |
As I noted above, the Insurance Annex proposed by AOSIS remained in the draft Convention text until the last negotiating meeting before it was signed in Rio. At that time, all annexes dealing with matters of substance were removed on the grounds that insufficient time remained to reach agreement on matters of detail before Rio; and the view of some countries (although not the AOSIS countries) that the Convention should not in any event be concerned with detailed mechanisms such as the Insurance Pool.
Nonetheless, the Climate Change Convention signed at Rio did refer to insurance. When it comes into force, the parties are bound by Article 4.8 to give 'furl consideration to what actions are necessary' in regard to insurance to meet the specific needs and concerns of the most vulnerable developing countries. Small island and low-lying coastal states head the list of vulnerable countries. Also, under Article 4.4, the developed country parties are obliged to assist the vulnerable developing country parties to meet the costs of implementing adaptation to those adverse effects. It is precisely to these adaptation costs that the AOSIS insurance proposal is directed.
The AOSIS countries therefore intend to develop the outline insurance proposal into a fully researched, viable insurance scheme and to put it before the parties to the Convention when protocols related to financial issues are negotiated.