Africa in search of institutional revival
by Frans VAN HOEK
From the independence period in the early 1960s until the
mid-1970s, the practicians and theorists of development swore by the theories,
models and concepts of central planning and strong, centralised systems of
government. Africa is still feeling the disastrous consequences of this blind
application of ideas borrowed wholesale from other parts of the world with no
concern for the specific realities of the continent itself.
Then, in the late 1970s, came the invasion of structural
adjustment, with particular emphasis on reducing State involvement, political
and economic liberation reigning supreme and the sacrosanct market economy set
up, in the light of the principle of its comparative advantages. And with this
movement, which was inspired by external forces in many cases, African
politicians and theoreticians woke up to the fact that developing the continent
meant completely changing domestic policies and structures to place the emphasis
on democracy, good governance and participatory development.
So, internal and external factors set the scene for the sudden
awakening of pressure for democracy in Africa today, with a mainly urban
population anxious for a new political order. There has been a severe attack on
the authoritarian regimes which took over most of the African countries with
their single party systems and always attracted strong support at home and
abroad by appearing as the means of overcoming ethnic and religious divisions
and building up the nation. The present call for a complete overhaul of the
organisation of the State and its relations with society can only be applauded
by all those concerned with development. No country can achieve lasting
development unless it has law and order, responsible, accountable leaders, room
for the people to capitalise on their skills and express themselves freely and
the right institutions, and strong ones too.
The importance of this last condition, one often lost sight of
in the past, was brought home by Jacques Attali, Head of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, recently, when he said that 'a democracy without
institutions is anarchy and a market economy without institutions is a Mafia'.
He was probably talking about the situation in Eastern Europe, of course, but,
all things being equal, the golden rule applies to Africa today too. It is now
clear that Africa has to have a new political, economic, social and
institutional framework to manage its development process, but how should it go
about obtaining it? Practical indications as to how to create a new
institutional framework that will be efficient in the context of Africa are
seriously wanting, although the pitfall of transplanting the principles and
institutions of western democracy has always to be avoided. The past provides
ample proof that grafts of this sort are not terribly efficient and more likely
to be actively rejected as foreign bodies. But it is frightening to see just how
little resistance the Africans put up to the idea of importing western models of
democracy, constitutions and electoral procedures. So the present process of
democratisation must be put back into the context of everything the African
heritage has to offer with an attempt to strike a proper balance of tradition
and modernity and native culture and foreign experience to shape genuinely
African systems in which the people can influence the political life of the
nation and the region.
It is as well to beware of the current tendency to assimilate
multi-party systems and democracy found among many of Africa's opposition
parties and in the foreign agencies which are pressing the countries for
reforms. Multiparty systems and competitive elections are neither a democratic
panacea nor adequate guarantee of public affairs being run properly. An
instrument as limited as the multiparty system is not enough to ensure a healthy
political and democratic life. It is worth remembering that 'the single party
system is not dead. It has merely multiplied', as one African commentator said
recently. Rivalry and even violence between the members of different parties are
already a feature of the new African 'democracies'. It is difficult to see how
this can contribute to the vital development of the majority of a population
which is now more concerned with having less repression, less arbitrariness and
better basic services such as education, health and access to credit than with
knowing that party X, Y or Z is in power in the capital.
Rearguard fighting is common, as are attempts by the elite (and
their potential successors, who are not necessarily a new generation of
politicians) to impose the whole process of democratisation and reform or at
least control it from above. This of course does nothing to help arouse or
increase the interest of a large part of the population in public affairs and
there is a risk of seeing democracy operate under a flag of convenience, with
the African governments going through the motions of bowing to pro-democratic
pressure at home and abroad, but failing to make the fundamental change to the
rules of the game which is vital if they are to achieve a democratisation of
conviction.
This, given the complications of managing the process of
transition, will take time to achieve. Three decades of authoritarian regimes
have created a gulf between State and society and there is no point in thinking
that a great national conference or the legalisation of opposition parties will
close it overnight. Developing what Olusegun Obasanjo calls a culture of
democracy means? first and foremost, changing the outlook of both governments
and governed and ensuring that everyone fully accepts the new rules of the game.
So when an author such as Etounga-Manguelle defends the idea
that what Africa needs most for lasting democratisation is cultural adjustment,
he is serious. The proof that the new institutional structures are efficient
will only come when the people involved-and that includes women, young people,
the rural population and the armed forces - manage to agree on the new roles of
State and society and each is in a position to perform the new functions to the
full, which means putting priority on literacy schemes and education at all
levels. It means teaching the new political leaders to perceive the State's and
their own jobs differently. It means teaching civil servants to relearn the
basic principles of State management and having a civil service that actually
serves the people. And it means teaching the non-governmental operators to
organise themselves better, to stop looking upon the State as an enemy and to
see it as a partner in the common war on want and the common campaign for fair
and lasting development. What Samir Amin calls today's canonisation of
non-governmental organisations, as the only worthwhile agents of development,
will not bring the partners in the development process any closer together. It
is foolhardy to imagine that a host of NGOs operating outside a national
political framework would be in a better position to solve Africa's present
development problems.
That leaves two basic questions rarely raised in discussions of
democratisation of Africa:
1) How viable a form of governance is democracy in a situation
of economic and social decline with scant prospects of improvement in the short
term? How conceivable is it to promote both structural adjustment with a high
social cost and greater involvement of civil society in the formulation and
implementation of development policies? The situation in some European countries
suggests that a return to autarky can never be ruled out in conditions of this
sort and that it does not take long for a population to stop believing in
democracy. It can only be hoped that the poor African peasant, who used to
wonder: 'when will all this independence come to an end?' does not soon start
asking: 'what is all this democratisation for?'
2) What part should the
international community, never a neutral partner in the African development
process, play? The international community facilitated, promoted even, the
import of foreign structures and institutions for all the world as if
precolonial Africa had no political, economic and social structures of its own.
It propped up authoritarian regimes, considered to be strategic allies, for
years, and then suddenly swerved to the defence of the democratic cause. If this
is what it really wants, it must also set about creating the conditions that are
vital if Africa is to develop in an ever more interdependent world. This does
not just mean adapting and increasing aid. It also means taking a hard look at
its relations with Africa in terms of trade, debt and the transfer of knowledge
and technolgy. It is of course up to the Africans, above all, to define and set
up their own democratic systems and structures, as indeed it is to get the
process of development off the ground again.
But the international community can no longer be content to be
the onlooker it was, well-intentioned of course, but also ready to impose
conditions which rode roughshod over the realities of Africa and ignored all the
time and money involved in this structural change to the continent. F V
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