5.1 Connecting local and internal conflict
The example of the war between Ethiopia and Somalia over the
Ogaden, mentioned in Chapter 4, indicates how local conflict between
semi-subsistence groups can become linked to wider national conflictsn this
case, between two sovereign states. More frequently, however, local conflict has
been the vehicle through which internal or intra-state conflicts have been
fought. Moreover, in most cases of inter-state wars, one side or the other has
had links with internal forces in the opposing country. Examples of locally
based internal conflict are legion. A few current ones include the enmity
between Arab and Dinka people in Sudan; the Krahn, Mano and Gio configuration in
Liberia (Africa Watch, 26/10/1990); the Isaac, Hawiya and Ogadeni confrontation
in Somalia; the relationship between the MNR opposition and central Shona
speakers in Mozambique (Hall, nd); in Angola, the association between UNITA and
the Ovimbundu (Africa Watch, 1989); and SO on. Other present and past internal
conflicts, in Nigeria, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, and so forth, are
similarly identified and structured. The strong association between local and
internal conflicts is a normal and defining characteristic of modern warfare in
Africa. In the past, commentators have tended to shy away from this fact,
feeling awkward and embarrassed by the spectre of 'tribalism'. In so doing, not
only has conflict not been accorded the policy relevance it clearly has, but its
powerful significance in relation to the current instability of semi-subsistence
has been neglected.
Clearly, the link between local and internal conflict is not a
direct one. Political mediation is a crucial and complex element which pertains
not only to how groups are linked to the state, but also to how they are
subsumed and organised by political factions or rebel groups. In discussing the
break between traditional African warfare and conditions today the idea of an
increasing imbalance and loss of reciprocity has been introduced. So far this
has been discussed only in relation to economic and environmental factors. By
far the greatest source of imbalance, however, is that leap which occurs once
local conflicts become politically integrated into wider internal wars. This
scenario can be seen as beginning with struggle against colonialism and having
continued ever since.
Political imbalance exists at two levels. In the first place,
and often building upon colonial patterns, the material benefits resulting from
the resolution of internal conflicts, such as roads, hospitals and education,
have frequently been disproportionately channelled to those groups allied to the
victorious party. Regional imbalances between core and peripheral groups have
been maintained or created in terms of access to such fruits of development.
Africa's shrinking resource-base has intensified these divisions.
Maintaining or extending such disparities, together with
attempts to redress or resist this process by subordinate groups, has, more
recently, become the source of the other major aspect of political imbalance:
access to modern automatic weapons. Internal conflict has led African
governments to spend staggering amounts of precious hard currency on armaments.
In the case of Sudan, which is by no means untypical, 40 per cent of government
expenditure is currently spent on arms. Such expenditure in otherwise poor
countries has meant that many governments, and opposing groups, have entered
into concessionary relations with superpowers and neighbouring states in order
to secure arms supplies. Local conflicts have become linked to internal wars
which, in turn, are the chess pieces of international rivalry. Once weapons
reach the local context, the ferocious killing power that modern arms embody is
more than sufficient to overwhelm any remaining semblance of balance or
reciprocity that may exist. It is in this context that internal war in Africa
has become synonymous with gross violations of human rights and deliberate
attempts to destroy the assets and way of life of opposing
groups.