4.2. Performance
The distribution of the common problems mentioned is given in Table 24. The
table reveals that permanence of cultivation, organizational shortcomings.
social acceptance, and economic viability are of different magnitude at the
various locations. But it seems that all projects, despite different designs and
sizes of operations, have some problems which could be tackled successfully with
the same kind of strategy. This is certainly true for permanence of cultivation
and the shortcomings of organization. Table 24 shows these problems in most
projects to be serious or most serious. The scale of judgment is of course a
very arbitrary, one; subjective observation dominates objective data, which are
not always sufficient to allow a balanced view. But it is an attempt to
summarize the main critical points of the analysis.
The third common problem, social acceptance. has a mixed rating. On the one
hand, this is due to the special Sudanese situation that vast areas of land are
still available for cultivation. and projects need not necessarily clash with
other vested interests in those regions. Projects could therefore be designed to
fit expectations and resources of particular groups of people, such as
immigrants, local small holders, tenants, absentee farmers. hired labour,
nomads, etc. Each group has a unified social background and project organization
could be adjusted to their specific needs. On the other hand, every time
heterogeneous groups had to be included in one project, serious problems of
acceptance were observed. This was especially true with nomads and their
integration into a settlement scheme. This points to the need of data collection
about the local population's opinions of the project's plans prior to their
implementation. Wherever possible, plans must be prepared with the people, not
for them!
TABLE 24. Range of Common Problems in Eight Development Projects,
Sudan. 1978
| No. | Scheme | Type | Permanence
of Cultivation | Organizational
Shortcomings |
Social
Acceptance | Economic
Viability |
| 3.1 | Simsim Area |
rain-fed | XXX |
X | XX | XX |
| 3.2 |
Khashm el Girba | irrigated | XX | XXX | XX | XX |
| 3.3 | Sag el Na am | irrigated | X | XX | X | XXX |
| 3.4 | Babanusa Area | livestock | X | XXX | XX | X |
| 3.5 | Nuba Mountains | rain-fed | XXX | XX | X | X |
| 3.6 | Gerih el Sarha | livestock | XX | XXX | XXX | X |
| 3.7 | Agadi State Farm | rain-fed | XXX | X | X | XX |
| 3.8 | Dura Schemes | rain-fed | XXX | X | XX | XX |
Note: XXX = very serious problems. XX = serious problems, X = light problems
TABLE 25. Socio-economic Indicators of Selected Projects, Sudan,
1978
| No. | Scheme | Type | Income Generation | Employment | Local People's |
| Private | Public | Creation | Involvement |
| 3.1 | Simsim Area | rain-fed | + | · | + | + |
| 3.2 |
Khashm el Girba | irrigated | + | · | + | |
| 3.3 | Sag el Na'am | irrigated | - | - | - | + |
| 3.4 | Babanusa Area | livestock | | | |
|
| 3.5 | Nuba Mountains | rain-fed | + | - | + | + |
| 3.6 |
Gerih el Sarha | livestock | + | - | - | - |
| 3.7 | Agadi State Farm | rain-fed | . | . | - | . |
| 3.8 | Dura Schemes | rain-fed | - | · | + | + |
Note: + = positive. - = negative. · = not significant
The fourth common problem, economic viability. is listed as serious to light
for most projects. No project can be called economically sound from the private
and the public point of view. The results depend. of course. heavily upon the
evaluation methods used and the definition of social costs. It is equally
difficult to calculate all social benefits to find a balance for each project. A
sufficient economic viability of projects was reached in those cases where
alternative project designs were developed and a selection process among
alternatives could be implemented. This led to a better organizational structure
and facilitated some flexibility in management decisions to improve the economic
performance.
For further analysis, certain socio-economic indicators are worked out and
presented in Table 25. They show the capacity of projects for private and public
income generation as an indicator of the combination of local resources and
additional external capital and labour input.
Employment creation has been added to emphasize the fact that income
generation through economic growth'is fine as long as larger numbers of people
will find productive employment. If economic growth has been accomplished
without increasing the labour input in those regions where labour has been in
surplus. project planning must certainly change to organizational types where
employment creation plays a more decisive role.
Finally, local people's involvement indicates the degree of
"bottom-up" planning and implementation. The difficulties are well
known; the question is whether planners have always tried hard enough to get a
local articulation process started.
4.2.1 Income Generation
The majority of projects show positive results for private income generation.
This apparent profitability of the listed projects is demonstrated by the fact
that most people plan to continue cultivation or ranching at the project site.
There are also enough applicants ready to take over from those who may leave the
schemes (for whatever reason). Large windfall gains during the first years
before soil depletion starts are especially notable.
From the public point of view. the situation looks different. None of the
projects has proved so far that it will be viable without continuous government
support or that all expenses (including loans) can be repaid out of the
generated income. If the government takes into account the environmental
consequences of the projects' activities in arid land regions, the life-span of
the projects may be shortened considerably. For example, for the Simsim Area
Project, the World Bank originally calculated an economic rate of return to the
investment of 17 per cent. Now, however. a major downward adjustment has to be
made due to the fact that fallowing is not practiced and soil exhaustion is
cutting the life-expectation of the project in half. This reduces the economic
rate of return for the government to close to zero.
4.2.2 Employment Creation
Employment creation has lately become a major goal of development policies in
many countries. The Sudan is no exception, as the ILO report Growth. Employment
and Equity pointed out in 1976. The projects observed for the present study are
not necessarily good examples; their employment potential is limited, except for
the irrigated projects. In fact, the mechanized farming schemes are designed to
use very few workers, because labour is usually not freely available in those
remote areas and cultivation and harvesting are only feasible with tractors and
mechanized equipment. In general. in the arid regions of Sudan, the number of
people looking for jobs is quite limited. If employment opportunities are
offered at irrigation schemes, they are mainly seasonal, and comfortable
facilities for housing are usually missing. Employment creation is therefore a
very complex problem, and most projects restrict themselves to the fuller use of
underemployed people of the locality, or they have invited a small number of
settlers to come to a scheme permanently and employ their family labour.
4.2.3 Local People's Involvement
The selected projects show different degrees of participation. Most projects
were planned "topdown" only. People apparently have to be organized
before a project starts to enable them to articulate their needs and their local
experience. A number of projects' problems have certainly something to do with
this point and future projects should avoid such shortcomings. In sparsely
populated areas, the local population's involvement is not an easy task, and the
administrative staff has to be motivated to try again and again to reach the
project's goals. But a project can only survive if the public support is secured
and the management is in line with the people's potential and expectations.
Local people's involvement seems to be especially crucial where changes of the
total life-style of the people are necessary to reach the project goals. It
seems to be significant that a sufficient integration of people into the
structure of the project could be reported very seldom. The interest of most
participants remained passive; full-hearted participation has not been
accomplished. People did not talk about "their" project and they did
not identify themselves with the management's intentions. They felt as if they
were objects of a "government project," not subjects of a development
process. Some reports point to a tendency of the members to oppose management
decisions rather than to participate in a joint decisionmaking process. Where
savings could be accumulated, they were usually not invested in the project, but
used for activities or consumption in other sectors of the economy.
In general, the analysis indicates that local people's involvement has to
become a major concern of future planning or more projects are bound to fail.
One concept of ''integrated rural development"-not planning for the people,
but planning With the people-definitely needs acceptance as a training component
of planners. Training courses for arid land management should therefore devote
equal time to basic knowledge and the techniques of production on the one hand,
and to means of motivating and organizing the active participation of the
population on the
other.
